I. Text

Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Third Edition)
Chapter 1. Japan's basic position on disarmament and non-proliferation

Chapter 2. Circumstances surrounding disarmament and non-proliferation and Efforts of Japan

Reference: Movements regarding disarmament and non-proliferation in and after the 1990s
Disarmament and Non-proliferation

1. The concept of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation

“Disarmament” means to reduce and, in a broader sense, eliminate armaments and weapons while “arms control” implies the regulation on armaments and weapons, verification and inspection thereof, confidence-building measures, and restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons. The concept of arms control originates from the US-USSR nuclear arms control negotiations held in the 1970s and was originally designed to develop a system to control nuclear weapons between the nuclear superpowers. The objective of “non-proliferation” is to curb and prevent the proliferation of weapons in general, in particular, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, their delivery means (missiles, etc.) and related materials and technologies.

The objectives in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are to improve the international security environment through establishing certain international rules concerning armaments or weapons, related materials and technologies, and based on such rules, regulating, controlling, restricting and reducing the armaments, weapons and related materials and technologies. The concept of disarmament and non-proliferation started with a sincere desire for humankind to create a more peaceful and secure world.

2. Why disarmament is needed?

Determined that “never again shall we be visited with the horror of war through the acting government” as the preamble of its constitution advocates, Japan has, as its basic policy, opted for contributing to world peace and prosperity instead of becoming a military superpower after World War II. War threatens our lives and prosperity, destroys our well-being and cultures, and causes many tragedies on the world. Japan’s postwar foreign policy has been conducted on the basis of the Japanese people’s deep-rooted desire for peace and security both nationally and internationally.

If the ultimate elimination of armaments were achieved, there would at least be no conflicts involving armaments. In reality, however, mistrust festers between countries and among ethnic groups, resulting in ever-present tensions and conflicts. Territorial disputes, religious conflicts, ethnic confrontations, etc. exist throughout the world, and these problems have the potential to develop into armed conflicts. It is a grim reality that most countries in the world feel the necessity for arming in order to defend themselves against a possible invasion or a military threat from other countries. It is therefore necessary to consider efforts for disarmament based on that reality.

Even if armament is necessary for a state’s national security, every state benefits from cooperation and coordination with other states in limiting the scale of armaments to an appropriate level, or if possible, in reducing armaments. When competing states strengthen their military capabilities in order to gain military dominance, they will be caught in a never-ending spiral of an arms race. In order to avoid such a situation, states have started to realize that limiting or coordinating the scale and capacity of their armaments is necessary.

First of all, the arms race is likely to jeopardize international peace and security. Even where states do not intend to actually invade their neighbors or threaten them with armed force uncon-
trolled expansion of armaments leads to a growing sense of mistrust and threat among other countries. This may destabilize international relations or, in certain circumstances, lead to unnecessary armed conflicts.

From an economic perspective, huge military expenditures also aggravate the financial situations of the governments involved. An unnecessary military race is a waste of resources. One of the desired effects of disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy is to prepare grounds for prioritizing spending on economic development and social welfare while reducing the military expenditure as much as possible.

In addition to the restriction on armaments from the humanitarian point of view stemming from the 19th century, international cooperation to bring about disarmament has been sought since the beginning of the 20th century from the viewpoints described above. The League of Nations, established in the wake of World War I, sought to promote disarmament as one of its major objectives. With warships forming the core of armed forces at the time, the treaties for the limitation of naval armaments were concluded as the result of a series of disarmament negotiations amongst the major powers. Since that time, disarmament has been pursued primarily through international cooperation in an attempt to efficiently and effectively bring about security amongst states.
Chapter 1. Japan’s basic position of disarmament and non-proliferation

Based on the following basic position, Japan has been promoting disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy. Firstly, Japan should vigorously promote disarmament and non-proliferation based on the philosophy of peace on which Japan stands, as a state which has responsibility for demonstrating the devastation of nuclear weapons as the only state that has suffered the horrific effects of atomic bombs. Secondly, in order to stabilize the security environment of the region surrounding Japan from the viewpoint of ensuring peace and security in Japan, it is important to forfend the arms race in the region and to prevent weapons of mass destruction from proliferation. In addition, it is important for Japan, which plays an important role in ensuring peace and security in the world as well as those in the region, to promote realistic and steady measures toward disarmament and non-proliferation while helping to maintain the security of the international community. Thirdly, in reaction to the accelerated aggravation of the misery of war due to an increase in the destructive and killing power of weapons, there has become an increasing need to work on disarmament and non-proliferation through a humanitarian approach. Fourthly, disarmament and non-proliferation have significance in realizing “human security.” In reference to the above, Japan’s basic concept of disarmament and non-proliferation are described below in detail.

