Diplomatic Bluebook 2024
Chapter 3
Diplomacy to Defend National Interests through Co-creation with the World
3 Global Security
(1) Regional Security
In the international community, a historical shift in the power balance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, is occurring. In light of the numerous security challenges confronting this region, there is a need for Japan to cooperate with its allies and like-minded countries and others. In particular, it is more important than ever to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. There is also a need for Japan to fundamentally reinforce its own defense capabilities. At the same time, by actively strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with each country, Japan has been making efforts to realize a desirable regional security environment for Japan.
Japan and Australia concurred, at the leaders' and foreign ministerial levels, to continue strengthening cooperation in partnership with like-minded countries, with a view to further deepening the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries and realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” In August, the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), aimed at facilitating cooperative activities such as joint exercises, disaster relief, and other forms of cooperative activities between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Australian Defence Force, entered into force. Immediately after that, Japan and Australia conducted joint exercises under the RAA with reciprocal deployments of F-35 fighter jets between the two countries. At the Japan-Australia Leaders' Meeting and Japan-Australia Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in September, the two sides welcomed the implementation of joint exercises under the RAA and concurred on strengthening security cooperation, guided by the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.2 With regard to illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers3, the Australian Defence Force conducted monitoring and surveillance activities in the waters around Japan by their naval vessels in late May and from late October to mid-November, and by their aircraft from early February to early March as well as from late August to mid-September. The 5th Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue was held in December, during which the two sides exchanged views on broad topics, such as each country's cybersecurity strategy and policy, bilateral and multilateral cooperation including the UN, and capacity building support.
Japan and India held three summit meetings: during Prime Minister Kishida's visit to India in March, at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May, and at the G20 New Delhi Summit in September. At these talks, Japan and India affirmed that they would work to further develop the “Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” At the working level, the Fifth Japan-India Cyber Dialogue was held in September to exchange views on national cyber policies and cybersecurity strategies, current cyber threat landscape, 5G and Open RAN technology developments of 5G and Open RAN technology. Both sides also discussed bilateral cooperation in the field of capacity building support, as well as cooperation at the UN and among Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad). In September, the first-ever Joint Service Staff Talks between Japan and India were held, and both sides concurred on further advancing defense cooperation, which has until now focused on service-to-service cooperation, to a joint services level.
In relation to the Republic of Korea (ROK), after concurring on activating communication between their governments in a wide range of fields at the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held in March, active dialogues were also held in the field of security, including the resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue in April after a five-year absence. Taking the opportunity of various occasions such as international conferences, talks were held between the leaders, foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of the national security agencies of Japan and the ROK, as well as Japan, the ROK, and the U.S., during which the countries affirmed their response to North Korea and close cooperation toward the realization of FOIP. Furthermore, in light of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting held in June, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Defense Ministers' telephone call in September, and the Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Defense Ministerial Teleconference Meeting in November, the three countries conducted joint exercises (February, April, July, August, September, October, November) among other forms of cooperation, and are promoting further trilateral cooperation to address regional security issues. Based on the Joint Leaders' Statement issued by Japan, the U.S., and the ROK in December, the three countries commenced the full activation of a real-time DPRK missile warning data sharing mechanism and jointly established a multi-year trilateral exercise plan in December.
In relation to the UK, which is Japan's “global strategic partner,” at the Japan-UK Summit Meeting held in May 2022, the two countries affirmed their agreement in principle to the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), aimed at facilitating cooperative activities such as joint exercises, disaster relief activities, and other activities between the JSDF and the UK Armed Forces. In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister Sunak signed the RAA at the Japan-UK Summit Meeting and concurred on further deepening security and defense cooperation. The Japan-UK RAA entered into force in October, and was applied for the first time to the field training exercise, Vigilant Isles 23, between the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) and the British Army, conducted in November in Japan. In December 2022, Japan, the UK, and Italy decided on and announced the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a joint development program for next-generation fighter aircraft. The three countries concurred on the recognition that this cooperative program is expected to build a foundation for global safety, stability, and prosperity over the next several decades. Furthermore, in December, Japan, the UK, and Italy signed the Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO)”, and affirmed their firm resolve to continue working together to overcome various issues, with a view to completing development by 2035. With regard to illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers, the Royal Navy vessel engaged in monitoring and surveillance operations in the waters surrounding Japan in early January. The 7th Japan-UK Bilateral Consultations on Cyber Issues were held in February. In addition to exchanging views on broad topics, such as on each country's cybersecurity strategy and policy, cooperation in international fora including the UN, and capacity building for cybersecurity, both sides also discussed about related policies including on 5G and Open RAN technologies. The Fifth Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministers' Meeting (“2+2”) was convened in November. At the meeting, the four ministers concurred to further strengthen the relationship between Japan and the UK to maintain and strengthen the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and issued a Joint Statement.

With France, which Japan shares an “Exceptional Partnership” with, the Sixth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (“2+2”) took place in January 2022. The Ministers shared the view of raising cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to a higher level and further promoting cooperation to address regional situations and challenges facing the international community. France has dispatched its Navy frigate since early April and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from early to late October to the waters surrounding Japan, to conduct surveillance operations against illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers. At the Japan-France Summit Meeting held in January, the two leaders welcomed the progress in substantive cooperation, including reciprocal visits of assets and joint exercises between Japan and France, and concurred in deepening cooperation between the two countries. At the Seventh Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (“2+2”) held in May, the French side reiterated France's strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, and the four ministers exchanged views on Japanese-French cooperation in areas such as cyber, space, and economic security. They highly appreciated the defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France, and shared the view to deepen such cooperation and exchanges as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. The 7th Japan-France Bilateral Consultations on Cybersecurity were held in November, during which the two sides exchanged views broadly on cybersecurity strategy and policy, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 5G technology and capacity building including human resource development in cybersecurity. During the Japan-France Telephone Summit Meeting held in December, the Roadmap that will guide the Japan-France cooperation was announced, and the two leaders concurred on making a further leap on their “exceptional partnership.”
In relation to Germany, negotiations commenced in September on the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (“Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement,” or ACSA), which facilitates the smooth and prompt provision of supplies and services between the JSDF and the Armed Forces of Germany, in order to promote joint activities between the two forces. An agreement in principle was reached in November.
At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in May 2022, Japan welcomed the progress in Japan-Italy security cooperation, including joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden by the Japan Maritime SDF and the Italian Navy, and the training of Japan Air SDF pilots by the Italian Air Force, and valued the formulation of the documents on the Indo-Pacific published by Italy, based on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in January 2023, the two leaders welcomed the GCAP announced at the end of 2022, and concurred on upgrading the relationship between the two countries to that of “strategic partners,” and shared the view to establish consultations between the respective foreign and defense authorities as well as to further promote cooperation in the field of security. Italy dispatched the Italian Navy's naval frigate Francesco Morosini to Yokosuka in June 2023, and the Italian Air Force's F-35A and other aircraft to JASDF Komatsu Air Base in August the same year to participate in the respective joint exercises. In December, Japan, the UK, and Italy signed the Convention on the Establishment of the GIGO.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is located in a geopolitically strategic position, and faces Japan's important sea lanes. A stable and prosperous ASEAN region is crucial to the stability and prosperity not only of the East Asia region but also of the international community. On June 3, Japan signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Singapore, which entered into force on the same day. In October, Japan delivered an air surveillance radar system to the Philippines as the first transfer case of finished equipment, and in November, Japan and the Philippines concurred to commence negotiations on the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). To ensure the rule of law in the seas, Japan also provides continuous support to the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, and other countries to improve the law enforcement capabilities of their coast guard authorities. The first joint exercise among the coast guard agencies of Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines was held in June.
As for Canada, at the summit meeting held during the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023 and on other occasions, Japan and Canada welcomed the steady progress of cooperation between the two countries, including holding the negotiation on the General Security of Information Agreement in relation to the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” announced at the Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in October 2022. In 2023, Canada deepened its engagement in the region, including dispatching three naval vessels to the Indo-Pacific to conduct activities. At the summit meeting held on the occasion of Prime Minister Kishida's visit to Canada in January, Prime Minister Kishida explained that Japan had decided to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities including the possession of counterstrike capabilities, and to increase its defense budget based on the new “National Security Strategy” (NSS) and other documents, to which Prime Minister Justin Trudeau gave his full support. The two leaders also concurred to collaborate closely for the peace and stability of the region. With regard to joint exercises with the Canadian Armed Forces, the Japan-Canada joint exercise “KAEDEX,” which has been conducted every year since 2017, was held in June. A number of multilateral joint exercises were also conducted, including “EXERCISE SAMASAMA,” a joint exercise conducted in October among Japan, the U.S., the Philippines, Canada, and the UK. As for responding to illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers, a Royal Canadian Navy vessel conducted monitoring and surveillance operations in early June and from early September to early November, while monitoring and surveillance activities by aircraft were carried out between early April and mid-May, and between early October and early November, in the waters surrounding Japan.
In relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), at the NATO Summit held in July, which Prime Minister Kishida attended, the leaders concurred to further enhance cooperation toward maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law, under the recognition that the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable. On this occasion, the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) was formulated as a new cooperation document to bring the Japan-NATO cooperation to new heights. In addition to traditional areas, both sides concurred on promoting cooperation in new areas such as cyber, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, and strategic communications. The first Japan-NATO Cyber Dialogue was held in November, during which the two sides exchanged views on broad topics ranging from each side's cyber policy to the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of cyber.
At the Japan-EU Summit Meeting convened in July, Japan welcomed the EU's strengthened involvement in the Indo-Pacific amid the current severe security environment, and they concurred on establishing a strategic dialogue at the foreign ministerial level, as well as developing a security partnership in areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, and disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition, the 5th Japan-EU Cyber Dialogue was held in November. In this dialogue, the two sides exchanged views on various topics, such as cybersecurity strategy and policy, bilateral cooperation, and multilateral cooperation including through the UN, and capacity building support.
There are various issues of concern in relation to China, such as its intrusion into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the extensive and rapid enhancement of its military power without sufficient transparency, and increasing activities by its military in the waters and air spaces surrounding Japan. Japan will continue to make use of opportunities at high-level dialogues, including summit meetings and foreign ministers' meetings, to firmly maintain and assert its position and strongly call for responsible actions by China. As China's military trends are a matter of serious concern for Japan, Japan is working on communicating its policies through security dialogues such as the Japan-China Security Dialogue, as well as efforts to build multilayered channels for exchanges. At the same time, Japan is communicating its concerns and urging China to improve transparency in relation to its defense policies and military power, as well as to take more concrete actions to contribute to the security environment and to the region, including Japan. The Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China that commenced operation in 2018 is aimed at promoting mutual understanding and mutual trust, and at avoiding unexpected collisions, and a hotline under this Mechanism commenced operation in May 2023.
