3 Global Security

(1) Regional Security

In the international community, a historical shift in the power balance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, is occurring. In light of the numerous security challenges confronting this region, there is a need for Japan to cooperate with its ally and like-minded countries and others. In particular, it is more important than ever to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. There is also a need for Japan to fundamentally reinforce its own defense capabilities. At the same time, by actively strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with each country, Japan has been making efforts to realize a desirable regional security environment for Japan.

Japan and Australia concurred, at the leaders' and foreign ministerial levels, to continue strengthening cooperation in partnership with a focus on cooperation with like-minded countries, toward further deepening the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries and realizing a “FOIP.” At the eleventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) convened in September, Japan and Australia concurred on working unwaveringly to deepen Australia-Japan strategic and security cooperation, including all tools of statecraft, in line with the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC)⁽³⁾ issued in 2022. Japan and Australia are steadily strengthening security cooperation by utilizing the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement that entered into force in 2023. For example, under this Agreement, the Australian Defence Force participated in Exercise Keen Sword 25, a joint Japan-U.S. exercise, for the first time in October. With regard to illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers, the Australian Defence Force conducted monitoring and surveillance operations in the waters around Japan with their naval vessels from early to mid-May and from early to mid-September, and with their aircraft from early to mid-February and from early to mid-November.

Japan and India have concurred, at the leaders' and foreign ministerial levels, to further diversify and deepen bilateral relations across a wide range of fields, including economy, security, and people-to-people exchanges, in order to further develop the “Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” At the Third Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting convened in August, the Ministers discussed cooperation toward the realization of FOIP, bilateral security and defense cooperation, as well as regional and global issues, and concurred to continue to work closely together. In November, Japan and India signed a Memorandum of Implementation for transfer of Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN) based on their reciprocal Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, and held the inaugural Japan-India Dialogue on Economic Security, including Strategic Trade and Technology.

In regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), the two sides concurred, at the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue held in November, to deepen mutual understanding of their respective security and defense policies, and to communicate closely toward enhancing Japan-ROK security and defense cooperation. Furthermore, based on the recognition that Japan-ROK relations are important in the current strategic environment, they agreed that Japan and the ROK, as well as Japan, the U.S., and the ROK, will continue to work closely together on matters, including responding to North Korea, taking advantage of various international conferences and other opportunities, and holding talks between leaders, foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of the national security agencies. Japan and the ROK are also advancing further trilateral cooperation to address regional security issues, including Freedom Edge, the first multi-domain joint exercise among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK (June and November), and other joint trilateral exercises (January, April, November). The Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Ministry Cooperation on North Korea's Cyber Threats was held in December 2023, March and September 2024, during which the three countries reaffirmed that they will continue to work closely, including in the cyber area.

In relation to the UK, which is Japan's “enhanced global strategic partner,” defense cooperation is advancing with the application of the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) that entered into force in October 2023. In April, the UK Royal Navy patrol vessel, HMS Spey, made a port visit to Japan, a fact that was touched on at the Japan-UK Foreign Ministers' Meeting convened in the same month. The HMS Spey conducted monitoring and surveillance operations on illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers, from mid- to late June. Later, at the Japan-UK Defense Ministers Meeting in July, the Ministers announced that the defense authorities had reached an agreement to apply Japan Self Defense Forces' Asset Protection Measures to the UK. In September, the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) training vessels JS Kashima and JS Shimakaze visited ports in London and Southampton, UK, and conducted bilateral exercise with the UK Royal Navy patrol vessel, HMS Tyne, in the English Channel. These port visits mark the first instances of the application of the Japan-UK RAA to the SDF. The 8th Japan-UK Cyber Dialogue took place in the same month, where the participants exchanged opinions on a wide range of issues, including each country's cybersecurity strategy and policy, cooperation in the international fora including the UN, and capacity building for cybersecurity. Japan, the UK, and Italy signed the Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO)” in December 2023. The Convention entered into force on December 10, with the deposition of the last instrument of ratification completed for Japan in July, the UK in October, and Italy in December.

With France, which Japan is bound by an “Exceptional Partnership,” the Seventh Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (“2+2”) took place in May 2023. In addition to affirming that it is essential to further strengthen cooperation between Japan and France, as like-minded countries, in both diplomacy and defense, the Ministers concurred on further promoting cooperation in addressing various regional and global issues, in order to maintain and strengthen the free and open international order based on the rule of law. The four ministers also exchanged views on Japanese-French cooperation in areas such as cyber, space, and economic security, highly appreciated the defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France, and shared the view to deepen such cooperation and exchanges as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. The 7th Japan-France Bilateral Consultations on Cyber security were convened in November 2023, at which the two sides exchanged views on broad topics, such as each country's cybersecurity strategy and policy, bilateral and multilateral cooperation including UN, and cybersecurity capacity building. In the same year, during the Japan-France Telephone Summit Meeting held in December, the Roadmap that will guide the Japan-France cooperation was announced, and the two leaders concurred on making a further leap on their “exceptional partnership.” The French frigates Bretagne and Prairial made port calls in August and November respectively, while the French Air Force fighter aircraft visited Japan in July 2023 and July 2024. In September, the Japan-France joint exercise “Brunet Takamori 24” was held in Japan for the first time. Monitoring and surveillance operations were also conducted on illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers, by the frigate Prairial from the end of October to the end of November, and by patrol aircraft from mid-October to late November. At the Japan-France Summit Meeting in May, the two leaders welcomed the multilayered developments of Japan-France cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and concurred on commencement of negotiations on the Japan-France Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA).

In relation to Germany, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (“Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement,” or ACSA) entered into force in July. German military aircrafts including Eurofighter Typhoons and a German frigate “Baden-Württemberg” and replenishment ship visited Japan in July and August respectively and conducted joint exercises with the SDF. The frigate conducted monitoring and surveillance operations on illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers from the end of August to mid-September.

At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting in February, the leaders welcomed the progress in cooperation such as joint exercises by naval vessels scheduled in 2024. In March, the inaugural Japan-Italy Politico-Military (PM) Dialogue was convened in Rome. Thereafter, in June, the two leaders took the opportunity of the informal talks at the G7 Summit in Apulia to announce the Japan-Italy Action Plan, which serves as a guideline for future Japan-Italy cooperation, as well as the commencement of formal negotiations on the Agreement on the Japan-Italy ACSA. In August, the carrier strike group (comprising of the aircraft carrier Cavour, the frigate Alpino, and the patrol vessel Raimondo Montecuccoli) visited Japan, and the two countries conducted navy-to-navy joint exercises. The training ship, Amerigo Vespucci, also visited Port of Tokyo for the first time. The patrol vessel Raimondo Montecuccoli conducted Italy's first monitoring and surveillance operations on illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers, from late August to early September. The JMSDF training vessels JS Kashima and JS Shimakaze made a port call in Naples, and carried out a goodwill exercise with the Italian navy frigate Carlo Margottini in the Aegean Sea. Following up from 2023, F-35 fighter aircraft from the Italian Air Force visited Japan in August and participated in a joint exercise. In November, Foreign Minister Iwaya and Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto signed the Japan-Italy ACSA.

Southeast Asia is located in a geopolitically strategic position and faces Japan's important sea lanes. A stable and prosperous Southeast Asia is crucial to the stability and prosperity not only for the East Asia region but also for the international community. On June 3, 2023, Japan signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Singapore, which entered into force on the same day. In October 2023 and March 2024, Japan delivered the first and second air surveillance radar systems to the Philippines as the first transfers of finished equipment. Japan and the Philippines concurred to commence negotiations on the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in November 2023, and signed the same Agreement in July. To ensure the rule of law at sea, Japan also provides continuous support to the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, and other countries to improve the law enforcement capabilities of their coast guard authorities. The first joint exercise among the coast guard agencies of Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines was held in June 2023.

With regards to Canada, a “strategic partner” of Japan, at the Japan-Canada Summit Meetings and Foreign Ministers' Meetings, the two countries welcomed the steady implementation of the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region (FOIP)” announced in 2022, as well as the consistent progress in bilateral cooperation. Negotiations on the Japan-Canada Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology also commenced in October. The Government of Canada revised its national defense policy in April, announcing its plan to inject 8.1 billion Canadian dollars of additional spending over the next five years (defense spending set at 1.76% of GDP in FY2029), followed by a fresh announcement by the Department of National Defence in July on a defense spending target of 2% of GDP by 2032. Canada has also set out measures in its defense policy to secure a more permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific, and is increasingly deepening its engagement with the region, as signaled by its dispatch of three naval vessels to the Indo-Pacific region in 2024 that passed through the Taiwan Strait at the end of July and late October. In September, the Minister of National Defence Bill Blair visited Japan, the first visit by a Canadian National Defence Minister in five years, and participated in the Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting. With regard to joint exercises with the Canadian Armed Forces, the Japan-Canada joint exercise “KAEDEX,” which has been conducted every year since 2017, was held from the end of August to early September, and Japan, the U.S., Canada, and the Philippines held cooperative maritime activities in the South China Sea in mid-June. As for responding to illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers, a Royal Canadian Navy vessel conducted monitoring and surveillance operations from mid-June to late July, from early to mid-November, and from late November to mid-December, while monitoring and surveillance operations by aircraft were conducted from early May to early June, and between late September and mid-October.

In relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Prime Minister Kishida attended the NATO Summit in July for the third consecutive year. He reaffirmed the importance of cooperating with like-minded countries across regional boundaries, based on the recognition that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly inseparable, and concurred on further strengthening Japan-NATO relations. During the Summit, NATO and the Indo-Pacific partners (IP4: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK) announced that the following four areas were identified as flagship projects aimed at establishing sustainable cooperation between IP4 and NATO: (a) support to Ukraine; (b) cyber defense; (c) hostile information, including disinformation; and, (d) technology. Furthermore, in October, members of the IP4 including Japan were invited to the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence for the first time. Defense Minister Nakatani attended the meeting and held a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who took office on October 1.

The 1st Japan-EU Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue was convened in November, during which the Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership was released, making Japan the first country in the Indo-Pacific region to announce a partnership with the EU. In this dialogue, the Ministers concurred on strengthening concrete cooperation and dialogues in areas such as cyber, space, response to hybrid threats, and maritime security, given the current severe security environment. The 6th Japan-EU Cyber Dialogue was held in the same month, and the two sides exchanged views on various topics, such as cybersecurity strategies and policies of Japan and the EU, challenges in the cyber domain, bilateral and multilateral cooperation including in the UN, and capacity building assistance.

There are various issues of concern in relation to China, such as its intrusion into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the extensive and rapid enhancement of its military power without sufficient transparency, and increasing activities by its military in the waters and air spaces surrounding Japan. Japan will continue to make use of opportunities at high-level dialogues, including summit meetings and foreign ministers' meetings, to firmly maintain and assert its position and strongly call for responsible actions by China. As China's military trends are a matter of serious concern for Japan, Japan is working on communicating its policies through security dialogues such as the Japan-China Security Dialogue, as well as efforts to build multilayered channels for exchanges. At the same time, Japan is communicating its concerns and urging China to improve transparency in relation to its defense policies and military power, as well as to take more concrete actions to contribute to the security environment and to the region, including Japan. The Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China that commenced operation in 2018 is aimed at promoting mutual understanding and mutual trust, and at avoiding unexpected collisions, and a hotline under this Mechanism commenced operation in May 2023.

Peace and stability in the Middle East region are vital to the peace and prosperity of the international community including Japan. The Middle East is one of the world's key energy suppliers, and approximately 90% of Japan's crude oil imports rely on the region. It is, therefore, extremely important to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in this region. As Japan's own efforts toward ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet decision in December 2019 on utilization of vessels and aircraft of the SDF to (a) make further diplomatic efforts toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, (b) to take thorough measures for ensuring safety of navigation including robust information sharing with relevant stakeholders, and (c) strengthen its information gathering system. Japan has continued to conduct information gathering activities using SDF vessels and aircraft in the waters of the Middle East since January 2020. The 1st Cyber Security Consultation between Japan and Jordan was held in June 2023, followed by the second Consultation in July 2024. They discussed their respective cybersecurity policies as well as threat awareness in cyberspace. In May 2023, Japan signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the first such agreement concluded between Japan and a country of the Middle East. This Agreement entered into force in January.

In addition, Japan has actively participated in and contributed to multilateral frameworks in the region, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), in order to strengthen security cooperation in the region. The ARF is a framework in which various entities participate, including North Korea and the EU, with the aim of improving the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region by promoting confidence-building and preventive diplomacy through dialogues and cooperation. In July, the 31st ARF Ministerial Meeting was held, and the participants candidly exchanged views mainly on regional and international affairs, including issues concerning Ukraine, Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East. Japan also actively contributes to the forum including through serving as a co-chair of all the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Maritime Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, and ICTs Security.

Furthermore, in addition to government-to-government dialogues (track 1), Japan utilizes frameworks where participants from both public and private sectors exchange opinions and explain their security policies (track 1.5), as well as other means, as part of its efforts to promote other countries' understanding of Japan's security policies, and to facilitate cooperation and confidence-building in the region.

---

• (3) A document that sets out the direction for the next 10 years of Japan-Australia security cooperation, signed at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in October 2022.

(2) Economic Security

A Trends Surrounding Economic Security

In recent years, various challenges have been surfacing in fields that cut across national security and the economy. The scope of the national security domain is expanding rapidly. Various risks are emerging, such as the risk of stolen or leaked advanced civilian technologies being converted to military use in other countries, the risk of suppliers influenced by foreign governments obstructing the stable operation of critical infrastructure such as those for telecommunications, the risk of disruptions to the supply of critical goods due to over-dependencies on other countries, and the risk of being targeted by economic coercion by some countries seeking to achieve political objectives by using their advantages in the supply chain or their purchasing power in the market as leverage.

In light of the emergence of various threats related to economic means, securing Japan's national interests such as peace, security, and economic prosperity by carrying out economic measures, in other words economic security, is becoming increasingly important. The Council for the Promotion of Economic Security, chaired by the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Minister as a member, has been convened since November 2021. In addition, in May 2022, Japan enacted the Economic Security Promotion Act centered around four pillars: enhancing the resilience of supply chains, ensuring security and reliability of critical infrastructure, support for the development of advanced critical technologies, and non-disclosure of selected patent applications. The operation of various systems related to these four pillars has commenced.

In the face of various threats at hand through economic means, the National Security Strategy, established in December the same year, also lays out that Japan will coordinate ideas on necessary economic measures and execute these measures comprehensively, effectively, and intensively to enhance Japan's self-reliance and to secure the advantage and indispensability concerning its technologies and others.

In light of the fact that it has become clear that supply chain vulnerabilities can have adverse impacts in diverse fields even from the perspective of development, the Development Cooperation Charter approved by the Cabinet in June 2023, as one of the priority policies in Japan's development cooperation, advocates promoting cooperation to enhance resilience and diversification of supply chains as well as economic diversification, sustainable development of critical mineral resources, and stable supply and security of food, among other forms of cooperation, in order to strengthen the socioeconomic autonomy and resilience of developing countries.

In May, the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Critical Economic Security Information, which covers the introduction of a security clearance system in the field of economic security, was enacted. It is scheduled to be enforced within one year from its promulgation.

B Recent Initiatives by Other Countries

Other countries have also been rapidly advancing initiatives to promote economic security in recent years.

The U.S. has taken the lead in adopting and implementing regulations and promotion measures from the perspectives of maintaining its technological advantage and addressing supply chain risks. With the aim of strengthening data security and protection for American citizens, the President issued an Executive Order in February 2024 that grants the Attorney General the right to issue regulations to prohibit the large-scale transfer of American's sensitive personal data to countries of concern. A National Security Memorandum (NSM) to manage AI security risks was announced in October, based on the Executive Order for the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) issued in October 2023. At the end of the same month, the Department of the Treasury issued a final rule on the Outbound Order (provisions pertaining to U.S. foreign investments) regarding countries or regions of concern (China, Hong Kong, and Macau) in relation to the three areas of semiconductors, quantum information technologies, and AI in view of the severe impact it may have on national security. In December, the Department of Commerce tightened export control measures of semiconductor-related items to China with the aim of restricting China's capability to produce advanced semiconductors that can be diverted for military applications. In the same month, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced tariff increases on imports of five products originating from China, including tungsten, polysilicon, and wafers, based on Section 301 of the Trade Act.

In January, the European Commission published a policy document entitled “Advancing European economic security: an introduction to five new initiatives,” and announced a comprehensive policy package comprising proposals on the screening of foreign direct investments into the EU, export control, outbound investment, support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential, and research security, based on the European Economic Security Strategy issued in June 2023. The Critical Raw Materials Act, which establishes targets related to supply capacities for strategic raw materials and sets out provisions on support for strategic projects and supply chain risk monitoring, entered into force in May, with the aim of securing the supply of critical raw materials for the EU. The need to address economic security issues, including critical raw materials and supply chain resilience, was also stressed in the report on the single market presented by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta in April, and the report on the future of European competitiveness presented by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi in September. The “Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024 – 2029,” published in July by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, positions the advancement of Europe's economic security as a priority, and a Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security was newly appointed in the European Commission inaugurated in December.

