Press Conference, 13 October 2006

Initiative concerning Closer Collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Domestic Institutions
Follow-up Question concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' New Initiative
Questions concerning Sanctions Imposed on North Korea by Japan
Questions concerning Japan's Assessment of the Political Reemergence of Mr. James Baker, Former US Secretary of State
Question concerning Potential Visit by Ms. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, to Japan
Questions concerning an Alleged Agreement between Japan and North Korea
Questions concerning Reports of Visits to Japan by Top Chinese Leaders
Questions concerning Japan's Latest Intelligence on the Nuclear Testing in North Korea

I. Initiative concerning Closer Collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Domestic Institutions

Deputy Press Secretary Tomohiko Taniguchi: Thank you for coming, and let me start the conference. From my side I do not have much to say today. The only thing I would like to tell you is that in conjunction with the ongoing initiative to strengthen Japan's diplomatic fundamentals an effort is now underway to link the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) more closely with the domestic institutions, notably those affiliated with municipalities.

Indeed today the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a meeting in Tokyo inviting officials from all the local governments, including some of the major city governments, and pledged that it would do more to help support such actions as follows: export promotion, inward direct investment promotion, inviting major conferences from abroad, and inviting foreign dignitaries to non-Tokyo areas.

II. Follow-up Question concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' New Initiative

Q: Well, I had one question I intended to ask, but what is the purpose of that? Is the view that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is underemployed and needs to take on more functions? What is the reason behind this initiative?

Mr. Taniguchi: Let me just give you some background on this initiative. Firstly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the smallest ministries (of foreign affairs) among the developed nations in terms of its human resources. So its human resources, I have to say, remain very limited, and given the scope of Japan's relationships with the outside world the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot shoulder all of its burdens. It is indeed a fact that many prefectural and city governments have continued to do their share in developing their ties with their sister cities and counterparts in many countries. An effort is also going on inspired very much by the legislative body that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to be strengthened, both in terms of human resources and in terms of its budget. So the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is requesting, for instance, that in the next fiscal year as many as more than 300 personnel should be added to the current number, which stands at something like 5,000. So those are the things that are going on. I view this new initiative against that background.

III. Questions concerning Sanctions Imposed on North Korea by Japan

Q: The question I was going to ask was about North Korea and sanctions. Have you or are you going to quantify or attempt to quantify what the impact will be on North Korea of the Japanese unilateral sanctions? And likewise what the impact on Japan would be if North Korea retaliates in some way?

Mr. Taniguchi: I can give you the numbers on Japanese trade relations with North Korea. North Korea-Japan trade was at its zenith in 1995, and in that year the export-import total between North Korea and Japan stood at something like US$339 million. Ten years after that in 2005 the total amount of export-import back and forth between North Korea and Japan reduced to approximately US$133 million. There are numerous statistics about this, but if I can cite what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook says, Japan's share in North Korea's export in 2004 stood at 12.9%, whereas the People's Republic of China made up 45.6% and South Korea 20.2%. Those are the figures for 2004. The Bank of Korea, the South Korean central bank, has got its own statistics and you can have a look at it by going to their website. But those are the figures that I can cite and you can imagine how much impact there will be on North Korea by Japan banning their exports from entering Japan.

Q: Among the sanctions, do they include food exports and, if they exist, food aid to North Korea? If there is food aid mostly what food is aided to North Korea and are there any plans on that?

Mr. Taniguchi: Is your question about their exports?

Q: Exports from Japan to North Korea and also aid from Japan to North Korea, if those exist.

Mr. Taniguchi: You mean what is Japan exporting to North Korea in terms of food and what is it doing in terms of food aid?

Q: Yes, and are these included in the sanctions?

Mr. Taniguchi: The second part of your question is easy to answer: it is all about banning their exports entering Japan. So Japanese exports will continue to go to North Korea. If I look at what North Korea is importing from Japan, transportation materials -- I would imagine most of them are cars and bicycles -- make up 43.3%; followed by textile materials with a share of 13.3%; and there is an item called food products, its share is 6.5%. Those are the figures for 2005. If North Korea is interested in continuing to import those goods and materials from Japan there is no restriction.

As far as Japanese aid is concerned nothing is going to North Korea, so that is the situation. The United States (US), South Korea, and the European Union (EU) have been making contributions via United Nations (UN)-affiliated institutions such as the World Food Programme (WFP), but there are none (at present) from Japan.

(Note: The Government of Japan has given North Korea food and medical materials before. The latest such attempt was the one in 2004 when the Government of Japan gave them 125,000 tons of food and US$7 million worth of medical materials through international organizations -- added later.)

Q: You do not have the breakdown for the food products?

Mr. Taniguchi: I do not have the broken-down figure at the moment. It will take time for you to look at the detailed items. There are statistics available if you have some time.

