Chapter 1. North Korea

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Chapter 1. North Korea

1. Current situations surrounding the Korean Peninsula

The North Korean situations showed some positive movements such as the “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration” of September 2002. However, the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear programs erupted again when North Korea acknowledged to the US delegates that it was working on the uranium enrichment program. North Korea announced to withdraw from the NPT in January 2003, and the IAEA Board of the Governors acknowledged and reported to the UN Security Council that North Korea was in non-compliance of its nuclear safeguards agreement in February. (See the next section for details.) Later, North Korea announced that it would resume its operation of the graphite-moderated reactor, which had been suspended under the “Agreed Framework,” and strengthen its own “nuclear deterrent.” Some activities have also been witnessed in the area of missiles. These North Korean issues have posed serious threats to the security not only of the Korean Peninsula but also of the Northeast Asian region as a whole.

Under such circumstances, various diplomatic efforts continued toward the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issues. As a part of these efforts, the first Six-Party Talks (Japan, the US, China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and North Korea) was held in Beijing August 27 to 29, 2003. Japan regarded the nuclear activities of North Korea as a threat to the whole international community, particularly to the peace and stability of the Northeast Asian region including Japan and as a grave challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan was of the stand that it would not tolerate this, and insisted that North Korea should dismantle all of its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. On the last day of the first round of the Six-Party Talks, Wang Yi, Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the host country, China, wrapped up the meeting by stating the
five-point consensus of the parties concerned: ① to solve the nuclear problem through dialogue, ② to call for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, ③ to pay due considerations to the security concerns of North Korea, ④ not to take actions that could escalate the situation, ⑤ to continue the process of the six-party talks.

At the second Six-Party Talks held in Beijing on February 25 to 28, 2004, frank and substantial discussions were held on the nuclear issue. The following outcomes were obtained through the second round of the Six-Party Talks and a step forward was made.

- The six parties reaffirmed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as their common goal.
- Understanding has deepened among many participants on the importance of the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear programs by North Korea.
- The parties shared the view to tackle the nuclear issue in the form of so-called “coordinated steps.”
- The parties agreed to hold the third round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing by the end of June 2004, and to establish a working group in preparation for the plenary.

However, due to the differences in the position of the six parties, the following two issues remained outstanding, leaving uncertainties about the future course of the Talks.
- While Japan, the US and the ROK were in the position that they demand the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear programs by North Korea, North Korea claims that peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be allowed and that dismantling should be limited to the nuclear weapons programs.
- Japan, the US and the ROK emphasized that North Korea should admit the presence of the uranium enrichment program, but North Korea denied that such program exists.

Japan endeavors to solve the North Korean issues based on the “dialogue and pressure” approach. Japan has long maintained its basic policy to seek a
comprehensive resolution to the security issue (nuclear issues and missiles), and the abduction issue based on the Pyongyang Declaration, thereby normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea in the form that would contribute to the peace and stability of the Northeast Asian region. Currently, North Korea’s nuclear issues are mainly discussed in the Six-Party Talks process, but it is also important to continue sending a message to North Korea through the multilateral regimes including the IAEA and the NPT that the development of nuclear weapons would not be of interest to North Korea, but would only cause isolation, and therefore, North Korea should dismantle all of its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

2. Movements surrounding North Korea in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

North Korea submitted a notice of withdrawal from the NPT to the UN Security Council on March 12, 1993; however, North Korea decided to remain a party to the NPT as the US-North Korea Joint Communiqué, which declared North Korea would suspend the effectuation of its withdrawal from the treaty, was publicly announced on 11 June, one day before 12 June which happened to be exactly three months since the notice of withdrawal. (Paragraph 1 of Article X of the NPT stipulates that withdrawal from the treaty requires three-month notice.)

