4 Disarmament and Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan has the responsibility to lead the international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

However, the path toward a world without nuclear weapons has become even more severe. As seen in the situation surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), there exists an apparent divergence of views on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, a divergence that exists not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States but also among non-nuclear-weapon States that are exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and those that are not. In the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States¹⁶ on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races issued on January 3, the five nuclear-weapon States affirmed for the first time that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Regardless of this Joint Statement, amidst Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which started on February 24, Russia has been making the threat to use nuclear weapons, and even the actual use of nuclear weapons is emerging as a real problem. Hence, there are growing concerns that the catastrophe of atomic bombings will be repeated. Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to persistently advance realistic and practical efforts, while bridge-building between states with divergent views, in order to promote nuclear disarmament.

With the aim of realizing a world without nuclear weapons, Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, has proposed the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which is rooted in five actions. This Plan, which Prime Minister Kishida presented himself, represents the first step of a realistic road map which would take us from the “reality” of a harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan has continued to pursue bridge-building between states with divergent views. It has done this, for example, through holding meetings of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), submitting the Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the UN General Assembly, and cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries, including within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as well as individual consultations. Moreover, Japan intends to continue maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime through cumulative efforts including through building up realistic and practical efforts, such as encouraging states to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), promoting education on disarmament and non-proliferation, and further, discussions and exercises with nuclear-weapon States toward the realization of effective nuclear disarmament verification.

The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon State has joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon States. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic and practical measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S.

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• 16 The U.S., Russia, the UK, France, China

A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Japan places great importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NPT Review Conferences have been held once every five years with the aim of achieving the goals of the NPT and ensuring compliance with its provisions, and discussions that reflect the international situation of the time have been held since the NPT entered into force in 1970.

The Tenth NPT Review Conference was held from August 1 to 26 at the UN Headquarters in New York, U.S. (see the Special Feature on page 230).

To ensure that this Conference achieves a meaningful outcome, Japan exerted all efforts prior to the Conference. Independently, Japan held meetings of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament¹⁷ and the Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament.¹⁸ Japan and the U.S. also worked together to issue the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January. Furthermore, as a part of its multilateral efforts, Japan submitted working papers through the NPDI and Stockholm Initiative.¹⁹

At the Conference held in August, Prime Minister Kishida, as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend an NPT Review Conference, delivered a speech at the General Debate session on the first day. In his speech, as the first step of a realistic roadmap which would take us from the “reality” of the harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons, he advocated that the international community should continue to engage in nuclear risk reduction, and proposed the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which is rooted in the following five actions: (1) a shared recognition on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons, (2) enhancing transparency, (3) maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile, (4) securing nuclear non-proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (5) encouraging visits to the affected communities by international leaders and others. Prime Minister Kishida then called upon the States Parties to achieve a meaningful outcome at the Conference.

Japan has continued to make every possible effort. For example, State Minister for Foreign Affairs TAKEI Shunsuke attended the conference at the instruction of Prime Minister Kishida, where he called upon the President of the Conference, Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, and delegations of the respective countries to adopt the outcome document by consensus.²⁰

At the Conference, Russia expressed its objection at the final stage due to the issue surrounding Ukraine, resulting in the Conference's failure to adopt the final document by consensus. Nevertheless, Japan considers it meaningful that a draft final document was created with the support of all States Parties except Russia through serious discussions among them.

As Foreign Minister Hayashi revealed in his statement released after the conclusion of the Conference, for Japan, while it is deeply regrettable that this Conference failed to adopt the final document due to the opposition of one country, Russia, it is a tremendous achievement that many of the ideas and proposals that Japan advocated at the Conference were reflected in the draft final document, and this would provide a basis for the international community to advance realistic discussions on nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, at the Conference, the timing of the next Review Conference and the process leading to it, as well as the establishment of a working group on further strengthening the review process, which Japan had long advocated through the NPDI, were agreed. This demonstrates the will of States Parties to maintain and strengthen the NPT, and Japan appreciates it.

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• 17 A Group launched in 2017 for the aim of making a recommendation to contribute to the substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament. It comprises 17 experts from countries of different positions, including Japan. A total of five meetings have been held up till July 2019, and the concrete outcomes were submitted to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference. In October 2019, the Chair's Report, summarizing discussions at all five meetings of the Group held to date, was published.
• 18 A meeting launched in 2020 with the participation of government officials and private-sector experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of following up with and further developing the outcomes of discussions by the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament.
• 19 The “Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” a group comprising 16 non-nuclear-weapon States that share a common recognition of the nuclear disarmament issue. It was launched by Sweden in 2019.
• 20 Adoption without a vote, but without any statements of dissent or objection

B International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP)

In January, Prime Minister Kishida announced in his Policy Speech to the Diet that the IGEP will serve as an opportunity for participants from nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as those from countries participating and not participating in the TPNW, to exchange ideas and thoughts beyond their respective national positions, with the involvement of former and incumbent political leaders of the world, and engage in candid discussions concerning a concrete path toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.

