Press Conference by the Press Secretary 25 May, 1999

1. Passage by the Japanese Diet of the bills related to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
2. Tokyo Workshop on Small Arms and Open Symposium "Small Arms and Civil Society" hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 31 May to 3 June
3. Response of certain Asian nations to the passage by the Japanese Diet of the bills related to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
4. Meeting between Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and United States Policy Coordinator for North Korea William Perry
5. Meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation
6. Contacts between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Passage by the Japanese Diet of the bills related to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation

   Press Secretary Sadaaki Numata: Good afternoon. I have a comment to make on the passage by the Diet of the so-called Guidelines legislations (Guidelines). We are indeed gratified that these legislations were passed by the plenary of the House of Councillors yesterday. These legislations are designed to contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, and thereby to ensure the peace and security of Japan. The passage and the enactment of these bills will contribute to peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region through enhancing the credibility of the Japan-US Security Arrangements and also it will put our Japan security policy on an even firmer basis. I would like to take this opportunity to make clear the following points. Firstly, that these bills do not change in any way the fundamental security policies of Japan, for example, defense purely for defensive purposes, the non-nuclear three principles and other basic principles involved in our security policy. Japan is firmly determined not to become a military power which would threaten other countries and is also determined to continue to pursue the path of peaceful development. The Japan-US Security Arrangements are purely defensive in nature. They are not predicated on any particular threat nor are they directed against any particular country. The Japanese Government, on its part, would like to make every effort towards the steady implementation of these laws and it is our intention to continue to explain our position fully to those concerned, both at home and abroad, with a view to seeking their further understanding. As Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated in the House of Councillors yesterday, it is our intention to improve our deterrence capability through the further enhancement of the credibility of the Japan-US Security Arrangements as well as through providing for adequate self-defense capability. At the same time, it is our intention to continue to attach importance to diplomacy based on dialogue with our neighboring countries. I might add that with a view to ensuring transparency about these bills and the Japan-US Security Arrangements, it is our intention to dispatch senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency to, for example, the Republic of Korea within a few days and also to the People's Republic of China. We may be dispatching these senior officials to Southeast Asia some time in the coming weeks. I might also mention in that context that the passage of these bills in no way changes our policy towards China. It continues to be our fundamental policy to develop friendly and cooperative relations with China further. After all, China is a very important neighbor to us. That is my first announcement.

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2. Tokyo Workshop on Small Arms and Open Symposium "Small Arms and Civil Society" hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 31 May to 3 June

   Press Secretary Sadaaki Numata: My second announcement is on the Tokyo Workshop on Small Arms and also an open symposium called "Small Arms and Civil Society." In the post-Cold War era there have been a number of ethnic and other conflicts in places like Kosovo and Africa and these have highlighted the importance of tackling the problem of small arms, for example, automatic rifles, which have in fact been the main weapons used in these conflicts. It is also true that these conflicts have involved a number of ordinary citizens who have fallen victim to these small arms. So it is important from the viewpoint of human security as well that we tackle this problem seriously with a view to ensuring the safety of the civil society. It is with these considerations in mind that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is holding a Tokyo workshop on small arms in Tokyo from 31 May to 3 June. There has been this United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, which has been looking into this problem, and this workshop will provide this Experts Group with an opportunity for further consideration of the subject. Besides seeking a solution to the small arms issue, this Experts Group will also consider matters, such as the aim and possible theme for an international conference on small arms to be held in the year 2001 under the auspices of the United Nations. This workshop will be attended by the 21-member countries of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and it will be chaired by Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki, our Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was at one time our disarmament ambassador in Geneva. In parallel with the Tokyo workshop, there will be an open symposium titled "Small Arms and Civil Society," which will be held on 3 June which is the last day of the workshop. The aim of this symposium is to deepen the understanding of the small arms issue in civil society and to activate the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in and out of Japan, concerning the collection of arms after conflicts and the disarming and reintegration into society of former combatants.

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3. Response of certain Asian nations to the passage by the Japanese Diet of the bills related to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation

   Q: As you mentioned earlier in your announcement concerning laws on defense cooperation with the United States, you said that these laws are not a threat against any country in the region. You said that officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency will visit China...