Australia has, thus far, positioned the securing of national resilience and the protection of assets and infrastructure as its national interests, and advanced concrete measures to that end. These include the formulation of the International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy (April 2021), which sets out the policy for promoting the identification of technologies that should be protected, and the tightening of investment screening systems for land and businesses related to sensitive national security (January 2021). In November, it amended the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 to further enhance security. This includes measures such as promoting information sharing between public and private entities by clearly stipulating the protection of trade secrets provided by businesses and other parties to the government, and introducing powers that allow regulators to issue remedial orders pertaining to the mandatory development of risk management programs by critical infrastructure owners and operators.

Canada published its Critical Minerals Strategy in 2022 and strengthened its efforts ranging from critical mineral research and exploration to recycling. In January 2024, it made a statement on new measures to protect Canadian research, which incorporates the publication of a list of named research organizations connected to military, national defense, or state security entities that may pose a risk to Canada's national security, as well as a list of sensitive technology research areas. Under the new measures, grants and funding will not be provided to research in these areas if any of the researchers involved in activities supported by the grant are affiliated with, or in receipt of funding or in-kind support from, a university, research institute or laboratory connected to such entities. In August, the Government of Canada announced additional tariffs of 100% on electric vehicles (EVs) produced in China as well as 25% on steel and aluminum products imported from China, with the aim of protecting Canadian workers and major economic sectors from China's unfair trade practices. These additional tariffs went into effect from October.

C Diplomatic Efforts Toward the Promotion of Economic Security

Diplomacy plays a significant role in promoting economic security. Japan, in cooperation with the international community, is engaged in active diplomacy in areas such as further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, responding to issues based on existing rules, and rule-making to address new challenges.

In relation to further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, Japan leverages bilateral efforts including through the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee Meeting (the Economic “2+2”) and economic security consultations, as well as cooperation under the G7, Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad), and Japan-U.S.-ROK, to expand and deepen cooperation with a view to developing common recognition and coordinating policies.

With regard to responses based on existing rules, Japan has been working in coordination with like-minded countries to seek correction of unfair trade policies and practices by other countries, from the perspective of consistency with existing rules such as World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Furthermore, Japan gathers and analyzes information on economic security measures and trade rules, drawing on the efforts of like-minded countries, and works to ensure that Japan's economic security policy needs are appropriately met.

With regard to rule-making to respond to new challenges, existing international agreements are not adequate for addressing areas such as critical and emerging technologies, economic coercion, and others. In fields where there is a need to further develop international rules, Japan continues to play a leading role in international debates in cooperation with like-minded countries.

D Cooperation with its Ally and Like-minded Countries

Following on from last year, Japan continued to make particularly significant progress in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries in 2024.

Under the G7 framework, based on the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security issued at the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May 2023, the G7 leaders affirmed at the G7 Apulia Summit held in June that they will continue to cooperate and act together on addressing issues related to overcapacity and non-market policies and practices (NMPP), countering economic coercion, enhancing supply chain resilience, and protecting critical and emerging technologies. In particular, they affirmed a shared recognition that the market distortions and overcapacity resulting from NMPP not only undermine the free and fair rules-based international economic order, but also exacerbate strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities and hinder emerging and developing countries' sustainable development. At the same time, they concurred on pursuing joint monitoring to assess how NMPP are producing harmful overcapacities and other spillover effects. At the G7 Trade Ministers' Meeting held in July, the Ministers concurred to strengthen collaboration among like-minded countries and between the public and private sectors for enhancing supply chain resilience, and to bolster efforts to address overcapacity and NMPP. At the same meeting, the Ministers also confirmed that they will work to strengthen monitoring and information exchange on export controls of critical minerals. Moreover, they condemned any attempts to weaponize economic dependencies, and concurred to increase collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion.

Furthermore, a session on economic resilience was convened at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Council Meeting chaired by Japan in May. During the session, participating countries discussed cooperation among member countries and the role that OECD could play, in efforts related to economic resilience and economic security, such as strengthening supply chain resilience, countering economic coercion, and addressing NMPP.

At the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting held in September, the leaders concurred on expanding cooperation in the area of 5G and Open RAN to the Philippines and Tuvalu, following the 2023 announcement of the launch and rollout of Open RAN⁽⁴⁾ in Palau. They also affirmed their continued commitment to advancing cooperation on semiconductors.

At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting held in November, the leaders commended the Trilateral Economic Security Dialogue for deepening trilateral engagements on economic security issues, and welcomed regularized, active consultation among the three countries to exchange early warning information on supply chain disruptions. They also concurred on the need for trilateral collaboration on technology security, standards, and trusted ecosystems.

With regard to Japan's relations with the U.S., at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April, the two leaders concurred on strengthening cooperation to respond to economic coercion, non-market policies and practices and overcapacities, and enhance supply chain resilience. In this context, they shared the view to further deepen coordination toward ensuring economic security either bilaterally, through the G7, or based on other various frameworks.

In regard to relations with European countries, the first Japan-France Economic Security Working Group was held in February, based on the “Roadmap on Japan-France Cooperation under the ‘Exceptional Partnership'” announced between the leaders of Japan and France in December 2023. At the Japan-UK Summit Meeting held in November, the two leaders concurred on the launch of the Japan-UK Economic 2+2 Ministers' Meeting (“Economic 2+2”) to further advance bilateral cooperation in the field of economy, including trade and economic security, between Japan and the UK. In regard to Germany, the first meeting of the Japan-Germany Economic Security Consultations was held in November based on the outcomes of the Japan-Germany Summit Meeting that took place in July.

With regard to Japan's relations with the EU, the two sides exchanged views on their respective initiatives regarding economic security at the Japan-EU High-Level Economic Dialogue held in May. In addition to affirming the importance of cooperation between like-minded countries, they confirmed the launch of the “Transparent, Resilient and Sustainable Supply Chains Initiative” and concurred on working together to address strategic dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities and ensure resilient and reliable global supply chains.

With regard to Japan's relations with the ROK, at the 16th Japan-ROK High-Level Economic Consultations held in December, the two sides confirmed the progress of collaboration and cooperation in a wide range of areas, including economic security.

With regard to Japan's relations with Australia, at the Eleventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) held in September, the Ministers concurred on strengthening cooperation in the field of economic security, including through leveraging the Australia-Japan Economic Security Dialogue. Furthermore, at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in October, the leaders concurred on strengthening dialogue and cooperation in the field of economic security.

As for India, at the Third Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting held in August, the two sides confirmed that they would enhance cooperation in the field of economic security. Following that, the inaugural round of the Japan-India Dialogue on Economic Security, including Strategic Trade and Technology, was held in November.

In relation to Canada, in addition to the 2022 announcement of the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region” that includes cooperation in the field of energy security, the two countries signed Memorandums of Cooperation Concerning Battery Supply Chains and Industrial Science and Technology respectively in September 2023, further accelerating cooperation in these fields.

With regard to Japan's relations with Southeast Asia, the “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States” issued on the occasion of the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Summit in April set out the leaders' strong opposition to economic coercion, and stressed the importance of a rules-based economic order while underscoring the need for close coordination in dealing with economic coercion. The “Mekong-Japan Cooperation Strategy 2024” adopted at the 15th Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July confirmed that Japan and the Mekong countries will work on strengthening economic security and economic resilience, expressed their concerns over as well as opposition to economic coercion, and stressed the importance of the rules-based economic order.

---

• (4) Refers to radio access networks (RAN) that can be built in an open way by a combination of multiple vendors. It offers the advantage of contributing to the mitigation of supply chain risks.

E Response to Economic Coercion

Among the new issues described in section C on page 206, economic coercion that involves using economic ties with a specific country and taking measures or threatening to take measures in an abusive, arbitrary, or opaque manner, in order to achieve political objectives, is becoming a particularly serious problem against the backdrop of globalization and the growing economic interdependence between countries. Such economic coercion poses challenges to a free, open and rules based international order.

