3 Korean Peninsula

(1) North Korea (including the abductions issue)

The Government of Japan has been taking various initiatives based on its basic policy of seeking to normalize its relations with North Korea through comprehensively resolving outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, as well as settlement of the unfortunate past in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of September 2002. In 2023, North Korea repeatedly conducted launches of ballistic missiles and others, including five intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles and a launch using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of satellite launch. This series of actions by North Korea constitutes a grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security and poses a clear and serious challenge to the region and the international community, and are totally unacceptable. Japan will continue to ensure the full implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions by the international community and seek the complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs while also cooperating with the international community, including the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The abductions issue is a humanitarian and time sensitive-issue with no time to spare. Japan continues to call on North Korea to implement the May 2014 Japan-North Korea agreement (the agreement in Stockholm)⁷ and will continue to make the utmost efforts to realize the return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, while working closely with the international community, including the U.S. and the ROK.

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• 7 In May 2014, Japan-North Korea Intergovernmental Consultations were held in Stockholm, Sweden. North Korea promised to conduct a comprehensive and full-scale investigation on all Japanese nationals, including abductees.

A North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues

(A) Recent Trends in North Korea Nuclear and Missile Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, in accordance with the series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

The Sixth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) was held at the end of December 2022, and it was reported that North Korean President of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un announced a work plan for 2023 and mentioned“the mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons” and “an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal.“ In February 2023, a military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army was held and it was reported that a “tactical missile column,” a “long-range cruise missile column,” a “tactical nuclear-armed unit” and an “intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) column” were presented. The Ninth Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly that was held in September where a constitutional amendment was adopted clearly stating that North Korea “develops highly nuclear weapons,” and President Kim was reported to have stated that, given “the present situation, in which the structure of the ‘new Cold War' is being materialized on a global scale” “by the reactionary imperialist forces,” “we must neither change nor concede the present position of our country as a nuclear weapon state, but, on the contrary, continue to further strengthen the nuclear force.”

In 2023, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 18 times (at least 25 launches). A ballistic missile was launched on January 1st, and on February 18 an ICBM-class ballistic missile is estimated to have fallen within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), approximately 200 kilometers west of Oshima-Oshima Island, Hokkaido. North Korea subsequently launched a ballistic missile on February 20, an ICBM-class ballistic missile which it announced as the “Hwasong-17” on March 16, and ballistic missiles on March 19 and March 27. On April 13, it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile that appears to use a new type of solid-fuel propulsion system and which was reported to have been the “first test launch” of the “Hwasong-18.”

On May 29, North Korea notified that it would launch a satellite between May 31 and June 11, and on May 31 North Korea conducted a launch using ballistic missile technology. On the same day, it was announced that the “Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite” had been launched and that it “lost propulsion and crashed.”

On June 15, two ballistic missiles were launched, and both were estimated to have fallen within Japan's EEZ, approximately 250 kilometers north-northwest of Hegura Island, Ishikawa Prefecture. On July 12, it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile once again which it announced as “Hwasong-18,” and ballistic missiles were also launched on July 19 and July 24.

On August 22, North Korea notified that it would launch a satellite between August 24 and August 31. On August 24 it conducted a “launch of the “Malligyong-1” military reconnaissance satellite” using ballistic missile technology, flying over the Japanese archipelago, but on the same day it was announced that the launch “failed due to an error in the emergency blasting system during the third-stage flight.” Ballistic missiles were also launched on August 30 and September 13.

On November 21, North Korea notified that it would launch a satellite between November 22 and December 1, but carried out the launch on November 21 using ballistic missile technology, and on November 22, the following day, announced that they had “accurately placed reconnaissance satellite ‘Malligyong-1' into orbit.”

North Korea also launched a ballistic missile on December 17, and the following day, on December 18, it launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile which it announced as the “Hwasong-18.”

Faced with these series of violations of Security Council resolutions, Japan, as a member of the Security Council, has been diligently working to take a resolute action at the Security Council in cooperation with the U.S. and other countries, but the Security Council has not been able to take a unified action due to the reluctance of some countries.

Under these circumstances, Japan has been working together with like-minded countries in encounraging relevant countries to enhance the effective implementation of sanctions based on existing Security Council resolutions.

On March 17, September 1, and December 1, the Government of Japan took further measures against North Korea, additionally designating a total of 7 entities and 12 individuals involved in North Korea's nuclear and missile development as being subject to asset freezes and other measures (as a result, a total of 144 entities and 133 individuals were designated as of the end of December 2023).

With regard to North Korea's nuclear activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report in August stated that further activity had been observed at the Adit 3 tunnel in the nuclear test site near Punggye-ri, and pointed out that several buildings had been constructed, including in the test site support area. On December 21, the IAEA Director General also pointed out that North Korea's light water reactor at Yongbyon had been shown to have reached criticality.

(B) Initiatives by Japan and Cooperation with the International Community

The repeated launches of ballistic missiles and others by North Korea are serious challenges not only to Japan, but also to the international community, and are totally unacceptable. It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner by North Korea. Japan has confirmed these points at meetings with the leaders and foreign ministers of various countries. On March 19, July 13, and December 19, G7 Foreign Ministers' Statements on the launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by North Korea were released, and on August 24 and November 22, G7 Foreign Ministers' Statements on the launch using ballistic missile technology by North Korea were released.

In addition, recognizing that the collaboration among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK is essential for regional peace and stability beyond issues related to North Korea, Japan, the U.S., and the ROK have been enhancing collaboration at multiple levels, through holding meetings among leaders, Foreign Ministers, Vice-Ministers, and Special Representatives to the Six-Party Talks. At the leaders' level, an exchange of views among Japan-U.S.-ROK leaders was held on May 21 on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, and subsequently on August 18, the first-ever stand-alone Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting was held at Camp David in the U.S. (See the Special Feature on page 37). Furthermore, an informal talk among Japan-U.S.-ROK leaders was held on November on the occasion of the APEC Leaders' Meeting in San Francisco, U.S. At the foreign ministerial level, Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meetings were held on February 18 in Munich, Germany on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference, and on July 14 in Jakarta, Indonesia on the occasion of the ASEAN-related Foreign Ministers' Meetings. In both meetings, North Korea's launches of an ICBM-class ballistic missile were strongly condemned and a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement was released after the July meeting. On September 22, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' informal talk was held in New York, U.S. on the occasion of the UN General Assembly, and on November 14, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in San Francisco, U.S. on the occasion of the APEC Ministerial Meeting. At the vice-ministerial level as well, a Japan-U.S.-ROK vice foreign ministerial meeting was held on February 13 in Washington, D.C. , U.S., and after the meeting a joint statement was released. In addition, at the level of the Special Representatives to the Six-Party Talks, trilateral meetings among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK were held in Seoul, ROK on April 7, in Karuizawa, Japan on July 20, and in Jakarta, Indonesia on October 17, and a Japan-U.S.-ROK joint statement was released after the talks in April.

