Diplomatic Bluebook 2022

Chapter 3

Japan Strengthening Its Presence in the International Community

4 Disarmament and Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during wartime, Japan has the responsibility to lead the international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

The global security environment has been severe in recent years. As seen in the situation surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that entered into force in January, there exists an apparent divergence of views on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, a divergence that exists not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states but also among non-nuclear-weapon states that are exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and those that are not. Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to persistently advance realistic measures while bridge-building between states with divergent views, in order to promote nuclear disarmament.

Japan has continued to pursue bridge-building between states with divergent views with the aim of realizing a world without nuclear weapons. It has done this through cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries, in ways such as holding meetings of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament and the follow-up Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, submitting the Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament to the UN General Assembly, and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as well as bilateral consultations. Moreover, Japan intends to continue maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime through cumulative efforts that include promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encouraging states to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and building up realistic efforts that nuclear-weapon states can also participate in, such as discussions and exercises toward the realization of effective nuclear disarmament verification.

The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon state has not joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon states is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during wartime, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon states. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S.

A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Japan places great importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NPT Review Conferences have been held once every five years with the aim of achieving the goals of the NPT and ensuring compliance with its provisions, and discussions that reflect the international situation of the time have been held since the NPT entered into force in 1970. However, at the 9th Review Conference held in 2015, discussions failed to arrive at a consensus regarding the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and other issues, and the Conference ended without a consensus document.

2020 is a milestone year, marking 50 years since the NPT entered into force and 75 years since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Statement by the Foreign Minister was released on March 5 to coincide with the entering into force of the NPT. In the statement, Foreign Minister Motegi expressed appreciation for the NPT's invaluable contribution to the consolidation and maintenance of international peace and security as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and spoke about the need to uphold and strengthen the NPT regime. Although the 10th NPT Review Conference was scheduled for April 2020, it has been postponed four times due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

B Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament and the Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament

The “Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” (EPG; consisting of 17 experts from countries of different positions, including Japan) was launched by Japan in 2017 with the goals of rebuilding trust among countries with divergent views on how to proceed with nuclear disarmament and of obtaining recommendations that will contribute to the substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament. The Group held a total of five meetings leading up to July 2019, and the concrete outcomes were submitted to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In October 2019, the Chair's Report, summarizing discussions at all five meetings of the Group held to date, was published.

Thereafter, Japan established “The Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” with the participation of experts and government officials from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, for the purpose of following up with, and further developing, the discussions of the EPG. At the Third Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, held online in December 2021, Prime Minister Kishida attended the meeting as Prime Minister for the first time, and delivered the opening remarks. At this meeting, discussions were held on the possible outcomes of the 10th NPT Review Conference, and in particular, the approach to producing outcomes that strike a balance between the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful uses), and the approach to making progress in nuclear disarmament based on Article 6 of the NPT.

Prime Minister Kishida delivering the opening remarks at the Third Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (December, Tokyo. Photo: Cabinet Public Relations Office)Prime Minister Kishida delivering the opening remarks at the Third Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament (December, Tokyo. Photo: Cabinet Public Relations Office)
C The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

The NPDI, a group of 12 non-nuclear-weapon states from various regions established under the leadership of Japan and Australia in 2010 has served as a bridge between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. It leads efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through its realistic and practical proposals with the involvement of the foreign ministers of its member states. At the 10th NPDI Ministerial Meeting, co-organized by Japan and Australia and held during the G20 Aichi-Nagoya Foreign Ministers' Meeting in November 2019, an NPDI Joint Ministerial Statement was issued concerning the importance of maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime.