On the other hand, amid the increasing concern over the nuclear issue triggered by admittance by North Korea of the uranium enrichment program to the US government’s officials visiting North Korea in October 2002, North Korea announced that it would lift the freeze and immediately reactivate and restart building nuclear facilities. It removed seals for IAEA safeguard and stopped the function of the surveillance cameras in the graphite moderate nuclear reactor, fuel fabricating facilities and reprocessing facilities, and let IAEA inspectors leave the country. On January 10, 2003, it sent a letter to the Chairmen of the UN Security Council and declared that it would “revoke the
suspension on the effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT,” meaning that it intended to withdraw from the NPT. Japan immediately reacted to this decision by releasing the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating “It is extremely regrettable that North Korea has made such a decision, and Japan is gravely concerned about the situation. Japan will strongly urge North Korea to immediately retract its decision and take prompt action to dismantle its nuclear development programs.” On the 6th of the same month, the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting was held and adopted a resolution to call upon North Korea to take actions towards the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore, the IAEA Board of Governors Special Meeting was held again on February 12, and adopted a resolution, which includes the decision to report North Korea’s non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreements to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. This was made possible because of the efforts mainly from Japan, the US and the ROK. Upon receiving a letter on this issue from the IAEA Secretary-General, the UN Security Council took up this matter at informal sessions. (However, no substantial deliberation was conducted after that.) The IAEA Board of Governors Meeting was held once again in March and the nuclear issue of North Korea was further discussed.

Under such circumstances, the North Korea nuclear issue was discussed as one of the main topics at the second Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference held in Geneva, April to May 2003. Japan and other countries expressed their concerns over the nuclear issues of North Korea, and called upon dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs and compliance with all obligations of the NPT safeguards agreement, regarding the decision of withdrawal from the NPT as a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. (See “The 2005 NPT Review Conference Process” Section 3, Chapter 1, Part III.)

The international community called upon North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs and rescind its decision to withdraw from the NPT in a
subsequent series of announcements. Examples are the G8 Declaration on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Declaration at the G8 Evian Summit held on June 3, 2003, the Chairman’s Statement of the ARF Meeting on June 18, 2003, and the Chairman’s Statement of the ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting on July 24.

In the IAEA, its Board of Governors continued discussing the matter in June 2003, and the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution calling for North Korea to promptly accept the comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreement, to cooperate with the agency in full and effective implementation, to maintain the essential verification role of the IAEA, and to dismantle all nuclear weapons programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

3. Nuclear issue of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is an international organization established by Japan, the United States and the ROK in March 1995 in accordance with the “Agreed Framework” concluded by the US and North Korea in 1994. It aims to finance and supply light-water reactors and interim energy alternatives in return for North Korea freezing its operation and construction of graphite moderated reactors. However, North Korea’s nuclear issues erupted when North Korea admitted to have a uranium-enrichment program in October 2002. In response, the Executive Board of KEDO demanded that North Korea rapidly dismantle any nuclear weapons program in a visible and verifiable fashion and decided to suspend the supply of heavy fuel oil as of the December in November 2002. In the announcement, the KEDO Executive Board made it clear that the supply of heavy oil depends on whether or not North Korea would take specific and credible actions to completely dismantle the program to enrich uranium. The board then repeatedly urged North Korea to take positive responses, but to no avail. Thus, the Executive Board of KEDO concluded that the ground for the continuation of the light-water project had been lost and decided to suspend the project for one year from December 1, 2003, and the
decision was announced on November 21, 2003. The future of the light-water reactors under construction will be discussed by the Executive Board before the one-year suspension period expires.

(Reference) In March 1993, North Korea refused IAEA special inspections on the alleged nuclear facilities, and announced the withdrawal from the NPT. In response, the UN Security Council held an informal discussion on the sanction against North Korea. As these movements grew, the US and North Korea signed an “Agreed Framework” in October 1994, after the June 1994 meeting between former US President Jimmy Carter and North Korean Chairman Kim Il Sung. With this, North Korea remained a state Party to the NPT, accepted verification measures through the IAEA Safeguards Agreement obligations, and pledged to freeze and dismantle existing nuclear facilities and those of under construction. In return, the US agreed to supply North Korea with light-water reactors (two light-water reactors with about 1000 megawatts of power) and 500 thousands tons of heavy oil a year until the completion of the first reactor to support its energy demand in the meantime.

As founding members, Japan, the US and the ROK, signed the “Agreement of the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),” thus the KEDO was formally established in March 1995. (The EU joined, as a member of the Executive Board alongside the three founding members, in September 1997) A supply agreement concerning a light-water reactor project was signed between KEDO and North Korea in December 1995. Later, KEDO and Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) signed a Turnkey Contract for the project in December 1999 (entry into force: February 2000). The construction for the installation of the main light-water reactor started in September 2001, and the concrete was injected into the foundation of the light-water reactor building in August 2002.

