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Chapter 1. Overview (Japan’s basic stance on disarmament and non-proliferation of conventional arms)

Conventional arms generally refer to all weapons except weapons of mass destruction, and include various types of weapons, such as landmines, machine guns, combat vehicles, war ships, fighter aircrafts, cannons, missiles. Disarmament and non-proliferation of conventional arms started to draw attention in the international community in the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. What lies behind this is the need to deal with weapons that had been given loose rein during the Cold War without sufficient control and thus injuring victims in the conflict-affected areas. Moreover, in the wake of the 21st century, a serious threat has been mounted for the acquisition of surface-to-air missiles by terrorist groups, and efforts are increasingly necessary from a new perspective of preventing conventional weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

What is distinctive about conventional weapons is that they are actually used in armed conflicts and causing civilian casualties. Therefore, efforts are needed to collect and destroy small arms that are illicitly circulated and excessively accumulated in conflict-affected areas and to control illicit circulation of small arms. This requires a broad approach from various perspectives, confidence-building through improvement of transparency, contribution to post-conflict peace-building, coordination with humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, in addition to control and prohibition of the use and production of weapons themselves.

Based on this recognition, two approaches that Japan could take in an attempt to keep conventional arms under control are conceivable.

One is to universalize and strengthen the regulations and frameworks at an international level. Examples of this approach include encouragement of participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, active promotion of implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and encouragement for ratification of the Ottawa Convention. Steady implementation of the regulations of the international community and strengthening of the framework will be conducive to prevent damage inflicted by conventional arms.

Another approach is measures against weapons that have already been circulated and accumulated and are the cause of conflict and deterioration of security. This requires assistance on the ground, including institution building to prevent illicit inflow at weapons, collection and disposal of weapons. Japan has provided support for mine clearance in mine affected countries, such as Afghanistan, and carried out small arms collection projects in Cambodia. Accumulation of knowledge and experience is important for these practical actions and cooperation with international organizations and NGOs with experience and knowledge in these areas is also essential. Such efforts of Japan to address conventional arms issues is to embody Japan’s diplomatic policy of consolidation of Peace which aims to develop peace building processes in a quick and seamless manner, which involves promotion of post-cease fire peace processes, ensuring national stability and security, emergency humanitarian relief, and reconstruction assistance.
Chapter 2. Small arms and light weapons

Section 1. Background of the SALW issues and international efforts

The weapons that are actually being used and responsible for killing and injuring people in today’s conflicts are small arms and light weapons (SALW) and therefore many describe them as the real weapons of mass destruction. According to the UN Secretary-General Report of 2002, at least 500,000 people are killed by the use of SALW every year. SALW not only prolong and intensify conflicts, but also impede humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities of the UN and others in the post-conflict period, and cause resurgence of conflicts and increase in crimes. In particular, crime syndicates and terrorist organizations are said to be using all types of SALW, and civilians resort to weapons to defend themselves (armed civilians), spiraling into a vicious circle. Against this background, the problem of collecting and destroying SALW that have been illicitly circulated and excessively accumulated, and controlling illicit circulation of SALW have become urgent tasks for the international community.

(Reference)

According to the Report of the UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms, “small arms and light weapons” cover weapons that are “actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations” and that are manufactured specially for military purpose, including the following three types: (1) “small arms” that are portable and usable by a single soldier, (2) “light weapons” that are portable and usable by several soldiers, and (3) ammunitions and explosives. In general, these are collectively called “small arms and light weapons.”