The NPDI has actively contributed to the NPT review process through realistic and practical proposals, including the submission of 19 working papers to the 9th NPT Review process and 16 to the 10th NPT Review process. For example, with a view to the 10th NPT Review Conference, the NPDI submitted a working paper (“Landing-zone Paper”) that proposes the elements that should be incorporated into the final document concerning the three pillars of the NPT─nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

D Initiatives Through the United Nations (Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament)

Since 1994, Japan has submitted draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. They incorporate issues of the time related to nuclear disarmament, and are aimed at presenting a realistic and concrete nuclear disarmament approach proposed by Japan to the international community. As a means to facilitate the building of a common ground between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the 2021 resolution focused on joint courses of action to be taken immediately by the international community toward nuclear disarmament as well as the importance of future-oriented dialogues. The resolution was adopted with the broad support of 152 countries at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October and of 158 countries at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in December. The states supporting the resolution have divergent views, and include nuclear-weapon states such as the U.S., the UK, and France as well as many non-nuclear-weapon states. While other resolutions that comprehensively addressed nuclear disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly in addition to Japan's draft resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan has enjoyed support among a larger number of states. For more than 20 years, Japan's resolutions have continued to enjoy the broad support of states with divergent views in the international community.

E Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Japan attaches great importance to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic measure of nuclear disarmament where both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states can participate. Japan also has continued diplomatic efforts to call on all countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, including those countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force, to do so. In 2021, during the UN High-Level Meetings held in September, the 12th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was convened in hybrid format. Video messages from UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), as well as from the government representatives of various countries, were broadcast at the meeting. In his video statement issued to the Conference, Foreign Minister Motegi welcomed the progress in the universalization of the CTBT and the remarkable development of the verification regime over the 25 years since it opened for signatures. At the same time, he expressed Japan's commitments toward the entering into force of the treaty, and stated that it is vital to realize the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea. The aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for the CTBT to be signed and ratified by countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force.

F Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty10 (FMCT)

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has great significance for both disarmament and non-proliferation as it would prevent the emergence of new states possessing nuclear-weapons by banning the production of fissile materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it limits the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states. For many years, however, no agreement has been reached on commencing negotiations for the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Consequently, it was decided at the 71st UN General Assembly in December 2016 to establish the FMCT High-Level Experts Preparatory Group, and Japan actively participated in the Group's discussions. Through discussions at the first meeting (August 2017) and second meeting (June 2018), a report was adopted that includes possible options for the outline of a future treaty and contents to consider in negotiations. The report was submitted to the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018. The aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for all countries to put every effort into immediate commencement of negotiations on the FMCT. Japan will actively continue to contribute to FMCT discussions.

  • 10 A treaty concept that aims to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile materials (such as enriched uranium and plutonium) that are used as materials to produce nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
G Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan places great importance on education in disarmament and non-proliferation. Specifically, Japan has been actively engaged in efforts to convey the realities of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons to people both within Japan and overseas, through activities such as translating the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, invitations for young diplomats from other countries to go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament11 (in 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an online event was held to convey the realities of atomic bombing), providing assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibitions overseas,12 and designating atomic bomb survivors who have given testimonies of their atomic bomb experiences as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.” The aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for all countries to put effort into nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Additionally, as the atomic bomb survivors age, it is becoming increasingly important to pass on the realities of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings across generations and borders. To this end, from 2013 to 2021, Japan conferred the designation of “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” for more than 400 youths in Japan and overseas.

  • 11 Implemented since 1983 by the UN to nurture nuclear disarmament experts. Program participants are invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to promote understanding of the realities of atomic bombing through such means as museum tours and talks by victims about their experiences in the atomic bombings.
  • 12 Opened as a permanent exhibition about the atomic bomb in New York, U.S.; Geneva, Switzerland; and Vienna, Austria, in cooperation with Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.
H Initiatives Toward Future Arms Control

In the area of nuclear disarmament, in addition to initiatives through multilateral frameworks such as the NPT, the U.S. and Russia have also concluded and maintained a bilateral arms control treaty. On February 3, 2021, the two countries agreed on an extension to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The New START Treaty demonstrates important progress in nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia, and Japan welcomed this extension. The U.S. and Russia also set up a dialogue on strategic stability after the extension of the treaty, and are continuing to hold dialogues that also cover the topic of arms control.

On the other hand, in view of the recent situation surrounding nuclear weapons, it is important to establish a new arms control mechanism that encompasses a wider range of countries beyond the U.S. and Russia, while also including a broader range of weapon systems. From this perspective, Japan has been communicating with China on this issue at various levels. For example, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting held in August, Foreign Minister Motegi, joining hands with other countries, expressed his desire to encourage China to continue its efforts to fulfil its responsibility as a nuclear weapon state and an important player in the international community, and engage in the bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and China on arms control in accordance with the obligation to negotiate in good faith under the NPT.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also stresses the importance of concrete actions for transparency among nuclear-weapon states, and reaffirms the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon states to initiate arms control dialogues on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing.