4. Missile issues

Missile development of North Korea together with the nuclear issue is an element causing instability not only to the Asia and Pacific regions but also to
the whole international community.

Under such circumstances, Japan, the US and the ROK have been making concerted efforts to deal with the missile issue. In the US-North Korea relation under the Clinton Administration, after North Korea announced a moratorium on missile launching, the US and North Korea had bilateral talks on the missile issue. When US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited North Korea, she discussed overall missile issues with Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea Kim Jong Il. Later, a full-fledged review on the US policies on North Korea was conducted under President Bush’s leadership, and verifiable restraint of missile activities and cessation of export of missiles were listed as a part of the policies on North Korea. In the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration signed at the Summit Meeting in September 2002, North Korea pledged its intention to extend the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003, and confirmed the need to solve security issues including missile issues. At the Japan-North Korea Normalization Talks held in Malaysia in October 2002, Japan requested specific and proactive measures on the dismantlement of already deployed Nodong missiles with range which can reach Japan.

However, concerns over the North Korean ballistic missiles have been increasing. For example, it was revealed in December 2002 that North Korea had sold Scud missiles to Yemen. Moreover, Choe Jin-su, North Korean ambassador to China signaled that North Korea might withdraw its moratorium on missile launching in January 2003.

At the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing in August 2003, Japan insisted on resolving various outstanding issues including ballistic missile issues of North Korea in line with the Pyongyang Declaration. The chairman’s summary stated that the participants of the Six Party Talks agreed not to take actions that would escalate the situation in the process of resolving the issues peacefully.

Policy coordination on non-proliferation of missiles and their related technology has been conducted through frameworks such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). It is also important to urge countries that seem to be in cooperation with North Korea in the area of missiles to cut off the cooperative relationship completely, and to strengthen the global norms.

(Reference 1) Background of Missile Development of North Korea

It is suspected that North Korea has produced and deployed Scud missiles, etc. and has been exporting those missiles to the Middle East since the latter half of the 1980s. In addition, the development of the longer range ballistic missiles is assumed to have started in the 1990s, and the Nodong (estimated range of 1300 km) is believed to be used for the launch of the ballistic missile in the Japan Sea in May 1993. In August 1998, North Korea launched ballistic missile based on Taepodong 1 (estimated range of more than 1500 km) that flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. Many of the details of the development of ballistic missiles of North Korea remain still unclear. However, it is fair to assume that North Korea provides high priority to the development of ballistic missiles not only from the perspective of military capability but also from the political and diplomatic perspective.

The influx of various materials and technologies from outside is seen to be behind the rapid progress of missile development by North Korea. The possibility of transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technologies from North Korea is also pointed out.

(Reference 2) The launches of Surface-to-Ship Missile by North Korea

Two missiles were launched from the northeast coast region of North Korea in February and March 2003. Neither is thought to be a ballistic missile but a surface-to-ship missile with a shorter range of 100km.

5. Biological and chemical weapons issues

North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in March 1987, however, some suspect that North Korea possesses a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents (from the January 2003 CIA unclassified report to Congress). North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and some assume that it already possesses chemical weapons (from the same CIA report). Minister of Foreign
Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi discussed the importance of getting North Korea to join the CWC when she met Mr. Rogelio Pfrirter, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

6. Japan’s approach toward illegal activities of North Korea

Japan has been implementing strict controls for the illegal activities by North Korea. Japan has tightened all the possible inspections of North Korean ships under the existing law. For example, strict safety and customs inspections are performed on Man Gyong Bong, the North Korean freighter-passerenger ship calling at Niigata Port. In terms of export control, Japan has been making efforts to reinforce the ‘Catch-all Control’ (implemented since April 2002) to control exports of materials that could be possibly used for development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. As a result, some illicit exports to North Korea have been detected and prevented.