As part of the Japan Coast Guard's patrolling activities and the Self-Defense Forces' surveillance operations, Japan has been conducting information gathering on the activities of vessels suspected to be violating the UN Security Council resolutions. When the Government of Japan finds activities strongly suspected to be violating the UN Security Council resolutions, including ship-to-ship transfers⁸ with North Korean vessels, measures have been taken, such as notification to the UN Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee and other bodies, sharing of information with related countries, and releasing of information to the public. Aircraft of Australia, Canada, and France, in addition to U.S. aircraft, have, based on the UN Status of Forces Agreement, used U.S. military facilities and areas in Japan to engage in surveillance operations against illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers. Furthermore, monitoring and surveillance activities were conducted in the waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea, by naval vessels such as multiple vessels of the U.S. Navy, the UK Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey, the French Navy frigate Prairial, the Royal Canadian Navy frigates HMCS Montréal and HMCS Vancouver, and the Royal Australian Navy frigates HMAS Anzac and HMAS Toowoomba. From the perspective of further deepening the multinational cooperation, Japan considers it significant that concerned countries are sharing information and coordinating efforts to ensure that UN Security Council resolutions are implemented fully and effectively.

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• 8 In this context, “ship-to-ship transfers” refers to the transfers to or from North Korea-flagged vessels of any goods or items at sea, which UN Security Council resolution 2375 (adopted in September 2017) prohibits the UN member states from facilitating or engaging in.

B The Abductions Issue and Japan-North Korea Relations

(A) Basic Position on the Abductions Issue

To date, the Government of Japan has identified 12 separate incidents, involving a total of 17 Japanese abductees, 12 of whom have not yet returned home. North Korea claims that 8 of these 12 abductees have died and that it is unable to confirm that the other 4 ever entered its territory, but as no convincing explanation of this claim has been provided, Japan continues to work toward the resolution of this issue on the assumption that all of the abductees whose whereabouts are unknown are still alive. As well as being a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens, abductions by North Korea constitute a universal issue among the international community as a violation of basic human rights. In addition, the abductions issue is a humanitarian issue with a time constraint. With not just the abductees themselves, but also their families having reached an advanced age, Japan continues to work toward the resolution of this issue with a determination to “never give up.” Based on the basic recognition that the normalization of its relations with North Korea is impossible without resolving the abductions issue, Japan has positioned its resolution as the most important issue. Accordingly, Japan has strongly urged North Korea to provide a full account of all the abduction cases, to hand over the perpetrators to Japan, and to ensure the safety of all abductees and their immediate return to Japan, irrespective of whether the abductees are officially identified. In January 2024, Prime Minister Kishida gave a policy speech where he stated: “ With the aging of the families of abductees, the abductions issue, which is a top priority for my administration, is a humanitarian and time sensitive issue with no time to spare. North Korea's nuclear and missile development is totally unacceptable. I would like to pursue high-level talks under my direct supervision toward holding a summit meeting with President Kim Jong-un, in order to realize the return of all abductees at the earliest possible date and thereby bring the relations between Japan and North Korea to new heights, as well as to resolve the outstanding issues of concern in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”

(B) Initiatives by Japan

Following the nuclear test by North Korea in January 2016 and the launch of the ballistic missile in the following month, which North Korea purported to be a “satellite,” Japan announced its autonomous measures against North Korea in February 2016. In response, North Korea unilaterally announced that it would completely stop the investigations on all Japanese abductees and dissolve the Special Investigation Committee. Japan lodged a serious protest against North Korea, conveyed its intention of not abandoning the agreement in Stockholm, and strongly demanded that North Korea implement the agreement and return all the abductees home at the earliest possible date.

(C) Japan-North Korea Relations

During the reception of the PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games Opening Ceremony in February 2018, Prime Minister Abe brought up the abductions, nuclear and missile issues and conveyed Japan's basic position to Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea. Prime Minister Abe strongly urged North Korea to resolve the abductions issue, especially the return of all abductees to Japan. In September, Foreign Minister Kono held a meeting with the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Yong Ho at the UN headquarters. In September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida addressed the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, declaring: “I would like to hold high-level talks under my direct supervision to realize a summit meeting at an early time” with President Kim.

(D) Cooperation with the International Community

In order to resolve the abductions issue, it is essential for Japan not only to proactively urge North Korea, but also to gain understanding and support from other countries regarding the importance of resolving the abductions issue. Japan has taken all possible diplomatic opportunities to raise the abductions issue, including at summit meetings, foreign ministers' meetings and international conferences such as the G7 Summit. At the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May, Japan confirmed with G7 leaders that they would continue to closely work together in dealing with North Korea, including on the abductions issue. Additionally, at the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting on August 18, President Joseph Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol reaffirmed their support for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and the Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Leaders' Statement released after the meeting also reaffirmed their commitment to the immediate resolution of the abductees issue.

With regard to the U.S., President Donald Trump raised the abductions issue with President Kim at the U.S.-North Korea Summit in June 2018, at the request of Prime Minister Abe. At the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in February 2019, President Trump raised the abductions issue with President Kim at the tête-à-tête meeting, which was held first on the first day, and clearly stated Prime Minister Abe's views regarding the abductions issue. Furthermore, at the small group dinner that followed, President Trump again raised the abductions issue, and a serious discussion was held between the leaders. During his visit to Japan in May 2022, President Biden met with the family members of the abductees, listened carefully and earnestly to the families' sentiments and their requests for U.S. support in resolving the abductions issue as soon as possible, and encouraged them. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings on January 13 and May 18, 2023, Prime Minister Kishida asked for continued understanding and cooperation toward the resolution of the abductions issue, to which President Biden offered his full support. At the joint press conference following the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in August 2023, President Biden mentioned his meeting with the family members of the abductees and expressed the commitment to work together to see the return of all who have been abducted.

