Press Conference by the Press Secretary 3 July, 1998

1. Emergency aid from Japan to Romania for flood disaster relief
2. Emergency aid from Japan to the People's Republic of China for flood disaster relief
3. Holding of the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development from 19 to 21 October in Tokyo
4. Visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright of the United States of America to Japan
5. Representation of the Government of Japan at the Fourth of July party at the Embassy of the United States of America
6. Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Japan
7. The role of Japan in promoting stability in South Asia
8. Japanese press treatment of the United States
9. Status of sanctions against the Republic of India
10. United States response to economic policies of the Government of Japan

1. Emergency aid from Japan to Romania for flood disaster relief

   Good afternoon. Firstly, there have been two major floods in the world; one in Romania and the other in the People's Republic of China. In Romania from mid-May to mid-June, torrential rain hit the central, northwestern and northeastern parts of the country and there has been very large-scale damage; 34 reported deaths, about 60,000 people afflicted and also great damage to crops and livestock. The flood also played havoc with transportation and telecommunications. In view of all this, on Wednesday, 1 July, the Government of Japan decided to extend emergency aid consisting of medicines, generators, tents and other relief goods worth about 12 million yen and we are also extending an emergency grant-in-aid of US $50,000 to the Government of Romania. The Government of Romania is of course carrying out its own relief activities, but it has also requested emergency assistance from the international community including Japan and we are responding to that.

2. Emergency aid from Japan to the People's Republic of China for flood disaster relief

   Then we have this news from China that since around the middle of June there have been large-scale floods in the Southern provinces; that is Fujian, Anhui, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. There have been nearly 60 million people affected, with the death toll reaching more than 500, and more than 120,000 people either injured or having been afflicted with disease and more than 1.3 million houses destroyed. In the light of all this, we sent a series of messages of condolences and sympathy to those who have been affected. Today, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent a message to Prime Minister Rhongi Zhu of the People's Republic of China and Minister for Foreign Affairs Keizo Obuchi sent a message to Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan of the People's Republic of China. We do earnestly hope that the rehabilitation of the affected areas will proceed as quickly as possible. In view of the seriousness of the damage and the friendly relationship between Japan and China, we are in the process of considering the extension of emergency assistance to China from a humanitarian viewpoint.

3. Holding of the Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development from 19 to 21 October in Tokyo

   Next we go off to the African continent. The Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) is to take place in Tokyo from 19 to 21 October this year. This will be co-hosted by Japan, the United Nations and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA). The central idea running through this conference is that of ownership on the part of sub-Saharan African countries, that is the need for them to stand on their own on the one hand, and partnership between these countries and the members of the international community. So it is on the basis of these ideas of ownership and partnership that we will be exploring ways to support the efforts of these countries to promote economic development while improving the livelihood of their people in a climate of peace and stability. In fact there have been some encouraging signs in the sub-Saharan African countries in the sense that although a number of these countries are still poor in the sense that their per capita gross national product (GNP) in many cases is less than US $1 per day, at the same time, in recent years, some significant development has been achieved to the extent that in 1996 and 1997 about 20 out of the 47 sub-Saharan African countries have attained an annual real growth rate of GNP of around 5%. So this TICAD II meeting is designed to provide further support to the development efforts of these countries, and to that end it is envisioned that in this TICAD II meeting we will try to formulate an Agenda for Action for African development and in formulating this Agenda we will be looking, among others, at the experience of nation-building by Japan and other Asian countries. Some of the priority areas that might be looked at in this Agenda for Action are firstly, for example in the general area of capacity building or human resources development through education and health programs, the question of gender in development, in particular empowerment of women, agricultural development and support to the private sector. This meeting will also look at the question of good governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. As you may recall, TICAD I took place in October 1993 and in fact many of the points that were discussed at TICAD I were subsequently reflected in the new development strategy adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996. We expect to have participants at the ministerial and in some cases even the higher level of the leaders, from African countries, some Asian and European countries, the United States of America and from the international organizations concerned as well.

4. Visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright of the United States of America to Japan

   Q: Regarding Ms. Albright's brief visit, what is the plan for her press conference and is she going to hold one with the Foreign Minister? This is what they say in Japanese is a karai situmon, but how would you interpret --

   A: I will wait until I taste it.