(Reference) An Example of Illicit Export of Equipment in relation to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles to North Korea by a Japanese Company

When Meishin Corporation tried to export three stabilized direct current suppliers that could be suspected of being diverted to nuclear weapons development (uranium enrichment) in November 2002, it was informed of the requirement to apply for a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. However, the company in question made no application and attempted a circumvention through Thailand to North Korea, but the smuggled goods were confiscated by the customs house in Hong Kong in response to the request made by Japan. (The conviction in February 2004.)
Chapter 2. Middle East

Iran

1. Nuclear issue - Overview -

Iran joined the NPT in 1970 and concluded the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974. Iran signed the IAEA Additional Protocol in December 2003, but has not ratified it as of the end of December 2003.

Iran has conducted nuclear activities with support from Russia including the construction of a light water reactor with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts at Bushier. Triggered by the revelation of the construction of large-scale nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, the Iranian nuclear issue was much discussed at the Board of governors meeting of the IAEA and others, with the international community expressing strong concern. From the discussions with the IAEA and the inspections it was discovered that Iran had long been conducting unreported nuclear activities repeatedly including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

Reacting to the allegation, Iran asserted that all of the nuclear activities were entirely peaceful, and Iran had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. Iran then provided the IAEA with information concerning its nuclear activities, which they claimed to be comprehensive and accurate. In addition, Iran took positive measures such as signing the Additional Protocol in December 2003, deciding to start procedures for ratification and the provisional application of the Additional Protocol and deciding the voluntary suspension of activities related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

Japan hopes that the nuclear issue with Iran will be resolved through the IAEA, and makes efforts to that end.

2. Movements led by the IAEA concerning the nuclear issue

In August 2002, an Iranian dissent organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, provided to the IAEA information that Iran had covert plans to construct a
large-scale uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a large-scale heavy water production facility in Arak. The government of Iran admitted the construction of these facilities but asserted that all of the nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes.

When the IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei visited Iran in February 2003, the Iranian government officially declared to the IAEA the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. This was followed by the inspections by the IAEA and it was then revealed that Iran had imported natural uranium from China in 1991 without declaration and conducted various activities including the processing of metallic uranium. In light of these facts, the IAEA Board of Governors held in June 2003, issued a Chairwoman’s Summary expressing concerns over the Iran issue. It also called on Iran to fully cooperate with IAEA, to conclude and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and furthermore, as a confidence-building measure not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.

In September 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the resolution, which was co-submitted by Japan, Australia, and Canada. The resolution called on Iran to clear up questions about its program by the end of October, to cooperate with IAEA, and to sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and to act henceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol. It also urged Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

Iranian delegation, in protest against that resolution, left his seat at that September Meeting. But later when foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany visited Iran in October 2003, Iran announced its decision to accept the requirements of the resolution, and submitted later a report to the IAEA describing its nuclear activities in the past and present, which was expected to be comprehensive and accurate.

Inspection activities of the IAEA made certain progress thanks to Iran’s positive and cooperative attitude including the submission of the report. As a result of the inspections, the IAEA Secretariat provided the Board of Governors with a report in November. The report revealed that Iran had long conducted various nuclear activities
including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, and conversion, processing, and irradiation using fissile materials in the Kalaye Electric Company and other parts of the country without reporting to the IAEA, and clearly failed to meet the obligations under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Following the report, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution in November 2003, deploiring strongly Iran’s past failures and breaches, while welcoming active cooperation by Iran with the IAEA. It also urged Iran to implement decisions made in line with the Board of Governors’ resolution of September. It has been decided that the Board of Governors would consider all options at its disposal in line with the IAEA Charter and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, should any further serious Iranian failures come to light.

The Director General reported in the statement submitted in November that it was still too early to conclude that Iranian nuclear activities were intended solely for peaceful purposes although no evidence was found that unreported nuclear materials and nuclear activities were linked with nuclear weapons programs. The IAEA inspections are still under way to verify whether Iran has accurately declared all of its nuclear activities of the past.

3. Missile issue

Iran developed a ballistic missile called the Shahab-3, and conducted its test launches in July 1998, and July and September 2000. After a test launch confirmed on July 7, 2003, Supreme leader Ayatolla Ali Khamenei (also Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards) declared the deployment of the Shahab-3 at a ceremony for the Revolutionary Guards on July 20, 2003. In response to such missile activities, Japan expressed its regret against test launches of missiles in the statements by the Press Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and urged Iran to restrain its ballistic missile activities during the Japan-Iran foreign ministerial talks and the Japan-Iran Disarmament and Non-proliferation Talks. Ever since there are reports on the cooperative relationship between Iran and North Korea in the area of missile development, Japan has encouraged Iran to restrain missile cooperation with North
Korea in view of the national security concerns. Japan will continue use various channels to call on Iran to restrain its missile activities.

