Section 4. Soviet Union

 

1. Internal Politics

 

(1) Progress in Political Reform

The past year, which marked President Mikhail Gorbachev's 5th year in power, was an epoch-making year in Soviet history, for it witnessed drastic political reforms in the country.

People's disenchantment with perestroika spread and criticism of the Communist Party leadership from conservative elements of the party intensified. Behind these moves lie the aggravation of ethnic disputes in the three Baltic states, Caucasus and other regions; the deterioration of economic disorders resulting from commodity shortages, inflation and unemployment; and the eclipse of authority and leadership of the Communist Party. President Gorbachev acknowledges that it is difficult for the Communist Party alone to surmount the current social crisis, the party needs the cooperation of other social forces, and that it is inevitable for the party to relegate its authority to state organizations. It was against these backgrounds that Gorbachev convened an expanded general meeting of the party central committee in February 1990 to propose the deletion of the article on the Communist Party's leading role from the Constitution, endorsement of pluralism and the introduction of a presidency. These proposals were adopted after heated debate between radical reformists and conservatives. At the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1990, Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev was elected President. Presidential power has been vastly strengthened as compared with the authority given to the defunct Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The president 1) serves as the supreme commander of the armed forces, 2) has the authority to send back legislative bills to the legislature; and 3) has the authority to dissolve the legislature. As auxiliary organs to the presidential office, the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation were established.

At the 28th Party Congress held in July 1990, the conservatives stepped up their criticism of the party leadership, and some radical reformists including Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, seceded from the party. However, President Gorbachev successfully managed the congress by controlling the conservatives, winning the whole party's approval of his perestroika policy line and his present foreign policy line, and obtaining the party's basic endorsement of the party's orientation toward transformation from a social vanguard into a parliamentary political party based on pluralism. Furthermore, President Gorbachev created, as part of the structural changes, the post of Deputy General Secretary who supports the General Secretary and supervises the Secretariat. President Gorbachev was elected General Secretary and Vladimir Ivashkov, former president of the Ukraine Republic, was elected Deputy General Secretary. Gorbachev appointed his associates to key posts of the Politburo, Secretariat and other party organizations.

 

(2) Formation of Groups

As drastic political reform progressed, inter-party debate on how the party leadership should be, with a result that various groups were formed including the Democratic Manifesto group led by pro-reformist local delegates and the conservative-led Leninism Manifesto group. The Democratic Manifesto group scored major gains in local elections, with Professor Popov elected Chairman of the Moscow City Council and Boris Yeltsin, delegate to the USSR Supreme Soviet, elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic. Some members of the Democratic Manifesto Group, their argument rejected by the 28th party congress, are moving to secede from the party and form a new party.

Under the democratization, various organizations such as the Russian Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic Party, Socialist Party and Christian Democratic League have emerged, as citizens took initiatives in forming unauthorized groups in a move toward pluralism under democratization.

 

(3) Ethnic Problem

Ethnic disputes further aggravated in the three Baltic states, Caucusas and Central Asian countries, and their settlement became the most important task for the Gorbachev regime in pursuing its perestroika policy. The Gorbachev Regime convened a general meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee in September 1989 to discuss the ethnic problem in general and adopted a party manifesto on ethnic policy. However, the ethnic disputes have remained tense and have rather turned more complex.

In the three Baltic states, an organization called "Human Chain," aiming at linking the three republics, was established in August 1989 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Russo-German nonaggression pact, underscoring the Baltic states' desire for independence from the USSR and the strength of the Baltic people's solidarity. The Lithuanian Communist Party decided to secede from the USSR Communist Party in December 1989. In the election of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in March 1990 the ethnic front Sajudis won a majority and the Sajudis-led Lithuanian legislature adopted a declaration of Lithuania's independence from the USSR on March 11, 1990. President Gorbachev, denouncing Lithuania's independence as violation of the Constitution, cut the supply of oil, natural gas and other goods to Lithuania to pressure the republic into retracting the declaration of independence. The Western powers issued statements seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute through dialogue and urged the Soviet Union to restrict its action. In June, while negotiations with the Soviet Government were going on, Lithuania decided to temporarily freeze its declaration of independence, with the result that the Soviet sanction was lifted, Estonia and Latvia followed Lithuania, declaring their independence on March 30 and May 4, respectively. However, Estonia and Latvia set transitional periods, aiming at achieving independence through negotiations with the USSR.

