Background Briefing on the Summit Meeting by Foreign Ministry Official

17 April 1996

I. Introduction to the briefing

Official of the International Press Division: We are now going to start the background briefing. Since this briefing is on a background basis, we ask that you use only the attribution of Foreign Ministry Official and not quote the Press Secretary directly by name or title. Thank you.

II. Background information on the Summit Meeting between President William Clinton of the United States of America and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan

Foreign Ministry Official: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before I give you a readout of the Meeting between President William Clinton of the United States of America and Prime Minister Hashimoto, I would like to remind you that two documents were signed by the two leaders and announced this afternoon before the Press Conference.

One of the documents is titled, Message from Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton to the Peoples of Japan and the United States. This document first reviews the past achievements of our bilateral relationship, and then sets forth the areas of future cooperation in a broad range of areas, such as security/diplomatic cooperation, United Nations, disarmament, the fight against terrorism, the economy, APEC, the Common Agenda, and people-to-people exchanges. The other document is titled, the Japan-U.S.

Joint Declaration on Security -- Alliance for the 21st Century. In this document, the two leaders take stock of the regional scene, and reaffirm the significance of the Alliance and the Security Treaty on which the Alliance is based. It spells out specific areas of bilateral security cooperation, in which efforts will be made to undertake cooperation. It also addresses regional and global cooperation. This document, to borrow the words of the Prime Minister, will serve as a starting point for future cooperation.

III. Details of the Summit Meeting between President William Clinton of the United States of America and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan

A. Overview

Foreign Ministry Official: Now for the Summit Meeting between the two leaders. The Meeting took place between 11:35 and 13:15, so it lasted for about an hour and 40 minutes. They discussed a broad range of subjects on the bilateral relationship. On international issues they discussed the People's Republic of China, the Korean Peninsula, the former Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, the Middle East, the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety, and United Nations reform. They discussed economic issues, both macroeconomic and microeconomic. They discussed the Common Agenda, and last, but not least, they discussed people-to-people exchanges.

B. The bilateral relationship

Foreign Ministry Official: At the outset of the Meeting,
Prime Minister Hashimoto reiterated his condolences for the passing of Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown of the United States of America. He emphasized the importance of underscoring to the peoples of the two countries, to the Asia-Pacific region, and to the entire world, the importance of the Japan-U.S. relationship in this new era. He said that the two countries have forged a very strong relationship, and that he would like to take advantage of this opportunity to confirm the future direction of the cooperative ties. At this point, the two leaders agreed to issue the two messages. In response to this, President Clinton referred to the postponement of his visit in November for domestic reasons. He referred to the developments in the Japan-U.S. relationship after November last year. He said that the Joint Security Declaration was in the interest of the peoples of both countries and the region, and that it sends out a good signal. He said it was a very strong document.

C. The People's Republic of China and Taiwan

Foreign Ministry Official: After that, they discussed China. On China, Prime Minister Hashimoto took the lead. He referred to recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and emphasized the importance of the two countries and the international community to seek a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. He also underscored the importance of conveying this position to China. He also said that he considered the positive engagement of China in the international community to be important. He reiterated Japan's support for China's early accession to the World Trade Organization. President Clinton referred to the United States' One China Policy, and he also expressed the hope that the unification will be achieved peacefully. He also said that he was aware that talks were going on between Taipei and Beijing regarding cooperation in the economic area, and that this was good news. He said that it was important to be sure that the cross-strait relations do not deteriorate. On the WTO he said that, basically the United States supported China's accession to it, but that certain commercial conditions had to be met.

