As was demonstrated by September 11 attacks a new trend in terrorism may be to target symbolic monuments, to maximize casualties among innocent civilians, to seek widest publicity and visibility, and to cause panic among people in civilized societies. The use of weapons of mass destruction for this purpose may have even more devastating effects. Therefore, all efforts have to be made to prevent such a thing from happening again.

   On the other hand, it is a fact that small arms and light weapons remain to be by far the most frequently used means of terrorist attacks even today, particularly in the regions of conflicts and instability such as Middle East, South Asia and Central America. According to the figure cited by Mr. Rohan Gunaratna at a Symposium on Terrorism organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations soon after the September 11 tragedy, 88 to 92 per cent of terrorist attacks in todayﾕs world take place in a localized manner where both the perpetrator and the victim are from the same country. One of his conclusions was, "as the bulk of terrorism employs firearms or explosives, controlling their widespread availability is at the heart of reducing the scale of terrorist violence" . I agree with this. The September 11 incident was only the tip of an iceberg, and without addressing its broader base, it would not be possible to effectively reduce terrorist violence.

   As a matter of fact, international efforts to control the excessive availability of small arms and light weapons were initiated in mid- nineties, not necessarily because of terrorist violence, but mainly because of the brutal damages they could cause in regional and internal conflicts. In todayﾕs world of post-cold-war era, large-scale wars between major military powers became a rarity, but regional or internal conflicts fought mostly with small arms and light weapons became more frequent and less controllable. According to the UN Secretary-Generalﾕs report to the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations more than five millions people were said to have died in such conflicts in the last decade or so. Naturally, far greater number of people were injured and/or forced to become refugees. Thus, small arms and light weapons are the real weapons of mass destruction of today.

(Small arms "Action Programme" refers to terrorism)

   It was for this reason that in July 2001, after some six yearsﾕ intensive preparatory activities in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and also at numerous regional and sub-regional meetings, the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects came to be convened, and a Programme of Action was adopted. This was only a little over a month before the September 11 attacks.

   In the preamble of the Action Programme, reference to terrorism is made in two paragraphs:

   "Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism," (I, 5)

   "Concerned also about the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective," (I,7) Also, in the main portion of the Action Programme reference is made to it in the following two paragraphs:

    "To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime," (II, 38)

   "Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism," (III,15)    As can be seen, the close linkage between small arms and light weapons and terrorism was a matter well recognized even before the happening of September 11 attacks. Let us look a little more closely at the linkage between small arms, regional conflicts and terrorism.

(Small arms and regional conflicts)

   First, what are the small arms and light weapons? They are smaller and lighter types of military weapons. According to the definition used in the 1997 report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms which I had the honor to chair, "small arms" include pistols and revolvers, rifles and assault rifles such as AK 47, M 16, sub-machine guns and light machine-guns, all of which can be carried and used by one person. "Light weapons" include heavy machine-guns, mortars, portable anti-tank/anti-aircraft guns, rockets and missiles such as RPG-7, all of which can be carried and used by several persons serving as a crew. "Small arms and light weapons" also cover "ammunition and explosives", including grenades and land-mines. For the sake of convenience, we may simply call all of them by the name of "small arms".

   Second, why did small arms become excessively available? Until around the end of the Second World War, they were almost exclusively for the use by infantry soldiers, and seldom went out to the hands of ordinary citizens. However, during the Cold War, the so-called "proxy wars" --- wars of national liberation, wars to suppress guerrilla activities, etc. --- were fought in the third world, and small arms were supplied abundantly both from the Eastern and Western camps. In these proxy wars, these weapons became accessible to a large number of populace including women and children who were not professional soldiers.

   Even after the Cold War came to an end and arms reduction became a world-wide trend, small arms that became surplus as a result continued to be supplied to regions of conflicts. Besides, production-capable countries continued to increase. According to Small Arms Survey 2001, while 196 companies in 52 countries could produce such weapons in 1980s, the number increased to 385 companies in 64 countries in 1990s . Consequently, it is estimated that about 650 million small arms are in circulation in the world today, roughly one tenth of the worldﾕs population.

   Furthermore, with the modernization of the means of transportation and information technology, small arms became more readily available to any groups --- good or bad governments, rebel forces, terrorists and criminals --- through the intermediary of illicit traffickers. The size of illicit trade in small arms can only be a guess, but it has been suggested that its annual global value is in the range of $2 billion to $3 billion, compared with $7 billion to $10 billion in legal trade.