   Mr. Numata: And the Republic of Korea and several other countries in Asia.

   Q: Concerning China, which has had a lot of worry concerning these laws, are Japanese officials going to give certain guarantees to the Chinese leadership to put them more at ease concerning these laws?

   Mr. Numata: We have been engaged in rather intensive dialogue with China and other countries concerning these new Guidelines and the legislations. Throughout this dialogue, we have been emphasizing to the Chinese and other governments, that these Guidelines in no way change our basic security policies. For example, I as I said earlier, our basic posture of defense purely for defensive purposes exclusively for self-defense, our non-nuclear three principles, our not seeking to become a military power and so forth. Also the fact that these Guidelines and the legislations related thereto fall fully within the framework of the existing Japan-US Security Treaty. These are the points I expect these senior officials when they go to these capitals will be explaining again to the people concerned.

   Q: I think there is a certain point which makes a final warning concerning these laws, which is that there is no certain definition for the implementation of the agreement.

   Mr. Numata: I do not know whether you are a better reader of the Chinese psychology than I am, but the whole point of this concept of the situations in the areas surrounding Japan which have an important effect on the peace and security of Japan, the whole point of that is that it is situational, it is not geographic. I think perhaps people might have some reasons to worry once people start defining where these situations might be taking place. If I may use an analogy, suppose you are living in a house, and you have your neighbors. One of your neighbors might be a very helpful neighbor, who, when there is a fire nearby, comes to your rescue. You yourself, may be constrained in some way from going out there and actually putting out the fire, but you may have a very reliable neighbor, who might be willing to do it for you. When I am taking about the fire, which may be the situations in the areas surrounding Japan in metaphorical terms, the whole point is that you cannot in advance decide from which house in the neighborhood the fire might come from. If you say from the outset that there is certainly a fire which will be coming from such and such a house, that could be construed as a sort of ungrounded targeting of one of your neighbors. So it is in that sort of sense that this concept of situations in areas surrounding Japan is situational and it is not possible to say in advance which countries or regions would fall under that category.

   Q: You were saying earlier that the new defense Guidelines will add to the security of Japan, or make Japan a more secure place, yet throughout this whole debate China has expressed concern. The official news agency of China has even made a comment, even though the laws were only passed last night. How can it add to Japan's security and make Japan a safer place if it draws such a response from China?

   Mr. Numata: Firstly, what these legislations do is to make sure that the Japan-US Security Arrangements do work if contingencies arise which have to be addressed. Basically we are talking in terms of deterrence. Anybody who has some understanding of security policy in general understands the value of deterrence. Providing for deterrence by itself does not mean that you go around attacking people. These laws in no way empower the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to go out and engage in combat. That is point one. You referred to the statement by Spokesman Zhu Bangzao of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. What Spokesman Zhu said in essence was that they would be looking at Japan's words as well as deeds with care in the sense of making sure that Japan will not become a military power and would firmly maintain the path of peaceful development, that these principles in Japan's security policy be reflected in Japan's actions. It is certainly our intention to abide by these basic elements of our security policy and that is what we will continue to be saying to the Chinese.

   Q: There is sometimes, though, a fine line, a matter of perception of what is defensive capability and what is potentially an offensive capability. When you combine the Defense Guidelines with Japan's earlier decision to engage in the Theater Missile Defense System...

   Mr. Numata: Again, you are not quite right to say that we have decided to engage in the Theater Missile Defense system.

   Q: I stand corrected. I mean in the study of the Theater Missile Defense system. What sort of signal do you think that sends to China?

   Mr. Numata: Again, we do not talk about it in terms of the Theater Missile Defense system. We talk about it in terms of the Ballistic Missile Defense system because we are not interested in a theater-wide defense system, we are interested in providing the defense for possible ballistic missile attacks against Japan, and that is purely for the defense of Japan. That is my first point. You did catch the point. What has been decided is that we have made a budgetary allocation in this year's budget to conduct joint technological research with the United States to look at this idea. There will need to be further decisions to be made if one is going to go further along the path in the sense of deciding whether to go from research to development, then again whether to go on from development to deployment. But again the important point is that we do face some risks of ballistic missile attacks. I do not think I need to elaborate. Something rather terrible happened last year, and it is not something we can totally ignore. It is something that we will need to be looking at. But that again does not change our defense posture. Talking about perceptions, yes, perceptions are important. That is why we continue to engage in this constant dialogue with the Chinese Government and also with other neighbors. I gather that you are from Australia from your accent. I am sure the Australian Government takes a somewhat different view of all this from the Chinese Government. The perception other than those which have been offered by those people who have been rather critical of the Guidelines, is rather widely shared in this region.