The ethnic disturbance between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the control of Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous state, which started in February 1989, resulted in heavy casualties. The USSR Government took an emergency measure of directly controlling Nagorno-Karabakh, but unsuccessfully. As the conflict became further aggravated at the end of 1989 it developed into a massive bloodbath, the Gorbachev Government decreed a state of emergency and ordered regular Soviet troops into the region to suppress the riot by force.

In Central Asia, following the Uzbekistan riot (Note), a clash between the Kirgis and the Uzbeks occurred in Osh state in the Kirgis Republic over the leasing of land for housing construction and other matters. The disturbance spread to all parts of the Kirgizia Republic and resulted in more than 150 persons killed.

The ethnic problem developed into moves in Russia, the Ukraine and other republics to pursue their own identity.

The Russian Congress of People's Deputies on June 12, 1990, adopted by an overwhelming majority a declaration on the sovereignty of the Russian Republic, which immediately came into force. According to the declaration, 1) the Constitution and laws of the Russian Republic take precedence over the Constitution and laws of the USSR, 2) the Russian Republic possesses the exclusive right of the ownership and utilization of natural resources in the republic, 3) the Russian Republic reserves the right to secede from the USSR, and 4) the territory of the Russian Republic will not be altered without the expression of the people's will in a referendum.

Against a background of rising Russian nationalism, the Russian Republic Communist Party was created in June 1990 and Polozkov, was elected first secretary of the Communist Party.

The Ukraine declared its sovereignty on July 16, 1990, and passed a resolution on the creation of republic armed forces, and the issuance of its own currency. The republics of Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazav and White Russia followed by declaring their sovereignty.

Under these circumstances, the Gorbachev Government aims to create a loose federation of Soviet states. The concept is now being studied mainly at the Council of the Federation.

 

(4) Economy

In contrast to the progress in political reform, glasnost (freedom of information) and other areas, perestroika, now in its 5th year, has failed economically to achieve such substantial results as people feel in their lives. Due to commodities shortages and inflation, the situation is rather deteriorating. Under the impact of large-scale coal mine strikes in the summer of 1989, ethnic conflicts and disputes, and low morale of the people, main economic indices in 1989 sharply declined from 1988. Furthermore, gross national product in the first half of 1990 declined 1% from the same period of the previous year. Due to the unusual decline in GNP the economic confusion in the Soviet Union is further deepening. Realization of a higher living standard which is the important task for the Government in accelerating perestroika, is coming slowly. Shortages of consumer goods and foodstuffs are continuing. Rationing has been introduced for some items. Despite massive imports of foodstuffs and consumer goods aimed at easing the shortages, the situation remains unchanged. Unsatisfied demand (a situation in which consumers cannot buy goods due to shortages even if they have money) totaled 165 billion rubles (about $260 billion) in value at the end of 1989.

Under these circumstances, Government programs on economic reforms and legal adjustments including the enactment of the ownership law, all aimed at a shift to a market-oriented economy, are progressing, while undergoing the process of trials and errors.

The Ownership Law was enacted in March 1990 to diversify the form of ownership and grant legitimacy to the non-state-owned sector by correcting the overemphasis placed on state ownership.

This does not mean, however, that the law recognizes private ownership of production means as in a capitalistic economy. Private ownership under the law is limited to several sectors including private agriculture.

The Basic Rental Law, the Basic Land Law and the Enterprise Law were enacted in November 1989, February 1990 and June 1990, respectively, and laws concerning taxation, banking, employment and prohibition of monopoly are expected to be enacted.

