2 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

(1) Overview of Japan-U.S. Security Relationship

Under the security environment surrounding Japan, which is becoming increasingly severe at an ever more rapid pace, it is indispensable to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance not only for the peace and security of Japan, but also for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and the U.S. are further enhancing their deterrence and response capabilities under the Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security. Through such efforts, Japan and the U.S. have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including ballistic missiles defense, cyberspace, space and maritime security. Japan and the U.S. have been working closely on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and other locations in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(2) Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in Various Fields

A Multilayered Efforts Under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were formulated in 2015, reviewed and updated the general framework and policy direction of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and other efforts established under these Guidelines, Japan and the U.S. have been sharing information closely, establishing a common understanding of the situation, and engaging in “seamless” responses and efforts from peacetime to contingencies. From the very beginning, the Biden administration has made it clear that it places great importance on the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In March 2021, just two months after the inauguration of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, and Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, visited Japan in the first overseas trip made by cabinet members under the administration, and held a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting with Foreign Minister Motegi and Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo. The four Ministers reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and renewed the unwavering commitment of both countries to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. They also concurred to further deepen the coordination to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Furthermore, the U.S. underscored its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear. The four Ministers affirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and affirmed that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands.

In January 2022, the “2+2” meeting was convened virtually for the first time. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hayashi and Defense Minister Kishi from the Japanese side, and Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin from the U.S. side. The four Ministers engaged in candid and important discussions on how to advance the evolution of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and continue to effectively address current and future challenges. The outcome of the meeting is broadly summarized in the following three points. Firstly, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” They also held an in-depth discussion and aligned their understanding on the changing strategic environment in the region, including China's efforts to undermine the rules-based order and North Korea's nuclear and missile activities. Secondly, they affirmed that they would advance concrete discussions toward fundamentally enhancing the Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities. Furthermore, they concurred on pursuing investments to ensure that the Alliance will maintain its competitive edge into the future, including in the field of space, cyberspace as well as emerging technologies. Thirdly, they concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and sharing information in a timely manner, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Also, in-person visits by senior U.S. defense officials continued to take place in 2021, Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, respectively visited Japan in June, while there were also visits by Admiral Charles A. Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, in July, and Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy, in October. Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, visited Japan once again in November, and was the first foreign dignitary to pay a courtesy call to Foreign Minister Hayashi after his inauguration. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue was held virtually in April. This Dialogue has been held on a regular basis since 2010 as part of security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. It provides an opportunity for the two governments to discuss regional security, Alliance defense posture, nuclear and missile defense policy, and arms control issues, to frankly exchange views on means to enhance alliance deterrence and to deepen mutual understanding. Through these multilayered efforts, Japan will continue to promote security and defense cooperation with the U.S., further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance.

Japan-U.S. “2+2” (videoconference) (January 2022)

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Miyake Shingo receiving a courtesy call from Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy (October, Tokyo)

B Missile Defense

Japan has been making steady efforts to develop and engage in the production of the BMD system while continuing cooperation with the U.S., including on the steady implementation of joint development and joint production of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3 Block IIA) since 2006, and Japan is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of its citizens from the threat of ballistic missiles to Japan under any circumstances.

C Cyberspace

Japan and the U.S. affirmed the importance of cyberspace in the field of security at the “2+2” meeting convened in March 2021, and, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in April, declared that they would advance defense cooperation in the cyber domain. Based on these discussions, at the “2+2” meeting held in January 2022, the two sides confirmed that it was imperative for the Alliance to jointly address threats in the cyber domain. In light of the necessity for cross-governmental efforts by both Japan and the U.S., stakeholders from both sides engaged in discussions, through frameworks such as the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, on bilateral cooperation across a wide range of areas. The two sides are continuing to cooperate on matters related to cyberspace, promoting bilateral policy coordination, strengthening systems and capabilities, and exchanging incident information, while taking into consideration Japan's cybersecurity strategy and the cyber policies of the U.S.