   Q: What does the Japanese Government make of China's response so far to the Guidelines and the debate over the last couple of years? From your earlier comment, from the statement of the official spokesman from China, is there evidence that China is coming to accept the need for the Guidelines or is there a danger perhaps that China may take it, as you would say, the wrong way, and there is a risk of a regional arms build-up? How do you see China's response?

   Mr. Numata: The important point is that since the days when the Guidelines were being drafted, we have been keeping in close contact with China and there have been a number of opportunities where we have had rather intensive defense and security dialogue, sometimes with the participation of our Self-Defense Forces personnel from our side, and from people from the People's Liberation Army, on their side. That process, I think, has been a valuable one in the sense that that process has helped each side understand the policies and thinking of the other side. So that is my first point. My second point is that, yes, we do know about China's concerns to which we have been responding in the sense of explaining our basic policies and through that process we are aware that China is watching our actions with very keen interest. That is, I think, where we stand. It might be going a bit too far from that to say that there seems to be a real danger of some sort of conflict flaring up between Japan and China. Things may be a little quieter than that.

   Q: My question was raised to the risk of a regional arms race.

   Mr. Numata: My answer was meant to be an answer to that, perhaps an indirect one. However I am not a free-wheeling military analyst, so it is not my job to make predictions about regional arms build-ups and so forth. Basically let me say that I think the process of defense and security dialogue with China and other neighbors has been working.

   Q: The South Korean Government expressed hope that the operations of the Guidelines will be transparent. How are Japan's operations to be transparent in military issues?

   Mr. Numata: Actually what you mentioned is only a part of the response of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the Guidelines legislation because they first expressed their appreciation of the fact that these legislations which enable Japan's logistic support or rear-area support to the US forces contribute basically to the enhancement of war deterrence capability on the Korean Peninsula and that it will also contribute to the joint operation of the ROK and US forces. So they started with that positive statement. They also expressed the hope that Japan's basic defense or security policies such as the Peace Constitution, defense exclusively for self-defense and the non-nuclear three principles and so forth will continue to be abided by. Then they went on to say that in the implementation of these laws and in the joint planning between Japan and the United States and so forth, there will be maximum transparency. It is certainly our intention to provide maximum transparency in that regard, and that is why these senior officials are going out to the Republic of Korea to do precisely that and we have been doing this since the time that we were drafting the Guidelines.

   Q: This transparency is directed to South Korea only or to other countries?

   Mr. Numata: It applies to all the countries in the region and that is way I have been emphasizing that since the days that we were drafting the Guidelines, we have been involved in frequent and intense defense and security dialogue with the Republic of Korea, China and the other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

   Q: I take it not including North Korea?

   Mr. Numata: There is a certain dearth of channel for communications which prevents us from effectively carrying out defense or any other kind of dialogue.

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4. Meeting between Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and United States Policy Coordinator for North Korea William Perry

   Q: Yesterday, Mr. William Perry met with the Prime Minister about his mission to North Korea. Did Japan demand Mr. Perry to deliver a certain message to the leadership of North Korea concerning relations between the two countries?

   Mr. Numata: This consultation with Dr. William Perry, US Policy Coordinator for North Korea, which took place yesterday, is a part of the ongoing process of our trilateral coordination between the United States, the Republic of Korea and ourselves with respect to our approach toward North Korea. The important point is that we have been very closely coordinating our approach to North Korea among these three governments, so in this round of consultations yesterday we reviewed our coordinated approach toward North Korea and discussed ways to further enhance it. In advance of Dr. Perry's visit to Pyongyang, the message that we agreed Dr. Perry will convey to North Korea was coordinated among the three delegations, so it is a natural outcome of this process of coordination. The message was coordinated among the three delegations and I have to leave it at that. You might start asking whether they are one message or three messages, or a message from whom to whom. I am not at liberty to go into these details but there is a coordinated message which will somehow be conveyed to North Korea.