The first significant international-level initiative to raise the issue of SALW is said to have been made by then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who appealed the necessity of “micro-disarmament” in his report “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace” in 1995. “Micro-disarmament” means “practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with, and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.” The United Nations subsequently displayed active initiative in dealing with the issue of SALW, and established the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1996 and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1998. The Panel and Group examined the issue of SALW and prepared reports of recommendations. Then, the United Nations first and second biennial meetings to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action were convened in 2003 and 2005, increasing momentum toward the efforts of the international community to deal with the issue.
Section 2. Japan’s efforts

1. Activities through the United Nations

(1) Since the issue of SALW was brought up in the international community, Japan has played a leading role in dealing with this issue through the framework of the United Nations. Japan does not export weapons under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and the three principles on arms export and there is no export-based military industry, and this fact gives Japan a position to lead the international community. Specifically, Japan has presented the draft resolution on SALW to the UN General Assembly almost every year since 1995 to promote international public awareness as well as presenting prescriptions to solve the issue. Based on the resolutions on SALW presented by Japan, the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1996) and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1998) were established, the UN Conference on Small Arms (2001) and the UN First and Second Biennial Meetings of States on Small Arms (2003 and 2005) were convened, and the Open-Ended Working Group on an International Instrument for the Identification and Tracing of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (2004) was established. From 2001, Japan started to present draft resolutions on SALW jointly with South Africa and Columbia, and the resolutions were adopted by consensus or by overwhelming majority.

(2) Japan has also played an important role in international conferences related to SALW held by the United Nations. Japan chaired the above-mentioned UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms at the UN Conference on Small Arms (Vice-chairperson: Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki, Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and served as vice-chairperson, thereby contributing to successful negotiations on the instruments adopted at the meetings.

(3) In 2003, Japan, as a chairperson of the UN Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms (Chairperson: Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (then)), brought success to the meeting by widely working with participating States and the UN during and prior to the meeting. Also while the meeting was in progress, Japan contributed to finalizing a Chairperson’s summary and the meeting ended with the adoption of a report to which the Chairperson’s summary was attached. All of these are considered to have consolidated Japan’s leading role in dealing with the issues of SALW.

(Reference) Overview of the Programme of Action adopted at the UN Conference on Small Arms

The contents of the Programme of Action are roughly divided into (1) prevention and (2) reduction of illegal circulation of SALW. Prevention measures include enacting relevant laws and regulations, establishing the secure management and the marking system, improving relevant data, applying strict export standards, and mutual cooperation between customs and the authorities in charge of border control. Possible reduction measures are collecting and destroying SALW, carrying out “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR),” providing assistance for democratization and development, and reforming the security sector.
2. Efforts at the regional level and Small Arms Collection Project

(1) In order to steadfastly implement the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons at a regional level, Japan co-sponsored the Regional Workshop on Arms Register/Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bali, February 2003, and the Seminar on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Central Asia in Almaty, March 2004. In August 2004, Japan co-hosted a seminar for members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Fiji with Australia and the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. Japan also co-sponsored a seminar mainly targeting ASEAN member states and Central Asian nations in China, April 2005, in cooperation with China, Switzerland, and the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

(2) Japan has been carrying out projects for collecting small arms and light weapons (SALW), in which the collection of SALW is incorporated into a development program, as specific support to SALW-affected countries. In 2003, Japan, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), carried out a collection project in Kosovo ($1 million) and has implemented the Peace Building and Comprehensive Small Arms Management Program in Cambodia in cooperation with the local authorities ($450 million in 2002 and $470 million in 2004). This project centers on development in exchange for collection of arms, destruction of arms, support for registration of SALW, and awareness raising campaigns. Under the project, more than 12,000 of the SALW were collected and destroyed by May 2005. A project for collecting (SALW) has been implemented through the UN since June 2003 in Niger ($1 million). Also in March 2005 a decision was made to extend, through UNDP, grant aid for conflict prevention and peace building of approximately $200 million to the Republic of Sierra Leone for the Arms for Development (AFD) Program
The Open-Ended Working Group held its third substantive session in June 2005 in New York (UN Headquarters), and the conclusion of negotiations on a Draft International Instrument was reached on the final day, which was then adopted as a political document at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2005. This international instrument presents a framework of international cooperation to identify and trace illicitly circulating weapons that have been flown out of a manufacturing or exporting country, stipulating that each country should mark the weapons (marking) and keep the record of production and trade for a longer period of time.

