WORKSHOP VI
SECURITY:
"How Asia and Europe Can Cooperate About Security
Issues"
Final Report
I. CONVENTIONAL AGENDA: HOW TO COPE WITH THE PRESENT SECURITY REGIME IN THE WORLD?
All the participants agreed that the collapse of the Cold War order fundamentally changed the security regime in the world, and loosened it - thus rendering the world into a more unpredictable place than it used to be.
The security problems are not similar in the two regions: Europe is a land mass of rather homogenous countries, while Asia's security is mostly concerned with sea lines, and the countries are much more diverse.
Nevertheless, both regions face the same dilemma about security. All the participants agreed that the sole remaining superpower endowed with a global military reach - the United States - is the pillar of the current security regime, through its military presence in Europe and Asia. However, since the security relationship is fundamentally unbalanced, there is an inherent risk of American withdrawal following a unilateral decision.
The other pillar of the present security regime is international organizations, especially the United Nations, which might be used for "global governance," since no other institution can provide legitimacy for peace-making operations. No participant disagreed, although they differed about the efficiency of the United Nations and the possibility of reform to improve its operations.
All the participants agreed about the need to avoid unilateralism and develop regional cooperation as a building block for global security. In Europe, this could be done by building on the existing Wester European Union to forge integrated armed forces. But participants differed about the feasibility of such an option. Since Asian countries did not reached the same stage of integration, the "regionalization" of security must be attained primarily by building regional forums and enhancing preventive diplomacy and CBM, in order to cope with the numerous territorial issues that still divide Asian countries.
The panel basically agreed on the following proposals:
1) Any effort for balancing the present security regime is intended to complement the major role played by the U.S., not to exclude them from the regional security systems.
2) The international organizations must be reinforced as much as possible, especially with regards to "global CBM" like the UN Register for the arms trade - which also must be expanded to control light weapons - and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
3) Expertise in preventive diplomacy must be shared between Europe and Asia, especially by granting Observer Status to ASEAN and China at the OSCE. Expertise must also be shared regarding peace-keeping operations (through the meeting of experts, joint training, and any other means).
4) In order to avoid a single actor from enjoying a monopoly on high-tech weapons, Europe and Asia must foster their cooperation in that field, and also on intelligence-sharing. Some participants expressed doubts about the feasibility of such cooperation on a significant scale - although no one disagreed with the underlying logic. But the best possible scenario is a bilateral cooperation with the U.S.
5) Europe and Asia must consult each other on a regular basis, through existing channels like ASEAN-PMC, ARF and ASEM, which are the pillars of mutual trust. Policy towards Russia and the Middle-East must be placed high on the agenda, since Russia is altogether a European and an Asian power and the Middle-East is vital for the world economy.
6) The participants suggested that Asia and Europe should be able to talk frankly about issues of divergent interests, even beyond the scope of economic relationships, using all the necessary channels.
II. NON-TRADITIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AGENDA
Security problems in the contemporary world extend far beyond the classical geostrategical questions. Security became complex and diffused, due to the very quick pace of changes in the economy and technology, which heavily impacts the whole social order and the value systems. A sense of a "diffused and global threat" prevails.
To identify the security risks involved with such changes and the way to cope with them, the participants agreed that a "second-track approach" might be very useful, because of its ad hoc feature and flexibility. They agreed on a very broad agenda, which overlaps, in many respects, the work of the other workshops. The most important items were listed as follows:
1) To cope with the "internal threat to security" linked to the traumatic modernization of societies, especially by focusing ODA on social infrastructure. Private investment must be encouraged to pay attention to such "security problems," and to minimize its traumatic impact on traditional societies. Some of the participants underlined the utility of non-state actors, such as NGOs, as "security facilitators."
2) To manage in an orderly manner the natural resources necessary for lasting economic growth.
3)a. To tackle resolutely the problem of Mafias - even when they enjoy the support of some governments. Drugs and arms-trafficking, and money-laundering can have a destabilizing impact on a world scale.
3)b. Post-conflict peace-building betterment, including the rebuilding of communities, must be placed high on the agenda for cooperation to avoid the formation of "permanent areas of international lawlessness" in countries devastated by long-lasting wars, since they are prone to become the basis for many kinds of trafficking, and to provide training grounds and experienced fighters of terrorism.
4) To provide "new age societies" with a rich cultural life and value system which fosters, at the same time, a sense of identity and being a part of a world worth living in can also be considered a part of the security problem.
5) To improve the security in cyberspace, which remains highly vulnerable to sophisticated hostile enterprises, although it has become tremendously important for the world economy and sophisticated weapons systems.
III. POINTS OF DIVERGENCE
The participants had a frank and lively exchange of views about what role Japan should play in regional security, especially since she has yet to come to terms with her historical past of aggression. Japanese participants argued that the changing of the current generation of leadership should bring new attitudes towards this problem. Some participants also had a frank exchange of views about East Timor.
Not all participants agreed that the rise of armaments in Asia needs to be checked. Some argued that the relationship between the provider of sophisticated weapons and the buyer is a kind of CBM, because it implies an enduring relationship (training, technology transfer, spare parts) which allows for control.
Not all the participants agreed with the extension of NATO to former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, because Russia might feel threatened. Some others considered that since European region-building efforts (which the very existence of NATO permitted) is the most significant step towards lasting peace in the history of humankind, it was worth the risk to seize the opportunity to integrate the neighboring nations into it.
IV. FINAL RECOMMENDATION
The participants would like to stress that if the next Young Leaders Symposium is to tackle security issue again, in order not to duplicate the work already done in this workshop, the agenda must focus more precisely on specific items among the broad agenda that we drafted together.
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