A program specifying the time schedule for economic reforms was examined from around the autumn of 1989 and was approved by the Congress of People's Deputies in December. However, as President Gorbachev has been pointing out the conservative nature of the program and urging acceleration and radicalization of reforms since the turn of the year, voices are being raised for a review of the program.

These moves prompted the Government to formulate a new program, which, after examination by the Presidential Council, was submitted to the Supreme Soviet in the form of a report of Premier Nikolai Ryzkhov, and deliberated there. The new program envisaged the transfer to an adjusted market economy by 1995 in three stages and was more oriented to a market economy. In particular, it called for embarking on a price reform, which is the central issue of the economic reform, 1991. Specifically, the price reform would nearly double food prices and almost triple bread prices from July 1, 1990. The price reform was to be accompanied by compensationary measures. But, since it could directly affect people's lives, the reform has caused anxiety and restlessness among people, and citizens in Moscow rushed to shops to corner commodities. In view of the strong objections to the foreseeable price raises, the Government was forced to adopt an alternative program by September 1, to be deliberated at the third session of the Supreme Soviet in the autumn and after. The proposed bread price raise was also to be reviewed after the autumn.

 

2. Diplomacy

 

As the situation in Eastern Europe changed dramatically and unification of Germany became imminent, the Soviet Union has remained committed to a non-intervention policy. Rather, the Soviet Union supported these moves, prompting the collapse of the postwar European order and the pursuit of a new European order. Its diplomatic activities with the United States achieved various concrete results through the holding of summit meetings and Foreign Ministers meetings. The Soviet Union also launched new diplomatic initiatives in Asia, as the holding of a summit meeting with the Republic of Korea.

 

(1) Relations with the U.S. and Western Europe

In U.S.-Soviet relations, the first U.S.-Soviet summit since U.S. President Bush took office was held in Malta in December 1989. Though the Malta summit was an unofficial session without negotiation, the two leaders exchanged views on a wide range of issues and pledged to reach accord on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Negotiations on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CEF) within 1990. At a joint press conference held after the summit, they confirmed that the U.S.-Soviet relations were headed for cooperation from confrontation and declared the advent of a new era in the superpower relationship. In the next U.S.-Soviet summit held in Washington from late May through early June 1990, the two leaders issued a Joint Statement on their basic agreement on the START and signed a number of documents including the Chemical Weapons Agreement and the Commercial Agreement. The two leaders also deepened their understanding of each other's stand on German unification and the issue of the Baltic republics, both of which will be central to the building of a new European order. But, they stopped short of solving their differences and decided to continue consultations.

As to relations with Western Europe, General Secretary Gorbachev visited Finland in October 1989 and Italy in November, while Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney came to Moscow in November 1989, French President Mitterrand in December and May, and British Prime Minister Thatcher in June.

Through these summit talks, the Soviet side appealed for each country's support to the strengthening of bilateral relations to promote the induction of capital and technology needed for the economic vitalization of the Soviet Union, and concluded various agreements and arrangements concerning economy and trade. In connection with the West European move toward integration, General Secretary Gorbachev strongly urged for the building of a "Common European House" during his visit to France and West Germany. He also called at the Vatican during his visit to Italy and achieved rapprochement with the Vatican by agreeing with the Pope on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, for his part, signed the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the EC during his visit to Brussels in December.

As German unification emerged as a reality following the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the Soviet Union at first strongly opposed West German Chancellor Kohl's 10-point proposal on German unification made in November on the ground that unification was not yet on the agenda. However when East German Premier Modrow proposed German unification on condition of neutrality of a unified Germany in February, the Soviet Union supported the idea. In his talks with West German Chancellor Kohl in Moscow during the same month, General Secretary Gorbachev acknowledged that German unification is basically a matter of self-determination for the German people.

