Diplomatic Bluebook 2016

Chapter 3

Japan’s Foreign Policy to Promote National and Worldwide Interests

4.Disarmament, Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(1) General Overview

As a responsible member of the international community, Japan is striving to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation, both to ensure and maintain its own safety and to achieve a safe and peaceful world, based on the principle of pacifism advocated by the Constitution of Japan. Japan’s efforts in this area encompass weapons of mass destruction (which generally refers to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), conventional weapons, missiles and other means of delivery, and related materials and technology.

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan is engaged in various diplomatic efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons1. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. To maintain and strengthen the NPT regime, Japan has partnered with Australia to lead the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a group consisting of 12 non-nuclear-weapon States2, to promote concrete and practical proposals, and has been contributing through, among others, submitting working papers and issuing joint statements to the 2015 NPT Review Conference including the three Preparatory Committees.

Japan’s endeavors also focus on achieving stronger, universal conventions targeting weapons of mass destruction, other than nuclear weapons, namely biological and chemical weapons, as well as those targeting conventional weapons.

In addition, Japan is making efforts to begin negotiations on new disarmament treaties, such as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), as well as to strengthen and increase the efficiency of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)3 safeguards4.

Japan is also actively involved in various international export control regimes, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)5, and initiatives aimed at enhancing nuclear security6.

Furthermore, Japan is actively engaging in disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy through bilateral dialogue. Japan is also undertaking wide-ranging activities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy such as the conclusion of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements7.

  • 1 For more details about Japan’s policy in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, please refer to “Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy” (7th Edition) published in March 2016.
  • 2 Established by Japan and Australia in September 2010, it now has 12 members. The other members are Canada, Chile, Germany, Poland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the Philippines and Nigeria.
  • 3 The IAEA was established in 1957 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent it from being diverted from peaceful to military uses. Its secretariat is located in Vienna. Its highest decision-making body is the General Conference, which consists of all member countries and meets once a year. The 35-member Board of Governors carries out the IAEA’s functions, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference. As of December 2015, the IAEA has 167 member countries. Mr. Yukiya Amano has been its Director General since December 2009.
  • 4 Verification measures (inspections, checks of each country’s material accountancy (management of its inventory of nuclear material) records, etc.) undertaken by the IAEA in accordance with the safeguards agreements concluded by each individual country and IAEA, in order to guarantee that nuclear material is being used solely for peaceful purposes and is not being diverted for use in nuclear weapons or the like. Pursuant to Article 3 of the NPT, the non-nuclear states that are contracting parties to the NPT are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA and to accept safeguards on all nuclear material within their borders (comprehensive safeguards).
  • 5 The PSI is a framework established in May 2003 to prevent the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials, where each country implemented and review possible measures jointly available within the scope of international and domestic laws. As of December 2015, 105 countries take part in PSI activities and cooperation. Japan conducted PSI maritime interdiction exercise twice in 2004 and 2007. In November 2010, it hosted the Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Tokyo, and in July 2012, it hosted the PSI air interdiction exercise, the first activity conducted in Japan. Japan also proactively participated in the exercises and related meetings organized by other countries. In May 2013, a High-Level Political Meeting was held in Poland with 72 participant states from PSI member countries, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the PSI. As Japan will host the exercise in 2018, Japan proactively participated in the PSI interdiction exercise “MARU2015” hosted by New Zealand, and also joined the Operational Expert Group (OEG) meeting in May of the same year. In January 2016, the Mid-Level Political Meeting was organized by the U.S.to review the status of progress since the High-Level Political Meeting in 2013.
  • 6 Measures to prevent terrorists and other criminals from obtaining nuclear materials.
  • 7 Providing equipment required for the long-term onshore storage of reactor compartments removed in the process of dismantling nuclear submarines.

(2) Nuclear Disarmament

A. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Following the three Preparatory Committees held annually after 2012, the 2015 NPT Review Conference was held in New York from April 27 to May 22. Despite intensive discussions, it ended without being able to adopt the final document, because of divides among member States on the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. However, it is important to continue to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime for promoting the three pillars of the NPT, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

B. The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

Through its concrete and practical proposals, and with the involvement of the foreign ministers of its member states, the NPDI takes a bridging role between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, taking the lead in the international community’s initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In April 2014, Japan hosted the 8th NPDI Ministerial Meeting in Hiroshima, for the first time in Japan. As well as being a chance for participants to witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings, this meeting was a unique opportunity for NPDI member states to undertake more proactive discussions with a view to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Agreement was also reached on concrete and practical measures proposed by Japan, including the reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, urging those not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to freeze/reduce their arsenals, the development of multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions and increased transparency. Ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which was held in April and May 2015, NPDI submitted 18 working documents and a draft outcome document of the NPT Review Conference in order to take the lead in the international community.