(2) Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security

A Japan's Efforts Toward Non-proliferation

To ensure Japan's security and to maintain peace and security of the international community, Japan has been making efforts concerning non-proliferation policy. The goal of such a policy is to prevent the proliferation of weapons that could threaten Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and biological/chemical weapons, as well as missiles with the ability to deliver those weapons and conventional weapons) and of related materials and technologies used to develop such weapons. In today's international community, economic growth in emerging countries has enabled a growing capacity to produce and supply weapons in those countries as well as materials that could be diverted to the development of such weapons. Meanwhile, methods for procuring these materials are becoming more sophisticated, due in part to increasing complexity in means of distribution. Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies is spurring a growing potential for private sector technologies to be diverted to uses for military purposes, and increasing the proliferation risk of weapons that could pose a threat and of related materials and technologies. Under these circumstances, Japan has been implementing its non-proliferation policies, focusing on maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes and rules, taking appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and promoting close coordination with and capacity building support for other nations.

Japan's three main measures of preventing proliferation are (1) IAEA safeguards, (2) export control, and (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Safeguards refer to verification activities conducted in accordance with safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and aim to ensure that nuclear energy will not be diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors,13 Japan has made various efforts, including supporting the IAEA. For example, based on the view that the IAEA safeguards are at the core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Japan enhances the understanding and implementation capabilities of safeguards of other countries. Japan also encourages other countries to conclude the Additional Protocol (AP)14 to the IAEA safeguards agreements. Japan will continue providing utmost support at the IAEA General Conference, Board of Governors meetings, and other fora to Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, who has extensive knowledge and experience, and will continue to work with other member countries to strengthen the role of the IAEA.

Export control is a useful measure in the so-called supply-side regulation toward countries of proliferation concern, terrorist organizations, and other entities attempting to acquire or distribute weapons or related materials or technologies. There are currently four export control frameworks (international export control regimes) in the international community. Japan has participated in all of them since their inception, engaging in international coordination and practicing strict export control. Each of the four regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons, the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missiles,15 and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for conventional weapons, establishes a list of dual-use items and technologies which contribute to weapons development. To ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, participating countries to the regimes implement export control measures on the listed items and technologies in accordance with their domestic laws. The export control regimes also exchange information concerning trends in countries of proliferation concern and are engaged in outreach activities to non-participating countries to the regimes in order to strengthen their export control. Japan actively engages in such international rule-making and application of rules, and makes various contributions. Additionally, in terms of international contributions in nuclear non-proliferation, the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna serves as the Point of Contact of the NSG.

Furthermore, Japan seeks to complement the activities of the international export control regimes by actively participating in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).16 Through efforts such as hosting the maritime interdiction exercise “Pacific Shield 18”17 in July 2018, Japan is working to enhance coordination among countries and concerned institutions. In October 2021, Japan participated in an exercise hosted by Singapore (conducted in hybrid format).

Japan also holds Asia Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)18 and Asian Export Control Seminar19 every year in order to promote a better understanding of the non-proliferation regimes and strengthen regional efforts, mainly in Asian countries.

Furthermore, with regards to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540,20 which was adopted in 2004 with the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (missiles) to non-state actors, Japan contributes to maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation frameworks through Japan's contributions to support the implementation of the resolution by Asian nations.

