Press Conference by the Press Secretary 30 January 1996

French nuclear testing
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hiroshi Hashimoto: Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. My colleague has already distributed the comments made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama today on the end of Nuclear Testing by the French Republic. The comment itself is self-explanatory; however, I will just touch on some points. One point is it is extremely regrettable that the French Republic has conducted nuclear testing -- as many as six times, despite the repeated appeals from the international community, including Japan. This morning, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukihiko Ikeda made an additional comment that, at first, the French Republic announced it would conduct the testing as many as eight times by the end of May this year; however, decided to reduce the frequency and period of testing. The French Republic decided to support the so-called zero-yield option under the Lalotonga Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and decided to sign the protocol of the Nuclear-Free Zone Agreement. Foreign Minister Ikeda said that Japan is of the view that the firm opinions shared by the international community should be reflected in the decisions of the French Republic. It is very much hoped that the French Republic will take an active and positive attitude toward the early conclusion of the CTBT and make an effort to promote nuclear disarmament, leading to the outcome of the elimination of nuclear weapons. I am ready to take any questions concerning the testing or on the other issues you may wish to raise.

Q: The Government of the United Kingdom said in a letter to the Mayor of Hiroshima that he could not oppose nuclear testing. I think this is the first time this has been said publicly. How is that remark going to go down with the Japanese Government?

A: Mr. Dawkins, I am terribly sorry, but I was not aware of the statement of the Government of the United Kingdom. Was that issued yesterday?

Q: It was a letter from Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom to the Mayor of Hiroshima.

A: Was it issued yesterday?

Q: I believe so, yes.

A: We will check on that.

Q: Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama was rather honest at one time in saying that Japan has cut off grants in the People's Republic of China, but has no such leeway with the French Republic. Now, the People's Republic of China is expected to continue its tests, and in fact, the People's Republic of China has even not agreed to cease testing until the CTBT is applied -- not agreed upon. Secondly, there is the dispute about zero yield -- they have not agreed to it. Assuming that you cut off grants to the People's Republic of China, what leverage do you have to convince the People's Republic of China to come in line with the other nuclear powers?

A: First of all, the CTBT negotiations are now conducted in Geneva, and unfortunately the People's Republic of China delegation once again stated its stance that the nuclear testing for peaceful purposes should be allowed under the new agreement. Japan cannot accept this position. We will continue to persuade the People's Republic of China to agree to the zero-yield option. At the same time, as you rightly pointed out, the Japanese Government has basically frozen grant aid to the Government of the People's Republic of China -- so far as they are going to conduct nuclear testing. Our measure to freeze grant aid is applied to the fiscal 1996 year -- by the end of March. If the People's Republic of China conducts a nuclear test in the new financial year, I think most probably, the Japanese Government will continue to freeze grant aid to the People's Republic of China. Simultaneously, of course, the Japanese Government continues to protest to the Government of the People's Republic of China on nuclear testing. But, your question is whether the Japanese Government is going to take further steps on this. I am not sure what you have in mind, but to freeze grant aid is already a very severe measure. I think the Japanese Government does not contemplate taking further measures.

Q: On the CTBT -- the former Bush Administration of the United States championed the Chemical Weapons Convention and the United States Congress has not yet ratified it. Would you agree that even on the CTBT, there is a Clinton Administration electoral agenda in having it signed by autumn to further election prospects, because they too have to ratify it, you have to ratify it, and there are a number of people who cannot ratify it. The Chemical Weapons Convention did not go to the Diet until the Aum Shinrikyo case came up. I question the seriousness of purpose of some of these nuclear weapon powers, or those dependent on nuclear weapon powers for their security. What is there to the view of certain non-nuclear weapon powers that you are trying to perpetuate the existing nuclear weapons regime?

A: On the CTBT it is probably too premature for us to talk about the ratification of the Treaty. First of all, we have to conclude the Agreement, and we will do our utmost to conclude the Agreement by spring. However, we have to persuade the People's Republic of China to agree to the zero-yield option. The Russian Federation's attitude is still rather vague. It has not yet officially announced the present position of its Government at the CTBT negotiations. We sincerely hope that the Russian Federation will agree with the zero-yield option. The Republic of India is floating a completely different idea, which is not necessarily acceptable by the participants of the CTBT negotiations. We sincerely hope that the Government of the Republic of India will take a realistic attitude on the CTBT. So, before we talk about the ratification, we have many things to do. Lastly, the Japanese Government does not suspect the sincerity of the Clinton Administration on the CTBT.
Takeshima territorial issues
Q: How are you going to solve the potential territorial problem between Japan and the Republic of Korea about Takeshima Island?