The first meeting was held on December 10 and 11 in Hiroshima. In addition to three Japanese members including Chair SHIRAISHI Takashi, Chancellor of the Prefectural University of Kumamoto, 10 non-Japanese members from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States also attended the meeting, making 13 members in total to participate in person. The Chairperson of Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, KOIZUMI Takashi, also attended in person, as an “expert from the host city.”

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Takei delivered Prime Minister Kishida's address on his behalf while also delivering the welcoming remarks at the opening session. This was followed by the video messages from political leaders such as former U.S. President Barack Obama, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany, and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, as well as UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Rector of the College of Europe Federica Mogherini (former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission), and former Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A video message from former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa (a member of the IGEP) was also presented as he was unable to attend the meeting in person.

Through the four sessions over the two-day meeting, the IGEP members analyzed the current international situation and the security environment surrounding nuclear disarmament, while also having candid discussions regarding challenges in promoting nuclear disarmament, priorities on the nuclear disarmament front and how to advance future discussions in the IGEP.

To deepen their understanding of the realities of the atomic bombings, the IGEP members attended the talk on the experience of an atomic bombing by Ms. YAHATA Teruko, a victim of an atomic bombing. The members also offered flowers to the Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims and made a visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Finally, at the closing session, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his expectations that the IGEP will further discuss concrete measures to bring the harsh “reality” closer to the “ideal” and formulate useful outcomes with an eye on the next NPT Review Conference.

C The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

The NPDI, a group of 12 non-nuclear-weapon States from various regions established under the leadership of Japan and Australia in 2010 has served as a bridge between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It leads efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through its realistic and practical proposals. In August, Prime Minister Kishida attended the 11th NPDI High-level Meeting held in New York, as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend this NPDI High-level Meeting. A Joint High-level Statement was released after the meeting. This statement strongly deplores that Russia's aggression against Ukraine and escalatory actions seriously undermine global efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including the NPT regime, and expresses NPDI's resolve to remain committed to fostering the sustained, high-level political leadership and diplomatic dialogue needed to strengthen the implementation of the NPT.

The NPDI has actively contributed to the NPT review process through realistic and practical proposals, including the submission of 19 working papers to the Ninth NPT Review process and 18 to the Tenth NPT Review process. In particular, with a view to the Tenth NPT Review Conference, the NPDI submitted a working paper (“Landing-zone Paper”) that proposes the elements that should be incorporated into the final document concerning the three pillars of the NPT─nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the draft final document incorporated many elements proposed by the NPDI in this working paper. Although the Tenth NPT Review Conference failed to adopt the final document, the establishment of a working group on strengthening the review process, which NPDI has consistently been proposing so far, was unanimously agreed.

D Initiatives Through the United Nations (Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons)

Since 1994, Japan has submitted draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. They incorporate issues of the time related to nuclear disarmament with a view to presenting a realistic and concrete nuclear disarmament approach proposed by Japan to the international community. Taking into consideration the discussions at the Tenth NPT Review Conference held in August and recognizing the need to present a way forward for realistic and practical measures to realize a world without nuclear weapons, Japan submitted the 2022 draft resolution, which is based on the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the Conference, with a focus on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons, enhancing transparency as well as disarmament and non-proliferation education that fosters an accurate understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons use. The resolution was adopted with the broad support of 139 countries at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October and of 147 countries at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in December. The states supporting the resolution have divergent views, including nuclear-weapon States such as the U.S., the UK, and France, as well as U.S. allies such as NATO member countries, Australia, the ROK, and the states advocating the TPNW. While other resolutions that comprehensively addressed nuclear disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly in addition to Japan's draft resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan has enjoyed support among a larger number of states. Every year, Japan's resolutions continue to enjoy the broad support of states with divergent views in the international community.

E Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Japan attaches great importance to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic measure of nuclear disarmament where both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States can participate. Japan also continues with diplomatic efforts to call on all countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, including those countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force, to do so.

In his general debate speech at the NPT Review Conference in August, Prime Minister Kishida announced the convening of a first meeting of the CTBT Friends at the leader's level.²¹ This meeting was held during the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly in September and attended by Prime Minister Kishida. In his statement delivered at the opening of the meeting, Prime Minister Kishida, while referring to the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which he had announced at the NPT Review Conference in August, stated that the entry into force of the CTBT would be an important step in advancing the plan, and stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and its early entry into force, as well as the strengthening of the verification system. At the meeting, statements were also presented by Ms. NAKAMITSU Izumi, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the representative of the CTBTO Youth Group, as well as Mr. Sauli Niinistö, President of the Republic of Finland, a member state of CTBT Friends, and, as guest countries, Mr. Azali Assoumani, President of the Union of Comoros, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State of the Vatican, and Ms. Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand. At the end of the meeting, a joint statement of the meeting was adopted.

