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Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Fourth Edition)

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The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT

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- Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons
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- Statement by H.E Mr. Hiroshi Kimura, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 5th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (September 17, 2008)

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- Opening Speech by Mr. Hitoshi KIMURA, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, at the 5th Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation (April 25, 2008, Tokyo)

Statement of Japan

by H.E. Sumio Tarui, Permanent Representative of Japan
to the Conference on Disarmament

2nd Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Geneva, 28 April 2008

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,

At the outset, on behalf of my delegation, please allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Volodymyr Yel'chenko of Ukraine, on your assumption of the chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference. We assure you of our utmost support in your endeavors. It was satisfying for Japan that last year the 2010 review process got off to a successful start under the guidance of Chairman Amano. Based on the outcomes of last year's first session, we are positive that meaningful and substantial discussions will also take place under your able leadership, Ambassador Yel'chenko, within the current Preparatory Committee.

Mr. Chairman,

From the viewpoint of the only country to experience the devastation of nuclear bombings, Japan strongly hopes for achievement of a safe world free of nuclear weapons on the earliest possible date. Japan, for improving the security environment, places immense importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non - proliferation regime. Nevertheless, the NPT regime now faces a variety of serious challenges. Firstly, in relation to nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon States have made announcements and presented initiatives for new disarmament measures. As this trend is welcomed as having a positive impact on the current NPT review process, greater progress on nuclear disarmament including above mentioned measures by the nuclear - weapons states is imperative for maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime. Secondly, the nuclear issues of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, which are of a very grave nature, require the continued efforts of the States Parties as a high priority. Thirdly, as the anticipated demand for energy grows, the question of how to balance the needs of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non - proliferation is an important issue that the whole international community should also tackle. Lastly, dedicated efforts must continue in order to improve the universalization of the NPT. These are extremely grave challenges, but Japan is convinced that the NPT regime can be strengthened further by overcoming them.

With this understanding in mind, Japan hopes that the mutual understanding of the significance and role of the NPT regime will be promoted among the States Parties, and that substantial deliberations are conducted within the current PrepCom on all the issues just pointed out, based on last year's agenda. Consequently, we anticipate that it will be demonstrated to the international community that the NPT fulfils an exceptionally vital and effective role for international peace and security, and confidence in the NPT is maintained and improved.

Mr. Chairman,

It is in this spirit that Japan intends to take up the following topics within this PrepCom.

Progress in nuclear disarmament along with nuclear non - proliferation leads to the strengthening of the NPT regime. The pressing issues with concrete measures are: (1) the early entry - into - force of the Comprehensive - Nuclear - Test - Ban Treaty (CTBT) and in the meanwhile a moratorium on nuclear test explosions by the relevant countries, and (2) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut - off treaty, and in the meanwhile, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes by the relevant countries. Such legally binding multilateral measures will consolidate steps for nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, while welcoming the ongoing progress in nuclear weapons reductions, we would like to emphasize the importance of all the nuclear - weapon States reducing their arsenals with transparency. Furthermore, we believe it is important to apply the principles of irreversibility and verifiability to these nuclear disarmament measures.

I will talk about this issue in detail during Cluster 1., but I would like to draw the attention of the States Parties to the working paper on nuclear disarmament which Japan has submitted to the present session.

(Regional nuclear issues)

Mr. Chairman,

The nuclear issues of the DPRK and Iran present a serious challenge to the international non - proliferation regime.

As the DPRK's October 2006 announcement of a nuclear test demonstrated, the DPRK nuclear issue is a grave challenge to the NPT regime. The abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs by the DPRK is not only essential for peace and security of Northeast Asia, but for the entire international community. Japan will continue its work to resolve peacefully and diplomatically the DPRK nuclear issue through the Six - Party Talks. We call on the DPRK to promptly provide a "complete and correct declaration" of all its nuclear programmes, which they promised to present by the end of last year as part of the "Second - Phase Actions". We also call on the DPRK to take steady actions towards abandoning "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes" as agreed to in the Joint Statement of the September 2005 Six - Party

Talks. Furthermore, we urge the DPRK to abide promptly by the obligations stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1718.

Recently, the US Government issued a statement on a matter of proliferation concern regarding DPRK's assistance to Syria's covert nuclear activities. The international community must remain vigilant to the challenges we face.

Japan regrets that, despite the repeated calls of the international community, Iran has not complied with the requirements of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which include the suspension of all enrichment - related and reprocessing activities, as well as a heavy water - related program. Although there has been a certain amount of progress in the implementation of the programme of work for resolving the "outstanding issues" agreed to between Iran and the IAEA Secretariat last August, Iran has further continued and expanded its enrichment - related activities without re - establishing the confidence that Iran's nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful in their nature. This further aggravates the situation. For resolving this issue peacefully and diplomatically, Japan will tenaciously urge Iran to comply with the requirements of the relevant UN resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolution 1803, which was adopted last month. Moreover, it is important that each country steadily implements the measures required in these resolutions.

Recently, the US government issued a statement of the matter of proliferation concern in Syria. Japan will remain vigilant to the future developments of this issue.

(Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards)

Mr. Chairman,

Japan believes that universalizing the IAEA Additional Protocol is the most realistic and effective way to strengthen the international non - proliferation regime. We exhort all the States Parties that have yet to conclude an Additional Protocol to do so expeditiously. Japan believes it imperative that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy be prompted in a manner consistent with the highest level of safeguards standards including the IAEA Additional Protocol. To this end, we intend to further intensify out - reach activities through cooperation with the IAEA and other like - minded countries.

(Peaceful uses of nuclear energy)

Mr. Chairman,

In recent years, expanding global energy demand and efforts to prevent global warming have brought about a reexamination of the role of nuclear energy, and internationally the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is gaining momentum.

The use of nuclear power must be accompanied by commitments to effective implementation of nuclear non - proliferation/Safeguards, Safety and Security (3Ss). It is even more important for the international community to reconfirm common understanding that ensuring 3Ss constitutes an

indispensable part of the necessary infrastructure for the introduction of nuclear power generation. While ensuring 3Ss is primarily the responsibility of the countries interested in nuclear power programs, international cooperation in this field is beneficial to support the countries concerned.

The IAEA has undertaken various important activities for ensuring 3S and Japan intends to continue its support for the IAEA. In particular, the international community must tackle the new issue of strengthening nuclear security to ensure the prevention of the proliferation of fissile material to non - state - actors such as terrorists. In this regard, Japan is making efforts to enhance nuclear security through such measures as its contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. It is Japan's intention to carry on such support.

(Withdrawal)

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT recognizes the right of a State Party to withdraw in the situation that "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". This, however, must not occur from the perspective of international peace and security. Since there are a range of different arguments, I will not speak on this subject in detail, but I would like to note that there is already a stockpile of useful discussions on this topic. Japan has submitted a working paper on withdrawal, and we hope that further constructive discussions take place at this Preparatory Committee.

(Disarmament and non - proliferation education)

Mr. Chairman,

Japan attaches importance to disarmament and non - proliferation education, and believes that gaining a broader recognition of disarmament and non - proliferation in civil society, including among young people, is indispensable for progress in this field. Japan would like to point out the importance of deepening and spreading recognition of the NPT's role, as well as promulgating knowledge and experience on the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and their effects on humans and the environment. In this regard, Japan has submitted a working paper on this subject and will be holding in collaboration with UNIDIR, a side - event on disarmament and non - proliferation education, with the cooperation of civil society during this PrepCom.

Mr. Chairman,

Lastly, allow me to conclude by saying that the Government of Japan has submitted to this PrepCom a working paper on the three pillars, a working paper on withdrawal, and a working paper on disarmament and non - proliferation education. In addition to these efforts, we intend to participate proactively in the upcoming Cluster debates. It is our strong desire that a solid foundation is established for the 2010 NPT Review Conference through frank discussions among the NPT

States Parties in the current Preparatory Committee.

I thank you for your attention.

<End>

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

CLUSTER 1: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working Paper submitted by Japan

I. Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non - proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970. The decision in 1995 by the non - nuclear - weapon States to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely is one of the most valuable achievements for international peace and security. At the same time, it should be recalled that the promotion of nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the "Principles and Objectives", which was adopted by consensus in 1995. It is necessary for the NPT States Parties, especially the nuclear - weapon States, to make progress in implementing to their fullest extent the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

II. Recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament

2. Despite the many challenges the NPT faces, there have been several notable developments with respect to new nuclear disarmament initiatives. Recently, there have been important and concrete decisions and initiatives by nuclear - weapons States. The nuclear disarmament efforts of the United States and the Russian Federation, including the broad nuclear stockpile reductions by the United States, are continuing. They are also continuing to develop a legally binding arrangement to succeed START I, as agreed to in the U.S. - Russia Strategic Framework Declaration on 6 April this year. The United Kingdom in collaboration with Norway is developing verification technologies for nuclear disarmament. France announced an action plan for the nuclear - weapon States to commit themselves towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference in addition to a significant cut in its nuclear arsenal. NPT States Parties should take advantage of these developments to promote constructive discussions on nuclear disarmament at the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

III. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps

3. With a view to contributing to such discussions, firstly Japan would like to emphasize the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear - Test - Ban Treaty and the maintenance of existing moratoriums on nuclear - weapon test explosions pending its entry into force. Japan also emphasizes the importance of immediately commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut - off treaty and its early conclusion. Furthermore, pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear - weapon States should declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

4. Japan would like to present the following practical nuclear disarmament measures to be taken by all the nuclear - weapon States:

(A) To further reduce their nuclear weapons with transparency.

(a) Further reduction of nuclear weapons with transparency will serve to promote nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament. One of the agreed 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference consists of several sub - steps to be taken by all the nuclear - weapon States. Included among these sub - steps is, “ increased transparency by the nuclear - weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence - building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. ”

(b) Despite differences in the interpretation of “ nuclear weapons capabilities ” as well as in the depth and level of detail, nuclear - weapon States have exercised transparency in their statements and reports on the implementation of Article VI. Nuclear disarmament will further strengthen the trust among NPT States Parties if it is accompanied by transparency measures. Examples of information to be disclosed for increased transparency, although not exhaustive, could include:

- (i) extent of reduction in nuclear stockpiles,
- (ii) number of reduced nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
- (iii) number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as the pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
- (iv) aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed,
- (v) extent of reduction in nuclear weapons complex, including reduction in the square footage and the number of personnel,
- (vi) years in which the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was ceased,
- (vii) amount of fissile material declared excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition,
- (viii) activities to assist in the removal of fissile material from dismantled weapons,
- (ix) efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine,
- (x) plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures.

