3 Korean Peninsula

(1) North Korea (including the abductions issue)

The Government of Japan has been taking various initiatives to realize its basic policy of seeking to normalize its relations with North Korea through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, as well as settlement of the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of September 2002. In 2022, North Korea launched ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners, launching ballistic missiles 31 times (at least 59 launches) including missiles that flew over Japan and multiple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles. The series of actions by North Korea, including ballistic missile launches that exacerbate the situation, constitutes a grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security and poses a clear and serious challenge to the international community. It is totally unacceptable. Japan will continue to fully implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions and aim for the denuclearization of North Korea, coordinating closely with the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) while cooperating with the international community. With regard to the abductions issue, Japan continues to call on North Korea to implement the May 2014 Japan-North Korea agreement (the agreement in Stockholm)⁹ and will continue to make utmost efforts to realize the return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, while working closely with relevant countries, including the U.S.

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• 9 In May 2014, Japan-North Korea Intergovernmental Consultations were held in Stockholm, Sweden. North Korea promised to conduct a comprehensive and full-scale investigation on all Japanese nationals, including abductees.

A North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues

(A) Recent Trends in North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, in accordance with the series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

In April, a military parade was held to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army, and in his speech, President of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un is reported to have said “we will continue to take measures for further developing the nuclear forces of our state at the fastest possible speed.” At the military parade, it was also reported that the columns of the latest tactical missile units, a column of super-large Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), columns of strategic missiles, and a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile were on display. In September, the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly was held, and a decree “On the DPRK's Policy on the Nuclear Forces” was discussed and adopted. At the 7th session, it was also reported that President Kim stated that, with regard to North Korea's nuclear weapons, “we have drawn the line of no retreat regarding our nuclear weapons,” and “herein lies the great importance of the legalization of the policy of the nuclear forces,” as well as “even a moment around the difficulties we are experiencing now; we can never give up the nuclear weapons,” “we will make the nuclear combat posture consolidated in every way,” and that “it is also necessary to steadily step up the deployment of cutting-edge strategic and tactical weapon systems.”

In 2022, North Korea launched ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners, launching ballistic missiles 31 times (at least 59 launches). On January 5 and 11, it launched ballistic missiles that it called “hypersonic missiles.” Additionally, North Korea announced that it had launched ballistic missiles as “a firing drill for checking and judging the proficiency in the action procedures of the railway-borne missile regiment of North Phyongan Province” on January 14, “tactical guided missiles” on January 17 and 27, and a “long-range cruise missile” on January 25. On January 30, North Korea launched what appeared to be an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) “Hwasong-12,” and launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile on February 27 and March 5 for what they claimed as important tests for developing a “reconnaissance satellite.” Furthermore, approximately one week after the launch of a ballistic missile on March 16, which was assumed to have not flown successfully, on March 24 North Korea launched an apparently new type of ICBM-class ballistic missile. It was estimated that this missile had a flight distance of approximately 1,100 kilometers, with a maximum altitude that exceeded 6,000 kilometers, and that is fell into Japan's EEZ, approximately 150 kilometers west of the Oshima Peninsula in Hokkaido. In response to North Korea's provocative actions, on April 1, the Government of Japan announced further measures against North Korea and additionally designated four entities and nine individuals as subject to asset freezes and other measures.

Following these launches, North Korea launched a ballistic missile on May 4, a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on May 7, three ballistic missiles on May 12, and on May 25 launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile and a ballistic missile. On May 27, following the launch of a series of ballistic missiles, which included ICBM-class ballistic missiles, the U.S. proposed a new UN Security Council resolution that included tougher sanctions. Although the resolution received the support of the 13 Security Council Member States other than China and Russia, it was rejected due to the veto exercised by China and Russia. On the other hand, at the UN General Assembly held on June 8 and 10, numerous member states criticized North Korea's nuclear and missile activities and its violation of the Security Council's resolutions. During this period, on June 5, North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles from multiple locations.

North Korea also launched a cruise missile on August 17, and then launched a series of ballistic missiles on September 25, 28, and 29 in a short period of time. On October 1, 4, 6, 9, and 14, North Korea launched ballistic missiles and, on October 4, a ballistic missile flew over Japan. On October 18, the Government of Japan, as further measures against North Korea, additionally designated five entities involved in North Korea's nuclear and missile development as subject to asset freezes and other measures.

North Korea launched ballistic missiles on November 2, 3, 9, and 18, including the launch of a possible ICBM-class ballistic missile. The ICBM-class ballistic missile on November 18 was estimated to fly a distance of approximately 1,000 kilometers, with a maximum altitude that exceeding 6,000 kilometers and fall within Japan's EEZ, approximately 200 kilometers west of Oshima-Oshima Island in Hokkaido. On December 2, the Government of Japan, as further measures against North Korea, additionally designated three entities and one individual involved in North Korea's nuclear and missile development as subject to asset freezes and other measures.

On December 18, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles claiming as a crucial test of final stage for the development of “reconnaissance satellite,” and five days later, on December 23, it launched another ballistic missile. Furthermore, on December 31, 2022, and January 1, 2023, North Korea launched ballistic missiles that it termed “super-large MLRS.”

As a result of the measures taken against North Korea so far, the Government of Japan has designated 137 entities and 121 individuals in total as subject to asset freezes and other measures.

Regarding North Korea's nuclear activities, the U.S. State Department released their assessment in May that North Korea could be ready to conduct a nuclear test at the Punggye-ri test site in the northeastern part of North Korea in the same month. Additionally, in May it was also reported that the ROK's National Intelligence Service (NIS) revealed that North Korea had completed all preparations for its seventh nuclear test and was waiting on the timing to conduct the test. In June, the U.S. State Department also indicated that North Korea had completed preparations for a nuclear test. In September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report pointed out that there were indications that North Korea had reopened Adit 3 and constructed several new support buildings at the nuclear test site located near the settlement of Punggye-ri.

(B) Initiatives by Japan and Cooperation with the International Community

The repeated launches of ballistic missiles and others by North Korea are serious challenges not only to Japan, but also to the international community, and are completely unacceptable. It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner by North Korea. Japan has confirmed these points at meetings with the leaders and foreign ministers of various countries.