With regard to China, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting in June 2019, President Xi Jinping stated that he had conveyed Japan's position on Japan-North Korea relations and Prime Minister Abe's views to President Kim during the China-North Korea Summit held in the same month. Prime Minister Abe also gained the strong support of President Xi for the improvement of Japan-North Korea relations, including the abductions issue. At the Japan-China Summit Meeting on November 16, 2023, Prime Minister Kishida and President Xi discussed international affairs, such as North Korea, including the abductions issue, and confirmed that they would maintain close communication on those issues.

The ROK has also raised the abductions issue with North Korea at multiple opportunities, including the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting in December 2019, President Moon Jae-in of the ROK expressed his understanding for Japan's position regarding the importance of the abductions issue and stated that the ROK had repeatedly raised the abductions issue with North Korea. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings held on March 16 and May 7, 2023, President Yoon reiterated his support for Japan regarding the abductions issue, and at the Japan-ROK Summit Meetings held on July 12 and November 16, the two leaders confirmed that they would work closely with each other in dealing with North Korea including the abductions issue.

At the UN Human Rights Council in April 2023 and the UN General Assembly in December, a resolution on the human rights situation in North Korea that was submitted by the EU and co-sponsored by Japan was adopted without a vote. Additionally, on August 17, 2023, a public meeting of the Security Council was held to discuss the human rights situation in North Korea, including the abductions issue, for the first time in about six years since December 2017, and after the meeting, the EU and 52 like-minded countries referred to the abductions issue in the joint stakeout. Japan will continue to closely coordinate and cooperate with relevant countries, including the U.S., toward the early resolution of the abductions issue.

C North Korea's External Relations, etc.

(A) U.S.-North Korea Relations

From 2018 to 2019, the U.S. and North Korea held two summit meetings as well as a meeting between President Trump and President Kim in Panmunjom, and in October 2019, U.S.-North Korea working-level talks were convened in Stockholm, Sweden. However, after this, no concrete progress was made in dialogues between the U.S. and North Korea.

Through President Biden's North Korea policy review in April 2021, the U.S. has made it clear that its goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and that it is stepping up its efforts to ensure the security of its allies, including Japan. In October 2022, the U.S released a new National Security Strategy (NSS), indicating that it would seek sustained diplomacy toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and that it would strengthen extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. At the same time, the U.S. has also stated on various occasions that the U.S. has no hostile intentions toward North Korea and that it is prepared to resume dialogue with North Korea without any preconditions.

On the other hand, it was reported that President Kim said in his speech at the 9th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September: “the accelerated establishment of the triangular military alliance with Japan and the ‘Republic of Korea' finally resulted in the emergence of the ‘Asian-version NATO,' the root cause of war and aggression. This is just the worst actual threat, not threatening rhetoric or an imaginary entity” and that North Korea would “further promote solidarity with the nations standing against the U.S. and the West's strategy for hegemony.”

In July, a U.S. Forces Korea soldier crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and was detained by North Korea. He was released in September. In response to a series of provocative acts by North Korea, including ballistic missile launches, the U.S. decided to additionally designate individuals and entities as subject of its own sanctions in March, April, May, June, August, and November of 2023, respectively.

(B) Inter-Korean Relations

In May 2022, the President Yoon administration was inaugurated in the ROK with the goal of “normalizing inter-Korean relations.” In August, President Yoon proposed the “audacious initiative” that would provide various types of economic assistance on the condition of genuine and substantial denuclearization, but North Korea has not shown any willingness to respond to this proposal. In January 2023, President Kim was reported to have said that, “Now that the South Korean puppet forces […] openly trumpet about ‘preparations for war' have assumed our undoubted enemy,” and in February, the ROK's defense white paper stated that North Korea's regime and military were “an enemy of the Republic of Korea.”

In April, the inter-Korean communication line, which had been restored since October 2021, was disrupted again. In response, the Government of the ROK issued a statement from the Unification Minister expressing strong regret. In September, the Constitutional Court of the ROK ruled that a provision in a law enacted during the Moon administration which banned the dissemination of leaflets to North Korea was unconstitutional. In November, the ROK announced the partial suspension of the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” that was signed in 2018, citing North Korea's repeated violations of the agreement and the launch of a “military reconnaissance satellite.” In response, North Korea reportedly issued a statement saying that it would no longer be bound by the agreement. Furthermore, at the Ninth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK, there was reportedly a pivot in policy toward the ROK, with it being said that “The North-South relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states.”

In response to a series of provocative acts by North Korea, including ballistic missile launches, the ROK decided to additionally designate individuals and entities as subject to its own sanctions in February, March, April, May, June, July, September, and December, respectively.

(C) China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea Relations

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, since 2020 there have been no visits by dignitaries, but it was reported that in July 2023, a delegation headed by Li Hongzhong, Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People's Congress of China, and Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu visited North Korea to commemorate North Korea's “70th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War,” and that letters from President Xi and President Vladimir Putin were delivered to President Kim. In relation with Russia, with the year 2023 being the 75th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations, President Kim visited Russia in September for the first time in four years and held a summit meeting with President Putin in Amur Oblast, where it was reported that the two sides agreed to strategic and tactical cooperation. In October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited North Korea to hold a Russia-North Korea Foreign Ministers' Meeting and paid a courtesy call to President Kim. On October 26, Japan, the U.S., and the ROK released the U.S.-Japan-ROK Joint Statement on North Korea-Russia arms transfers, in which they strongly condemned the provision of military equipment and munitions by North Korea to Russia, and announced that Japan, the U.S., and the ROK were closely monitoring the situation regarding the possibility of military assistance from Russia to North Korea.

Trade between China and North Korea, which accounts for approximately 90% of North Korea's entire external trade, was significantly reduced when compared to pre-COVID-19 levels due to traffic restrictions following the global spread of COVID-19, but has continued to be on a recovery trend since September 2022 when it was announced that cross-border rail freight between Dandong, China, and Sinuiju, North Korea, would be resumed. As a result, the China-North Korea trade volume in 2023 greatly exceeded that of the previous year and has recovered to pre-COVID-19 levels.