D. The situation on the Korean Peninsula

Foreign Ministry Official: They discussed yesterday's proposal made on the island of Cheju. He said that Japan held in high regard the proposal to hold talks without preconditions. He also expressed his appreciation for letting the Government of Japan know beforehand about the proposal. He also referred to the fact that he expressed his support for the proposal immediately after the announcement was made. On North Korea, he said that we did not have sufficient information, but that there seemed to be shortages of food and energy. He reiterated that the proposal for a four-party meeting was a good proposal. With regard to Japan's relations with North Korea, he referred to the fact that Japan was having preliminary informal contacts with the North Korean side, but that in view of the series of recent actions by North Korea, at this moment, the conditions were not there for moving forward with the normalization talks with North Korea. On the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), he underscored the importance of Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea working closely together. On our ties with the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Hashimoto said there had been a delicate phase in the relationship, but that in his meeting with President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea at the time of the ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok, the two leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining good ties between the two countries. In response to this, President Clinton expressed his appreciation for Japan's quick support for the proposal for the four-party meeting. He said that he was not aware of North Korea's reaction to this proposal.

E. The former Yugoslavia

Foreign Ministry Official: Prime Minister Hashimoto paid tribute to the efforts of the United States, and said that Japan would spare no efforts to support the process there. President Clinton said that Japan's support was very useful.

F. Russian reform

Foreign Ministry Official: On Russia, President Clinton took the lead. He said he was aware of the territorial issue between Japan and Russia, and that the United States supported Japan's position. He said that it was important for Russia to maintain reform and unity, and that the United States would continue support to Russia to this end. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that, although we had a territorial issue with Russia, Japan supported Russia's reform efforts.

G. The G-7 Summit

Foreign Ministry Official: In connection with the G-7 Summit, he said, with regard to the question of the G-8, that he would like to stay in close touch with the United States. President Clinton agreed that on the G-8, the two governments should stay in touch.

H. The Middle East peace process

Foreign Ministry Official: On the Middle East peace process, President Clinton referred to the recent situation in Lebanon. He appreciated Japan's high-level participation in the Peacemakers' Summit. He also expressed his appreciation for Japan's support to the West Bank and Gaza.

He said that he was convinced that the peace process would make progress. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that Japan appreciated the United States' initiative regarding the Peacemakers' Summit. He said that Japan would like to make contributions to improve the economic and social situation in the autonomous areas. He said that Japan would continue to extend financial support to this area.

I. The Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit

Foreign Ministry Official: In connection with the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit, President Clinton stated that the United States would like to continue to call on China, the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to support a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and that this year, 1996, provided great opportunities for nuclear disarmament. He said he would like to cooperate with Japan on this matter. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that he agreed with President Clinton on this, and that Japan would like to cooperate closely with the United States on this matter. He also referred to the disposal of nuclear waste. He said that Japan attached importance to this issue, and added that, at the time of the Moscow Summit, Japan would like to get a clear commitment on this matter from Russia.

J. United Nations reform

Foreign Ministry Official: President Clinton reiterated United States support for Japan's permanent seat on the Security Council, and also, Japan's bid this year to become a non-permanent member of the Security council. Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his appreciation for the United States support. He said there was a tendency to focus on the financial aspect of United Nations reform, but that it was important to pursue progress in all three areas of United Nations reform; that is to say, in addition to the financial area, restructuring of the Security Council, and also reform in the social and economic areas. He also underscored the importance of United States leadership regarding this matter.

K. Bilateral economic issues

Foreign Ministry Official: President Clinton said that a lot of progress had been made on individual trade issues, and he expressed his appreciation for the fact that 20 agreements have been achieved. He said there still remained issues to be resolved. He also said that he was aware of Prime Minister Hashimoto's positions on these issues, and said that he would like to work for the solution of these issues. He specifically referred to insurance, semiconductors, the air service talks -- the passenger aspect, and photographic film. In response, Prime Minister Hashimoto said that Japan would like to hold talks with the United States on how to proceed with the passenger services aspect of the air services talks. On semiconductors, he said he was not going to repeat his position, except to say that the role of the Agreement was now over. He said that currently, the semiconductor industries of the two countries were holding talks, and that he was hopeful that these talks would achieve good results. On photographic film, he said that this matter could be resolved by the anti-monopoly authority. On insurance he said that talks were being conducted in a constructive manner, but that further progress was necessary. He said that Japan was hoping that the United States would be more flexible on this matter.

