Statement on Non-Proliferation
St. Petersburg, July 16, 2006
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, together with international terrorism remain the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. The international community must therefore boldly confront this challenge, and act decisively to tackle this threat. We reaffirm our determination and commitment to work together and with other states and institutions in the fight against the proliferation of WMD, including by preventing them from falling into hands of terrorists.
As an essential element of our efforts to confront proliferation, we are determined to fulfil arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments under relevant international treaties, conventions and multilaterally agreed arrangements to which we are parties or in which we participate. We call on all other states to meet their obligations and commitments in full in this regard. We rededicate ourselves to the re-invigoration of relevant multilateral fora, beginning with the Conference on Disarmament. These efforts will contribute to the further reinforcement of the global non-proliferation regime.
We call on all states not Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to them without delay and those states that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. We urge all states concerned to strictly observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.
We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the NPT. We call on all states to comply with their NPT obligations, including IAEA safeguards as well as developing effective measures aimed at preventing trafficking in nuclear equipment, technology and materials.
We stress the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. We are seeking universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements for the effective implementation of Article III of the NPT and to the Additional Protocol. In this context we urge all states that have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement these instruments promptly. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, with a view to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard. We will also work together vigorously to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.
Peaceful use of nuclear energy
We recall that Article IV of the NPT stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. We are committed to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Full compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards agreements, is an essential condition for such exchange.
An expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be carried forward in a manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation commitments and standards. In this regard, it is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to nuclear fuel related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities. In this respect we appreciate the recent potentially complementary Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for nuclear fuel. We will work to elaborate further these initiatives. To further strengthen this common approach we will:
- continue reviewing multinational approaches to the fuel cycle, including international centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, with the IAEA, as well as relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions;
- facilitate developing credible international assurances of access to nuclear fuel related services; while
- those of us who have or are considering plans relating to use and/or development of safe and secure nuclear energy will promote research and development for safer, more efficient, more environmentally friendly and more proliferation resistant nuclear energy systems, including relevant technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. Until advanced systems are in place, appropriate interim solutions could be pursued to address back-end fuel cycle issues in accordance with national choices and non-proliferation objectives.
We support the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
Enrichment and Reprocessing
In accordance with approaches agreed upon at the G8 summits at Sea Island and in Gleneagles, we support the development of measures to prevent transfers of sensitive nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands.
We will exercise enhanced vigilance with respect to the transfers of nuclear technology, equipment and material, whether in the trigger list, in the dual-use list, or unlisted, which could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and will be particularly vigilant with respect to attempts to acquire such technology, equipment and material by covert and illicit means.
We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to those states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the last two years we have made significant progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the progress noted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its commitment to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue by 2007.
In aid of this process we continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island and Gleneagles, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states. We call upon all other states to adopt this strategy of prudence.
We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime.
We look forward to a successful 6th BTWC Review Conference dedicated to the effective review of the operation of the Convention. We will facilitate adoption by the Review Conference of decisions aimed at strengthening and enhancing the implementation of the BTWC.
We call upon all States Parties to take necessary measures, including as appropriate the adoption of and implementation of national legislation, including penal legislation, in the framework of the BTWC, in order to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons and to ensure control over pathogenic micro organisms and toxins. We invite the States Parties that have not yet done so to take such measures at the earliest opportunity and stand ready to consider appropriate assistance. In this regard, we welcome initiatives such as the 2006 EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC.
We continue to support full implementation of the CWC. We note the ongoing destruction of chemical weapons by the possessor states and are encouraged by the fact that the stockpiles of these deadly weapons are gradually decreasing. We acknowledge their obligations to destroy chemical weapons and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities within the time limits provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We welcome the increasing number of States Parties to the Convention. We acknowledge the value of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Action Plan on national implementation measures and improvement of the situation with adoption of such measures. We urge States Parties to continue and intensify efforts in this direction. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
We reaffirm the key role of the UN Security Council in addressing the challenges of proliferation. We urge all states to implement fully UNSC Resolution 1540, including reporting on their implementation of the Resolution.
We welcome the decision of UN Security Council Resolution 1673 to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee in promoting the full implementation of the resolution. We intend to continue working actively at national and international levels to achieve this important aim, and stand ready to consider all requests for assistance in this regard.
We reaffirm our commitment to work toward the, universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the full implementation of its confidence-building measures.
We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to counter trafficking in WMD, their delivery means and related materials. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative as it was demonstrated at the High Level Political Meeting in Warsaw. We take note of the discussion at that meeting on how PSI states can work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of the objectives of UNSCR 1540.
The international community's positive response to Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates the benefits that follow a strategic decision to cooperate with the international community and be a part of the global nonproliferation mainstream.
We remain seriously concerned over the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme and we remain united in our commitment to see those implications resolved.
We stand fully behind the far reaching proposals presented to Iran on June 6, 2006 on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America with the support of the High Representative of the European Union for a long-term comprehensive agreement with Iran based on cooperation and mutual respect.
We fully support the Statement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America issued on July 12, Paris, in which the Ministers and the High Representative of the European Union expressed their profound disappointment over the absence of any indication at all from the Iranians that Iran is ready to engage seriously on the substance of the above-mentioned proposals. Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA and supported in the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement. The Ministers therefore decided to return the issue to the United Nations Security Council. We, the Leaders of the G-8, fully support this decision and the clear messages it sends to Iran about the choice it must make. We support the Paris appeal to Iran to respond positively to the substantive proposals made on June 6, 2006.
We welcome the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1695 which represents the clear and strong will of the international community.
We condemn the launching by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of multiple ballistic missiles on July 5 local time and express serious concerns as this jeopardizes peace, stability and security in the region and beyond. This action violated the DPRK's pledge to maintain a moratorium on missile launches and is inconsistent with the purposes of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, in which all parties - including the DPRK - committed to joint efforts to lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We also express our grave concern about the DPRK's indication of possible additional launches. We call on the DPRK to reestablish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launches and to refrain from contributing to missile proliferation. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1695 we will exercise vigilance in preventing any external cooperation with the DPRK' s missile and WMD programmes.
These missile launches intensify our deep concern over the DPRK's nuclear weapons programmes. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. We reaffirm our full support for the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the Six-Party talks. We urge the DPRK to expeditiously return to these talks without precondition and to cooperate to settle the outstanding issues of concern on the basis of this Statement, which reaffirms the common objective of Six Parties; all participants should intensify their efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has continued its progress in the past year towards achieving the goals set out at Kananaskis. It has become a significant force to enhance international security and safety. Much has been accomplished in all areas but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation.
We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives. We also reaffirm our openness to examine the expansion of the Partnership to other recipient countries and donor states which support the Kananaskis documents and to embrace the goals and priorities of all Partnership members. We welcome the progress GP members have made working with Ukraine.
We appreciate the contribution of 13 non-G8 states who joined the Global Partnership.
We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.
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