(c) During the 2010 NPT review process, all the nuclear - weapon States are encouraged to provide transparency on the above - mentioned items.

(B) To reaffirm the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility for nuclear disarmament as agreed to as one of the practical steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear disarmament with the application of irreversibility will pave the way towards a world free from nuclear weapons. Exemplary measures on irreversibility that nuclear - weapon States have taken so far are the following:

- (i) dismantling nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
- (ii) dismantling nuclear testing sites,

- (iii) shutting down and dismantling its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes,
 - (iv) disposing fissile material declared as excess to national security requirements,
 - (v) confirming that fissile material voluntarily declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament have not been reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes.
- (C) To apply verifiability to nuclear disarmament.
- (D) To further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.
- (E) To diminish the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- (F) To keep the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons as high as possible.

IV. Conclusion

5. Japan hopes that this working paper on nuclear disarmament will facilitate constructive discussions in the 2010 NPT Review process, leading to an agreement on nuclear disarmament measures to be incorporated into the Final Document or any agreed document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

CLUSTER 2: NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS
“ TOWARDS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
AND THE UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ”

Working Paper submitted by Japan

The role of the IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol

1. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation represents a serious challenge to global security. The non - proliferation of nuclear weapons is a fundamental goal of the NPT and implementation of the nuclear non - proliferation obligations set out in the NPT must be ensured through IAEA safeguards.
2. The IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring non - diversion of declared nuclear materials through application of safeguards. It is important that the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards should be strengthened by maximizing IAEA's authority and capacity.
3. Japan strongly believes that the universalization of the Additional Protocol is the most realistic and effective way to strengthen the current non - proliferation regime. The Additional Protocol, when fully implemented in addition to States' comprehensive safeguards agreements, can play a pivotal role in increasing the transparency of States' nuclear related activities by providing the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability. Japan believes that IAEA safeguards, reinforced by universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, should constitute the NPT safeguards standard as required by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT.
4. In the context of the expected expansion and introduction of nuclear power generation in response to increasing energy demand and global warming, tackling the associated potential proliferation risks is becoming all the more important. Japan believes it imperative that the peaceful use of nuclear energy be promoted in a manner consistent with the highest level of safeguards standards including the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Japan's commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy

5. Japan has been strictly limiting the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes since the enactment of the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955 upon the introduction of nuclear power. Japan also upholds its “ Three Non - nuclear Principles ” of “ not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. ”
6. Japan has been utilizing nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, fully ensuring international confidence and maintaining highest level of transparency through faithful implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement concluded in 1977, the early conclusion of the Additional Protocol in 1999, and implementation of integrated safeguards commenced in 2004. It is under these strict national policy and regulations that Japan has started utilizing recovered materials such as plutonium and uranium from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel.

Japan's efforts for the universalization of the Additional Protocol

7. Japan has been actively taking initiatives, in cooperation with the IAEA and like - minded countries, to universalize the Additional Protocol. Japan has contributed to a series of IAEA seminars, which resulted in shared awareness on the importance of the Additional Protocol and the steady increase in the number of countries that have signed/ concluded an additional protocol in recent years. Last year, Japan supported and participated in the IAEA safeguards regional seminar held in Sydney, Australia, the National Seminar on Additional Protocol held in Hanoi, Vietnam, and the IAEA Regional Technical Meeting on Additional Protocol Implementation in Asia and the Pacific Region held in Sydney.
8. Japan has been also hosting the Asian Senior - level Talks on Non - proliferation (ASTOP) yearly since 2003 in which Japan has been working to promote the understanding of the Additional Protocol and to remove factors which could create obstacles to the conclusion of the Protocol. Since 2004, Japan has participated in the G - 8 joint demarche led by G8 Chairs to facilitate conclusion of the Additional Protocol worldwide. Japan, serving as G8 Chair this year, intends to continue such efforts.
9. Furthermore, to support the IAEA's non - proliferation activities and to strengthen its verification capability, Japan made an additional contribution (€ 6.91 million) to the IAEA Fund for Non - Proliferation this year. Through this contribution, Japan intends to assist those countries which are determined to achieve maximum transparency with respect to their nuclear activities and the highest level of safeguards standard including the Additional Protocol.

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

CLUSTER 3: PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE

Working paper submitted by Japan

Rising expectations for nuclear power

1. Nuclear energy has made an invaluable contribution to mankind in various areas including human health and medicine, food and agriculture and industry. A large number of countries strongly support the development of peaceful uses for nuclear energy.
2. Recent international environment demands new focus in the uses of nuclear energy. Over the last few years, a growing number of countries worldwide - according to some calculations, around 30 countries - have expressed their interest in embarking on nuclear power programs. The promotion of applications of nuclear power is considered crucial to meeting the challenge of providing sufficient and reliable energy to support the world's sustainable development for the benefit of all. This renewed interest in the potential of nuclear power is shown by the resolution on nuclear power applications adopted at the fifty - first General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
3. Those countries that have or are considering plans for nuclear energy believe that nuclear power will make an essential input to their sustainable development strategies and contribute to global energy security while reducing air pollution and addressing climate change, while others hold different views based upon their assessment of benefits and risks. While the outlook for global average energy consumption rate remains mixed, there is clearly a sense of rising expectations for nuclear power.
4. These new circumstances have high relevance to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Article IV of the NPT establishes the “ inalienable right ” of all States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Applications of nuclear power are an important part of peaceful uses foreseen in article IV of the NPT.