Peace and stability in the Middle East region is vital to the peace and prosperity of the international community including Japan. The Middle East is one of the world's key energy suppliers, and approximately 90% of Japan's crude oil imports rely on the region. It is, therefore, extremely important to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in this region. As Japan's own efforts toward ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East region and the safety of Japan-related vessels, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet decision in December 2019 on utilization of vessels and aircraft of the SDF (a) to make further diplomatic efforts toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, (b) to take thorough measures for ensuring safety of navigation including robust information sharing with relevant stakeholders, and (c) to strengthen its information gathering system. Japan has continued to conduct information gathering activities using SDF vessels and aircraft in the waters of the Middle East since January 2020. The 1st Cyber Security Consultation between Japan and Jordan was held in June, and the two sides shared their recent updates of cyber security policies and exchanged views on the current state of affairs in cyberspace. In May, Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the UAE concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the first such agreement concluded between Japan and a country of the Middle East region. This Agreement entered into force in January 2024.
In addition, Japan has actively participated in and contributed to multilateral frameworks in the region, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), in order to strengthen security cooperation in the region. The ARF is an important framework for dialogue on security in which various entities participate including North Korea and the EU, with the aims of improving the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through dialogues and cooperation on political and security issues. It is also an important forum that focuses on confidence-building through various initiatives. In July, the 30th ARF Ministerial Meeting was held and the participants candidly exchanged views mainly on regional and international affairs, including issues concerning Ukraine, Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, North Korea, and Myanmar. Japan also actively contributes to the forum including through serving as a co-chair of all the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Maritime Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, and ICTs Security.
Furthermore, in addition to government-to-government dialogues (track 1), Japan utilizes frameworks where participants from both public and private sectors exchange opinions and explain their security policies (track 1.5), as well as other means, as part of its efforts to promote other countries' understanding of Japan's security policies, and to facilitate cooperation and confidence-building in the region.
- 2 A document that sets out the direction for security and defense cooperation between Japan and Australia over the next 10 years, signed at the Japan-Australia Leaders' Meeting in October 2022.
- 3 In this context, “ship-to-ship transfers” refers to the transfers to or from North Korea-flagged vessels of any goods or items at sea, which UN Security Council resolution 2375 (adopted in September 2017) prohibits UN member states from facilitating or engaging in.
(2) Economic Security
A Trends Surrounding Economic Security
In recent years, various challenges have been surfacing in fields that cut across national security and the economy. The scope of the national security domain is expanding rapidly. Various risks are emerging, such as the risk of stolen or leaked advanced civilian technologies being converted to military use in other countries, the risk of suppliers influenced by foreign governments obstructing the stable operation of critical infrastructure such as those for telecommunications, the risk of disruptions to the supply of critical goods due to over-dependencies on other countries, and the risk of being targeted by economic coercion by some countries seeking to achieve political objectives by using their advantages in the supply chain or their purchasing power in the market as leverage.
In light of the emergence of various threats related to economic means, securing Japan's national interests such as peace, security, and economic prosperity by carrying out economic measures, in other words economic security, is becoming increasingly important. In view of this, Japan is accelerating efforts, such as the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, and its gradual execution. This Act is centered around four pillars: enhancing the resilience of supply chains, ensuring security and reliability of critical infrastructure, support for the development of advanced critical technologies, and non-disclosure of selected patent applications. In the face of various threats at hand through economic means, the National Security Strategy, established by the Government of Japan in December the same year, also lays out that Japan will coordinate ideas on necessary economic measures and execute these measures comprehensively, effectively, and intensively to enhance Japan's self-reliance and to secure the advantage and indispensability concerning its technologies and others. Furthermore, to strengthen and promote economic security efforts, the Council for the Promotion of Economic Security, chaired by the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Minister as a member, has been convened since November 2021.
In light of the fact that it has become clear that supply chain vulnerabilities can have adverse impacts in diverse fields even from the perspective of development, the new Development Cooperation Charter approved by the Cabinet in June 2023, as one of the priority policies in Japan's development cooperation, advocates promoting cooperation to enhance resilience and diversification of supply chains as well as economic diversification, sustainable development of critical mineral resources, and stable supply and security of food, among other forms of cooperation, in order to strengthen the socioeconomic autonomy and resilience of developing countries. These efforts are important not only for the sustainable growth of developing countries, but also for Japan. To that end, Japan will actively work to support human resources development, legal system development, and relevant infrastructure development that contribute to addressing and resolving these issues.
B Recent Initiatives by Other Countries
Other countries have also been rapidly advancing initiatives to promote economic security in recent years.
The U.S. has taken the lead in adopting and implementing regulations and promotion measures from the perspectives of maintaining its technological advantage and addressing supply chain risks. In February, the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force for the purpose of protecting its advanced technologies from illegal acquisition and use.
In August, President Biden issued an Executive Order (EO) to regulate outbound investment, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to formulate new regulations.
In October, the Department of Commerce revised its semiconductor export control measures to appropriately manage the export of semiconductors used in AI processing and supercomputers, as well as semiconductor manufacturing equipment used in high-end semiconductor production, due to concerns that sensitive technologies may be diverted to military applications.
The EU promotes strengthening resilience against the risk of supply disruptions to critical technologies and materials, under the concept of “strategic autonomy.” The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) entered into force in January, enabling the European Commission to conduct investigations in the case of suspected market distortive effects caused by subsidies, in regard to activities conducted within EU markets by companies that have received subsidies from foreign governments outside of the region.
The European Commission published the European Economic Security Strategy in June. This strategy defines supply chain vulnerabilities, physical and cyber security risks to critical infrastructure, technology leakage, and the weaponization of trade policies or economic coercion, as risks to economic security, and sets out concrete measures to address such risks. In December 2021, the European Commission published its proposal for an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which provides procedures and standards for invoking countermeasures as a last resort when a third country refuses to stop its economic coercion on an EU Member State even with the implementation of dialogues and other deterrence measures. The proposal was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in October 2023, and entered into force in December the same year.
Australia has, thus far, positioned the securing of national resilience and the protection of assets and infrastructure as its national interests, and advanced concrete measures to that end. These include the formulation of the International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy (April 2021), which sets out the policy for promoting the identification of technologies that should be protected, the tightening of investment screening systems for land and businesses related to sensitive national security (January 2021), and the establishment of the Next Generation Technologies Fund, which invests approximately 60 billion yen over 10 years from 2016 into game-changing technologies on national security. In December 2021, the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act came into effect. This law is aimed at strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and sets out the expansion of critical infrastructure departments and their responsibilities, as well as government support and intervention measures in the event of cyber security incidents.
Canada published its Critical Minerals Strategy in 2022 and strengthened its efforts ranging from critical mineral research and exploration to recycling. During the same year, Japan and Canada concurred on the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” which includes cooperation in the field of energy security. Cooperation between the two countries in these fields has been further accelerated with the signing of two Memorandums of Cooperation concerning Battery Supply Chains and on Industrial Science and Technology in September 2023. Canada is also promoting economic security efforts in the Indo-Pacific region with other countries. In May 2023, the ROK and Canada signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Critical Mineral Supply Chains, and the Clean Energy Transition and Energy Security. In September, ASEAN and Canada concurred to establish the ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership and issued the ASEAN-Canada Joint Leaders' Statement on Strengthening Food Security and Nutrition in Response to Crises. In January 2024, it announced new measures to protect Canadian research, which incorporates the publication of a list of named research organizations connected to military, national defense, or state security entities that may pose a risk to Canada's national security, as well as a list of sensitive technology research areas. Under the new measures, grants and funding will not be provided to research in these areas if any of the researchers involved in activities supported by the grant are affiliated with, or in receipt of funding or in-kind support from, a university, research institute or laboratory connected to such entities.
C Diplomatic Efforts Toward the Promotion of Economic Security
Diplomacy plays a significant role in promoting economic security. Japan, in cooperation with the international community, is engaged in active diplomacy in areas such as further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, responding to issues based on existing rules, and rule-making to address new challenges.
In relation to further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, Japan leverages cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee Meeting (the Economic “2+2”) and bilateral efforts with the UK and other partners, as well as cooperation under the G7, Japan-Australia-India-U.S., and Japan-U.S.-ROK, to expand and deepen cooperation with a view to developing common recognition and coordinating policies.
In responding to issues based on existing rules, Japan has worked on correcting unfair trade policies and practices of others in cooperation with like-minded countries from the perspective of consistency with existing rules, including World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), investment-related treaties. Furthermore, Japan gathers and analyzes information on economic security measures and trade rules, drawing on the efforts of like-minded countries, and works to ensure that Japan's economic security policy needs are appropriately met.
With regard to rule-making to respond to new challenges, existing international agreements are not adequate for addressing areas such as critical and emerging technologies, including the fifth-generation mobile communications systems (5G), economic coercion, and others. In fields where there is a need to further develop international rules, Japan continues to play a leading role in international debates in cooperation with like-minded countries.
D Cooperation with its Ally and Like-minded Countries
Following on from last year, Japan continued to make particularly significant progress in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries in 2023.
Under the G7 framework, economic resilience and economic security was established as an independent item for the first time in the G7 Foreign Ministers' Communique, issued at the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April. At the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May, a standalone session on economic resilience and economic security was convened for the first time in the history of the G7 Summit, and the G7 leaders affirmed that the G7 will be united in responding to issues such as 1) enhancing resilience of supply chains and critical infrastructure, 2) strengthening its response to non-market policies and practices and economic coercion, and 3) appropriately managing critical and emerging technologies. Based on this session, a comprehensive and concrete message on economic resilience and economic security was sent out in the form of the “G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security.” Building on these outcomes, the G7 Trade Ministers' Meeting in Osaka-Sakai held in October affirmed further progress in responding to economic coercion and strengthening the resilience of supply chains, while the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in November affirmed that efforts will be made to further develop international cooperation on economic resilience and economic security beyond the G7. At the G7 Leaders' Video Conference held in December, Prime Minister Kishida noted that it is important to address issues, including non-market policies and practices and economic coercion, strengthening supply chains and key infrastructure, and managing sensitive technologies, in a comprehensive manner with close collaboration, and stated that the discussions in Hiroshima and the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security are the foundation for this. The leaders affirmed that they would continue strengthening cooperation among the G7.