C. Contributions in the UN

In September, Foreign Minister Kishida attended the UN General Assembly meeting to commemorate the International Day for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. In December, the resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which Japan has submitted annually since 1994, was co-sponsored by 107 countries and adopted with 166 votes in favor, 3 against, and 16 abstentions.

D. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)8

Japan prioritizes the early entry into force of the CTBT, as it is a key pillar of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes based upon the NPT. Japan continues its diplomatic efforts to persuade those countries that have not yet ratified it to do so. In September 2015, 70th year since the atomic bombings, Foreign Minister Kishida co-chaired the 9th Conference on Facilitating the early entry into force of the CTBT, together with the Kazakh Foreign Minister. Japan is going to lead the efforts for the early entry of the Treaty as the co-president of the Conference for two years, until September 2017.

  • 8 This prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions everywhere, whether in outer space, in the atmosphere, underwater and underground. Although it was opened for signature in 1996, it had yet entered into force as of December 2015 because among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have yet to ratify it, while India, North Korea and Pakistan have yet to sign it.
E. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT: Cut-off Treaty)9

In light of a situation where negotiations on FMCT have not been started in the CD for years, the UN General Assembly decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on an FMCT in 2012. Four GGE meetings were held between 2014 and 2015, and reports including a recommendation on future FMCT negotiations were produced. Former Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Akio Suda attended the GGE meetings as Japan’s governmental expert and contributed to the discussions.

World Nuclear Forces: Total Inventory (2015)

  • 9 A proposed treaty that seeks to halt the quantitative increase in nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile material (including highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) for use as raw material in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
F. Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education

In recent years, the international community has become increasingly aware of the importance of educating citizens about disarmament and non-proliferation, in order to further promote disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. As the only country to have ever suffered the atomic bombings, Japan is actively promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education. Japan has translated testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, conducted training courses for young diplomats from other countries in atomic bombed cities, and submitted working papers and given speeches on this issue during the NPT review process. In addition, the Government of Japan supports activities aimed at conveying the reality of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons to people both within Japan and overseas through, among others, commissioning atomic bomb survivors as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” and having them speak at international conferences. In recent years, with the atomic bomb survivors aging, Japan launched the “Youth Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” program for the younger generation in addition to the existing “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” program. Japan places high priority on initiatives to pass on across borders the current understanding of the realities of the use of atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Government also extends cooperation in organizing the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues and provides assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibition overseas through diplomatic missions overseas, in cooperation with Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cities. In December, an atomic bomb exhibition was launched in Vienna as the third permanent one in the world.

G. Other Bilateral Initiatives

Through the Japan-Russia Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Former Soviet Union, Japan has provided its cooperation to Russia in dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines, with the objective of furthering nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as preventing environmental pollution10. Japan is also engaged in cooperation to enhance nuclear security through committees on cooperation for the elimination of nuclear weapons reduced in Ukraine and Kazakhstan respectively11.

  • 10 The “Star of Hope” program, for dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines was implemented as part of the G8 Global Partnership agreed to at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit held in June (Canada) and was completed in December 2009 after dismantling a total of six submarines. Since August 2010, Japan has undertaken cooperation through the construction of facilities for ensuring the safe onshore storage of reactor compartments removed from the dismantled nuclear submarines.
  • 11 In January 2011, Japan undertook efforts to enhance nuclear security at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology through the Japan-Ukraine Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in Ukraine. In November , Japan also extended assistance for upgrading protective materials and equipment to secure nuclear security in Kazakhstan through the Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in Kazakhstan

(3) Non-proliferation

A. Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Japan is undertaking various diplomatic efforts to enhance non-proliferation regimes. As a member state of the IAEA Board of Governors designated by the Board12, Japan contributes to its activities in both personnel and financial terms. The IAEA safeguards is a central measure to the international nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Japan encourages other countries to conclude Additional Protocols of the IAEA safeguards13 in cooperation with the IAEA in various discussion forums, providing personnel and financial support for the IAEA’s regional seminars.