The National Security Strategy published in December 2022 also sets out the policy for promoting effective efforts against economic coercion by foreign countries. To address economic coercion, which is an issue that cannot be adequately addressed by existing international agreements, it is important to foster a common recognition broadly within the international community in cooperation with the relevant countries including the Global South, while also working with allies and like-minded countries to raise international awareness on how economic coercion challenges the free, open, and rules-based international order. Based on such understanding, steady efforts have been made on the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion, whose launch was confirmed by the leaders at the G7 Hiroshima Summit. At the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting held in May, an abstract was released for the OECD trade policy paper titled “Trade Impacts of Economic Coercion,” prepared with voluntary contributions from Japan. This paper analyzed past cases of economic coercion to shed light on their characteristics and economic impacts. The Japan-Philippines-U.S. Trilateral Discussion on Economic Resilience was held in October, during which participants shared their concern over and strong opposition to economic coercion, and a commitment to building economic resilience. They also affirmed that the three countries intend to cooperate to enhance their resilience and ability to respond to potential economic coercion.

(3) Cyber

Today, cross-border cyberspace has become an indispensable social infrastructure for conducting all activities in countries around the world, and its importance and public nature are growing due to its role as a public space that all citizens are engaged in. On the other hand, amid the growing competition among nations and other entities that reflects recent geopolitical tensions, cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks.

Based on this recognition, MOFA is engaged in various diplomatic efforts to realize a free, fair, and secure cyberspace: deterring cyberattacks, rule-making in cyberspace, supporting developing countries, and leveraging various cyber consultations and dialogues for information exchange and policy coordination related to these efforts.

As an initiative to deter cyberattacks, Japan has carried out “public attribution,” which is to publicly condemn or express concerns about groups conducting cyberattacks. MOFA has issued statements by its Press Secretary to condemn North Korea's involvement behind the WannaCry incident⁽⁵⁾ in 2017, the cyberattacks by APT10 based in China in 2018, and the cyberattacks carried out by APT40 in 2021. Also, in January 2025, Japan issued the Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Statement on Cryptocurrency Thefts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Public-Private Collaboration, working with ally and like-minded countries to send out such messages.

Regarding initiatives on rule-making in cyberspace, through discussions at the UN that have spanned about a quarter of a century, all UN Member States have confirmed the application of existing international law to cyberspace and adopted the UN norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace,⁽⁶⁾ which sets out 11 items. While these norms are not legally binding under international law, they have been adopted by consensus among the UN Member States and provide the basis for rule-making in cyberspace. Therefore, it is important for each country to implement these norms concretely, and to build up state practices. Based on this perspective, Japan participates actively in the relevant discussions in the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), in which all UN Member States participate, for the term from 2021 to 2025. It is also important for each country to clarify their basic positions on how existing international law applies to cyberspace. Japan made its position public in 2021,⁽⁷⁾ and has been emphasizing the importance of clarifying basic positions through various venues.

With regard to capacity building support, in view of the borderless nature of cyberspace, enhancing the capacity of other countries and regions contributes to the security environment for the world as a whole, including Japan, relevant ministries and agencies, including MOFA are engaged in initiatives, including those through international organizations, with a focus on ASEAN, which is a cornerstone for realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” based on the rule of law. Specifically, Japan conducts training at the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC) and provides training programs and equipment by the relevant ministries and agencies, implements the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Country/Knowledge Co-Creation Program (KCCP), contributes to the Cybersecurity Multi-Donor Trust Fund through the World Bank, and co-organizes the “JP-US-EU Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Week for the Indo-Pacific Region” jointly with the U.S. and European governments through the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence (ICSCoE) under the Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA), among other initiatives.

Leveraging various cyber consultations and dialogues is of utmost importance in advancing these initiatives in cyberspace. To that end, Japan is promoting international cooperation through cyber consultations and dialogues with many countries and regions. In 2024, Japan held intergovernmental consultations with the U.S., Jordan, Lithuania, and the UK, as well as trilateral consultations between Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.-Philippines, and with the EU. Under the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership announced at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting in May 2022, the four countries are cooperating on cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and capacity building support in the Indo-Pacific region, among other efforts. Japan also participates actively in discussions within the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, a multilateral framework led by the U.S. to combat the rapidly growing threat of ransomware,⁽⁸⁾ as well as the Pall Mall Process, which is a framework led by the UK and France to tackle the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion capabilities.

Through these diplomatic efforts, Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of a free, fair and secure cyberspace.

---

• (5) A malicious program that North Korea is believed to have been involved in. In May 2017, more than 300,000 computers in over 150 countries were infected, and ransom was demanded.
• (6) At the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015, a report setting out 11 items on non-binding, voluntary norms for responsible state behavior was adopted.
• (7) See MOFA's website for Japan's position:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page3e_001114.html
  
• (8) Cyberattacks carried out for ransom purposes.

(4) Maintaining and Developing the International Maritime Order

Japan is a country surrounded by the sea on all sides, and is blessed with a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and long coastlines. It is a maritime nation that has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources. “Free and Open Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based on the rule of law including freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than force, are essential for the peace and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Based on this stance, the Government of Japan has stood united in promoting efforts to maintain and develop the international maritime order, in addition to securing Japan's national interests in its territorial waters, in accordance with the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy adopted in April 2023 and the Ocean Development Strategy formulated this April. In cooperation with allied and like-minded countries, Japan is advancing efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” and working in particular to strengthen maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, where important sea lanes are located.

A Basic Stance

There is an increasing number of cases, particularly in Asia, of tensions arising from friction between countries over issues surrounding the seas. In light of this, in 2014, Prime Minister Abe shared the view that it was necessary to fully uphold the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea.” (See Section 1, 6(2) on page 253.) At the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida reaffirmed the importance of the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” while introducing the new plan for FOIP. Based on these principles, Japan has been cooperating with other countries to work toward maintaining and developing the international maritime order. (See Chapter 2, Section 1)

B United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Also known as the “Constitution for the Oceans,” UNCLOS is the very basis of maritime order governed by the rule of law. Japan regards maritime order with the Convention at its core as the cornerstone that safeguards Japan's maritime rights and interests while facilitating its maritime activities across the international community. As such, Japan actively contributes to discussions among concerned international organizations at conferences that include the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, as well as to the sharing of ideas for achieving stability in the maritime legal order, in order to ensure that the convention will be even more widely applied and implemented appropriately. (See Section 1, 6(2) on page 253.) At the G7 Apulia Summit held in June, G7 leaders re-emphasized the universal and unified character of UNCLOS.

C Response to Challenges to Japan's Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests (Situation Surrounding the East China Sea) (See Chapter 2, Section 2, 2(1) B(D))

In the East China Sea, China Coast Guard vessels intruded into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in rapid succession in 2024, and the number of days China Coast Guard vessels navigated in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands reached a record high of 355 days in the year. Furthermore, there were repeated occurrences of China Coast Guard vessels intruding into the territorial sea and approaching Japanese fishing vessels, and the situation remains severe, with the number of hours of intrusion into the territorial sea hitting a record high of more than 80 hours in April 2023. The Chinese military is also becoming increasingly active and expanding their operations, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the air and waters in the East China Sea, and China has been continuing with unilateral resource development in areas where the EEZ and the continental shelf are pending delimitation. Additionally, in recent years, Japan has found numerous research projects being conducted by China in the waters surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, without Japan's consent. In July 2023, Japan spotted a buoy believed to have been installed by China in Japan's EEZ in the East China Sea. The Government of Japan has taken various opportunities at all levels, including at the leader and foreign ministerial levels, to protest against China and has strongly and repeatedly urged China to remove the buoy immediately. In February 2025, it was confirmed that the buoy in question was not within Japan's EEZ. Regarding a buoy newly identified within Japan's EEZ south of Yonaguni Island in December 2024, the Government of Japan is calling on China for its immediate removal, on such occasions as the Japan-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in the same month.

Given China's continued and strengthened unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea, Japan will carefully monitor the trends and movements around its air and sea spaces and continue to respond in a firm but calm manner with a determination to resolutely defend Japan's territory as well as territorial sea and airspace. At the same time, it will promote cooperation with the relevant countries including the U.S. in order to achieve peace and stability in the East China Sea.

At the G7 Apulia Summit convened in June, G7 leaders stated that they remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas, and strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Furthermore, at the ASEAN Japan Summit and East Asia Summit (EAS) held in October, Prime Minister Ishiba expressed strong opposition to the continuing and intensifying activities in the East China Sea that infringe upon Japan's sovereignty.

D Response to Challenges to the Maritime Order in the South China Sea (See Chapter 2, Section 2, 7(2))

In the South China Sea, China has been continuing and intensifying unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, which run counter to the rule of law and openness, as well as actions that increase regional tensions, based on expansive maritime claims without legal basis. These include further militarization of disputed features, and coercive and intimidating actions against coastal states and others by using its armed forces, coast guards and maritime militia. Especially since 2023, ramming between Chinese and Philippine vessels as well as use of water cannons by Chinese vessels against Philippine vessels have frequently occurred. In June, Chinese crews boarded a Philippine vessel in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal, seized weapons and supplies, destroyed equipment, and forcibly towed a Philippine vessel. A Philippine soldier lost a thumb due to the ramming.