   Q: Okay. How do you interpret the failure of President Clinton and the Treasury Secretary Mr. Rubin to even make a stop-over in Japan. Lots of the Japanese press have said that this is a snub to Japan, that Washington is practicing "tough love" towards Japan --

   A: Tough what?

   Q: Tough love.

   A: Tough love. Yes. I have seen that before.

   Q: Basically distancing itself in disapproval of Japan's handling of its economy. What do you say to that?

   A: Let me take the simpler question first. Your first question. The possibility of a press opportunity in the context of the visit of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright of the United States of America is intensively being looked at. So we should know in due course exactly what form it will take. Perhaps I should say as a spokesman that in the process of intensively looking at the question, perhaps it is better for us to bear in mind the fact that you did raise this question. You expressed an interest. Do you have a follow-up on that?

   Q: The follow-up is whether Ms. Albright is presenting certain difficulties? My understanding is that she is being a little bit wagamama about this.

   A: I have not heard anything to that effect.

   Q: Is she presenting difficulties though?

   A: No. The only thing is that her visit is taking place at a time when the election campaign is in full-swing and our leaders do have a rather busy schedule so it is a question of coordinating their schedules. As to your second question, firstly I think I should make clear that as far as I understand, and I am sure I am correct, that the expression "tough love" has never been used by any member of the United States Administration. I think it may have been used by somebody from the American academic community in a particular journal, editorial or column in a newspaper. I would also point out that there were public expressions of dissent from that viewpoint and those public expressions of dissent were carried, again in the form of columns or editorials in some of the major American media. So that is my comment on "tough love." I do not think we feel in any way that we have been snubbed by President William Jefferson Clinton of the United States of America. We did know that he was going to China, with a stop over in Hong Kong and then returning to the United States. Secretary of State Albright is coming to brief us when she is here. We look forward to being briefed by her about President Clinton's visit. I will also add that in fact we announced yesterday that Prime Minister Hashimoto has been invited to make an official visit to the United States from 21 to 25 July after his trip to the French Republic, which will take place on 19 to 21 July. I think I might make one other point in the sense that you raise this question in the context of a so-called "implied comparison" between the relationship between the United States and China, on the one hand, and the relationship between the United States and Japan, on the other hand. There have been comments made about this. The way we look at it is this, and I have said this before, but I will repeat it. I do feel that it is in the interest of Japan, and of the Asia-Pacific region and of the world that a good and stable relationship develops between the United States and China. We believe that is the case and we also believe that the trilateral inter-relationships between the United States, China and Japan should indeed be, and can indeed be, a positive-sum game as opposed to a zero-sum game where the development of one relationship takes place at the expense of another. In the sense that there have been recent trends for improvement in the relationship between the United States and China, and in the sense that such a trend has apparently been reinforced by President Clinton's visit to China, I feel that that is something that will contribute to the sort of positive-sum game that I was referring to. As I say all this, I would also bear in mind that we do have an enduring alliance relationship with the United States. That is something that we have nurtured over the years and I think that constitutes a very strong basis for a bilateral relationship; a strong relationship in which, when there are issues that arise, we do engage in some straight talk as well. I might make the observation that the development which is taking place between China and the United States, given that China and the United States are not allies in the sense that Japan and the United States are, the development between China and the United States may be seen as a process in which their relationship is in a way, catching up with the sort of relationship that Japan has enjoyed with the United States for some years.

5. Representation of the Government of Japan at the Fourth of July party at the Embassy of the United States of America

   Q: What was the level of representation by the Japanese Government at yesterday's Fourth of July party at the United States Embassy?

   A: That is a good question. Though I was there, apparently it took place in two installments --

   Q: Two shifts, right.

   A: In two shifts, and I was only in the first shift, so I could not really tell exactly. I did not have a very full idea of who they were. I did see some former -Foreign Ministers. I did see a lot of my colleagues, but I do not think it would very much to say that my colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were well-represented.

   Q: I understand no Cabinet Ministers attended, and I also understand that most of the -- that the LDP Secretary General did not attend.