D Space

Japan and the U.S. affirmed the importance of space in the field of security at the “2+2” meeting convened in March 2021, and, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in April 2021, declared that they would advance defense cooperation in the space domain. Based on these discussions, at the “2+2” meeting held in January 2022, the two sides confirmed that it was crucial for the Alliance to jointly respond to severe threats to, from and within space. Japan and the U.S. are continuing to cooperate on space security, including through mutual exchanges of information in the field of Space Situational Awareness and others, as well as concrete examinations of cooperation over hosted payloads (mission instruments loaded onto other entities' satellites).

E Information Security

Information security plays a crucial role in advancing cooperation within the context of the alliance. Based on this perspective, both countries continue to hold discussions designed to enhance their cooperation regarding information security, the importance of which was affirmed in the Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders' Statement of April 2021 and the “2+2” Joint Statement of January 2022.

F Maritime Security and Multilateral Cooperation

In forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Japan and the U.S. stress the importance of peacefully resolving maritime issues in accordance with international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Guidelines announced in April 2015 also provide that Japan and the U.S. will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order in accordance with international law, including the freedom of navigation. Even under the conditions of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2021, Japan and the U.S. continued to conduct bilateral training and exercises in the surrounding waters in the region including the South China Sea, and strengthened their cooperation with regional partners including Australia and India through exercises such as MALABAR (Japan-U.S.-Australia-India joint exercise). Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. also conducted multilateral exercises with the UK, which deployed the UK Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific region, and with European partners such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, and affirmed that the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific is widely shared among these countries. Both Japan and the U.S. will continue to place importance on strengthening cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

(3) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

The Government of Japan will continue to make every effort to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, by soundly promoting the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, while still maintaining the deterrence capabilities of said forces.

In the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement issued in April 2021, Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed their commitment to current arrangements on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma, the Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) Facility at Mageshima, and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam. Similarly, in the Joint Statement of the “2+2” issued in January 2022, the ministers confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on these force realignment efforts.

Japan and the U.S. will also continue to work closely on the steady implementation of plans for matters such as the relocation of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, and on the returns of land south of Kadena based on the April 2013 “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa.”

In particular, the return of lands in Okinawa has been realized by completing various return projects based on this Consolidation Plan, even after the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area (NTA, approximately 4,000 hectares) in December 2017. The return of all areas indicated as “Immediate Return” under the Consolidation Plan was achieved with the return of a portion of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran in March 2020. The land near Samashita Gate at Futenma Air Station was also returned in December 2020, followed by the return of the laundry factory area of Makiminato Service Area (land along National Route No. 58) in May 2021.

(4) Host Nation Support (HNS)

Since 1987, Japan has borne part of the costs which the U.S. is obliged to bear under the provision of Article XXIV of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), by concluding Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) as special measures relating to the SOFA, with a view to ensuring the effective operations of U.S. Forces in Japan amidst the growing severity of the security situation surrounding Japan.

The Governments of Japan and the U.S have been engaged in discussions on how HNS should be borne after April 1, 2022. Taking Japan's difficult financial situation into consideration and amidst the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, Japan has been engaged in the consultations under the recognition that it is necessary to support the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan while also more effectively strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In December 2021, the two countries reached consensus, and the signing of the SMA took place on January 7, 2022, in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Hayashi and Mr. Raymond F. Greene, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of U.S.A. in Japan. Furthermore, as both parties concurred that the costs borne by Japan should be used to build a foundation upon which the Japan-U.S. Alliance will be further strengthened, the Japanese side decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency.

The outline of the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) during the effective period of the agreement (April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2027) is as follows. The annual average budget for HNS is approximately 211 billion Japanese yen.

Signing of the New Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
(January 2022, Tokyo)

(1) New SMA

A. Labor costs: The Government of Japan will bear the labor costs (basic salary and other components) for 23,178 workers in U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Japan (maintaining the number of workers funded by Japan in FY2021, which was 23,178 workers).

B. Utilities costs: The Government of Japan will bear annual utilities costs of 23.4 billion Japanese yen for FY2022 and FY2023, 15.1 billion Japanese yen for FY2024, and 13.3 billion Japanese yen for FY2025 and FY2026.