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• 21 A group established in 2002 by Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands from the perspective of maintaining and boosting momentum toward promoting the entry into force of the CTBT. (Member states are Japan, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, and Germany.) Nine foreign ministers' meetings have been held to date.

F Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty²² (FMCT)

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would have great significance for both disarmament and non-proliferation as it would prevent the emergence of new states possessing nuclear-weapons by banning the production of fissile materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would limit the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. For many years, however, no consensus has been reached on commencing negotiations for the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Consequently, it was decided at the 71st UN General Assembly in December 2016 to establish the FMCT High-Level Experts Preparatory Group, and Japan actively participated in the Group's discussions. Through discussions at the first meeting (August 2017) and second meeting (June 2018), a report was adopted that includes possible options for the outline of a future treaty and contents to consider in negotiations. The report was submitted to the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018. The aforementioned Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons also demands the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, and the declaration or the maintenance of the production moratorium for fissile materials (FM) for use in nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Japan will actively continue to contribute to the discussions on an FMCT.

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• 22 A treaty concept that aims to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile materials (such as enriched uranium and plutonium) that are used as materials to produce nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

G Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan places great importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Specifically, Japan has been actively engaged in efforts to convey the realities of nuclear weapons use to people around the world, through activities such as translating the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, invitations for young diplomats from various countries to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament,²³ providing assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibitions overseas,²⁴ and designating atomic bomb survivors who have given testimonies of their atomic bomb experiences as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.”

At the General Debate of the NPT Review Conference held in August, Prime Minister Kishida announced that Japan would contribute 10 million US dollars to the UN for the establishment of the “Youth Leader Fund for a World Without Nuclear Weapons.” The goal of this program is to create a global network of future generations with the shared goal toward the elimination of nuclear weapons by bringing future leaders such as young policymakers and researchers from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to Japan to learn firsthand the realities of nuclear weapons use. At the same Conference, Japan also delivered a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education that emphasizes the importance of such education. This statement received support from a record high of 89 countries and regions (including Japan).

Additionally, as the atomic bomb survivors are aging, it is becoming increasingly important to pass on the realities of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings across generations and borders. To this end, from 2013 to 2022, Japan conferred the designation of “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” for more than 500 youths in Japan and overseas.

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• 23 Implemented since 1983 by the UN to nurture nuclear disarmament experts. Program participants are invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to promote understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons use through such means as museum tours and talks by victims about their experiences in the atomic bombings.
• 24 Opened as a permanent exhibition about the atomic bomb in New York, U.S.; Geneva, Switzerland; and Vienna, Austria, in cooperation with Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.

H Initiatives Toward Future Arms Control

In the area of nuclear disarmament, in addition to initiatives through multilateral frameworks such as the NPT, the U.S. and Russia have also concluded and maintained a bilateral arms control treaty. On February 3, 2021, the two countries agreed on an extension to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The New START Treaty demonstrates important progress in nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia, and Japan welcomed this extension. However, in August 2022, Russia announced to exempt all its facilities from inspection activities temporarily. In November, Russia also notified the U.S. to postponing the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) scheduled for the same month. In January 2023, the U.S. Department of State submitted a report to Congress stating that Russia cannot be certified as being in compliance with the New START Treaty. In February of the same year, President Putin announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly the suspension of the New START. In light of these developments, at the G7 Leaders' Video Conference on February 24, Prime Minister Kishida referred to President Putin's announcement to suspend the implementation in the New START Treaty, and expressed Japan's serious concern about Russia's behavior from the perspective of both achieving a world without nuclear weapons and ensuring security.

Moreover, in view of the recent situations surrounding nuclear weapons, it is important to establish a new arms control framework that involves not only the U.S. and Russia but other countries and covers a wider range of weapon systems. From this perspective, Japan has been explaining this issue to the relevant countries at various levels. For example, the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) issued on January 21, 2022 and the Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders' Statement issued on May 23 noted China's ongoing increase in its nuclear capabilities, and requested China to contribute to arrangements that reduce nuclear risks, increase transparency, and advance nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Resolution of the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons also reaffirms the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to initiate arms control dialogues on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing.