1. Desire for peace and mission as the only country in the world to have suffered the devastation caused by the use of atomic bombs

   Japan exerts strenuous efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation, which is one of the important pillars of its foreign policy, because Japan aspires to maintain and ensure peace and stability in the world on which it exists. After World War II, Japan chose to establish its position in the international community as a nation dedicated to peace, with strong determination that the devastation of war be never repeated. Such philosophy of peace is advocated in the Constitution of Japan. It is clear to everyone that Japan has proudly pursued the following policy goals: achieving economic development through peace, not through military build-up, increasing the welfare of the Japanese people, and promoting international peace and stability as a prerequisite for these aims. Japan’s mission, as the only nation that has suffered from atomic bombs, is to strongly appeal to the world that the devastation of the nuclear weapons should not be repeated and nuclear weapons should be completely eliminated. Japan’s experience in leading efforts in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation is a valuable diplomatic asset, and continued active efforts in this field involve an aspect of dissemination of the model established by Japan to the rest of the world.

2. Japan’s security viewpoint

   It is obvious from the regional security environment surrounding Japan that it is significant for Japan to vigorously promote disarmament and non-proliferation.

   Two of Japan’s neighbors, China and Russia, are major powers with vast territories and enormous military capability that includes nuclear weapons. The adjacent areas contain unstable elements such as North Korea, which allegedly has a nuclear weapons program and possesses bal-
listic missiles, and the Taiwan Strait. Even after the Cold War ended, tensions and unclear and uncertain elements still linger in the Northeast Asian region where Japan is located. The fact that North Korea launched a ballistic missile based on “Taepodong 1” which flew over Japanese territory and landed in the Pacific Ocean in August 1998 was viewed as a serious threat to Japan. Furthermore, in January 2003, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and subsequently issued a Foreign Ministry statement in February 2005 to the effect that “North Korea will take measures to increase nuclear weapons arsenal... has manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense.” In this manner, North Korea has continued to take actions that raise concern.

In order to ensure peace and security in Japan, it is imperative to stabilize as much as possible the political and security environment in the area surrounding Japan in order to make certain that the states in the region will not create a dangerous situation by initiating a reckless arms race. It is also important to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means from proliferating to certain states and terrorists. Japan has maintained the basic position of ensuring its peace and security through diplomatic efforts to assure the stability of the international environment, as well as through maintenance of its defense capability and the Japan-US Security Arrangements. Maintaining and strengthening the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and establishing a new international framework to deal with the emergence of a new threat have been essential elements in Japan’s diplomatic efforts. It is possible to make the security environment surrounding Japan safer by prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in line with certain rules, by preventing proliferations in the region, and by thoroughly discussing an appropriate level of armaments with states in the region. This is why it is important for Japan to utilize and strengthen the framework of disarmament and non-proliferation as a part of its national security policy.

3. Humanitarian approach

The humanitarian approach in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation is gaining significance because the misery of war has been aggravated seriously as destructive and killing power of weapons has increased. The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) forbidding the use of certain inhumane weapons by defining “the technical limits within which the necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of humanity” and the protocol banning the use of poisonous gas (the Geneva Protocol, 1925) are some of the first examples of this approach. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention) entered into force in 1999 and it is one recent example of a humanitarian-oriented disarmament convention. Japan, in addition to the security viewpoint, makes much of the humanitarian viewpoint, and it participated in the Ottawa Convention as an original signatory state in December 1997 and accepted it in September 1998.