Recognizing that the collaboration among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK is essential for regional peace and stability beyond issues related to North Korea, Japan, the U.S., and the ROK have been enhancing collaboration at multiple levels, through holding Summit Meetings, Foreign Ministers' Meetings, Vice-Ministerial Meetings, and Heads of Delegation Meetings for the Six-Party Talks. On June 29, on the occasion of the NATO Summit Meeting in Madrid, Spain, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting was held for the first time in about four years and nine months. On November 13, Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on the occasion of the ASEAN-related Summit Meetings. The three leaders shared the recognition that bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK is becoming increasingly important in the face of North Korea's provocations, which are unprecedented both in their frequency and their manner, and a looming possibility of further provocations. They concurred to work together to take resolute actions toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea. After the meeting, the “Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific” was released. Following this, in response to North Korea's launch of an ICBM-class ballistic missile on November 18, an emergency meeting was held by the leaders of Japan, the U.S., the ROK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand who were attending the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, at which the leaders condemned the ballistic missile launch in the strongest possible terms and concurred that it is absolutely unacceptable. At the Foreign Minister level, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Honolulu, the U.S., on February 12, and in Bali, Indonesia, on July 8, on the occasion of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting. On September 22, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in New York, the U.S., on the occasion of the UN General Assembly. The three Foreign Ministers aligned their views on how to respond to further provocations by North Korea, including another nuclear test, and on future measures toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The three Foreign Ministers also concurred to further enhance the collaboration among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK at multiple levels. After the meeting, a joint statement on the Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Ministers' Meeting was released. On November 21, following North Korea's launch of an ICBM-class ballistic missile on November 18, the “G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)” was released.

As part of the Japan Coast Guard's patrolling activities and the Self-Defense Forces' surveillance operations, Japan has also been conducting information gathering on the activities of vessels suspected to be violating the UN Security Council resolutions. When the Government of Japan finds activities strongly suspected to be violating the UN Security Council resolutions, including ship-to-ship transfers¹⁰ with North Korean vessels, measures have been taken such as notification to the UN Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee and other bodies, sharing of information with related countries, and releasing of information to the public. Aircraft of Canada, Australia, and France, in addition to U.S. aircraft, have, based on the UN Status of Forces Agreement, used U.S. military facilities and areas in Japan to engage in surveillance operations against illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers. Furthermore, monitoring and surveillance activities were conducted in the waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea, by naval vessels such as multiple vessels of the U.S. Navy, the French Navy frigate VENDÉMIAIRE, the Royal Australian Navy frigates HMAS PARRAMATTA and HMAS ARUNTA, the Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS VANCOUVER, and the UK Royal Navy frigate HMS TAMAR. From the perspective of further deepening the multinational cooperation, Japan considers it significant that concerned countries are sharing information and coordinating efforts to ensure that UN Security Council resolutions are implemented fully and effectively.

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• 10 In this context, “ship-to-ship transfers” refers to the transfers to or from North Korea-flagged vessels of any goods or items at sea, which UN Security Council resolution 2375 (adopted in September 2017) prohibits the UN member states from facilitating or engaging in.

B The Abductions Issue and Japan-North Korea Relations

(A) Basic Position on the Abductions Issue

To date, the Government of Japan has identified 12 separate incidents, involving a total of 17 Japanese abductees, 12 of whom have not yet returned home. North Korea claims that 8 of these 12 abductees have died and that it is unable to confirm that the other 4 ever entered its territory, but as no convincing explanation of this claim has been provided, Japan continues to work toward the resolution of this issue on the assumption that all of the abductees whose whereabouts are unknown are still alive. As well as being a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens, abductions by North Korea constitute a universal issue among the international community as a violation of basic human rights. In addition, the abductions issue is a humanitarian issue with a time constraint. Not just the abductees themselves, but also their families having reached an advanced age, and they continue to work toward the resolution of this problem with a determination to “never give up.” Based on the basic recognition that the normalization of its relations with North Korea is impossible without resolving the abductions issue, Japan has positioned its resolution as the most important issue. Accordingly, Japan has strongly urged North Korea to provide a full account of all the abduction cases, to hand over the perpetrators to Japan, and to ensure the safety of all abductees and their immediate return to Japan, irrespective of whether the abductees are officially identified. In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida gave a policy speech where he stated: “the abductions issue, one of our highest priorities, is a grave humanitarian issue and we have no time to lose in resolving it. I will resolutely make every possible effort to achieve the return of all the abductees to Japan at the earliest possible date, seizing every possible opportunity. I am determined to meet with President Kim Jong Un myself face to face, without any conditions.”

(B) Initiatives by Japan

Following the nuclear test by North Korea in January 2016 and the launch of the ballistic missile in the following month, which North Korea purported to be a “satellite,” Japan announced its autonomous measures against North Korea in February 2016. In response, North Korea unilaterally announced that it would completely stop the investigations on all Japanese abductees and dissolve the Special Investigation Committee. Japan lodged a serious protest against North Korea, conveyed its intention of not abandoning the agreement in Stockholm, and strongly demanded that North Korea implement the agreement and return all the abductees home at the earliest possible date.

(C) Japan-North Korea Relations

During the reception of the PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games Opening Ceremony hosted by President Moon Jae-in in February, 2018, Prime Minister Abe brought up the abductions, nuclear and missile issues and conveyed Japan's basic position to Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea. Prime Minister Abe strongly urged North Korea to resolve the abductions issue, especially the return of all abductees to Japan. In September, Foreign Minister KONO Taro held a meeting with the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Yong Ho at the UN headquarters. In September 2022, Prime Minister Kishida addressed the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, declaring “I am determined to meet with President Kim Jong Un without any conditions.”