In relation to the U.S., during the Economic “2+2” held in November, discussions were conducted on two topics: strengthening the rules-based economic order in the Indo-Pacific region, and strengthening economic resilience as well as promoting and protecting critical and emerging technologies. The two sides shared their plans to continue working to address non-market policies and practices and economic coercion in order to build a free and fair economic order in the Indo-Pacific region. They also confirmed their intention to accelerate cooperation, including on promoting and protecting their technology in areas such as semiconductors, AI, quantum, clean energy, and 5G, and furthermore, confirmed that they will promote concrete collaboration in areas such as securing a stable supply of critical minerals and cooperation toward ensuring energy and food security.
At the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting held in Hiroshima in May, the leaders affirmed, in the joint statement issued, that they will step up efforts to strengthen supply chain resilience and improve the region's digital connectivity through access to critical and emerging technologies and advanced telecommunications technology, including 5G networks. In addition to announcing cooperation with Palau to establish a deployment of Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN)4, the first in the Pacific, they also announced the release of the Open RAN Security Report, which analyzes the advantages, challenges, and possibility of overcoming challenges of Open RAN, and of the Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards.
At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit held in August, the leaders exchanged views on strengthening coordination on economic security. Furthermore, in the Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Leaders' Statement released after the Summit, the three countries concurred on working closely together to launch early warning system pilots for supply chain disruptions, and to enhance cooperation on technology protection measures.
With regard to Japan's relations with the ROK, the leaders of the two countries concurred to launch a bilateral consultation on economic security during the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held in March, and this consultation was conducted three times in 2023. In addition, the 15th Japan-ROK High-Level Economic Consultations were held in December, during which the ministers exchanged views on, among others, economic coercion, critical and emerging technologies, and supply chains, and concurred to continue working together.
In regard to relations with European countries, at the Japan-UK Summit Meeting held in May, the two leaders concurred on deepening cooperation on economic security challenges, including economic coercion. The “Hiroshima Accord: An Enhanced Japan-UK Global Strategic Partnership” was issued on this occasion. In this document, the two sides agreed to work together on issues such as supply chain resilience, all forms of forced or coerced technology transfers and intellectual property theft, and export controls. They also noted shared concerns over, and strong opposition to, economic coercion and non-market policies and practices that distort the level playing field. In the Joint Leaders' Statement on the Deepening of the Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Kingdom of Denmark, issued in October, the two leaders appreciated the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security, adopted at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, and concurred in enhancing cooperation on economic security, including in addressing non-market policies and practices, economic coercion and other harmful practices. This was reiterated in the Joint Statement on the Strategic Partnership between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, issued in December.
With regard to Japan's relations with Southeast Asian countries, the joint statement which was issued from the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting held in February set out the decision to strengthen cooperation in the promotion of economic security, expressed concerns for and strong opposition to economic coercion, and stressed the importance of close coordination in addressing economic coercion. The Japan-Bangladesh Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership, released in April, also shared the recognition on the importance of economic security including strengthening resilience of supply chains, and the rules-based international economic order to counter challenges such as economic coercion. The Joint Statement on the Elevation of the Japan-Viet Nam Relations to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia and the World, issued in November, affirmed the importance of cooperation to ensure economic security, recognized the importance of transparent, diverse, secure, sustainable, and reliable supply chains, and confirmed the enhancement of supply chain resilience to ensure stable production activities for the benefit of both sides. In addition, the Japan-Malaysia Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, issued in December, expressed the shared intention to cooperate on economic security including strengthening supply chain resilience, and affirmed that the two sides will promote cooperation in areas including ICT.
- 4 Refers to radio access networks (RAN) that can be built in an open way by a combination of multiple vendors. It offers the advantage of contributing to the mitigation of supply chain risks.
E Response to Economic Coercion
Among the new issues described in “C” above, economic coercion that involves using economic ties with a specific country and taking measures or threatening to take measures in an abusive, arbitrary, or opaque manner, in order to achieve political objectives, is becoming a particularly serious problem against the backdrop of globalization and the growing economic interdependence between countries. Such economic coercion poses challenges to a free, open and rules-based international order (See the Special Feature on page 212).
The National Security Strategy published in December 2022 also sets out the policy for promoting effective efforts against economic coercion by foreign countries. To address economic coercion, which is an issue that cannot be adequately addressed by existing international agreements, it is important to foster a common understanding within the international community by working with its ally and like-minded countries and strategically raising international awareness. The G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security, issued at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, announced the launch of the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to increase collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence and response to economic coercion, and efforts are progressing under this platform.
F MOFA's Role
Changes in the global security environment have increased a need to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international economic order, while also taking into account the perspective of security. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as the ministry that is responsible for security policies, external economic relations and international law, will continue to lead diplomatic efforts related to economic security, as well as to work proactively to maintain and strengthen the international order.
Economic coercion that involves using economic ties with a specific country and taking measures or threatening to take measures in an abusive, arbitrary, or opaque manner, in order to achieve political objectives, is becoming a particularly serious problem against the backdrop of globalization and the growing economic interdependence between countries. Such economic coercion poses challenges to a free, open and rules-based international order, and it is unacceptable that the target country's autonomous policy decision-making or its sound economic development are inhibited by a specific country through economic coercion. The National Security Strategy published in December 2022 also sets out the policy for promoting effective efforts against economic coercion by foreign countries. Japan has also made use of various opportunities, including the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May 2023, to clearly demonstrate its intention to counter economic coercion.
At the Hiroshima Summit, the launch of the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion was announced through the issuance of the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security. The Platform has already commenced its activities to seek early warning, rapid information sharing, collaborative situation assessment, and coordinated responses to economic coercion.
The G7 Trade Ministers' Meeting in Osaka-Sakai held in October also saw ministers engage in discussions on economic coercion and concur on working toward further progress as the G7.
Efforts in other fora than the G7 included, for instance, the issuance of the Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices in June by Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the U.S. Building on the momentum from the G7, this Joint Declaration reiterates concerns about economic coercion and affirms that the respective countries will enhance international cooperation.
Japan is also deepening cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, the Japan-Philippines Joint Statement issued in February and the Japan-Bangladesh Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership issued in April affirmed the importance of countering economic coercion. The same intention was also affirmed in joint statements with like-minded countries that do not belong to the G7, including the Joint Leaders' Statement on the Deepening of the Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Kingdom of Denmark issued in October, the Joint Statement on friendship and comprehensive partnership in the new era between Japan and the Kyrgyz Republic issued in November, and the Joint Statement on the Strategic Partnership between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway issued in December.
Japan will continue to make effective use of the frameworks of like-minded countries such as the G7, as well as bilateral measures, while actively promoting collaboration with an ally and like-minded countries and responses that are aligned with international rules.
(3) Cyber
Today, cross-border cyberspace has become an indispensable social infrastructure for conducting all activities in countries around the world, and its importance and public nature are growing due to its role as a public space that all citizens are engaged in. On the other hand, amid the growing competition among nations and other entities that reflects recent geopolitical tensions, cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks.
Based on this recognition, MOFA is engaged in various diplomatic efforts to realize a free, fair, and secure cyberspace: promoting the development and deepening of rules and norms, working to deter cyberattacks, supporting capacity building, and engaging in international cooperation to effectively advance these efforts.
To promote the development and deepening of rules and norms, through discussions within the UN that have spanned about a quarter of a century, all UN Member States have confirmed the application of existing international law to cyberspace and concurred on the UN norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace5, which sets out 11 items. While these norms are not legally binding under international law, they provide the basis for the development of rules in cyberspace. Therefore, it is important for each country to specifically implement these norms, and to build up national practices. Based on this perspective, Japan participates actively in the relevant discussions in the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), in which all UN Member States participate, for the term from 2021 to 2025. It is important for every country to clarify their basic positions on how existing international law applies to cyberspace, and Japan made its position public in 2021.6
As an initiative to deter cyberattacks, Japan has carried out “public attribution,” which is for each country to publicly condemn or express concerns about groups conducting cyberattacks. Japan has publicly condemned North Korea's involvement behind the scenes on the WannaCry incident in 20177 as well as the long-running cyberattacks perpetrated by the China-based group APT10 in 2018. Furthermore, in July 2021, the Press Secretary of MOFA issued a statement on cyberattacks, assessing that a group known as APT40, which the Chinese government is behind, as well as a group known as Tick, which Unit 61419 of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is behind, were highly likely to have been involved in these cyberattacks, and firmly condemned these activities in coordination with Japan's ally and like-minded countries. In 2023, Japan, together with the U.S., released a joint cybersecurity advisory about cyberattacks by the cyberattack group known as BlackTech, which the Chinese government is behind. While it may be difficult to identify cyberattacks, analyzing attacks, ascertaining the entities behind the attacks, and making the information public can raise awareness of the threat, send out the message that activities by the states or criminal organizations behind the attacks have been acknowledged and will not be tolerated, and help to shape international standards. This is expected to be effective in raising the costs of future activities for cyberattackers.
With regard to capacity building support, in view of the borderless nature of cyberspace, enhancing the capacity of other countries and regions contributes to the security environment for the world as a whole, including Japan. From this perspective, relevant ministries and agencies, including MOFA, continue to provide support for capacity building and promote initiatives through international organizations, with a focus on ASEAN, which is positioned as a cornerstone for realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” based on the rule of law. Specifically, Japan conducts training, provides equipment at the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC), implements the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Country/Knowledge Co-Creation Program (KCCP), and contributes to the Cybersecurity Multi-Donor Trust Fund through the World Bank, among other initiatives.
International cooperation is of utmost importance in advancing these initiatives in cyberspace. To that end, Japan engages in cyber dialogues with many countries and regions, including consultations with the UK, the U.S., Jordan, India, France, NATO, EU, Australia, and among Japan-U.S.-ROK in 2023. Under the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership announced in May 2022 at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting, the four countries are cooperating on cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and capacity building support in the Indo-Pacific region, among other efforts. Japan also participates actively in discussions for the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, a multilateral framework hosted by the U.S. with the aim of addressing the rapidly growing threat of ransomware.8
Through these diplomatic efforts, Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of a free, fair and secure cyberspace.
- 5 At the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015, a report setting out 11 items on non-binding, voluntary norms for responsible state behavior was adopted.
- 6 See MOFA's website for Japan's position:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page3e_001114.html - 7 A malicious program that North Korea is believed to have been involved in. In May 2017, more than 300,000 computers in more than 150 countries were infected and ransom was demanded.