L. The Common Agenda

Foreign Ministry Official: Prime Minister Hashimoto referred to the six areas that were added to the Common Agenda. They are mentioned specifically in the message from the two leaders to the peoples of the two countries. It is paragraph 16, on the last page. The new areas are infectious diseases, the improvement of the global food supply, the strengthening of civil society, support for democratization in developing and newly emerging countries, the mitigation of damage from natural disasters, the use of technology in education, and the fight against terrorism.

Prime Minister Hashimoto also said, with regard to the Common Agenda, that there are probably other things that we need to do for the future of the world. In response, President Clinton said that the United States was making efforts for progress on the Common Agenda, and he welcomed the progress made in such areas as Polio eradication and natural disasters.

M. People-to-people exchanges

Foreign Ministry Official: Finally, they discussed people-to-people exchanges. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that in order to achieve broad based exchanges between the two countries, exchanges of young people between the two countries was particularly important. President Clinton expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister's initiatives in the exchange of students. He also added that he would not be what he is today, if it were not for the Fulbright Scholarship.

These are the points that I wanted to make, and I will be delighted to respond to any questions that you might have.

IV. Further matters on the bilateral trade relationship

Q: On President Clinton, what is your impression of his reaction to the assessments on the various bilateral issues that you mention, from the Japanese side, for example that the films thing should be resolved by the anti-monopoly --
was there any give and take, or was it just both people stating their views?

A: I will tell you in more detail what President Clinton said. He said on insurance that he hoped agreement would be achieved by 1 June.

Q: Who said that?

A: President Clinton. And, on semiconductors, he said that he recognized that this was a difficult issue for both sides. He said that he hoped that the two sides could reach a conclusion by the end of July through creative talks. He said this was a question of monitoring by the two governments. On civil aviation, he referred to the agreement in the air cargo area, and he said he was aware of Japan's wishes to initiate talks on passenger services. On photographic film, he said that he would like for the two sides to endeavor to resolve this issue.

Q: Is that something new?

A: That is not new. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) has already initiated investigations on inter-company transactions in this area, in view of the oligopolistic structure of this industry in Japan.

Q: It sounds like he is agreeing with the Japanese on this particular issue of film, which the Japanese have always maintained it was a company-to-company kind of thing.

A: Actually, on these four issues, President Clinton spoke first.

Q: I mean President Clinton's position now, as you related to us, sounds like he is agreeing with the Japanese contention that this is just a fight between two companies, so the governments shouldn't be involved with it -- because, you said Clinton said it is a matter he hopes the two sides will resolve, meaning the two companies, I assume.

A: No, I think he was referring to governments.

Q:Oh, he is still considering it.

A: He did not say companies.

V. Further matters on the bilateral security relationship

Q: On page four of the security document, there is a paragraph that refers to studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan. Does that represent or point toward an extension of the scope of the Security Treaty as it has existed up to now, or is it a reiteration of what you have already provided for in the Security Treaty?

A: No. It does not imply an extension of the scope of the Security Treaty. Let me give you a little bit of background on this. The existing guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation were drawn up in 1978. The existing guidelines are based on the previous defense program outline of 1976. What the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation of 1978 did was lay down the guidelines for studies on the modalities of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in three areas:

a) postures for deterring aggression, b) action in response to an armed attack against Japan, and c) Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East, outside of Japan, which would have an important influence on the security of Japan. This is the previous guideline. Since the defense program outline was renewed in November, a revision of the defense cooperation guidelines is also in order. That is the background to this.

Q: The wording of the third section in the 1976 document is almost identical to this wording, is it not?

A: I could say that it is similar, but not identical.

Q: Could you just repeat it again? I didn't get it.

A: The 1976 document refers to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East, outside of Japan, which will have an important influence on the security of Japan. But, the new guidelines of course, will have to be based on the new defense program outline. I think you are aware of the contents of the new defense program.

VI. Further matters relating to trade and economic relations

Q: Did the President respond to the Prime Minister's statement that he would like to see more flexibility from the U.S. on insurance?