  • 13 13 countries are designated by the IAEA Board of Governors. The designated member states include Japan and other G7 countries with advanced nuclear energy capabilities.
  • 14 In addition to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that is applied on all nuclear materials pertaining to the peaceful nuclear activities in that country, and that non-nuclear-weapon NPT States Parties must conclude with the IAEA pursuant to Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the NPT, an Additional Protocol is concluded between IAEA and the respective State Parties. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol expands the scope of nuclear activity information that should be declared to the IAEA, and gives the IAEA strengthened measures to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As of December 2021, 138 countries have concluded the Additional Protocol.
  • 15 Apart from export control regimes, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which includes the principle of exercising restraint in their development and deployment, addresses the issue of ballistic missiles. As of December 2021, 143 countries subscribe to the HCOC.
  • 16 An initiative launched in 2003 for the purpose of implementing and considering possible measures consistent with relevant international laws and national legal authorities in order to interdict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, along with related materials. 107 countries participate in and support the PSI as of December 2021. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and the U.S. have agreed to conduct a yearly rotation exercise in the Asia-Pacific region since 2014. Through the cooperation of agencies including MOFA, the National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, Japan Coast Guard and Ministry of Defense, Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises in 2004, 2007, and 2018, PSI air interdiction exercises in 2012, and an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in 2010. Japan has also actively participated in training and related meetings hosted by other countries.
  • 17 Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the U.S. contributed assets and personnel to the exercise, which was held in Yokosuka City, in the sea and airspace off the Boso Peninsula, and in the airspace off the Izu Peninsula, and 19 countries from Indo-Pacific region and other countries sent observers.
  • 18 A multilateral Director-General-level meeting launched in 2003 and hosted by Japan to discuss various issues related to the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime in Asia among the 10 ASEAN Member States, China, India, the ROK, as well as the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and the EU, which have common interests in Asian regional security. Most recently, the 16th meeting was held online in December 2020, and discussions were held on topics such as North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and the strengthening of export control.
  • 19 A seminar hosted by Japan to exchange views and information toward strengthening export controls in Asia, with the participation of export control officials from Asian countries and regions. It has been organized annually in Tokyo since 1993.
  • 20 Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all countries to: (1) refrain from providing support to terrorists and other non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction; (2) adopt and enforce laws prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors; and (3) implement domestic controls (protective measures, border control, export controls, etc.) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also establishes, under the UN Security Council, the 1540 Committee, which comprises Security Council members and has a mandate to review and report to the Security Council the level of resolution 1540 implementation by member states.
B Regional Non-proliferation Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

North Korea launched ballistic missiles twice in March 2021, and thereafter, repeatedly launched missiles, including ballistic missiles, over September and October, suggesting that its missile technology is improving steadily. The IAEA Director General's report in August pointed out that North Korea's nuclear activities continue to give rise to serious concerns. In particular, it pointed out that new indications of the operation of a 5MW nuclear reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing facility) in Yongbyon are deeply troubling, and that the continuation of North Korea's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. Moreover, at the IAEA General Conference in September, a resolution based on the report was adopted by consensus, demonstrating the united position of IAEA member states toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Regardless of such efforts by the international community, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with extremely high frequency and in new ways since the beginning of 2022.

It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner by North Korea. To that end, Japan will continue to coordinate closely with related countries, including the U.S. and the ROK, as well as international organizations such as the IAEA. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will work on capacity building for export control particularly in Asia. Japan will also continue to contribute actively to discussions on North Korea's nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and MTCR.

Since the withdrawal of the former U.S. administration of Trump from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)21 in 2018, Iran has continued with actions to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA. In January 2020, Iran announced that it would not be bound by the limit on the enrichment of uranium set forth in the JCPOA. Since the start of 2021, it has produced 20% enriched uranium in January, suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA including the AP in February, and produced 60% enriched uranium in April. By August, it was confirmed that Iran had produced uranium metal enriched at up to 20%.

Japan has consistently supported the JCPOA, which contributes to the international non-proliferation regime, and is paying close attention to efforts by the relevant countries toward the return of both the U.S. and Iran to the JCPOA. Japan, being deeply concerned about Iran's continued reduction of its commitments under the JCPOA, has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from further measures that may undermine the JCPOA and to return fully to its commitments under the JCPOA.

In February, September, and November, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Iran to discuss these issues related to compliance with the JCPOA and the series of problems with safeguards (in which nuclear materials that had not been declared to the IAEA were found in Iran). During his visits in February and September, Iran and the IAEA issued joint statements and affirmed their mutual spirit of cooperation. However, the two parties failed to reach a final agreement during the visit in November, and a joint statement was not issued. In response, European and American countries expressed their concern. Thereafter, Iran and the IAEA affirmed a certain degree of cooperation in December.

