## Documents

1. **NPT**
   - Statement by Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament (April 26, 2004)  
   - Working paper submitted by Japan

2. **UN**
   - A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons (58th General Assembly UN (2003))

3. **IAEA**
   - Chairman’s Summary (December 10, 2002)

4. **CTBT**
   - Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi (September 3, 2003)

5. **North Korea**
   - Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (September 17, 2002)

6. **Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)**
   - Chairman’s Summary (November 13, 2003)

7. **CD**
   - Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi (September 4, 2003)
STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. YOSHIKI MINE

AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY
HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

26 April 2004, New York
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,

At the outset, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations to you, Ambassador Sudjadnan, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this 3rd Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. I am confident that this PrepCom will be a constructive lead-up to the 2005 Review Conference under your able leadership. I assure you of my delegation’s full support throughout the session.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, Mr. Nobuyasu Abe, and the members of his Department, for the hard work they have put into in preparing this PrepCom.

(The role of the NPT)
Mr. Chairman,

The NPT is a treaty on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These two complementary aspects are closely interlinked, hence both aspects need to be promoted.

With respect to nuclear non-proliferation, the Treaty has been significantly reinforced by the achievement of its near-universality, the 1995 decision on its indefinite extension, and the introduction of the Additional Protocol. It therefore contributes greatly to the enhancement of international security.

As for nuclear disarmament, the NPT obligates nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of their nuclear weapons should be achieved through the full implementation of Article VI. The 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirm this objective.

All States Parties must remain fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in realizing global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States must remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty.
(Japan's basic stance)
Mr. Chairman,

Japan considered it important to demonstrate to the international community that it would not pose a threat to the world, and hence renounced the option of nuclear armament. In 1955, Japan enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which limits nuclear activities in Japan exclusively to peaceful purposes. Subsequently, in 1967, Japan announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.” Japan has upheld these principles and will continue to do so.

Japan acceded to the NPT in 1976 as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and internationally promised to renounce the option of nuclear armament. Today, the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the NPT as its cornerstone, is a fundamental pillar of Japan’s security. Japan also accepted the IAEA safeguards to provide transparency of its nuclear activities. Japan promptly concluded the Additional Protocol in 1999. Evidently, Japan attaches crucial importance to the NPT regime for its peace and prosperity, and is convinced that this recognition is shared by a substantial part of the international community.

Japan has been making active diplomatic efforts aimed at realizing a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Japan has submitted a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” to the UN General Assembly each year since 1994, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the international community.

The year 2005, during which the NPT Review Conference is scheduled to be held, will mark the 60th anniversary of the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan calls upon all Parties to the NPT to reaffirm their strong commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the lead-up to the Review Conference, with the unfailing determination that nuclear devastation never again be repeated. There is also strong support from the general public and the international community toward this aim.

Recent challenges to the NPT regime, such as DPRK’s nuclear program and Dr. Khan’s underground network, have brought to light the urgency for States to demonstrate their collective commitment to the NPT in the lead-up to the 2005 Review Conference. The
utmost importance of such a commitment cannot be overemphasized if we are to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime, and ensure the success of the 2005 Review Conference. Japan considers it important that this PrepCom produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference.

(Issues of primary importance)
Mr. Chairman,

Given the ever-present challenge faced by the international community to curb nuclear proliferation, nuclear non-proliferation will no doubt constitute an important issue for discussion during this PrepCom. Dr. Khan’s underground network supporting the proliferation of nuclear-related technology, as a more recent example, reaffirms the necessity for the further strengthening of existing nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In this respect, specific measures, such as the strengthening and universalization of IAEA safeguards, the physical protection of nuclear material, and the strengthening of export control, should be the subject of extensive discussion at this PrepCom. Japan also attaches great importance to the strengthening of non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia, and has been making efforts to this aim.

