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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan

October 18, 2004

  1. Japan will host the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise off the coast of Sagami Bay and off the Port of Yokosuka from Monday, October 25 to Wednesday, October 27, 2004.
  2. The vessels, aircraft and units of Australia, France, the United States and Japan will participate in this exercise. As of October 18, the following countries are planning to dispatch observers to this exercise: Cambodia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
  3. The Maritime Interdiction Exercise scenario scheduled for Tuesday, October 26 will consist of basic maritime interdiction operations mainly focusing on law enforcement activities to be conducted in accordance with national legal authorities and relevant international law and framework. In addition, a training demonstration is scheduled for Wednesday, October 27, in which the participating countries will demonstrate to one another their skills related to boarding and inspection, an essential part of maritime interdiction activities.
  4. The main objective of this exercise is to improve proficiency and strengthen coordination among organs concerned of the participating countries as well as to promote understanding of the non-PSI participating countries on PSI.
  5. The PSI interdiction exercises have been conducted 11 times already in various regions of the world and this is the first time to be hosted by Japan.

(Note) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

  1. PSI is an effort to consider possible collective measures among the participating countries, in accordance with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their related materials that pose threats to the peace and stability of the international community (announced by US President Bush in May 2003). In accordance with the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which stipulates the principles of the PSI, Japan has participated, including as an observer, in exercises to improve necessary capabilities for interdiction activities, and is encouraging Asian countries to co-operate in and support the PSI.
  2. The PSI is administered by the "core group" countries, which, at present, consist of 15 countries (Japan, US, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Canada, Norway and Russia).

Scenario for the PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Team Samurai 04"

18th October 2004

The exercise will consist of basic maritime interdiction operations mainly focusing on law enforcement activities, to be conducted in accordance with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.

1. Initial Stage

(1) Receipt of intelligence

One of Japan's intelligence-related authorities receives intelligence from an intelligence agency of the United States that a suspected shipment of sarin (CW)-related cargo is on a ship scheduled to dock at a port in Japan. It is unclear from the intelligence if the cargo is sarin or chemical precursors for sarin. Intelligence suggests that a terrorist organization "T" might be attempting a terrorist attack in Japan, but it is still unclear if the cargo is to be offloaded in Japan or if it is continuing on to a next destination.

(2) Information sharing and confirmation of closer cooperation

The intelligence is passed on to the Cabinet Secretariat and other PSI related authorities of Japan from the intelligence-related authority which has received the intelligence. Relevant information is gathered at the Cabinet Secretariat. The strengthening of cooperation and information gathering system of all the PSI related authorities of Japan is confirmed.

2. Interdiction at sea

(1) Receipt of intelligence

One of Japan's intelligence-related authorities receives intelligence from an intelligence agency of the US that "Yokohama Autumn" (YA), a "break bulk" vessel in question flying the Japanese flag, is to receive the suspect cargo off Tokyo Bay from "American Summer" (AS), another "break bulk" vessel in question flying US flag which is sailing towards Japan. This intelligence is passed on to the Cabinet Secretariat and all the PSI related authorities of Japan. Japan Coast Guard obtains a search/seizure warrant for YA from the court.

(2) Identification

Maritime patrol aircraft of Japan Self Defense Force under guard and surveillance activity identifies on the high seas AS flying US flag sailing towards the territorial waters of Japan and reports to the related authorities.

(3) Guard and Surveillance

As AS approaches Japanese territorial waters, JCG aircraft and patrol vessels head towards the scene immediately. JSDF and JCG continue the guard and surveillance activities on AS.

(4) Prevention of transshipment

YA, which left a port in Japan a few hours ago, approaches AS, and crew of respective vessels start transshipping the material in question from AS to YA on the high seas. JCG patrol vessels attempt to approach YA in order to prevent the transshipment; but AS and YA suspend the transshipment of the material and flee from the scene.

(5) Measures against YA

(a) Boarding; searching of the vessel; identification and seizure of the material in question

JCG patrol vessels stop YA, the vessel in question flying the Japanese flag, on the high seas and identify the material in question as a result of boarding and searching. On confirmation that the material is sarin by a sample check, the material is seized. YA is diverted to the nearest port.

(b) Investigation

Suspects are interrogated at the nearest port. As the result of an expert examination, it becomes definite that the material is sarin. The suspects are sent to the prosecutor's office.

(6) Measures against AS

(a) Fleeing and pursuing

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan notifies the US of the fact that AS has fled from the scene. The US vessel sailing around the area start the pursuit, based on the information provided from Japan (JCG and JMSDF) concerning the location of AS. At the request of the US and based on the information provided from Japan (JCG and JMSDF) concerning its location, Australian and French ships also pursue the AS.

(b) Boarding; inspection of the vessel; identification and securing of the material

The US vessel stops AS on the high seas. The US calls for support of the Australian and French ships in conducting search of the material in question, and secures it as a result of the joint search.

(c) Expert examination and seizure of the material

The US ship requests JCG to assist in such efforts as the identification of the material in question. As a result of an expert examination on the material conducted by an authority of the US and comparison with the data provided by JCG, it becomes definite that the material is sarin. The material is seized based on the US laws.

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