- 8 Cyberattacks carried out for ransom purposes.
(4) Maintaining and Developing the International Maritime Order
Japan is a country surrounded by the sea on all sides, and it is blessed with a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and long coastlines. It is a maritime nation that has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources. “Free and Open Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based on the rule of law including freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than force, are essential for the peace and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Based on this stance, the Government of Japan has stood united in promoting efforts to maintain and develop the international maritime order, in addition to securing Japan's national interests in its territorial waters, in accordance with the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy adopted in April. In cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, Japan is advancing efforts to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” and in particular, working to strengthen maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region where important sea lanes are located.
A Basic Stance
There is an increasing number of cases, particularly in Asia, of tension arising from friction between countries over issues surrounding the seas. In light of this, in 2014, Prime Minister Abe shared the view that it was necessary to fully uphold the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” (See 6(2) on page 257). At the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) convened in March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida reaffirmed the importance of the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” in his introduction to the new plan for FOIP. Based on these principles, Japan has been cooperating with other countries to work toward maintaining and developing the international maritime order (See Chapter 2, Section 1).
B United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Also known as the “Constitution for the Oceans,” UNCLOS is the very basis of maritime order governed by the rule of law. Japan regards maritime order with the Convention at the core as the cornerstone that safeguards Japan's maritime rights and interests while facilitating its maritime activities across the international community. As such, Japan actively contributes to discussions among concerned international organizations at conferences that include the Meetings of States Parties to the Convention, as well as to the sharing of ideas for achieving stability in the maritime legal order, in order to ensure that the convention will be even more widely applied and implemented appropriately (See 6(2) on page 257). At the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May, G7 leaders emphasized the universal and unified character of the UNCLOS.
C Response to Challenges to Japan's Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests (Situation Surrounding the East China Sea) (See Chapter 2, Section 2, 2(1) B(D))
In the East China Sea, China Coast Guard vessels intruded into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands in rapid succession in 2023, and the number of days China Coast Guard vessels navigated in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands reached a record high of 352 days in the year. Furthermore, there were repeated occurrences of China Coast Guard vessels intruding into the territorial sea and approaching Japanese fishing vessels, and the situation remains severe, with the number of hours of intrusion into the territorial sea hitting a record high of 80 hours and 36 minutes in April. Chinese military vessels and aircraft are also becoming increasingly active and expanding their operations, and China has been continuing with unilateral resource development in areas where the EEZ and the continental shelf are pending delimitation. Additionally, in recent years, Japan has found numerous research projects being conducted by China in the waters surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, without Japan's consent. In July 2023, Japan confirmed the presence of a buoy believed to have been installed by China in Japan's EEZ, on the Japan side of the geographical equidistance line between Japan and China in the East China Sea, and has been repeatedly calling on China since then to remove it immediately.

Given China's continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea, Japan will carefully monitor the trends and movements around its air and sea spaces, and continue to respond in a firm but calm manner while making claims that should be made. At the same time, it will promote cooperation with the relevant countries including the U.S. in order to achieve peace and stability in the East China Sea.
At the G7 Hiroshima Summit convened in May, G7 leaders stated that they remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas, and strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Furthermore, at the ASEAN Japan Summit and East Asia Summit (EAS) held in September, Prime Minister Kishida expressed strong opposition to the continuing and intensifying activities in the East China Sea that infringe upon Japan's sovereignty. At the Commemorative Summit for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation held in December, he reiterated serious concern over the continuing and intensifying activities in the East China Sea that infringe upon Japan's sovereignty, and stated that Japan will continue to cooperate with ASEAN to address the regional and international situation.
D Response to Challenges to the Maritime Order in the South China Sea (See Chapter 2, Section 2, 7(2))
In the South China Sea, China has been continuing and intensifying unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, which is against the rule of law and openness, attempts to make it faits accomplis, as well as actions that increase tensions in the region. These include further militarization of disputed features and coercive actions toward coastal states and others. The international community, including Japan, has expressed serious concerns over these actions. Japan strongly opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force as well as any actions to increase tensions in the South China Sea, and has consistently supported the full enforcement of the rule of law, while focusing on ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and ensuring the safety of sea lanes. Japan has also emphasized the importance of all the concerned parties related to the South China Sea to work toward peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, in particular the UNCLOS.

At the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May, G7 leaders stated that there is no legal basis for China's expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea and expressed opposition to China's militarization activities in the region. They further reaffirmed UNCLOS's important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. G7 leaders also reiterated that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings, and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. Furthermore, at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting held in May 2023, Prime Minister Kishida expressed opposition and serious concern about attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the Indo-Pacific, including the East and South China Seas, and the four leaders shared the view that they strongly oppose such attempts. At the ASEAN-Japan Summit and EAS in September, Prime Minister Kishida pointed out that militarization and coercive activities are continuing in the South China Sea, and that claims of maritime rights and activities in the sea should be conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. At the Commemorative Summit for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation held in December, he reiterated serious concern over the continuation of actions that increase tensions in the South China Sea, expressing that Japan will continue to cooperate with ASEAN to address the regional and international situation.
The issue with regard to the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and constitutes a legitimate concern of the international community. The issue is also an important matter of concern for Japan, which depends on marine transport for much of its resources and energy and which is a stakeholder that utilizes the South China Sea. Cooperation within the international community is of great importance in maintaining and developing “Free and Open Seas” based on the rule of law. From this perspective, Japan supports the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations9 in the South China Sea.
- 9 The U.S. Government explains its “Freedom of Navigation” operations as efforts to challenge excessive claims that can infringe freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right of lawful uses of the sea. One example of this is the navigation of the U.S. Navy's USS Benfold guided-missile destroyer through the waters around the Spratly Islands on September 8, 2021.
E Measures to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
Japan actively contributes to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and safe maritime transport through efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia and Africa as well as close partnership and cooperation with other countries.
(A) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which Japan took the initiative in formulating, entered into force in 2006. Since then, the Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) established in Singapore has been conducting information sharing on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and other regions, as well as cooperation to support capacity building. To date, Japan has been supporting the activities of ReCAAP-ISC by dispatching the Executive Directors (left office in March 2022) and Assistant Directors and making financial contributions. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), while the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the seas of Southeast Asia was 56 in 2021, 58 in 2022, and 67 in 2023, as a result of activities by ReCAAP-ISC and the contributions of the member states, the number of serious incidents, including kidnappings and assaults, has been suppressed in recent years.
(B) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
According to the IMB, the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, which is an important sea lane linking Asia and Europe, was 237 at its peak in 2011. It has since declined to a low level with zero or one attempted incident since 2019. However, in 2023, the first hijacking case since 2017 occurred in this region. Although this was a single case, IMB sounded the warning that this case signals the presence of entities in these areas of the ocean that have the capability to carry out acts of piracy.
Since 2009, Japan has been conducting counter-piracy operations by deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers (with coast guard officers on board) and P-3C patrol aircraft off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To solve the root causes of piracy in these areas, Japan has been making multilayered efforts that include support for enhancing the maritime security capabilities of Somalia and its neighboring countries and ensuring the stability of Somalia.
(C) Measures to Address Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea
According to IMB, the number of cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea increased slightly from 19 in 2022 to 22 in 2023, and it continues to be a sea area with the largest number of serious incidents in the world, resulting in multiple casualties. Strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities among coastal states remains a key issue. To that end, Japan provides capacity building assistance to the coastal states through training programs conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and JICA, and also works with the international community through participation in meetings of the “G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea,”10 among other efforts.
- 10 G7++FoGG comprises G7 countries, non-G7 countries and international organizations.
F International Cooperation on Capacity Building Assistance
Amid advancing globalization, the impact of technological innovation on the global security environment, rapid changes in the military balance, including China's growing militarization, and greater cross-border threats, no single country can protect its peace and security on its own. This is particularly true in the maritime field. Therefore, Japan is advancing efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities and maritime law enforcement capabilities, while providing capacity building assistance to various countries to support their maritime security and maritime law enforcement capabilities as well as engaging in international cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) with the aim of maintaining and developing international maritime order, in collaboration and cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries.
Japan has been utilizing Official Development Assistance (ODA) in these cooperative efforts. At the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in 2022, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan will make use of technical cooperation, training, and other means conducive to strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of at least 20 countries to promote efforts to train at least 800 maritime security personnel and strengthen their human resources network over a three-year period until 2025, including through sharing Japan's knowledge and experience on advanced technologies, such as satellites, artificial intelligence (AI) and unmanned aerial vehicles, with other countries. Additionally, he pledged to provide at least approximately 2 billion U.S. dollars in assistance, such as the provision of maritime security equipment including patrol vessels and development of maritime transportation infrastructure, to Indo-Pacific countries. He also stated that Japan will strengthen support to Indo-Pacific countries, utilizing the Quad and international organizations and so forth. In 2023, trainings were conducted in Japan and overseas for more than 600 officials of coast guard authorities and relevant agencies of 23 countries. Japan also decided to provide a large patrol vessel, which will be built at a Japanese shipyard, to the Indonesian Coast Guard Agency under the grant aid project, “The Project for Enhancement of Ability in Maritime Safety and Security.” Through its support toward the Maritime Law Enforcement Capacity Building Project implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), Japan also develops training courses and conducts training and workshops related to measures against illegal maritime activities in the target countries.
To provide capacity building assistance to coast guard authorities of coastal states of the Indo-Pacific, the Japan Coast Guard dispatches highly skilled Japan Coast Guard officials with expert knowledge as well as the Japan Coast Guard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT), a special team that provides foreign coast guard authorities with capacity building (including through the GMCP framework). The Japan Coast Guard also invites foreign coast guard officials to Japan to train them under the “Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program.” In addition, Japan provides capacity building support in areas, such as warship maintenance and diving medicine, to the militaries of the Indo-Pacific countries, and conducts training on board Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels for young naval officers of ASEAN member states.
Furthermore, Official Security Assistance (OSA), newly established in 2023, positions maritime security as one of the priority areas, and aims to strengthen security and deterrence capabilities by providing materials and equipment as well as assistance for infrastructure development to the armed forces and other related organizations of friendly countries. In 2023, Japan decided to provide the Philippines with coastal radar systems, Bangladesh with patrol boats, Malaysia with monitoring and surveillance equipment (such as rescue boats), and Fiji with patrol boats and other related equipment through OSA (See the Special Feature on page 219).
When providing such assistance, Japan coordinates with its ally and like-minded countries, aligning its assistance with the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)11 of the Quad, and sharing MDA information based on its memorandum of cooperation with each country.