(D) Other Issues

In 2023, a total of 22 drifting or wrecked wooden vessels presumed to be from North Korea were discovered (49 in 2022) on Japan's coast with the Sea of Japan. The Government of Japan continues its effort to gather and analyze information, with great interest on relevant developments. In September 2020, a vessel that appeared to be an official North Korean vessel in Japan's EEZ in the west of the Yamatotai bank in the Sea of Japan was confirmed, and when this incident occurred the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed Japan's position to North Korea. Japan will continue to deal appropriately with these issues in close coordination among relevant ministries and agencies.

D Domestic Political Affairs and Economy

(A) Political Affairs

In January 2021, for the first time in approximately five years, North Korea held the Eighth Congress of the WPK, which is the highest decision-making institution in the WPK, and President Kim, while emphasizing “people-first politics,” is reported to have given an activity summary of achievements/reflections on the past five years and on future issues, including the continued nuclear and missile activities as well as the external relations. It was also reported that the “Five-Year Plan for the Development of National Defence Science and the Weapons System” and the “Major Five-Point Goals for Developing the National Defence Capabilities” were presented at the Congress of the WPK. At the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK that was held in December 2022, President Kim reportedly mentioned the launch of the first “military satellite” and emphasized strengthening defense capabilities.

At the 8th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly held in January 2023, the year 2022 was reportedly evaluated as “ full of unprecedented challenges and threats” while also reporting that “ the Korean people achieved remarkable successes in the struggle for economic construction and improvement of the people's standard of living.” It was also reported that the “Law on the Protection of the Cultured Pyongyang Dialect” was adopted to “exterminate non-normative language elements.” In February, the 7th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK was held, and President Kim was reported to have said that “the WPK has attached importance to the rural question as a strategic one which should be settled without fail.” In June the 8th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK was held with President Kim in attendance, and it was reported that the development of a military reconnaissance satellite was mentioned as one of “the Five-Point Major Goals for Developing the Defense Capabilities” and that the need to “push ahead with the expansion and development of the space industry as a national affair “ was pointed out. At the 9th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly held in September, it was reported that decisions were made regarding constitutional amendments and changing the “National Aerospace Development Administration of the DPRK” to the “National Aerospace Technology Administration of the DPRK.”

At the 9th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK that was held at the end of December, President Kim is reported to have praised 2023 as a “year full of eye-opening victories and events” and announced to lay a “foundation for steadily increasing the production of nuclear weapons” in 2024, as well as vowing to launch in addition three reconnaissance satellites.

Additionally, during the launch of an ICBM-class ballistic missile in November 2022, President Kim is reported to have “guided on the spot” that launched together with his “beloved child,” allegedly his daughter, who publicly appeared for the first time. Subsequently, President Kim is reported to have been accompanied by this child on various occasions, including a February 2023 event related to the “75th Founding Anniversary of the Korean People's Army (KPA),” the April inspection of the National Aerospace Development Administration, and the visit to the KPA Navy Command.

(B) Economy

It was reported that at the 8th Congress of the WPK in January 2021, President Kim presented the new “five-year plan for the national economic development” (2021 to 2025) centered around self-reliance and self-prosperity while referring to difficulties due to sanctions, natural disasters and the global health crisis. In January 2023, President Kim is reported to have defined the year 2023, the third year of the five-year plan for the national economic development, as “a year of making a big stride in the development of the national economy, a year of attaining key goals in increasing production─carrying out the strategy of readjustment and reinforcement and improving the people's living standards,” and to set “as the main targets the economic indices and 12 major goals to be attained by all sectors of the national economy.”

E Other Issues

Defectors who have fled North Korea have to be kept in hiding to avoid being cracked down on by the authorities in the countries where they are staying or to avoid being forcibly repatriated to North Korea. The Government of Japan is addressing the protection of and support for these North Korean defectors, in line with the purpose of the North Korean Human Rights Violation Act, taking into account a comprehensive range of factors, including humanitarian considerations, the safety of those concerned, and relations with the countries in which these defectors reside. Relevant ministries and agencies in Japan are closely working together to promote measures aimed at helping the settlement of defectors accepted by Japan.

(2) Republic of Korea (ROK)

A Situation in the ROK

(A) Domestic Affairs

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration has sought to promote a variety of policies amidst rising international prices, including stabilizing prices and people's lives, expanding exports and investment, and promoting a market-centered economy and sound public finances. However, the National Assembly continued to be divided, with the ruling People Power Party holding a minority of seats and the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea, holding the sole majority. The ruling and opposition parties were bitterly divided over various issues including the role of individual policies and the appointment of ministers. Although an opposition-led motion was passed to impeach the Minister of the Interior and Safety over the 2022 Itaewon crowd accident, the claim was dismissed in a hearing at the Constitutional Court. In September, a proposal to dismiss the Prime Minister was passed for the first time in the history of the ROK's constitutional government. In addition, the appointment of the government's nominee for Supreme Court Chief Justice was rejected, and for about two and a half months the position of Supreme Court Chief Justice remained vacant for the first time in about 35 years.

The term of office for the current National Assembly concluded at the end of May 2024, with a general election for National Assembly members being held in April. Both the ruling and opposition parties have been moving towards the elections in earnest since the end of 2023.

(B) Foreign Policy

President Yoon has promoted active summit diplomacy, including visiting foreign countries with the goal of becoming a “Global Pivotal State (GPS) that contributes to freedom, peace, and prosperity.” Since his inauguration and until the end of October 2023, President Yoon held 142 summit meetings with 93 countries.

As for relations with the U.S., President Yoon visited the U.S. for a State Visit from April 24 to 30 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. This was the first State Visit to the U.S. by an ROK President in about 12 years since President Lee Myung-bak. President Yoon held a Summit Meeting with President Joseph Biden, and after the meeting, in addition to releasing a Leaders' Joint Statement, the Washington Declaration was also released to strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK. As a result, the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was established in July. In addition to the above, the following statements were also released on the occasion of President Yoon's visit to the U.S.: “Joint Statement of the U.S. and the ROK on Cooperation in Quantum Information Science and Technologies,” “ROK-U.S. Joint Statement on Launching the Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies Dialogue,” “Strategic Cybersecurity Cooperation Framework between the ROK and the U.S.,” “Joint Statement from the Presidents of the U.S. and the ROK on the Identification of Medal of Honor Recipient from Korean War,” and “Joint Statement of Intent for Cooperation on Space Exploration and Science.” During his visit, President Yoon also visited the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center, gave an address to the U.S. Congress, and delivered a speech at Harvard University. President Yoon also held an ROK-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Biden on the occasion of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting held at Camp David in August.