The UN Second Biennial Meeting of States was held in New York from July 11-15, 2005 and current implementation of each country was presented. The UN Small Arms Review Conference is scheduled to take place in 2006 (June 26-July 7) to review the progress of the implementation of the Action Programme.

A draft resolution concerning illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, jointly submitted by Japan, Colombia and South Africa, was adopted by consensus at the Plenary Session of the 60th United Nations General Assembly in December 2005. This draft resolution includes encouraging all initiatives for a successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, scheduled to be held in 2006, calling upon all states to implement the international instrument on tracing, and establishing a group of government experts on brokering (control over illicit brokering) after the latter half of 2006.
Chapter 3. Anti-personnel Landmines

Section 1. Present situation on Anti-personnel landmine issue

Anti-personnel mines emplaced especially in conflict-affected regions are causing extremely serious humanitarian problems by inflicting injury and death on non-combatant civilians in an indiscriminatory manner. Those mines also pose major impediments to reconstruction and development after conflicts have come to an end.

As of 2004, more than 80 countries have been affected by landmines in the world, and the number of people injured or killed by landmines amounts to 15,000 to 20,000 per year. It is believed that more than 110 million landmines are left emplaced, which means it would take 1,100 years to clear all landmines even if we could clear 100,000 landmines a year (data: United Nations 1997). Once emplaced, it will be a long time before a landmine becomes harmless as they are corrosion-resistant (50 to 100 years). In addition, while landmines are easily produced, inexpensive ($3 to 10 per mine), and easy to emplace, their clearance is costly ($100 to 1,000 per mine). Accordingly, a tremendous amount of money is needed to completely clear landmines, causing an extremely serious problem.

Mine affected countries have been taking mine action, including mine clearance, with support from donor nations. From 1999 to 2003, more than 1,100 km of land was cleared and more than 4 million landmines were destroyed throughout the world. (Landmine Monitor Report 2004, compiled mainly by international NGOs).
1. Starting point

Concerns about the anti-personnel mine issue in the international community grew since early 1990s, and the ICRC, then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Boutros Ghali, and then US President Bill Clinton, among others, called for increased efforts to deal effectively with the issue.

2. Regulations by the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Protocol II on Mines, adopted in 1980, was not sufficient. It was not applied to civil wars and did not ban the use of undetectable mines. In response to growing concern from the international community on the landmine issue, the protocol was amended in May 1996 to become the Amended Protocol II. It incorporated a number of reinforced provisions. For example, the Amended Protocol II is applied to civil wars, bans anti-personnel mines of a vicious nature, such as:

(Reference) Number of anti-personnel mines possessed, produced and traded, according to research by NGOs

As of 2004, a total of 200 million anti-personnel mines are estimated to be possessed (stored) by 67 countries. The major countries and the number of landmines possessed are listed below at 1, and produced and traded are listed below at 2.

1. Estimated number of landmines possessed by countries that have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction

   (1) China 110,000,000
   (2) Russia 50,000,000
   (3) United States 10,400,000
   (4) Pakistan 6,000,000
   (5) India 4,000,000-5,000,000
   (6) ROK 2,000,000

   Other than those countries, Myanmar, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam are believed to possess anti-personnel mines. Also besides these countries, some countries that have signed but not acceded to the Convention are believed to possess landmines: Ukraine (5,950,000), Poland (1,000,000), Indonesia and Brunei. The total number of these four countries is estimated to be 7,000,000-8,000,000.

2. Estimated number of landmines produced and traded

   At one time more than 50 countries used anti-personnel mines. Since then some progress has been made; 33 countries among them have acceded to the Ottawa Convention, and three countries ceased production. Many non-States Parties of the Convention have prohibited or restrained from export of landmines, and virtually no trade is taking place.

(Source) “Landmine Monitor Report 2004” compiled mainly by international NGOs

Section 2. Efforts of the international community

1. Starting point

Concerns about the anti-personnel mine issue in the international community grew since early 1990s, and the ICRC, then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros-Boutros Ghali, and then US President Bill Clinton, among others, called for increased efforts to deal effectively with the issue.

