II. Documents

Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Third Edition)
1. NPT
(2005 NPT Review Conference)
- Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura (May 2, 2005)
- Working paper of Japan

2. UN
- Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons (60th General Assembly UN (2005)

3. CTBT
(The fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT)
- Statement by Special Envoy of the Government of Japan, Tatsuo Arima (September 22, 2005)

4. Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation(ASTOP)
(The third ASTOP)
- Speech by Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsutoshi Kaneda (February 13, 2006)

5. CD
- Statement by Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Akiko Yamanaka (June 20, 2006)
Mr. President,

On behalf of the Japanese government and people, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference.

The NPT is currently facing serious challenges. The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means is one of the most serious security issues. We should make this Conference an opportunity to reinforce the authority and credibility of the NPT.

I have visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki many times and witnessed the tragic effects of atomic bombings. Today, as I entered this hall, I was struck anew by the exhibits of the nuclear devastation. At the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings, I hope that we will reconfirm our commitment to the NPT so that such a tragedy will never be repeated.

(UN Reform)

Mr. President,

In his Report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined the increasing relevance of disarmament and non-proliferation to international peace and security. I believe that the United Nations should play an essential role in tackling this issue. For this purpose also, reform of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, is indispensable. To date, Japan has been at the forefront in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan is resolved to play an ever more active role in a functionally reinforced United Nations to promote these causes and will continue to uphold its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”.

(Japan’s priority issues)

Mr. President,

I would like to stress the following five points in order to strengthen the functioning of the NPT.

First, it is of paramount importance to correctly deal with regional issues.

In particular, the DPRK's nuclear programs pose a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as a direct threat to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, including Japan. The declaration by the DPRK in February this year that it had manufactured and
possesses nuclear weapons has generated deep concern in the international community. Japan urges the DPRK to comply with its obligations under the NPT, and to completely dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment programs, subject to credible international verification. Japan also urges the DPRK to expeditiously return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions. Japan hopes that this Conference will deliver these clear messages to the DPRK.

As for the Iranian nuclear issue, Japan considers it important that Iran sincerely implement all the requirements of the relevant IAEA resolutions. Japan urges Iran to reach an agreement with France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the “objective guarantees” that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Japan calls upon India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions. Japan welcomes Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs. Japan also supports the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Second, in order to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, practical nuclear disarmament measures must be implemented incrementally. From this viewpoint, Japan urges those countries whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force to ratify it at the earliest date. Japan also urges an early commencement of negotiations on the FMCT.

While the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals should be duly appreciated, Japan calls upon all the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament, including deeper reductions of all types of nuclear weapons.

In this respect, we should recall that the “Principles and Objectives” was agreed upon in 1995, and the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference.

Third, Japan strongly believes that the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol is the most realistic and effective means to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has been actively promoting this goal. Japan calls on all States that have not yet concluded it to do so without further delay.

Fourth, it is of great value to reinforce the non-proliferation regime as a whole with proactive cooperation of as many states as possible. Japan actively participates in the PSI and calls upon all states to sincerely implement UN Security Council resolution 1540.

Lastly, while the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is increasingly important, it must be carried out with the confidence of the international community. Such confidence should be based upon the faithful fulfillment of NPT obligations and high transparency of nuclear activities. Japan continues to support IAEA’s technical cooperation activities based on these considerations.

(Conclusion)
Mr. President,

Japan submits a document entitled “Twenty-one Measures for the 21st Century” containing the gist of concrete messages that we sincerely hope the Conference will deliver. Japan believes that
these measures will contribute to reinforcing the functioning of the NPT regime. I strongly hope that the Conference will issue robust and clear messages enabling the NPT regime to be further consolidated.

Thank you for your attention.

(End)
The 2005 NPT Review Conference will provide the States Parties with opportunities to show their resolve to make progress in strengthening the NPT regime, which will certainly contribute to the international peace and stability.

Japan believes that the States Parties should redouble their efforts to reach a common understanding on measures to be taken for further strengthening the NPT at the coming NPT Review Conference.

To this end, Japan proposes the following 21 measures to be included in the document(s) to be issued as final product(s) of the 2005 NPT Review Conference;

1. **Nuclear Disarmament**

   In accordance with Article VI of the Treaty and pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference agrees that all States Parties should take further practical measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

   1. **Further reduction in nuclear arsenals**
      
      The Conference agrees that the realization of a safe world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States with greater transparency and in an irreversible manner, in the process of working towards their elimination.
      
      While recognizing the progress made by nuclear-weapon States on nuclear arms reductions, the Conference encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States.