Progress in nuclear disarmament is equally important with a view to maintaining the NPT regime. Japan continues to urge all nuclear weapon States to implement concrete measures to this end. It should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with “Principles and Objectives,” which includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States should seriously note the commitment made to date by nearly all countries to renounce the option of nuclear armament under the NPT regime, and it is imperative that they respond to this resolute determination held by non-nuclear weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

In this context, Japan welcomes the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States, which should serve as an important step for further nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes for full implementation of the Treaty by both States. It is nonetheless regrettable that no progress has been made with regard to the entry into force of the CTBT or the commencement of FMCT negotiations, despite relevant agreements that have been formulated to this end. The CTBT is of historic significance in that it promotes both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
by restricting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important. Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Yoriko Kawaguchi, attended the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT last year, and stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT, as well as the moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

(Compliance)
Mr. Chairman,

Japan is concerned with the DPRK's declaration of its intention to withdraw from the NPT, as well as its refusal to accept the IAEA safeguards agreement. The international community urges the DPRK to retract such decisions immediately. The continuation of the Six-Party Talks process is important, with a view to realizing a peaceful and early resolution of the current problem. Japan urges the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Japan welcomes Iran's decision to act in accordance with the Additional Protocol's provisions, pending its entry into force. Japan expects and trusts that Iran will, in order to dispel international concerns, respond to all outstanding requests contained in the IAEA Board resolutions, ratify the Additional Protocol speedily, and continue and intensify cooperation with the IAEA, in particular through the prompt provision of detailed information.

Japan welcomes Libya's decision to abandon all of its WMD programmes. Japan calls upon Libya to promptly ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol. Japan strongly hopes that the DPRK, and those states under the suspicion of WMD development, will follow Libya's example.

(Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations---disarmament and non-proliferation education)
Mr. Chairman,

Last but not least, I would like to touch upon the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education. In the current unsettled security environment, there is a patent need to inform people of the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.
order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead the future generations, and of civil society as a whole. Japan places a great emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation education and welcomes the Report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education,” which was prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. Japan has been making various efforts in this field, including inviting disarmament educators from overseas. Japan is committed to the continuation of such efforts.

Japan will again submit a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education to this PrepCom. Japan encourages other States to become co-sponsors of this working paper, and to voluntarily share information on efforts they have been undertaking in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation at the 2005 Review Conference. To this end, Japan will submit an additional working paper entitled “Japan’s Efforts in Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education” to this PrepCom.

Thank you very much.
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working paper submitted by Japan

I. Overview

As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970.

In light of the recent challenges to the NPT regime, such as the DPRK’s nuclear programs and Dr. Khan’s underground network, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially that of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery poses a significant threat to international peace and stability. In order to address this problem, all states must strengthen their non-proliferation policies, reaffirm their commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and norms, including the NPT, promote universalization of these treaties and ensure compliance with them.

The review process for the 2005 Review Conference was launched smoothly with constructive discussions on substantive issues at the first Preparatory Committee in 2002 and the second one in 2003. Given the current international security environment, Japan considers it crucial for the States Party to the NPT to unite and take effective actions to deal with emerging challenges to the NPT regime, and make efforts to further strengthen the NPT regime towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In this regard, Japan co-sponsored with Indonesia the NPT workshop entitled “Toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects” in March this year in order to provide an opportunity to disseminate information and encourage informal discussion before the third Preparatory Committee and thereby make a contribution to the success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, continues to adhere to its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan”. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the present Koizumi
cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, and there is no change in the position of the Government of Japan in that it continues to uphold these principles.

Japan, since its accession to the NPT, has concluded the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol in an effort to ensure transparency of its nuclear related activities. Furthermore, in 1955, Japan promulgated “the Atomic Energy Basic Law” that stipulates that the utilization of Japan’s atomic energy be limited to peaceful purposes. These points also testify that Japan has no intent to possess nuclear weapons.

2. Nuclear disarmament

The NPT pursues both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fact that an overwhelming majority of countries have decided to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons is epoch-making in international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This achievement should be taken seriously by nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with “Principles and Objectives”, which includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear-weapon States are urged to respond to such resolute determination on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

The international community should realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. It is imperative that nuclear-weapon States strengthen and continue to take disarmament measures. In recent years, concern over the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been expressed more frequently. As the only nation which suffered atomic bombing, Japan has strongly urged that nuclear devastation never be repeated. Japan is convinced that every effort should be made to avoid it. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be kept as high as possible. In this vein, Japan believes that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to faithfully strive to make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Japan has submitted a resolution entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” at each session of the General Assembly since 2000. These resolutions identify concrete steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the 2000 Review Conference agreements, and appeal to the international community for the necessity of progress in nuclear disarmament.

(1) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in that it restricts the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, together with the IAEA safeguards, has a significant role as one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards realizing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Efforts for universalizing the Treaty
have resulted in the signature of 171 and ratification of 112 states in seven years since its adoption in 1996. However, the CTBT has not yet come into force, thus making the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation less certain, and it is feared that the NPT regime may be negatively affected.

Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important and urgent, and has worked actively to this end. Japan has been actively calling on all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT, in particular States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest opportunity both on bilateral occasions as well as in the multilateral fora. The aforementioned UN resolution sponsored by Japan that underlines the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT was once again adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 58th U.N. General Assembly in 2003. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi, attended the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2003 to make a strong personal appeal.

In response to the Final Declaration of the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those twelve states whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

It is also important that efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime undertaken by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission will continuously be made, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), and that the necessary budget will be ensured to establish such a regime. As a part of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the construction of domestic monitoring facilities has progressed steadily under the supervision of the CTBT National Operation System of Japan.

Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, was elected as chairman of the Commission for 2004 and has been making every effort for the CTBT’s early entry into force.

Japan firmly believes that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries have to maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear-explosions. Also, it must be recalled again that in paragraph 3 of its resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council called on all countries to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT. Japan once again strongly urges all states not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions.

(2) Fissile material cut-off treaty

It is truly regrettable that, despite the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not yet commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. All states, including
nuclear-weapon States, should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of the FMCT. The FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A conclusion of the FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system. Furthermore, the delay in entry into force of the CTBT should not justify the delay in the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

As a concrete contribution to the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT, Japan presented a working paper on the FMCT to the CD on August 14th, 2003, aiming at deepening discussions on the substantive issues of the FMCT and facilitating the early commencement of its negotiations.

Japan regards it as a primary task to reach agreement on a programme of work at the CD, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD. Japan redoubled its endeavors for this purpose during its Presidency of the CD from August 18th to December 31st, 2003; during this period, on September 4th, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Yoriko Kawaguchi, visited the CD and appealed for the early resumption of substantive discussion at the CD, stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

(3) Reduction of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States

Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the START I Treaty, the measures for unilateral reduction and the recent ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.

Japan highly values the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ratified by the United States and the Russian Federation as guaranteeing, in a legally binding form, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons which the U.S. and Russia had already respectively declared, and hopes for full implementation of this Treaty by both States. Japan believes that all nuclear-weapon States should reduce their nuclear arsenals and hopes that the other nuclear-weapon States will undertake, unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions of their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions to be undertaken by the United States and Russia. In this regard Japan hopes that the nuclear-weapon State(s), which has(have) not taken such measures so far, will immediately start to reduce its(their) nuclear weapons.

(4) Non-strategic nuclear weapons

It is imperative for all states that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to undertake measures to reduce them, while maintaining transparency, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000
NPT Review Conference. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is crucially important in terms of regional and international security, as well as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the U.S. and the Russian Federation implement their initiatives on the reduction of their non-strategic nuclear forces completely and on a voluntary basis, as declared in 1991-1992, and provide data on the status of implementation of these initiatives.

(5) Assistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet States

Japan considers that making one practical and concrete step after another is the only way to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Thus, Japan has been actively taking the following practical measures.

In June 2002, Japan announced its intention to make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million US dollars for the G8 Global Partnership, 100 million of which would be allocated to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and the rest to other projects such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines.

(Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement)

Japan has already extended assistance to Russia by providing a floating facility for liquid radioactive waste treatment. In December 2003 Japan and Russia launched the first project of dismantling a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine and this project is scheduled to be finished by this autumn.

(Management and Disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium)

A significant amount of nuclear material, including weapon-grade plutonium, has been withdrawn from dismantled nuclear weapons as a result of ongoing nuclear disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia. It is an urgent task to prevent such material from being reused for military purposes or proliferated to a third country or terrorist group from the viewpoint of disarmament, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Japan’s efforts in this field are twofold. Firstly, with the cooperation of Japan, twenty kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists, for the first time in the world. Secondly, as mentioned above, Japan has pledged 100 million US dollars for a multilateral disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and actively participated in the negotiations towards the establishment of such a program. Japan strongly hopes that the outstanding issues such as liability, disposition methods and program management be solved as soon as possible and that actual disposition can start. Among others, Japan stresses the importance of verification that will be required to provide a reliable assurance of compliance with relevant agreements and of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes that the Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Russia and the IAEA will be completed and implemented, and that adequate monitoring and inspections will be put in place.
Japan signed the "Agreement for the Establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)" in 1992, and has been actively supporting the project since the inauguration of the ISTC head office in Moscow in March 1994.

(Asistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet Union States other than Russia) As for the Former Soviet Union States other than Russia, Japan has implemented projects, such as assistance for establishing the State System for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control, and medical assistance to workers involved in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

(6) Reporting
The submission of regular reports by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the NPT is one of the thirteen practical disarmament steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and is an effective means to facilitate the implementation of specific disarmament measures.

It is encouraging that more reports were submitted to the second Preparatory Committee than to the first Preparatory Committee, thereby contributing to enhancing transparency. Japan submitted its comprehensive report to the first and the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Japan hopes that this trend will be maintained and further strengthened. Discussion on specific methods of reporting should be continued.

Japan looks forward to all States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, putting forward reports on their efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

3. Non-proliferation
(1) Strengthening of the commitment to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards
Japan attaches great importance to strengthening the reliability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and believes that the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities should be enhanced. In this respect, the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends, among others, the consideration of a possible plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion of the IAEA safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. Japan strongly supports this recommendation and regards it as urgent to promote the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

In view of the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol, Japan participated actively in formulating the "Plan of Action" and hosted the International Symposium for Further Reinforcement of IAEA Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific Region in June 2001 and the International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards in December 2002 in cooperation with the IAEA, and contributed financial and human resources to a series of other regional seminars. Japan has been taking a leading role in the Friends of the Additional
Protocol organized in Vienna, consisting of representatives of interested member states as a follow-up to the International Conference of December 2002, in order to address various issues in cooperation with the IAEA such as: how to promote the conclusion of the Additional Protocol at bilateral and regional levels; how to draw political attention to the importance of the Additional Protocol; and how to eliminate legal, technical and other obstacles to the promotion of its conclusion.

Japan notes that these efforts, together with those by other States and the IAEA Secretariat, have led to a higher level of interest and understanding on the importance of the Additional Protocol and the steady increase in the number of States that have signed and/or concluded an Additional Protocol in recent years.

The Additional Protocol can play a pivotal role in increasing the transparency of States’ nuclear related activities, by providing the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability to, inter alia, verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities as well as additional information on nuclear-related research and development, export and import. Therefore, Japan strongly believes that the universalization of the Additional Protocol remains as the most realistic and effective means to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. Japan strongly urges all states that have signed but not yet ratified an Additional Protocol to redouble their efforts to complete their national ratification procedures promptly.

Japan firmly believes that the more advanced nuclear technology a State has and the larger the scale of its nuclear activity, the higher the degree of responsibility and transparency it should have in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the light of this belief, Japan calls upon all countries with nuclear activities, and especially those with reprocessing and/or uranium enrichment and/or heavy water production related activities, to discharge their responsibility by, among others, concluding the Additional Protocol.

Moreover, strengthening the non-proliferation regime is a matter which should also involve non Party States to the NPT. Given the imminent importance of enhancing non-proliferation, Japan wishes to call upon non Party States to conclude an Additional Protocol to their own safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Japan also emphasizes the importance of maximizing the efficiency of safeguards methods, given the limited safeguards resources and ever-growing verification needs. In this sense, implementation of Integrated Safeguards, which refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, should be widely promoted in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

(2) Export control

The International export control frameworks for nuclear related materials and technologies, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), have played an
indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT by the States Parties. The coordinated export control policy, in line with common guidelines of the NSG and the ZC as well as their outreach activities, are of great significance for the effective deterrence and prevention of proliferation from the supply side. In this respect, Japan urges that the roles of the NSG and the ZC be explicitly endorsed in the NPT review process towards the 2005 Review Conference as important mechanisms to help ensure strict compliance with the NPT.

These export control regimes have been subject to continuous improvements. Among others, Japan supports the idea of making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for civilian nuclear programs. Japan believes that the signing of the Additional Protocol is not sufficient and its ratification should be required as a condition. Japan also adheres to the principle stipulated in the NSG Guidelines of preventing the transfer of not only uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology, but all nuclear related material, equipment and technology to states with nuclear proliferation concerns.

Japan, considering the significance of the export control regimes in connection with the NPT, has been actively participating in the activities of these regimes, by acting as the Point of Contact of the NSG, for instance. Japan calls for a redoubling of efforts of the international community towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the stringent implementation of export control on nuclear related items that may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, so as to complement nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is necessary for the international community as a whole to prevent proliferation of the means of delivery of nuclear materials. In this regard, Japan was deeply involved in and contributed to the drafting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Japan highly values the successful launch of the HCOC in November 2002 as an important step, and is making efforts to universalize the HCOC by promoting dialogue with non-participating states, in particular ASEAN countries.