(D) Cooperation with the International Community

In order to resolve the abductions issue, it is essential for Japan not only to proactively urge North Korea, but also to gain understanding and support from other countries regarding the importance of resolving the abductions issue. Japan has taken all possible diplomatic opportunities to raise the abductions issue, including at summit meetings, foreign ministers' meetings and international conferences such as the G7 Summit, the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Summit Meeting, the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting, ASEAN-related Summit Meetings, and UN meetings. With regard to the U.S., President Trump raised the abductions issue with President Kim at the U.S.-North Korea Summit in June 2018, at the request of Prime Minister Abe. At the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in February 2019, President Trump raised the abductions issue with President Kim at the tête-à-tête meeting, which was held first on the first day, and clearly stated Prime Minister Abe's views regarding the abductions issue. Furthermore, at the small group dinner that followed, President Trump again raised the abductions issue, and a serious discussion was held between the leaders. Moreover, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Video Teleconference Meeting on January 22, 2022, and at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting on May 23, 2022, Prime Minister Kishida asked for full understanding and cooperation again for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and gained further support from President Biden. During his visit to Japan in May, President Biden met with the family members of the abductees, listened carefully and earnestly to the families' sentiments and their requests for U.S. support in resolving the abductions issue as soon as possible, and encouraged them. Furthermore, at the October 4 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Meeting, the November 13 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, and the January 13, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Kishida asked for continued understanding and cooperation toward the resolution of the abductions issue, to which President Biden offered his full support. With regard to China, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting in June 2019, President Xi Jinping stated that he had conveyed Japan's position on Japan-North Korea relations and Prime Minister Abe's views to President Kim during the China-North Korea Summit held in the same month. Prime Minister Abe also gained the strong support of President Xi for the improvement of Japan-North Korea relations, including the abductions issue. During the Japan-China Summit Meeting on November 17, 2022, Prime Minister Kishida requested President Xi Jinping's understanding and support toward the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and the two leaders confirmed that they would continue to work closely together on this issue. The ROK has also raised the abductions issue with North Korea at multiple opportunities, including the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting in December 2019, President Moon Jae-in of the ROK expressed his understanding for Japan's position regarding the importance of the abductions issue and stated that the ROK had repeatedly raised the abductions issue with North Korea. During the October 6, 2022 Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Meeting and the November 13 Japan-ROK Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Kishida asked for continued understanding and cooperation for the resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained President Yoon Suk Yeol's support. At the UN Human Rights Council in April and at the UN General Assembly in December, the EU submitted the Joint Statement on DPRK Human Rights, which was co-sponsored by Japan, and it was adopted without a vote. Furthermore, in December, an informal UN Security Council consultation on the human rights situation in North Korea was held, and afterwards, like-minded countries, including Japan, issued a joint statement urging the resolution of the abductions issue, particularly the immediate return of the abductees. Japan will continue to closely coordinate and cooperate with relevant countries, including the U.S., toward the immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

C North Korea's External Relations, etc.

(A) U.S.-North Korea Relations

From 2018 to 2019, the U.S. and North Korea held two summit meetings as well as a meeting between President Trump and President Kim in Panmunjom, and in October 2019, U.S.-North Korea working-level talks were convened in Stockholm, Sweden. However, after this, no concrete progress was made in dialogues between the U.S. and North Korea.

Through President Biden's North Korea policy review in April 2021, the U.S. has made it clear that its goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and that it is stepping up its efforts to ensure the security of its allies, including Japan. In October 2022, the U.S released a new National Security Strategy (NSS), indicating that it would seek sustained diplomacy toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and that it would strengthen extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in November, the three leaders shared the recognition that bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK is becoming increasingly important as North Korea continues its provocations, and in the Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific that was released after the meeting, President Biden reiterated that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan and the ROK is ironclad and backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear. At the same time, the U.S. has also stated on various occasions that the U.S. has no hostile intentions toward North Korea and that it is prepared to meet with North Korea without any preconditions.

On the other hand, it was reported that President Kim said in his speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September: “in direct proportion to the increase of the period of suffering imposed on our people by the U.S.'s brutal hostile policy against us, our absolute strength is continuing to be built up at exponential speed and the security threat they have to face is increasing in direct proportion;” “there will never be such a thing as our abandonment of the nuclear weapons or denuclearization first, nor will there be any negotiations to this end or bargaining chip in these process;” and “our Republic's nuclear forces represent the destiny of the country and the people and their lasting prestige.” From September 25 to October 9, President Kim directed the “military drills of the Korean People's Army units for the operation of tactical nukes,” and, on October 10, he is reported to have said “the enemies have still talked about dialogue and negotiation while posing military threats to us, but we have no content for dialogue with the enemies and felt no necessity to do so.”

Furthermore, at the 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK), held from December 26 to 31, President Kim is reported to have said that the U.S. was “pushing forward the realization of triangular cooperation with Japan and South Korea on a full scale while working hard to establish a new military bloc like an Asian version of NATO,” emphasized the need to strengthen military capabilities, and highlighted “the importance and necessity of mass-producing tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal.”

In response to a series of provocations by North Korea, including ballistic missile launches, the U.S. decided to additionally designate individuals and entities as subjects of its own sanctions in January, March, April, May, August, October, November, and December of 2022, respectively.

(B) Inter-Korean Relations

In May, President Yoon Suk Yeol's administration was inaugurated in the ROK with the goal of “normalizing inter-Korean relations.” In his inaugural address, President Yoon stated; “if North Korea genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearization, we are prepared to work with the international community to present an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea's economy and improve the quality of life for its people.” In August during the Liberation Day speech, he proposed “the audacious initiative” on the condition of genuine and substantial progress on denuclearization of North Korea, and referred to the implementation of a large-scale food program; assistance for power generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure; projects to modernize ports and airports for international trade, as well as technical assistance program to enhance North Korea's agricultural productivity, assistance to modernize hospitals and medical infrastructure, international investment and financial support initiatives. In response to this, North Korea released a statement in August by Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK, describing the “audacious initiative” by the ROK as “the height of absurdity as it is an impracticable one” and commenting that it was not a new one, but a replica of ‘denuclearization, opening and 3000' raised by their President Lee Myung Bak.

In October, using U.S.-ROK military exercises as a pretext, North Korea carried out provocative actions, including repeated ballistic missile launches, bombardments with multi-launch rockets, and demonstrations by military aircraft. The ROK criticized North Korea for repeatedly shelling the zone where all live-fire artillery drills and field training exercises were agreed to be ceased in the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration¹¹ in the Military Domain”¹² that was adopted at the Inter-Korean Summit Meeting in 2018. Also in October, the Government of the ROK additionally designated subjects of its own sanctions against North Korea for the first time in about five years, citing a series of North Korea's missile launches and other reasons. When North Korea launched a number of missiles in November, one ballistic missile landed near the ROK's territorial waters, south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), for the first time since the division of Korea. The ROK strongly denounced this action. In response to North Korea's launch of an ICBM-class ballistic missile in November, the ROK in December additionally designated subjects of its own further sanctions against North Korea. At the end of December, North Korean drones violated the ROK's airspace, and one flew as far as Seoul.