A: No.

VII. Matters relating to U.S.-China relations and Most Favored Nation (MFN) status

Q: I just want to confirm two points. You said that Clinton told Hashimoto on the U.S. and China's MFN status, that it would be difficult to do so for -- could you repeat exactly what you said Clinton said?

A: I did not say that.

Q: Something about commercial--.

A: WTO.

Q: Yes, WTO. Hashimoto hoped for --.

A: Let me repeat what I said. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that Japan supported the early accession of China to the WTO. And, in response to this, President Clinton said that basically, the United States supported China's accession to the WTO, but before that, certain commercial conditions had to be met -- it was important for China to meet certain commercial conditions.

Q: In the Japanese language it may be clear. When my question was asked, the response from one of your colleagues was, [Japanese], implying that internal American domestic conditions were difficult. He was probably referring to opposition in Congress to China's accession to the WTO. Did Clinton also mention any domestic pressure, or domestic difficulties?

A: I was also in that briefing and my impression was that this was being discussed in the context of extension of MFN.
I think the briefer said that there were very critical voices in the United States regarding MFN.

Q: Right. Were those voices commercial voices or governmental voices? What was said, or was it just left generally?

A: The briefer in the Japanese briefing made a very general statement, and he was not more specific about that.So,
there is no way I can answer that question. I was not in the Meeting myself.

Q: Are those the briefer's words that it is severe domestic considerations, or did the President refer in any way to domestic conditions regarding China?

A: He said that there were very critical voices. It was not a direct quote.

Q: What did the President say about domestic --.

A: I can only say what the briefer said. The briefer said that the President explained that there were critical voices in the United States with regard to MFN.

Q: Yes, but critical voices in the U.S. is quite a different translation from domestic conditions are strict, would you not agree? That is a very, very different interpretation, so what we are trying to find out here is what specifically Clinton said vis-à-vis domestic pressure in the U.S. -- whether that pressure was commercial pressure or governmental pressure.

A: As much as I would like to, I cannot answer that question, because I was not in the Meeting. I have nothing to add to what Mr. Kono, the other briefer, said.

VIII. The number of agreements reached between Japan and the United States

Q: On the number of agreements that Clinton said that had been reached -- was it 20 agreements?

A: Yes, in the Meeting he said 20.

Q: Ok. The Japanese press conference said 21. Which is it, 20 or 21?

A: Our understanding is that in the Meeting, President Clinton said 20, and in the Press Conference he said 21.

IX. Japan-U.S. cooperation on ballistic missile defense

Q: About the Security Declaration, page five, brackete. It says in the last two lines, "They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense." Can we interpret this as an official endorsement at the highest level?

A: There is nothing new in this, because cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) between the two governments has been going on for some time now. And, I am sure that the cooperation has been going on with the knowledge of the top leaders of the two governments, given the importance of this issue.

Q: What I want to say is the fact that the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States specifically mentioned in this very important security declaration about continuous cooperation and study of ballistic missile defense. Is it not an official endorsement -- the go-ahead?

A: Do you mean the go-ahead with the deployment of BMD?

Q: The go-ahead with ongoing studies.

A: I would say it is a reaffirmation of the top leaders.
Everything else in the document is a reaffirmation at the highest government level on defense cooperation.

X. Security matters relating to U.S. troop levels in Japan

Q: On page three, the current force structure of 100,000 U.S. troops in the region, and then a somewhat more vague reference to U.S. troops in Japan at about the current level. Does that mean that there is in fact some steps for a small reduction of U.S. troops in Japan from the present 47,000?

A: No. I do not think so. The figure 47,000 is the level of forces that the United States deems necessary for the United States to preform its duties under the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty. This figure was arrived at after a very thorough assessment of the security environment in this part of the world. It is the position of the Government of Japan to respect the considered judgement of the United States on this matter.

Q: If the security situation changes in this region -- the Korean Peninsula is unified, for example -- then one could argue that the troop level could change. Could we not?