Infrastructure necessary for the development of nuclear power program

5. Due to its dual nature, certain nuclear technology can be misused for non - peaceful purposes. Furthermore, should nuclear accidents occur, they would cause a serious consequence not only to the country where the nuclear power plant in question locates, but also to the neighboring countries and to the international community as a whole. Since 11 September 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of terrorism involving nuclear weapons and material.
6. While each state has a right to define its national energy policy, the use of nuclear power must be

accompanied by commitments to effective implementation of nuclear nonproliferation/ Safeguards, Safety and Security (3Ss) in accordance with its national requirement and its relevant international obligations including those under the NPT. It is even more important for the international community to reconfirm common understanding that ensuring 3Ss constitutes an indispensable part of the necessary infrastructure for the introduction of nuclear power generation. While ensuring 3Ss is primarily the responsibility of the countries interested in nuclear power programs, international cooperation in this field is beneficial to support the countries concerned.

“ 3Ss ” and Japan's experience

7. In this connection, Japan ' s experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear power can provide an example for countries interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ensuring 3Ss.
8. Japan adheres to the “ Three Non - Nuclear Principles, ” of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. “ The Atomic Energy Basic Law ” also limits the use of nuclear energy only to peaceful purposes. In addition to these political and legal commitments, Japan applies stringent and concrete 3Ss measures to its nuclear activities in a manner consistent with the highest international standard. Japan utilizes nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, fully ensuring international confidence and maintaining high transparency through faithful implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, the Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards. It is under these strict national policy and regulations that Japan has started to utilize recovered materials such as plutonium and uranium from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel. Japan continues to uphold its established policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the strict application of safeguards.

International cooperation for the development of nuclear power program

9. While it is a matter of principle that those countries considering nuclear power programs have to bear the responsibilities in developing 3Ss and other necessary infrastructures before they embark upon nuclear power programs, international cooperation both bilateral and multilateral in this field is an essential part of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many countries have actively been engaged in international cooperation through a large number of cooperation arrangements with a view to ensuring 3Ss. The IAEA has substantive ongoing activities for 3Ss and other necessary infrastructures, such as publication of IAEA Nuclear Energy Series: “ Milestones in the Development of a National Nuclear Power Infrastructure. ” The IAEA has also undertaken generic and country specific assessment on approaches and options for addressing legal, administrative and other infrastructure requirements so as to provide guidance and options for nuclear energy and its safe, secure and efficient use, for those Agency ' s Member States that are interested in considering or planning for the introduction of nuclear energy. The IAEA is well positioned to take a pivotal role in enhancing nuclear energy while ensuring 3Ss.
10. With its long and extensive experiences in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the belief that international cooperation contributes to the development of nuclear energy, Japan, in cooperation with the IAEA, has proactively engaged in international efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear

energy in a way that promotes 3Ss. Japan has been encouraging and assisting those countries which have expressed interest in nuclear power to establish 3Ss and other necessary infrastructures before they actually embark upon nuclear programs. Japan has contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund to assist states, in particular Asian states, to upgrade their nuclear security capabilities. Japan also hosted seminars aimed at promoting the accession to the international counter - terrorism conventions and protocols. In the field of nuclear safety, Japan has conducted a series of training courses and seminars for regulatory experts and technicians of the neighboring Asian countries with a view to further enhancing nuclear safety in the respective countries. In the bilateral context, Japan requests, as a matter of policy, any state, with whom Japan enters into bilateral talks for nuclear cooperation agreements, to conclude the Additional Protocol beforehand. As part of Japan's efforts in the universalization of the Additional Protocol, it has conducted various seminars such as the National Seminar on the Additional Protocol in Vietnam.

Conclusion

11. The expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy seems to continue. It is important for the international community to deliberate how best to assist the countries concerned in further promoting their capabilities to develop 3Ss and other necessary infrastructures. International cooperation should be duly recognized as an essential part of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan will continue to engage in international efforts both bilaterally and multilaterally to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy that is consistent with 3Ss with a view to the fullest implementation of article IV of the NPT.

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION EDUCATION

Working paper submitted by Japan

I. Introduction

1. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference last year, Japan submitted the working paper entitled “ Japan ’ s efforts in disarmament and non - proliferation education ” (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.1/WP.3).
2. The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the value of disarmament and non - proliferation education in the NPT context, to present points to be discussed on disarmament and non - proliferation education and to provide updates on Japan ’ s efforts in this area.