From the perspective of supporting the full enforcement of the rule of law at sea, and upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and the safety of sea lanes, Japan has consistently expressed its strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, as well as any actions that increase tensions in the South China Sea. Japan has also emphasized the importance of all the concerned parties related to the South China Sea to work toward peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, in particular UNCLOS. In July, which marked eight years since the issuance of the Arbitral Tribunal's award as to the disputes between the Philippines and China regarding the South China Sea in 2016, MOFA released a statement by the Foreign Minister, reiterating that the 2016 Tribunal's award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute, the Philippines and China, and that Japan strongly hopes that the parties' compliance with the award will lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

At the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Summit, held for the first time in April, the three leaders reiterated serious concern over China's repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels' exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal, which constitute dangerous and destabilizing conduct. At the G7 Apulia Summit convened in June, the G7 leaders expressed serious concern about the situation in the South China Sea, and reiterated their strong opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion. They also expressed serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippine vessels. In this regard, they reaffirmed UNCLOS's important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. At the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting held in September, the leaders expressed their serious concern about the militarization of disputed features and coercive and intimidating maneuvers in the South China Sea, and condemned the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, including increasing use of dangerous maneuvers. Furthermore, they underscored their opposition to efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities, and re-emphasized the importance of maintaining and upholding unimpeded commerce consistent with international law. At the ASEAN Japan Summit and EAS held in October, Prime Minister Ishiba stressed that, as the militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea are continuing and intensifying, any unjust claims of maritime interests and activities that do not align with UNCLOS are unacceptable.

Issues regarding the South China Sea are directly related to the peace and stability of the region and constitute a legitimate concern of the international community. These issues are also important matters of concern for Japan, which depends on marine transport for much of its resources and energy. Japan will continue to work with the international community, such as ASEAN member states, and the U.S. to uphold and strengthen a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law.

E Measures to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

Japan actively contributes to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and safe maritime transport through efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia and Africa as well as close partnership and cooperation with other countries.

(A) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia

In 2006, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) entered into force under Japan's leadership, and through the Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) established in Singapore, has been conducting information sharing on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and other regions, as well as cooperation to support capacity building. To date, Japan has been supporting the activities of ReCAAP-ISC by dispatching the Executive Directors (expiration of term in March 2022) and Assistant Directors and making financial contributions. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), while the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the seas of Southeast Asia was 58 in 2022, 67 in 2023, and 70 in 2024, the occurrence of serious incidents, including kidnappings and assaults, has been suppressed in recent years as a result of activities by ReCAAP-ISC and the contributions of the contracting parties.

(B) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

According to the IMB, the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, which is an important sea lane linking Asia and Europe, was 237 at its peak in 2011. It has declined to a low level with zero or one attempted incident since 2019. This low level has been maintained despite the occurrence of eight piracy cases in 2024. Going forward, there is a need for cooperation with the international community to ensure that the number of piracy cases does not reverse into an increasing trend again.

Since 2009, Japan has been conducting counter-piracy operations by deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers (with coast guard officers on board) and P-3C patrol aircraft off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, which have helped to stabilize the situation in these waters. Japan has also been making multilayered efforts such as support for enhancing the maritime law enforcement capabilities of Somalia, Djibouti, and the neighboring countries, and ensuring the stability of Somalian society.

(C) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea

According to IMB, the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea was 19 in 2022, 22 in 2023, and 18 in 2024, and the Gulf of Guinea continues to be a sea area with the largest number of serious incidents in the world, including cases with multiple casualties. Strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities among coastal states remains a key issue. To that end, Japan provides capacity building assistance to the coastal countries through training programs conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and JICA, and works with the international community through participation in meetings of the “G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea,” among other efforts.

F International Cooperation on Capacity Building Assistance

Amid advancing globalization, the impact of technological innovation on the global security environment, rapid changes in the military balance, including China's growing militarization, and greater cross-border threats, no single country can protect its peace and security on its own. This is particularly true in the maritime field. Therefore, Japan is advancing efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities and maritime law enforcement capabilities, while providing capacity building assistance to various countries to support their maritime security and maritime law enforcement capabilities as well as engaging in international cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) with the aim of maintaining and developing international maritime order, in collaboration and cooperation with allied and like-minded countries.

Japan has been utilizing Official Development Assistance (ODA) in these cooperative efforts. At the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in 2022, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan will make use of technical cooperation, training, and other means conducive to strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of at least 20 countries to promote efforts to train at least 800 maritime security personnel and strengthen their human resources network over a three-year period until 2025, including through sharing Japan's knowledge and experience on advanced technologies, such as satellites, artificial intelligence (AI) and unmanned aerial vehicles, with other countries. Additionally, he pledged to provide at least approximately 2 billion U.S. dollars in assistance, such as the provision of maritime security equipment including patrol vessels and development of maritime transportation infrastructure, to Indo-Pacific countries. He also stated that Japan will strengthen support to Indo-Pacific countries, utilizing Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) and international organizations and so forth.

In 2023, trainings were conducted in Japan and overseas for more than 600 officials of coast guard authorities and relevant agencies of 20 countries. Japan also decided to provide a large patrol vessel, which will be built at a Japanese shipyard, to the Indonesian Coast Guard Agency under the grant aid project, “The Project for Enhancement of Ability in Maritime Safety and Security.” Through its support toward the Maritime Law Enforcement Capacity Building Project implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), Japan also develops training courses and conducts training and workshops on measures against maritime crimes in the target countries of the Indo-Pacific and West Africa.

To provide capacity building assistance to coast guard authorities of coastal states of the Indo-Pacific, the Japan Coast Guard dispatches highly skilled Japan Coast Guard officials with expert knowledge as well as the Japan Coast Guard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT), a special team that provides foreign coast guard authorities with capacity building (including through the GMCP framework). The Japan Coast Guard also invites foreign coast guard officials to Japan to train them under the “Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program.” In addition, Japan provides capacity building in areas, such as vessel maintenance and underwater medicine, to the militaries of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and conducts training on board Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels for young naval officers of ASEAN member states and other countries.

Official Security Assistance (OSA), newly established in 2023, positions maritime security as one of its priority areas with a view to strengthening security and deterrence capabilities by providing equipment and supplies as well as assistance for infrastructure development to the armed forces and related organizations of like-minded countries. In FY2024, Japan decided to provide the Philippines with Rigid-hulled inflatable boats and coastal radar systems, Indonesia with patrol boats, and Djibouti with coastal radar systems and related infrastructure.

Japan also provides support toward strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities through international organizations and multilateral frameworks. In October, coast guards and other law-enforcement agencies from 12 ReCAAP contracting parties, primarily Asian countries, were invited to Tokyo to participate in a capacity building project. (See the Special Feature on page 216.) Japan is also coordinating with allied and like-minded countries, such as by cooperating on the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), an initiative implemented by Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad), and sharing MDA information with various countries based on memorandums of understanding.

(5) Outer Space

In June 2023, Japan revised its Basic Plan on Space Policy for the first time in three years and formulated a new Space Security Initiative. The Space Security Initiative sets out specific challenges and policies in the field of space security, incorporates measures to be taken for space security during the next decade, and covers efforts to maintain the stable use of and free access to outer space together with Japan's allied and like-minded countries.

In recent years, outer space has become more congested due to diversification of use and an increase in the number of countries using space. In addition, the increase of space debris due to factors such as anti-satellite (ASAT) tests poses a growing risk to the sustainable and stable use of outer space. In order to respond to this situation, Japan has been engaging in initiatives such as strengthening Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance for space systems. Japan has also been working on international rule-making and international space cooperation.

A Realization of the Rule of Law in Outer Space

Based on the belief that outer space must remain a domain free of nuclear weapons, Japan and the U.S. jointly drafted a United Nations Security Council resolution in April that calls on the member states not to develop nuclear weapons and any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction specifically designed to be placed in outer space. This draft resolution was co-submitted by 65 member states but was rejected, as Russia exercised its veto. Subsequently, Japan, the U.S., and Argentina jointly submitted a draft resolution that included similar elements to the United Nations General Assembly. The draft resolution was adopted with an overwhelming majority of 167 member states.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a permanent committee established under the UN General Assembly, plays an important role in international rule making related to civil space activities.

Apart from the Committee, which engages in comprehensive discussions, COPUOS has the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which conducts reviews on issues related to space activities from scientific and technical aspects, and the Legal Subcommittee, which discusses legal matters arising from space activities.