   A: I was there only for a limited portion of the reception and it is not the sort of thing on which I get a detailed report. Had I anticipated the question, I would have managed that, but I did not anticipate the question. I would also point out that the reception took place in the morning and as I understand it, a lot of Ministers and others are very busy campaigning.

6. Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Japan

   Q: A high-ranking business delegation of Japanese that will travel to Teheran soon. Can you tell me what is the purpose of the visit?

   A: I have not got the details, but I see it in the context of the evolving dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Japan. You raised the question about the political dialogue between Iran and Japan the other day, and you asked me about the possibility of a visit by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Japan. That is indeed being looked at in the context of it taking place sometime in the course of this year, but the date has not been fixed. I do not yet have the details of this business mission. I think I will look at it in the context of a gradually evolving relationship between Japan and Iran.

7. The role of Japan in promoting stability in South Asia

   Q: What is the latest development on Japan's plan to mediate the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan? The United States is softening the sanctions against India and Pakistan. Is Japan going to do anything like that?

   A: Well, firstly, I am not quite sure whether our interest in the question of reducing the tension between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan could exactly be described as an offer to mediate. I do take note of the fact that in the Security Council Resolution which we co-sponsored with certain other countries and which was passed unanimously, there was indeed this expression of the desire of the international community to see these questions peacefully resolved between India and Pakistan. As I recall, the resolution urged India and Pakistan to resume their dialogue, and also it called on these two countries to try to find mutually acceptable solutions to a number of problems, including Kashmir. When the Group of Eight (G8) Foreign Ministers met in London shortly after the Security Council Resolution they did issue a document at the end of that meeting, the same sort of idea was reflected. In the course of that meeting, Foreign Minister Obuchi said that as we try to translate these ideas which are contained in the Security Council resolution and the G-8 document into reality, if it should be the case that India and Pakistan and other parties concerned are looking for a suitable venue for that sort of dialogue to take place, we will be very happy to offer Japan. I would also point out that it was agreed at the time of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting that there will be further discussions to take place in a sort of task force of senior officials consisting of the G8 representatives as well as other interested countries and this task force is to look at the question of non-proliferation and other nuclear issues as well as the question of reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. So perhaps there will be follow-up work in that respect. Our position is that if there is a role for Japan to play, for example, by offering a venue, we would be very happy to do so.

8. Japanese press treatment of the United States

   Q: Forgive me if you have already addressed this, but there seems to be a rising tide, for lack of a better term, of anti-American articles in even some credible weekly publications -- non-mainstream publications in Japan. I just wondered, to what do you attribute this. Do you think that this is a natural by-product of the gaiatu dynamic which seems to be taking place between Washington and Tokyo at this time?

   A: It is a bit difficult for me to comment because you referred in very general terms to this "anti-American" tide in some of the non-mainstream journals. Which particular comments should I address myself to?

   Q: I think during the Summers visit, there were a spate of articles -- one was in Syukan Shinsho and just in this week's Shokun there is an article about the United States manipulating foreign exchange in order to dominate Japan. As you know, and I know as well, these articles are a staple of that part of the media but I would argue that the Summers visit seems to have stoked the fire a little bit and I just wondered if the Ministry can offer some comment.

   A: At considerable risk, I would venture the comment that we in this building are not in the habit of eliciting advice on policy from some of the journals that you have mentioned. I hope you would not repeat my comment back to these people. So I do not know how much weight I should assign to the kind of phenomenon that you have just described. Having said that, I do not think it is quite correct to say that there is a rising tide of anti-American sentiment. The substantive issue which is at stake is the future of the Japanese economy. How we can get the Japanese economy out of its current difficulties. And this is something that the Japanese people feel very strongly about as well. It has to do with managing our own economy, and for us to do that is not only in our own interest but in the interest of our Asian neighbors, as well as the United States and other partners. So, I do not think it would be quite correct to describe this situation as something in which outside people are trying to impose on the Japanese people something that they would really detest because pulling Japan out of our current economic difficulties is something that we have got to handle ourselves. Having said that, there may be some people who feel that this is the sort of thing which we should figure out and tackle ourselves, without any advice from the outside world. But there are also a lot of people who feel that in tackling this sort of problem, it is necessary to bear in mind the concerns and expectations which are entertained by people outside Japan. So, on the basis of all this, again, I respectfully would differ with you if you were to argue that there is indeed this rise of -anti-Americanism.    Q: When Summers was here, as my colleague in the Far Eastern Economic Review notes this past week, that some of the television shows did not accord his arrival well. To what do you ascribe these rather extremist depictions of the bilateral relationship?

