The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
September 2011
[Overview]
The security environment in the regions surrounding Japan has been rapidly becoming more challenging in recent years, with such factors as nuclear and ballistic missile development, and a series of provocations by North Korea, including the South Korean patrol ship sinking incident and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island as well as China's military build-up. Under such conditions, the presence of the United States Forces under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is becoming increasingly important for the peace and stability of Japan and surrounding regions.
The year 2010 was a milestone marking the 50th year since the concluding of the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and the Japan-U.S. Foreign Ministerial Meeting in January of that year kicked off a deliberation process by both Japan and the United States to deepen their alliance. The process entailed sharing the recognition of the regional security environment and the promotion of Japan-U.S. security cooperation in a broad range of areas: global commons (such as maritime security, outer space and cyber space), extended deterrence,* missile defense, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting held in June 2011 (hereinafter, the "2+2 Meeting"), to summarize the results of the process of deepening the alliance in the area of security and defense, the two countries issued a joint statement on such matters as the review and revalidation of the Alliance's Common Strategic Objectives of 2005 and 2007 based on the increasingly uncertain security environment in Japan and the region, the deepening and expansion of Japan-U.S. cooperation on security and defense, the supplementation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of 2006 (hereinafter, the "Roadmap"), and confirmation of steady implementation of it and the strengthening of the ability of Japan and the United States to respond to diverse situations based on the experience of the Japan-U.S. joint response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident.
Note: "Extended deterrence" refers to the concept of a country providing deterrence through its own military force for its ally in order to defend the ally from an attack by a third country.
Reference1:Japan-US Consultations on Security Issues(as of September 2011)[PDF]
[Realignment of U.S. Forces Posture in Japan]
Since the end of the Cold War, new threats have become prominent in the world, including international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. To deal with these challenges in such a new security environment, the United States is utilizing its development of military technologies and reviewing its military's posture around the world to achieve higher mobility, and coordinate closely with its allies, including Japan and friendly countries.
In this context, in May 2006, Japan and the United States announced a plan (the Roadmap) to implement concrete measures of realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan, and in February 2009 the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, followed by the conclusion of the agreement in May. Concerning a replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement of the 2+2 Meeting in May 2010, confirming their intent to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters. Following up to this, the consideration of the location, configuration and construction method of the replacement facility for the Futenma Air Station was carried out by a bilateral experts study group on the facility, and the experts' report was released on August 31 [PDF] . By the June 2011 2+2 Meeting, verification and validation on the relocation plan for the Futenma Air Station was completed (the runway was resolved to be V-shaped), and steady implementation of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam was reconfirmed, and, although the two countries agreed to revise the previously targeted time of 2014 for the completion of the Futenma replacement and Guam relocation, confirmed that the projects should be completed at the earliest possible date after 2014 to avoid the indefinite use of the Futenma Air Station and that the two governments should make progress to reduce the local impact. The Japanese government intends to proceed firmly in line with these Japan-U.S. agreements, giving wholehearted explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and seeking their understanding.
Reference2:Realignment of USFJ[PDF]
[Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)]
The BMD system is a purely defensive capability for protecting the life and property of the citizens of Japan from ballistic missile attacks, and it is the only such measure with no alternatives available. In light of North Korea's actions, such as ballistic missile launches (July 2006, April 2009, July 2009) and nuclear weapons tests (October 2006, May 2009), it is imperative that the Japanese government further improve its deterrence capabilities and enhance reliability of such mechanisms under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, by strengthening and accelerating BMD cooperation with the United States.
Since the resolution to introduce the BMD system in December 2003, the Japanese government has worked steadily to develop the system. Japan-U.S. cooperation on BMD system capabilities has been advancing in areas that include (1) strengthening cooperation in BMD operation, including sharing information on BMD operation and others, directly, mutually, in real time, and at all times, (2) deploying and operating long-range surveillance radars (X-band radars) and Patriot (PAC-3) missiles, and (3) continuous strengthening of the defense capabilities of missile interceptors (SM-3) loaded on Aegis destroyers. Moreover, Japan has taken its own initiative in the successive deployment of PAC-3, starting at its Iruma Air Base in 2007 and followed by deployment at other sites, and succeeded in its launch test in September 2008. Japan performed a launch test for the SM-3 as well in December 2007 by the Aegis destroyer Kongo, which represents Japan's first missile interception capabilities. After subsequent tests by the Chokai in 2008 and the Myoko in 2009, Japan succeeded in a launch test by the Aegis destroyer Kirishima in October 2010. At the 2+2 Meeting in June 2011, regarding the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development between Japan and the United States, it was resolved that future issues would be considered in preparation for transition to a production and deployment phase, and agreed that transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA to a third country may be allowed in cases where the transfer supportsthe national security and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third country has sufficient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA.
Reference3:BMD Architecture and ConceptBMD Architecture and Concept of Operationof Operation[PDF]
[Host Nation Support (HNS)]
From the standpoint that it is important to ensure smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as the security situation surrounding Japan becomes more and more severe, the Japanese government bears the rent for U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the Facility Improvement Program (FIP) funding within the scope of the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement. Under special measures agreements, Japan bears labor costs, utility costs, and training relocation costs for U.S. Forces in Japan.
Both the governments of Japan and the United States conducted a comprehensive review on HNS to make it more stable, efficient, and effective, and the governments signed a new Special Measures Agreement on January 21, 2011. The effective period of this new Special Measures Agreement is five years, and the agreement specifies that (1) concerning the labor costs, the Upper Limit of the Number of Workers Japan funds is to be incrementally reduced from 23,055 to 22,625 during the period of the agreement, (2) the amount Japan is to bear for utilities each fiscal year shall be capped at \24.9 billion, with the percentage of the expenses being born by Japan reduced incrementally from 76% to 72% of annual utilities costs during the five years, (3) costs for training relocation to territory under the administration of the United States of America, such as Guam, are newly covered, and (4) the United States will make further efforts to economize on these expenses.
Furthermore, the amount of reduction of labor and utilities costs will be added to FIP funding. Therefore the overall level of the HNS is to be maintained at the FY2010 level (bearing in mind the budget of 188.1 billion yen for JFY2010) over the five years starting from FY2011.
Reference4:USFJ-related Costs borne by Japan(JFY 2011 Budget)[PDF]
[Various Issues Related to U.S. Military Presence in Japan]
To ensure smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important to reduce the impact that the activities of the U.S. Forces in Japan have on the surrounding residents and maintain the understanding and support of the residents regarding the presence of U.S. Forces. In particular, the importance of promoting reduction of the impact on Okinawa Prefecture, where U.S. Forces facilities and areas are concentrated, has been confirmed mutually by Japan and the United States on numerous occasions, including Japan-U.S. summits and Japan-U.S. foreign ministerial meetings.
The Japanese government continues to work steadily to implement the final report on the Special Actions Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Regarding the realignment of the posture of U.S. Forces in Japan, the government supplemented the 2006 Roadmap with the June 2011 2+2 Meeting joint statement and reaffirmed the commitment to implement steadily the realignment initiatives described in the 2006 Roadmap. The government intends to continue working in these directions from the perspective of maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces while reducing the impact on local communities.
Regarding the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement, the Japanese government intends to consider this issue, taking into account progress in other urgent issues, while striving to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance even further. The government plans to make utmost efforts to prevent incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces personnel, to reduce the noise impact by U.S. Forces aircraft, to deal with environmental issues at U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, and to address other specific issues in view of the requests of local communities.
Reference5:Deployment of U.S. Forces in Japan[PDF]
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