At the session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee convened from January through February, active discussions were held on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, in addition to discussions on individual themes, such as space debris and remote sensing.

At the session of the Legal Subcommittee convened in April, discussions were held on the definition of outer space and on issues related to equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit, as well as on Space Traffic Management (STM) and space resources, which have been attracting more attention in recent years. In particular, intensive discussions were held at the working group established under the Legal Subcommittee in 2021 on how international rules regarding space resources should be.

Regarding the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), active discussions were held in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on “Responsible Behaviours in Outer Space” from 2022 through 2023, which was jointly proposed by Japan, the UK, and other countries in 2021. However, the OEWG was unable to adopt the report due to objection from some countries. Separately, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on PAROS, established through a proposal by Russia in 2022, was convened in Geneva in November 2023 and August 2024, and a report was adopted by consensus. The United Nations General Assembly also decided to merge the succeeding OEWG on “Responsible Behaviours” proposed by the UK and the OEWG on PAROS proposed by Russia in 2023 respectively.

In addition, with a view to contributing to the rule of law in outer space, Japan announced in 2021 that it would cooperate with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) on its “Space Law for New Space Actors” project and has since been offering support to emerging space-faring nations in the Asia Pacific region for the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws. Japan provided legal capacity building support with a focus on continuing supervision as well as authorization and licensing of space activities, and conducted an intensive three-day workshop at the United Nations University in January with about 25 experts from seven countries (Bhutan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, and Thailand).

B International Dialogues and Consultations on Outer Space

Japan promotes dialogues and consultations on outer space primarily with major space-faring nations and nations in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, the Ninth Meeting of the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space was held in the U.S. in August. It was attended by officials from space-related ministries and agencies of Japan and the U.S., who engaged in comprehensive discussions on a wide range of subjects including commercial space, space security, and civil space. A joint statement was issued on the outcomes of the Dialogue.

As part of the efforts under Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad), workshops were conducted through the Quad Space Working Group established at the Quad Leaders' Meeting held in 2021. At the Quad Leaders' Meeting held in September, the four leaders concurred on calling upon all States to contribute to the safe, peaceful, responsible, and sustainable use of outer space.

With regard to multilateral meetings, the 30th session of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-30) was held in November, co-organized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the Australian Space Agency (ASA). At this Forum, discussions were held regarding a collaborative system for building a sustainable and responsible regional space sector.

C International Space Exploration and the International Space Station (ISS)

The progress of space exploration and application for peaceful purposes is a common benefit for all humankind, and is also of diplomatic significance.

In 2019, Japan decided to participate in the Artemis Program, a U.S.-led international space exploration program. In 2020, with the Artemis Program in mind, eight countries, including Japan and the U.S., signed the Artemis Accords, which set out a political commitment to establish principles for creating a safe and transparent environment in promoting outer space activities. Thereafter, more countries signed the Artemis Accords, and the number of signatories increased to 52 countries as of the end of December 2024.

Furthermore, in 2023, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. signed the Framework Agreement between Japan and the United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which is a new legal framework to further facilitate Japan-U.S. space cooperation, represented by the exploration and use of outer space. This Agreement entered into force in June. The Implementing Arrangement prepared for this Framework Agreement and signed in April states that Japan will provide and maintain the operation of the Pressurized Rover on the lunar surface, while the U.S. will provide two astronaut flight opportunities on the lunar surface to Japanese astronauts in future Artemis missions. In connection with this, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting convened in the same month, the two leaders announced a shared goal for a Japanese national to be the first non-American astronaut to land on the Moon on a future Artemis mission.

Japan has been providing human resource development programs (robot programming, physics and plant experiments, etc.) to the Asia Pacific region through the Kibo-ABC Initiative established under the APRSAF, utilizing the Japanese Experiment Module “Kibo” on the ISS to support capacity building in the space field. Japan also provides emerging space-faring nations with the opportunity to deploy nano-satellites through the KiboCUBE program,⁽⁹⁾ a collaborative framework implemented with the UNOOSA. Under this program, the Central American Integration System (SICA), Mexico, as well as Tanzania and Côte d'Ivoire (both countries jointly) are developing satellites for deployment.

---

• (9) A program that provides selected organizations with the opportunity to deploy nano-satellites from the ISS/Japanese Experiment Module – Kibo, with the aim of contributing to improving space-related technologies in emerging space-faring nations.

D Addressing Global Issues through the Utilization of Space Technology

Amidst rising expectations of space technology's potential in resolving global issues in recent years, Japan has been promoting international cooperation based on the utilization of its internationally superior space technologies, and contributing toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

For example, Japan provides, at no charge, the Global Satellite Mapping of Precipitation (GSMaP) system, which utilizes multiple satellites to observe the global rainfall situation. This system is applied to a wide range of uses, including rainfall situation monitoring, disaster management, and agriculture in 152 countries and regions around the world. Furthermore, Japan took the lead in launching “Sentinel Asia,” an initiative to provide free observational satellite information during disasters to contribute to disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region. To date, this project has responded to more than 490 emergency requests from 37 countries. Japan also holds workshops for those who are involved in disaster readiness and response, and contributes to capacity building in the utilization of satellite data during disasters in Asian countries.

In addition, the JICA, in collaboration with JAXA, hosted 13 officials from space-related agencies of 10 countries in Japan in July for training to enhance their ability to utilize space technology to contribute to the SDGs. Additionally, in the technical cooperation projects launched in FY2023 to improve the organizational and technological capacity of the space agencies of Paraguay and Rwanda, several training courses were conducted in Japan with the support of industry, academia, and government partners in Japan's space sector. On the occasion of Prime Minister Kishida's visit to Paraguay in May, JAXA and the Paraguayan Space Agency (AEP) signed a memorandum of cooperation on space development and established the “Japan-Paraguay Space Cooperation Program” through industry-academia-government collaboration, affirming that both sides will advance multifaceted cooperation.

(6) Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The international community is still experiencing regional and domestic conflicts as a result of various factors including differences in race, religion, and history, or due to the impact of poverty and disparity. In recent years, the protracted nature of these conflicts has particularly become a challenging problem. For this reason, in addition to post-conflict peacekeeping through the dispatch of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and other means, peacebuilding efforts that take into consideration building a foundation for development have become an important issue for preventing conflicts and their recurrence, as well as realizing post-conflict nation-building and sustaining peace.

In recent years, there have been concerns about the impact of conflicts, as well as new risks such as climate change and infectious diseases, on peace and stability, necessitating a more unified approach. As issues facing the international community become more complex and diverse, peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives are becoming increasingly important. For example, the strengthening of Peace operations, such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts has been incorporated into the “New Agenda for Peace” and the outcome document of the Summit of the Future entitled “Pact for the Future.” (See Section 5 (2) on page 243.)

A On-the-Ground Initiatives

(A) UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)

As of December 31, 2024, 11 UN PKO missions are on active duty, primarily in the Middle East and Africa, to handle a wide range of duties that include monitoring cease-fires, promoting political processes, and protecting civilians. About 70,000 military, police, and civilian personnel have been deployed to these missions. Against the backdrop of an increasingly complex environment surrounding UN PKO, including growing threats associated with the use of new technologies, active discussions are being held on the future of Peacekeeping.

In addition to PKO missions, the UN has also established Special Political Missions (SPMs) mainly consisting of civilian personnel. SPMs fulfill diverse roles including the peaceful settlement of disputes, post-conflict peacebuilding, and conflict prevention.

Based on the Act on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Act), Japan has dispatched more than 12,700 personnel to a total of 29 missions since 1992, including UN PKO missions. Most recently, since 2011, Japanese staff officers have been dispatched to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), while engineering units have been deployed there from 2012. The engineering units undertook such activities as developing infrastructure and providing water supplies to displaced persons, and concluded their activities in May 2017. Two additional SDF personnel, including an officer to fill a Deputy Chief of Staff position, were dispatched to the UNMISS Headquarters in May 2024, making a total of six SDF personnel on active duty there as of December 31, 2024. They continue to work toward peace and stability in the country. Additionally, since 2019, Japan has been conducting activities contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East by dispatching SDF officers to the Headquarters for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) stationed on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, where four SDF officers are on active duty as of December 31, 2024. Leveraging its own strengths, Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace cooperation in the future by means such as enhancing capacity building support and dispatching units and individuals.