(2) Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security

A Japan's Efforts Toward Non-proliferation

To ensure Japan's security and to maintain peace and security of the international community, Japan has been making efforts concerning non-proliferation policy. The goal of such a policy is to prevent the proliferation of weapons that could threaten Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and biological/chemical weapons, as well as missiles with the ability to deliver those weapons and conventional weapons) and of related materials and technologies used to develop such weapons. In today's international community, economic growth in emerging countries has enabled a growing capacity to produce and supply weapons in those countries as well as materials that could be diverted to the development of such weapons. Meanwhile, methods for procuring these materials are becoming more sophisticated, due in part to increasing complexity in means of distribution. Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies is spurring a growing potential for private sector technologies to be diverted to uses for military purposes, and increasing the proliferation risk of weapons that could pose a threat and of related materials and technologies. Under these circumstances, Japan has been implementing its non-proliferation policies, focusing on maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes and rules, taking appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and promoting close coordination with and capacity building support for other nations.

Japan's three main measures of preventing proliferation are (1) IAEA safeguards, (2) export control, and (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Safeguards refer to verification activities conducted in accordance with safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and aim to ensure that nuclear energy will not be diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors,²⁵ Japan has made various efforts, including supporting the IAEA. For example, based on the view that the IAEA safeguards are at the core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Japan enhances the understanding and implementation capabilities of safeguards of other countries, and encourages other countries to conclude the Additional Protocol (AP)²⁶ to the IAEA safeguards agreements.

Japan participates actively in regional and international efforts to strengthen safeguards. For example, the 13th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), which aims to strengthen safeguards in the Asia-Pacific region, was held in Viet Nam in December, and Japan led discussions on efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through capacity building and other means, and the implementation status of domestic safeguards, among other topics.

In May, following on from February 2020, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi was invited to Japan as a guest of MOFA. Through his courtesy call to Prime Minister Kishida and meeting with Foreign Minister Hayashi during the visit, Japan and the IAEA affirmed that they would further advance cooperation on the non-proliferation issues such as the ones related to North Korea and Iran, the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and other matters. Japan also took the opportunity to announce that it will provide a total of 2 million Euros toward the provision of related equipment and the dispatch of IAEA experts, as a part of its efforts to support Ukraine through the IAEA.

Japan provides utmost support at the IAEA General Conference, Board of Governors meetings, and other fora to Director General Grossi, who has extensive knowledge and experience, while continuing to work with other member countries to strengthen the role of the IAEA.

Export control is a useful measure in the so-called supply-side regulation toward countries of proliferation concern, terrorist organizations, and other entities attempting to acquire or distribute weapons or related materials or technologies. There are currently four export control frameworks (international export control regimes) in the international community. Japan has participated in all of them since their inception, engaging in international coordination and practicing strict export control. Each of the four regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons, the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missiles,²⁷ and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for conventional weapons, establishes a list of dual-use items and technologies which contribute to weapons development. To ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, participating countries to the regimes implement export control measures on the listed items and technologies in accordance with their domestic laws. The international export control regimes also exchange information concerning trends in countries of proliferation concern and are engaged in outreach activities to non-participating countries to the regimes in order to strengthen their export control. Japan actively engages in such international rule-making and application of rules. In addition, from the perspective of international contributions in nuclear non-proliferation, the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna serves as the Point of Contact of the NSG.

Furthermore, Japan seeks to complement the activities of the international export control regimes by actively participating in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).²⁸ Through efforts such as hosting the maritime interdiction exercise “Pacific Shield 18”²⁹ in July 2018, Japan works to enhance coordination among countries and concerned institutions. In August 2022, Japan participated in an exercise hosted by the U.S.

Japan also holds the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)³⁰ and the Asian Export Control Seminar³¹ every year in order to promote a better understanding of the non-proliferation regimes and strengthen regional efforts, mainly in Asian countries.

Furthermore, with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540,³² which was adopted in 2004 with the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (missiles) to non-state actors, Japan contributes to maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation frameworks through Japan's contributions to support the implementation of the resolution by Asian nations.