A: As far as the Takeshima issue is concerned, we have already announced the principle positions of the Japanese Government at the Diet Session. I do not think that there is any change on this position.

Q: Could you repeat that position for us?

A: The paper detailing the position of the Government is not available for you here -- I do not have the official statement here. Last year in the Diet, there was a question and answer session on this. So, if you like, I will give you a copy of the review in Japanese.

Q: I have a series of questions on this particular subject about the Sea of Japan. There have been reports in the recent past, in the Republic of Korea and in Japan, that you are intending to apply the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) either before or after ratification. Do you think the circumstances are right considering the Republic of Korea is going into elections, and Japan is probably going into elections, and in the People's Republic of China transition is taking place? Do you think these circumstances are normal in terms of what these countries are raising is honest or for domestic purposes?

A: What the Japanese Government has so far stated is that it intends to present the Law of the Seas-related bills and the Agreement to the present Session of the Diet. We have not decided when we will actually present the bills to the Diet. This is one point. The other point is, in this connection, we have not yet decided about the declarations of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). We are in the process of forming a consensus among the Ministries concerned. This is what I can tell you officially.

Q: If you have the information, could you spell out the distance from the nearest shore of the Republic of Korea to Japan?

A: I do not have a map here, but first of all, the Japanese Government has established a fishing zone. As far as the fishing zone is concerned, we have not established the fishing zone in the sea near the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The Japanese people concerned are very much interested whether the Japanese Government is going to establish the full economic zone and whether the full area will be covered by the new regulations or not. On the questions of the establishment of the EEZ, and to what extend the Japanese Government is going to apply the regulations, it is still undecided and under study. The second point is that Japan has fishing treaties with the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. In the past, when we have had the chance, we have explained to our colleagues in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea that we intend to present the Law of the Seas-related regulations and bills to the Diet, but we have not told them whether we would declare the EEZ in conjunction with the Law of the Seas regulations. But, in any case, once the fishermen from the People's Republic of China and Republic of Korea are currently engaged in fishing inside the Japanese fishing zone, presumably, we will have to consult with the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, in due course, about what we should do about this tradition.

Q: Would it be correct to assume that even if you apply the EEZ, your current thinking is that you would like to -- without renouncing your claim to Takeshima -- keep relations going without settling the possession issues as such -- freeze it like the Republic of Singapore, for example?

A: Japan has no intention of disturbing the friendly relations with the People's Republic of China and with the Republic of Korea. But, at the same time, we have certain issues to be discussed, like the EEZ. What I can tell you is that if we have to conduct fishing negotiations in the future, those talks will tend to be very severe. We hope we can find a mutually acceptable solution to this. This is rather abstract, but what I can tell you is limited to this.

Q: To come back to my earlier question on timing. The Sea of Japan is a very emotive issue for them. In my view, that country has not shied away from using its relations with Japan to press the issue. They have in the past picked this up, as in September 1994. Is it the right time to ratify the Law of the Seas?

A: First of all, the Republic of Korea Parliament has already ratified the Law of the Seas regulations. At the same time, we understand that the People's Republic of China is also preparing for this. The Law of the Seas Conference has a long history and now it is the right time for us to present those laws to the Japanese Diet.

Q: When you normalized relations, were there any secret discussions during the normalization that the amount of reparations would also cover the ownership of Takeshima?

A: Regularly, the Japanese Government keeps telling the Government of the Republic of Korea of the principle positions of the Japanese Government on Takeshima Island. There is no secret about this.
Food aid to North Korea
Q: Another question on a completely different subject -- I noticed you put down North Korean food aid as one of the issues you have just been highlighting. Could you just bring us up to date on the deliberations?

A: Yes, you remember that the tripartite meeting on the level of Deputy-Ministers between Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States took place in Hawaii. They exchanged views on the situation of North Korea. They talked about the food situation. They shared, more or less, the same view on this. It is that the food situation is severe, but it has not reached the critical point where, for example, famine has been caused by this. This is the objective analysis of the three countries on the food situation. Secondly, the Japanese side explained to its colleagues about how we extended rice to North Korea on an humanitarian basis, and we explained that the stock of rice has disappeared. Because this rice has disappeared, we do not intend to send rice to North Korea. A United States colleague told us that they have not decided whether they will extend emergency aid for this purpose. At the same time, they said that even if they extend rice to North Korea, it will not be as much as Japan and the Republic of Korea have extended in the past -- so, a relatively limited amount is seemingly under study. If you are talking about the news brought by member of the House of Councilors Akiko Domoto, yes, we communicated with Councillor Domoto on this, but the position of the Japanese Government is as I have just explained to you.

Q: I understand some ruling coalition politicians are planning to go visit the North Korea. Apparently, they are willing to extend further rice aid. Does it not mean that there is sort of a difference in the negotiation of the current situation between the Government and the ruling political coalition?