 

(2) Relations with Eastern Europe

Just as it had done to capitalist countries, the Soviet Union had applied to East European countries such principles as the respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the freedom of choice. Similarly, the Soviet Union encouraged East European countries to adopt perestroika and emphasized the respect of each country's independence. In fact, the Soviet Union supported East European moves toward reform, such as the inauguration of a Solidarity-led administration in Poland in September, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November and the collapse of the Ceausescu Regime in Romania in December. General Secretary Gorbachev convened a summit conference of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in December which criticized the military intervention in the "Prague Spring" reform movement in Czechoslovakia. The criticism was made in a Soviet statement and also in a joint statement by the five countries involved in the "Prague Spring" affair. Since the turn of the year, the Soviet Union has signed agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops by the summer of 1991, with Czechoslovakia in February and with Hungary in March.

 

(3) Relations with Asia

Since the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in May 1989, the two countries have exchanged visits of their leaders, with Deputy Chinese Premier Tian Jiyun visiting the Soviet Union in July, and Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman Anatoliv Lukyanov and Valentin Falin, director of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party, visiting China, in September and December, respectively. During Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow in April, the two countries confirmed their agreement to develop bilateral relations according to the five-point principle of peaceful coexistence and signed documents regarding reductions in their military forces deployed along their border and economic cooperation. In March 1990 the Soviet Union signed with Mongolia an agreement on the Soviet Union's troop withdrawal from Mongolia by 1992.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union announced in January that it had started withdrawing its troops from Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and had withdrawn MiG-23 fighters and Tu-16 bombers from there at the end of 1989.

In 1990, moves were set into motion toward normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea. Kim Yong Sam, a top leader of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, visited the Soviet Union in March. Soviet President Gorbachev held talks with Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco in June in the first summit session ever held between Soviet and Korean leaders, which contributed to a substantial improvement in relations between the two countries.

Other exchange of visits included Indonesian President Suharto's visit to Moscow in September and Soviet Premier Ryzkhov's visit to Thailand, Australia and Singapore in February 1990, underscoring the Soviet Union's positive diplomatic initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.

 

(4) Relations with the Middle East

The Soviet Union stepped up improvement of relations with Iran which has been adopting realistic policies under President Mohammad Rafsanjani. In June 1989 President Rafsanjani (then the Speaker of the legislature) visited Moscow though the Ayatollah Khomeini had died right before then.

Egyptian President Mubarak visited the Soviet Union in May 1990 as the first Egyptian head of state to do so in 18 years, whereby Russo-Egyptian relations, gradually improving since the 1980s, made great strides.

Russian Jew's emigration to Israeli-occupied territories was strongly opposed by Arab countries. As the number of Russian Jews leaving the Soviet Union has sharply increased as a result of the Gorbachev Administration's easing of exit restrictions, Israel encouraged these emigrants to settle in the occupied territories. The Israeli policy was criticized by the Soviet Union.

 

(5) Relations with Latin America

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made an unheralded visit to Nicaragua and Cuba in October 1989. (His visit to Nicaragua was the first ever by a Soviet Foreign Minister.) The Soviet Union has reconfirmed the suspension of its supply of arms to Nicaragua. Nicaragua on its part promised to make public the supply of light arms and ammunition from Cuba and other Soviet-bloc countries.

The Soviet Union is also boosting relations with other Latin American countries. In January 1990 Brazil's then President designate Fernando Collor visited the Soviet Union. Relations with Chile were normalized in March.

 

3. Relations with Japan

 

(1) Overview

Active political dialogue has been unfolding between Japan and the Soviet Union. Since Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  visited Japan in December 1988, Foreign Ministerial conferences were held five times and Vice Foreign Ministerial-level working group meetings on a peace treaty also five times up to July 1990. On the political level, Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Yakovlev visited Japan in November 1989 and former Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe visited Moscow in January 1990. At a Japan-Soviet Foreign Ministers meeting in the United Nations in September 1989, Shevardnadze conveyed to the Japanese side President (then Communist Party General Secretary) Gorbachev's intention to visit Japan. President Gorbachev himself confirmed his intention in his letter to Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu in February 1990.