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as undetectable anti-personnel mines or those that lack a self-destruction mechanism, in principle, and restricts their transfer. The Amended Protocol II has been concluded by 82 states, including Japan, as of the end of July 2005. On the other hand, the Amended Protocol II falls short of banning production and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines although it bans the use and transfer on certain conditions.

Section 3. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)

1. Background and Overview

(1) Based on international criticism that a partial prohibition by the CCW would not result in a fundamental solution to the issue of anti-personnel mines and that the total ban of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer thereof is necessary, a path to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction was opened through the activities of NGOs, headed by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and cooperation from various states in favor of the total ban of anti-personnel mines. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) was prepared through the so-called Ottawa process, which originated from an international conference convened in Ottawa under the auspices of the Government of Canada in October 1996. The Convention was opened for signature in Ottawa in December 1997 and entered into force on March 1, 1999. As of the end of September 2005, 147 states including Japan have concluded the Convention.

(2) The Ottawa Convention prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and commits States Parties to destroy all stockpiled landmines no later than four years after the convention comes into force and emplaced landmines to be cleared no later than ten years and, at the same time, calls for international cooperation and assistance to clear landmines and assist the landmine victims.

(3) Following the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, the Meeting of State Parties to the Convention has been convened every year since 1999. At the end of November 2004, the First Review Conference was convened in Nairobi, and three documents were adopted: first, the Review, which outlines achievements in the past five years and challenges that remain for the goal of a mine-free world; next, the Action Plan as the guidelines for actions on the remaining tasks in the next five years; and last, the High Level Declaration, which presents political commitments to the objective of eliminating anti-personnel landmines.

2. Major countries that have not acceded to the Convention and reasons thereof

The United States has not yet acceded to this Convention, among others, because of security concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula, and Russia has also not taken this step as it feels it must protect its national nuclear power plants. China maintains the position not to accede to the Convention because it considers anti-personnel mines to be a necessary weapon for a state with long land borders. The ROK has not acceded to the convention because it considers landmines to be necessary for its defense against a potential invasion by North Korea. India and Pakistan
have not acceded to the Convention because of security concerns. (That said, however, these states have already acceded to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW mentioned above.)

(Reference) Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed

A total of 76 states had destroyed about 37 million anti-personnel mines by the end of February 2005. At the same time 15 States Parties to the Convention are in the process of destroying about 10 million stockpiled landmines. The following shows some states that have destroyed anti-personnel mines and the number of mines destroyed.

1. Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed by the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction that have achieved their destruction targets:
   (1) Italy About 7,100,000
   (2) Turkmenistan About 6,600,000
   (3) Switzerland About 3,900,000
   (4) Sweden About 2,700,000
   (5) UK About 2,400,000
   Other than these, Germany (about 1,700,000), Albania (about 1,700,000), France, Rumania and Japan (about 1,000,000 for each country), etc. destroyed anti-personnel mines.

2. Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed by the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction that are still in the process of their destruction and the number of landmines to be destroyed:
   (1) Belarus About 3,900,000
   (2) Turkey About 3,000,000
   (3) Greece About 1,600,000
   (4) Serbia Montenegro About 1,300,000

3. Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed by States not party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction:
   (1) Russia About 18,700,000 (1996-2003)
   (2) Ukraine More than 400,000 (signed but not acceded to the Convention)

(Source) “Landmine Monitor Report 2004” compiled mainly by international NGOs

Section 4. Japan’s efforts

At the singing ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction held in Ottawa in December 1997, then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed the “Zero Victims Program”, with the aim of solving the issue of anti-personnel mines, and stated that a comprehensive approach is indispensable, based on the realization of the universal and effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of assistance for mine clearance and victim assistance. Japan has been actively promoting that policy. With emphasis on Asia, Africa and the Middle-East, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr. Katsuyuki Kawai (then) announced Japan’s new policy on mine
action at the First Review Conference in Nairobi held in November 2004. Japan will carry out its assistance for mine action on three principles: namely, Peace Building, Human Security, and Strengthening cooperation between governments, NGOs, the private sector and academia.

