1. Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections monitoring May 2007
   1.1. Nationwide support to Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV)
   1.2. Agreement of Muslim civil society organizations with Catholic-based PPCRV
   1.3. Muslim CSOs hosted 21 observers from 6 Asian countries through ANFREL

2. Survey of Opinion of Muslim Mindanaoans in ARMM and adjacent areas
   2.1. Bottom-line is that they accept electoral results
   • 68% satisfied proclaimed winners did indeed get the most votes (only 11% not)
   2.2. However, they are less approving of existing electoral procedures
   • 76% would be more confident if votes counted at precinct (instead of municipal)
   2.3. Particular worries about violence lead to endorsement of uncompetitive elections
   • 61% say election-related violence is serious in their locality
   • 62% say “It is good to have an unopposed candidate in an election since it reduces campaign violence…”

3. Elections shape the governance context, but we need to move beyond them
   • The Asia Foundation in the Philippines has supported participatory good governance in more than 100 municipalities and cities
   • Improved services, better business climate, lower procurement costs

4. Direct citizen participation between elections
   4.1. Helps transmit information on citizen preferences
   • Elections at best say which candidate/party, but not what part of platform (if any)
   4.2. Has a demonstrable effect on project choice
   • Participatory budgeting more likely to chose social services than infrastructure
   4.3. Is endorsed by some local chief executives as useful, and popular
   • Gives them a better idea of what their constituents want; local governments match Asia Foundation support for village-level exercises

5. Governance difficult in complex conflict situation
   5.1. Rido: clan conflict
   • 43% have experienced it (versus 38% for separatist-related conflict)
   5.1.2. Often linked to elections
   • 21% of ridos caused by politics (35% by land conflicts)
5.2. RPMM: regional faction of communist NPA insurgency
- Local “peace talks” a threat of the government, an anathema to the NPA

5.3. Mining and natural resources
- Conflicts within communities, between communities and outside agencies

5.4. Human rights
- Extra-judicial killings deplete legitimacy of government actions

5.5. MNLF and MILF (Moro National and Moro Islamic) Liberation Fronts
- Separate, parallel, peace talks ongoing

6. Inadvertent exacerbation of conflict
6.1. Project selection can favor one faction over another
- Placement of, for example, water project
- Partners or implementing organizations often have ties to particular groups

6.2. Excessive focus on one conflict aspect skews solutions
- Typically in Mindanao, focus is on negotiations regarding separatist conflict
- *Rido* can trigger “Small War” clashes that escalate into “Big War”

6.3. The lesson is that conflict analysis must be built into state building and other development projects

7. Donors must work with local communities, governments, organizations
7.1. Partnership: if merely “contractual” does not build legitimacy
- Goals of indigenous groups must be supported
- This often means capacity-building at this local level

7.2. Examine possibility that central state contributes to instability
- In Asia, many of the conflicts are center-periphery: Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India
- Peripheral population may perceive state authority in their area as illegitimate
- Grievances of this population must be addressed

8. State Building, like peacebuilding, is a protracted process
- Government often has poor planning, budgeting, treasury, personnel functions
- Private sector undeveloped, assymetric response to “market driven” development
- Associational structures are weak; social capital helps in state building and “bridging” social capital helps in peacebuilding