Iraq

1. Post Gulf War inspections of weapons of mass destruction and their suspension

Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. As a result of the military activities of multinational forces (the Gulf War) in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 678 (adopted 1990), Iraq withdrew its army out of Kuwait in 1991. The UN Security Council Resolution 687 (cease-fire resolution, adopted 1991) provided for conditions for cease-fire, which Iraq accepted in order to establish a truce.

The UN Security Council Resolution 687 required Iraq to accept the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their related facilities under the international supervision. In addition, the Security Council Resolution 687 set up the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) with an aim to remove threats posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles. It was to implement monitoring and inspections of the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (UNSCOM is in charge of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles; IAEA is in charge of nuclear capabilities.)

As a result of inspection activities, a large volume of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles were destroyed (Iraq has actually used weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons) in the Iran-Iraq War, etc.), and the development of nuclear and biological weapons was also revealed, which Iraq had been denying. Particularly with respect to nuclear weapons, it was found that Iraq had secretly developed nuclear weapons despite the fact that it had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Thus, monitoring and inspections of weapons of mass destruction by the UNSCOM made some progress; however, Iraq continued false reporting and
obstructions against the inspection teams in violation of its obligations under the Security Council Resolution 687. Iraq finally decided to end all cooperation with UNSCOM, and expelled inspection teams from Iraq in October 1998.

![Image of mustard gas bombs](image_url)

Photo: A large number of mustard gas bombs destroyed under the UNSCOM (UN/DPI)

2. Establishment of UNMOVIC and recommencement of inspections

As for the issues pertaining to the Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and inspections on them, the UN. Security Council resolution 1284 was adopted in December 1999. The United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), an enhanced organization to conduct sustainable monitoring and inspection activities replacing the UNSCOM, was established by the Security Council resolution 1284 and the Former IAEA Director General Hans Blix was appointed as Executive Chairman.

Nonetheless, Iraq continued to refuse UNMOVIC inspections, and agreement was not easily reached on the recommencement of inspection even after the talks between the UN and Iraq. In September 2002, US President George Bush addressed the issues concerning Iraq in his speech made at the UN General Assembly’s general debate. US President Bush pointed out that Iraq had not complied with the Security Council
resolutions, and voiced his view that action would be unavoidable if Iraq’s regime defied us again, while emphasizing the need for solving problems through the Security Council. In the midst of growing tension, Iraq announced the acceptance of an unconditional return of weapons inspectors on September 16. In response to this, the UN Security Council resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously demanding Iraq to accept an enhanced inspection regime with an aim to implement immediate, unconditional and unrestricted inspections without exception at all sites, so as to provide Iraq with a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligation (November 18). (Meanwhile, this Security Council resolution 1441 decided that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolutions 687.)

Upon Iraq’s acceptance of this resolution, the UN inspection team consisting of UNMOVIC and IAEA resumed inspections for the first time in four years, on 27 November.

(Reference) Summary of Main Points of the UN Security Council Resolution 1441

● The UN Security Council holds Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations including dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction under relevant resolutions including the cease-fire resolution 687.

● The UN Security Council decided to afford Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions.

● The UN Security Council will set up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process in light of Iraq’s long-term intervention with inspections.

● The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to any sites and buildings in Iraq and “immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons.

● Any false statement or omission in the declaration and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, will
be considered further material breach of Iraq’s obligations, and the Security Council will be convened immediately to assess the case.

● UNMOVIC and IAEA will immediately report any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, and the Security Council will be convened immediately upon receipt of a report.

● It recalled in that context, that the Security Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face “serious consequences” as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.