4. Human security viewpoint

Significance is attached to disarmament and non-proliferation from the viewpoint of “human security” in recent years. “Human security” is the concept that means “in addition to providing national protection, focusing on each and every person, eliminating threats to people through cooperation by various countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and civil society, and striving to strengthen the capacity of people and society so as to enable people to lead self-sufficient lives” (Diplomatic Blue Book, FY 2004). In association with disarmament and non-proliferation, weapons such as anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons threaten the safety and lives of people in conflict areas even after ceasefire, and therefore, they pose problems closely related to “human security.” Efforts in the issues on anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons are quite important in building security that serves as a prerequisite for reconstruction and peace, and have considerable significance in realizing “human security.”
Chapter 2. Circumstances surrounding disarmament and non-proliferation and Efforts of Japan

There have been movements challenging the NPT regime from 2004 to 2005 after the issuance of the second edition of Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (March 2004), and differences in priorities over disarmament and non-proliferation have become distinct in the international community. Thus, the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime is faced with many issues and challenges. On the other hand, various frameworks and initiatives have been developed in order to respond to the new environment. The key points of the present circumstance of disarmament and non-proliferation after the issuance of the second edition and Japan’s efforts are outlined below.

### 1. Regional non-proliferation issues (See Part II)

The international community has been facing extremely difficult issues, such as nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran, during the period between 2004 and 2005. In addition, there has been no substantial progress in the situation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan.
(1) North Korea

The North Korean nuclear issue boils down to a breach of the NPT by a non-nuclear-weapon state, which is prohibited from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, and it is undermining the existence of the international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT from within. The nuclear issue of North Korea, which declared to withdraw from the NPT in January 2003 and officially announced its intention to manufacture nuclear weapons in February 2005, poses an extremely serious threat to Japan’s security as well. In addition, the fact that a party to the NPT declared its intention to newly possess nuclear weapons had a serious repercussion on the very significance of the existence of the NPT itself. If the confidence of the state parties to the treaty wavers in the future, it might lead to further nuclear proliferation, posing a negative influence on control of nuclear weapons, which is an extremely important issue for the international community. The international community needs to continue to exert persistent efforts in tackling this difficult issue. This North Korean nuclear issue has been discussed under the framework of the Six-Party Talks consisting of Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, North Korea and Russia, since August 2003. At the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks held in summer 2005 after about one-year adjournment, the first joint statement of the Six-Party Talks was agreed upon, in which North Korea specifically promised renunciation of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a verifiable manner. This was a significant result that serves as a basis for peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in the future. However, North Korea has protested against measures against money-laundering taken by the United States and the Six-Party Talks have not been held since the Fifth Round in November 2005.

Japan has made positive contributions as a member of the Six-Party Talks. Although the path to realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula involves difficulties, Japan will continue to make the utmost effort to achieve a common goal of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, in intense collaboration with the states concerned.

(2) Iran

An accusation by a dissident group in August 2002 revealed that Iran had violated the IAEA Safeguards Agreement by engaging in repeated nuclear activities without making a declaration to the IAEA for almost the past 20 years. In response to this, the international community expressed strong concern and demanded Iran to implement the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions requiring the suspension of uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In response to the agreement between EU3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Iran (Paris Agreement) on November 14, 2004, Iran suspended its uranium enrichment-related activities and started negotiations with EU3 toward conclusion of a long-term agreement. However, Iran rejected the proposal of EU3 at the beginning of August 2005 and partly resumed its uranium conversion activities. In the wake of such a move, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding Iran’s “non-compliance” with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in September. Although states concerned made continuous diplomatic efforts to restart negotiations between EU3 and Iran thereafter, Iran resumed the uranium enrichment-related activities in January 2006. In the wake of Iran’s response, a resolution to report the issue to the UN Security Council was adopted by a majority at the IAEA
Special Board of Governors in February 2006.

Japan has been taking every opportunity to urge Iran to sincerely comply with all the requirements of the relevant IAEA Board of Governors resolutions including the suspension of all the uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities without exception.

(3) India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan, which conducted nuclear tests in 1998, have yet to sign the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) despite approaches to them by Japan and other countries. Japan has continuously taken various opportunities to urge India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT and sign and ratify the CTBT.