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• 11 “Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula” signed at the Inter-Korean Summit between President Moon and President Kim on April 28, 2018. President Kim's intention for the denuclearization of North Korea was affirmed in writing.
• 12 Based on this agreement, which was adopted as a result of the Inter-Korean Summit in September 2018, measures were taken that include the suspension of military exercises around the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), the establishment of a no-fly zone over the MDL, and withdrawal of some guard posts in the demilitarized zone.

(C) China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea Relations

Since 2020, due to the spread of COVID-19, there was no travel by dignitaries between China and North Korea or between Russia and North Korea as before, but China and North Korea have exchanged congratulatory messages between President Kim and President Xi Jinping on occasions such as the anniversary of the founding of their “countries,” and in August the Central Committee of the WPK of North Korea expressed its full support for China's Taiwan policy in a letter of solidarity that was addressed to the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CPC). Between Russia and North Korea, in addition to sending congratulatory message on occasions such as the anniversary of the founding of their “countries,” in July 2022 it was reported that North Korea “recognized” the “independence” of the “Donetsk People's Republic” and “Luhansk People's Republic” in eastern Ukraine. Additionally, North Korea made moves to defend Russia's position regarding its aggression against Ukraine, such as issuing a statement in October in support of purported “incorporation” of certain regions of Ukraine by Russia.

Trade between China and North Korea, which accounts for approximately 90% of North Korea's entire external trade excluding inter-Korean trade, also significantly reduced when compared to pre-COVID-19 levels due to traffic restrictions following the global spread of COVID-19. Although it was announced in January that the cross-border rail freight between Dandong, China, and Sinuiju, North Korea, would be resumed, in April, it was announced again that this service would be temporarily suspended. However, later in September, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China said that it was decided to resume this service through friendly consultations. As a result, the China-North Korea trade volume in 2022 greatly exceeded that of the previous year, but has yet to recover to pre-COVID-19 levels.

(D) Other Issues

In 2022, a total of 49 drifting or wrecked wooden vessels presumed to be from North Korea were discovered (18 in 2021) on Japan's coast with the Sea of Japan. The Government of Japan continues its effort to gather and analyze information, with great interest on relevant developments. In September 2020, a vessel that appeared to be an official North Korean vessel in Japan's EEZ in the west of the Yamatotai bank in the Sea of Japan was confirmed, and when this incident occurred the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed Japan's position to North Korea. Japan will continue to deal appropriately with these issues in close coordination among relevant ministries and agencies.

D Domestic Political Affairs and Economy

(A) Political Affairs

In January 2021, for the first time in approximately five years, North Korea held a Congress of the WPK, which is the highest decision-making institution in the WPK, and President Kim, while emphasizing “people-first politics,” gave an activity summary of achievements/reflections on the past five years and of future issues, mentioned the continuation of nuclear and missile development, external relations such as U.S.-North Korea relations, and inter-Korean relations. In December 2021, at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK, based on the principle of “people-first politics,” the economy, emergency anti-epidemic projects, and the strengthening of “national” defense capabilities were promoted as major issues for 2022.

Amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic, in August 2020 North Korea “shut the border tighter” and to date had not reported any COVID-19 infections, but in May 2022 the Omicron variant was confirmed and its “national” anti-epidemic work was shifted to “the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system,” and at its peak, nearly 400,000 “new fever cases” were reported to have occurred per day.

At the 5th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK held in June, President Kim is reported to have said that the situation was a “harsh and difficult period unprecedented in the history” compounded by “the severe health crisis,” and then praised to strenuously push forward with the implementation of the economic policies and steadily directed great efforts to strengthen the “national” defense capability. Other personnel appointments were also reported, including the election of a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK and the appointment of Choe Son Hui as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In August, “new fever cases” were no longer reported and President Kim declared victory in “the great anti-epidemic war” at the “National” Meeting of Reviewing the Emergency Anti-epidemic Work.

In September, the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly was held. Continuing from 2021, President Kim made a policy speech in which he reiterated the success of measures to address COVID-19, stating that North Korea had “defended the security of the nation and the people,” advanced tasks including the farming work and construction projects as achievements to be proud of, and stated that North Korea was “laying foundations and assets for the country's economic development and promotion of the people's wellbeing.” Furthermore, he reportedly stated that “while administering vaccination in a responsible way, we should recommend all residents wear masks” from November to prepare for the influenza virus as well as COVID-19.

At the end of December, the 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK was held, with President Kim reportedly evaluating that “2022 was a time which was by no means meaningless” and defined 2023 as a year of attaining key goals in “the improvement of the people's living standard.” Additionally, based on the recognition that international relations have been shifted to a “new Cold War” system and a push for multipolarization is further expediated, the principles of external work, such as “the principle of struggle against the enemy - might for might, frontal match” were clarified.

At the ceremony of donating the “super-large multiple launch rocket system” that was held during the Enlarged Plenary Meeting, it was reported that President Kim delivered a speech in which he praised the contributions of the working class in the munitions industry in increasing the defense capabilities.

(B) Economy

It was reported that at the 8th Congress of the WPK in January 2021, President Kim presented the new “five-year plan for the national economic development” (2021 to 2025) centered around self-reliance and self-prosperity while referring to difficulties due to sanctions, natural disasters and the global health crisis.

In particular, North Korea's economic situation in 2022 may still be severe due to a series of UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions against North Korea by various countries, as well as natural disasters. President Kim himself has admitted that “the economic difficulties facing us now are severe” (administrative policy speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September).

Since February 2020, the amount of trade with China, North Korea's largest trading partner, was significantly reduced due to the global spread of COVID-19. The China-North Korea trade volume in 2022 greatly exceeded that of the previous year, but has yet to recover to pre-COVID-19 levels.

E Other Issues

Defectors who have fled North Korea have to be kept in hiding to avoid being cracked down on by the authorities in the countries where they are staying or to avoid being forcibly repatriated to North Korea. The Government of Japan is addressing the protection of and support for these North Korean defectors, in line with the purpose of the North Korean Human Rights Violation Act, taking into account a comprehensive range of factors, including humanitarian considerations, the safety of those concerned, and relations with the countries in which these defectors reside. Relevant ministries and agencies in Japan are closely working together to promote measures aimed at helping the settlement of defectors accepted by Japan.