In terms of relations with China, President Yoon had his first meeting with State Council Premier Li Qiang on the occasion of the ASEAN-related Summit Meetings in September. Later that month, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo visited China, the first visit by a Prime Minister in four and a half years, to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games Hangzhou, and took this opportunity to meet with President Xi Jinping. In November, the ROK hosted a Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Busan for the first time in about four years, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi visiting the ROK to attend this meeting and then holding a China-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

(C) Economy

In 2023, the GDP growth rate in the ROK fell from 2.6% to 1.4% in comparison to the previous year. The total amount of exports decreased by 7.4% year-on-year to approximately 632.7 billion U.S. dollars, and the total amount of imports decreased by 12.1% year-on-year to approximately 642.7 billion U.S. dollars. Although this was a trade deficit for a second consecutive year, the deficit amounted to approximately 10 billion U.S. dollars, which was smaller than the record high deficit of approximately 47.8 billion U.S. dollars in 2022 (figures published by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy).

At the time of its inauguration in May 2022, the Yoon administration announced economic policies based on four pillars: “A dynamic economy that puts the private sector at its core,” “An economy that pushes toward economic leaps by addressing structural issues,” “A leading economy that prepares for the future,” and “An inclusive economy that moves forward together.” In 2022, the “new Regime's Energy Policy” and the “Semiconductor Superpower Strategy” were released, and the ROK is proceeding with economic policies based on these documents. In the private sector, in September 2023, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) announced that, in order to eliminate influence from the issue in 2016 when FKI companies donated large amounts of money to a foundation associated with a friend of former President Park Geun-hye, (at the time, numerous member companies, including the four major groups (Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG) withdrew from the FKI), it changed itself and its Korean name to “correct an organizational culture that allowed political and economic collusion in the past,” and at this time the main companies of the four major groups that had previously withdrawn from the FKI once again became member companies.

In recent years, the ROK has had a rapidly declining birthrate and aging population. In 2023, the total fertility rate was a record low of 0.72 children per woman, making the declining birthrate issue all the more serious.

B Japan-ROK Relations

(A) Bilateral Relations

2023 was a year of major developments in Japan-ROK relations.

The ROK is an important neighboring country with which Japan should cooperate as partners in dealing with various issues of the international community. In particular, under the current severe international environment, Japan and the ROK need to deepen coordination and expand the scope of cooperation across a variety of areas in order to secure their mutual interest in regional peace and stability.

The two countries have built a close, friendly and cooperative relationship based on the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea, and other relevant agreements that the two countries concluded when they normalized their relationship in 1965, but bilateral relations had been severely strained over the past several years, particularly due to the issue of former civilian workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs). However, since the change in administration in the ROK, and the inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in 2022, close communication between the two countries' Foreign Ministries has taken place, including between the foreign ministers. Subsequently, on March 6, 2023, the Government of the ROK announced its position on the issue of CWKs. In response, on the same day, the Government of Japan released a comment by Foreign Minister Hayashi⁹,stating that it values the measures announced by the Government of the ROK, as a move toward restoring Japan-ROK relations, which had been severely strained due to the ROK Supreme Court ruling in 2018, to a sound footing, and Japan-ROK relations have turned around.

On March 16, just 10 days after the measures were announced, President Yoon visited Japan¹⁰ ,¹¹ in the first bilateral visit by the ROK President in about 12 years. At the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting, the leaders concurred to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” in which both leaders frequently visit each other without being bound by formality,and also agreed on the early resumption of the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue and the Japan-ROK Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue as well as the launch of a bilateral consultation on economic security. Furthermore, the two leaders welcomed the progress made in the area of export control.

Following this, Prime Minister Kishida visited the ROK on May 7, the first bilateral visit by a Prime Minister of Japan in approximately 12 years.¹²

At the Summit Meeting with President Yoon, the two leaders confirmed that dialogue and cooperation between the two governments were moving forward in a wide range of areas, as well as the robust resurgence of bilateral exchanges in the business sector and the robustness seen in private sector exchanges and parliamentary exchanges, and welcomed the fact that the improvement of the Japan-ROK relations is on track. Regarding the ALPS treated water, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan will continue to provide the ROK with explanations based on scientific evidence in a highly transparent and sincere manner, and the two leaders concurred on the dispatch of a delegation of ROK experts to TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

Subsequently, on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May, President Yoon visited Japan again, and the two leaders continued to deepen their trust. They visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and offered prayers together at the Cenotaph for the Victims of the ROK atomic bombing victims.

Throughout 2023, a total of seven Japan-ROK Summit Meetings took place taking the opportunities of the NATO Summit Meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania in July, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting at Camp David in the U.S. in August, the G20 New Delhi Summit in New Delhi, India in September, and the APEC Leaders' Meeting in San Francisco, U.S. in November. Through these frequent exchanges, Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon have been driving the development of Japan-ROK cooperation in a variety of fields and have been promoting efforts for their mutual interest which is ensuring regional peace and stability. Furthermore, in San Francisco, the two leaders appeared together at a Summit discussion held at Stanford University and discussed cooperation in the field of advanced science and technology. During the same period, communication between the Foreign Ministers also took place extremely frequently, with six face-to-face meetings and three telephone calls. In particular, regarding the protection of Japanese nationals living overseas, close cooperation was made possible based on exchanges between the Foreign Ministers in support of evacuations and departures from Sudan and Israel. Intergovernmental dialogue has become significantly more active, including ministerial-level contacts across a wide range of areas including finance, aviation, ICT, tourism, trade, energy, culture, and the environment. Moreover, there has been progress on a wide range of cooperation between Japan and the ROK, including active economic and business exchanges, a recovery in the number of flights, and expanded cooperation in the fields of finance and energy.