- 11 A maritime domain awareness initiative designed to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters and counter illegal fishery in cooperation with regional partners. It was announced at the Quad Leaders' Meeting held in Tokyo in May 2022.

As Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, it is essential for Japan to drastically strengthen its own defense capabilities as well as enhance the security and deterrence capabilities of like-minded countries in order to prevent unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, ensure the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region in particular, and create a security environment desirable for Japan. From this perspective, in 2023, Japan established a new cooperation framework “Official Security Assistance (OSA),” apart from “Official Development Assistance (ODA)” which aims for the economic and social development of developing countries.
Under the OSA framework, Japan will provide equipment and supplies as well as assistance for the development of infrastructure for the benefit of the armed forces and related organizations of the countries. By enhancing their security and deterrence capabilities, OSA aims to deepen Japan's security cooperation with the countries, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to contribute to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. The policy for OSA is set out in the National Security Strategy approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022. On April 5, 2023, the Implementation Guidelines for Japan's OSA were decided and announced at the National Security Council.
An important premise behind OSA is to continue firmly maintaining Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation, and to respond to the security needs of recipient countries. For this reason, the Implementation Guidelines prescribe the following principles, among others: (1) Implemented within the framework of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines; (2) Implemented only in fields not directly relating to any international conflict; (3) Conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Based on these Implementation Guidelines, Japan will provide support toward activities that contribute to enhancing capabilities for ensuring peace, stability, and security based on the rule of law (monitoring and surveillance in territorial waters and airspace, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, etc.), humanitarian activities (disaster response, search and rescue, medical care, enhancing transportation capabilities for relief goods, etc.), and international peace cooperation operations (capacity building to participate in Peacekeeping operations (PKO), etc.).
When implementing OSA, from the perspective of ensuring its appropriateness and transparency, Japan will ensure the following: appropriate information disclosure, assessment and monitoring of the programme and disclosure of information on its results, proper management of the provided assistance including prohibition of extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. Furthermore, OSA will be implemented in close coordination with related organizations including the National Security Secretariat, and the Ministry of Defense.
In the first year of OSA implementation in FY2023 (as of December 31), Japan decided that assistance will be provided to the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Fiji, which play an important role in the peace and security of the region. Of these, the exchange of notes on projects for the Philippines and Malaysia was carried out in the presence of Prime Minister Kishida, President Marcos of the Philippines, and Prime Minister Anwar of Malaysia, respectively. Assistance to these four countries is aimed at contributing to enhancing surveillance capabilities in the field of maritime security, and specifically, involves the provision of coastal radar systems to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, patrol boats to Bangladeshi Navy, rescue boats and other relevant equipment to the Malaysian Armed Forces, and patrol boats and other relevant equipment to Fiji Navy. Going forward, MOFA will continue to work with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure that OSA achieves meaningful outcomes that contribute to its purposes.
(5) Outer Space
In June, Japan revised its Basic Plan on Space Policy for the first time in three years and formulated a new Space Security Initiative. The Space Security Initiative sets out specific challenges and policies in the field of space security, incorporates measures to be taken for space security during the next decade, and covers efforts to maintain the stable use of and free access to outer space jointly with Japan's ally and like-minded countries.
In recent years, outer space has become more congested due to its diversified use and an increasing number of countries using space. In addition, the increase of space debris due to factors such as anti-satellite (ASAT) tests poses a growing risk to the sustainable and stable use of outer space. In order to cope with this situation, Japan has been engaging in initiatives such as strengthening Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance for space systems. Japan has also been working on international rule-making and international space cooperation.
In May, Japan, as the G7 Presidency, incorporated the importance of addressing the issues of space debris and the commitment not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent ASAT missile testing into the G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué for the first time in a G7 communiqué.
A Realization of the Rule of Law in Outer Space
The international community has been vigorously discussing international rule-making concerning outer space activities in a variety of ways. Japan has also been actively involved in these efforts toward realizing the rule of law in outer space.
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a permanent committee established under the UN General Assembly, plays an important role in international rule-making related to civil space activities.
Apart from the Committee, which engages in comprehensive discussions, COPUOS has the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which conducts reviews on issues related to space activities from scientific and technical aspects, and the Legal Subcommittee, which discusses legal matters arising from space activities.
At the session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee convened in February, active discussions were held on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, in addition to individual themes, such as space debris and remote sensing.
At the session of the Legal Subcommittee convened in March, discussions were held on issues related to the definition of outer space and equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit, as well as on Space Traffic Management (STM) and space resources, which have been attracting more attention in recent years. In particular, with reference to space resources, intensive discussions were held on how international rules regarding space resources should be at the Working Group on Space Resources, newly established under the Legal Subcommittee in 2021 (chaired by Professor AOKI Setsuko of Keio University Law School).
With regard to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), established based on the resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” jointly proposed by Japan, the UK, and other countries in 2021, convened four sessions until September. Active discussions were held on the international laws applied to outer space, and the threats, responsible or irresponsible behaviors in outer space. However, the report was not adopted due to objection from one country. Separately, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established through a proposal by Russia in 2022, was held in Geneva in November. Furthermore, at the meeting of the UN's First Committee held in October, it was decided that an OEWG on “responsible behaviours” proposed by the UK would be convened from 2025 to 2026, and that another OEWG on PAROS proposed by Russia would be convened from 2024 to 2028.
In addition, with a view to contributing to the rule of law in outer space, Japan announced in 2021 that it would cooperate with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) on its “Space Law for New Space Actors” project and has since been offering support to emerging space-faring nations in the Asia Pacific region for the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws. In 2023, Japan provided legal capacity building support with a focus on the supervision as well as authorization and licensing of space activities. In June, in collaboration with 11 participating countries of the “National Space Legislation Initiative (NSLI)” of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), Japan compiled a joint report summarizing efforts of each country in developing and operating national space legislation , and submitted it to UN COPUOS to share the findings of each country.
B International Dialogues and Consultations on Outer Space
Japan promotes dialogues and consultations on outer space primarily with major space-faring nations and nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
In particular, in 2023, Japan held the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space for the first time in six years and the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue for the first time in four years in January, as well as the Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space for the first time in three years in March. In addition to information on the space policies of each side, they also exchanged views on a wide range of subjects, including security cooperation and inter-agency cooperation (See page 199, 2(2) D on relations with the U.S.).
As part of the efforts under the Quad (Japan- Australia-India-U.S.), Japan organized capacity building support (such as responding to extreme precipitation events) to third countries through workshops and other efforts, utilizing the working group on space established at the Quad Summit Meeting held in 2021. At the Quad Leaders' Meeting held in May 2023, the four leaders recognized the importance of space technologies and space-related applications in the fields of climate change, disasters and oceans.
With regard to multilateral meetings, the 29th session of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-29), co-organized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) of Indonesia, was held in September. At this Forum, discussions were held on expanding the space industry, promoting sustainable space activities for the future, and contributing to the resolution of social issues.
C International Space Exploration and the International Space Station (ISS)
The progress of space exploration and application for peaceful purposes is a common benefit for all humankind, and is also of diplomatic significance.
In 2019, Japan decided to participate in the Artemis Program, a U.S.-led international space exploration program. In 2020, with the Artemis Program in mind, eight countries, including Japan and the U.S., signed the Artemis Accords, which set out a political commitment to establish principles for creating a safe and transparent environment in promoting outer space activities. Thereafter, more countries signed the Artemis Accords, and the number of signatories increased to 33 countries as of the end of December 2023.
In April, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. signed the Exchange of Notes between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America for the Martian Moons eXploration (MMX) mission, which aims to bring back samples from a Martian moon to Earth.
Furthermore, in January, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. signed the Framework Agreement between Japan and the United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which is a new legal framework to further facilitate Japan-U.S. space cooperation, represented by the exploration and use of outer space. This Agreement entered into force in June (See the Special Feature on page 222).
Japan has been providing human resource development programs (robot programming, physics and plant experiments, etc.) to the Asia Pacific region through the Kibo-ABC Initiative12 established under the APRSAF, utilizing the Japanese Experiment Module “Kibo” on the ISS to support capacity building in the space field. In June, Japan conducted a protein crystal growth experiment in collaboration with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) onboard Kibo/ISS. Japan also provides emerging space-faring nations with the opportunity to deploy nanosatellites through the KiboCUBE program13, a collaborative framework implemented with the UNOOSA, and the open call for the 8th KiboCUBE was announced in June. Under this program, the Central American Integration System (SICA), Mexico and Tunisia are developing satellites for deployment.
- 12 Kibo-ABC (Asian Beneficial Collaboration through “Kibo” Utilization) initiative: An initiative aimed at promoting the use of the ISS/Japanese Experiment Module – Kibo in the Asia Pacific region, and the sharing of its values.
- 13 A program that provides selected organizations with the opportunity to deploy nanosatellites from the ISS/Japanese Experiment Module – Kibo, with the aim of contributing to improving space-related technologies in emerging space-faring nations.
Have you ever thought about traveling all the way to the Moon or Mars? Japan has been participating in the Artemis Program, a U.S.-led international lunar exploration program, and aims to realize the landing of a Japanese astronaut on the Moon by the late 2020s. Today, various countries are planning space exploration, including on the Moon. As such, we can say that the world has truly entered a new era of space exploration.
Japan plans to cooperate on many projects with the U.S., including on the development and operation of lunar exploration equipment and astronauts' lunar surface activities. We also expect that cooperation will be further expanded to include a wide range of areas, such as space science and earth observation. In this context, there was a growing need for a new legal framework to facilitate such cooperation even more swiftly and smoothly. To that end, negotiations commenced on the Framework Agreement between Japan and the United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.
This Agreement sets out the basic matters related to space cooperation to establish a framework that enables the implementation of individual cooperative activities by implementing agencies of Japan and the U.S., including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and other space-related agencies. For that purpose, during the negotiations for this Agreement, both sides diligently discussed the legal framework necessary for future Japan-U.S. space cooperation and norms for safe and sustainable space activities, looking ahead to scenarios in which Japanese and U.S. astronauts jointly conduct lunar exploration. Some examples include provisions on the jurisdiction over personnel in outer space when engaging in cooperation, and provisions related to planetary protection and mitigation of space debris. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, negotiations had to be conducted online for some time. Eventually, after multiple in-person negotiations while wearing masks, the negotiations culminated in a fruitful result.