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• 25 13 countries are designated by the IAEA Board of Governors. The designated member states include Japan and other G7 countries with advanced nuclear energy capabilities.
• 26 In addition to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that is applied on all nuclear materials pertaining to the peaceful nuclear activities in that country, and that non-nuclear-weapon NPT States Parties are required to conclude with the IAEA pursuant to Article III Paragraph 1 of the NPT, an Additional Protocol is concluded between the IAEA and the respective States Parties. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol expands the scope of nuclear activity information that should be declared to the IAEA, and gives the IAEA strengthened measures to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As of December 2022, 140 countries have concluded the Additional Protocol.
• 27 Apart from export control regimes, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which includes the principle of exercising restraint in their development and deployment, addresses the issue of ballistic missiles. As of December 2022, 143 countries have subscribed to the HCOC.
• 28 An initiative launched in 2003 for the purpose of implementing and considering possible measures consistent with relevant international laws and national legal authorities in order to interdict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, along with related materials. 107 countries participate in and support the PSI as of December 2022. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and the U.S. have agreed to conduct a yearly rotation exercise in the Asia-Pacific region since 2014. Through the cooperation of agencies including MOFA, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance, the Japan Coast Guard and the Ministry of Defense, Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises in 2004, 2007, and 2018, PSI air interdiction exercises in 2012, and an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in 2010. Japan has also actively participated in training and related meetings hosted by other countries.
• 29 Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the U.S. contributed assets and personnel to the exercise, which was held in Yokosuka City, in the sea and airspace off the Boso Peninsula, and in the airspace off the Izu Peninsula, and 19 countries from the Indo-Pacific region and other countries sent observers.
• 30 A multilateral Director-General-level meeting launched in 2003 and hosted by Japan to discuss various issues related to the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime in Asia among the 10 ASEAN Member States, China, India, the ROK, as well as the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and the EU, which have common interests in Asian regional security. Most recently, the 16th meeting was held online in December 2020, and discussions were held on topics such as North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and the strengthening of export control.
• 31 A seminar hosted by Japan to exchange views and information toward strengthening export controls in Asia, with the participation of export control officials from Asian countries and regions. It has been organized annually in Tokyo since 1993.
• 32 Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all countries to: (1) refrain from providing support to terrorists and other non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction; (2) adopt and enforce laws prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors; and (3) implement domestic controls (protective measures, border control, export controls, etc.) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also establishes, under the UN Security Council, the 1540 Committee, which comprises Security Council members and has a mandate to review and report to the Security Council the level of resolution 1540 implementation by member states.

B Regional Non-proliferation Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

In 2022, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 31 times (at least 59 launches) with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners, including missiles that flew over Japan and ICBM-class ballistic missiles. The series of actions by North Korea, including the ballistic missile launches that exacerbate the situation, constitutes a grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security and poses a clear and serious challenge to the international community. It is totally unacceptable. The IAEA Director General's report in September pointed out that North Korea's nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern, and that the reopening of the tunnel at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri is deeply troubling. It also stated that the continuation of North Korea's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. Moreover, at the IAEA General Conference convened in the same month, a resolution based on the report was adopted by consensus, demonstrating the united position of IAEA member states toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Japan, too, took opportunities such as the NPT Review Conference in August and the IAEA General Conference in September to proactively convey to the international community the importance of addressing North Korea's nuclear issue. Regardless of such efforts by the international community, North Korea has continued to repeatedly launch ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners thereafter.

It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner by North Korea. To that end, Japan will continue to coordinate closely with related countries, including the U.S. and the ROK, as well as international organizations such as the UN and the IAEA. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will work on capacity building for export control particularly in Asia. Japan will also continue to contribute actively to discussions on North Korea's nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.

Since the withdrawal of the previous U.S. administration under President Trump from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)³³ in 2018, Iran has continued actions to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA. In January 2020, Iran announced that it would not be bound by the limit on the enrichment of uranium set forth in the JCPOA. Since the start of 2021, it has produced 20% enriched uranium in January, suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA including the Additional Protocol (AP) in February, and produced 60% enriched uranium in April. In August 2021, it was confirmed that Iran had produced uranium metal enriched at up to 20%.

Japan has consistently supported the JCPOA, which contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and is paying close attention to the efforts by relevant countries toward the return of both the U.S. and Iran to the JCPOA. Japan, being deeply concerned about Iran's continued reduction of its commitments under the JCPOA, has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from further measures that may undermine the JCPOA and to return fully to its commitments under the JCPOA.

In March, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Iran to discuss these issues related to the implementation of the JCPOA and the series of safeguards issues (in which nuclear materials that had not been declared to the IAEA were found in Iran). The two sides issued a joint statement setting out the measures that should be taken toward the resolution of the safeguards issues by the meeting of the Board of Governors in June. However, the IAEA Director General's report issued at the end of May clearly stated that the issues remain unresolved as Iran had not provided the required technical explanations. In view of this situation, a resolution was adopted at the Board of Governors' meeting in June requesting from Iran an immediate response to the IAEA Director General's call to resolve the issues. Furthermore, a resolution was also adopted at the Board of Governors' meeting in November that set out a decision on the concrete actions that Iran should take toward resolving the issues, and requested for the Director General to issue a report on the matter by March 2023. Japan has consistently been supporting the IAEA's efforts with regard to Iran, and will continue to call strongly on Iran to cooperate completely with the IAEA. Japan will also continue to contribute to discussions related to Iran's nuclear and missile activities in the international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.