Given the severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific, close cooperation between the two countries is necessary now more than ever. As Japan-ROK relations get back on track and continue to improve, a variety of issues in the international arena were discussed at summit meetings and foreign ministers' meetings, including the Indo-Pacific, North Korea, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and the Israel-Palestine situation, where they confirmed that they will further enhance coordination on global issues.

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• 9 See References on the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs)
• 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website explaining President Yoon's visit to Japan on March 16 and 17:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page1e_000593.html
  
• 11 Prime Minister's Office website on the March 16 Japan-ROK joint press conference:
  https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202303/_00010.html
  
• 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website explaining Prime Minister Kishida's visit to the ROK on May 7 and 8:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page1e_000658.html
  

(B) The Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs)

The Government of Japan is of the view that it is necessary to advance Japan-ROK relations based on the platform on which the friendly and cooperative bilateral relations have been built since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, and that the issue of CWKs, which was ruled on by the ROK Supreme Court in 2018, needs to be resolved to that end. Based on this recognition, the Foreign Ministry engaged in close communication with their ROK counterpart including at the Ministerial level since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in May 2022.

On March 6, 2023, the Government of the ROK announced its position on the issue of CWKs, and a ROK foundation will pay court-awarded fees and late charges to the plaintiffs in the three 2018 final judgements by the ROK Supreme Court.

In response, on the same day, Foreign Minister Hayashi made public the view of the Government of Japan, stating that it values the measures announced by the ROK government as a move toward restoring Japan-ROK relations, which had been severely strained due to the ROK Supreme Court ruling in 2018, to a sound footing; that the Government of Japan will enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S. coordination; that the Government of Japan confirms that it upholds in its entirety the positions of the previous Cabinets on history, including the “Japan-ROK Joint Statement” issued in October 1998; and that the Government of Japan hopes to see a robust expansion of political, economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries, together with the implementation of the announced measures.¹³ The U.S., Australia, the UK, the European Union (EU), Germany, Canada, the UN, and others publicly welcomed the announcements made by the Government of the ROK and the Government of Japan.

In April, the Government of the ROK announced that it had made payments to 10 plaintiffs. Later, at the Japan-ROK Summit joint press conference during Prime Minister Kishida's visit to the ROK in May, he said, “As efforts by the Government of the ROK have progressed, I was moved by the fact that many people opened their hearts for the future, even though they have not forgotten the painful memories of the past. My own heart aches for the fact that many people experienced tremendous pain and suffering under harsh conditions at the time.”

Subsequently, another payment was made to one plaintiff in July. The Government of the ROK has expressed its intention to continue to make the utmost efforts to gain the understanding of the plaintiffs, and the Government of Japan will continue to maintain close communication with the ROK side.

Meanwhile, in December 2023 and January 2024, the ROK Supreme Court rendered final judgments in multiple similar lawsuits and followed the 2018 judgement in ordering Japanese companies to pay compensation. On these judgements, as well as on a case in February 2024 where a deposit previously paid by a Japanese company to the ROK court was handed over to the plaintiffs, the Government of Japan has lodged protests to the ROK government that these are extremely regrettable and totally unacceptable. In its announcement of the measures on March 6, 2023, the Government of the ROK has stated that a ROK foundation will pay the judgement court-awarded fees and late charges in the event that other currently pending CWK-related lawsuits (at the time of the announcement) end in favor of the plaintiffs.

The below Ministry of Foreign Affairs website details the issue of CWKs.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000947.html

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• 13 See References on the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula (CWKs)

(C) The Issue of Comfort Women

Japan has sincerely dealt with the issue of comfort women as it has been a major diplomatic issue between Japan and the ROK since the 1990s. The issue concerning property and claims between Japan and the ROK was settled “completely and finally” in 1965 through the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, from the perspective of facilitating feasible remedies for the former comfort women, in 1995, the people and the Government of Japan cooperated to establish the Asian Women's Fund in 1995, through which they carried out medical and welfare projects and provided “atonement money” to each former comfort woman in Asian and other countries, including the ROK. Furthermore, successive Prime Ministers have sent letters expressing their “apology and remorse” to former comfort women.

Furthermore, as a result of great diplomatic efforts, the Governments of Japan and the ROK confirmed that the issue of comfort women was “resolved finally and irreversibly” with the agreement reached at the Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting in December 2015. Directly after this Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Japanese and ROK leaders also confirmed that they would take responsibility as leaders to implement this agreement and that they would deal with various issues based on the spirit of this agreement, and that the Government of the ROK committed to the agreement. This agreement was welcomed by the international community, including then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the U.S. Government. In accordance with the agreement, in August 2016, the Government of Japan contributed 1 billion Japanese yen to “the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation” established by the Government of the ROK. As of December 31, 2023, the fund provided financial support to 35 out of 47 former comfort women who were alive at the time of the agreement, and to the bereaved families of 65 out of 199 former comfort women who were deceased at the time. The agreement has been received positively by many former comfort women.

However, in December 2016, a comfort woman statue¹⁴ was installed on the sidewalk facing the Consulate-General of Japan in Busan. Later, the Moon Jae-in administration was inaugurated in May 2017. Based on the results of the assessment made by the Taskforce to Review the Agreement on Comfort Women Issue under the direct supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, the position of the Government of the ROK on the issue of comfort women was announced to be as follows: i) it will not ask for a renegotiation with Japan; and ii) the 2015 agreement, which fails to properly reflect the wishes of the victims, does not constitute a true resolution of the issue. In November 2018, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family announced that it would proceed with its dissolution of “the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation” and has since moved ahead with the dissolution procedures. The moves to dissolve the Foundation are totally unacceptable for Japan in light of the 2015 Japan-ROK Agreement.