A: As I said, this 47,000 was reached after a thorough assessment of the security environment. So, if there are major changes in the security environment, then there can be changes in troop levels.

Q: This document is called an Alliance for the 21st Century, and it mentions the specific number of 100,000 troops in the region. How long can this type of agreement last? When will it be up for revision? What is your understanding? Is it a 10-year agreement? Or a 20-year?

A: This is not an agreement in the legal sense. It is a political declaration issued by the two leaders of the two countries. A treaty usually says, "this agreement will expire after ten years," or something like that.

Q: So, this is just indefinite? With the understanding of the Japanese Government, how long do you expect this idea of having 100,000 troops and the Alliance to last?

A: I think it is better to ask the United States that question. It depends on the security environment. It is impossible to predict what the situation in this part of the world will look like five or ten years from now.

Q: So, it could change from this number in the next five or ten years?

A: That sounds like a loaded question.

Q: Not really. Does this mean you think that America is going to keep this number of troops in the Far East until the 21st Century ends -- for ever, as far as you're concerned? I assume you have some kind of understanding on this. What is your interpretation on this? Because, I am wondering how you regard this kind of language -- not an agreement, an alliance.

A: This declaration is based on the assessment of the current situation. It is impossible to tell if there will be major changes in the picture in the next few years, in five years from now, or ten years from now. So, I really cannot answer that question.

Q: So, as long as the current situation continues roughly as it is, this will hold? Then, if the current situation changes, can you expect changes to come to light?

A: I do not know how meaningful answering that question is,
beyond what I have told you.

XI. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Q: Does the ACSA imply an evolution on the three principles?

A: Do you mean the three principles on arms exports? Are you referring to that?

Q: Yes.

A: The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA),
Article II, paragraph three, says that paragraph two of this Article shall not be interpreted as to include the provision of ammunition. However, the list of items covered by the three principles is broader than that. For example, the list includes spare parts for military aircraft. Under the ACSA, it is possible to provide spare parts for military aircraft. The Government has already said the three principles on arms exports will not apply to that extent.
Did you understand?

Q: Yes. So, there is an exception actually?

A: So, an exception is being made to the three principles.
But, this is not the first time. In 1983, we concluded an agreement with the United States on the provision of military technology to the United States. At that time, we declared that the three principles would not be applicable to this.

Q: He says that the President says that he understands or recognizes Japan's request for the air passenger talks. Did he go beyond that? Did he make any comment?

A: That is all he said.

Q: I think Defense Secretary Perry was quoted as saying that this troop document is something like the most important document of its kind to be issued since the end of the Cold War. Does it, in fact tell us anything new about the defense relationship that we didn't know already or that had not been published?

A: The security document is a very comprehensive and detailed document. It sums up the security dialogue that has been conducted for the past year, and maybe a little more than that. I can say that it covers all the important elements of the dialogue.

Q: You said that President Clinton expressed his hope to Prime Minister Hashimoto to find a resolution to the semiconductor problem to be reached by the end of July. Did Prime Minister Hashimoto have any thoughts on this?

Q: You attended the part where Hashimoto said there was no need to put it in the current agreement, as far as semiconductors are concerned. Did the President react at all to the Prime Minister's declaration that there is no need to extend the bilateral semiconductor agreement?

A: No. What was your question?

Q: What was Prime Minister Hashimoto's response to the President's hope that an agreement be reached by the end of July?

A: He said on semiconductors that he was not repeating his position on this. He just said that the role of the agreement was over.

Q: So, then there was no response on by the end of July?

A: He said that talks were now being held between the semiconductor industries of the two countries, and that he hoped that the talks would achieve good results. That is what he said.

Q: I gathered from the way you've been briefing that the economic issues didn't take up a lot of time. Most of the hour and 45 minutes were spent discussing security issues. Only 20 minutes may have been devoted to the economic and bilateral issues?

A: They discussed a large number of issues; I did not count, but more than ten issues. I gave you a list of the issues discussed in Meeting.