As for Syria, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 found that activities such as Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor would constitute non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To address this outstanding issue, Japan is calling upon Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. It is important for Syria to sign, ratify and implement the AP. Similarly, at the NPT Review Conference held in August 2022, Japan participated in the joint statement on Syria's non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. This statement mentioned the IAEA's assessment pointing out the comparability between Syria's domestic nuclear facilities and facilities in North Korea.

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• 33 Sets forth detailed procedures for imposing constraints on Iran's nuclear activities while ensuring that they serve peaceful purposes, and for lifting the imposed sanctions.
  <Main measures undertaken by Iran>
  ● Constraints on enriched uranium-related activities
  ・Limit on the number of centrifuges in operation to 5,060 units
  ・Upper limit on enriched uranium at 3.67%, and limit on the amount of stored enriched uranium at 300 kg, etc.
  ● Constraints on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor, and reprocessing
  ・Redesign / remodeling of the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor so that it is not able to produce weapon-grade plutonium and to transfer spent fuel out of the country
  ・No reprocessing including for research purposes, no construction of reprocessing facilities, etc.

C Nuclear Security

International cooperation is advancing in nuclear security to prevent acts of terrorism such as those involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These include the entering into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2007 and of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2015 respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit was held four times between 2010 and 2016. Japan has actively participated in and contributed to these efforts. For example, at the International Conference on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in 2020, State Minister for Foreign Affairs WAKAMIYA Kenji participated in the ministerial conference as a representative of the Government of Japan and delivered a speech to share the view of Japan with other participants.

In Vienna in March 2022, the first Conference of the Parties since the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was held, and the validity and implementation status of the Convention were verified. Japan expressed that it would continue to support the IAEA in the areas of human resources development and technological development going forward, as well as contribute to strengthening international nuclear security.

On March 2 and 3, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors convened an emergency meeting in Vienna to discuss the implications of Russia's aggression against Ukraine on nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. At the meeting, participating countries condemned and expressed their concerns regarding Russia's attacks on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine from the perspective of nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. The resolution adopted by a majority at the meeting deplores Russia's actions in Ukraine, which are posing serious and direct threats to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and civilian personnel. It also calls upon Russia to immediately cease all actions in order for Ukraine to preserve or promptly regain full control over nuclear facilities. Resolutions were also adopted by a majority at the Board of Governors' meeting in September and November. These resolutions express grave concern that Russia has not heeded the call of the Board to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, and call on Russia to enable the Ukrainian authorities to regain full control over the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant to ensure its safe and secure operation, as well as to enable the IAEA to fully and safely conduct its safeguards verification activities. Furthermore, they also incorporate support for the efforts by the IAEA Director General and others to address the implications for the nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine, through means such as the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) and the continuous presence of the IAEA staff at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Japan also strongly condemns Russia's aggression including its seizure of nuclear facilities, and will continue to support the IAEA's efforts for ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine.

(3) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A Multilateral Efforts

Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the treaty, it is the “inalienable right” for any country that meets its obligations to non-proliferation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reflecting the increase in international energy demand, many countries use or are planning to use nuclear power.³⁴

On the other hand, these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes, and a nuclear accident in one country may have significant impacts on neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”;³⁵ that is, (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety (e.g., measures to ensure safety to prevent nuclear accidents), and (3) Nuclear Security. As the country that experienced the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, it is Japan's responsibility to share its experiences and lessons learned from the accident with other countries and to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety. In this regard, in 2013, the IAEA, in collaboration with Japan, designated the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC) in Fukushima Prefecture. By December 2022, they had conducted 26 workshops for Japanese and foreign officials to strengthen their capacity in the field of emergency preparedness and response.

The difficult work of decommissioning, contaminated water management, decontamination and environmental remediation has been progressing steadily at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station by leveraging the collective technologies and knowledge of the world, and in cooperation with the IAEA, the expert organization in the field of nuclear energy. The Government of Japan announced its Basic Policy on the handling of the ALPS treated water³⁶ in April 2021, and signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS treated Water with the IAEA in July. Under this TOR, Japan is cooperating with the IAEA to implement the IAEA reviews on the safety and regulatory aspects of ALPS treated water. In May 2022, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Japan, during which he visited TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and stated that the IAEA could confirm that the discharge of treated water into the Pacific Ocean would be carried out in full compliance with international standards, and that the discharge does not have any adverse impact on the environment. Furthermore, safety and regulatory reviews (assessments) by third-parties, including international experts selected by the IAEA, were conducted in February and March, and the IAEA published the respective reports in April and June. The second safety review was conducted in November, after which IAEA Director General Grossi stated that points raised by the task force in the first mission in February 2022 have been fully reviewed and reflected through revisions to Japan's plans. The IAEA is scheduled to continue conducting reviews going forward.