Moreover, on January 8, 2021, in the lawsuit filed by former comfort women and others against the Government of Japan, the Seoul Central District Court of the Republic of Korea rendered a judgment which ordered the Government of Japan, inter alia, to pay compensation to the plaintiffs, denying the application of the principle of State immunity under international law. On January 23, 2021, this judgment was confirmed.¹⁵ On April 21 of the same year, in a similar lawsuit filed by former comfort women and others, the Seoul Central District Court dismissed the case, taking into account the principle of State immunity under international law, but on November 23, 2023, at the appeal in this case, the Seoul High Court rendered a judgement denying the application of the principle of State immunity under international law and allowing the plaintiff's lawsuit. Japan has repeatedly expressed its position that this lawsuit must be dismissed because for these comfort women lawsuits it is not acceptable for the Government of Japan to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ROK in accordance with the principle of State immunity in international law. As mentioned above, the issue concerning property and claims between Japan and the ROK, including the issue of comfort women, was “settled completely and finally,” with the Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea of 1965. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the issue of comfort women was “resolved finally and irreversibly” with the agreement between Japan and the ROK in 2015. Therefore, these judgments are extremely regrettable and absolutely unacceptable, as it is clearly contrary to international law and agreements between the two countries. Japan has strongly urged the ROK to immediately take appropriate measures to remedy the status of its breaches of international law on its own responsibility as a country.

The Japan-ROK agreement in 2015 is an agreement between two countries, and abiding by promises made between two countries is the foundation of bilateral relations. The ROK has a responsibility to the international community to steadily implement the agreement. As stated above, the Government of Japan has implemented all measures it committed to under the Japan-ROK agreement. The Government of the ROK itself also acknowledges that this agreement is an official agreement between the two governments, and the Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge the ROK to steadily implement the Japan-ROK Agreement (See page 40 for the comfort women issue in the international community).

The below Ministry of Foreign Affairs website details Japan's Efforts on the Issue of Comfort Women.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/page22e_000883.html

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• 14 For the sake of practical convenience, they are referred to as “comfort woman statues.” However, the use of this term is not a reflection of the recognition that these statues correctly embody the reality of those women at that time.
• 15 See References on the Issue of Comfort Women

(D) Takeshima

Regarding the dispute between Japan and the ROK concerning the territorial sovereignty over Takeshima, Takeshima is indisputably an inherent territory of Japan both in light of historical facts and based on international law. However, the ROK has continued its illegal occupation of Takeshima with no legal basis in international law, including stationing permanent security personnel. Japan has been keeping the world informed about Japan's position on the issue through various media platforms.¹⁶ Japan has also repeatedly lodged strong protests against the ROK over matters such as South Korean citizens including members of the ROK's National Assembly landing on the island, and the ROK's military exercises and marine surveys in and around Takeshima. In 2023, military exercises were conducted on and around Takeshima and members of the ROK National Assembly landed on Takeshima. The Government of Japan considers these activities unacceptable in view of Japan's position and lodged strong protests.¹⁷ Japan will continue to respond resolutely based on Japan's basic position regarding Takeshima.

For a peaceful settlement of the Takeshima dispute, Japan proposed to the ROK that the issue be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1954, 1962 and 2012. However, the ROK rejected the proposal in all instances. Japan is determined to continue to engage in persistent diplomatic efforts to settle the Takeshima dispute in a peaceful manner in accordance with international law.

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• 16 In February 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a pamphlet entitled “Takeshima: 10 points to understand the Takeshima Dispute.” It is available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website in 11 languages: Japanese, English, Korean, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, Russian, Chinese and Italian. Furthermore, since October 2013, videos and flyers about Takeshima have been available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website, and they are currently available in the above 11 languages. Furthermore, Japan has taken initiatives such as distributing a smartphone app that aims to increase awareness of the Takeshima issue. Further details are available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html
  
• 17 In May, Democratic Party of Korea lawmaker Jeon Yong-gi landed on the island. ROK armed forces conducted military training related to Takeshima in June and December 2023. The Government of Japan immediately conveyed to the Government of the ROK that such an act was unacceptable and extremely regrettable in light of Japan's position on sovereignty over Takeshima, and strongly protested against the act.

(E) Update on Licensing Policies and Procedures on Exports of Controlled Items to the ROK

With regard to issues concerning export control between Japan and the ROK,¹⁸ on March 6, 2023, the Government of Japan and the Government of the ROK announced that they would hold a Japan-Korea Export Control Policy Dialogue so as to return to a pre-July 2019 state, and the Government of the ROK decided to suspend the WTO dispute settlement procedures during the Dialogue. On March 16, the ROK announced that it would withdraw its complaint to the WTO dispute settlement procedure regarding Japan's export control measures, and on the same day, Japan decided to revise its operation on the exports of three semiconductor-related items (fluorinated polyimide, resist and hydrogen fluoride) to the ROK applying the Special General Bulk Export License system (the circular notice was revised on March 23).¹⁹

Subsequently, in April, the Government of the ROK restored Japan to its “whitelist (countries with preferential treatment for export screenings),” and in July, Japan added the ROK to “Group A” under its Export Trade Control Order, after the public comment procedures and a Cabinet Decision.²⁰ Additionally, the export control authorities in Japan and the ROK signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on a follow-up framework to take appropriate measures, including revision of their respective systems and operations.²¹

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• 18 On September 11, 2019, the Government of the ROK requested bilateral consultations with Japan under the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures, claiming the update by the Government of Japan of the operation of measures related to Japan's export to the ROK of three items for semiconductors (fluorinated polyimide, resist and hydrogen fluoride), and the system for requiring individual export licenses, is in breach of the WTO Agreements. The Government of the ROK announced on November 22, 2019, that it suspended the effect of the notification of termination of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information (GSOMIA), and in doing so said that it would also suspend its WTO dispute settlement procedures while the Japan-ROK Export Control Policy Dialogue would be held as normal. Subsequently Export Control Policy Dialogues were held in December 2019 and March 2020. However, the Government of the ROK resumed WTO dispute settlement procedures in June 2020, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body decided to establish a panel in July 2020.
• 19 See the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website dated March 23, 2023, regarding the circular about the partial amendment of “Operation of the Cabinet Order on Export Trade Control”:
  https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2023/0323_001.html
  
• 20 See the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website dated June 27, 2023, regarding the Cabinet Order to partially amend the Export Trade Control Order:
  https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2023/0627_004.html
  
• 21 See the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website dated July 11, 2023, regarding the Japan-Korea Export Control Policy Dialogue:
  https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2023/0711_001.html
  

(F) Exchanges and Travel

In 2018, the number of people making visits between the two countries was approximately 10.49 million people, but since early 2020, travel between Japan and the ROK significantly decreased due to the strengthening of border measures related to the spread of COVID-19, and in 2021, approximately only 30,000 people made trips between the two countries. In 2022, due to visa exemption measures resuming in both countries and the resumption of flights between Japan and the ROK including the Haneda-Gimpo route, the number of travelers has gone up with the number of visitors between Japan and the ROK reaching about 1.31 million people. In 2023, the number of travelers between Japan and the ROK increased significantly to approximately 9.27 million people as border control measures were lifted, and airline service between Japan and the ROK was restored to pre-COVID-19 levels.