Against such a background Japan has taken active initiatives for improving relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of a basic concept for Japan-Soviet relations outlined by then Foreign Minister Uno at a Japan-Soviet Foreign Ministers conference in May 1989. The basic concept is that Japan will expand overall relations with the Soviet Union in equilibrium while giving priority to settling the northern territorial question and concluding a peace treaty.

Along this policy line, Japan has advanced positive arguments in various negotiations, accepted two Soviet economic survey missions concerning the promotion of perestroika, held new government-level consultations in the field of marine transportation, maritime safety and the protection of migratory birds, and made preparations for an environment protection agreement and a trade payment agreement. The Soviet side, on its part, has permitted a Japanese mission to visit Sakhalin to investigate unrepatriated Japanese nationals and expanded northern areas where Japanese are allowed to visit the tombs of their kin.

Despite the promotion of dialogue and the advancement of mutual understanding through exchanges, however, Japan and the Soviet Union have remained wide apart over the northern territorial question, the most outstanding issue between the two countries, as there has been no substantial change in the Soviet attitude.

Nevertheless, a Japan-Soviet Foreign Ministers conference, postponed for reasons of Soviet internal situations, was to be held in Japan in September 1990, and another Foreign Ministers meeting is scheduled to be held in the Soviet Union at an appropriate time. Through these meetings, President Gorbachev's planned visit to Japan will be stepped up.

Against a background of the historic detente between the East and the West, as witnessed in the U.S.-Soviet relations and the European situation, there is a growing awareness globally that improvement in the Asia-Pacific situation, in particular the normalization of and a drastic improvement in Japan-Soviet relations, are important for putting East-West detente on a steady footing. As a typical example of such an awareness, U.S. President Bush, in his summit talks with Soviet President Gorbachev in May, took up the northern territorial issue from the standpoint of improving East-West relations.

 In this sense, President Gorbachev's visit to Japan, scheduled for 1991, could become a historic opportunity for improving Japan-Soviet relations. At a time when the Japan-Soviet negotiations are entering a crucial stage, Japan must pursue diplomacy toward the Soviet Union more tenaciously than ever with national consensus, while taking international opinion into account.

 

(2) Talks on Peace Treaty

Negotiations on a peace treaty including the northern territorial issue have been actively held on the Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Ministerial levels. While agreeing to hold discussions on the historical and legal aspects of the territorial issue, the Soviet stand has remained unchanged on the substance of the discussions, indicating the Soviet side still maintains a severe stand on the territorial issue. In his talks with Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Rogachev in Moscow in September 1989, Japanese Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Owada, referring to the proceedings of the bilateral peace treaty working group, repeated the Japanese stand that, in order to put Japan-Soviet relations on a genuinely stable footing, the conclusion of a peace treaty is essential, solution of the territorial issue is most central to the peace treaty issue and Japan cannot accept any settlement which leaves the territorial issue ambiguous.

Foreign Minister Nakayama asserted in his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the United Nations in September 1989, that 1) Japan and the Soviet Union should materialize an expanded equilibrium in their entire relationship, while striving on one hand to pursue substantial progress in the territorial issue which is most important, and on the other hand make supplementary efforts, and 2) the two countries should find a breakthrough on the settlement of the territorial issue with wisdom in future negotiations on a peace treaty. He also told the Soviet Foreign Minister "Let us open a new era in the Japan-Soviet relationship by our hands in our time." At the fourth meeting of the working group on a peace treaty, held in Tokyo in December 1989, discussions centered around Soviet refutation of the Japanese contention made at the 3rd working group meeting in regard to the historical aspect of the territorial issue illegal. The Japanese side made only necessary refutations and carried over its full refutation to the next meeting. The Soviet attitude on the territorial issue remains stiff. The Soviet stand is that if Japan recognizes the reality which has resulted from World War II and is still resulting now, and if Japan stops unfounded denunciation of the Soviet Union concerning a final decision on the territory, then it will help to give "positive character" to the peace treaty working group.

