2 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

(1) Overview of Japan-U.S. Security Relationship

Under the security environment surrounding Japan, which is becoming increasingly severe at an ever more rapid pace, it is indispensable to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance not only for the peace and security of Japan, but also for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and the U.S. are further enhancing their deterrence and response capabilities under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“The Guidelines”) and the Legislation for Peace and Security. Through such efforts, Japan and the U.S. have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including missile defense, cyberspace, space and information security. While advancing these efforts, Japan and the U.S. have concurrently been working closely on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa to Guam and other locations in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa.

(2) Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in Various Fields

A An Overview of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were formulated in 2015, reviewed and updated the general framework and policy direction of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and other efforts established under these Guidelines, Japan and the U.S. have been sharing information closely, establishing a common understanding of the situation, and engaging in “seamless” responses and efforts from peacetime to contingencies.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held during Prime Minister Kishida's official visit to the U.S. in April, President Joseph Biden reiterated unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. The two leaders also declared new strategic initiatives including upgrade of command and control frameworks, holding of the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) Forum that includes co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment within its scope, and holding of ministerial meeting on extended deterrence.⁽¹⁾ Furthermore, they issued instructions to further deepen concrete discussions on Japan-U.S. cooperation in the field of security through the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”).

The Japan-U.S. “2+2” was held in Tokyo in July, and was attended by Foreign Minister Kamikawa and Defense Minister KIHARA Minoru from Japan, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin from the U.S. Recognizing that Prime Minister Kishida's official visit to the U.S. in April was historic in bringing the Japan-U.S. Alliance to an unprecedented level, both sides reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives following the official visit, with the vision to build a global partnership for the future, including upgrading Alliance command and control, deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations. The first Japan-U.S. ministerial meeting on extended deterrence was also convened. The two sides engaged in in-depth discussions at the ministerial level on cooperation to further strengthen extended deterrence, and affirmed that they will continue enhancing discussions on extended deterrence at various levels, primarily through the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD). The ministers also underscored their support for the global partnership goals on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and affirmed that realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific requires the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in leadership positions as well as their contributions toward conflict prevention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding.

In December, Prime Minister Ishiba received a courtesy call by Secretary of Defense Austin on the occasion of his visit to Japan. Prime Minister Ishiba expressed gratitude for Secretary Austin's past contribution to strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and stated that Japan and the U.S. must work together to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the alliance, in order to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific amidst the increasingly severe security environment.

On February 7, 2025, Prime Minister Ishiba, during his visit to Washington D.C., held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Donald J. Trump. The two leaders concurred to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and to work closely to address strategic challenges in the region that both countries are facing. Prime Minister Ishiba also expressed Japan's unwavering commitment to fundamentally strengthen Japan's defense capabilities, which President Trump welcomed. Furthermore, President Trump underscored the unwavering commitment by the U.S. to the defense of Japan, using its full range of capabilities including nuclear. The two leaders reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands.

In 2024, Japan continued to engage in personnel exchanges with senior U.S. defense officials, including successive visits to Japan by General Charles A. Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, Admiral Stephen Koehler, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), and Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in April; Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in May; General Charles Q. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Austin in July; Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth in August; Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in October; General Mahoney, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps in November; Secretary of Defense Austin and Lt Gen. James F. Glynn, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific in December.

Discussions on extended deterrence are also being intensified in the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD). The EDD was established in 2010, and as a part of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, it provides an opportunity for the two governments to discuss regional security, Alliance defense posture, nuclear and missile defense policy, and arms control issues, to engage in an in-depth exchange of views on means to sustain and strengthen extended deterrence, which is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and to deepen mutual understanding on alliance deterrence. At the EDD meeting held at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming in June, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to enhance the regional deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear assets. The two sides explored avenues to enhance joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner to deepen Alliance political, diplomatic, and defense cooperation and further prepare the Alliance to defend against potential attacks and deter nuclear use. Both sides also reiterated their pledge to improve coordination and strengthen the Alliance's capabilities and posture against adversary missile threats. As a part of these discussions, the delegations received an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) wing mission brief before touring the missile procedures trainer, where U.S. Air Force missile combat crews conduct training on ICBM launch procedures, and a training launch facility, where ICBM maintenance professionals train on maintaining the Minuteman III ICBM weapons system. In addition, as mentioned previously, the first Japan-U.S. ministerial meeting on extended deterrence was convened in July.

