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トップページ > 外交政策 > 軍縮・不拡散 |
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堂之脇外務省参与のスピーチ アフリカは小型武器問題の最大の被害地域であり、アフリカの紛争予防、再発予防問題を考えるに際しては小型武器問題は避けて通れない問題である。小型武器問題に関しては2001年の国連小型武器会議で「行動計画」が採択されたが、これはそれに先立つ数年間にわたるわが国のイニシアティブによる政府専門家会議の報告書とか、国連小型武器会議準備委員会での作業をふまえたものであった。他方、アフリカ諸国の立場からすれば、国連会議の半年ほど前の2000年12月にOAU(アフリカ統一機構)閣僚会議が採択した「バマコ宣言」が国連の「行動計画」作成に大きく貢献したということである。今日でも多くのアフリカ諸国は「バマコ宣言」と「国連行動計画」の双方の実施が重要であるとしている。これはアフリカの「オーナーシップ」意識として歓迎されるものである。そこで、小型武器問題解決のために必要とされる措置につき「国連行動計画」と「バマコ宣言」とが共通して行っている提言を中心にアフリカにおける小型武器問題を論じた論文を以下に紹介する。これは2003年3月に外務省と日本国際問題研究所の共催で開催された「アフリカにおける平和定着に関するシンポジウム」で堂之脇外務省参与により発表されたものである。 Symposium organized by JIIA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs March 11~12, 2003, at the UN University, Japan Conflict prevention in Africa by way of the control of small arms and light weapons. Presentation by Mitsuro Donowaki As is well known, conflict prevention became a topical issue from around mid-nineties after the frustrating failure of the UN peace-keeping operations in Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere. "Prevention is better than cure" was the catch-phrase. In parallel, also from around mid-nineties, the international community started to tackle the problem of small arms and light weapons. This was because they are the primary weapons used in internal and regional conflicts that became uncontrollable in recent years. Small arms and light weapons may not cause conflicts with which they are fought, but their excessive availability prolongs conflicts, exacerbates the scale and lethality of conflicts, and even after conflicts come to an end, seriously hinders the consolidation of peace. Why not do something about the excessive availability of such weapons? By so doing, the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts may be reduced if not prevented completely, and the consolidation of peace can certainly be made easier. It was for this reason that the UN General Assembly established the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1996 by a resolution introduced by Japan. The Panel which I had the honor to chair produced a report in 1997, the first ever of its kinds, containing various practical recommendations. The report had the effect of triggering a large number of small-arms-related initiatives at all levels, global, regional and sub-regional, as well as at governmental and non-governmental levels. Eventually, in accordance with relevant resolutions introduced by Japan and others, the stage was set for the convening of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001, and for the adoption by the Conference of the Programme of Action. I wish to stress that Africa, as the region most seriously affected by the problems of small arms and light weapons, took active initiatives in the process leading up to the UN Conference. For instance, in October 1998, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared a moratorium on the imports, exports and manufacture of small arms, and subsequently adopted a Code of Conduct related to its implementation. ECOWAS also established a regional project administered by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) called the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). In Southern Africa, at a ministerial meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU) held in November 1998, an action program concerning the proliferation of and illegal trafficking in small arms was approved. Then, in March 2000 at a regional meeting in Kenya of the foreign minister of ten countries, the "Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa" was signed. As a continent-wide initiative, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that met in July 1999 in Algiers decided to take a coordinated African approach to the problem of small arms. Following this decision, after a preparatory conference of continental experts held in May 2000 in Addis Ababa, the "Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons" was issued on December 1, 2000. As can be seen, Japan played an active role in placing the issue of small arms and light weapons squarely on the international agenda as one of the top-priority issues, and Africa also played an active role by making valuable inputs in the UN Programme of Action itself. After the UN Conference of 2001, what is now required of all of us is to ensure the effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action, in order to facilitate the consolidation of peace in Africa. In view of the limited time available, I will not go into the details of the UN Programme of Action. Instead, I wish to highlight some of the key recommendations contained in both the UN Programme of Action and the Bamako Declaration. First is the importance of national, rather than international efforts. It is the primary responsibility of states to make efforts to control small arms and light weapons, for example, by ensuring to have necessary legislative and other measures to treat as criminal offences the illicit manufacturing, trafficking, possession, etc. of such weapons, and also by collecting and destroying illicit, seized and surplus weapons. This would require national coordination and national action programs. It was for this reason that both the UN Programme of Action and the Bamako declaration strongly recommended the establishment of national coordination agencies, or national focal points. As a result, such efforts are already in good progress in a number of countries in Africa, such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. Even as early as in July 2001, the official title of the representative of Rwanda who spoke at the UN Conference was "Chairman of National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Minister of Defense of Rwanda". I remember this because I presided over the so-called "high-level segment" of the Conference. Second is the importance of the active involvement of civil society in the formulation and implementation of national action programs. Of course, the primary responsibility for solving the problems of small arms falls on national governments, but civil society can make valuable inputs and support governmental efforts in this field because it is the ordinary citizens including women and children who suffer the most from armed conflicts and violence. Also, their support and cooperation would be essential in enhancing public awareness and in transforming culture of violence into culture of peace. The role played by SaferAfrica, Saferworld and other NGOs in the past few years in assisting governments in establishing national focal points and action programs in Africa should be highly commended. Third is the importance of sub-regional initiatives for cooperation and information-sharing among police, customs and border-control agencies to combat illicit trafficking in small arms. Since illicit traffickers take advantage of porous borders and the lack of vigilance and coordination among law-enforcement officials, the creation of sub-regional networks for cooperation and information sharing among them is urgently needed. ECOWAS has been making efforts in this direction since 1998. The Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) has been making significant progress in this respect since 1998. The Nairobi Declaration of 2000 also stressed the importance of such efforts. Fourth is the importance of capacity-building. Most countries in the affected region lack financial and technical resources to train and deploy adequate number of qualified police, customs and border-control officers. Without reliable law-enforcement mechanism and good governance, people tend to seek weapons for their own self-defense, creating ideal conditions for illicit traffickers and criminals. Therefore, assistance and cooperation from outside states and international organizations in a position to do so are strongly urged in the UN Programme of Action and the Bamako Declaration. Fifth is the importance of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of former combatants (DDR) in a post-conflict situation. Here again, cooperation and assistance by states and international organizations in a position to do so are strongly recommended. An integrated approach combining disarmament and development assistance was first experimented by the United Nations in West Africa and then in Albania, and came to be known as DDR programs more recently. Japan also has been undertaking, since a few years ago, what we call "weapons for development" projects in Cambodia in cooperation with the European Union. Japan now intends to expand such assistance to other post-conflict regions of the world including Africa. Last but not the least is the importance of restraint or control of the supply-side of small arms and light weapons. Both the UN Programme of Action and the Bamako Declaration strongly recommended the supplier countries to exercise strict control over the manufacture and export of such weapons. Marking, record-keeping and tracing of such weapons, as well as the control of brokering activities are mentioned in this connection, because in most cases it is through the diversion of legally manufactured or traded arms that they end up as illicit arms. But I do not think it is necessary to go into detail on these issues at this time, because most countries in Africa are neither major manufacturers nor major suppliers of such weapons. I wish to conclude by stressing that Japan is a unique nation that as a matter of principle does not export any military weapons. Thank you. |
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