In Japan, K-POP and related content is widely accepted mainly among younger generations, and Korean dramas and movies have become widely popular amongst people of all ages. In 2023, the major Japan-ROK grassroots exchange program “Japan-Korea Exchange Festival” (Nikkan Koryu Omatsuri) was held in person in both Tokyo and Seoul, with a total of approximately 116,000 people from both countries participating. The Government of Japan works on promoting mutual understanding, primarily between Japanese and ROK youth, and building a friendly and cooperative relationship for the future through Japan's Friendship Ties Programs (JENESYS 2023). Since FY2020, online exchanges continued even when face-to-face exchanges were halted due to the spread of COVID-19, and in 2022 face-to-face exchange programs were partially resumed. In 2023, in light of the improvements in Japan-ROK relations, the two governments decided to fully resume face-to-face exchange programs in order to double the number of exchanges compared to the previous year, and are working to revitalize exchanges between the youth generation, who represent the future of both countries.

(G) Other Issues

The Governments of Japan and the ROK concluded the Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information (GSOMIA) in November 2016 in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the two countries in the field of security and contribute to regional peace and stability. Afterwards, the agreement was automatically extended in 2017 and 2018. However, the Government of the ROK announced on August 22, 2019, its decision to terminate the GSOMIA in connection with Japan's update of licensing policies and procedures on exports (see (E) above) and notified the termination on the following day, August 23. Following this and after exchanges between Japan and the ROK, on November 22, 2019, the Government of the ROK announced that it would suspend the effect of the notification of termination of August 23. On March 21, 2023, immediately after President Yoon's visit to Japan, the Government of the ROK officially notified that it would withdraw its notification of August 2019 to terminate the Japan-ROK GSOMIA. In view of the current regional security environment, the Government of Japan considers it important for the Agreement to continue operating in a stable manner.

Sea of Japan is the only internationally established name for the sea area concerned, and the UN and governments of major countries such as the U.S. adopt Sea of Japan as the official name. Objections to this name, however, were first raised by the ROK and North Korea in 1992. Since then, the ROK and North Korea have been objecting to the name at the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN),²² the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and other international conferences. These assertions however are groundless, and Japan has firmly refuted these assertions each time they arise.²³

Furthermore, Japan has been urging the Government of the ROK through its diplomatic channels to return cultural properties that were stolen and are currently in the ROK²⁴ to Japan as soon as possible, and Japan will continue to take appropriate steps.

Japan has provided support and taken measures as much as possible from a humanitarian perspective in various fields, including responses for ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin,²⁵ addressing the issue of atomic bomb survivors living in the ROK,²⁶ and helping Hansen's disease patients admitted to sanitariums in the ROK.²⁷

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• 22 A UN conference where experts on place names and geospatial information from each country discuss, from a technical point of view, the definitions of terms related to place names and the notation methods for place names. In 2017, the UN Conferences on the Standardization of Geographical Name, which had been held every five years, and the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names, which had been held every two years, were integrated into the United Nations Group of Experts on Place Names (UNGEGN).
• 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs website detailing the issue of the name of the “Sea of Japan”:
  https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/maritime/japan/index.html
  
• 24 After being stolen in Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture in 2012 and shipped to the ROK, the “Kanzeon Bosatsu Statue” was collected and stored by the Government of the ROK. A Korean temple asserting ownership of the statue has filed a claim seeking to have the Government of the ROK hand over the statue, and in January 2017 the Daejeon District Court issued a verdict of the first hearing to the plaintiff's side (the Korean temple), but in February 2023 the Daejeon High Court reversed the initial ruling and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiffs have made an appeal, but in October 2023 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
• 25 For various reasons, before the end of World War II, people from the Korean Peninsula traveled to what was then known as Minami Karafuto (South Sakjalin) and were compelled to remain there for a long time after the war ended under the de facto rule of the Soviet Union, without being given the opportunity to return to the ROK. The Government of Japan is providing such people with support, such as to enable them to return home temporarily and to visit Sakhalin.
• 26 This is the issue of provision of support to those who were exposed to the atomic bombs while living in Hiroshima or Nagasaki during World War II and subsequently went to live overseas. To date, Japan has provided support in the form of the Atomic Bomb Victim Health Handbook and allowances based on the Atomic Bombs Survivors' Assistance Act.
• 27 In February 2006, the “Act on Payment of Compensation to Inmates of Hansen's Disease Sanatorium” was amended, and former residents of Hansen's disease sanatoriums outside of Japan, which were established by Japan before the end of World War II, were made eligible for compensation, similar to former residents of domestic sanatoriums. Additionally, in November 2019, the “Act on Payment of Compensation to Families of Former Patients of Hansen's Disease” was enacted, and the families of former Hansen's disease patients were also made eligible for compensation.

C Economy

The total value of trade between the two countries amounted to approximately 10.90 trillion Japanese yen in 2023. Japan is the ROK's fourth largest trading partner, and the ROK is Japan's fifth largest trading partner. The ROK's trade deficit with Japan decreased by approximately 18.2% from a year earlier, reaching approximately 2.20 trillion Japanese yen (Trade Statistics of Japan, Ministry of Finance). Japanese direct investment in the ROK totaled approximately 1.30 billion U.S. dollars (down 14.7% from the previous year) (figures published by the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy), making Japan the ROK's fourth largest source of foreign direct investment (excluding the Cayman Islands from the ranking). Japan and the ROK also cooperate together as parties to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement and as members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and work together in various economic frameworks, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In December, the 15th Japan-ROK High-Level Economic Consultations were held for the first time in about eight years to discuss a wide range of topics, including bilateral economic relations and the international economic situation.

As for import restrictions on Japanese food products by the Government of the ROK, Japan is taking various opportunities to urge the ROK to remove the restrictions as soon as possible.