Statement by Ambassador Yukio Takasu
Representative of Japan
to Main Committee II of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Delivered on 19 May 2005
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The serious challenges to the NPT regime since the 2000 NPT Review Conference highlight why, more than ever before, we should focus on non-proliferation issues.
First of all, the decision by the DPRK in January 2003 to withdraw from the NPT and its declaration in February 2005 regarding the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons are sources of deep concern.
The undeclared nuclear program by Iran which was revealed in 2003 is another concern. Likewise, Libya's concealed nuclear weapons programs, which it decided to abandon in December 2003; and a clandestine procurement network of nuclear material, sensitive equipment and technology, which was exposed in connection with investigation of Libya's nuclear weapons programs. The potential threat of nuclear terrorism using nuclear material and radioactive sources in the advent of September 11, 2001 is another challenge of proliferation concern.
The international community has undertaken a series of countermeasures to resolve these challenges. These include strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, in particular the universalization of the additional protocol, which enables the IAEA to verify undeclared nuclear material and activities. There has been a major stride in promoting universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol during the last five years. IAEA has been conducting thorough investigation and verification of Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs.
International cooperation on non-proliferation has been significantly enhanced, e.g. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Efforts are being made to strengthen export controls through the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). IAEA's activities aimed at protecting against nuclear terrorism are also greatly appreciated.
In furtherance of these counter proliferation measures and to achieve the goal of strengthening the NPT regime, I would like to highlight the major issues before Main Committee II.
First and foremost, there should be no more additional states permitted to possess nuclear weapons. Any nuclear weapon program in any country should not be permitted.
In this regard, all nuclear programs in the DPRK must be completely dismantled under credible international verification. I would like to express our deep concern regarding the decision by the DPRK in January 2003 to withdraw from the NPT. It is contrary to the efforts to universalize the NPT. The statement by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2005 regarding the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons, and indefinite suspension of its participation in the Six-Party Talks, is extremely regrettable. We must also express serious concern over the recent announcement by the DPRK's Foreign Ministry that the DPRK has completed withdrawal of spent fuel rods from the reactor and that it is continuing to take necessary measures to increase its nuclear arsenals.
The international community must clearly state that, under any circumstances, any development, acquisition, possession, test or transfer of nuclear weapons by the DPRK should not be accepted. Japan urges the DPRK to promptly come into compliance with the NPT and completely dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment programs, in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to credible international verification. To solve this issue peacefully, the Six-Party Talks continue to be the most appropriate framework and should be fully utilized. Japan urges the DPRK to expeditiously return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions. Japan, together with other partners, will continue to make every effort towards a resolution through diplomatic efforts, primarily by actively contributing to the Six-Party Talks.
In order to dispel the serious concern of the international community, Japan believes it essential that Iran sincerely implement all the requirements of the relevant IAEA resolutions. In particular, Japan urges Iran to continue its suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities without exception. It is important for Iran to continue to positively cooperate with the IAEA regarding the provision of adequate and complete information and of any access deemed necessary by the IAEA. It is equally important that Iran ratifies its additional protocol as a matter of urgency. Japan supports the efforts of the EU3, who are in the midst of serious negotiations with Iran. It is Japan's sincere hope that an agreement will be reached on long-term arrangements. We consider it extremely important that Iran agrees to provide sufficient "objective guarantees" as required by the EU3, which we believe will provide the most effective assurance that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Japan welcomes and commends Libya's decision in December 2003 to abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction programs, while expressing concern over Libya's past failure to meet the requirements of its safeguards agreement, which constituted non-compliance. I would also like to welcome Libya's positive cooperation with the IAEA in the verification work related to Libya's past undeclared nuclear programs.
(The Strengthened Safeguards System)
Assuring nuclear non-proliferation through the application of an effective IAEA safeguards system is a key and essential component of the NPT regime. The universalization of an impartial and effective safeguards system by the IAEA represents a significant contribution to the non-proliferation regime.
The cases of Iraq and the DPRK in the early 1990s clearly demonstrated that verification through safeguards only on declared activities and materials did not provide a sufficient basis of assurance. It became apparent that verification on undeclared nuclear materials and activities is also essential to ensure effectively non-diversion to military purpose. Thus, the additional protocol was introduced to complement the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
The modality of the effective safeguards to ensure non-proliferation evolves and develops as progress in technology and change in international situation. The NPT envisages this principle in its preamble paragraph four and five. (NPT parties ...support for efforts... to further the application, within the framework of the IAEA safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively ... by use of instrument and other techniques.)
In the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was recommended that the IAEA and its Member States consider ways and means, including a plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The additional protocol can play a vital role in increasing the transparency of a State's nuclear activities by providing the IAEA with enhanced verification ability, additional information on nuclear related research and development, as well as export and import information. Japan believes, therefore, that the universalization of the additional protocol remains the most realistic and effective means to strengthen the current international non-proliferation regime.
Following the recommendations made in the 2000 final document, the importance of the additional protocol was emphasized in a series of IAEA General Conference resolutions and Board of Governors meetings. The General Conference reiterated its request that all concerned states and other parties that have not yet concluded the additional protocol together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, should do so as soon as possible. We commend the efforts of the IAEA Secretariat and the Member States concerned, which have been making strenuous efforts towards universalizing the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.
Japan, one of the strongest supporters of the universalization of the Additional Protocol, has positively contributed to a series of outreach activities such as IAEA regional seminars and training courses, through its voluntary contribution to the Secretariat. Japan is also working towards this goal through its hosting of "the Friends of Additional Protocol" meetings in Vienna, where concrete measures to realize this goal have been discussed among the Member States concerned and the IAEA Secretariat.