As a new notable movement, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed with President George W. Bush to an initiative intending full civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and Indian governments at the time of his visit to the United States in July 2005. Japan has closely observed the progress of this U.S.-India agreement with the view that it is necessary to carefully examine the agreement including its impact on the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, since it is intended to provide India, which has not acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, with nuclear cooperation.

2. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (See Part III, VI and VII)

(1) Nuclear disarmament

At the NPT Review Conference held in May 2005, about two-thirds of the session of the conference was spent on the adoption of procedural matters due to disagreement between Non-Aligned Movements states, mainly Middle Eastern countries, and Western countries. Consequently, no consensus document on substantial matters was concluded at the end. In addition, no statement on disarmament and non-proliferation was included in the Outcome Document adopted at the UN World Summit in September 2005 because negotiations couldn’t reach agreement due to the discord over the balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “We have failed twice this year”, Japan also regards these results as highly regrettable. There has been increasing need for the international community to strengthen concrete measures through cooperation among states and various frameworks.

Japan has made efforts to form a consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the international community by submitting a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly every year from 1994. In response to these circumstances, Japan reorganized a draft resolution and submitted it as a concise but powerful draft resolution without redundancy in 2005. As a result, the draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority with the support of 168 states, reaching a record-high (incidentally, seven New Agenda Coalition (NAC) countries voted for the draft resolution for the first time after 2000).

With respect to the CTBT, although six states have signed it and 18 states have ratified it since the time of previous issuance of Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (March 2004), the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the only state which has newly
signed and ratified the CTBT out of the states whose ratifications are required for the entry into force of the CTBT. Thus, there is still no prospect for the entry into force of the CTBT. On the other hand, moratorium on nuclear testing is still ongoing, and continued diplomatic approach to promote the entry into force of the CTBT is required.

Japan has taken a proactive approach. For example, in April 2005, then-Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura sent letters requesting early ratification of the CTBT to the foreign ministers of 11 states whose ratifications are required for the entry into force of the CTBT but which have not ratified it, in advance of the NPT Review Conference.

(2) Non-proliferation

(a) G8 effort

The “G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation” was adopted at the Sea Island Summit in 2004, and the G8 comprehensively and specifically presented the tasks to be addressed and the agreed measures to be taken by the international community in relation to weapons of mass destruction. The tasks include universal adherence to and compliance with the treaties relating to disarmament and non-proliferation; support for establishment of national implementation systems and building of law enforcement capacity; full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation; moratorium on the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for enrichment and reprocessing; universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol; enhancement of IAEA’s functions; strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); response to regional issues in North Korea, Iran and other countries; continuation of activities by the G8 Global Partnership; defense against bioterrorism; measures to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons, and; nuclear safety and security.

(b) United Nations effort

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 prescribing efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the international community was adopted on April 28, 2004. The resolution provides a basis for the international community to respond to the increasing threat of non-state actors developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction. It thus has a great significance in terms of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Japan is also working on implementation of the resolution and submitted a report requested by the resolution to the Security Council on October 28, 2004.

(c) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The international community has made various proactive efforts to effectively deal with these difficult issues. In May 2003, US President George W. Bush proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to complement the non-proliferation regime centered on the existing export control. Following the proposal, the Statement of Interdiction Principle was issued by the member countries and strenuous efforts for the prevention of proliferation, such as organizing of various exercises, have been made.

Japan has made active contributions, including hosting a maritime interdiction exercise in Sagami Bay in October 2004.
(d) Proposals by US President George W. Bush

In February 2004, President Bush proposed seven actions to close the loopholes in the international non-proliferation regime, and the efforts to materialize these proposals have been made through the international community.

(Reference) Seven Proposals concerning non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by US President George W. Bush

Following recent international developments such as Libya’s decision to abandon weapons of mass destruction programs and investigations on the outflow of the nuclear related technologies from Pakistan (See “Part II: Regional Non-Proliferation Issues and Efforts of Japan” for both), activities of transnational proliferation, the so-called “Underground Network,” are brought under the spotlight. In his speech on February 11, 2004, US President Bush pointed out such an “Underground Network,” and to close the loopholes in the international non-proliferation regime, proposed the following seven actions.