Export control regimes are frameworks for cooperation among countries which have the ability to supply weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and/or related dual-use goods and technologies, and support appropriate export controls. Japan participates in and contributes to all export control regimes of nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, missiles14, and conventional weapons. In particular, the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna serves as the Point of Contact of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Moreover, as well as placing a high priority on the initiatives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Japan is encouraging other countries, primarily those in Asia, to enhance regional efforts through frameworks such as the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)15 and the Asian Export Control Seminar16, with the aim of promoting understanding of non-proliferation regimes and enhancing relevant efforts. Furthermore, through the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), Japan is contributing to international scientific cooperation and efforts to prevent the proliferation of knowledge and skills in the field of weapons of mass destruction. More specifically, scientists from Russia and Central Asia, among others, who were previously involved in research and development focused on weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, are now employed by the ISTC, where they undertake research for peaceful purposes.

  • 12 13 countries designated by the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan and countries such as other G7 members that are advanced in the field of nuclear energy are nominated.
  • 13 Protocols concluded by each country with the IAEA, in addition to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. The conclusion of Additional Protocol subjects countries to more stringent verification activities, extending the scope of information about nuclear activities that should be reported to the IAEA. As of December 2015, 126 countries have concluded such protocols.
  • 14 In addition to the export control regimes, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) has the principles on self-restraint in development and deployment of ballistic missiles. Japan served as the HCOC chair for a year, from May 2013.
  • 15 ASTOP is a multilateral meeting hosted by Japan to discuss various issues related to strengthening of the non-proliferation apparatus in Asia, with participants consisting of 10 ASEAN states, China, Korea, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. A recent meeting was held in January 2016.
  • 16 It is a seminar to exchange views and information, aimed at strengthening export controls in the Asian region by gaining participants, including local export control authorities from various countries and regions of Asia. It has been held annually in Tokyo since 1993; the most recent one was organized in February 2016 with 28 participating countries and regions.
B. Regional Non-proliferation Issues

North Korea’s continued development of nuclear and missile program is a grave threat to the international peace and security; in particular, its nuclear program is a serious challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In October 2002, the nuclear issue once again became more serious when North Korea admitted that it had a uranium enrichment program17. In July 2006, seven ballistic missiles, including Taepo Dong 2 class, were launched, followed by a nuclear test in October of the same year.

In 2007, ‘‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’’ and ‘‘Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’’ were adopted at the Six-Party Talks. North Korea, however, soon announced the suspension of the actions prescribed in the two documents.

Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea showed a ‘‘uranium enrichment facility’’ to Professor Siegfied Hecker of Stanford University, who visited North Korea.

North Korea further proceeded with its third nuclear test in February 2013 and in April, announced its intention to restart its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

The report submitted in March 2015 by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 stated that the number of ballistic missiles launched by North Korea in 2014 (13 to 15 missiles) was unprecedented. In 2015, North Korea again launched ballistic missiles on several occasions. According to the IAEA Director General’s report published in September 2015, North Korea continues its nuclear and missile development with some continuing signs, such as steam discharges associated with the graphite moderated reactor and the expansion and utilization of the suspected facility for uranium enrichment. Furthermore, North Korea conducted the fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile in the following month. In the wake of this situation, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2270, which encompasses strong and comprehensive content, significantly adding to and strengthening the sanctions. While continuing to coordinate closely with the U.S., the ROK and other relevant countries, Japan will strongly urge North Korea to steadily implement steps toward the abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, including immediate cessation of its uranium enrichment activities (see 2-1-1 (1)).

The Iranian nuclear issue is also a serious challenge to global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, Iran had continued uranium enrichment-related activities, despite the adoption of a series of resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors18 and the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the suspension of such activities19. However, after the Rouhani administration took office in August 2013, Iran has changed its stand, and, in November 2013, “Joint Plan of Action”20 was agreed. Under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran agreed, among others, that it will not make any further advances of its activity at Arak heavy-water reactor, in return for the partial lifting of the sanctions by the EU3 (UK, France, and Germany) +3 (U.S., China, and Russia). After the negotiations for the comprehensive solution, the EU3 (UK, France, and Germany) +3 (U.S., China and Russia) and Iran reached a final agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue with “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)”21 in July 2015. The JCPOA specified the procedures to lift the sanctions imposed on Iran, with its implementation of designated measures, while constraining Iranian nuclear activities for ensuring the peaceful purposes of its activities. At the same time, with regards to the possible military dimensions22 concerning the Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA and Iran agreed on a “Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Following this situation, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 endorsing the JCPOA and requesting the IAEA to conduct necessary verification and monitoring activities.