 

(3) Economic Relations

Japan-Soviet trade totaled $6.086 billion both ways in 1989, up 3.2% from the previous year, reaching the $6 billion level for the first time. The bilateral trade was virtually balanced as Japan registered a meager surplus of $77 million during the year.

By commodity, Japan's exports in 1989 showed gains in textile products, heating and cooling equipment, electric appliances and transport machinery but registered declines in iron and steel, metal processing machinery, construction machinery and mining machinery, all of which are traditionally Japan's major export items to the Soviet Union. Sharp increases in the exports of passenger cars, copying machines. Videotape recorders represent the recent trend in the pattern of Japan's exports to the Soviet Union. In imports, while raw cotton and nonferrous metal increased, non-monetary gold and fish declined. Lumber remained on the previous year's level.

Since a Soviet Ministerial Council decision on the establishment joint ventures was enforced in January 28, 1987, Japan-Soviet joint ventures were believed to have been established in the Soviet Union as of April 1, 1990, in the services, lumber processing, fishery and other areas.

In order to support the perestroika policy (liberalization, democratization and the introduction of market economy) and expand the Japan-Soviet relations in equilibrium, Japan accepted vice ministerial level economic survey missions from the Soviet Union in November 1989 and in April 1990. The two missions were aimed at surveying, among others the government and the private sector roles in the economic management in Japan for possible application for the domestic economic reforms now going on in the Soviet Union. Japan's acceptance of the two missions was highly appreciated by the Soviet side.

 

(4) Fishery Relations

Japan and the Soviet Union held annual fishery talks in Moscow from November 1989 to set 1990 catch quotas for each country's fishery operations in the 200-nautical-mile waters of the two countries. Agreement was reached in December except on a part of the payable quota. The agreement provided for free quotas of 182,000 tons for both sides as compared with 210,000 tons for the previous year and a Japanese quota of 35,000 tons which requires payment to the Soviet Union, down from 100,000 tons for 1989. As to the pending payable quota, additional negotiations were held in Moscow in February, but both sides remained wide apart and failed to reach agreement.

Separate talks to determine a quota for salmon originating in the rivers of the Soviet Union for Japanese fishing boats on the high seas in 1990 were temporarily suspended in March 1990, as the Soviet side continued to demand a drastic cut in the overall catch quota on the basis of a 1988 Soviet statement which sought a total ban on Japan's salmon fishing in international waters. In the resumed negotiations in April the Soviet side made minor concessions and the overall 1990 quota was set at 11,000 tons, down from 15,000 tons for 1989, while Japan's payment of the so-called "fishery cooperation fee" to the Soviet Union in 1990 was pegged at \3,150 million as compared with \3,350 million in 1989.

 

(5) Scientific and Technological Cooperation

The Japan-Soviet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Committee, at a meeting in Moscow in December 1989, agreed to add AIDS to the list of fields covered by bilateral scientific and technical cooperation. AIDS is the 8th item on the list. The 7 other fields, agreed to in 1988, are agriculture and forestry, nuclear fusion, radiology medical care, artificial hearts, undulatory gears, environment, and earthquake forecasting. The first meeting concerning the bilateral environment agreement started in December 1989.

 

(6) Cultural Exchange

The Japan-Soviet Cultural Exchange Committee was established on the basis of the bilateral cultural agreement which came into force in December 1987. The first committee session worked out a cultural exchange program to be implemented between April 1, 1989, and March 31, 1991. The program covers in detail cultural exchanges to be implemented in a wide field. Of these exchanges, the implementation of the long-pending, government-level student exchange and the holding of "Japan Week" in Moscow deserves special mention.

 

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Note: In June 1989, in which some 100 persons were killed as result of a clash between the Uzbeks and Meshetia