In March 2022, Director General Grossi visited Iran again. The two parties issued a joint statement and agreed to set the aim to reporting the conclusions on the safeguards issue by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2022. Japan supports the IAEA's efforts on Iran matters so far and will continue to call strongly upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Japan is also contributing to discussions on Iran's nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and MTCR.

As for Syria, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 found that activities such as Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor would constitute non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To address this outstanding issue, Japan is calling upon Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. It is important for Syria to sign, ratify and implement the AP.

  • 21 Sets forth detailed procedures for imposing constraints on Iran's nuclear activities while ensuring that they serve peaceful purposes, and for lifting the imposed sanctions.
    <Main measures undertaken by Iran>
    ● Constraints on enriched uranium-related activities
    ・ Limit on the number of centrifuges in operation to 5,060 units
    ・ Upper limit on enriched uranium at 3.67%, and limit on the amount of stored enriched uranium at 300kg, etc.
    ● Constraints on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor, and reprocessing
    ・ Redesign / remodeling of the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor so that it is not able to produce weapon-grade plutonium and to transfer spent fuel out of the country
    ・ No reprocessing including for research purposes, no construction of reprocessing facilities, etc.
C Nuclear Security

International cooperation is advancing in nuclear security to prevent acts of terrorism such as those involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These include the entering into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2007 and of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2015 respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit was held four times between 2010 and 2016. At the International Conference on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in 2020, Mr. Wakamiya Kenji, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs participated in the ministerial conference as a representative of the Government of Japan and delivered a speech to share the view of Japan with other participants. Japan continues to actively participate in and contribute to these efforts.

In October 2019, relevant Japanese ministries and organizations conducted a table-top exercise on nuclear security measures for major public events with the participation of experts from the IAEA and the U.S.

On March 2 and 3, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors convened an emergency meeting in Vienna to discuss the implications of Russia's aggression against Ukraine on nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. At the meeting, participating countries condemned and expressed their concerns regarding Russia's attacks on the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine from the perspective of nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. The resolution adopted by a majority at the meeting deplores Russia's actions in Ukraine, which are posing serious and direct threats to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and civilian personnel. It also calls upon Russia to immediately cease all actions in order for Ukraine to preserve or promptly regain full control over nuclear facilities. Japan also strongly condemned the aggression by Russia, including seizing control of nuclear facilities, and will continue to respond appropriately while monitoring the relevant situation closely in cooperation with the IAEA and other parties.

(3) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A Multilateral Efforts

Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the treaty, it is the “inalienable right” for any country that meets its obligations to non-proliferation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reflecting the increase in international energy demand, many countries use or are planning to use nuclear power.22

On the other hand, these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes, and a nuclear accident in one country may have significant impacts on neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”:23 that is, (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety (e.g. measures to ensure safety to prevent nuclear accidents), and (3) Nuclear Security. As the country that experienced the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, it is Japan's responsibility to share its experiences and lessons learned from the accident with other countries and to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety. In this regard, in 2013, the IAEA, in collaboration with Japan, designated the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC) in Fukushima Prefecture. By December, they had conducted 26 workshops for Japanese and foreign officials to strengthen their capacity in the field of emergency preparedness and response. In November 2021, the IAEA held the International Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety, marking 10 years since the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, to reflect on the lessons and experiences drawn from the actions taken by participating countries and international organizations, and to identify pathways for further strengthening nuclear safety in the future.

The difficult work of decommissioning, contaminated water management, decontamination and environmental remediation has been progressing steadily at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station by leveraging the collective technologies and knowledge of the world, and in cooperation with the IAEA, the expert organization in the field of nuclear energy. The Government of Japan announced its Basic Policy on the handling of the ALPS treated water24 in April, and signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS treated Water with the IAEA in July. Under this TOR, Japan is cooperating with the IAEA to implement the IAEA reviews on the safety and regulatory aspects of ALPS treated water. This cooperation is facilitated by a task force established within the IAEA, which also includes experts identified by the IAEA from its member states. In November, experts from the IAEA and analytical agencies of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Germany and France conducted Marine Monitoring in Japan.