   Third, why did small arms became such a big issue? This was because the devastating damages caused by small arms became intolerable. Small arms by themselves may not cause conflicts with which they are fought, but their excessive availability can prolong the duration of conflicts, and exacerbate the lethality of conflicts. Indeed, it was only from around 1992 with the horrific civil wars in Somalia, Angola and Rwanda that the problem of small arms came to be recognized as a matter of serious concern to the international community. The number of lives lost was staggering --- more than 2.5 million in these three conflicts alone.

   It was reported that "during the Rwandan genocide, Hutu militia (Interabamwe) were trained to murder 1,000 people every 20 minutes." It was also a fact that the rebel forces in Somalia led by Mohammed Farah Aidid used anti-tank/aircraft rockets to shoot down US attack helicopters. When such light weapons are used against targets in city centers, people would be panicked.

   Indeed, small arms became a problem because regional and internal conflicts of today are fought not in the style of regular warfare in which targeting of civilians is a crime, but in the style of irregular warfare where there exist no clear battle lines and no distinction between civilians and combatants. Moreover, the trend is to employ more lethal weapons --- assault rifles rather than pistols and revolvers, and then mortars and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenade launchers) rather than assault rifles. In such warfare, creating a state of panic by means of mass massacre and the burning down of towns and villages is the quickest way to threaten and topple local authorities.

(Regional conflicts and terrorism)

   Now, let us look at the linkage between regional conflicts and terrorism in both of which small arms are the weapons most frequently used. First, there is the problem of the interchangeable nature of regional and internal conflicts and terrorist activities. Normally, the distinction is clear. Competing forces in regional or internal conflicts fight for the control of land or territory, while terrorists do not seek to do so and tend to act clandestinely. Conflicts may be prevented or settled if skillfully mediated, while terrorism defies prevention or settlement because it is clandestine. Therefore, even when mass massacres take place and people are panicked in regional or internal conflicts, conflicts are conflicts and not terrorism.

   However, this distinction gets blurred often, particularly in the regions of conflicts and instability. When terrorists are successful in their struggle, the struggle may develop into a civil war. Conversely, if one side in a conflicts gets the upper hand, the losing side may go clandestine, hide among civilians and become terrorists. Thus, the interchangeable nature of the two can be a problem.

   Second, as the use of small arms in civil wars becomes more brutal and lethal as mentioned already, the same can happen with the terrorist violence. As is well known, the original usage of the term "terrorism" as recorded by the Academie Fran_aise in 1798 was "system or rule of terror". Then, much later, from around the time of the end of Czarist Russia, the term was used by revolutionaries in justifying the assassination of oppressive leaders. The most common form of terrorist attack for decades until recently, or even today, was believed to be ambushes followed by bombings and assassinations. Also, casualty among ordinary people was to be avoided as much as possible, because terrorists also had a cause to defend, legitimacy to claim, and the need to obtain sympathy and support from their compatriots or sympathizers.

   However, with the new trend in the use of small arms in regional and internal conflicts for mass massacre and creating a state of panic, terrorist violence can follow the same trend. The bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the September 11 attacks may have been symptoms of such a disturbing trend. As is often pointed out, it is the underlying discontent and culture of violence that breed such acts. Therefore, if we wish to reduce the scale of regional and internal conflicts and also of terrorist violence, a comprehensive approach addressing the root causes of discontent and at the same time the excessive availability of the tools of violence --- small arms --- would be needed.

   The third important linkage between regional conflicts and terrorism is the recent phenomena of so-called "failed states". Afghanistan was one of the most seriously affected nations by internal conflicts and the excessive availability of small arms. These weapons were brought in or supplied abundantly from outside world during civil war year that lasted more than two decades. Even after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in late 1980s, fighting among tribal forces resumed, with Taliban forces getting the upper hand, but with no cease-fire in sight, with no viable government, and with a large number of its people killed or displaced from their homeland.

   What made the case of Afghanistan even worse was, as is well known, that the Taliban forces became aligned with the Al Qaeda terrorist group, and the land became the training ground and launching pad for international terrorist activities. Although terrorists normally do not seek to control land or territory, the availability of a sanctuary from law-enforcement activities must have been more than a welcome offer.

   What is needed in such a situation is first the military operation to wipe out terrorist forces, and second to restore the failed state back to a viable state that would never again be used as a base for terrorist activities. While the first task of military operation may have to be carried out by the United States and other capable and willing nations, the second task of restoring failed states requires the support and cooperation from much wider international community. The supply of small arms will have to be controlled as effectively as possible, and the failed states need to be assisted in restoring governability, by clearing land-mines, collecting and destroying leftover weapons, re-integrating former combatants into society, and by rebuilding reliable police and security forces, for example.

(Main features of "Action Programme")

   The control of small arms requires a comprehensive approach, "both from a supply side and demand side perspective" as was stated in the preamble of the Programme of Action on Small Arms (I,7) adopted at the United Nations Conference in 2001.