On January 13, Foreign Minister Hayashi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed this Agreement in Washington, D.C. (U.S.). Prime Minister Kishida, who attended the signing ceremony, stated that he strongly expects this Agreement to vigorously promote Japan-U.S. space cooperation and expand areas of cooperation for the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is stronger than ever before.


This Agreement subsequently entered into force in June following the completion of domestic procedures within both Japan and the U.S. This Agreement is expected to further promote space cooperation between the two countries, including the Artemis Program. Furthermore, through their cooperation under this Agreement, Japan and the U.S. are expected to contribute to creating international rules on space activities by implementing safe and sustainable space activities.
D Addressing Global Issues through the Utilization of Space Technology
Amidst rising expectations of space technology's potential in resolving global issues in recent years, Japan has been promoting international cooperation based on the utilization of its internationally superior space technologies, and contributing toward the achievement of the SDGs.
For example, Japan provides, at no charge, the Global Satellite Mapping of Precipitation (GSMaP) system, which utilizes multiple satellites to observe the global rainfall situation. This system is applied to a wide range of uses, including rainfall situation monitoring, disaster management and agriculture, in 150 countries and regions around the world. Furthermore, Japan took the lead in launching “Sentinel Asia,” an initiative to provide free observational satellite information during disasters to contribute to disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region. To date, this project has responded to more than 430 emergency requests from 36 countries. Japan also holds workshops for those who are involved in disaster readiness and response, and contributes to capacity building in the utilization of satellite data during disasters in Asian countries.
In addition, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), in collaboration with JAXA, hosted 16 officials from space-related agencies of 12 countries in Japan from August to September for training to enhance their ability to utilize space technology to contribute to the SDGs. In September and October, JICA also started technical cooperation projects in Rwanda and Paraguay respectively, to improve the organizational and technological capacity of their space agencies (scheduled to last for two years each). In addition, JICA is promoting response to global issues through the use of space technologies in diverse fields, such as the use of satellite technology, under the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) initiative.
(6) Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
The international community is still experiencing regional and domestic conflicts as a result of various factors including differences in race, religion, and history, or due to the impact of poverty and disparity. In recent years, the protracted nature of these conflicts has particularly become a challenging problem. For this reason, in addition to post-conflict peacekeeping through the dispatch of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and other means, peacebuilding efforts that take into consideration building a foundation for development have become an important issue for preventing conflicts and their recurrence, as well as realizing post-conflict nation-building and sustaining peace.
In recent years, there have been concerns about the impact of conflicts, as well as new risks such as climate change and infectious diseases, on peace and stability, necessitating a more unified approach. As issues facing the international community become more complex and diverse, peacebuilding initiatives are becoming increasingly important, as signaled by UN Secretary-General Guterres' call to Member States to strengthen peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts in the “New Agenda for Peace” published in July 2023.
A On-the-Ground Initiatives
(A) UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)
As of December 31, 2023, 11 UN PKO missions are on active duty, primarily in the Middle East and Africa, to handle a wide range of duties that include monitoring cease-fires, promoting political processes, and protecting civilians. More than 80,000 military, police, and civilian personnel have been deployed to these missions. In response to the increasing complexity and scale of the mandates and the associated shortages of personnel, equipment, and financial resources, discussions on more effective and efficient implementation of UN PKO are underway in various fora including the UN.
In addition to PKO missions, the UN has also established Special Political Missions (SPMs) mainly consisting of civilian personnel. SPMs fulfill diverse roles including the peaceful settlement of disputes, post-conflict peacebuilding, and conflict prevention.
Based on the Act on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Act), Japan has dispatched more than 12,500 personnel to a total of 29 missions since 1992, including UN PKO missions. Most recently, since 2011, Japanese staff officers have been dispatched to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), while engineering units have been deployed there from 2012. The engineering units undertook such activities as developing infrastructure and providing water supplies to displaced persons, and concluded their activities in May 2017. As of December 31, 2023, four Self-Defense Forces of Japan (SDF) officers are on active duty at the UNMISS Headquarters, who continue to work toward peace and stability in the country. Additionally, since 2019, Japan has been conducting activities contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East by dispatching SDF officers to the Headquarters for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) stationed on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, where four SDF officers are on active duty as of December 31, 2023. Leveraging its own strengths, Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace cooperation in the future by means such as enhancing capacity building support and dispatching units and individuals.
(B) ODA and Other Cooperation to Facilitate Peacebuilding
In addressing conflicts and humanitarian crises, peacebuilding and preventing the recurrence of conflict even in peacetime, in addition to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, are important toward the realization of an inclusive society. With the number of refugees and displaced persons in the world exceeding 100 million people for the first time in 2022, there is a greater need than before to address the root causes of crises through assistance for self-reliant development by building resilient nations and stabilizing societies from a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan clearly set out the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP Nexus)”14 approach in its Development Cooperation Charter revised in June 2023. At the Second Global Refugee Forum (GRF) held in December, Foreign Minister Kamikawa expressed Japan's resolve to play a leadership role in advancing this approach while cooperating with the international community to address the unprecedented humanitarian crisis, including support for peacebuilding.
- 14 Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP Nexus): An approach that combines short-term “humanitarian aid” with the medium- to long-term efforts of “development cooperation” to support refugees in gaining independence and reducing the burden on host countries, as well as “peace initiatives” toward resolving and preventing conflicts, which are the root causes that create refugees.
a. Middle East
Japan has provided comprehensive support for peace and stability in the Middle East. This includes providing food and refugee assistance, as well as support for the development of human resources who can play an active role in nation-building. As for Palestine, in addition to an increase in the refugee population, it is also facing serious deterioration of the living environment, including the deteriorating refugee camp infrastructure as well as unemployment and poverty. Japan worked on improving the living environment of refugees through the implementation of the Camp Improvement Project (CIP) at refugee camps in Palestine, as well as by providing support to educational facilities, and contributed to the stabilization and improvement of the people's welfare based on human security.
b. Africa
At the Eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 8) in 2022, Japan presented its view of working with African countries to bring about a peaceful and stable Africa. Japan also expressed its intention to strongly support the promotion of the rule of law as well as Africa's own efforts for return to constitutional order and consolidated democracy, and announced the appointment of an Ambassador, Special Envoy for the “Horn of Africa”15. Under the New Approach for Peace and Stability in Africa (NAPSA) proposed at TICAD 7 in 2019, Japan, even after TICAD 8, has continued to respect Africa's ownership while providing support for African-led efforts toward peace and stability through consolidating democracy and promoting the rule of law, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and support toward strengthening the foundations of the community.
For example, Japan has conducted criminal justice training since 2014 for Francophone African countries, and has supported stabilization of the Sahel region by strengthening the capabilities of investigative and judicial bodies. Japan has also provided African countries with security equipment to improve their ability to maintain security against frequent terrorist attacks and transnational crimes, and provided support for landmine clearance.
In South Sudan, along with dispatching personnel to UNMISS Headquarters, in response to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)16 signed in 2018, Japan has been supporting the implementation of the agreement and cease-fire monitoring through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization in East Africa, as well as other organizations. Furthermore, Japan, in collaboration with the UNDP, has disbursed a total of 65 million U.S. dollars between 2008 and 2023 to Peacekeeping Training Centers located in 14 African countries, contributing to strengthening Africa's capacity for peacekeeping activities.
- 15 The “Horn of Africa” refers to the region on the northeastern part of the African continent that protrudes in the shape of a horn toward the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It encompasses the countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya.
- 16 As the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan signed in 2015 stalled as a result of clashes in July 2016, the parties involved entered into an agreement (R-ARCSS) once again on establishing an interim government, cease-fire measures, the holding of elections, and other efforts to resolve the conflict.
B Initiatives within the UN
Against the backdrop of the growing awareness within the international community of the need for peacebuilding efforts, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established based on UN Security Council resolution 1645 and a General Assembly resolution of 2005, as an advisory body to the UN Security Council and General Assembly, with the aim of providing consistent advice on assistance, from conflict resolution to recovery, reintegration and reconstruction. In addition to conducting discussions on the approach to peacebuilding in countries and regions, the PBC also engages in discussions on themes such as Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). In recent years, there have been increasing opportunities for the PBC to fulfill its advisory function to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
Japan has consistently served as a member of the Organizational Committee since the PBC's establishment, advocating the importance of investments in institution building and people from the viewpoint that it is necessary to adopt an approach based on the HDP Nexus, in order to realize resilient and sustainable peace.
Japan has contributed a total of 63.07 million U.S. dollars to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)17 as of December 31, 2023, and as a major donor country, also actively supports the execution of projects implemented by UN agencies in Africa and other regions.
Japan continues to address peacebuilding as one of its priorities during its two-year term on the UN Security Council starting from January 2023. It hosted an Open Debate on peacebuilding during its Presidency of the UN Security Council in January 2023, focusing not only on Ukraine, but also various challenges faced by the so-called “Global South.” The debate also emphasized the role of people in building and sustaining peace, and underscored the importance of strengthening the UN's functions through means such as utilization of the PBC by the UN Security Council. Representatives from 74 countries delivered statements at this Debate, and many countries supported Japan's views.
Furthermore, Japan has been engaging in efforts in the area of peacebuilding in cooperation with other members of the UN Security Council. For example, the ministerial-level Open Debate on peacebuilding during Switzerland's Presidency of the UN Security Council in May was attended by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs AKIMOTO Masatoshi, representing Japan. He stressed the importance of human security through investing in people, and also spoke about the role that the UN Security Council should play in regard to peacebuilding. In addition, Japan, Guyana, and Mozambique co-hosted a meeting in January 2024 based on the theme “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace through Comprehensive Approaches–Investment in People, including Empowerment of Women.” During this meeting, Japan actively communicated its position, bringing up the importance of investing in people, including the empowerment of women, in peacebuilding. In these ways, Japan has been stimulating discussions not only as a PBC member state, but also in UN fora as a member of the UN Security Council, in order to prompt in-depth sharing on the importance of peacebuilding efforts.
- 17 A fund established in October 2006 to provide support to regions, including Africa, for stopping the recurrence of regional conflicts and civil wars after they have ended as well as preventing conflicts. Specifically, the fund supports peace processes and political dialogues, economic revitalization, institution building for nations, and the participation by women and youth in nation-building, among other initiatives.