In July, Dr. Gillian Hirth, former Chair of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and Ms. Borislava Batandjieva-Metcalf, Secretary of UNSCEAR, and their delegation visited Japan. During the visit, they exchanged opinions with the Government of Japan, local residents, and other stakeholders on the UNSCEAR 2020/2021 Report published in March 2021 as a revised edition of the report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The report concluded that “no adverse health effects among Fukushima residents have been documented that could be directly attributed to radiation exposure from the accident.”

In order to make progress in the decommissioning works and in recovery with the support and correct understanding of the international community, the Government of Japan periodically releases comprehensive reports through the IAEA that cover matters such as progress in decommissioning and contaminated water management at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, results of the monitoring of air dose rate and seawater radioactivity concentration, and food safety. In addition, Japan submits reports on the current situation to the relevant organizations, including Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo, and to the IAEA basically every month. Furthermore, Japan has organized more than 100 briefing sessions to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo since the accident (held in February, March, May, June, July, and November in 2022), and provided information through Japanese diplomatic missions overseas.

The Government of Japan continues to provide information thoroughly to the international community in a transparent manner, based on scientific evidence, and to provide highly transparent explanations for claims that may encourage reputational damage.

Nuclear energy is applied not only to the field of power generation, but also to other areas including human health, food and agriculture, environment, and industrial uses. Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such non-power applications and contributing to development issues are becoming increasingly important as developing countries make up the majority of NPT States Parties. The IAEA also contributes to technical cooperation for developing countries and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In this context, Japan has been actively supporting the IAEA's activities, with its technical cooperation based on the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and with its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In FY2021, Japan contributed toward projects to address the problem of marine plastic pollution, and in FY2022, toward radiation cancer treatment projects, among others.

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• 34 According to the IAEA, as of January 2023, 423 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 56 reactors are under construction.
• 35 “3S” is used to refer to the IAEA's efforts toward nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards, which are typical measures for non-proliferation.
• 36 “ALPS treated water” refers to water purified using multiple purification systems, including Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS), to ensure that the level of radioactive substances in the water (except for tritium) are below the regulatory standards for safety. Furthermore, it is assumed that the ALPS treated water is adequately diluted thereafter to reduce its concentration of radioactive substances, including tritium, to significantly below the level of regulatory standards for safety, before it is discharged into the sea.

B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to establish a legal framework required for securing a legal assurance from the recipient country on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear-related material and equipment that are transferred between the two countries, so as to realize cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the two countries. Under such bilateral agreements, cooperation in areas such as the strengthening of nuclear safety can be promoted. Japan makes its decision on whether or not to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with another country taking into account a wide range of factors such as non-proliferation efforts and nuclear energy policy of that country, its trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries among others. As of October 2022, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 14 countries and one organization, which in order of entry into force of the agreement are: Canada, France, Australia, China, the U.S., the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India.

(4) Biological and Chemical Weapons

A Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)³⁷ is the only multilateral legal framework, comprehensively prohibiting the development, production and possession of biological weapons. However, how to reinforce the Convention is a challenge as there are neither provisions governing means of verification of compliance with the BWC nor an implementing organization for the Convention.

Since 2006, decisions have been made to establish the Implementation Support Unit (fulfilling the functions of a Secretariat) and to hold intersessional meetings twice a year in between the Review Conferences held every five years. During this time, progress has been made with respect to initiatives aimed at strengthening the BWC regime.

At the 9th Review Conference of the BWC held in Geneva from November 28 to December 16, 2022, the final report, which included the establishment of a working group to discuss measures for strengthening the BWC, was adopted by consensus.

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• 37 Entered into force in March 1975. Total number of States Parties is 184 (as of December 2022).

B Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)³⁸ comprehensively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance is ensured through a verification system consisting of declarations and inspections, making this Convention a groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. Its extensive efforts toward the realization of a world without chemical weapons were highly acclaimed, and the Organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Japan, which has a highly developed chemicals industry and numerous chemicals factories, also accepts numerous OPCW inspections. Japan also actively cooperates with the OPCW in many other concrete ways, including measures to increase the number of member states and strengthening national implementation measures by States Parties with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention. Moreover, under the CWC, Japan aims to complete, as soon as possible, the destruction of chemical weapons of the former Japanese Army abandoned in Chinese territory by working in cooperation with China.

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• 38 Entered into force in April 1997. Total number of States Parties is 193 (as of December 2022).