As a result of a series of activities and works between Iran and the IAEA based on the “Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” the IAEA Director-General issued a final assessment report23 in December 2015. The final assessment report stated that although a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2004, the IAEA has no credible indications of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device in Iran after 2010.

Overview of Disarmament and Non-proliferation Arrangements for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Conventional Weapons (Including Related Materials)

  • 17 In January 2003, North Korea gave notice of its withdrawal from the NPT, and subsequently re-started its 5 MWe graphite-moderated reactor, which had been frozen under the “Agreed Framework” that the U.S. and North Korea signed in October 1994, resuming the reprocessing of its spent nuclear fuel rods.
  • 18 Following the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003 and the Teheran Declaration concluded with the EU-3 (UK, France, and Germany) in October, Iran demonstrated a constructive response for a time, committing to suspension of its enrichment-related activities and signing up to corrective measures concerning safeguards as well as signing of an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, but it continued its activities associated with uranium enrichment. Although Iran suspended the activity under the Paris Agreement with the EU3 in November 2004, it resumed the activity in August 2005. Following this, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran had violated the safeguards agreement, and adopted a resolution at the IAEA Special Board of Directors in February 2006 to the report Iran nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. Since then, the Iran nuclear issue has also been discussed at the UN Security Council.
  • 19 Similar UN Security Council resolutions were adopted regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. However, these resolutions, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, oblige Iran to provide the IAEA with access or cooperation for discontinuing enrichment and reprocessing related activities, heavy water-related plans, and other pending issues. They also call for a quick conclusion of the additional protocol; Resolution 1835 requires Iran to observe the duties imposed by these four resolutions without delay. Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 include measures against Iran, such as an embargo of nuclear-related materials against Iran, and asset freezing of nuclear and missile-related individuals and organizations in Iran under Article 41, Chapter 7 of the Charter. Resolution 1929, as additional measures against Iran, includes comprehensive measures including the expansion of embargoes on armed forces, control of ballistic missile development, asset freezing, expansion of travel restrictions, financial and commercial fields, and enhanced restrictions on banks, and inspection of cargo.
  • 20 Joint Plan of Action
    ・It consists of “elements of a first step” taken by representatives in the negotiations for six months, and “elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution.
    [Elemets of a first step]
    (Iran’s voluntary measures)
    • Suspension of uranium enrichment over 5%
    • Dilute the 20% UF6 to no more than 5% and convert UF6 enriched
    • Suspending the strengthening of enrichment capacity (No new location for the enrichment. No additional centrifuges.)
    • Ban on increasing stockpiles of low enriched uranium
    • Iran announces that it will not make further advances of its activities at the Arak reactor
    • Enhanced monitoring by the IAEA
  • (EU3+3’s voluntary measures)
    • Limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible lifting of sanctions
    • Suspension of sanctions on gold and precious metals, and the petrochemical and auto industry
    • Suspension of sanctions in the civil aviation sector (supply of repair parts needed for safety reasons)
    • Maintenance of imports of crude oil produced in Iran at the current, substantially reduced level
    • Postponement for six months of the imposition of new sanctions against the nuclear program
    • Facilitation of humanitarian trade and establishment of a financial channel
  • [Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution]
    • Comprehensive lifting of UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions
    • A mutually defined enrichment program (mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical-needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for period to be agreed upon)
    • Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing
    • Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol
    • Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel
  • Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT
  • 21 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
    ●The JCPOA specified the procedures to lift the sanctions imposed on Iran, while constraining its nuclear activities for ensuring the peaceful purposes of its activities.
    (Main Measures Taken by Iran)
    ●Restrictions concerning uranium enrichment activities
    • Limit the number of working centrifuges to 5,060 units
    • Limit the uranium enrichment up to 3.67% at the maximum, and the stored amount of enriched uranium to 300 kg
    ●Restrictions on the heavy-water reactor at Arak and reprocessing
    • Redesign and rebuild the Arak heavy water reactor so that it will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and ship the spent fuels out of Iran.
    • Not conduct research and development on reprocessing or build any facilities capable of reprocessing
  • 22 PMD (Possible Military Dimensions)
    In November 2011, the IAEA pointed out the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear activities, consisting of 12 items, in a report from the Director-General of the Secretariat, including signs that nuclear bombs, including devices which can be used to trigger nuclear weapons, are under development. After the report, the PMD had been treated as an important matter at issue for discussions between the IAEA and Iran.
  • 23 The IAEA Director-General’s Final Evaluation Report on the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s Nuclear Issue (Summary)
    The report mentioned the following three points.
    (1) All of the activities included in the “Road-map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program” were implemented as scheduled.
    (2) The IAEA assessed that Iran had conducted the activities relevant to the development of nuclear explosive device in its organizational structure before the end of 2003, and some activities took place after 2003. At the same time, the IAEA assessed that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. Also, the IAEA has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.
    (3) The IAEA has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.