Q: I am no expert on sanctions but it seems like a very limited form of sanctions if Japan continues to export to them. A more effective sanction would be to cut off North Korea from supplies of Japanese products, but these are totally ineffective.

Mr. Taniguchi: I would have to add that for materials related to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs of North Korea, those are already under severe surveillance and some have been restricted. But in terms of the general trade, general exportation going from Japan to North Korea, that is still under no restriction.

Q: How will they get there if North Korean vessels are being banned from Japanese water from now on, as well as Japanese ports? How will the exports physically get from Japan to North Korea?

Mr. Taniguchi: Good question. But you cannot deny all the "animal spirit" (entrepreneurial vigor) by the Japanese entrepreneurs.

Q: Deny what spirits?

Mr. Taniguchi: By the Japanese entrepreneurs. There may be or may not be.

Q: I do not follow. They can find some way of getting the exports?

Mr. Taniguchi: The outgoing vessels from Japan are not restricted, of course. North Korean ships have been banned and will continue to be banned from entering Japanese ports.

Q: So if a Japanese-owned vessel wished to leave Niigata, for example, to sail to Pusan...

Mr. Taniguchi: Well, that is very much a hypothetical question, but it could be possible. I do not know if there is a strong animal spirit among the Japanese entrepreneurs, expecting North Korea would pay a due price for their exported goods.

IV. Questions concerning Japan's Assessment of the Political Reemergence of Mr. James Baker, Former US Secretary of State

Q: Yes, I have a question about Mr. James Baker, former US Secretary of State. Mr. Baker has reappeared back on the political scene. Obviously this is not directly and immediately going to affect this country, but I wonder what the assessment is about his reappearance with plans and obviously important proposals to make?

Mr. Taniguchi: There is no assessment done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the former Secretary of State's "reappearance" in the political arena. You can have many theories to understand what is happening and why he has started to look greater or not. But so long as the US-Japan relationship and Japan's relations with other nations are concerned I do not think there has been any assessment reviewed or created in conjunction with that.

Q: Obviously I was thinking particularly of Iraq. He has let drop hints that he is in favor of what looks like a partition, and Japan has been deeply involved in things Iraqi in the last few years. Therefore it occurred to me there would be some reception here of whether Mr. Baker is moving in the right direction or not?

Mr. Taniguchi: The answer is the same, there is no assessment, no evaluation about that.

V. Question concerning Potential visit by Ms. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, to Japan

Q: Ms. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, is planning to visit quite soon. I suppose the visit will focus on the supposed nuclear explosion in North Korea. Do you have any comments to make on Ms. Rice's visit?

Mr. Taniguchi: If her visit does materialize as reported it is more than welcome. The Japanese Government is going to welcome her and she will bring many issues to be discussed between Japan and the US and between Japan, China, South Korea, and the US in the aftermath of the announced nuclear tests by the North Korean Government.

VI. Questions concerning an Alleged Agreement between Japan and North Korea

Q: Recently Mr. Yasuhiko Yoshida, Professor at Osaka University who is an expert on North Korea, mentioned the figure of US$10 million, which is what he effectively says Japan had promised North Korea by way of compensation in 2002. This was agreed but has not been paid yet and is not likely to be paid under the present circumstances. Has that figured ever been mentioned before, or what is the basis of this claim?

Mr. Taniguchi: It is based on no factual understanding on the side of Professor Yoshida.

Q: So there was no agreement on that?

Mr. Taniguchi: Absolutely no agreement, and absolutely no proposal unilaterally done from the Japanese side.

VII. Questions concerning Reports of Visits to Japan by Top Chinese Leaders

Q: There are reports saying that from China both Hu Jintao, President of China, and Wen Jiabao, Premier of China, will be invited to Japan as early as January of next year. Are these reports correct?

Mr. Taniguchi: Absolutely not. We often say, so long as dignitaries' visits are concerned, "absolutely not", due to security concerns. Then in a couple of days or a week or so we would sometimes confirm that, but this is not absolutely the case.

Q: Is there no likelihood that both governments are going to coordinate the visits in terms of the schedules and so on?

Mr. Taniguchi: Both governments have agreed to continue (leaders') visits from both sides to one another, between China and Japan when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went to Beijing. But in terms of the specific schedules for President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao there is no plan at all.

VIII. Questions concerning Japan's Latest Intelligence on the Nuclear Testing in North Korea

Q: What is Japan's latest intelligence on the nature of the explosion in North Korea? Sources say that it was a low-level atomic explosion that failed to achieve fission and this shows that there is still a long way to go before North Korea actually has a nuclear device. What is Japan's latest information on that?

Mr. Taniguchi: I cannot be as confident as Professor Yoshida to comment one way or the other. It still remains very much difficult to confirm or deny that it was a nuclear explosion.

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