   2. **International cooperation on reducing nuclear-weapons-related materials**
      
      With a view to accelerating disarmament of nuclear weapons excess to military needs, the Conference encourages States to continue to pursue efforts within the framework of international cooperation aimed at the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials, such as the Co-operative Threat Reduction program, and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

   3. **Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems**
      
      The Conference calls for the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.
4. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons.

The Conference reaffirms the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

5. Securing fissile materials

The Conference stresses that fissile material resulting from reductions in nuclear arsenals must be controlled and protected to the highest standards, and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification as soon as is practicable to ensure such material is irreversibly removed from nuclear weapons use.

6. Early entry into force of the CTBT

The Conference reaffirms the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The Conference urges all States that have not yet ratified the CTBT, in particular those eleven States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so at the earliest opportunity.

The Conference agrees that existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions must be maintained pending entry into force of the CTBT.

7. CTBT verification regimes

The Conference reaffirms the importance of continued development of the CTBT verification regime, including the International Monitoring System, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty.

8. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The Conference reaffirms the importance of immediate commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and its early conclusion.

The Conference stresses that a conclusion of the FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system.

The Conference calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and the non-NPT states to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the FMCT.

Given the importance of immediate commencement of negotiation of the FMCT, the Conference regards it as a primary task for the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on a programme of work.
9. DPRK

The Conference expresses grave concern over the DPRK's nuclear programs, which undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

The Conference also expresses deep concern regarding the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Treaty, which continues to represent a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime.

Furthermore, the Conference expresses its utmost regret and deep concern over the DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement on February 10, 2005, which announced that it would suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks for an indefinite period and that it had manufactured nuclear weapons.

The Conference urges the DPRK to promptly come into compliance with the NPT and completely dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment programs, in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to credible international verification. The Conference stresses that the Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized, while the peace, security and stability of the region should be strengthened and the legitimate interests and concerns of the relevant parties should be satisfied.

The Conference emphasizes the importance of peacefully resolving this issue through diplomatic means within the framework of the Six-Party Talks and urges the DPRK to expeditiously return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions.

10. Iran

Recognizing the efforts made by the international community, especially EU3(France, Germany, United Kingdom)/EU and Iran, to pursue the peaceful resolution of Iranian nuclear issue, the Conference recognizes the importance of the fact that Iran has voluntarily continued and extended its suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. At the same time, the Conference reaffirms its strong concern that Iran's policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Conference further calls on Iran to sincerely implement all the requirements of the relevant IAEA resolutions and expects the current negotiation process between EU3/EU and Iran to result in a success. In particular, the Conference considers it extremely important that Iran, through its negotiations with the EU3/EU, agree to provide sufficient "objective guarantees" that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

11. Libya

The Conference welcomes Libya's decision announced in December 2003 to abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction programs, while expressing concern over Libya's past failures to meet the requirements of its safeguards agreement, which constituted non-compliance. The Conference strongly hopes that the DPRK and those states that are subject to suspicion for developing WMDs will follow Libya's example.

12. Strengthening and maximizing the efficiency of the IAEA Safeguards
The Conference reaffirms the necessity of enhancing the IAEA’s capability of safeguards activities to assure the non-diversion of declared nuclear material which has been placed under safeguards in each State and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole, and emphasize, in particular, the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol as the most realistic and effective means to strengthen the current international non-proliferation regime. The Conference recognizes that the strengthened safeguards system should constitute the NPT safeguards standard as required by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT from a certain date. The Conference urges those States Parties that have not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol with the IAEA to do so without further delay.

The Conference welcomes the IAEA’s completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards as well as its application to those States Parties that have achieved a good track record on the IAEA safeguards activities based on both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference recognizes the importance of promoting the adoption of integrated safeguards with a view to maximizing the effectiveness and the efficiency of the IAEA’s safeguards activities within available resources, and encourages the IAEA to take necessary steps to strengthen integrated safeguards approaches.

13. Establishing and implementing effective national export control systems

Recognizing the important role of multinational export control regimes for nuclear related materials, equipment and technology, i.e., the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in ensuring the implementation of paragraph 2 of the Article III of the Treaty, the Conference urges those States Parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate effective national rules and regulations on export controls over both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, based on the Zangger Committee Understandings (INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) and the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2). In this regard, the Conference notes that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in April 2004 requires all States to establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export controls.

14. Special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology

In particular, the Conference recognizes the necessity of introducing new measures to place special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons, such as those related to enrichment and reprocessing, and urges all States Parties to exercise restraint in and vigilance over such transfer. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the continuing, devoted efforts to update the NSG Guidelines by the NSG participating governments.