(2) Republic of Korea (ROK)

A Situation in the ROK

(A) Domestic Affairs

On March 9, the ROK presidential election was held, and former Prosecutor General Mr. Yoon Suk Yeol of the People Power Party, the largest opposition party at the time, was elected, defeating Mr. Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea. On May 10, former Prosecutor General Yoon took office as the 20th President of the ROK. In his inaugural address, he stressed the importance of universal values such as freedom, and international norms, also expressed his desire to build a nation that fulfills its responsibility as a trusted member of the international community.

The nationwide local elections and National Assembly by-elections were held on June 1. The ruling People Power Party won 12 out of 17 electoral districts for metropolitan mayors and governors, and won five out of seven electoral districts for the National Assembly by-elections. Meanwhile, the National Assembly continue to be divided with the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea, holding the majority number of seats. The ruling and opposition parties were bitterly divided over various issues including the Yoon administration's foreign and defense policies, the response of the former Moon Jae-in administration regarding the shooting of a ROK public official by North Korea's army, the investigation into the Democratic Party of Korea's leader Lee Jae-myung and his associates, and the Financial Year 2023 budget proposal.

On October 29, a crowd surge by citizens who had gathered for Halloween in Itaewon, Seoul, turned into a deadly stampede, and 159 people were killed, with two Japanese nationals among them. Criticism mounted over the inadequate response by the police and the authorities at the time of the accident, which later led to the arrest of senior police officers.

(B) Foreign Policy

With the inauguration of the Yoon administration in May, which advocated for the “normalization of North and South Korean relations,” the ROK's policy toward North Korea changed dramatically. On August 15, during his speech for the Liberation Day, President Yoon proposed an “audacious initiative” to provide a variety of economic aid under the condition of substantial denuclearization by North Korea. However, North Korea rejected the proposal and still continues with a variety of military provocations (for more information on inter-Korean relations, see section 2, 3(1)C (B)).

As for relations with the U.S., President Joseph Biden visited the ROK in May shortly after President Yoon's inauguration ceremony, held his first U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting with President Yoon, and issued a Joint Statement. The Joint Statement recognized that the growing threat posed by North Korea is increasing, and emphasized the importance of the rules based international order and economic security. The statement also reaffirmed extended deterrence and referred to the expansion of the scope and scale of joint military exercises between the U.S. and the ROK, including the deployment of strategic assets. Furthermore, U.S.-ROK combined command exercises were conducted in April. Additionally, in August, U.S.-ROK joint exercises, including field maneuver trainings, were conducted, with the exercises being evaluated for the transition of wartime operational control.

In terms of relations with China, Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan attended the presidential inauguration ceremony in May. In August, ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin visited Qingdao, China, to meet with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi and for a bilateral meeting. At the G20 Summit held in Indonesia in November, President Yoon held his first Summit Meeting with President Xi Jinping of China. After the meeting, the ROK announced that they had agreed to further mature and develop their bilateral relations based on mutual respect, mutual benefit, and common interests.

During his presidential campaign, President Yoon pledged that he would make the ROK into a “Global Pivotal State that contributes to freedom, peace, and prosperity.” After the inauguration of the administration, Foreign Minister Park announced that the ROK would formulate an “Indo-Pacific Strategy” toward the realization of the plan. At the ASEAN-ROK Summit Meeting in November, President Yoon announced the outline of the ROK's “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region,” stating that, through solidarity and cooperation with ASEAN and other major countries, the strategy would be implemented based on three major visions of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity, and under three major principles of cooperation: Inclusiveness, Trust, and Reciprocity. At the end of December, the Government of the ROK released the full text of the strategy.

(C) Economy

In 2022, the GDP growth rate in the ROK fell from 4.0% to 2.6% in comparison to the previous year. The total amount of exports increased by 6.1% year-on-year to a record high of 683.9 billion US dollars. However, since the total amount of imports increased by 18.9% in comparison to the previous year to approximately 731.2 billion US dollars due to the soaring global energy and raw material prices, the ROK's trade balance turned into a deficit for the first time in 14 years, reaching a record high of approximately 47.2 billion US dollars (figures published by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy).

At the time of its inauguration in May, the Yoon administration announced economic policies based on four pillars: “A dynamic economy that puts the private sector at its core,” “An economy that pushes toward economic leaps by addressing structural issues,” “A leading economy that prepares for the future,” and “An inclusive economy that moves forward together.” Three new economic policies were released in July and August. In order to abolish the policy of abandoning nuclear power generation, the new Regime's Energy Policy was announced in July, and the “measures to achieve national housing stability” was released in August in order to normalize the real estate market. With regard to semiconductor policy, the “Semiconductor Superpower Strategy” was also released in July.

In recent years, the ROK has had a rapidly declining birthrate and aging population. In 2022, the total fertility rate was a record low of 0.78 children per woman, making the declining birthrate issue all the more serious.

B Japan-ROK Relations

(A) Bilateral Relations

The ROK is an important neighboring country with which Japan should cooperate in dealing with various issues of the international community. The two countries have built a close, friendly and cooperative relationship based on the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea, and other relevant agreements that the two countries concluded when they normalized their relationship in 1965. However, in spite of the above, situations unacceptable to Japan have continued in the last few years, including the issue of former civilian workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs), moves that go against the spirit and intent of the Japan-ROK agreement on the issue of comfort women in 2015, and the Takeshima dispute. In the current international environment where the rules-based international order is being threatened, there is no question as to the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK strategic coordination and as such, it is necessary to resolve issues of concern, and further advance sound Japan-ROK relations.

Based on this recognition, following the inauguration of a new administration in the ROK in 2022, there was active high-level contact between the two countries. In March, Prime Minister Kishida had a telephone call with President-elect Yoon, who had been elected as the 20th President of the ROK. Prime Minister Kishida extended his congratulations on Mr. Yoon's electoral victory, and both sides concurred to improve relations between the two countries. Following this, a delegation from the upcoming Yoon administration (ROK-Japan Delegation for Policy Consultation) visited Japan in April and exchanged views with Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi. In May, Foreign Minister Hayashi attended the inauguration of President Yoon as a Special Envoy of the Prime Minister. In June, Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon met for the first time in Madrid, where the NATO Summit was held, through the occasions of Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit and NATO Asia-Pacific partners (AP4) Leaders' Meeting.