   A: Again, I think the first point I would make is that I do no subscribe to that kind of mindset.

   Q: That, I understand.

   A: I hope I have made at least that clear. Secondly, why does there seem to be that sort of mindset on the part of some people. I do not know that it is for me to speculate but, I think when people look at our relationship with the United States, depending on their memories, some people hark back to events which took place forty or fifty years ago, and try to see that in that context. But again, I emphasize, there are a lot of other people who feel that the important thing is for us to focus on the present and the future. So, I think what I have been trying to say throughout, in responding to your questions, is that I do not really see a sort of anti-American sentiment developing on the part of the majority of our populace. But, to the extent that the problems that we face in terms of our economic management are indeed very serious, and people when -they are very serious, may sometimes be somewhat sort of sensitive to certain things. You may find some expressions of that.

9. Status of sanctions against the Republic of India

   Q: I have a question regarding the United States softening sanctions against India. Will Japan do the same?

   A: Well, I think in the case of the United States, one of the questions involved is how you interpret the requirements under U.S. law. In our own case, I think in a sense, the coverage of the U.S. sanctions as dictated by law, may be a bit wider than ours. In our own case, our sanctions apply to new commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA), including loans and also applying to ODA through international organizations. They do not apply to trade, for example, so I think there is a difference there. As far as our position with respect to ODA is concerned, there has been no change in the sense that there has been no sort of appreciable positive development from our viewpoint, regarding the question of non-proliferation, a matter which originally prompted us to take these measures.

10. United States response to economic policies of the Government of Japan

    Q: This involves my question about how Japan perceives the by-passing.

    A: Now this seems to be the day for perception, it seems.

    Q: Actually what this gentleman was saying is all over the press too, as you know. How can we characterize Japan's collective feelings? Rubin was making pronouncments in Bangkok about what Japan should be doing with its economy. He did not come here to say that, but he could have. What does Japan --

    A: I will answer that Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin of the United States of America, even though he may not have come to Japan, he does seem to be quite successful in making known what his concerns are. To that extent, I think your question may be an academic question, in the sense that I think we have many different ways of knowing what the interest of the United States is in all this, and what they would like Japan to do.

    Q: But how does Japan feel about it?

    A: We take them as expressions of the American interest and expectations and we bear them in mind as we grapple with the task of formulating ways and means of extricating ourselves from our current economic difficulty. I would say, for example, just yesterday, the second stage of the Total Plan for revitalizing the Japanese financial system has been worked out the central idea being that of the Bridge Bank. In formulating that plan we have taken very much into account the experience in the United States regarding the Savings and Loan crisis, and you may note that some of the central ideas in the Total Plan, notably, disclosure and transparency, on the one hand, and the ways of dealing with the whole bad-assets program, especially the idea of the bridge bank is something which is very similar to one that has been tested in the United States. In that sense, there has been very intense communication between our two governments.

    Q: Do you think the steps to correct the financial situation -- bridge bank anouncements, would be taking place according to the current schedule, without what would be described as pressure from the United States?

    A: Again, I do not see it in terms of pressure and so forth, but I will keep saying, that in trying to grapple with this sort of issue, and this is something that if we may go back to more than fifty years, when there was a financial crisis in Japan but things have changed since then. When it was a question specifically, of trying to deal with a bad debt problem, or more specifically, trying to remove the overhang of bad assets from the books of the financial institutions, there are not too many examples from which we can learn, and in that respect, the experience the United States has provided us with some pointers. But all this took place in the sense of both our government and political parties concerned, and our businesses, and the public searching for ways to tide over the difficulies and looking for hints. Some hints may have been provided by the United States. You may call it pressure, I do not.