In January 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran had implemented the part of the measures that the country committed to in the JCPOA.In accordance with the newly adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the part of the sanctions imposed by the previous Security Council resolutions were terminated. However, Iran’s nuclear activities and missile transfer activities continue to be subject to the restriction. Henceforward, Iran’s steady implementation of the agreement and the monitoring and verification by the IAEA are important. In this process, Prime Minister Abe during the Japan-Iran Summit meeting of September 2015 urged President Rouhani to steadily implement the final agreement and cooperate with the IAEA. During the visit of Foreign Minister Kishida to Iran in October 2015, he expressed his intention to cooperate in the field of nuclear safety and IAEA safeguards and transparency measures within the JCPOA’s implementation process after Implementation Day as defined by the JCPOA.

The IAEA board of governors has also been discussing Syria’s implementation of the IAEA safeguards since the year 2008. In 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors confirmed that Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement. It is of extreme importance for Syria to completely cooperate with the IAEA and to sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol to clarify the facts.

C. Nuclear Security

International cooperation on “Nuclear Security” to prevent terrorism using nuclear materials or other radioactive materials are also enhanced through various efforts from the IAEA, UN and member countries. In particular, U.S. President Obama led the Nuclear Security Summit. Its third summit took place in The Hague, the Netherlands, in March 2014, attended by 53 countries and four international organizations. Prime Minister Abe attended this Summit and expressed Japan’s efforts in ensuring nuclear security, including the minimization of nuclear materials, proper management of them, and compliance with the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection on Nuclear Material. The next meeting will be held in Washington D.C., U.S. from March 31 to April 1, 2016.

In February 2015, Japan received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission consisting of IAEA experts. The mission reviewed the implementation of nuclear security measures. The report presented after the mission suggested recommendations and advice for continuous improvements, as well as best practices, concerning the nuclear security structure in Japan and the facilities the mission visited.

Also, the computer security international conference in the field of atomic energy was held by the IAEA in Vienna in July 2015 with participation of more than 700 people from 17 organizations in 92 countries. Many government officials and experts from Japan participated in the meeting.

(4) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A. Multilateral Efforts

Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are considered as one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the Treaty, it is “inalienable rights” for any country that meets its obligations to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to develop nuclear research, and production and use for peaceful purposes.

The number of countries that are planning to further develop or newly introduce nuclear power program24 is increasing, due to such factors as growing global energy demand and the need to address global warming. Even after the accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (the Fukushima Daiichi accident), nuclear power remains an important energy source for the international community.

On the other hand, the technology, equipment, and nuclear material used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes. A nuclear accident in one country may have a wide-spread impact on its neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”25: (1) Safeguards (and other non-proliferation measures); (2) Nuclear Safety (measures to ensure safety to prevent a nuclear accident, etc.); and (3) Security (measures against nuclear terrorism). As the country that experienced the Fukushima Daiichi accident, it is Japan’s responsibility to share with the rest of the world its experience and lessons learned from the accident and to contribute in strengthening global nuclear safety. In this regard, Japan and the IAEA organized workshops in April and November 2015 at the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC), which was designated in Fukushima Prefecture, as part of their cooperation. These workshops provided relevant Japanese and foreign participants with training in the field of emergency preparedness and response.

It is important to provide information on the situation at Fukushima Daiichi NPS in a timely and appropriate manner not only to the Japanese public, but also to the international community. From this perspective, Japan issues comprehensive reports via the IAEA, which include information on the progress of the decommissioning and contaminated water management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the results of monitorings of the air dose rate and radioactivity concentration in the ocean as well as safety of food. In addition, the Government holds briefing sessions for the foreign diplomatic missions in Tokyo and provides relevant information via Japanese diplomatic missions.

The decommissioning and contaminated water management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS involves a series of difficult and unprecedented tasks in the world. Japan tackles these tasks by gathering technologies and knowledge not only from domestic experts, but also from the international community including the IAEA. To this end, Japan advances cooperation with the international community; IAEA’s experts on marine monitoring visited Japan (in September and November 2014, and May and November 2015). In the area of the effects of ionizing radiation, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) held seminars and workshops in Fukushima prefecture and Tokyo (in September and November 2014).