In July, Foreign Minister Park visited Japan, which was the first bilateral visit in four years and seven months by a ROK Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Hayashi and Minister Park had a broad and candid exchange of views on the overall Japan-ROK relations, including on the issue of CWKs. Furthermore, President Yoon expressed his strong intention to improve Japan-ROK relations in his speeches on August 15 and on August 17, the 100th day of his inauguration, and the Government of Japan welcomed these statements. In September, informal talks were held between the leaders of Japan and the ROK in New York on the occasion of the UN General Assembly. The two leaders noted that Japan and the ROK are important neighbors who should cooperate with each other in the current strategic environment. They shared the view on the importance of promoting Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation and decided to instruct their officials to accelerate ongoing consultations among the diplomatic authorities to resolve issues of concern. Furthermore, at the ASEAN-related Summit in November, Prime Minister Kishida held a Japan-ROK Summit Meeting with President Yoon for the first time in three years. The two leaders confirmed that they will cooperate on issues with North Korea, and on the realization of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” Regarding the issue of CWKs, the two leaders reaffirmed that they would pursue an early resolution of this issue, building on the accelerated talks between the diplomatic authorities following the instructions given by the two leaders in September in New York. After close communication between the Foreign Ministers and other diplomatic authorities, on March 6, 2023, the Government of the ROK announced its position on the issues of CWKs. On the same day, the Government of Japan expressed its stance that it values the measures announced by the Government of the ROK, as a move toward restoring Japan-ROK relations, which had been severely strained due to the ROK Supreme Court ruling in 2018, to a sound footing.

Furthermore, throughout 2022, in response to North Korea's repeated launches of ballistic missiles, there were a number of telephone conversations between the Foreign Ministers of Japan and the ROK. Close communication between the Governments of Japan and the ROK continued through consultations between Vice-Ministers and Director-Generals on numerous occasions.

The ROK's marine research activities and military exercises around Takeshima continued in 2022. The Government of Japan lodged strong protests against them. The Government of Japan will continue to respond appropriately to this matter based on its consistent position.

(B) The Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs)

The Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which is the core of the normalization of their relationship in 1965, stipulates that Japan shall supply to the ROK 300 million US dollars in grants and extend loans up to 200 million US dollars (Article I). Furthermore, the Agreement stipulates that the “problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals [abridged] is settled completely and finally” and that “no contention shall be made” with respect to such claims (Article II).

However, on October 30 and November 29, 2018, the Supreme Court of the ROK gave final judgments ordering Japanese companies to pay compensation for damages to ROK nationals who were said to have worked for the companies during the World War II.

These Supreme Court judgments and related judicial procedures clearly violate Article II of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea and inflict unjustifiable damages and costs on the Japanese companies. Above all, the judgments completely overthrow the legal foundation of the friendly and cooperative relationship that Japan and the ROK have developed since the normalization of diplomatic relations. Such judgments are extremely regrettable and totally unacceptable.

In January 2019, the Government of Japan requested a diplomatic consultation with the Government of the ROK pursuant to Article III-1 in order to settle this issue in accordance with the dispute settlement procedures under the Agreement. However, the Government of the ROK failed to respond to the request. Additionally, the Government of Japan gave notice to the Government of the ROK in May 2019 that it would refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with Article III-2 of the Agreement, but, although requested to comply with this, the Government of the ROK did not fulfill its obligations regarding the arbitration procedure stipulated in the Agreement, and, as a result, the arbitration board could not be constituted.¹³

In the meantime, based on the plaintiffs' petitions, the ROK courts have steadily advanced the procedures for seizing and liquidating the assets of the Japanese companies, including September 27 and December 30, 2021 orders to sell the assets of Japanese corporations (special liquidation orders). The Government of Japan has repeatedly emphasized to the Government of the ROK that if the seized assets of Japanese companies were to be liquidated, it would lead to a serious situation for Japan-ROK relations and must be avoided, and renewed its call for the ROK to urgently provide a solution that is acceptable to Japan, including remedying the status of its breaches of international law.

Since the inauguration of the Yoon administration in May 2022, there has been close communication between the diplomatic authorities of Japan and ROK on this issue. Foreign Minister Park, who visited Japan in July, stated that the Government of the ROK would work to come up with a desirable solution before the assets of Japanese companies were liquidated, and the two Foreign Ministers agreed to resolve the issue as soon as possible. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting in November, the two leaders reaffirmed to pursue an early resolution of this issue, building on the accelerated talks between the diplomatic authorities following the instructions of the two leaders during the leaders' talks held in New York in September. Subsequently, after further close communication between the Foreign Ministers and other diplomatic officials, on March 6, 2023, the Government of the ROK announced its position on the issue of CWKs. In response, on the same day, Foreign Minister Hayashi expressed the Japanese government's stance, stating that it values the measures announced by the ROK government as a move toward restoring Japan-ROK relations, which had been severely strained due to the ROK Supreme Court ruling in 2018, to a sound footing, and that the Government of Japan hopes to see a robust expansion of political, economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries, together with the implementation of the announced measures.¹⁴

The below Ministry of Foreign Affairs website details Japan's Efforts on the Issue of CWKs.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000947.html

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• 13 See References on the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs)
• 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website explaining President Yoon's visit to Japan on March 16 and 17, 2023:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page1e_000593.html
  

(C) The Issue of Comfort Women

Japan has sincerely dealt with the issue of comfort women as it has been a major diplomatic issue between Japan and the ROK since the 1990s. The issue concerning property and claims between Japan and the ROK was settled “completely and finally” in 1965 through the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, from the perspective of facilitating feasible remedies for the former comfort women, in 1995, the people and the Government of Japan cooperated to establish the Asian Women's Fund in 1995, through which they carried out medical and welfare projects and provided “atonement money” to each former comfort woman in Asian and other countries, including the ROK. Furthermore, successive Prime Ministers have sent letters expressing their “apology and remorse” to former comfort women.

Furthermore, as a result of great diplomatic efforts, the Governments of Japan and the ROK confirmed that the issue of comfort women was “resolved finally and irreversibly” with the agreement reached at the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting in December 2015. Directly after this Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Japanese and ROK leaders also confirmed that they would take responsibility as leaders to implement this agreement and that they would deal with various issues based on the spirit of this agreement, and that the Government of the ROK committed to the agreement. This agreement was welcomed by the international community, including UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the U.S. Government. In accordance with the agreement, in August 2016, the Government of Japan contributed 1 billion Japanese yen to “the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation” established by the Government of the ROK. As of December 31, 2022, the fund provided financial support to 35 out of 47 former comfort women who were alive at the time of the agreement, and to the bereaved families of 64 out of 199 former comfort women who were deceased at the time. The agreement has been received positively by many former comfort women.