1. Accession to relevant conventions by Japan

Japan ratified the Amended Protocol II on mines, booby-traps and other devices of the CCW on June 10, 1997. In addition, Japan ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction under the leadership of then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi on September 30, 1998. At the same time, the Law on the Prohibition of the Manufacture of Anti-Personnel Mines and Regulation of the Possession of Anti-Personnel Mines was enacted to guarantee execution of the Convention within Japan. Japan completed the destruction of about 1 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines, as the convention required, on February 8, 2003.

From the perspective that the ratification of this convention by as many states as possible will continue to solving the issue of anti-personnel mines, Japan has been urging in every occasion the governments of non-party states, especially those in Asia and those which have many landmines, to ratify the convention.

Japan co-chaired (with Cambodia) the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Awareness
and Mine Action Technologies, which was part of the Intersessional Programme of work between 2003 and 2004. Japan also participated as the co-chair of the Review Conference, held in November-December 2004 in Nairobi.

2. Strengthening of mine clearance and victim assistance

(1) Japan announced assistance of some 10 billion yen over five years from 1998 to promote concretely mine clearance and victim assistance based on the “Zero Victims Program,” with this amount being disbursed by October 2002. As of July 2005, the accumulated assistance after 1998 totals more than 18 billion yen.

(2) Exceptions to the Three Principles on Arms Exports and relevant regulations

As a measure to further strengthen its efforts on the anti-personnel mines issue, Japan decided not to apply the Three Principles on Arms Exports under specific conditions to the export of equipment needed for mine clearance, (announced by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on December 2, 1997). In August 2002, vehicles and mine detectors used only for the disposal of anti-personnel mines were exempted from export licensing since their specifications do not correspond to the definition of weapons as defined by the principles: weapons that are used by military forces and employed directly in combat.

(3) Announcement of a new landmine policy

As mentioned above, Japan announced a new policy on mine action at the First Review Conference. While placing emphasis on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the policy is to continue Japan’s support for mine action on a similar scale to the previous assistance, based on three principles: contribution to peace building, the viewpoint of human security, and cooperation between governments, NGOs, the private sector and academia (and efforts for technological development as part of the cooperation).

(4) Efforts for technological development

As a cooperative effort by governments, NGOs, the private sector and academia, in order to improve safety and efficiency of demining activities, Japan conducts development of demining related equipment, using existing civilian technologies, and research and development of more advanced detection technologies. Such technology development requires on-site verification tests in mine-affected countries. Japan has conducted the tests in Afghanistan and Croatia thus far. At the First Review Conference, Japan hosted side events on its efforts, which attracted the attention of many participants.
(5) Recent efforts – assistance to Sudan

In response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan in January, 2005, the Japanese Government decided and provided the support of approximately 800 million yen (about $7.3) through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) with the aim, primarily, of emergency survey mine clearance, mine risk education, etc., in order to contribute to the establishment of peace in the country.

3. Future efforts

It is necessary to promote the universalization of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction and to develop an international environment that makes it much harder to emplace anti-personnel mines. Japan will pay attention to its “visibility” in providing assistance by, for example, dispatch of Japanese personnel and development of demining technologies by using Japan’s advanced technology, in addition to continuing to provide traditional assistance based on financial aid through international organizations: Grand Aid for Humanitarian Demining and Victim Assistance, and Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security, and Grant Aid for Japanese NGOs’ Projects, etc. In order to also implement more effective and efficient assistance, the Conventional Arms Division of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department will formulate comprehensive policies for mine action and undertake overall coordination as a competent office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>(Reference) Record of assistance (as of FY 2004)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mine action in general: $8.2 million (four projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Assistance through international organizations: $8.2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. De-mining: $26.3 million (20 projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Bilateral assistance $16 million</td>
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<td>(2) Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects $8.1 million</td>
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<td>(3) Grant assistance for Japanese NGOs $2.2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Victim assistance: $0.78 million (two projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Bilateral assistance $0.13 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects $0.65 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Mine risk education: $0.29 million (two projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects $0.02 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Grant assistance for Japanese NGOs $0.27 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Others: $0.82 million (five projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Assistance through international organizations $0.43 million</td>
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<td>(2) Others $0.39 million</td>
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In October 1980, the Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and the following Protocols I-III were adopted to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be inhumane.