Stressing the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy especially in developing countries, Japan provides supports to the IAEA through the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Fund and Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In particular, Japan attaches importance to promotion of applications of nuclear science and technology in the field of non-power generation such as human health and agriculture. Also in the field of electronic power generation, Japan provides assistance such as enhancement of radiation protection. In this way, Japan has been contributing to the socioeconomic development of developing countries by promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the NPT Review Conference held from April to May 2015, Japan announced to contribute a total of 25 million US dollars to the PUI over the next five years. Japan concluded the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) in January 2015, which contributes to prompt and fair remedies for victims, enhancement of compensation in the event of a nuclear accident and improvement of the legal predictability. As a result of Japan’s conclusion, the CSC entered into force on April 15, 2015, marking an important step to strengthen the international nuclear liability regime.

  • 24 According to the IAEA, as of January 2016, 441 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 64 reactors are under construction (see the IAEA website).
  • 25 IAEA’s safeguards, typical measures for non-proliferation, and nuclear safety and nuclear security are referred to as the “3Ss” for short.
B. Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to secure a legal assurance from the recipient country, when transferring nuclear-related materials and equipment such as nuclear reactors to that country, that the transferred items will be used only for peaceful purposes. The agreements especially aim to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensure non-proliferation.

Moreover, as Japan attaches importance to ensuring the “3S,” the recently concluded agreements between Japan and a foreign country include provisions regarding nuclear safety. Through conclusion of such agreements, cooperation in the area of nuclear safety can also be promoted.

High expectation for Japan’s nuclear technology has been expressed by numerous countries, even after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It is Japan’s responsibility to share with the rest of the world its experience and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, in order to make contribution in strengthening international nuclear safety, when promoting bilateral nuclear cooperation. Based on this recognition, in its bilateral nuclear energy cooperation, Japan intends to provide nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology with highest safety standards, while taking into account the situation in and intention of countries desiring to cooperate with Japan in this field. When considering whether or not to establish a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with a foreign country, Japan considers the overall situation in each individual case, taking into account such factors as non-proliferation, nuclear energy policy in that country, the country’s trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

As of the end of 2015, Japan has concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, Australia, China, U.S., France, UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Vietnam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.

(5) Biological and Chemical Weapons

A. Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)26 is the only multilateral legal framework imposing a comprehensive ban on the development, production, and retention of biological weapons. However, the question of how to enhance the convention is a challenge, as it contains no provision regarding the means of verifying compliance with the BWC.

In the 2015 meeting, there was a discussion on how to deal with a possible outbreak of any infection caused by biological weapons under the framework of the BWC, based on the lessons learned from the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa. Experts from Japan made presentations about the country’s assistance to the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak, contributing to the discussion on the strengthening of the Convention.

  • 26 Enacted in March 1975. The contracting states number 173 (as of December 2015).
B. Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)27 imposes a comprehensive ban on the development, production, retention, and use of chemical weapons and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance with this groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is ensured through the verification system (declaration and inspection). The implementing agency of the CWC is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, which has been underway since September 2013, and Japan has provided financial support for these activities. With an aim of identifying responsibility for the repeated use of chlorine gas and other substances in Syria, the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution in August 2015. There is an ongoing effort to prevent chemical weapons from being used again.

Japan is actively involved in cooperation aimed at increasing the number of States Parties, efforts by States Parties to strengthen measures for national implementation of the convention in order to increase its effectiveness, and international cooperation to this end. The OPCW Director-General Üzümcü visited Japan in February 2015 and held talks with Foreign Minister Kishida, where they confirmed cooperation in tackling the challenges, including the improvement of the effectiveness of the Convention. In September, as part of an OPCW program, Japan accepted two trainees from Sri Lanka and the Philippines at Japanese chemical plants, where they underwent training in plant safety management.

Moreover, under the CWC, Japan has an obligation to destroy chemical weapons of the Imperial Japanese Army left in territory of China, as well as old chemical weapons within Japan. As such, working in cooperation with China, Japan makes its utmost effort to complete the destruction of these weapons as soon as possible.

  • 27 Enacted in April 1997. With the Myanmar newly joined in August 2015, and Angola in October, the contracting states numbered 192 (as of December 2015).