However, in December 2016, a comfort woman statue¹⁵ was installed on the sidewalk facing the Consulate-General of Japan in Busan by a civic group in the ROK. Later, the Moon Jae-in administration was newly inaugurated in May 2017. Based on the results of the assessment made by the Taskforce to Review the Agreement on Comfort Women Issue under the direct supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha announced the position of the Government of the ROK on January 9, 2018, as follows: i) it will not ask for a renegotiation with Japan; and ii) the 2015 agreement, which fails to properly reflect the wishes of the victims, does not constitute a true resolution of the issue. In July 2018, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family of the ROK announced that it would arrange a reserve budget to “appropriate the full amount” of the 1 billion Japanese yen contributed by the Government of Japan and contribute this amount to “the Gender Equality Fund.” In November 2018, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family announced that it would proceed with its dissolution of “the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation” and has since moved ahead with the dissolution procedures. While the Government of the ROK, including President Moon Jae-in, repeatedly stated in public that it “will not abandon the agreement” and “will not ask for a renegotiation with Japan,” the moves to dissolve the Foundation are totally unacceptable for Japan in light of the 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement.

Moreover, on January 8, 2021, in the lawsuit filed by former comfort women and others against the Government of Japan, the Seoul Central District Court of the Republic of Korea rendered a judgment which ordered the Government of Japan, inter alia, to pay compensation to the plaintiffs, denying the application of the principle of State immunity under international law. On January 23, 2021, this judgment was confirmed.¹⁶ On April 21, in a similar lawsuit filed by former comfort women and others, the Seoul Central District Court dismissed the case, taking into account the principle of State immunity under international law, but on May 6, the plaintiffs appealed against the court's decision. Japan has repeatedly expressed its position that this lawsuit must be dismissed because it is not acceptable for the Government of Japan to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ROK in accordance with the principle of State immunity in international law. As mentioned above, the issue concerning property and claims between Japan and the ROK, including the issue of comfort women, was “settled completely and finally,” with the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea of 1965. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the issue of comfort women was “resolved finally and irreversibly” with the agreement between Japan and the ROK in 2015. Therefore, the judgment is extremely regrettable and absolutely unacceptable, as it is clearly contrary to international law and agreements between the two countries. Japan has strongly urged the ROK to immediately take appropriate measures to remedy the status of its breaches of international law on its own responsibility as a country.

The Japan-ROK agreement in 2015 is an agreement between two countries, and abiding by promises made between two countries is the foundation of bilateral relations. The ROK has a responsibility to steadily implement the agreement not only to Japan but also to the international community. As stated above, the Government of Japan has implemented all measures it committed to under the Japan-ROK agreement. The Government of the ROK itself also acknowledges that this agreement is an official agreement between the two governments and the international community is closely following the ROK's implementation of the agreement. The Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge the ROK to steadily implement the Japan-ROK Agreement (see page 40 for the comfort women issue in the international community).

The below Ministry of Foreign Affairs website details Japan's Efforts on the Issue of Comfort Women.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/page22e_000883.html

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• 15 For the sake of practical convenience, they are referred to as “comfort woman statues.” However, the use of this term is not a reflection of the recognition that these statues correctly embody the reality of those women at that time.
• 16 See References on the Issue of Comfort Women

(D) Takeshima

Regarding the dispute between Japan and the ROK concerning the territorial sovereignty over Takeshima, Takeshima is indisputably an inherent territory of Japan both in light of historical facts and based on international law. The ROK has continued its illegal occupation of Takeshima with no legal basis in international law, including stationing permanent security personnel. Japan has been keeping the world informed about Japan's position on the issue through various media platforms.¹⁷ Japan has also repeatedly lodged strong protests against the ROK over matters such as South Korean citizens including members of the ROK's National Assembly landing on the island, and the ROK's military exercises and marine surveys in and around Takeshima.¹⁸ In 2022, military exercises and maritime surveys also conducted on the island or its vicinity. The Government of Japan considers these activities unacceptable in view of Japan's position and lodged strong protests.

For a peaceful settlement of the Takeshima dispute, Japan proposed to the ROK that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1954, 1962 and 2012. However, the ROK rejected the proposal in all instances. Japan is determined to continue to engage in persistent diplomatic efforts to settle the Takeshima dispute in a peaceful manner in accordance with international law.

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• 17 In February 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a pamphlet entitled “Takeshima: 10 points to understand the Takeshima Dispute.” It is available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website in 11 languages: Japanese, English, Korean, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, Russian, Chinese and Italian. Furthermore, since October 2013, videos and flyers about Takeshima have been available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website, and they are currently available in the above 11 languages. Furthermore, Japan has taken initiatives such as distributing a smartphone app that aims to increase awareness of the Takeshima issue. Further details are available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html
  
• 18 In May, July, and August 2022, the activities of ROK marine research vessels were spotted in Japanese territorial waters around Takeshima and within Japan's EEZ. ROK armed forces conducted military training related to Takeshima in July and December 2022. The Government of Japan immediately conveyed to the Government of the ROK that such an act was unacceptable and extremely regrettable in light of Japan's position on sovereignty over Takeshima, and strongly protested against the act.

(E) Update of Licensing Policies and Procedures on Exports of Controlled Items to the ROK

On September 11, 2019, the Government of the ROK requested bilateral consultations with Japan under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures, claiming the update by the Government of Japan of the operation of measures related to Japan's export to the ROK of three items for semiconductors (fluorinated polyimide, resist and hydrogen fluoride), and the system for requiring individual export licenses,¹⁹ is in breach of the WTO Agreements. The Government of the ROK announced on November 22, 2019, that it suspended the effect of the notification of termination of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information (GSOMIA), and in doing so said that it would also suspend its WTO dispute settlement procedures while the Japan-ROK Export Control Policy Dialogue would be held as normal. Subsequently Export Control Policy Dialogues were held in December 2019 and March 2020. Despite the fact that the export control authorities of Japan and the ROK shared the view to resolve the issue through dialogue and communication, the Government of the ROK resumed WTO dispute settlement procedures on June 18, 2020, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body decided to establish a panel on July 29, 2020.