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) published a revised report in March on the levels and the impact of radiation from the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, based on the latest information.

In order to make progress in the decommissioning works and in recovery with a support and correct understanding of the international community, the Government of Japan periodically releases comprehensive reports through the IAEA that cover matters such as progress in decommissioning and contaminated water management at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, results of the monitoring of air dose rate and seawater radioactivity concentration, and food safety. In addition, Japan submits reports on the current situation to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo and to the IAEA basically every month. Furthermore, Japan has organized more than 100 briefing sessions to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo since the accident (held in April, August, September, November, and December in 2021), and provided information through Japanese diplomatic missions overseas.

The Government of Japan continues to provide an information thoroughly to the international community in a transparent manner, based on scientific evidence, and to provide firm explanations for claims that may cause reputational damage.

Nuclear energy is applied not only to the field of power generation, but also to other areas including human health, food and agriculture, environment, and industrial uses. Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such non-power applications and contributing to development issues are becoming increasingly important as developing countries make up the majority of NPT States Parties. The IAEA also contributes to technical cooperation for developing countries and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In this context, Japan has been actively supporting the IAEA's activities, with its technical cooperation based on the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and with its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In FY2020, Japan contributed 11 million euros toward measures to combat infectious diseases including COVID-19, and in FY2021 toward projects to address the problem of marine plastic pollution among others.

  • 22 According to the IAEA, as of January 2022, 439 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 50 reactors are under construction.
  • 23 “3S” is used to refer to the IAEA's efforts toward nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards, which are typical measures for non-proliferation.
  • 24 “ALPS treated water” refers to water purified using multiple purification systems, including Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS).
B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to establish a legal framework for securing a legal assurance from the recipient country on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear-related material and equipment that are transferred between the two countries, so as to realize cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the two countries. Under such bilateral agreements, cooperation in areas such as the strengthening of nuclear safety can be promoted. Japan makes its decision on whether or not to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with another country, taking into account a wide range of factors such as non-proliferation efforts and nuclear energy policy of that country, its trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries among others. As of the end of 2021, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, Australia, China, the U.S., France, the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India. As for the UK, following the changes of safeguards applicable to the UK as a result of its withdrawal from EURATOM, Japan engaged in negotiations with the Government of the UK from June 2019 on the Protocol Amending the Japan-UK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This Protocol was signed in December 2020 and entered into force in September 2021.

(4) Biological and Chemical Weapons

A Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)25 is the only multilateral legal framework imposing a comprehensive ban on the development, production and possession of biological weapons. However, the question of how to reinforce the Convention is a challenge as there are neither provisions governing the means of verifying compliance with the BWC nor an implementing organization for the Convention.

Since 2006, decisions have been made to establish the Implementation Support Unit (fulfilling the functions of a Secretariat) and to hold inter-sessional meetings twice a year in between the Review Conferences held every five years. During this time, progress has been made with respect to initiatives aimed at strengthening the regime of the BWC.

At the inter-sessional meetings up until the 9th Review Conference scheduled to be held in 2022, discussions were held on the five topics, namely international cooperation, reviews of developments in the field of science and technology, national implementation, assistance for preparedness and response, and institutional strengthening of the Convention.

  • 25 Entered into force in March 1975. Total number of state parties is 183 (as of December 2021).
B Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)26 imposes a comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance is ensured through a verification system consisting of declarations and inspections, making this Convention a groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. Its extensive efforts toward the realization of a world without chemical weapons were highly acclaimed, and the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Japan, which has a highly developed chemicals industry and numerous chemicals factories, also accepts many OPCW inspections. Japan also actively cooperates with the OPCW in many other concrete ways, including measures to increase the number of member states and strengthening national implementation measures by States Parties with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention. Moreover, under the CWC, Japan aims to complete, as soon as possible, the destruction of chemical weapons of the former Japanese Army abandoned in Chinese territory by working in cooperation with China.

  • 26 Entered into force in April 1997. Total number of state parties is 193 (as of December 2021).