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

1. What is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT aims mainly ① to advance nuclear disarmament among the nuclear-weapon States (U.S., Russian, UK, France, and China), ② to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ③ to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT is the only international treaty that stipulates general nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligation, and there are 191 state Parties to the Treaty. Japan ratified the NPT in 1976, and has contributed to international discussions aimed at maintaining and strengthening the Treaty.

The NPT holds a Review Conference every five years to review the operation of the Treaty. This is an important conference to review progress on the three pillars of the NPT - nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – in addition to setting next targets. After discussions lasting for four weeks, the Review Conference adopts a final document.

2. Perspective of 2015 NPT Review Conference and Japan’s efforts.

General statement by Foreign Minister Kishida at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (April 28, New York, U.S.)General statement by Foreign Minister Kishida at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (April 28, New York, U.S.)

The 2015 NPT Review Conference was held in the year which marked the 70th year since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but under difficult situation. This is because there were many issues which were difficult to attain converging views among state Parties such as the Middle East and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

Under such circumstance, Japan emphasized the importance of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in advancing practical and concrete measures towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Kishida, in his general statement, stressed the significance of the followings: ① Further transparency of nuclear forces, ② Reduction of all types of nuclear weapons and eventual multilateralization of nuclear weapons reduction negotiations, ③ Unity of the international community through common recognition of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, ④ Resolving regional nuclear proliferation issues such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments and ⑤ Visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by political leaders and youth. In addition, Prime Minister Abe, during his visit to the U.S. which coincided with the NPT Review Conference, announced the “Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on the NPT“, encouraging the efforts of the international community for maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime aimed at realizing a world free of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) submitted a draft outcome document of the NPT Review Conference and appealed for the understanding and cooperation of countries around the world. A significant portion of the NPDI’s proposal was incorporated in the substantial part of the draft of Final Document, by which Japan showed its strong presence.

3. Results of the 2015 NPT Review Conference

Despite such efforts of Japan, the State Parties could not reach consensus on the Final Document. Ms. Taous Feroukhi, (the Chair of the Conference) drafted the Final Document which was meant to be acceptable to the State Parties, and many were ready to accept the draft (or at least not blocking a consensus). However, in the end, a consensus was not attained among the countries concerned on the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and the Conference regrettably ended without substantial result.

  • 1)NPT Article 9-3 “For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and detonated nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices prior to 1 January, 1967.”

4. Toward the next Review Conference

As the draft of Final Document was not adopted in the Conference, clear guidelines toward the next Review Conference in 2020 were lost, which negatively affects international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime centered on the NPT to some extent. On the other hand, we cannot stop our step forward on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. After the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Japan strived to continuously maintain international momentum toward the progress of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through among others active discussions at the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Group of Eminent Persons Meeting held in Hiroshima in August 2015. In September, Foreign Minister Kishida served as co-chair of the Conference on Facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT. In December, the resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which Japan has been submitting to the UN General Assembly every year since 1994, was also adopted.

Given that Japan serves as the chair of the G7 in 2016 and co-coordinator state for facilitating entry into force of CTBT in 2015-2017, Japan has determined to promote efforts for maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including through the NPDI.

(6) Conventional Weapons

A. Cluster Munitions28

Japan takes the humanitarian consequences of cluster munitions very seriously. Therefore, in addition to taking steps to address these weapons by supporting victims and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance, Japan is continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)29. In addition, Japan is assisting with UXO clearance bomb disposal and victim assistance projects in Laos, Lebanon and other countries that suffer from cluster munitions30.

In September, the first Review Conference of the CCM was held in Croatia, to which Toshio Sano, Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, attended as a representative of Japan. While reviewing the achievements that Japan has made for the assistance of mine action, the Ambassador expressed the determination to continue the support. Japan’s approach for assisting with the handling of unexploded ordinances is for, mainly, the following three fields: the clearance of UXOs, victim assistance, and risk reduction education.

  • 28 Generally speaking, it refers to a bomb or shell which enables numerous submunitions to be spread over a wide area by opening in the air a large container, which holds those submunitions. It is said that there is high possibility that many of them do not explode on impact, which creates problem of accidental killing or injury of civilian population.
  • 29 Enacted in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while obliging the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas. As of December 2015, the number of contracting states is 98, including Japan.
  • 30 See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts in international cooperation regarding cluster munition and antipersonnel mine.
B. Small Arms and Light Weapons

Described as “weapons of mass destruction” in terms of the carnage they cause, small arms and light weapons continue to proliferate, due to their ease of operation. The use of small arms and light weapons is believed to result in the deaths of at least half a million people each year. These weapons cause drawing out and escalation of conflict, and hinder the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. In addition to contributing to efforts within the UN, such as the annual submission to the UN General Assembly of a resolution on small arms and light weapons, Japan supports various projects to combat small arms and light weapons across the globe, including weapons recovery and disposal programs and training courses.

