Outline of the Japan-United States Summit Meeting

20 March 2001
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The following is an outline of the summit meeting between Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and President George W. Bush of the United States of America on 19 March in Washington DC. The meeting consisted of the small group meeting that lasted approximately one hour, and the subsequent working lunch that lasted about one hour.

Attendees

United States Side:

Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Ambassador to Japan Thomas S. Foley, Chief of Staff to the President Andrew Card, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice.

Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neil, United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick and Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors Larry Lindsey only attended the working lunch.

Japanese Side:

Minister of State in Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy Taro Aso, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kosei Ueno, Ambassador to the United States of America Shunji Yanai, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Ryozo Kato, and Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau Ichiro Fujisaki. Secretary to the Prime Minister Kenichiro Sasae only attended the small group summit meeting

Assistant to the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kazuyoshi Urabe, Director-General of the International Bureau of the Ministry of Finance Zenbei Mizoguchi, Vice-Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Hidehiro Konno, and Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau Hitoshi Tanaka of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only attended the working lunch.

Political Issues

1. The Ehime Maru Accident

(1) Prime Minister Mori noted that while the Ehime Maru accident was regrettable, the apology from the United States is accepted as a sincere one. Prime Minister Mori requested that President Bush continue to work on the investigation of the cause of the accident, salvage of the Ehime Maru, and compensations.

(2) President Bush expressed his deepest regret and said that he would do what was possible. President Bush further said that he understood the strong emotions in Japan and would like to make efforts for the families.

(3) In the Joint Statement, Prime Minister Mori and President Bush concurred that "solid ties enable the two countries to deal with problems, such as the regrettable Ehime Maru accident." (Joint Statement, Paragraph I)

2. The Japan-United States Security Arrangement

(1) Stressing the importance of the Japan-US alliance, President Bush affirmed that the United States would continue to maintain its presence in those areas of the world where it is required for the sake of world peace, including its presence in the Republic of Korea and Japan.

(2) Prime Minister Mori stressed the importance of the United States' presence based on the Japan-US Security Treaty and further noted that Japan is actively promoting measures for the expansion and intensification of Japan-US security cooperation, including ensuring the effectiveness of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, enhancing cooperation on equipment and technology, and furthering cooperation in the field of information. Prime Minister Mori also touched on emergency legislation.

(3) With regard to Okinawa and the frequent occurrence of incidents and accidents over recent years, Prime Minister Mori conveyed the importance of giving consideration to the burden borne by the Okinawan people and the need to understand their feelings, and remarked that Japan and the United States would cooperate in the endeavor to alleviate Okinawa's burden through, among others, the implementation of the United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. Prime Minister Mori stated that the relocation of Futenma Air Station was important, and that he would like to continue to take up the time limit issue as requested by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, and continue to consult with the Government of the United States on its military postures, such as the US force structure, in response to changes in the international situation. President Bush responded in agreement, though he said that the time limit issue was a difficult issue and one which should be considered in light of the international situation, and that he would like to continue to consult between Japan and the United States concerning the relocation of Futenma Air Station.

3. Ballistic Missiles

(1) Prime Minister Mori expressed understanding toward the fact that the United States is considering a missile defense program to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles, while making various diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, he welcomed the expression by the United States that it would consult fully on this issue among allies and with other interested parties, including Russia and China.

(2) The two leaders agreed on the importance of consultation on ballistic missile issues, sharing recognition of the growing threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. (Joint Statement, Paragraph III)

4. The International Situation

(1) President Bush expressed concerns over the situation concerning the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Mori noted the importance of engagement policies, issues of (Nodong) missile development, and normalization talks between Japan and North Korea, including the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens. Furthermore, the two leaders confirmed they would advance trilateral coordination among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea.

(2) The two leaders agreed to continue to cooperate closely on United Nations Security Council reform. (In the Joint Statement, the two leaders agreed to "continue to work together to obtain for Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council.")

(3) The issues of China, Russia, and Africa were also taken up.

Economic Issues

1. Economic Management of the Two Countries

(1) President Bush noted that he would like to utilize fiscal, monetary, and trade policies for the renewed growth of the United States economy. Furthermore, he commented that he hoped for the earliest possible recovery of Japan's economy, noting that Japan should promote monetary reforms and resolve the issue of non-performing loans, rather that pursue an export-led economic recovery. He stated that he was not the kind of President to tell Japan what policies it should take, but rather that he had suggested these policies to Prime Minister Mori as a friend.

(2) Prime Minister Mori touched on the Bank of Japan's March 19 decision of monetary easing. He also pointed out that the downward trend in the United States economy was affecting Asia's economy. Moreover, having explained Japanese economic conditions in the 1990s, Prime Minister Mori elucidated recent trends in the Japanese economy. In particular, concerning the Government of Japan's recent economic policies, he commented that the Government and Ruling Parties Emergency Economic Package Headquarters was addressing the present economic situation, focusing on addressing the issue of non-performing loans.

(3) Prime Minister Mori reiterated his determination to continue pursuing appropriate economic policies and to promote vigorously structural and regulatory reform to revitalize the Japanese economy and strengthen the financial system, including through effectively addressing the issues of corporate debt and non-performing loans. (Joint Statement, Paragraph II)

2. The Building of New Japan-United States Economic Relations

Both leaders agreed to work together to seek new ways to enhance the US-Japan dialogue to address global, regional, and bilateral economic and trade issues. (Joint Statement, Paragraph II)

3. World Trade Organization (WTO)

Both leaders agreed to work together closely for the launch of a new WTO round this year. (Joint Statement, Paragraph II)