(1) Expansion of activities of the “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)”
(2) Early adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution on non-proliferation
(3) Expansion of the G8 Global Partnership
(4) Prevention of proliferation of enriched uranium and reprocessing equipment and its technologies
(5) To oblige the importing countries of equipment for the civil nuclear programs to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol
(6) Creation of the Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification
(7) To exclude states under investigation for proliferation violations from the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification

(e) Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA)

In October 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated in The Economist that we would need a new approach to uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and other activities from the viewpoint of strengthening the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. In response to this, a group of international experts was established to consider the potential of the Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) in June 2004 and the group compiled a report in February 2005.

Since discussion on nuclear fuel supply guarantees is expected to intensify in the international community in the future, Japan intends to actively participate in such discussions as it has conscientiously worked on the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(3) Nuclear security

Efforts for nuclear security have been strengthened in response to increasing awareness of the possibility that terrorists may use nuclear materials and radioactive sources as means of attacks, which the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 have demonstrated. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism was adopted in April 2005, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, intended to further strengthen international efforts to protect nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, was adopted in July 2005. In this manner, there has been significant progress between 2004 and 2005.

As for Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism when the Convention was opened for signature in September 2005 on the occasion of the UN World Summit. Consideration is ongoing toward early conclusion of the Convention, together with the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material adopted in July 2005.

(4) Assistance of Japan for denuclearization of Russia

With respect to the dismantlement project of decommissioned nuclear submarines titled “Star of Hope” in the Russian Far East region, the dismantlement program for the first submarine was completed in December 2004. When President Vladimir Putin visited Japan in November 2005, an implementation agreement was concluded with regard to a new dismantlement program for five submarines, and dismantlement work will be undertaken in the future. On the other hand, on-going consideration is now heading in the direction of utilizing 10 million Australian dollars, which Australia contributed to the Japan-Russia Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Chemical and biological weapons (See Part IV)

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have significant value in terms of the security of the international community, as multilateral conventions that comprehensively prohibit chemical and biological weapons. Japan and other states have been making efforts to strengthen the conventions, including achieving universality of the conventions and completing national implementation.

In particular, as the use of chemical and biological weapons by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations has become a real threat today, Japan supports other countries’ efforts to cope with chemical terrorism and bioterrorism. For example, Japan co-hosted the “Seminar on Prevention and Crisis Management of Chemical Terrorism” (July 2004) and the “Seminar on Prevention and Crisis Management of Bioterrorism” (July 2005) in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). In addition, Japan also held the “BWC Tokyo Seminar” (February 2006) in anticipation of the BWC Review Conference scheduled to be held in November 2006, thereby working on strengthening the BWC.

4. Conventional weapons (See Part V)

In recent years, there have been growing move to restrict or prohibit the use or possession of certain conventional arms, such as anti-personal landmines and small arms and light weapons, from the humanitarian viewpoint that these arms involve non-combatants in conflicts and cause results unacceptable from the humanitarian perspective as well as from the viewpoint of development that these arms leave a very serious impact on post-conflict society and economy. Based on the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted in 2001, efforts to restrict illicit trade of small arms and light weapons have been put into full swing. In
2005, a biennial meeting was held to consider the implementation, and negotiation on an international instrument on marking and tracing of illicit small arms and light weapons reached a consensus and the instrument was adopted at the UN General Assembly.

Japan held seminars in Asia, Oceania, Central Asia and other regions to promote steady implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons at the regional level. Moreover, Japan had submitted draft UN resolutions on small arms and light weapons together with South Africa and Colombia since 2001. In 2005, the draft resolution, submitted by Japan serving as a coordinator, was adopted by consensus at the UN General Assembly.