3. Activities and the report of the UN inspection team

A new regime consisting of UNMOVIC and IAEA has gradually been enforced and inspection activities have been performed continuously across Iraq since the inspection resumed. Iraq showed some cooperation. It accepted the inspection of the presidential palace, which it had refused previously. It also submitted a declaration on the development and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and a list of scientists involved in weapons of mass destruction-related programs in December 2002. The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix and the Director General of IAEA, ElBaradei submitted a report to the Security Council on January 27, 2003. According to these reports, while Iraq has cooperated rather well so far in regard to the procedures of the Security Council Resolution 1441, the declaration submitted by Iraq fails to clarify the unresolved disarmament issues, and does not contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. The report also pointed out undeclared empty chemical warheads had been found, and the “Al Samoud 2” ballistic missiles were found to be in violation of the Security Council resolutions.

Another report from UNMOVIC and IAEA was submitted to the Security Council on February 14, 2003, stating some progress was made in terms of the process of inspections. However, it summarized that Iraq’s immediate, unconditional and active cooperation was crucial in order to achieve the inspection goal of dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, in the Security Council report by
UNMOVIC and IAEA dated on March 7, it was pointed out once again the information thus far obtained was not substantial and Iraq should submit further records concerning the dismantlement. At the same time, in the report on “Unresolved Disarmament Issues” containing 29 items, presented by UNMOVIC to the Security Council, it was made clear that allegations presented by the UNSCOM inspections were hardly resolved through the inspection activities by UNMOVIC. For example, the report points out allegations concerning 2.4 tons or more of nerve agent VX, 6,500 chemical bombs (equivalent to 1000 tons of chemical agent), 10,000 liters of anthrax, and 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin. At the Security Council meeting held on March 19, Executive Chairman Blix delivered a speech asserting that whatever approach is followed, the result will depend on Iraq’s active cooperation on substance, and the further information provided by Iraq so far is limited enough in substance to solve the remaining issues.

Responding to Iraq’s attitude, US President Bush issued an ultimatum that Iraq President Saddam Hussein and his sons had to leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so would result in militant conflict. Iraq refused to accept the ultimatum on March 18, and vowed a do-or-die resistance against the United States, which triggered the use of force by the US together with the UK and others. In the meantime, the UN inspection teams left Iraq on March 18 a day before the use of force and in effect, its activities were suspended.

During the four-month inspection, UNMOVIC carried out 731 inspections at 411 sites, and IAEA conducted about 240 inspections. In the inspection regime at its prime, UNMOVIC and IAEA were comprised of about 100 inspectors and 15 in spectors respectively. UNMOVIC destroyed 66 out of 91 of Iraq’s Al Samoud missiles, which had been identified as being in violation of the Security Council resolution. In addition, UNMOVIC requested Iraq to enable the former to carry out interviews with total of 54 scientists. The fact is, however, that interviews were conducted only on 14.

President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq on May 1, 2003, while inspections by the UN inspection teams in Iraq have not resumed yet. The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) consisting of specialists from the US, the UK, and Australia
started searching weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and its activities are still under way (as of March 2004).

4. Japan’s contribution to UN inspections

From the viewpoint of preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan takes a stand to actively support the activities of the UN inspection teams. In line with this position, Japan dispatched Ground Self-Defense officials as inspection staffs under the UNSCOM regime, and Hideyo Kurata, Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, acted as Commissioner of UNSCOM from 1992 to 1999.

Upon the UNMOVIC establishment of 1999, Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Takanori Kazuhara was appointed as Commissioner of UNMOVIC (one of 17 members including the chairman), and he made strenuous efforts to formulate management policies of UNMOVIC at various meetings including quarterly conferences. In addition, Japan sent missiles specialists of the
Maritime and Air Self Defense forces to the UNMOVIC headquarters, registered specialist engineers in the field of chemical weapons of the Self Defense Agency as inspectors. Japanese inspectors were dispatched to Iraq to support the IAEA activities and conducted inspections relating to nuclear development.

Moreover, UN official Yasuhiro Ueki, spokesman for UNMOVIC and IAEA, was dispatched to the UNMOVIC Baghdad office from the United Nations, and provided international journalists with regular update reports on the progress of inspections until the withdrawal of inspection teams. This is another example of activities by a Japanese.