C Human Resource Development
(A) The Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development
Human resource development for highly skilled civilian experts with expertise presents a challenge in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding. Japan has been implementing a human resource development program in order to cultivate people who can play a leading role in the field. As of the end of 2023, more than 900 people have been trained. The participants who complete the program go on to play an active role in the field of peacebuilding and development in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, and have received high acclaim from different countries. Out of the 215 participants who have completed the training course (primary course) for entry-level human resources, 113 work in international organizations (as regular staff, as well as JPO, UN volunteers, and consultants). Hence, this program also contributes significantly to the career development of Japanese nationals, as well as the enhancement of their presence in international organizations in the fields of peacebuilding and development. In 2023, the primary course and a training course for mid-career professionals with experience in the fields of peacebuilding and development were conducted (See the Column on page 227).
I am KOJIMA Hideaki, a trainee in the Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through this program, I work as a UN Volunteer at the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Moldova.
Do you know of a country called Moldova? Located on the edge of Europe, Moldova has a history of always being at the mercy of its powerful neighbors, and even today, is known as the poorest country in Europe. Moldova currently hosts about 110,000 refugees who have fled from Ukraine, making up approximately 4% of its total population. Accepting such a large number of refugees is particularly difficult for this small country that is not endowed with abundant financial and human resources. UNHCR's mission is to protect refugees and resolve refugee issues under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and other agreements. It engages in a wide range of activities, including distributing cash and relief supplies, providing legal and physical protection to refugees who have fled to Moldova, and offering technical and material assistance to the government of Moldova.
When I first took up the position in Moldova as a member of the field team, I often visited the border between Moldova and Ukraine, the Refugee Accommodation Centres (RACs), local organizations providing assistance, and other places to conduct interviews on problems faced by refugees as well as their needs, and to provide necessary responses. Currently, I am working as a member of the inter-agency coordination team. In a refugee situation, various stakeholders are involved in humanitarian assistance, including government agencies, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and international/national NGOs. The role of the inter-agency coordination team is to take the lead together with the government of the host country to decide on a response plan for assistance activities, encourage all the relevant organizations to conduct their activities in line with this plan, and ensure that assistance is provided equitably to everyone in need without duplication. Within this team, I am responsible for the Local Refugee Coordination Forums set up in seven cities in Moldova. My job is to bridge between regional actors providing support to refugees with the country-level actors, such as facilitating collaboration among aid organizations in each region, identifying region-specific challenges, flagging the challenges to relevant agencies or the country-level refugee coordination structure, and to address these problems. As a member of UNHCR, I also led the inter-agency winterization taskforce to assess winter needs among people before the long and harsh winter in Moldova, and develop a winterization plan. This year, in addition to providing cash assistance, we are reinforcing infrastructure for the houses of economically vulnerable households and community facilities in rural cities.


Having experienced working here first-hand, I see every day how even UN agencies such as UNHCR are faced with many limitations in their activities. Nevertheless, it is a very rewarding job that gives me the opportunity to hear directly from refugees and host communities about difficulties they face, think about what solutions UNHCR can offer, and be involved in formulating policies to assist refugees. It has been my dream since high school to work in UNHCR to support refugees who have been denied their rights and threatened their safety. That is why I feel fortunate to have the chance to actually work in UNHCR today. Every day, I learn from my colleagues who have a wealth of experience from their previous missions in various humanitarian crises, and one day, I hope to become a humanitarian professional just like them.
(B) Training for Peacekeepers of Various Countries
Japan has been supporting peacekeepers from various countries participating in UN PKO to enhance their capabilities. Since 2015, in conjunction with cooperative efforts among the UN, supporting member states, and troop contributing countries, Japan has contributed financially to the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), a framework for innovative cooperation aimed at addressing the urgent need to improve the capabilities of PKO personnel by providing necessary training and equipment. Japan has also dispatched SDF personnel and other individuals as instructors. To date, Japan has conducted training on the operation of heavy engineering equipment for 312 personnel from eight African countries that expressed intentions to dispatch engineering units to UN PKO. In 2018, the TPP was extended to include Asia and the surrounding regions, and Japan conducted training in Viet Nam and Indonesia. Since October 2019, Japan has also started a lifesaving training program in the medical field, a considerably problematic area for UN PKO, while support for the introduction of telemedicine into UN PKO missions was launched from 2021. In 2023, Japan dispatched one SDF medical officer to the UN Field Medical Assistants Course (UNFMAC) held in Uganda in July. Japan has dispatched as many as 317 SDF personnel and other individuals as instructors for the operation of heavy engineering equipment and in the field of medicine. Furthermore, Japan decided in 2023 to contribute approximately 8.5 million U.S. dollars to expand the TPP and conduct training for personnel dispatched for peace support activities led by the African Union (AU). Other than TPP, Japan dispatches instructors and other personnel, as well as providing financial assistance, to Peacekeeping Training Centers in Asia and Africa.
(7) Initiatives to Combat Security Threats
Ensuring public security and protecting the lives of the people are the premise of various socioeconomic activities and the basic responsibilities of a country. To cope effectively with security threats such as international terrorism and organized crime, which are rapidly becoming more complex and severe in tandem with social changes such as the advancement of science and technology and the spread of COVID-19, it is vital for the international community to cooperate as a whole.
A Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Since the end of 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased people's reliance on information and communications technology. It has also had a major impact on the environment surrounding terrorism. Terrorists continue to carry out their terrorist activities in Asia and other parts of the world while adapting to the new social circumstances that have resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the weakening of governance as well as social divisions brought about by the manifestation of poverty and racial and ethnic issues. Furthermore, the spread of extremism or recruiting through the Internet and social media, as well as the tendency of acquiring funding for terrorism by using crypto-assets and other means, have become more conspicuous. In October 2023, Japan, as the G7 Presidency, hosted the G7 Roma-Lyon Group Meeting18 in Tokyo. In conjunction with this meeting, Japan invited the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT)19 to attend, with a view to deepening discussions on countering online terrorism, including measures to address terrorist contents.
Based on the “G7 Action Plan on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism” compiled at the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016, Japan has to date implemented the following actions: (1) measures to enhance counter-terrorism capacity, which include promoting the utilization of Interpol databases and measures against the funding of terrorism, (2) education and promotion of moderation in communities through dialogues and other means, in order to prevent violent extremism, which is a root cause of terrorism, and (3) support for capacity building of law enforcement agencies, including measures to support rehabilitation in prisons. In addition to these efforts, Japan, in order to steadily promote measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism mainly in Southeast Asia, has been implementing projects with various organizations including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), among others, by using their advantages and expertise respectively.
As an initiative that Japan has carried out continuously for the past 20 years, Japan has also run an exchange program inviting Islamic school teachers from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines and providing opportunities to experience interfaith dialogue, intercultural exchanges, and visit educational sites in Japan. While this was suspended in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the program was resumed in 2022. Japan will continue to implement the program going forward, in order to help promote moderation and the creation of more tolerant societies that are receptive to different values.
Through bilateral and trilateral counter-terrorism consultations and the Quad (Japan-Australia-India-U.S.) Counter-Terrorism Working Group, among other initiatives, Japan also exchanges information on terrorism situations and affirms the strengthening of partnerships, while developing practical cooperation with other countries.
Based on the view that information gathering is critical for countering terrorism, the Government of Japan established the Counter Terrorism Unit - Japan (CTU-J) in December 2015 and has been making concerted efforts to gather information with the Prime Minister's Office serving as the control tower. To fulfill the critical responsibility of securing the safety of Japanese nationals overseas, Japan will continue to further enhance its information gathering through the CTU-J and take all possible measures to counter terrorism to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas.
- 18 A framework to facilitate discussions among G7 experts on how to respond to priority issues in efforts to counter international terrorism and international organized crime. It provides opportunities for reaching a common position within the G7. Results of discussions are fed back into G7 leaders and ministerial meetings.
- 19 A private-sector forum established by IT companies for the purpose of jointly preventing the spread of terrorism and violent extremism on the Internet.
B Criminal Justice Initiatives
The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (“Congress”) (both of which have their secretariats under UNODC) are in charge of shaping policy on crime prevention and criminal justice in the international community. In March 2021, the 14th Congress (“Kyoto Congress”) was convened in Kyoto. In accordance with the overall theme, “Advancing crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law: toward the achievement of the 2030 Agenda,” the political declaration (“Kyoto Declaration”), summarizing the matters that should be addressed over the medium- to long-term by the international community in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice, was adopted. Since then, in cooperation with UNODC and other organizations, Japan has been demonstrating its leadership in advancing such initiatives as; (1) regularly convening the Criminal Justice Forum for Asia and the Pacific as a platform for information sharing and exchanges of opinions between practitioners in the field of criminal justice in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) regularly holding the Global Youth Forum for a Culture of Lawfulness, with the aim of facilitating independent discussions among youths, and incorporating their views into policies; (3) working toward the formulation of UN model strategies to promote efforts by the international community to reduce reoffending. In addition, Japan proactively engages in following up on the Kyoto Declaration through efforts such as supporting theme-based discussions on the Kyoto Declaration conducted by UNODC.
At the session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice convened in May 2023, Japan submitted a draft resolution to continue following up on the Kyoto Declaration, and this resolution was adopted unanimously. As a result, the outcomes of the Kyoto Congress will be carried on to the 15th Congress (hosted by United Arab Emirates) in 2026 (See the Column on page 229).
Furthermore, Japan provides support to improve prosecution capabilities and other criminal justice functions, to improve the operation of prisons, and to enhance capacities related to measures against cybercrime in Southeast Asian countries, by providing financial contributions to UNODC and Interpol, as well as contributions through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).
Through the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI)20, training on offender treatment, crime prevention, and anti-crime measures are conducted in Japan, contributing to the capacity building of criminal justice officers and other relevant personnel from various countries.
Japan is a State Party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which establishes a global legal framework for promoting cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime including terrorism more effectively. Japan advances international cooperation that includes providing international assistance in investigations in accordance with the UNTOC and reviewing the implementation of the Convention.
- 20 A regional UN research institute established in 1962 based on an agreement between the Government of Japan and the UN. Located in Akishima City, Tokyo, it is operated by the Ministry of Justice, and continuously implements training courses in the field of criminal justice for participants invited from overseas.
“Rapporteur, please explain the draft report.”

It is 1:30 a.m. at night on Saturday, May 27, on a podium at the 32nd session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). As the Rapporteur who was prompted by the Chair, I turned on the microphone and started speaking.
●Who is the Rapporteur (Reporter)?
A Rapporteur is a person who compiles and reports on the contents and results of the discussions at a conference. In my case, I was assigned to summarize in a report the discussions at the 32nd session of the CCPCJ, held over a week from Monday, May 22 to Friday, May 26. Usually, a Rapporteur explains a report at a meeting held on Friday afternoon, and the report becomes official after it has been adopted unanimously.