A: When Councillor Domoto brought the news of the request by the North Korean authorities for additional rice aid, there was speculation in the Japanese press about the possibility of dispatching a parliamentary delegation to North Korea. But, very recently, the Government has not heard anything on this, so I do not know whether the politicians concerned have decided to do so or not. As for the negotiations between Japan and North Korea on the normalization, unfortunately it has still been suspended.

Q: No progress at all?

A: No.

Q: I apologize for being late and it may be that this subject has already been touched upon, but about the meeting in Honolulu between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea -- particularly, the question of assessing the food shortages in North Korea. Various figures for the number of those at risk have been discussed by various agencies. I read a report that at the Honolulu meeting, a Republic of Korea representative presented unspecified evidence that the situation in the north was not as bad as had been suggestion. Do you have any more details of that, and does the Japanese Government have its own assessment of the danger? If so, what is it and what is it based on?

A: Before you came, I explained to your colleagues that the three sides shared, more or less, the same view on the food situation. The situation is severe; however, it has not yet reached a critical point where famine has been caused by this. The Japanese side has explained to their colleagues about what we have done in the past. Our stockpile of rice has disappeared and we do not intend to extend rice to North Korea. As for the data concerning the food situation, the Japanese Government does not obtain specific figures, except we have received some from various international agencies and so on. To be frank, we do not know actually or precisely what is happening in North Korea with the food situation. But, on the basis of the data which we have, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States shared, more or less, the same view as they expected.

Q: The position of the agency seems to be that although the situation could not be called a full-blown famine yet, by the time it is a full-blown famine, it will be too late to provide aid and that the best way of dealing with these situations is to intervene early. Does that form a part of your thinking, and is there a point at which you will intervene because the situation is worsening?

A: Last September, the United Nations Department of Human Affairs (DHA) issued an appeal on this. We received the appeal and thoroughly studied what we should do, and we decided to extend emergency aid in the amount of US$500,000 to North Korea through the DHA. After that, none of the United Nations organizations, including the DHA, announced another appeal. Every now and then, they provide us with piecemeal information. On the basis of this information, we think that, although the food situation is severe, it has not yet caused a famine. In this sense, we are not studying the option of sending aid to North Korea through international agencies now. I told your colleagues that the United States is studying whether it should extend emergency aid to North Korea. They have not decided to do so, but if they decide to do so, the amount, seemingly, is rather limited -- not so much as the Republic of Korea and Japan have provided in the past.

Q: During the Honolulu meeting of these three countries, was there any discussion on how to stem a possible North Korean exodus to Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China -- because this is very directly related to the previous question of how late you would react in giving food aid?

A: They talked about the political situation of North Korea. They, more or less, again, shared the view that Kim Jong Il more or less controls the country, and that the economic situation is severe; however, in the near term, it seemingly is not leading to a crisis which will upset the present regime. That is basically how they view the present situation in North Korea. I am not sure if they talked about a possible exodus or not, but on the basis of this, it seems that the situation has not reached a critical stage.
Japan-United States base realignment consultations
Q: Governor Ota of Okinawa suggested that he demand the United States close all the United States bases on Okinawa. What is the Central Government's reaction to this?

A: The meeting between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture presumably started at 14:00. We expect that the Okinawa Prefecture will give us its action agenda on the realignment, consolidation and reduction of Okinawa bases. When we receive that, I think we will formally start to study what the Central Government can do. For the time being, I know there have been speculations on this, but I am afraid I cannot make any official comment on this now.

Q: Let me confirm -- Okinawa is coming up with its own agenda on this?

A: Yes, but this does not necessarily mean that the Central Government can accept their ideas. But, they are going to give us their ideas, and we have been waiting for this.

Q: That leads to my second question -- I understand that after Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda's visit to the United States, the two governments are probably now drafting the joint declaration in expanded security cooperation between Japan and the United States. How does this Okinawa issue (which is obviously a thorn) negatively impact this preparation? In other words, the Okinawa area is a very major pillar of the global American strategy, that is to be able to fight two large-scale regional conflicts almost simultaneously. Okinawa is part of that greater strategy, and we are talking about it in terms of the Japan-United States Security Arrangements. If this current confusion over Okinawa's bases prevails until April, will it not mean that the eminent joint declaration sounds rather horrible, because it spoils the United States strategy?