   The adoption of the Action Programme was the first major step the international community has taken to deal with the problem of small arms, and this was a right step also in reducing the terrorist violence. As is usually the case with documents adopted after lengthy negotiations and compromises, the Action Programme is not necessarily a reader-friendly document. Besides, some of the common understandings not clearly spelled out in the document are of no less importance. Therefore, I wish to quickly highlight some of its main features.

   First, the title "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects" might be somewhat misleading, because it gives the impression as if the illicit trade was the only problem. It is true that some of the participating states at the UN Conference wanted the Programme of Action to deal only with illicit trafficking, and not to interfere in any way with the legal manufacture, possession, trade and so forth of small arms and light weapons. Therefore, the respect for such legitimate and sovereign right of states was clearly spelled out in the preamble of the document (I, 9, 10).

   However, the consensus view that prevailed at the Conference was that since most of illicit trade result from the diversion of such weapons legally manufactured, possessed or traded, the latter activities should be placed under the effective control of states, and that this should comprise the bulk of measures to be undertaken by states in the Action Programme.

   Furthermore, the Action Programme covers some other aspects of the issue such as disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation of former combatants (DDR) that has to be addressed in the regions seriously affected by excessive and destabilizing accumulation of such weapons. The words "in all its aspects" used in the title were understood to leave enough room for such flexibility. In other words, the Programme of Action is a set of recommended measures to prevent and reduce the excessive availability of small arms --- a product of comprehensive approach as it was conceived from the time the international community started to deal with the issue some six years earlier.

   Secondly, as mentioned already, most of the measures contained in the Action Programme are for the effective control of small arms and light weapons, or of the supply side of such weapons in order to prevent their diversion from legal to illegal actors. For example, all states are requested to have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to control the production, possession, export, import and so forth of such weapons (II, 2, 3, 6, 12, 23, 28). The marking (II, 7, 8, III, 12) record-keeping (II, 9), and secure stockpile management (II, 17, 29) of such weapons, and the disposal of the surplus of such weapons (II, 16, 18,19,20,34, III, 14) will have to be ensured also.

   Thirdly, the need for closer regional cooperation and information sharing among the police, customs, border control and arms control officials is stressed (II, 27). The need for international cooperation and assistance for this purpose is also mentioned (III, 7, 15).

   Fourth, as already mentioned, some of the demand side problems of the excessive availability of small arms are dealt with in the Programme of Action also. The need for assistance to DDR programs, including the destruction of collected weapons in the regions seriously affected by the excessive availability of such weapons is mentioned (II, 21, 30, 34, III, 14, 16). The need to address the problem of affected children is mentioned (II, 22). The need to promote public awareness and the culture of peace, instead of the culture of weapons, is also mentioned (II, 41).    Fifth, the need for cooperation and assistance in implementing the Programme of Action is given a special consideration as a separate section in the document. The majority of participating states from the developing world found it difficult to implement the Action Programme by themselves because of the lack of technical and financial resources. Therefore, cooperation and assistance for capacity building in implementing the Action Programme is stressed (III, 6).

   Sixth, some mechanical or institutional devices are incorporated in the Action Programme in order to ensure its effective and sustained implementation. For example, states are requested to establish or designate national coordination agencies or bodies to deal with the problems of small arms and light weapons (II, 4), and, in addition, states and sub-regional and regional organizations are requested to establish a point of contact to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Action Programme (II, 5, 24). Also, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs is requested to collate and circulate data and information provided by states on a voluntary basis (II, 33). Furthermore, the convening of a conference no later than 2006 to review the progress, and also of the biennial meetings to consider national, regional and global implementation are recommended in the Action Programme (IV, 1(a), (b)).

   Before concluding, I wish to emphasize again that the adoption of the Programme of Action at the UN Conference was a major first step the international community has taken on the problem of small arms in order to reduce the scale of regional and internal conflicts and of terrorist violence. It may not be a perfect document, and the possibility for its further improvement in future is provided for. But, in the meanwhile, all the members of the international community will have to make vigorous and dedicated efforts to implement it because, without doing so, the Programme of Action would end up as a useless paperwork.

1. "Terrorism and small arms and light weapons" by Rohan Gunaratna in Terrorism and Disarmament, DDA Occasional Papers, No. 5, October 2001, pp.50~57.
   
   
2. "We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century", Report of the Secretary-General, A/54/2000, paragraph 193.
   
   
3. Small Arms Survey 2001, Oxford University Press, p. 10.
   
   
4. "A Scourge of Small Arms" by Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, in Scientific American, June 2000, p. 49.
   
   
5. Ibid, Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 207.
   
   
6. "Defining Terrorism", Strategic Comments, IISS, vol. 7, issue 9, November 2001.