C. Training equipment and materials procurement: The Government of Japan will newly bear expenditures related to the procurement of training equipment and materials (up to a maximum of 20 billion Japanese yen over five years), which will contribute, not only to the readiness of U.S. Forces in Japan but also to the enhancement of the interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Forces.

D. Training relocation: The annual training relocation costs funded by the Government of Japan will be approximately equal to the budget amount of FY2021 (approximately 11.4 billion Japanese yen). Alaska will be confirmed as a permissible training relocation site for the Aviation Training Relocation program.

(2) Cost for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)

The Government of Japan will fund a maximum of 164.1 billion Japanese yen over five years to prioritize the promotion of projects that contribute to strengthening the readiness and resiliency of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(5) Various Issues Related to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

To ensure the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan as the linchpin of these arrangements, it is important to mitigate the impact of U.S. Forces' activities on residents living in the vicinity and to gain their understanding and support regarding the presence of U.S. Forces. The Government of Japan has been making utmost efforts to make improvements in specific issues in light of the requests from local communities. Among these issues are preventing incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces, abating the noise by U.S. Forces' aircraft, and dealing with environmental issues at U.S. Forces' facilities and areas, including the sound implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship of 2015 and the Agreement on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan of 2017. For example, when the leakage of water containing Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) occurred at an army oil storage facility in June 2021, Japanese officials accessed the site based on the Supplementary Agreement on Environmental Stewardship, just as they did during the leakage accident at MCAS Futenma in April 2020, and conducted water sampling. With regard to the measures to combat COVID-19, the Government of Japan and U.S. Forces in Japan issued a Joint Press Release in June 2021 on vaccinating local employees of U.S. Forces in Japan. In response to the occurrence of COVID-19 cases in U.S. Forces in Japan facilities and areas as well as their surrounding municipalities across Japan since December 2021, the Government of Japan took the opportunity of the Japan-U.S. Foreign Ministers' telephone call held on January 6, 2022, and the “2+2” meeting convened on the following day, to put forward strong requests to the U.S. authorities to take thorough measures to prevent the spread of infections and take steps to mitigate the anxiety within the local communities. Consequently, the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee Statement on Measures to Address the Spread of COVID-19 was issued on January 9, and at the Japan-U.S. Summit Video Teleconference Meeting held on January 21, the two governments agreed to continue working closely together to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Japan and the U.S. will continue to further strengthen cooperation to put in place thorough measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and to mitigate the anxiety among the local communities.

The TOFU: Think of Okinawa's Future in the U.S. program provides an opportunity for high school and university students from Okinawa to witness for themselves what Japan's alliance partner, the U.S., is truly like, and the role that Japan plays in the international community, as well as to promote mutual understanding between the two countries. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, this program was implemented as a Tokyo Dispatch Program¹ in March 2021. Meanwhile, since FY2020, the Project to Promote Exchanges and Enhance Mutual Understanding Between Japan and the United States has been implemented in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between Japanese and American middle and high school students (see the Column on page 192).

• 1 Participants from Okinawa are invited to Tokyo to meet related persons involved in Japan-U.S. relations and experts active in the international community (including online meetings), as well as visit and tour various facilities.

(6) the United Nations forces and U.S. Forces in Japan

Coincident with the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the UN forces was established in July of the same year based on the recommendation of the UN Security Council resolution 83 in June. Following the ceasefire agreement concluded in July 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) Headquarters was relocated to Seoul, South Korea in July 1957, and UNC-Rear (UNC-R) was established in Japan. Established at Yokota Air Base, UNC-R currently has a stationed commander and four other staff and military attachés from nine countries who are stationed at embassies in Tokyo as liaison officers for the UN forces. Based on Article 5 of the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, the UN forces in Japan may use the U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Japan to the minimum extent required to provide support for military logistics for the UN forces. At present, the UN forces in Japan is authorized to use the following seven facilities: Camp Zama, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Yokota Air Base, Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma and White Beach Area.

In July 2019, a joint board was held between the Government of Japan and UNC. The meetings saw discussions held over the situation on the Korean Peninsula, with the two sides reaching an agreement on notification procedures in case of unusual occurrences related to the UN forces in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue to work closely with the UN forces.