As a result of these efforts, there has been welcome and significant progress made since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and a number of countries (15) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreement. In 2000 the number of additional protocol in force was only 9. At present, 94 States have signed the additional protocol and 67 States have ratified it. However, 38 states have still yet to fulfill their obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and 14 states with significant nuclear activities still have yet to conclude an additional protocol. Therefore, Japan is of the view that more efforts should be made to universalize the IAEA safeguards system including the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.
Given the recent serious challenges to the NPT, it is insufficient to verify only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and facilities that have been placed under safeguards in a State in order to conclude whether all the nuclear activities in the State are for peaceful purposes. It is vital, therefore, to provide the IAEA with enhanced authorities and tools through the additional protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements in order to verify the absence of undeclared materials and activities. In our view, those States with significant nuclear activities have responsibilities to increase transparency, permitting the Agency the necessary means and authority to verify that nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purpose.
Therefore, Japan believes that the strengthened safeguards system (comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol) should constitute the NPT safeguards standard as required by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT from a certain date and we believe that, with further acceleration of universalization efforts, the additional protocol should become the IAEA safeguards standard.
Japan urges all States to the NPT to conclude the additional protocol as well as the comprehensive safeguards agreement without delay. Japan strongly urges, in particular, those 14 States with significant nuclear activities which have yet to conclude the additional protocol, to do so as soon as possible.
The establishment and implementation of integrated safeguards plays an important role in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Integrated Safeguards also reduce the burdens for the states concerned through the application of additional protocols. Last June, the IAEA drew the conclusion that it found no indication of any diversion of nuclear material or of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Japan. As a result of this, the integrated safeguards in Japan was initiated last September. Japan hopes that the application of integrated safeguards in Japan will serve as a helpful example to other states as well as to the IAEA Secretariat of a more effective and efficient means of implementing safeguards.
(Effective Export Control)
Each state should establish appropriate effective national rules and regulations with regard to export controls over nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology. Such efforts are essential to ensure the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the Treaty for the purpose of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
Export control is neither a mechanism for hindering a country's right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology nor hampering its free market activities. Rather, the activities of export control regimes create confidence about non-proliferation and thus facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a smooth and appropriate manner.
From this point of view, the role of multinational export control regimes for nuclear related materials, equipment and technology, such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should be highly appreciated.
These regimes are informal and voluntary in nature, and also have a limited membership. However, the published Zangger Committee Understandings (INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) and the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part2) are not only useful for participating states, but also for non-participating states providing useful basis for the establishment of national export control systems.
Japan believes the Review Conference should duly acknowledge the crucial contributions that these regimes make to achieve non-proliferation as envisaged in Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT.
The UNSCR1540 decides that all States shall establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective export control systems. We would like to encourage those states that have not yet done so to establish and implement an appropriate effective export control system, fully taking into account these guidelines.
When non-nuclear weapon States procure nuclear related technology and materials which could be also usable for the development of nuclear weapons, they have a responsibility to increase the transparency of their activities to permit the IAEA to verify their peaceful intentions. Only the Additional Protocol will provide the Agency with the necessary authority and tools to verify non-diversion to military purpose. Therefore, in order to strengthen the NPT regime, we believe, in addition to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, concluding the Additional Protocol should be a necessary condition of supply of all items in the Trigger List of the Zangger Committee Understandings and of the NSG Part 1 Guidelines to non-nuclear weapons States.
Japan highly appreciates the IAEA's efforts to investigate the nuclear related clandestine network. The Agency's effort to strengthen its analytical function regarding the trafficking of sensitive nuclear technologies is also important. It is crucial for State Parties to establish a national system of nuclear security such as legislation, law enforcement and, border-control, and to promote information exchange and cooperation between national authorities in preventing, detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.
Strengthened nuclear security measures have a particular importance in the fight against terrorism. Japan welcomes the fact that momentum has been built up to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). We would like to urge State Parties to the Convention to participate in the conference of Plenipotentiaries in July 2005 and to agree on amendments to strengthen the CPPNM. Japan also welcomes the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by the UN General Assembly.
Japan supports the activities implemented by the IAEA Secretariat based on its action plan "Protection against Nuclear Terrorism" and welcomes the initiative to review the action plan, taking into account recent circumstances on nuclear security.
Japan firmly supports the efforts being taken to establish and promote Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. In this regard, the lack of progress in establishing a weapons-of-mass- destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious concern. Japan has supported, and continues to support fully, the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. In this context, Japan calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, thereby contributing to taking an initiative for building confidence in the region.
Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. We hope that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between the five nuclear weapon states and the five countries of Central Asia.
The nuclear weapon capabilities of both India and Pakistan make peace and stability in South Asia more vulnerable. Japan continues to urge India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition. Japan also encourages both countries to continue their commitment to the moratorium, and to make a positive move toward signing and ratifying the CTBT.
Japan considers the challenges of the NPT can be overcome only by the political will of the Sates Parties. However, improvement of the institutional aspects of the Review Process could facilitate the Sates Parties to act positively for strengthening the NPT regime and to ensure the effective operation of the NPT. We have carefully examined various proposals on improving "institutional deficit" and look forward to full discussion on feasibility of these proposals.
Lastly, Japan has submitted a list of 21 measures which would promote and move forwards the purpose and objective of the NPT (NPT/CONF.2005/WP 21). Within those measures, 9th to 17th measures fall within the scope of Main Committee II. We believe these proposals serve as a good basis for formulating consensus texts to be included in the final product of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
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