   Q: Dr. Perry is supposed to deliver a report to the Congress and depending upon this report, the American administration will make some changes in its policy toward North Korea. Concerning Japan, is there any intention to have a change in its policy in light of Dr. Perry's report?

   Mr. Numata: When you talk about changes, I wonder what you mean by changes because it is changes from what? What I mean is that this process of trilateral coordination has been going on for sometime in the wake of the North Korean launch of the Taepdong missile and the US-North Korea consultations on the suspected underground nuclear facilities as well as the US-North Korea missile consultations and so forth. There have also been close consultations between Japan and the Republic of Korea on the occasion of the visit of President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea to Japan last October as well as on the occasion of Prime Minister Obuchi's visit to the Republic of Korea last March. So consultations have been going on and we have been comparing notes, we have been coordinating our approaches and there is basic agreement among the three governments that we will base our approach to North Korea on two key elements, that is dialogue and deterrence. That I understand to be the basic thrust of Dr. Perry's approach with which both the Republic of Korea and Japan agreed. In the case of the Republic of Korea, President Kim has been talking about his engagement policy which contains the same sorts of ideas and we have no problem with that. So in that sense, through this ongoing process of coordination, we have come to a certain meeting of minds with respect to the policy directions we pursue. So in that sense, I do not think it is quite correct to say that our policies will suddenly change from such and such a date. There may be further elaboration of the basic ideas that have been coordinated among the three of us as we go along, but I do not think it is quite correct to describe that as a change in Japan's policy.

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5. Meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation

   Q: Can you tell us about the topics of the forthcoming talks between Minister Koumura and his Russian counterpart?

   Mr. Numata: Foreign Minister Koumura does plan to visit Moscow towards the end of this month. We have not got too many days left in the month, but let me say towards the end of this month. What are the topics which may come up? Foreign Minister Koumura is the Japanese chairman of the Working Group on the Peace Treaty negotiations and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov is the Russian chairman of the Russian Working Group. We naturally expect that there will be a continuation of these negotiations. They may also discuss the continuation of the political dialogue between Japan and Russia, namely the visit of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation to Japan. We need to do the planning for that and hopefully we will have some more precision as to the timing of President Yeltsin's visit to Japan. They may also discuss international situations, such as North Korea for example, which is a matter of concern to both of us, and possibly Kosovo. You remember that when Prime Minister Obuchi was in Washington he had a brief meeting with Viktor S. Chernomyrdin who has been acting as the Special Envoy of President Yeltsin on Kosovo. This also depends on the formulation of the Russian Cabinet, but I am sure Foreign Minister Koumura will also have an opportunity to discuss bilateral economic issues with some Russian minister who is dealing with that. And of course he is looking forward to seeing the new Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Sergei Stepashin.

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6. Contacts between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

   Q: There are some reports of moves between some Western European countries and Iran. Is Japan going to go the same way in developing its relations with Iran and also, will Japan resume yen loans?

   Mr. Numata: I am not quite sure what you mean by renewed yen loans, but...

   Q: Resumed.

   Mr. Numata: Resumption of loans. I am not quite sure whether we are coming to a point where we would be nearer to the resumption of yen loans, but as a general proposition if you are talking about political and other dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran, we have been quite active in that regard, especially last year. There were a number of ministerial-level contacts. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi of the Islamic Republic of Iran was here in autumn, I believe. There has been this ongoing dialogue. So if it is a question of comparing where we stand to where the Europeans stand, I am not quite sure whether it would be correct to characterize Japan as trying to catch up with Europe. Perhaps it is the other way around. That is my general comment. I do not think I have anything specific to offer at this point.

   Incidentally, most of the questions you asked me were about the Guidelines. I should have mentioned that I said I refer all the questions to Director Kunihiko Miyake, Japan-US Security Treaty Division, North American Affairs Bureau, the background briefer, who will be on at 15:30. I should not have stolen his job. If you can think of any more questions, please raise them.

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