(5) Conventional Weapons

Conventional weapons generally refer to arms other than weapons of mass destruction and include a wide variety of weapons ranging from large weapons such as landmines, tanks, and artillery to small arms such as handguns. The problem of conventional weapons, which are used in actual wars and cause injury and death to civilians, is a serious one for both national security and humanitarian concerns. The disarmament agenda presented in 2018 by UN Secretary-General Guterres categorizes disarmament of conventional weapons as one of the three pillars, “Disarmament that Saves Lives.” Japan is making active efforts involving cooperation and support based on international standards and principles concerning conventional weapons.

A Small Arms

Described as “the real weapons of mass destruction” due to the many human lives they take, small arms continue to proliferate due to the ease with which they can be obtained and used. They contribute to conflict prolongation and escalation, hindering the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 1995, Japan has been working with other countries to submit a resolution on the illicit trade of small arms to the UN General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year. In areas around the world, Japan has also provided support for projects to address the issue of small arms, including training and the collection and destruction of weapons. In 2019, Japan contributed two million US dollars to a mechanism for preventing small arms established under UN Secretary-General Guterres' disarmament agenda.

B The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)27

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to establish common standards to regulate international trade in and prevent the illicit trade of conventional arms, entered into force in December 2014. As one of the original co-authors of the UN General Assembly resolution that initiated a consideration of the treaty, Japan has taken the lead in discussions and negotiations in the UN and contributed significantly to the establishment of the treaty. Even after the treaty entered into force, Japan has actively participated in discussions at Conferences of States Parties and other opportunities. Japan has continued to contribute in ways such as hosting the 4th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in Tokyo as the first chair country elected from the Asia-Pacific region in August 2018. Japan also places importance on the universal application of the ATT. To that end, it has been encouraging countries, in particular Asian countries, to participate in the ATT.

  • 27 As of December 2021, there are 110 states and regions that are parties to the ATT. Japan signed the Treaty on the day that it was released for signing and became a State Party in May 2014.
C Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW)28

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. It comprises a framework convention that sets forth procedural and other matters, as well as five annexed protocols that regulate individual conventional arms. The framework convention entered into force in 1983. Japan has ratified the framework convention and annexed Protocols I to IV, including the amended Protocol II. Prompted by concerns in the international community about the rapidly advancing military applications of science and technology, meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been held under the CCW framework since 2017. Meetings of the Group were held in March and August 2019, and the High Contracting Parties reached consensus on 11 guiding principles on LAWS. It was decided that discussions on matters including the guiding principles will be used as a basis for the clarification, consideration and development of normative and operational framework for the future. The 11 guiding principles were officially reached consensus at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW held in November 2019. In 2021, too, active discussions took place at the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) convened in August, September and December, and at the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW held in December. Japan continued to participate actively and constructively in the international rule-making, and contributed to discussions.

  • 28 As of December 2021, 125 countries and regions are parties to the CCW.
D Anti-Personnel Mines

Since the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)29 in 1998, Japan has continued to promote comprehensive measures with a focus on the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of support for mine-affected countries. Along with calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention, Japan has also been steadily engaged in international cooperation through landmine clearance, victim assistance and other activities in the international community, from the viewpoint of the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.”

At the 19th Meeting of the States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty held in Geneva in November 2021, Japan presented its initiatives and achievements in supporting mine action, and also expressed its continued resolve toward playing an active role in achieving a mine-free world.

  • 29 The Convention, which entered into force in March 1999, bans the use and production of anti-personnel mines while mandating the destruction of stockpiled mines and the clearance of buried mines. As of December 2021, there are 164 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.
E Cluster Munitions30

The international community takes seriously the humanitarian consequences brought about by cluster munitions. Japan is therefore taking steps to address this issue via victim assistance and unexploded ordnance clearance,31 while also continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).32 At the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in 2021, Japan participated in discussions concerning these issues and shared its proactive efforts.

  • 30 Generally speaking, it refers to bombs or shells in the form of large containers that open midair and release submunitions that spread over a wide area. They are said to be highly likely to not explode on impact, leading to the problem of civilians being accidentally killed or injured.
  • 31 See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts on international cooperation regarding cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines.
  • 32 Entered into force in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while mandating the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions. As of December 2021, there are 110 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.