A: When Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda met Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry of the United States in Washington, D.C., they once again confirmed the two governments' intention to issue a joint paper on the security relations between the two countries. This is one point. The two governments, I am sure, in due course, will start to prepare fully the wording of the joint paper. As far as this joint paper is concerned, the two governments will once again announce the importance of the present Japan-United States Security Arrangements, even in this post-cold war era. At the same time, the unfortunate incident took place on Okinawa, and both governments decided to set up a special action committee on the realignment consolidation and reduction of bases and other related matters. This committee will issue a final report by November this year. Therefore, what we can do when President Clinton visits is -- now that the Okinawa Government is giving us their ideas about the base issue -- we will fully study this plan and then talk to our American colleagues about what we can do. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda said that at the time of President Clinton's visit to Japan, both Governments will show to the public the specific direction of the study by the action committee. So, we do not know to what extent we can concretely tell the public about the progress of the Okinawa base issues. But, I am sure that the progress of study will be duly reflected in the joint paper. I do not think that this issue will dominate President Clinton's visit to Japan. Of course this is a very important issue. We will sincerely deal with this matter, but when President Clinton comes, we will not only talk about the security relationship, but also about other aspects of the bilateral issues -- such as the economic and trade relationship and the so-called common agenda. I do not think the base issue will negatively affect the joint paper.
Japan-United States-Republic of Korea consultations
Q: You said that Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea more or less shared the view that Kim Jong Il controlled the country. Can you elaborate on the Japanese position on that? Is Japan thinking that it is Kim Il Young who is more in charge of the country or less?

A: Again, the Japanese Government, also, does not know clearly what is happening over there. Our basic understanding is, although Mr. Kim Jong Il has not received the post of Secretary General of his party, or the head of state yet, more or less he controls the country. That is all we specifically know. We are not in a position to make a specific comment on how he governs the country or when he is going to be the General Secretary.

Q: By saying "more or less," you suggest that there are big question marks on the stability of the regime, right?

A: We understand that the economic situation is severe, but that it is not leading to a crisis which will upset the present Kim Jong Il regime. However, to be frank, we do not know how stable his position is, but we understand that, more or less, he governs and controls the country.
People's Republic of China-Taiwan relations
Q: Could you tell me what your Government's view is of the People's Republic of China's recent threats towards Taiwan?

A: As far as the New York Times report is concerned, we checked with the United States, and as you know very well, the United States Department of State has denied this. What I can tell you about the Japanese position is that we understand that the People's Republic of China has not abandoned the right to use force against a plot -- say, a possible interference by a foreign force on the unification of Taiwan; and that the Japanese Government is naturally interested in the situation between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The Japanese Government has not obtained any specific information that a possible use of force by the Government of the People's Republic of China will be imminent. In any case, the Japanese Government sincerely hopes that any problems concerning Taiwan will be solved peacefully by the parties concerned.

Q: Could you be more specific about the problems? What problems?

A: We cannot specify their problems, but they may tell you that there may be an independence movement; that there will be a possible conflict between the two parties, and so on. Whatever problems they may have, we sincerely hope that they will be solved peacefully, because the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are so close to Japan. If a conflict takes place over there, it will directly affect us.

Q: I read a recent statement that suggested the joint statement to come would recommend or reconfirm the United States' and Japan's cooperation in dealing with People's Republic of China-Taiwan problems. I wonder in what way the United States and Japan can cooperate or what cooperation Japan would like to have.

A: I do not know specifically which cooperation you are talking about, but what I can tell you is rather general. As you know very well, Japan and the United States are enjoying close ties on the basis of the Security Arrangements between the two countries, and we sincerely believe this helps the peace and stability of the Asia- Pacific region. Therefore, establishing and developing a very close relationship, especially based on the Security Treaty, itself contributes to peace and stability in the region. Apart from that, if your question is whether Japan and the United States are talking about a possible military cooperation in the case of military conflict in that area, what I can tell you is that the Japanese Government will take appropriate measures under the present Constitution, and under the present Japan-United States Security Treaty.

Q: Which would mean effectively, outside a certain zone there will be no military action?

A: It is difficult for me to answer hypothetical questions, but under the present Japanese Constitution, we cannot implement the collective security right. Within this constraint, and within the context of the Japan-United States security relationship, the Japanese Government will carry out its responsibilities. I understand my answer is very vague. What I can tell you is limited. On the other hand, it is not true that Japan and the United States are now engaged in a specific program of collaboration in the case of military conflict between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

Q: Or even planning that?

A: It is very difficult for me to explain answers to hypothetical questions. Have you obtained any classified information about this? I do not think that would be the case.

Q: With great respect -- a fraction.

A: Of course, we constantly exchange views and information about the situation of various parts of the Asia-Pacific region with the United States Government.

Q: Will any threat to Taiwan and the surrounding area of Taiwan not be seen as a threat to Japan?

A: What I can tell you now is that we are watching with great interest the situation over there, but we do not think that the situation over there is so critical or that military conflict will be imminent. Thank you very much.

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