Libya

Libya’s leader, Colonel Qadhafi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shalgham announced Libya’s intention to dismantle all existing weapons of mass destruction development programs and to immediately accept inspections by international organizations on December 19, 2003. On the same day, US President Bush and UK Prime Minister Blair delivered the announcements in line with Libya’s decision. In response, IAEA Director General ElBaradei visited Libya at the head of the IAEA inspection team to conduct inspections relating to nuclear development on December 27.

In addition, Libya ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (January 2004). The decision of Libya is of great significance to advance process of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is consistent with the policy of Japan to pursue the universalization of the international agreements to prohibit or control weapons of mass destruction.

(Reference) Summary of White House Fact Sheet dated on December 19, 2003

- Libya has disclosed to the US and UK significant information on its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as on its biological and ballistic missile-related activities
- Libya has also pledged to:
- eliminate all elements of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs;
- declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA;
- eliminate ballistic missiles beyond 300km range, with a payload of 500kg;
- accept international inspections to ensure Libya’s complete adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and sign IAEA Additional Protocol;
- eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions, and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and
- allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify all of these actions.

(Reference) Related Part from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s keynote policy speech of the 159th Ordinary Diet

The decision by Libya to abandon development programs for weapons of mass destruction, and to allow immediate inspections is of great significance. We strongly expect that other countries, including North Korea, will likewise make a responsible response. We will continue to actively participate in international efforts towards the prevention and elimination of terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Others

Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It has not yet ratified treaties for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also, Israel is regarded as a nuclear potential country and its government takes the position that it neither confirms nor denies the possession of nuclear weapons. Other Middle Eastern countries have consistently criticized the Israeli policy and submitted draft resolutions demanding a renunciation of nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT, etc. Against such moves, Israel adheres to the policy that it would not advance the disarmament and nonproliferation process unilaterally, citing the reason that it is surrounded by states whose main aim is to destroy it.

Japan strongly encouraged Israel to participate in various disarmament and non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction, and repeatedly urged Israel to take
initiatives to resolve the problems of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, taking such opportunities as visits by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi (April 2003) and Senior Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi (June 2003) to Israel and a visit by Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom to Japan (August 2003).

Furthermore, Japan has been making active efforts for the countries of the Middle East including Syria, which is said to be suspected of having weapons of mass destruction, by calling on them to accede to the treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction.

(Reference) Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
“The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”

1. Background
A resolution was adopted at the 34th UN General Assembly (1979), expressing concerns over the Israeli nuclear armament policy including nuclear cooperation with South Africa, and calling on other states to end all nuclear cooperation with Israel. Since then, the similar resolutions have been adopted every year. This matter had been previously dealt by the resolution entitled “Israeli Nuclear Armament,” but it was changed to “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East” at the 49th UN General Assembly (1994)

The General Assembly welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all states of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security.

3. Outcome of Voting
This resolution was submitted by Egypt representing the League of Arab States and adopted as follows:
First Committee: In favour 146 (including Japan) – Against 3 (including Israel)
– Abstaining 10
General Assembly: In favour 162 (including Japan) – Against 2 (including Israel)– Abstaining 10
Chapter 3. India and Pakistan

1. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan

India is of the position that it does not intend to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since it is discriminatory. It has been refusing to accede to the NPT, despite the calls from the international community. Pakistan takes the stand that it will not accede to the NPT from its own security viewpoint so long as India remains out of the Treaty. Under such circumstances, the international nonproliferation regime faced a serious challenge when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in succession in May 1998. Only two years had passed since the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after a series of heated discussions involving countries around the world. It was then when these tests were conducted, and this matter was taken gravely as going against the efforts of the international community toward nuclear disarmament.

Japan immediately lodged a strong protest by issuing the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement, and imposed a set of economic measures against both countries, India and Pakistan. (Principally suspension of grant aids and yen loans for new projects to both countries.) At the United Nations, Japan submitted a UN Security Council draft resolution with other concerned states calling for India and Pakistan to ultimately renounce nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT unconditionally, and it was adopted as the Security Council resolution 1172 (June 1998). In addition, Japan, at the G8 Summit, made great contribution to the adoption of statements of leaders as well as of Ministers for Foreign Affairs which called for both countries to halt the deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and to accede to the NPT and the CTBT. Furthermore, Japan has repeatedly explained Japan’s stance on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation to India and Pakistan on various occasions. (Recently, Japan’s stance was explained on the occasions of the visit by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko

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Kawaguchi to India (January 2003) and at the meeting of the Japanese – Pakistani Foreign Ministers Meeting (June 2003).)