15. IAEA Additional Protocol as a precondition of supply

With regard to the required safeguards in paragraph 2 of Article III of the Treaty, the Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of Decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, in which States Parties agreed that new nuclear supply arrange-
ments to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA’s full-scope safeguards. The Conference further agrees that new nuclear supply arrangements of all the items in the Trigger List of the Zangger Committee Understandings and of the NSG Part 1 Guidelines to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, the conclusion of additional protocols. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the continuing, devoted efforts to update the Zangger Committee Understandings and the NSG Guidelines by participating governments of the respective multinational export control regimes.

16. Nuclear-weapon-free zone

The Conference agrees that the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned contributes to enhancing regional and global peace and stability, and thus reaffirms its support for the concept.

The Conference appreciates the efforts made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, in particular in the Central Asia and the Middle East, and agrees that progress in this regard will further strengthen the credibility of the NPT.

17. Measures against nuclear terrorism

The Conference urges the States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to participate in the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in July 2005 and to agree on amendments to strengthen the CPPNM.

The Conference welcomes the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

The Conference welcomes the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by the UN General Assembly.

The Conference notes that United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 requires all States to develop and maintain appropriate physical protection measures, border control and law enforcement.

Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

18. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The Conference affirms that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by a non-nuclear-weapon State that carries out nuclear activities with the confidence of the international community by faithfully fulfilling its NPT obligations and by ensuring high transparency of its nuclear activities should not be unduly affected.

The Conference supports the promotion of the activities of the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety, and also supports adherence by as many States as possible to international conventions in this area, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

The Conference supports enhancing the global safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and thereby recognizes the importance of adherence by as many States as possible to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management.

The Conference recognizes the importance of international technical cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear technology, particularly in such fields as human health, agriculture, food, sanitary, and water resources, that plays a key role and brings about significant benefits to the whole world. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need to further strengthen the IAEA’s technical co-operation activities, to continually enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation programmes, and to promote activities supporting self-reliance and sustainability, particularly in developing countries in the fields stated.

The Conference urges IAEA Member States to make every effort to contribute to the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Fund as well as to honor their obligation to pay their National Participation Costs as well as arrears of Assessed Programme Costs. In this context, the Conference stresses that the financing of technical cooperation should be in line with the concept of “shared responsibility” and all members share a common responsibility towards financing and enhancing the technical cooperation activities of the Agency.

General Issues

19. Universalization of the NPT

The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference strongly urges the Non-Party States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty, pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

20. Effective mechanisms to deal with withdrawal from the NPT

The Conference reaffirms that a State Party which has withdrawn from the Treaty remains responsible for violations it committed while being a party. The Conference urges any supplier country of the nuclear material, facilities, equipment etc. to make necessary arrangements entitling it to require the return of any nuclear material, facilities, equipment etc. transferred prior to the withdrawal or their neutralization.

21. Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education

The Conference encourages the States Parties to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly at its 57th session and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to this end.

(End)
2. UN

Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons
(60th General Assembly UN (2005))

The General Assembly,

Recalling, on the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the need for all States to take further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, and renewing the determination to do so,

Noting that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling its resolution 59/76 of 3 December 2004,

Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear war and nuclear terrorism,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and expressing regret over the lack of agreement on substantive issues at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as over the elimination of references to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the 2005 World Summit Outcome,

Recalling the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,

Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing,

Reaffirming that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and thereby ensuring international peace and security,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons, including that caused by proliferation networks,

Welcoming the Final Declaration of the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in New York in September 2005,

1. **Reaffirms** the importance of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty, and stresses the importance of an effective Treaty review process;

2. **Also reaffirms** the importance of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions, and pending their accession to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in support of the Treaty;

3. **Encourages** further steps leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are committed under article VI of the Treaty, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance of applying irreversibility and verifiability, as well as increased transparency in a way that promotes international stability and undiminished security for all, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons;

4. **Also encourages** the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement fully the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty, while welcoming the progress made by nuclear-weapon States, including the Russian Federation and the United States, on nuclear arms reductions;

5. **Further encourages** States to continue to pursue efforts, within the framework of international cooperation, contributing to the reduction of nuclear-weapons-related materials;

6. **Calls for** the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

7. **Stresses** the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;

8. **Urges** all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty, and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty;
9. **Emphasizes** the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

10. **Calls upon** all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

11. **Stresses** the importance of further efforts for non-proliferation, including the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreements and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997 and the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004;

12. **Encourages** all States to undertake concrete activities to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its 57th session and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking to this end;

13. **Also encourages** the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Statement by H.E. Mr. Tatsuo Arima, the Special Envoy of the Government of Japan, at the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Mr. President,

On behalf of my Government, I should like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to Mr. Downer, on his election to the Presidency of this Conference. I am certain that, under his leadership, this Conference will be able to send a strong message to the international community about the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty. In light of the omission of the reference to disarmament and non-proliferation from the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit last week, we must sustain even greater recognition of the importance of the CTBT, and strengthen our efforts all the more to realize its early entry into force.

