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Overview and Evaluation of the 2005 NPT Review Conference

May 28, 2005

The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in New York (United Nations Headquarters) from May 2 to 27. Ambassador Sergio Queiroz-Duarte of the Federative Republic of Brazil presided the Conference. Mr. Nobutaka Machimura, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (Head of Delegation), made a statement on the first day of the Conference. Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Katsuyuki Kawai, attended the NGO session and invited the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), among others, that attended the session to a reception, at which he made opening remarks. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director-General of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Takeshi Nakane, Deputy Director-General of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were among those who attended the Conference.

1. Issues expected to discuss at the Review Conference

The NPT Review Conference is held every five years with the objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty. Substantive discussions were to take place in Main Committee I, II and III. Each Committee was tasked to make a consensus report on the substantive issues allocated to each Committee and to submit it to the Plenary for adoption as an integral part of a final document. To gauge the degree of success, attention of the world public opinion seemed to focus on whether or not substantive agreements could be reached, and the content of such agreements.

2. Outcome of the Review Conference

(1) The Review Conference began without even having reached a decision on procedural issues, such as the agenda and the establishment of subsidiary bodies, although they were supposed to be settled before the Conference. Two thirds of the Conference were spent in order to resolve these procedural issues due to differences of views between the Non-Aligned Movement states, centering on the Middle Eastern countries, on one hand, and the Western countries on the other hand. As a result, time for substantive discussion and for coordination on the language of the final document was extremely limited.
(2) Although each of the three Main Committees held substantive discussions, none of them were able to produce a consensus document on substantive issues. There were several reasons for this: first was the severe time constraint; second, there was no convergence of views among concerned States Parties and groups of States Parties on some major issues such as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East including Israel, Iranian nuclear issues and nuclear disarmament issues including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and third, the consensus rule posed a constraint. Furthermore, the President of the Conference did not issue any statement on substantive issues at the end of the Conference.
(3) Nevertheless, many States Parties pointed out at the Conference the important role of the NPT in ensuring international peace and security as well as the necessity of compliance with it. Many States Parties and groups of States Parties, including Japan, the EU and the Group of Ten (G10)*, presented useful proposals to the Conference.

*G10 is composed of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

3. Japan's efforts

(1) Japan held an NPT Seminar in Tokyo last February, in which President Duarte and other ambassador-level officials participated, in an effort to facilitate the smooth operation of the Conference.
(2) Foreign Minister Machimura made a statement on the first day of the Conference. Japan submitted a proposal entitled "21 Measures for the 21st Century" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21), of which the nuclear disarmament-related section was jointly proposed by Australia, and Japan made every effort for these measures to be reflected in the final document. Japan also submitted a comprehensive working paper on its position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.22) and two reports on nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2005/19) and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution (NPT/CONF.2005/20) respectively. Furthermore, Japan and seven other countries jointly submitted a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30) and Japan submitted a working paper entitled "Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.31).
(3) In the second week of the Conference, Parliamentary Secretary Kawai attended the NGO session and subsequently held a reception for NGOs, which called attention to Japan's stance of emphasizing dialogue with NGOs in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
(4) With regard to the DPRK's nuclear issues, Japan communicated closely with the United States (US) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) from an early date, and held a number of consultations with China, Russia, the President of the Conference and other concerned parties, with the aim of reflecting in the final document Japan's stance that the DPRK's nuclear program is a grave threat to the NPT regime and that Japan does not accept any nuclear program of the DPRK.
(5) At the Conference, Japan called for a further reduction in nuclear weapons. Prior to the Conference, Foreign Minister Machimura had sent the letters to Foreign Minister of all the states that have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) and whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including the US, urging them to ratify the CTBT at an early date. Japan also held a meeting of the CTBT Friends while the Conference was in session.
(6) Japan reiterated its position on the importance of universalizing the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was supported by many countries. As for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Japan expressed its support for promoting the IAEA's efforts in the fields of nuclear safety and security and stressed the importance of technical cooperation.
(7) At the final stage of the Conference, Foreign Minister Machimura issued an emergency appeal calling on States Parties to cooperate further in order to make the Conference a success.

4. Evaluation

(1) Japan had placed great importance on issuing a strong message for strengthening the NPT regime at this Conference, but the Conference was unable to produce a final consensus document on substantive issues. The following factors can be pointed out as, among others main reasons behind this result.
  1. There were serious differences in views regarding the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue.
  2. The rule that "every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus" was abused and applied to procedural matters.
  3. From the beginning, the prevailing view was that it would be difficult to agree on more substantive content than that in the 2000 Final Document. Many countries thought it was better to retain the 2000 agreement than to compromise and agree on less favorable content.
  4. There was a wide gap between States Parties with respect to their stance on nuclear disarmament issues including the CTBT.
  5. The gravity of the proliferation threat was not necessarily shared by all States Parties.
  6. In addition to the above, considerable time was spent for sorting out the procedural issues, leaving limited time for substantive discussions. In particular, the time available to find out consensus language of the final document was extremely insufficient.
(2) Nonetheless, many States Parties including Japan and groups of States Parties, submitted useful proposals of various kinds in order to contribute to the Review Conference. Japan believes that the intensive exchange of opinions on these proposals provided valuable material for future work on strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
(3) The failure to produce a consensus document on substantive issues at this Conference must not diminish the authority of the NPT regime and negatively affect individual issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In order to avoid such a situation, Japan believes that it has become even more urgent to strengthen specific measures with a view to reinforcing the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime by cooperating with major countries and working through frameworks such as the G8, the IAEA, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-proliferation (ASTOP).
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