(B) ODA and Other Cooperation to Facilitate Peacebuilding

In addressing conflicts and humanitarian crises, peacebuilding and preventing the recurrence of conflict even in peacetime, in addition to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, are important toward the realization of an inclusive society. With the number of refugees and displaced persons in the world exceeding 100 million people for the first time in 2022, there is a greater need than before to address the root causes of crises through assistance for self-reliant development by building resilient nations and stabilizing societies from a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan clearly set out the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP Nexus)”⁽¹⁰⁾ approach in its Development Cooperation Charter revised in June 2023. At the Second Global Refugee Forum (GRF) held in December 2023, Japan expressed its resolve to play a leadership role in advancing this approach while cooperating with the international community to address the unprecedented humanitarian crisis, including support for peacebuilding.

---

• (10) Humanitarian, Development, and Peace Nexus: An approach, whereby, in parallel with humanitarian assistance, development cooperation is provided to support the self-reliance of refugees and reduce the burden on host countries, and peace efforts are promoted to resolve and prevent conflicts that are the root causes.

a. Middle East

Japan has provided comprehensive support for peace and stability in the Middle East. This includes providing food and refugee assistance, as well as support for the development of human resources who can play an active role in nation-building. As for Palestine, in addition to an increase in the refugee population, it is also facing serious deterioration of the living environment, including the deteriorating refugee camp infrastructure as well as unemployment and poverty. Japan worked on improving the living environment of refugees through the implementation of the Camp Improvement Project (CIP) at refugee camps in Palestine, as well as by providing support to educational facilities, and contributed to the stabilization and improvement of the people's welfare based on human security.

b. Africa

At the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) Ministerial Meeting convened in August, Japan engaged in discussions toward peace and stability. Specifically, Japan announced the launch of the “Women's Peace Human Resource Development Initiative in the Horn of Africa” based at the Intergovernmental Development Organization (IGAD) and the development of a Mine Action Platform for counter-mine and unexploded ordnance measures, and highlighted the importance of reforming the UN Security Council to better reflect African voices. TICAD 9 is scheduled to be held in Yokohama in August 2025, and Japan will continue to support African-led efforts toward peace and stability through consolidating democracy and promoting the rule of law, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and community empowerment.

For example, Japan has conducted criminal justice training since 2014 for Francophone African countries, and has supported stabilization of the Sahel region by strengthening the capabilities of investigative and judicial bodies. Japan has also provided African countries with security equipment to improve their ability to maintain security against frequent terrorist attacks and transnational crimes, and provided support for landmine clearance.

In the “Horn of Africa” region, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa works to secure humanitarian access and promote ceasefire. Japan also contributes to the peace and stability of this region by providing support in elections, support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in Ethiopia, and humanitarian assistance, among other efforts. Furthermore, Japan, in collaboration with the UNDP, has disbursed a total of 66 million U.S. dollars between 2008 and 2024 to Peacekeeping Training Centers located in 14 African countries, contributing to strengthening Africa's capacity for peacekeeping activities.

B Initiatives within the UN

Against the backdrop of the growing awareness within the international community of the need for peacebuilding efforts, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established based on UN Security Council resolution 1645 and a General Assembly resolution of 2005, as an advisory body to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, with the aim of providing consistent advice on assistance, from conflict resolution to recovery, reintegration and reconstruction. In addition to conducting discussions on the approach to peacebuilding in countries and regions, the PBC also engages in discussions on themes such as Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS). In recent years, there have been increasing opportunities for the PBC to fulfill its advisory function to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Japan has consistently served as a member of the PBC's Organizational Committee since its establishment. It has been advocating the importance of investments in institution building and people, recognizing the need to adopt the HDP Nexus approach, in order to realize resilient and sustainable peace. In 2024, Japan served as the informal coordinator between the PBC and the Security Council, thereby contributing to strengthening cooperation between the two bodies.

Japan has contributed a total of 66.85 million U.S. dollars to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)⁽¹¹⁾ as of December 31, 2024, and as a major donor country, also actively supports the execution of projects implemented by UN agencies in Africa and other regions.

Japan continued to address peacebuilding as one of its priorities during its two-year term on the UN Security Council starting in January 2023. It hosted Open Debates on peacebuilding and conflict prevention on two occasions in January 2023 and March 2024 during its Presidency of the UN Security Council. These debates focused on various challenges faced by the so-called “Global South,” emphasized the role of people in preventing the recurrence of conflict and in sustaining peace, and underscored the importance of strengthening the UN through the utilization of the PBC. Many countries supported such views.

Furthermore, Japan engaged in efforts in the area of peacebuilding in cooperation with other members of the UN Security Council. In January 2024, Japan, Guyana, and Mozambique co-hosted a Security Council meeting based on the theme “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace through Comprehensive Approaches – Investment in People, including Empowerment of Women.” During this meeting, Japan actively communicated its position, bringing up the importance of investing in people, including the empowerment of women, in peacebuilding. In these ways, Japan stimulated discussions not only as a PBC member state, but also in UN fora as a member of the UN Security Council. Even after the conclusion of its term in the UN Security Council, Japan will continue to contribute actively through the PBC and in other ways.

---

• (11) A fund established in October 2006 to provide support to various regions, including Africa, for stopping the recurrence of regional conflicts and civil wars after they have ended as well as preventing conflicts. Specifically, the fund supports peace processes and political dialogues, economic revitalization, institution building for nations, and the participation by women and youth in nation-building, among other initiatives.

C Human Resource Development

(A) The Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development

Human resource development for highly skilled civilian experts with expertise presents a challenge in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding. Japan has been implementing a human resource development program in order to cultivate people who can play a leading role in the field. As of the end of 2024, more than 1,000 people have been trained. The participants who complete the program go on to play an active role in the field of peacebuilding and development in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, and have received high acclaim from different countries. Out of the 228 Japanese participants who have completed the training course (Primary Course) for entry-level human resources, 123 work in international organizations (as regular staff, as well as Junior Professional Officers (JPO), UN volunteers, and consultants). Hence, this program also contributes significantly to the career development of Japanese nationals, as well as the enhancement of their presence in international organizations in the fields of peacebuilding and development. In 2024, the Primary Course and a training course for mid-career professionals with experience in the fields of peacebuilding and development (Mid-Career Course) were conducted. (See the Column on page 223.)

(B) Training for Peacekeepers of Various Countries

Japan has been supporting peacekeepers from various countries participating in UN PKO to enhance their capabilities. Since 2015, in conjunction with cooperative efforts among the UN, supporting member states, and troop contributing countries, Japan has contributed financially to the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), a framework for innovative cooperation aimed at addressing the urgent need to improve the capabilities of PKO personnel by providing necessary training and equipment. Japan has also dispatched SDF personnel and other individuals as instructors. To date, Japan has conducted training on the operation of heavy engineering equipment for 336 personnel from nine African countries that expressed intentions to dispatch engineering units to UN PKO. In 2018, the TPP was extended to include Asia and the surrounding regions, and Japan conducted training in Viet Nam and Indonesia. Since October 2019, Japan has also started a lifesaving training program in the medical field, a considerably problematic area for UN PKO, while support for the introduction of telemedicine into UN PKO missions was launched in 2021. A total of 408 SDF personnel and other individuals have contributed to the training programs by serving as instructors for the operation of heavy engineering equipment and in the field of medicine. Japan decided in 2023 to contribute approximately 8.5 million U.S. dollars to expand the TPP and conduct training for personnel dispatched for peace support activities led by the African Union (AU), and it began training AU mission personnel in 2024. In Cambodia, Japan has also conducted cross-sectoral training in partnership with the ROK and Australia. Other than TPP, Japan dispatches instructors and other personnel, as well as providing financial assistance, to Peacekeeping Training Centers in Asia and Africa.

(7) Initiatives to Combat Security Threats

Ensuring public security and protecting the lives of the people are the premise of various socioeconomic activities and the basic responsibilities of a country. To cope effectively with security threats such as international terrorism and organized crime, which are rapidly becoming more complex and severe in tandem with social changes such as the advancement of science and technology and the spread of COVID-19, it is vital for the international community to cooperate as a whole.

A Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

In recent years, as people grow increasingly reliant on information and communication technology, it has become easier to spread information on extremism ideology online and to disseminate harmful contents that could incite terrorism or other damaging acts. There is a prominent trend of misuse of the Internet and social media by terrorist organizations for financing, recruitment, and propaganda activities. There has also been growing incidence of indiscriminate terrorist attacks that use simple, low-cost devices such as drones on soft targets where large crowds gather and security measures are limited, and some are of the view that terrorism is becoming more lethal. To counter such acts of terrorism, there is a need to cut off the flow of terrorist financing. Alongside international cooperation, it is also important for the public and private sectors to work together.