Mr. President,

In nine years since the UN adoption of the CTBT in 1996, 176 States have signed. 125 of them have ratified including 33 Annex II states. This support for the Treaty is transforming the prohibition of nuclear test explosions into an international norm.

Mr. President,

To maintain the momentum for the Treaty’s entry into force, it is essential for us to continue the steady build-up of the CTBT verification regime. Japan would like to extend its congratulations to Mr. Toth on his assumption of the post of Executive Secretary and express its hope that further consolidation of the verification system will be realized under his leadership.

The benefits of the CTBT verification system extend to the promotion of public welfare and science as well. In this context, Japan, together with Germany, held an experts’ discussion on civil, scientific and other applications of CTBT verification technologies in May 2004. The Preparatory Commission is currently carrying out a technical test involving the provisions of IMS data for tsunami warning systems. In view of the tremendous loss of life and damage caused by the earthquake off the coast of Sumatra at the end of last year, the provision of such information would be quite significant from the humanitarian point of view.

Mr. President,

This year we commemorate the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the only nation ever to have suffered nuclear devastation, Japan is totally committed to peace and to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Japanese thus wish to see the early entry into force of the CTBT and we have worked hard to achieve that end and I should like to highlight three aspects of our efforts.

First, Japan takes every diplomatic opportunity to urge the States that have not yet signed or rati-
fied the CTBT to do so. Before the NPT Review Conference in April this year, Foreign Minister Machimura sent a letter to those States to encourage them to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. It is extremely regrettable that the international community was not able to agree on the importance and urgency of the CTBT as well as other substantive matters either at the NPT Review Conference or the 2005 World Summit last week. To avoid such failures, Japan calls upon the international community at the highest political levels to take the decisive step of ratifying the CTBT at the earliest possible date. Japan calls, in particular, upon the remaining 11 Annex II countries to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Second, Japan continues to play an active role in the international community's efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons based on a practical and incremental approach. Thus Japan again will submit a draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly this year, which contains such concrete steps as the early entry into force of the CTBT. We hope that our draft resolution will once again be adopted by an overwhelming majority of the member states.

Third, Japan is making contributions towards the establishment of the CTBT verification system. We launched our “CTBT National Operation System” in November 2002, and have been doing our utmost to install and operate relevant IMS facilities in Japan provisionally, and consolidate National Data Centers. We are also providing technical assistance to developing countries to improve their verification capacity through training courses for global seismological observation. To date, we have welcomed 97 trainees from 63 countries.

Mr. President,

Before the CTBT was adopted in 1996, all the nuclear weapon States had declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. India and Pakistan did so after conducting nuclear tests in 1998. Although moratorium is not a substitute for the Treaty, Japan still values it and strongly urges those States with moratorium in place to maintain it pending entry into force of the Treaty. We also strongly urge all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions at any location.

Mr. President,

Let me conclude by expressing yet again the determination of my government to continue to work with the international community to realize the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty.

Thank you.
Distinguished delegates,

I am pleased to extend a few words of welcome to you all at the opening of the 3rd Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation.

Distinguished delegates,

This meeting, known as ASTOP, was launched in November 2003, and this is its third meeting.

At present, proliferation of WMDs, missiles and related materials and technology is recognized as a matter of grave concern to the international community.

The purpose of the meeting is to contribute to the strengthening of non-proliferation measures in Asia

To serve this purpose, I believe it necessary that government experts in non-proliferation issues exchange their views candidly from professional perspectives, and therefore I wish to welcome, in particular, those participants who traveled a long way from home to Japan amid tight schedules.

Distinguished delegates,

Let me briefly touch upon some remarkable developments in the area of non-proliferation after the 2nd ASTOP.

The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Vientiane, Laos, July last year, in particular, clearly states that the proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles remain a serious security challenge and recognizes the danger of them falling into terrorist hands as the most dangerous challenge.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear issue, a joint statement was adopted at the fourth round of the Six Party Talks in September last year, which stipulates abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.

The challenge at present is to determine ways for actual implementation of the statement, but unfortunately the schedule of the next Talks has not been confirmed.