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• 19 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced the following updates on July 1, 2019: (1) the amendment of the Export Trade Control Order of the ROK (Note: The ROK was excluded from “Group A.” A revised Cabinet ordinance entered into force on August 28 to effect this change) and (2) switching from bulk licenses to individual export licenses for Fluorinated polyimide, Resist and Hydrogen fluoride.

(F) Exchanges and Travel

In 2018, the number of people making visits between the two countries was approximately 10.49 million people, but since early 2020, travel between Japan and the ROK significantly decreased due to the strengthening of border measures related to COVID-19, and in 2021, approximately only 30,000 people made trips between the two countries. In 2022, due to visa exemption measures resuming in both countries and the resumption of flights between Japan and the ROK including the Haneda-Gimpo route, the number of travelers has gone up with the number of visitors between Japan and the ROK reaching about 1.31 million people.

The Governments of Japan and the ROK share the view that, notwithstanding the challenging situation of the bilateral relations, exchanges between Japan and the ROK are important. In Japan, K-POP and related content is widely accepted mainly among younger generations, and Korean dramas and movies have become widely popular amongst people of all ages. In 2022, the major Japan-ROK grassroots exchange program “Japan-Korea Exchange Festival” (Nikkan Koryu Omatsuri) was held as an in-person event in Seoul for the first time in three years (held online in Tokyo). The Government of Japan works on promoting mutual understanding, primarily between young people, and building a friendly and cooperative relationship for the future through Japan's Friendship Ties Programs (JENESYS 2022). After online exchanges were held in FY2020 and FY2021, in-person exchanges have partially resumed in 2022.

(G) Other Issues

The Governments of Japan and the ROK concluded the GSOMIA in November 2016 in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the two countries in the field of security and contribute to regional peace and stability. Afterwards, the agreement was automatically extended in 2017 and 2018. However, the Government of the ROK announced on August 22, 2019, its decision to terminate the GSOMIA in connection with Japan's update of licensing policies and procedures on exports (see (E) above) and notified the termination on the following day, August 23. Following this and after exchanges between Japan and the ROK, on November 22, the Government of the ROK announced that it would suspend the effect of the notification of termination of August 23. In view of the current regional security environment, the Government of Japan still considers it important for the Agreement to continue operating in a stable manner.

Sea of Japan is the only internationally established name for the sea area concerned, and the UN and governments of major countries such as the U.S. adopt Sea of Japan as the official name. Objections to this name, however, were first raised by the ROK and North Korea in 1992. Since then, the ROK and North Korea have been objecting to the name at the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN),²⁰ the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and other international conferences. These assertions however are groundless, and Japan has firmly refuted these assertions each time they arise.²¹

Furthermore, Japan has strongly requested the Government of the ROK through its diplomatic channels to return cultural properties that were stolen and are currently in the ROK²² to Japan as soon as possible, and Japan will continue to call on the ROK to take appropriate steps.

Japan has provided support and taken measures as much as possible from a humanitarian perspective in various fields, including responses for ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin²³ addressing the issue of atomic bomb survivors living in the ROK,²⁴ and helping Hansen's disease patients admitted to sanitariums in the ROK.²⁵

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• 20 A UN conference where experts on place names and geospatial information from each country discuss, from a technical point of view, the definitions of terms related to place names and the notion methods for place names. In 2017, the UN Conferences on the Standardization of Geographical Name, which had been held every five years, and the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names, which had been held every two years, were integrated into the United Nations Group of Experts on Place Names (UNGEGN).
• 21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website detailing the issue of the name of the “Sea of Japan”:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/japan/index.html
  
• 22 After being stolen in Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture in 2012 and shipped to the ROK, the “Kanzeon Bosatsu Statue” was collected and stored by the Government of the ROK. A Korean temple asserting ownership of the statue has filed a claim with the Daejeon District Court seeking to have the Government of the ROK hand over the statue, and in January 2017 the court issued a verdict of the first hearing to the plaintiff's side (the Korean temple). In response to this, the Government of the ROK appealed, and in February 2023 the Daejeon High Court reversed the initial ruling and dismissed the plaintiff's claim, but the plaintiff filed an appeal. The “Kanzeon Bosatsu Statue” is still being held by the Government of the ROK and has not been returned to Japan (as of the end of February 2023).
• 23 For various reasons, before the end of World War II, people from the Korean Peninsula traveled to what was then known as Minami Karafuto (South Sakjalin) and were compelled to remain there for a long time after the war ended under the de facto rule of the Soviet Union, without being given the opportunity to return to the ROK. The Government of Japan is providing such people with support, such as to enable them to return home temporarily and to visit Sakhalin.
• 24 This is the issue of provision of support to those who were exposed to the atomic bombs while living in Hiroshima or Nagasaki during World War II and subsequently went to live overseas. To date, Japan has provided support in the form of the Atomic Bomb Victim Health Handbook and allowances based on the Atomic Bombs Survivors' Assistance Act.
• 25 In February 2006, the “Act on Payment of Compensation to Inmates of Hansen's Disease Sanatorium” was amended, and former residents of Hansen's disease sanatoriums outside of Japan, which were established by Japan before the end of World War II, were made eligible for compensation, similar to former residents of domestic sanatoriums. Additionally, in November 2019, the “Act on Payment of Compensation to Families of Former Patients of Hansen's Disease” was enacted, and the families of former inmates were also made eligible for compensation.

C Economy

The total value of trade between the two countries amounted to approximately 11.52 trillion Japanese yen in 2022. Japan is the ROK's fourth largest trading partner, and the ROK is Japan's fifth largest trading partner. The ROK's trade deficit with Japan increased by approximately 19.7% from a year earlier, reaching approximately 2.69 trillion Japanese yen (Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance). Japanese direct investment in the ROK totaled approximately 1.53 billion US dollars (up 26.3% from the previous year) (figures published by the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy), making Japan the ROK's fourth largest source of foreign direct investment (excluding the Cayman Islands from the ranking).

In November 2020, 15 countries, including Japan and the ROK, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, which is also the first Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and the ROK. On December 3, 2021, the ROK deposited the ratification of the agreement with the depositary, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, and for the ROK the agreement entered into force on February 1, 2022.

As for import restrictions on Japanese food products by the Government of the ROK, Japan is taking various opportunities to urge the ROK to remove the restrictions as soon as possible.