II. The value of disarmament and non - proliferation education

3. As the report of the Secretary - General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the UN study on disarmament and non - proliferation education states, “ there is a pressing need to expand and improve disarmament and non - proliferation education and training in order to promote disarmament and non - proliferation and to strengthen international security ”. Therefore, disarmament and non - proliferation education plays an important role as a useful and effective means for addressing disarmament and non - proliferation issues.
4. In the context of the NPT, the value of disarmament and non - proliferation education lies in the following:
 - (a) The significant role the NPT is playing in the area of nuclear disarmament and non - proliferation should be duly dealt with in disarmament and non - proliferation education. In particular, the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non - proliferation education should lead to broader awareness among the public on the difficult challenges the NPT regime faces, as well as the benefits of the NPT to international peace and security. This is critical for fostering public support on the maintenance and strengthening of the NPT regime.
 - (b) In order to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime and to achieve a nuclear - weapon - free world, the knowledge and experience of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, as well as the injury and death they cause, must be shared worldwide and passed from generation to generation. Disarmament and non - proliferation education should include these aspects.

III. Points for consideration in the implementation of disarmament and non - proliferation education

5. The recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary - General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the ways for promoting disarmament and non - proliferation education should be reaffirmed and followed. These recommendations are comprehensive and practical. Japan believes that each State Party could commence its initiatives on disarmament and non - proliferation

by implementing them as a first step within existing and available resources.

6. Japan particularly attaches importance to the following points when implementing the recommendations in order to further enhance disarmament and non - proliferation education more effectively:
7. Firstly, humankind, including the future generations, should share as objective information the experiences of nuclear devastation and the persistent effects of radiation on the environment and human health. Civil society is already active in recording, compiling, preserving and further disseminating information using various tools, including narratives, visual media and other forms of communication. Governments should support, where necessary and appropriate, such efforts by civil society.
8. Secondly, efforts on disarmament and non - proliferation in the NPT context should include deepening discussions among security and disarmament experts on the security benefits of and challenges to the NPT regime, and providing knowledge on these issues to the public.
9. Thirdly, we should note the fact that UNSG report includes developing the critical thinking skills in an informed citizenry as one of the objectives of contemporary disarmament and non - proliferation education and training.
10. Finally, experiences in disarmament and non - proliferation education should be shared among Member States, international organizations, and civil society. The website of the United Nations, including the UN CyberSchoolBus site on peace education, provides all governments, organizations and citizens with a useful tool to this end. Relevant international organizations and research institutes could also play a role as hubs for information sharing.

IV. Japan's initiatives

11. Based on the above - mentioned value of disarmament and non - proliferation (II) and points to be addressed (III), Japan, as a sole country which experienced the devastation of atomic bombs, conducted or is conducting the following initiatives for disarmament and non - proliferation education and intends to continue similar efforts.

Students' debate forum on disarmament and non - proliferation

12. In August 2007, on the occasion of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Sapporo, a debate forum on “ how to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons ” was held with the participation of local university students. The purpose of this debate forum was to provide an opportunity for the young participants to deepen their understanding of disarmament and non - proliferation issues and to develop critical thinking skills.

Support for NGO activities

13. During the last session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Japan extended support to the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security for the screening at the UN headquarters in New York of a film titled “ Nagasaki Angelus Bell • 1945 ”.

Whitepaper on disarmament and non - proliferation policy

14. Japan's whitepaper on disarmament and non - proliferation policy, which includes a chapter on disarmament and non - proliferation education, is available in both Japanese and English on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's website (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamphlet.html>).

Additional initiatives

15. Collaboration with civil society, which is engaged in various activities on disarmament and non - proliferation education, is indispensable for making these efforts more effective. Japan intends to work together with NGOs and municipalities in order to promote disarmament and non - proliferation education. In the sidelines of the current session of the Preparatory Committee, Japan and UNIDIR are co - organizing a workshop on disarmament and non - proliferation education with the participation of NGOs and citizens. This workshop aims to deal with the theme of how the next generation can preserve the knowledge and experience of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, as well as the death and injury they cause.

Second session

Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008

PERSPECTIVES ON ISSUES RELATED TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
BOLSTERING THE BENEFITS OF THE NPT REGIME TO PREVENT
WITHDRAWAL

Working paper submitted by Japan

Introduction

1. The NPT regime has been facing many difficult challenges, among which the issue of withdrawal needs to be addressed as a matter of utmost importance. At the subsidiary body of Main Committee III of the 2005 Review Conference, States Parties discussed this issue and achieved a convergence of views. Based on the useful discussions at the 2005 Review Conference, the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference also witnessed constructive discussions. Building upon the results of these deliberations, Japan believes that the States Parties should seek to reach an agreement on concrete measures to address the issue of withdrawal.

Summary of Discussions at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee

2. Japan attaches great importance to the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, Japan submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF. 2010/PC.I/WP.2) which clarifies Japan's position on this issue in paragraphs 79 to 83. Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States of America also presented working papers on withdrawal to the same session. The discussions of the States Parties at the first session were summarized in the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF. 2010/PC. I/WP. 78) as follows:

“ 46. States parties were reminded about discussions held at the 2005 Review Conference on the need for disincentives on and response to withdrawal from the Treaty. While reaffirming the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from the NPT as provided for in article X (1), it was noted that article X envisaged that withdrawal would be exercised only in the face of extraordinary events. Importance was attached to the need for any withdrawal to be made in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty and that its consequences would be subject to international scrutiny.

47. Views were expressed that a State that withdraws from the NPT should not be able to benefit from nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the Treaty. It was emphasized that, under international law, a withdrawing party was liable for breaches of the Treaty that occurred prior to the withdrawal. It was also stressed that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by States for peaceful purposes prior to the withdrawal must remain subject to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards.