Last week, Japan held bilateral consultations with North Korea, but regrettably, there was no positive response from North Korea during the consultations on security.

As for Iran’s nuclear issue, it is worth mentioning that the IAEA Board of Governors resolution, adopted on February 4th with a large majority, sends a clear message of the international community that include reporting to the UN Security Council.

At the end of last month, I had a meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister Mr. Mottaki in London.
I strongly urged Iran to implement all the relevant IAEA Board resolutions and stressed the importance of Iran to gain a confidence of the international community.
I believe it is essential that the international community continues such diplomatic efforts.

Distinguished delegates,

Japan attaches importance to non-proliferation measures as one of main pillars of our policy on security of the entire Asian region.
For effective prevention of WMDs, every country on its own part needs to reinforce relevant measures in all aspects, and also sends a determined message to proliferators that we will not let them take advantage of any weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime.
I believe that the strengthened non-proliferation system in Asia will further promote security and prosperity of the region, and will lead to the improved security environment of the entire world.

Now let me conclude my remarks by expressing my hope that today’s meeting, through frank and candid discussions by every participant, will be an important step toward the strengthening of non-proliferation in Asia.

Thank you very much for your attention.
Statement by H.E. Professor Akiko Yamanaka,
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the Conference of Disarmament
20 June 2006

Mr. President,
Distinguished representatives,

I am greatly honored to address this esteemed body on behalf of the Government of Japan, especially since I have devoted myself to promoting world peace as my lifelong mission.

Mr. President,

The Conference on Disarmament, including in its former incarnation as the Disarmament Committee, was the venue that negotiated and agreed to such important arms control and disarmament treaties as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It has left for later generations an imperishable monument of the endeavors to heighten the security of countries, not by the accumulation, but through the reduction of weapons.

However, the CD has been in stalemate over the past decade. This was an unexpected and disappointing result in view of the fact that the cold war, which drew a long shadow over the world for so many years, has long since past into history. Moreover, as new challenges to the NPT regime amass, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the risk of those weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists, the CD cannot even respond since it is unable to agree on the so called program of work. Diplomats to this forum have made continuous attempts in vain to break the deadlock. This year, however, we have seen a silver lining spread across this dark cloud that has shrouded the CD, thanks to the introduction of Structured Debates on each issue of the agenda. This seems to be the first sign of momentum. Especially, the substantial discussions on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon (FMCT) have generated new possibilities which we should transform into concrete action.

Mr. President,

Structured Debates have brought the substantial exchange of views back to the CD. The productive session last month on an FMCT was especially encouraging. Many experts attended the debates and several countries submitted working papers. Japan contributed in both aspects. In particular, we believe that the proposed US draft treaty on an FMCT and mandate have provided us with a good starting point. I call upon all the experts gathered here, with their sagacity and exten-
sive experience, to join together and utilize this proposal as a good basis to commence actual negoti-
ations on an FMCT and conclude a treaty as early as possible.

While I believe many countries share my view, I am aware that some do not. However, I want to
emphasize that the CD must not hesitate in revitalizing its work.

Firstly, we should begin by doing what can be done. As you are all well aware, the impasse at
the CD is not the result of diverse priorities among members but of the linkage approach, which
conditionally links one item to another. To my knowledge, in the history of multilateral fora, such
an approach has produced scant few positive outcomes. We should reconsider this approach.
Nonetheless, abandoning linkages does not mean other items will be disregarded. Each item is
meritorious in its own right, and we should begin work in accordance with those merits. An FMCT
is considered ripe since not a single country has voiced objection to embarking on negotiations. Of
course, we should also continue to deliberate on nuclear disarmament, Prevention of Arms Race in
Outer Space (PAROS) and Negative Security Assurance (NSA).

Secondly, we must avoid clinging to the past approaches of the Conference. For instance, the
Five Ambassadors’ proposal for a program of work has produced few results, and we must break
from its spell. We must review the present situation with fresh eyes while distancing ourselves from
the past approaches. In this spirit, I believe that agreement to initiating negotiations on an FMCT
without preconditions will suit the interests of all.

Mr. President,

Now is the time for CD members to be flexible in their quest for a creative and pragmatic modus
operandi. During the remaining three months of this year’s session, the Conference should redou-
ble its efforts to break the long-standing stalemate.

Let me conclude by expressing my strong faith in the deep knowledge and insight of the distin-
guished members of the CD, as experts of disarmament and non-proliferation. The “window of
opportunity” is open and there is a real chance before us. It is our responsibility to grasp it, because
let me remind you, in the context of this forum, inertia is also a weapon of mass destruction.

I thank you.