At the EDD held at MOFA in December, the two sides shared assessments of challenges to regional security, and particularly in the face of the dynamic reality surrounding nuclear capabilities, reiterated their shared resolve to further strengthen extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan's capabilities. In this context, the two sides discussed how to improve policy coordination and alignment of defense capabilities to deter and, if necessary, respond to aggression against the Alliance and in the region. Furthermore, they deepened discussion on the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear military matters within the Alliance, on coordinating deterrence messaging and escalation management practices during both peacetime and contingencies, and on bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) throughout every phase of a developing situation. The delegations visited the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture and observed the Japan-U.S.-Australia command post exercise “Yama Sakura 87” (YS-87) and JGSDF assets such as the Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missile and Network Electronic Warfare System.

• (1) Providing deterrence that a country possesses to its allies and partners. Japan possesses its own deterrence while also receiving extended deterrence from its ally, the U.S..

B Missile Defense

Japan has been making steady efforts to develop and engage in the production of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system while continuing cooperation with the U.S., including on the steady implementation of joint development and joint production of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3 Block IIA) since 2006, and Japan is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of its citizens from the threat of ballistic missiles to Japan under any circumstances. Japan is also advancing its efforts to effectively counter new airborne threats, including hypersonic weapons, and at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in August 2023, announced the decision to initiate the joint development of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI). In May, Japan and the U.S. signed the Project Arrangement for the joint development of GPI. In the Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders' Statement issued in April, the two countries reviewed their approach to the sharing of information to counter missile threats, including announcing their “vision to cooperate on a networked air defense architecture among the U.S., Japan, and Australia.”

C Cyberspace

In light of the necessity for cross-governmental efforts by both Japan and the U.S., the 9th Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was convened in June, where participants engaged in wide-ranging discussions on Japan-U.S. cooperation on cyber-related matters, including cyber policies in both countries, cooperation in the international arena and bilateral cooperation. At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” held in July, the two countries concurred on strengthening cooperation in the context of strengthening Alliance deterrence and response capabilities. Stakeholders from both sides engage in discussions, through frameworks such as the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, on bilateral cooperation across a wide range of areas. Furthermore, the two sides are continuing to cooperate on matters related to cyberspace, including promoting bilateral policy coordination, strengthening systems and capabilities, and exchanging incident information, while taking into consideration Japan's cyber security strategy and the cyber policies of the U.S..

D Space

At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” convened in January 2023, Japan and the U.S. committed to deepening cooperation on space capabilities, and considered that attacks to, from, or within space, present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Japan and the U.S. are continuing to advance space cooperation in the field of security such as mutual exchanges of information in the field of Space Domain Awareness and others, cooperation on hosted payloads (mission instruments loaded onto other entities' satellites), and cooperation on space capabilities including Low Earth Orbit (LEO) detection and tracking constellation for strategic threats such as long-range missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles.

E Information Security

Information security plays a crucial role in advancing cooperation within the context of the Alliance. Based on this perspective, both countries continue to hold discussions designed to enhance their cooperation regarding information security, the importance of which was affirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” held in July.

(3) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

While advancing the efforts described above, the Government of Japan will continue to make every effort to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, and to maintain the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan, by steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko.

In the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” issued in July, the two sides reiterated their firm commitment to the steady implementation of such realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. This Statement emphasized the importance of optimizing Alliance force posture to address increasing security challenges in the region and be better postured to meet these challenges in the future. To this end, ministers welcomed the U.S. plan to modernize its tactical aircraft laydown across Japan, which reflects capability investments to enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance and bolster regional deterrence. At the same time, they celebrated the U.S. redesignation of the 12th Marine Regiment to the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), and the steady implementation of the MLR reorganization toward initial operational capability by 2025. Furthermore, they welcomed the forward deployment and return of the USS George Washington to Japan, and its critical role in supporting Alliance deterrence. Regarding the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, it was confirmed in the Statement that the relocation would begin in 2024, and the commencement of relocation was officially announced on December 14.