Q: In the economic bilateral area?

A: No, not just in the economic area, but on everything.

Q: I am referring to the economic and trade issues. That was a very small part of their discussion.

A: I do not know whether it was a very small part. The same question was asked in the briefing session for the Japanese press. The briefer said that it would not be very useful to answer that question, because it depends on how rapidly the two leaders spoke. In the first part of the Meeting they spoke very slowly, but in the latter part of the meeting they were running out of time, and they spoke more rapidly. So, discussing how many minutes were spent on a particular subject was not very meaningful.

Q: Add up the words.

Q: The bilateral Security Treaty which Japan and the United States has been evolving on the basis of mainly containing communism in the region. That was the enemy or the danger to contain. But, now the situation has very much changed. Communism has broken down at its very base. The bases locations -- the geopolitical impacts of that -- you have a similar situation between the Philippines and America. The bases were closed there, because the Philippines thought there was no need for that when China was no longer an enemy for them. Do you see anything in the future developing in that direction? Has it already been taken out? I am asking two things: the security bilateral, and the positioning of the bases mainly in Okinawa. Who is the enemy?

A: The Security Treaty does not have any hypothetical enemies. It is not directed at any hypothetical enemy. It never was.

Q: Security against what?

A: The reason why we need the Security Treaty is discussed in the security document. There is an assessment of the regional situation -- why, against this background, the Security Treaty is necessary. I hope you take a good look at the security document.

Q: I am still trying to understand security against what? Security to stop something? What is it? Is it internal?

A: Do you have the document?

Q: Which document?

A: The security document.

Q: I have one that just says Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.

A: And, have you read the document?

Q: I just got it, so I have not.

A: I hope you take a good look at it.

Q: Do you want me to read it and come back with questions next time?

A: Sure.

Q: Ok, great.

XII. Assessment of the Summit's success

Q: This summit was billed in advance as the most important summit since the end of the Cold War. Did it live up to those expectations?

A: I think it was a very important summit, and a very successful summit. Everybody here in Japan is very happy with what was achieved in the Summit. It fully lived up to our expectations, and perhaps achieved more than that.

Q: In President Clinton's statements this afternoon, he said regarding trade issues that "for the first time, I wanted everyone to be clear we have established a process to resolve problems in an efficient and pragmatic manner. What is your interpretation of that? Some new process? Or is he reaffirming an old process? What is this, "we have established a process?"

A: It would be extremely presumptuous of me to attempt to put words in President Clinton's mouth.

Q: Then, how does the Japanese side interpret that?

A: I have not discussed this with my colleagues yet, so I can only give you my personal impression. I think he is referring to the framework talks process.

Q: So, he is reaffirming commitment to that.

A: That is my impression, yes.

Q: You said it went beyond your expectations. In what way?

A: That was a slip of the tongue. I was just giving my personal impressions of the atmosphere, the contents of the documents.

Q: Then everything went as orchestrated then?

A: I do not like the word orchestrated.

Q: There were no surprises?

A: No.

Q: Were there any frank exchanges?

A: What do you mean by frank exchanges?

Q: The word frank --.

A: Are you using it in the way journalists usually do?

Q: In the way diplomats use it.

A: I was not in the Meeting, so I cannot give you a very personal account of what happened in the Meeting. But, I am sure it was a very cordial, friendly meeting. Discussions between the United States and Japan are always frank -- not in the diplomatic sense.

Q: I thought in a diplomatic sense, frank means that the two sides disagree with each other, but try to be polite about it.

A: I was not using the word frank in that sense. I am using the word frank as an average man on the street would use it.

Q: How many people were in the room?

A: There were two sessions. There was a tete-à-tete -- not in the strictest sense of the word. We call it a tete-à-tete, though. There was this restricted meeting, then a larger meeting.

Q: Did they call each other Bill and Ryu?

A: Yes, they have been calling each other Bill and Ryu since Santa Monica.

Official of the International Press Division: Ladies and gentlemen, are there any other questions? Let us close the briefing session. Thank you very much.

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