48. The need was noted for States parties to undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort, including on a regional basis, to encourage a party to reconsider its sovereign position to withdraw. Given the particular circumstances envisaged in Article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw, the role of the Security Council as provided for in that article was also underlined. ”
3. In Japan ’ s view, the above summary can serve as a basis for further discussions on this issue among States Parties. All the elements reflected in the discussions are aimed at deterring withdrawal by upholding a set of relevant principles of the international law, by clarifying the requirements stipulated in Article X of the Treaty, and by stressing the importance of appropriate international responses, including the role of the Security Council. In this regard, in addition to the elements reflected in paragraph 47 of the Chairman ’ s working paper, Japan reiterates its belief that a withdrawing Party should return or neutralize any nuclear material, facilities, equipment, etc., transferred prior to withdrawal through necessary prior arrangements with the supplier country.

Bolstering the Benefits of the NPT Regime to Prevent Withdrawal

4. Japan would like to present a broader perspective for dealing with the issue of withdrawal. Japan believes that reconfirming and bolstering benefits of the NPT are crucial to prevent withdrawal.
5. States Parties adhere to the NPT because it contributes to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security, serving as a cornerstone of the global non - proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It is important that States Parties steadfastly enjoy this benefit of the Treaty. States Parties can and should protect such a benefit through various efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the NPT regime.
6. In addition, the “ Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non - Proliferation and Disarmament ” (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex) provides in its paragraph 16 that “ In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non - nuclear - weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account. ” This is considered as another tangible benefit of the Treaty for non - nuclear - weapon states. States Parties should reconfirm the principle of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
7. It is also important to consider and discuss security assurances for the NPT non - nuclear weapon States. The nuclear - weapon States should reaffirm Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as their own relevant declarations. Japan believes that ensuring the effectiveness of the existing nuclear - weapon - free zones, including accelerating their entry - into - force, is a practical and realistic step to strengthening negative security assurances.
8. Nuclear disarmament should also be addressed. It should be recalled that the promotion of nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the “ Principles and Objectives ” , which was adopted by consensus in 1995 when all the non - nuclear - weapon States, which constitute an overwhelming majority of the NPT States Parties, decided to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely. It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear - weapon States,

to faithfully make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The implementation of such measures is critical for all States Parties, in particular non-nuclear-weapon States, in order to feel secure and have full confidence in the Treaty.

2. UN

Sixty-second session

Agenda item 98

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[on the report of the First Committee (A/62/391)]

62/37. Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the need for all States to take further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, and renewing the determination to do so,

Noting that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling its resolution 61/74 of 6 December 2006,

Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear terrorism,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹ as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and expressing regret over the lack of agreement on substantive issues at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as over the elimination of references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the World Summit Outcome in 2005,² the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan,

Recalling the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,⁴

Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing,

Reaffirming that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and thereby ensuring international peace and security,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons, including that caused by proliferation networks,

Recognizing the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 with regard to the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006, while welcoming the recent progress achieved by the Six-Party Talks,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty;

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

² See resolution 60/1.

³ See *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

⁴ *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vols. I.III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I.IV)).

2. *Stresses* the importance of an effective Treaty review process, welcoming a successful start of the 2010 review process with the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007, and calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to work together to ensure that the second session of the Preparatory Committee, in 2008, is held constructively, in order to facilitate the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
3. *Reaffirms* the importance of the universality of the Treaty, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions, and pending their accession to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty;
4. *Encourages* further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in a way that promotes international stability and undiminished security for all, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;
5. *Encourages* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions,⁵ which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty, while welcoming the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States of America, on nuclear arms reductions;
6. *Encourages* States to continue to pursue efforts, within the framework of international cooperation, contributing to the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials;
7. *Calls for* the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
8. *Stresses* the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;
9. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty⁶ at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty, and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty;
10. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to immediately resume its substantive work to its fullest, considering the developments of this year in the Conference;
11. *Emphasizes* the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices pending the entry into force of the

⁵ See CD/1674.

⁶ See resolution 50/245.

Treaty;

12. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
13. *Stresses* the importance of further efforts for non-proliferation, including the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreements and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997⁷ and the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions including resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004;
14. *Encourages* all States to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session,⁸ and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to that end;
15. *Encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

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⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

⁸ A/57/124.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[on the report of the First Committee (A/62/391)]

62/47. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, 57/72 of 22 November 2002, 58/241 of 23 December 2003, 59/86 of 3 December 2004, 60/81 of 8 December 2005 and 61/66 of 6 December 2006,

Emphasizing the importance of the continued and full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,¹

Welcoming the efforts by Member States to submit, on a voluntary basis, national reports on their implementation of the Programme of Action,

Noting with satisfaction regional and subregional efforts being undertaken in support of the implementation of the Programme of Action, and commending the progress that has already been made in this regard, including tackling both supply and demand factors that are relevant to addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons,

Recognizing the efforts undertaken by non-governmental organizations in the provision of assistance to States for the implementation of the Programme of Action,

Recalling that, as part of the follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, it was agreed that meetings of States should be convened on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action,²

Recognizing that illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons is a serious problem that the international community should address urgently,

Bearing in mind the importance of regular national reporting, which could greatly facilitate the rendering of international cooperation and assistance to affected States,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 61/66,³

Welcoming the fact that the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held from 26 June to 7 July 2006, highlighted the commitment of States to the Programme of Action as the main framework for measures within the activities of the international community to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, beyond 2006,⁴

¹ See *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001* (A/CONF.192/15), chap. IV, para. 24.