In particular, the return of lands in Okinawa has been moving forward based on the April 2013 “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” (“Okinawa Consolidation Plan”), even after the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area (NTA, approximately 4,000 hectares) in December 2017. The return of all areas indicated as “Immediate Return” under the Okinawa Consolidation Plan was achieved with the return of a portion of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran in March 2020. In May 2022, which marked the 50th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, Japan and the U.S. concurred to enable the public use of the Lower Plaza Housing Area of Camp Zukeran as a greenspace, ahead of its return to Japan, and the start of general use commenced in March 2024. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting convened in February 2025, the two leaders confirmed their commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko and the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma.

(4) Host Nation Support (HNS)

With a view to ensuring the effective operations of U.S. Forces in Japan amidst the growing severity of the security situation surrounding Japan, Japan bears a part of costs, such as the costs of Facility Improvement Programs (FIP), within the scope provided for under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In addition, Japan has also borne the labor costs for U.S. Forces working in Japan, utilities costs, and training relocation costs, by concluding the Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) which set out special measures relating to the SOFA. Under the New SMA signed on January 7, 2022, and entered into force on April 1, it was decided that Japan will also bear the expenditures related to the procurement of training equipment and materials which will contribute, not only to the readiness of U.S. Forces in Japan but also to the enhancement of the interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Forces. Based on the SOFA and the New SMA, the Government of Japan will bear the HNS costs from FY2022 to FY2026. In consultations on the New SMAs, as both parties concurred that the costs borne by Japan should be used to build a foundation upon which the Japan-U.S. Alliance will be further strengthened, the Japanese side decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency. During the effective period of the new SMAs (April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2027), the annual average budget for HNS is approximately 211 billion Japanese yen.

(5) Various Issues Related to the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan

To ensure the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the stable stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan as the linchpin of these arrangements, it is important to mitigate the impact of U.S. Forces' activities on local residents living in the vicinity and to gain their understanding and support regarding the stationing of U.S. Forces. The Government of Japan, taking into consideration the requests from local communities, has been making utmost efforts in areas such as preventing incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces, abating the noise of U.S. Forces' aircraft, and dealing with environmental issues at U.S. Forces' facilities and areas. At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” convened in July, Japan and the U.S. emphasized the importance of continued bilateral coordination to ensure the sharing of information in a timely manner, and in the spirit of alliance cooperation, positively evaluated efforts to be implemented by the U.S. Forces in Japan to prevent unacceptable incidents and behavior. In matters related to the environment, ministers discussed enhancing bilateral environmental cooperation, including on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) issues.

MOFA is implementing various initiatives, including exchanges between U.S. Forces personnel and residents living near U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Japan. Since FY2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) have been implementing Student Educational Exchange and Dialogue (SEED) projects at the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Japan. These projects are aimed at deepening mutual understanding through cultural and educational exchanges among Japanese and American junior and senior high school students, and have been conducted continuously at U.S. Forces' facilities and schools in various parts of Japan, with the cooperation of local governments in the vicinity and U.S. Forces in Japan. (See the Column on page 199.) In addition, in Okinawa where there is a concentration of U.S. Forces' facilities and areas, the “TOFU: Think of Okinawa's Future in the United States” program has been implemented since FY2017 to provide an opportunity for high school and university students from Okinawa to witness what Japan's alliance partner, the U.S., is truly like, and the role that Japan plays in the international community, as well as to promote mutual understanding between the two countries. The program served as an opportunity for participants to cultivate an international perspective through visits to Tokyo, Washington, D.C., and New York, exchanges of opinions with key government officials, and tours of government facilities. (See the Column on page 199.)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) conducts exchange programs in municipalities where the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas are located, in order to sow the “SEED” for the future of Japan and the U.S. and make it flourish. The Student Educational Exchange and Dialogue (SEED) project was implemented at seven locations across Japan in FY2024 (Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni; Yokota Air Base; Camp Kuwae; U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka; Camp Zama; Misawa Air Base; and U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo). This initiative is named “SEED” with the hope that the project will nurture talents who will play an active role in the international community by providing opportunities for Japanese junior and senior high school students and American students living in the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas to interact in English and deepen mutual understanding. TAKAHASHI Ryo, who participated in the project at U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, is one such valued “SEED.”