5. Bilateral cooperation in the disarmament and non-proliferation fields

Japan has held bilateral consultations with major countries for the close exchanges of views, and, took up specific issues as deemed necessary. The senior-official-level talks held in 2004 and 2005 are listed in the table below. Japan is expected to exercise its diplomatic power more effectively by systematically combining these bilateral talks with deliberations at multilateral fora such as the UN and the Conference on Disarmament as well as with regional or like-minded countries meetings such as the G8, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Japan intends to further promote its cooperative relationships with other countries in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
6. Utilization of ODA in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation

Japan has been providing developing countries, including Asian countries, with various supports, utility of ODA in the field of conventional weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and small arms and light weapons as well as in the field of non-proliferation, such as export control. Japan will continue to actively utilize ODA as a useful diplomatic tool in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

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1. Movements in the 1990s

The developments in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation culminated in the first half of the 1990s when the tension of East-West confrontation eased after the end of the Cold War. The number of nuclear weapons throughout the world substantially decreased when the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) entered into force. Several states including France and China became state parties to the NPT (both France and China in 1992), and in 1995 it was agreed that there would be an indefinite extension of the NPT. In addition, the CTBT that prohibits all nuclear tests including underground tests was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1996. In the field of conventional weapons, a noticeable result was achieved by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (entered into force in 1999).

On the other hand, there were movements to reverse the progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and movements that undermined the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime in the 1990s. Iraq and North Korea, both state parties to the NPT, were suspected of developing nuclear programs in the early 1990s. Despite the fact that a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA was applied to Iraq (joined the NPT in 1969) and UN Security Resolution 687 invited Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the NPT, it was revealed after the Gulf War that Iraq had been covertly pursuing a nuclear-weapon program, in breach of the safeguards agreement. These events posed serious challenges to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. As a result, efforts to further enhance the effectiveness of the regime have been made. In 1998 India conducted nuclear tests and Pakistan followed. This was seriously taken to heart as the international efforts towards nuclear disarmament after led to the adoption of the CTBT after lengthy painstaking efforts only two years prior to their nuclear tests.

At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, after concluding the long-pending CTBT negotiations in the summer of 1996, negotiations on substantive matters have stalemated. Negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT or so called Cut-off Treaty), which prohibits the production of materials for nuclear weapons, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium and which was expected to be a matter of priority after the conclusion of the CTBT, have yet to begin.

2. Movements in and after 2000

Amongst new movements toward promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation after the year 2000 is the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference in which nuclear-weapon states agreed to the 13 practical steps including “an unequivocal undertaking towards nuclear disarmament” for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament.

The governments of the United States and Russia declared in December 2001 the completion of implementation of their obligations based on START I, and in June 2002 they ended the ABM, which had been one of the important legal frameworks for the mutual assured destruction.
Further the Moscow Treaty entered into force in June 2003, which was meant to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads of the United States and Russia to about one third. The United Kingdom and France are also trying to reduce weapons to a sufficiently low level to maintain deterrence (complete abolition of surface-to-surface weapons by France and reduction of nuclear warheads by the United Kingdom). On the other hand, China stated that it would completely abolish nuclear weapons to realize a world free of nuclear weapons (“White Paper, China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation” in 2005). Although China has shown intention to speed up nuclear disarmament, specific reduction of nuclear weapons does not seem to have progressed in the past 20 years. In addition, there are other problems. Regarding the CTBT, among nuclear-weapons states, the United States and China has not ratified it. In addition, China has not declared moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Consequently, further efforts in nuclear disarmament are expected.

As for the ballistic missiles, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) was launched in November 2002.

At the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, “G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” was agreed. Under this initiative, G8 countries agreed to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety including the environment. Moreover, the G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation was adopted at the Sea Island G8 Summit in 2004, and the G8 comprehensively and specifically presented and agreed to implement tasks to be addressed and measures to be taken by the international community in relation to issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, including universal adherence to and compliance with the treaties relating to disarmament and non-proliferation, support for establishment of a national implementation system and building of law enforcement capacity, complete implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation, restriction on the diversion of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for enrichment and reprocessing, universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol, enhancement of IAEA's functions, strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), response to regional issues in North Korea, Iran and other countries, continuation of activities by the G8 Global Partnership, defense against bioterrorism, measures to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons, and nuclear safety and security.