- Protocol on Non-Detective Fragments (Protocol I)
- Protocol on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps (Note: meaning bombs laid in harmless-looking objects such as food and toys) and Other Devices (Protocol II)
- Protocol on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)

Subsequently, the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) was adopted in October 1995. Furthermore, in response to the international public opinion calling for stronger international control over mines and other weapons, the Amended Protocol II was adopted in May 1996, which extended the scope of application to armed conflicts not of an international character and considerably strengthened restrictions on the use of landmines. Japan has ratified the convention itself and all protocols including the Amended Protocol II, as well as the Amended Convention.

Armed conflicts not of an international character had been included in the scope of application only in the Amended Protocol II, but as the Second Review Conference of the CCW convened in December 2001, it was adopted to amend the convention to extend its scope of application to armed conflicts not of an international character.

Since unexploded ordnance and anti-vehicle mines cause considerable damage to civilians, especially after the end of the conflicts their inhumanity has come into question. In response to this, negotiations on an instrument (started in 2003 under the framework of the CCW) to deal with explosive remnants of war (ERW) mainly composed of unexploded ordnance. As a result, the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was adopted as Protocol V (at the Meeting of States Parties to the CCW in November 2003). The protocol mainly stipulates post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minimize the risks and effects of ERW other than mines. At the 2004 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW, an agreement was reached on a mandate to consider all proposals on anti-vehicle mines which may be deemed to cause inhumane damage by blocking access to a region in need of post-conflict assistance.
1. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an arrangement established by the UN General Assembly resolution entitled “Transparency in Armaments,” which was jointly submitted by Japan and the member states of EC (then) and adopted by an overwhelming majority in 1991. It was a groundbreaking arrangement that increases transparency and openness in regard to armaments, mainly in the area of the international transfer of conventional arms, with the aim of building confidence among countries and preventing an excessive accumulation of arms, while considering the fact that the excessive accumulation of arms by Iraq led to the destabilization of the region and culminated in the Gulf War in 1991.

2. This arrangement calls upon the UN member states to keep a record of imports and exports from the preceding year of the seven categories of conventional arms listed as weapons used for full scale invasion, specifically, the quantity transferred within the year and the names of the importing and exporting countries and to provide the record in a designated form to the UN Secretariat. In addition, the UN member states are invited to provide data on their military holdings and procurement through national production, etc. Weapons subject to register under this arrangement were changed as follows in 2004: (1) lowering the bore diameter of large caliber artillery systems to be registered from 100mm to 75mm, and (2) adding man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to missiles and missile launchers as a sub-category. Furthermore, all States Parties are encouraged to voluntarily submit additional information on transfer of SALW weapons produced for military purpose.

3. More than 110 of the UN member states participate in this arrangement. The register covers most international transfers of arms since the major arms exporting states provide data for register. However, it is important to promote further understanding of and participation in the register in African and Middle Eastern countries, in view of their low rate of participation.

4. China participated in the register from 1992 to 1996, but has not been providing data since 1997 reacting to the US commencing to report its exporting to Taiwan. It remains unresolved to date as the United States keeps insisting on the legitimacy of including arms exports to...
Section 2. Japan’s policy

1. The establishment of this register was triggered by the fact that Japan announced (Kaifu cabinet) the Immediate Measures against Problems in the Middle East after the Gulf Crisis in the wake of lessons learned in the Gulf War at the beginning of 1991, and called for (1) self-restraints of arms export by the major arms exporting states and (2) establishment of a UN register of convention arms. Subsequently, Japan and then EC states jointly prepared a draft UN resolution to establish the arrangement.