As a part of Japan's efforts to counter international terrorism and violent extremism, and to take measures against terrorist financing, it contributes to projects through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and supports capacity building for law enforcement organizations in Southeast Asian countries. Japan has also participated actively in relevant meetings and discussions held by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an international counter-terrorism framework, and cooperates on the project level with the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), an organization affiliated with GCTF, and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ). In particular, MOFA, together with IIJ and the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI),⁽¹²⁾ held the “Rule of Law Workshop in South Asia and Southeast Asia” in Tokyo in February 2024. Through bilateral and trilateral counter-terrorism consultations and the Quad (Japan-Australia-India-U.S.) Counterterrorism Working Group, among other initiatives, Japan also exchanges information on terrorism situations and affirms the strengthening of partnerships, while developing practical cooperation with other countries. As an initiative that Japan has carried out continuously for the past 20 years, Japan also runs an exchange program inviting Islamic school teachers to Japan and providing opportunities to experience interfaith dialogue, intercultural exchanges, and visit educational sites in Japan, with the aim of promoting moderation and the creation of more tolerant societies that are receptive to different values. Going forward, it will continue to implement such initiatives.

---

• (12) A regional UN research institute established in 1962 based on an agreement between the Government of Japan and the UN. Located in Akishima City, Tokyo, it is operated by the Ministry of Justice, and continuously implements training courses in the field of criminal justice for participants invited from overseas.

B Criminal Justice Initiatives

The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (“Congress”) (both of which have their secretariats under UNODC) are in charge of shaping policy on crime prevention and criminal justice in the international community. In March 2021, the 14th Congress (“Kyoto Congress”) was convened in Kyoto. In accordance with the overall theme, “Advancing crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law: toward the achievement of the 2030 Agenda,” the political declaration (“Kyoto Declaration”), summarizing the matters that should be addressed over the medium- to long-term by the international community in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice, was adopted. Since then, in cooperation with UNODC and other organizations, Japan has been demonstrating its leadership in advancing such initiatives as; (a) regularly convening the Criminal Justice Forum for Asia and the Pacific as a platform for information sharing and exchanges of opinions between practitioners in the field of criminal justice in the Asia-Pacific region; (b) regularly holding the Global Youth Forum for a Culture of Lawfulness, with the aim of facilitating independent discussions among youths, and incorporating their views into policies; (c) working toward the formulation of UN model strategies to promote efforts by the international community to reduce reoffending. In addition, Japan proactively engages in following up on the Kyoto Declaration through efforts such as supporting theme-based discussions on the Kyoto Declaration conducted by UNODC. At the session of the CCPCJ convened in May 2024, Japan submitted a draft resolution to continue following up on the Kyoto Declaration, and this resolution was adopted unanimously. As a result, the outcomes of the Kyoto Congress will be carried on to the 15th Congress (hosted by United Arab Emirates) in 2026. Furthermore, Japan provides support to improve prosecution capabilities and other criminal justice functions, to improve the operation of prisons, and to enhance capacities related to measures against cybercrime in Southeast Asian countries, by providing financial contributions to UNODC, INTERPOL, and the Council of Europe. Japan also contributes to the capacity building of criminal justice officers and other relevant personnel from various countries by conducting training on offender treatment, crime prevention, and anti-crime measures in Japan, through the UNAFEI. Japan is a State Party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which establishes a global legal framework for promoting cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime including terrorism more effectively. Japan advances international cooperation that includes providing international assistance in investigations in accordance with the UNTOC and reviewing the implementation of the Convention. With cybercrime emerging as a rising cross-border threat today, the UN launched discussions in 2019 on the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes, with the goal of bringing the international community together to address cybercrime. This Convention was adopted at the UN Headquarters in New York in December 2024. With the aim of ensuring a free, fair, and secure cyberspace, Japan worked tirelessly to conclude negotiations, including serving as the Vice-Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee established for the purpose of elaborating the Convention.

C Anti-corruption Measures

There is growing global interest in addressing corruption, which has been pointed out as a factor that threatens sustainable development and the rule of law. Against this backdrop, Japan, as a State Party to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which sets out provisions for international cooperation and measures to address corruption such as bribery and embezzlement of property by public officials, actively participates in discussions for the effective implementation of the UNCAC and the strengthening of international cooperation on preventing and combating corruption. In September 2023, under the UNCAC review mechanism (mutual reviews conducted among the State Parties), an executive summary was published on the results of a country review conducted on Japan's implementation of the UNCAC regarding the provisions for criminalization and law enforcement (Chapter III) and international cooperation (Chapter IV). Japan also participates actively in the activities of the Anti-Corruption Working Group convened under the G20 framework and has contributed to formulating the Group's action plan from 2025 to 2027, as well as high-level principles in relation to the strengthening of anti-corruption measures in the private sector. In October 2024, Japan attended the ministerial meeting in Natal, Brazil, held for the third time since the establishment of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. The G20 countries, including Japan, engaged in discussions on strengthening the international anti-corruption framework, after which the G20 Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting Ministerial Declaration⁽¹³⁾ was adopted. In addition, Japan conducts the International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption in Japan through the UNAFEI. Japan is an active participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which verifies the implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions by each state party to prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.

---

• (13) For the full text of the Ministerial Declaration of the 2024 G20 Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting, see MOFA's website:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100748701.pdf
  

D Measures to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism

Regarding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international framework that establishes the international standards that countries should implement and conducts peer reviews to assess levels of implementation. In recent years, the FATF has also been engaged in initiatives to prevent financing for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has issued the FATF statement that calls for the eradication of illegal financial activities by North Korea. As a founding member, Japan has actively participated in these discussions. Since the adoption of the Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report in 2021, Japan has been steadily implementing measures based on the Report, and at the FATF Plenary held in October 2024, successfully increased its ratings on all the points for improvements raised in the same Report. In addition, Japan actively takes measures to counter the financing of terrorism as a State Party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and also implements its own response measures to freeze the assets of terrorists and terrorist entities in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1373⁽¹⁴⁾ and designations by the UN Security Council Taliban Sanctions Committee and the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. As of November 30, 2024, Japan has implemented asset freezing and other measures, based on foreign exchange and international terrorist asset freezing laws, on 390 individuals and 94 entities related to Taliban, Al-Qaida, and ISIL (Da'esh) as designated by the respective UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, as well as 41 individuals and 31 entities designated in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1373, making a total of 420 individuals and 122 entities (excluding 11 individuals and 3 entities overlapping in both categories).

---

• (14) Adopted by the UN Security Council in September 2001 after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in the same year. It calls for UN Member States to take comprehensive measures against those who undertake acts of terrorism and those who have involvement with such actors, such as by freezing their assets.

E Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants

To effectively combat increasingly sophisticated and obscure trafficking in persons, Japan has strengthened its domestic system in accordance with its “2022 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons,” while proactively providing assistance to developing countries. In 2024 as well, Japan continued to conduct training programs through the JICA to deepen mutual understanding on human trafficking countermeasures (especially prevention, victim protection and support to restore the financial independence of victims) of stakeholders in various countries, including Japan, and to promote more effective regional cooperation. For example, Japan has been implementing a technical cooperation project with the Government of Thailand via JICA since January 2022, and as a part of that, held a workshop in July 2024 on human trafficking countermeasures to strengthen networks among those involved in such countermeasures in the Mekong region. Since March 2022, Japan has been engaged in technical cooperation with the government of Cambodia through JICA, aimed at enhancing the capacity of the relevant organizations to support victims of human trafficking. With respect to cooperation with international organizations, in 2024, through funding to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Japan continued to provide assistance for the safe repatriation of foreign victims of trafficking in persons protected in Japan, and to carry out social reintegration assistance programs to prevent the recurrence of trafficking after they return to their countries. Japan also provided support to strengthen response capabilities, including training programs for law enforcement authorities, by funding projects organized by UNODC in Southeast Asia. As a State Party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Japan has also further deepened its cooperation with other countries with a view to combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

F Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking

In cooperation with UNODC, Japan is contributing to investigations and development of analytical information for interdiction of the production, manufacturing, and trafficking of precursor chemicals and newly emerged synthetic drugs, and the maintenance and enhancement of cooperative networks. Japan is also strengthening practical capabilities for cross-border drug control, providing development support for alternative livelihoods such as the production of alternative crops in place of illicit cultivation of plant materials for drugs to prevent the vulnerable communities (including migrants and youths) in farming villages with unstable political situations and rural areas with poor border controls, particularly in developing countries, from becoming involved in organized crime, as well as advancing efforts to improve the availability of information related to crackdowns on illicit trafficking. At the same time, it is engaged in global efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking, while giving consideration to region-specific development challenges in the area of drug control.