(5) Conventional Weapons

Conventional weapons generally refer to arms other than weapons of mass destruction and include a wide variety of weapons ranging from landmines, tanks, and artillery to small arms and light weapons such as handguns. The problem of conventional weapons, which are used in actual wars and cause injury and death to civilians, is serious in light of both national security and humanitarian concerns. The disarmament agenda presented in 2018 by UN Secretary-General Guterres categorizes disarmament of conventional weapons as one of the three pillars, “Disarmament that Saves Lives.” Japan is making active efforts involving cooperation and support based on international standards and principles concerning conventional weapons.

A Small Arms and Light Weapons

Described as “the real weapons of mass destruction” due to the many human lives they take, small arms and light weapons continue to proliferate due to the ease with which they can be obtained and used. They contribute to conflict prolongation and escalation, hindering the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 1995, Japan has been working with other countries to submit a resolution on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons to the UN General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year. In areas around the world, Japan has also provided support for projects to address the issue of small arms and light weapons, including training and the collection and destruction of weapons. In 2019, Japan contributed two million US dollars to a mechanism for preventing small arms established under UN Secretary-General Guterres' disarmament agenda, and in 2022, through this mechanism, projects on small arms and light weapons were launched in Cameroon, Jamaica, and South Sudan.

B The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)³⁹

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to establish common standards to regulate international trade in and prevent the illicit trade of conventional arms, entered into force in December 2014. As one of the original co-authors of the UN General Assembly resolution that initiated a consideration of the treaty, Japan has taken the lead in discussions and negotiations in the UN and contributed significantly to the establishment of the treaty. Even after the treaty entered into force, Japan has actively participated in discussions at Conferences of States Parties and other opportunities. Japan has continued to contribute in ways such as hosting the 4th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in Tokyo as the first chair country elected from the Asia-Pacific region in August 2018. Japan also places importance on the universal application of the ATT. To that end, it has been encouraging countries, in particular Asian countries, to participate in the ATT.

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• 39 As of December 2022, there are 112 states and regions that are parties to the ATT. Japan signed the Treaty on the day that it was released for signing and became a State Party in May 2014.

C Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW)⁴⁰

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. It comprises a framework convention that sets forth procedural and other matters, as well as five annexed protocols that regulate individual conventional arms. The framework convention entered into force in 1983. Japan has ratified the framework convention and annexed Protocols I to IV, including the amended Protocol II. Prompted by concerns in the international community about the rapidly advancing military applications of science and technology, meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been held under the CCW framework since 2017. In 2019, the Group formulated 11 guiding principles on LAWS, which were officially approved at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW held in November the same year. Japan has continued to contribute actively and constructively to such discussions on international rule-making. At the GGE held in March 2022, Japan submitted a proposal on “Principles and Good Practices on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” jointly with the U.S., the UK, Australia, Canada, and the ROK. Many working papers were also submitted by other countries, and the parties engaged in active discussions at the GGE convened in March and July as well as the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW convened in November.

Concerning Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), which has been discussed at the CCW and other fora, a political declaration was drawn up in 2022 by countries sharing the same concern under the leadership of Ireland. Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs YOSHIKAWA Yuumi attended the adoption ceremony for the declaration held in November and delivered a statement.

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• 40 As of December 2022, 126 countries and regions are parties to the CCW.

D Anti-Personnel Mines

Since the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)⁴¹ in 1998, Japan has continued to promote comprehensive measures with a focus on the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of support for mine-affected countries. Along with calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention, Japan has also been steadily engaged in international cooperation through landmine clearance, victim assistance and other activities in the international community, from the viewpoint of the “Humanitarian- Development-Peace Nexus.”

At the 20th Meeting of the States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty held in Geneva in November, Japan presented its initiatives and achievements in supporting mine action, and also expressed its continued resolve toward playing an active role in achieving a mine-free world. As the Chair of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance of the Treaty, Japan also put every effort into promoting international assistance toward mine-affected countries.

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• 41 The Convention, which entered into force in March 1999, bans the use and production of anti-personnel mines while mandating the destruction of stockpiled mines and the clearance of buried mines. As of December 2022, there are 164 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.

E Cluster Munitions⁴²

The international community takes seriously the humanitarian consequences brought about by cluster munitions. Japan is therefore taking steps to address this issue via victim assistance and unexploded ordnance clearance.⁴³ Japan is also continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).⁴⁴ At the 10th Meeting of States Parties to the CCM held in August 2022, Japan participated in discussions concerning these issues and shared its proactive efforts.

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• 42 Generally speaking, it refers to bombs or shells in the form of large containers that open midair and release submunitions that spread over a wide area. They are said to be highly likely to not explode on impact, leading to the problem of civilians being accidentally killed or injured.
• 43 See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts on international cooperation regarding cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines.
• 44 Entered into force in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while mandating the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions. There are 110 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan (as of December 31, 2022).