2. Consequently, Japan has been urging the governments of the UN member states to submit data in order to universalize the register arrangement, as well as contributing to strengthening the register, including support for holding workshops. In addition, Japan has participated in and played a central role in every Group of Governmental Experts meeting, which has been held every three years in principle to discuss the implementation status of the register (next meeting is scheduled in 2006).

3. For example, at the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the register, Japan served as one of the sponsors of the Workshop on Transparency in Armaments, which had been held in China, Namibia, Peru, and Indonesia between 2002 and 2003, and made efforts to universalize the register and increase its number of participating states. At the Group of Governmental Experts meeting in 2003, seven categories of conventional arms that needed to be reported were successfully reviewed for the first time due to Japan’s efforts.
Chapter 6. Other trends surrounding conventional arms

Conventional arms cover a wide range of weapons, other than those mentioned earlier. The following is an outline of recent movements.

Section 1. International move toward strengthening regulations of transfer of weapons

Based on the UN Programme of Action on SALW, adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001, the international community is addressing issues of SALW tracing and brokering. There are other movements primarily by the UK, Finland, and international NGOs towards strengthening regulations of international transfer of weapons.

One of them concerns small arms and light weapons and is called Transfer Control Initiative (TCI). In view of the importance of regulations of transfer to deal with serious issues of SALW, the UK aims to set common standards for transfer of weapons between states at a regional level, with a goal of inclusion of minimum and common international regulations over transfer of SALW in the Programme of Action on SALW.

Another is an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Recent movements are directed towards a wider range of conventional weapons, without being confined to small arms and light weapons. The principles of the ATT currently presented by NGOs include the establishment of a license system for the international transfer of weapons, and show the cases in which transfer should not be approved, as well as the factors to be considered when approving the transfer. To date, no negotiation has been undertaken on an ATT draft text at international fora such as the United Nations conferences. In the UK Chair’s statement after the G8 foreign ministers meeting in June 2005, it is said that G8 foreign ministers discussed common concerns about the proliferation of conventional arms in areas of conflict and instability and the UK elaborated on its proposal for the ATT.

Section 2. Cluster munitions

Although there is not always a clear definition of cluster bombs, cluster munitions generally refer to bombs based on the following mechanism: a large container of a large amount of sub-munitions is dropped from the air the container is opened at a certain altitude above the ground to scatter the sub-munitions. While a cluster bomb can dissipate the explosive power of one bomb and affect a wide range, which cannot be done with a conventional bomb, it is said that the probability to leave unexploded bombs is higher. It has been pointed out that bombings by cluster bombs conducted by the United States and other countries in Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as unexpected cluster munitions are causing harm to civilians.

There are no international laws and regulations that restrict and prohibit the production and use of cluster munitions. However, efforts have been made on the issue of cluster munitions under the framework of the CCW. At the Second Review Conference on the CCW (December 2002), it was decided that discussions by the Governmental Expert Group should continue on the issue of explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded cluster munitions, after 2002. Subsequently, in November 2003, the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War was adopted at the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention (see Chapter 4). This protocol does not control cluster munitions but includes voluntary generic preventive measures in terms of management and manufacturing of munitions with a focus on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature such as the record keeping and provision of information necessary to eliminate ERW and promote such elimination.

**Section 3. Depleted uranium munitions**

Depleted uranium refers to a byproduct occurring in the process of producing enriched uranium from natural uranium, of which the content rate of fissionable uranium-235 is lower than that of natural uranium. Since depleted uranium is in high density and has very high gravity, it is used for balance weight on the aircraft trails, military armors, and piercing projectiles, etc.

A depleted uranium munition is a shell that has high penetrating power against the armor of battle tanks, etc., using depleted uranium as penetrator by taking advantage of its characteristics-high density and hardness.

A definite conclusion about the effect that the use of depleted uranium munitions would cause on the human body has not yet drawn internationally.

Consultations on the effect of depleted uranium in Iraq are held at the UNEP, WHO, and IAEA where appropriate. The UNEP has held workshops inviting Iraqi experts, and an on-site preliminary study is being undertaken by the Iraqi team, with the involvement of international organizations.