●Run, Rapporteur!
The main themes for the week were “enhancing the functioning of the criminal justice system to ensure access to justice” and the “implementation status of the Kyoto Declaration, which is the outcome document of the Kyoto Congress.”1 My job was to summarize the views presented by the participating countries on these themes. As the Rapporteur, I had to compile the report by Friday, so I prepared the draft with the help of the CCPCJ Secretariat. A Rapporteur is only an official of this meeting, or in other words, an official of the UN that is separate from my position as an official of the Government of Japan. At the same time, I was also a member of the delegation from the Government of Japan attending this meeting. Therefore, I was fulfilling two roles at the same time: drafting a report in my role as a UN official, while participating in negotiations on the resolution, supporting officials who were visiting from Tokyo, and preparing for the side events hosted by Japan as a member of the government delegation from Japan. I was constantly busy and running around. Even the diplomats from other countries remarked, “You're everywhere, just like a ninja.” For example, I received a call from the Secretariat asking, “Where are you, Jun? We want to discuss how to write the report.” Then, the ninja hurried off to meet with the Secretariat. Once the discussion ended, the ninja returned to providing support on the ground as a member of the Japanese delegation. After that, the Secretariat called me again. Simply put, I was always running throughout this one-week period.
When preparing the report, I encountered the difficult problem of how to incorporate statements made by a certain country that seemed to be critical of other countries, even if the countries targeted were not explicitly named. Since it is a fact that the statements had been made, not including them in the report would lead to opposition from that country. On the other hand, the countries that had been criticized would also not remain silent if these statements were incorporated. Therefore, I referred to the writing style of past reports and used as moderate wording as possible.
The draft report was shared with the participating countries on Thursday afternoon so that they could review it. Then, on the night of the same day, I received queries asking, “Jun, what is the meaning of this?” from the representing officials of the countries that had been criticized in the statements made by the abovementioned country. I hurried off again, meeting the representative officials from these countries individually, explaining the contents to them, and seeking their understanding.
Friday finally came. This time, however, negotiations on the resolution hit a deadlock, and it became impossible to tell when the negotiations would reach their conclusion. As the resolution forms a part of the report, the report could not be adopted until the resolution was finalized. When the resolution was eventually finalized, it was past midnight. Thus, after the chaos settled, I finally made it to the podium at 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, May 27.
●Toward the adoption of the report
“Does anyone have comments on the draft report explained by the Rapporteur?” the Chair asked the attendees. His question was followed by a comfortable silence. To my surprise, not even one country asked to speak! The sound of the Chair pounding his gavel echoed across the room, and the draft report was successfully adopted as the official report at about 2:00 a.m. on Saturday. After the conference, I heard from the Secretariat that it was the first time in CCPCJ's history, spanning more than 30 years, that the report had been adopted without a single amendment. Both the Chair and the Secretariat were pleased, and the participating countries also expressed their appreciation. I may have worked steadily and earnestly, just like a “ninja” who never stood out, but everyone had witnessed my hard work and efforts. I hope that my work as a Rapporteur contributed to boosting Japan's presence in the international community.
- 1 The United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (typically referred to as “the Congress”). Convened once every five years, it is the largest UN conference covering the field of crime. The 14th Congress held in March 2021 was hosted by Japan, and took place at the Kyoto International Conference Center in Kyoto City.
C Anti-corruption Measures
There is growing global interest in addressing corruption, which has been pointed out as a factor that threatens sustainable development and the rule of law. Against this backdrop, Japan, as a State Party to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which sets out provisions for international cooperation and measures to address corruption such as bribery and embezzlement of property by public officials, actively participates in discussions for the effective implementation of the UNCAC and the strengthening of international cooperation on preventing and combating corruption. In September, under the UNCAC review mechanism (mutual reviews conducted among the State Parties), an executive summary was published on the results of a country review conducted on Japan's implementation of the UNCAC regarding the provisions for criminalization and law enforcement (Chapter III) and international cooperation (Chapter IV). Japan also participates actively in the activities of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and has contributed to formulating high-level principles in areas related to anti-corruption, including strengthening international cooperation on law enforcement and promoting integrity among authorities that are responsible for preventing corruption. In August 2023, Japan attended the ministerial meeting held for the second time since the establishment of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. After discussions on strengthening the international anti-corruption framework, the G20 Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting Outcome Document and Chair's Summary were adopted. In addition, Japan conducts the International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption in Japan through the UNAFEI.
Japan is an active participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which verifies the implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions by each state party to prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.
D Measures to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism
Regarding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international framework that establishes the international standards that countries should implement and conducts peer reviews to assess levels of implementation. In recent years, the FATF has also been engaged in initiatives to prevent financing for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has issued the FATF statement that calls for the eradication of illegal financial activities by North Korea.
As a founding member, Japan has actively participated in these discussions. The Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report of Japan was adopted at the FATF Plenary held in June 2021, and was published at the end of August the same year. Japan is steadily making preparations and implementing measures to address the points for improvement raised in this Report.
In addition, Japan takes measures to counter the financing of terrorism as a State Party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and also implements its own response measures to freeze the assets of terrorists and terrorist entities in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1373,21 and designations by the UN Security Council Taliban Sanctions Committee and the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. In light of the terror attacks against Israel by Hamas and others on October 7, 2023, Japan designated nine individuals and one entity related to Hamas as subjects for asset freezing and other measures on October 31, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1373. After that, it additionally designated three individuals related to Hamas on December 26. As of December 31, 2023, Japan has implemented asset freezing measures on 410 individuals and 120 entities in total.
- 21 Adopted by the UN Security Council in September 2001 after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in the same year. It calls for UN Member States to take comprehensive measures against those who undertake acts of terrorism and those who have involvement with such actors, such as by freezing their assets.
E Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants
To effectively combat increasingly sophisticated and obscure trafficking in persons, Japan has strengthened its domestic system in accordance with its “2022 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons,” while proactively providing assistance to developing countries. For example, in 2023, Japan continued to conduct training programs through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to deepen mutual understanding on human trafficking countermeasures (especially prevention, victim protection and support to restore the financial independence of victims) of stakeholders in Asian countries, including Japan, and to promote more effective regional cooperation. Furthermore, Japan has been implementing a technical cooperation project with the Government of Thailand via JICA since January 2022, and in August 2023, held a workshop on human trafficking countermeasures to strengthen networks among those involved in such countermeasures in the Mekong region. Japan has been engaged in technical cooperation with the government of Cambodia through JICA, aimed at enhancing the capacity of the relevant organizations to support victims of human trafficking. With respect to cooperation with international organizations, in 2023, through funding to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Japan continued to provide assistance for the safe repatriation of foreign victims of trafficking in persons protected in Japan, and to carry out social reintegration assistance programs to prevent the recurrence of trafficking after they return to their countries. Japan also provided support to strengthen response capabilities, including training programs for law enforcement authorities, by funding projects organized by UNODC in Southeast Asia.
As a State Party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Japan has also further deepened its cooperation with other countries with a view to combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants (See the Column on page 232).
Myanmar is a country in Asia, like Japan is. While the majority of its people are said to be Buddhists, many Japanese people may not be familiar with the country. On the other hand, in its neighboring country of Thailand, another Southeast Asian country, there is a large number of Japanese people, and it is visited by millions of tourists worldwide.
Since the military coup d'état in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, the number of evacuees, including children, from Myanmar to Thailand is increasing rapidly near the border. This situation has become a humanitarian and social issue. Just in June 2022, the number of people from Myanmar who entered Tak Province in northern Thailand irregularly was estimated at 10,500 (according to a survey conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)). Of these, more than 2,000 new arrivals to Thailand were children of schooling age who have been deprived of school education for years. A rise in the number of children who are unable to attend school poses a significant risk of human trafficking, child labor, and exploitation. Girls, in particular, are at greater risk of falling prey to sexual exploitation outside schools. The Migrant Educational Coordination Centre (MECC) under the Ministry of Education of Thailand is working hard to coordinate with 64 Migrant Learning Centres (MLCs) to manage the education of more than 10,000 children in Tak Province. However, its financial resources are extremely limited.
Since its establishment, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been promoting international cooperation in the fields of education, sciences, culture, and communication, as well as in projects to support developing countries. In these areas of work, it also addresses the personnel and institutional aspects of crisis preparedness, rescue and relief, recovery, and reconstruction. Particularly in the field of education, it provides support to enable access to quality education with the aim of building a foundation for sustainable recovery and long-term development.


In light of the deteriorating situation at the Thai-Myanmar border, UNESCO, with support from the Government of Japan, has launched an emergency educational and humanitarian support project in Tak Province to provide displaced children with a safe space and access to learning. From the perspective of the UN's humanitarian-development-peace cooperation (HDP nexus), this project is strengthening the links between humanitarian action, development, and peace by promoting social cohesion (promoting equality, justice, tolerance, respect, and diversity through education), building social resilience, promoting dialogue, and strengthening ownership of the region. Specifically, various forms of support are provided, including ensuring continued learning for approximately 3,000 migrant children and providing food assistance and hygiene management, providing ICT equipment and Internet services to enable access to online learning programs, developing quality video courses for main subjects that are in line with the basic educational curriculum prescribed by the Ministry of Education of Myanmar, and offering Thai language classes so that migrant children and youths can transfer from MLCs to schools in Thailand. Support is also provided to about 100 teachers, including the provision of opportunities to learn about sociability and emotions. More than double the number of students is enrolled in the target MLCs, so the ability to access online learning programs from remote locations means that more children who require assistance can benefit from the renovation of MLCs and such online learning programs. Through this project, migrants and socially vulnerable children are given safe, appropriate, and inclusive opportunities to continue learning, alongside improving their physical and mental health, and reducing learning loss. In this way, it is expected that the project will promote peace at the Thai-Myanmar border. Even after the conclusion of the project, we also plan to build partnerships with other UN agencies, government organizations, foundations, Japanese corporations, NGOs, and other entities, so that continued support can be provided to the children.
F Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking
In cooperation with UNODC, Japan is contributing to investigations and development of analytical information for interdiction of the production, manufacturing, and trafficking of precursor chemicals and newly emerged synthetic drugs, and the maintenance and enhancement of cooperative networks. Alongside strengthening practical capabilities for cross-border drug control, providing support for the production of alternative crops to reduce illicit cultivation of plant materials for drug, and preparing information for regulation of the controlled substances, Japan is also working to take measures against the global proliferation of illicit drugs while giving consideration to region-specific development challenges in the area of drug control.