Hiroshima Nagasaki Peace Messengers “Our ability may be limited, but we are not powerless” 2nd grade of Nagasaki Prefectural Nagasaki-Higashi High School ●Ms.Rina Uchino

The author making a speech at the UN Office in GenevaThe author making a speech at the UN Office in Geneva

2015 marked the 70th year since the atomic bombings.

In this important year, we, 21 members of the 18th high school student Peace Messengers, were appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” and traveled to Switzerland to pass on our hopes to the world towards the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace.

My grandfather experienced the atomic bombing in Nagasaki when he was 12 years old. Fortunately he survived, but he lost a lot of friends. My grandfather keeps saying, “Mankind must not repeat a tragedy like the atomic bombings.” As a youth from the city that suffered an atomic bombing, I would like to pass on the hopes of the atomic bomb survivors.

Hiroshima Nagasaki Peace Messengers program was launched from wishes of Nagasaki citizens to have their voices heard over the world when India and Pakistan carried out successive nuclear tests in 1998.

In August 16 – 21, 2015, we, the 18th Peace Messengers, visited the UN Office in Geneva, Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Delegation of Mexico to the CD, and offices of 5 NGOs and collected signatures in Bern to appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

At the UN Office in Geneva, one of the Peace Messengers from Hiroshima got a chance to deliver a speech in the plenary session of the Conference. Following that, all of us made speeches at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and submitted a list of 164,176 signatures we had collected over the course of one year. The number of signatures since 1998 has now amounted to 1,337,598. After we submitted the list of signatures, we participated in an event of the 70th year since the atomic bombings hosted by the Delegation of Japan to the CD. In the meeting, we had chances to introduce our activities in front of people from different countries.

In our visit to the Delegation of Mexico to the CD, 3 of us delivered speeches and exchanged views.

The Ambassador of Mexico to the CD told us, “Japan should lead the international efforts in advancing nuclear disarmament as the only country to have ever suffered the atomic bombings.”

Group photo at the UN Office in GenevaGroup photo at the UN Office in Geneva

During the visit to Switzerland, we met a lot of people who took our voice seriously. We could realize that a lot of people are taking actions for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and all of them share hopes for peace beyond languages. We also felt that activities and hopes of Japanese youths are spreading around the world. I would like to keep conveying the hopes of the atomic bombing survivors to the world and future generations, believing in a word “our ability may be limited, but not powerless.”

C. Anti-Personnel Mines

Japan promotes comprehensive initiatives focused primarily on the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and enhancement of support for mine-affected countries. As well as calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)31, Japan has, since 1998, provided support worth over 62 billion yen to 50 countries and regions to assist them in dealing with the consequences of land mines (for example, landmine clearance and support for the victims of landmines).

In addition, Japan has served a term (running from January 2014 until December 2015) as chair of the Mine Action Support Group, which consists of major donor states that support efforts to combat land mines.

  • 31 While banning the use and production of antipersonnel mines, the Convention, which came into force in March 1999, obliges the destruction of stockpiled mines and clearance of buried mines. As of December 2014, the number of contracting states is 162, including Japan.
D. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The ATT32 seeks to establish common international standards to regulate international trade in conventional weapons and prevent illegal trade in them. It was adopted at the UN General Assembly in April 2013, and came into force on December 24, 2014. At the first Conference of State Parties held in August 2015, Geneva, Switzerland, was selected as the host city for the Permanent Secretariat of ATT. Mr. Dladla, Director-General of the Conventional Weapons Control Committee of South Africa, was selected as the Interim Director of the ATT-Secretariat. Consistently underlining the need for a treaty that enjoys an effective and wide participation, Japan has played a proactive and constructive role as one of the original co-sponsors of the resolution that initiated the ATT process. In May 2014, Japan deposited the instrument of acceptance, becoming the first States Party in the Asia-Pacific region, and calls on nations that have not yet done so to conclude the Treaty without delay.

  • 32 As of December 2015, the number of signatory states to Army Trade Treaty (ATT) is 130, and contracting states is 78.