Due partly to these efforts from the international community including Japan, neither India nor Pakistan has conducted nuclear tests since June 1998. Both countries announced that they would continue their nuclear test moratorium and exercise stricter export controls for nuclear nonproliferation. In October 2001, Japan decided to discontinue its economic measures against both countries considering the following points: Japanese measures produced some positive results; the stability and cooperation of Pakistan is of great importance in the fight against terrorism; and the necessity to deepen active engagement in India, etc. At the same time, it also mentioned that Japan would continue to urge India and Pakistan to make progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, including signing of the CTBT and, consider taking appropriate measures including restoring of the discontinued measures, should the situation concerning nuclear non-proliferation deteriorate in India and/or Pakistan.

(Reference) The First Underground Nuclear Test by India (1974)

The first underground nuclear test by India made the international community perceive the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation as a real concern, and consequently the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was set up in 1977 in order to control exports of nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies. (See Section 2, Chapter 1, Part VI)

Since then, the Indian government has adhered to the position that “it would keep its nuclear option.” Upon the change of government in the year of 1998, the new government took a harder-line, pledging to “exercise the nuclear option,” and conducted an underground nuclear test in May of the same year.

2. Movement following the economic measures

In January, 2003, the government of India (the Cabinet Committee on Security) decided and announced its nuclear doctrine comprising building and
maintaining nuclear deterrent, exercising nuclear retaliation strikes, continuing the nuclear test moratorium, etc. In September 2003, India’s nuclear command authority held the first meeting, which was hosted by the Prime Minister, to consider appropriate measures for promoting a strategic weapons program.

In the meantime, both India and Pakistan still continue ballistic missile-launching tests.

(Reference) Summary of India’s Nuclear Doctrine (Issued on 4 January 2003)

1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
2. A posture of “No First Use”: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
3. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
4. Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorized by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).
5. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states; however, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
6. A continuance of strict controls on the export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
7. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world, through global, verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

3. Japan’s stance

India and Pakistan have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). These two countries and Israel constitute the only three remaining non-states parties to the NPT among the UN member countries.
(North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in January 2003.) The fact that these three countries still remain outside of the NPT regime weakens the value of the NPT as a norm; Japan has repeatedly called for these three countries to accede to the NPT.

Non-signatory states of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) among the countries whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force are India, Pakistan and North Korea. Japan called for the early signing and ratification of the CTBT by both India and Pakistan, and urges them to extend the moratorium until the ratification.

Japan also calls for both India and Pakistan to voluntarily exercise maximum control in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, and to strengthen the efforts to enforce stricter export controls on weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

Pakistan has been allegedly involved in the missile technology cooperation and under technology transfer and other countries including North Korea. Since such issues involving North Korea directly affect the security of Japan, Japan has expressed its concerns on a number of occasions. In response, Pakistan, for example, while denying any involvement in this issue at the Japan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers Meeting in June 2003, replied that it had made a political decision to discontinue in principle any relationship with North Korea in all areas including missile and nuclear technologies.

In view of the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan, Japan takes measures to prevent Japan’s nuclear technologies (particularly the ones that may be diverted to the nuclear weapons development) from being transferred to India or Pakistan (limitation on acceptance of engineers and visits from India and Pakistan, suspension of the provision of related information, etc.). Japan also implements strict export controls on nuclear related-materials to both countries in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.
(Reference)

In February 2004, Pakistani President Musharraf revealed at the press conference that Dr. Khan, known as “the Father of Nuclear Development,” and other scientists were involved in the flow of nuclear-related technologies out of the country.

Japan regards the Pakistani efforts of investigating this issue as a sign of attitude of Pakistan to strictly prevent the nuclear proliferation. However, the outflow of nuclear-related technologies from Pakistan, whatever the form, would harm the peace and stability of the international community and damage the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The alleged outflow to North Korea especially constitutes a matter of serious concern for the security of Japan. Therefore, Japan has expressed its regret to Pakistan and strongly urged to provide further information regarding this issue and to take necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. (As of February 2004)