■TAKAHASHI Ryo, second year student at the Yokosuka School for the Deaf

I participated in the SEED project held on November 2 and 3 at U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. I took part in this project as I felt it would be a good opportunity to interact with American students in English.

I am hearing impaired and live with cochlear implants in both ears. Some of the American students' English pronunciation was different from the English pronunciation that I usually hear in my classes, so I had to strain to understand it. However, since I have been working hard on my English studies, I was able to understand some of the conversations in English that the American students had.

While sharing ideas with my teammates in English, I introduced products made with local resources. As I delivered a presentation in front of those who have supported the SEED project as well as the American students, I felt so nervous that my heart was pounding. Also, I was able to make American friends for the first time.

Participating in the project made me realize that my English proficiency is still not good enough. I am now even more motivated to work harder in the future so that I can speak with people from all over the world. Despite being hearing impaired, I was able to gain experience by challenging myself. Going forward, I would like to continue learning English, never giving it up.

Takahashi receiving a completion certificate as the representative of the participating students (November 3, Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)

Commemorative photo of the SEED participants at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (September 8, Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture)

MOFA also runs the “TOFU: Think of Okinawa's Future in the United States” program for Okinawa Prefecture, where there is a concentration of the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas. This initiative aims to promote mutual understanding between Japan and the U.S. by providing students from, or residing in, Okinawa Prefecture with an opportunity to have a first-hand experience in the U.S.

TOFU program participants at a meeting with Georgetown University students (March 23, Washington, D.C., U.S.)

In March, the program participants paid courtesy calls on Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi and Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, HOSAKA Yasushi, and received encouragement from them. Thereafter, they visited Washington, D.C. and New York. After returning to Japan, they participated in a final presentation to report the outcome of the program to various relevant stakeholders in Okinawa Prefecture in May. In June, Foreign Minister Kamikawa visited Okinawa Prefecture and met with the participants of the TOFU program, and she encouraged them to play an active role to bear responsibility for the future of Okinawa Prefecture. This initiative has been welcomed and highly commended in Okinawa Prefecture and elsewhere.

TOFU program final presentation (May 11, Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture)

Such investments in future generations contribute to fostering the people-to-people connections that underpin the Japan-U.S. Alliance. MOFA, in cooperation with municipalities where the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas are located, will continue to support the development of the younger generation.

(6) The United Nations Forces and U.S. Forces in Japan

Coincident with the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the UN forces were established in July of the same year based on the recommendation of UN Security Council resolution 83 in June. Following the cease-fire agreement concluded in July 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) Headquarters was relocated to Seoul (South Korea) in July 1957, and UNC-Rear (UNC-R) was established in Japan. Established at Yokota Air Base, UNC-R currently has four military staff members including a stationed commander, as well as military attachés from nine countries who are stationed at embassies in Tokyo as liaison officers for the UN forces. Based on Article 5 of the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, the UN forces in Japan may use the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Japan to the minimum extent required to provide support for military logistics for the UN forces. (Note that the status of U.S. forces that form a part of the UN forces is governed by the relevant agreements implemented made pursuant to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.) At present, the UN forces in Japan are authorized to use the following seven facilities: Camp Zama; U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka; U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo; Yokota Air Base; Kadena Air Base; MCAS Futenma and White Beach Area. In October 2023, General Paul J. LaCamera (Commander, UNC/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea) paid a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Kamikawa. Foreign Minister Kamikawa expressed her appreciation for the surveillance activities against illegal ship-to-ship transfers⁽²⁾ by the UNC Sending States as well as the role played by Japan-U.S. Alliance and the trilateral coordination among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK for peace and stability in the region. She also stated that Japan looks forward to continuing the enhancement of the relationship with the UNC.

• (2) In this context, “ship-to-ship transfers” refers to the transfers to or from North Korea-flagged vessels of any goods or items at sea, which UN Security Council resolution 2375 (adopted in September 2017) prohibits UN member states from facilitating or engaging in.