² *Ibid.*, sect. IV, para. 1 (b).

³ See A/62/162.

Taking note of the reports submitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General dealing with the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,⁵

1. *Encourages* all initiatives, including those of the United Nations, other international organizations, regional and subregional organizations, non-governmental organizations and civil society, for the successful implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,¹ and calls upon all Member States to contribute towards the continued implementation of the Programme of Action at the national, regional and global levels;
2. *Calls upon* all States to implement the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,⁶ among others, through the provision of information to the Secretary-General on the name and contact information of the national points of contact and on national marking practices related to markings used to indicate country of manufacture and/or country of import, as applicable;
3. *Takes note* of the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolution 60/81 to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons,⁷ and encourages States to implement its recommendations;
4. *Decides* that, in conformity with the follow-up to the Programme of Action, the next biennial meeting of States to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action shall be held from 14 to 18 July 2008, in New York;
5. *Recalls* that the meeting of States to consider the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, shall be held within the framework of the biennial meeting of States;
6. *Encourages* States to submit, well in advance of the next biennial meeting of States, national reports on their implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in accordance with these instruments, and requests the Secretary-General to collate and circulate such data and information provided by States;
7. *Also encourages* States to include in their national reports, on a voluntary basis, information on their efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, as well as on their actions aimed at enhancing international cooperation for this purpose;
8. *Calls upon* States, in considering the implementation of the Programme of Action, to take full advantage of the biennial meetings of States to identify priority issues or topics of relevance in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to highlight their implementation challenges and opportunities;
9. *Underlines* the fact that the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

⁴ See A/CONF.192/2006/RC/9.

⁵ A/62/162 and A/62/163.

⁶ A/60/88 and Corr.2, annex; see also decision 60/519.

⁷ See A/62/163.

requires concerted efforts at the national, regional and international levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and that their uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world has a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and poses a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels;

10. *Emphasizes* the need to facilitate the implementation at the national level of the Programme of Action through the strengthening of national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure;
11. *Also emphasizes* the fact that initiatives by the international community with respect to international cooperation and assistance remain essential and complementary to national implementation efforts, as well as to those at the regional and global levels;
12. *Recognizes* the necessity for interested States to develop effective coordination mechanisms, where they do not exist, in order to match the needs of States with existing resources to enhance the implementation of the Programme of Action and to make international cooperation and assistance more effective;
13. *Encourages* States to consider, among other mechanisms, the coherent identification of needs, priorities, national plans and programmes that may require international cooperation and assistance from States and regional and international organizations in a position to do so;
14. *Encourages* civil society and relevant organizations to strengthen their cooperation and work with States at the respective national and regional levels to achieve the implementation of the Programme of Action;
15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;
16. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled “ The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects ”.

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3. CTBT

Statement by H.E. Mr. Hitoshi KIMURA, Senior Vice-Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 5th Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Vienna, 17 September 2007

Madam/Mr. President,

I would like to begin by extending my heartfelt congratulations to Her Excellency Dr. Ursula Plassnik and His Excellency Mr. Bruno Stagno Ugarte on their election to the Presidency of this Conference. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Austrian Government for their support in hosting this Conference.

(The significance of the CTBT in the context of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation)

Madam/Mr. President,

Japan supports the CTBT, which underpins the international nuclear non-proliferation regime founded on the NPT, as a practical and concrete measure for realizing a nuclear-weapon free world. Therefore, Japan places the utmost importance on early entry into force of the CTBT. The process towards the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT has started successfully, following the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, held under the chairmanship of Ambassador Amano of Japan in Vienna this year in April-May. Japan stresses the importance of proactive work towards early entry into force of the CTBT, particularly in the context of strengthening efforts in the lead up to the 2010 Review Conference.

(Recognition of the circumstances surrounding the CTBT)

Madam/Mr. President,

Following many long years of debate and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the UN General Assembly finally adopted the CTBT in September 1996. It is disappointing that, despite the passage of eleven years since the Treaty became open for signature, it has still not entered into force. However, the fact that the number of State Signatories and Ratifying States has reached 177 and 140 respectively can be said to reflect a near universal acceptance in the international community of a ban on nuclear testing as an international norm.

Against this backdrop, the nuclear test proclaimed by North Korea in October last year represented a serious challenge to the CTBT and to the peace and security of the entire international community. Japan reiterates its condemnation of nuclear testing by North Korea and strongly urges North Korea to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Recently, Yongbyon nuclear facility has been shut down as one of the Initial Actions agreed at the Six-Party Talks towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. These developments as well as the commencement of monitoring and verification activities by IAEA on the facility are welcomed. However, this is only the first step towards full implementation of the Joint Statement of September 2005, and reaching early agreement on the measures to be taken in the "next phase" and taking concrete actions to this end swiftly is critical. Japan would like to emphasize that

abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as described in the Joint Statement, is absolutely essential. Japan continues to actively work towards a peaceful resolution of nuclear issues within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to resolving outstanding issues concerned with North Korea, including abductions, nuclear and missile issues, and realizing the normalization of relations with North Korea.

The maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear testing is imperative. As the only nation ever to have suffered nuclear devastation, Japan calls on the international community to ensure that nuclear testing is never carried out by any country ever again.

(Japan's efforts to bring about entry into force of the CTBT)

Madam/Mr. President,

Since Japan presided over the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty here in the Hofburg Congress Center eight years ago, Japan actively worked as the first coordinator country to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty. Japan has seized each and every occasion to urge early signature and ratification of the CTBT by the Annex 2 states. Japan once again calls upon all states which have not yet done so, particularly the remaining ten Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible. In addition to our bilateral efforts to date, before the first NPT Preparatory Committee meeting held this year, Japan strongly encouraged these ten states to sign and ratify the Treaty. Furthermore, in February and July this year, Japan invited representatives of two Annex 2 states, Colombia and Indonesia, who are influential to the ratification process in their countries to visit our CTBT related facilities in Japan and exchange views with us. We encouraged both countries to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

In order to maintain the momentum towards the entry into force of the CTBT, enhancing its universality through increased signature and ratification of the Treaty by non-Annex 2 states is very important. With this in mind, this August Japan urged such states to sign and ratify the Treaty. As one of the world's most earthquake-prone countries, we have been carrying out seismological observation training courses through the Japan International Cooperation Agency and, through the participation in this course of technical experts from states who have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, Japan continues its work to promote a greater understanding of the importance of the Treaty.

Aiming towards the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible, Japan believes that this Conference should be held on a biannual basis for maintaining the momentum towards the entry into force of the Treaty.

Madam/Mr. President,

Significant progress has been made by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission towards the establishment of an International Monitoring System (IMS). Already more than 200 stations have been certified. Japan welcomes these developments and commends the efforts of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat. North Korea's recent nuclear test reaffirmed the usefulness of the IMS. The IMS can also be valued for the role it plays in maintaining the momentum towards the entry into

force of the CTBT.

We are doing our utmost to install and operate relevant IMS facilities in Japan. In February this year, the Okinawa Radionuclide Station was certified. Along with the installation late last year of noble-gas-monitoring equipment at our Radionuclide Monitoring Station in Takasaki, Japan has now completed all necessary steps to commence operation of our radionuclide monitoring stations. We are exerting our best efforts to complete the certification process for the remaining IMS facilities in Japan. Moreover, Japan is working towards the establishment of National Data Centers in Japan which can perform data analysis to detect a nuclear test. These data centers are assisting the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, including through the submission of data. Japan will host a workshop on infrasound technology with the support of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in November this year.

The use of IMS data in tsunami early warning systems also underscores the significance of the CTBT within the international community. Japan welcomes the agreement reached by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission last November on the principles and operating rules for the provision of data to tsunami warning organizations. Japan's Northwest Pacific Tsunami Advisory Center is developing a more sophisticated system for tsunami warning system in the Northwest Pacific region by using the data transmitted from the IDC for testing purposes.

(Conclusion)

Madam/Mr. President,

A ban on nuclear testing continues to be one of the most important agenda in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of early entry into force of the CTBT and the willingness of Japan as the only nation to have suffered nuclear devastation to exert its leadership towards the realization of the long-cherished wish of our people and all mankind for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Thank you.

4. ASTOP

Opening Speech by Mr. Hitoshi KIMURA
Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan
at the 5th Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation
April 25, 2008, Tokyo

Distinguished delegates,

I am pleased to welcome all of you to Japan in its best season. Today, we are gathering for the 5th Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation, ^{エーストップ} ^{ファイブ} ASTOP- V. The purpose of this meeting is to strengthen the non-proliferation efforts in Asia. I am especially glad to note that this important dialogue has become a well-known event in the past five years.

Distinguished delegates,

This year, it is particularly important for Japan to listen to views and interests of Asian countries in the area of non-proliferation. As the chair of G8, Japan will lead the discussion with other G8 members to explore the ways to further enhance the global non-proliferation efforts. We intend to reflect the outcome of today's meeting in the forthcoming G8 process.

Distinguished delegates,

The international community, including this region, has been exposed to serious challenges to non-proliferation. The nuclear and missile issues of North Korea present a real threat to peace and security, not only in East Asia but also to the entire international community. Japan supports and actively participates in the Six-Party Talks. The Iranian nuclear issue also gives serious concern to the international community. Japan appreciates the efforts of the UN Security Council in this regard, and faithfully implements all the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Today, the US government issued a statement on the matter of proliferation concern in Syria. The international community must remain vigilant to the challenges we face.

Distinguished delegates,

The international community has been reinforcing its tools to address the non-proliferation challenges. Japan is willing to work together with the Asian countries to strengthen such efforts. In this context, I should also like to remind you of the PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Pacific Shield 07" Japan hosted last year,

and to take this opportunity to renew our thanks to the participants.

Distinguished delegates,

You have a full day of intensive work ahead of you. I hope this ASTOP meeting will be a valuable opportunity to have in-depth discussions and to share your experience in tackling our huge common challenges.

Thank you very much. I am looking forward to hearing the result from you at the reception this evening.