(3) Measures against nuclear terrorism

Since September 11 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons and material. In order to prevent terrorism involving nuclear weapons or material, the international community must cooperate at regional and international levels, and exert individual and collective efforts in relation to exchanges of information, border control and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In this respect, Japan welcomes the current efforts to amend the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to extend its scope.

The IAEA also has an essential role to play in this area. Japan has already contributed half a million US dollars to the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund, and will finance, jointly with other like-minded countries, the project to upgrade the nuclear material accounting and control
system in the ULBA Fuel Fabrication Facility in Kazakhstan. Since the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is becoming increasingly important, Japan supports the US proposal to improve global control of radioactive sources. Japan also supports the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, endorsed at the IAEA General Conference last year, and calls upon other countries to support and take necessary measures to implement the Code. Furthermore, Japan encourages the IAEA to continue its efforts in line with the Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources.

Japan is certain that the Additional Protocol can play a meaningful role in preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists because it provides additional information to the IAEA on the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment. The conclusion of the Additional Protocols should therefore be promoted also from the viewpoint of anti-terrorism.

(4) Japan’s efforts to promote cooperation for Non-Proliferation in Asia

Recognizing the growing risk of Asia becoming more and more an active region for transshipment and procurement activities of proliferators, Japan attaches great importance to the strengthening of non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia. Following the APEC leaders’ commitment in October 2003 to “take all essential actions to eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by strengthening international non-proliferation regimes,” Japan organized the first Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo November 2003 to hold policy dialogue on various non-proliferation matters with the participation of all the ASEAN countries, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. This ASTOP meeting deserves credit as being the first Director-General level meeting in Asia specifically dedicated to talks on non-proliferation. The participants all shared the view that the prevention of the proliferation of WMD, their delivery means, and related materials, equipment, and technologies is vitally important to international peace and security.

This shared view was fully reflected in the Japan-ASEAN Tokyo Declaration and the Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action issued at the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2003, in which the leaders agreed to “enhance cooperation in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and related materials.” This was a great step forward towards further strengthening non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia.

After these commitments were made at the summit level for non-proliferation, relevant ministries and agencies of the Government of Japan, headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formed an inter-agency “Japan-ASEAN Non-Proliferation Cooperation Mission”. This Mission visited all 10 ASEAN countries in February 2004. The success of the Mission has enabled Japan and ASEAN countries to further understand each other’s views and to recognize concrete areas in which cooperation is needed.
Based on the results of the Mission, Japan now plans to hold an “Asia Non-Proliferation Seminar focusing on Maritime Cooperation” in May 2004 for ASEAN countries in need of cooperation, notably in the field of maritime law enforcement in relation to non-proliferation. Japan continues to host the Asia Export Control Seminar, which has been held for the last 11 years, to cooperate with Asian countries in strengthening export controls. The 2nd ASTOP meeting is planned to be held sometime in fall 2004. All these efforts have provided, and will continue to provide, the countries in the region with opportunities to “think together,” which Japan strongly believes is a very important approach in tackling non-proliferation issues.

4. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Under the NPT, all the States Parties enjoy the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with its Articles I and II.

Japan is fully committed to respecting this right as long as the purpose of such development is exclusively peaceful. At the same time, however, recent cases relating to compliance with NPT obligations have indicated that the international community should be vigilant against possible exploitation of this right under the cover of “peaceful” purposes.

Safeguards by the IAEA have been incorporated as an essential part in the NPT in order to prevent such exploitation. Therefore, it is vitally important for all the States Parties to fully comply with all obligations under the NPT, including those of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to accept safeguards, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In light of the importance of this issue, Japan is ready to actively participate in discussions on how to address the issue of the possible exploitation of the right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Japan, on its part as a State Party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, Japan has fully complied with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol, and ensured transparency in its nuclear activities, including those relating to plutonium, in order to increase international confidence.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preventing global warming. Japan is pursuing the research and development of innovative nuclear systems that would be safer, more efficient, as well as more diversion and proliferation-resistant, and that would help to extend the scope of the use of nuclear energy to new areas such as hydrogen production.

Japan also places the highest priority on the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan believes that the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management are of great importance and urges those countries that have not yet concluded these Conventions to
do so as soon as possible. Japan wishes to note that the First Review Meeting on the Joint Convention, which took place in November, 2003, in Vienna, contributed to enhancing the global safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. In this context, we expect the Third Review Meeting pursuant to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which is scheduled to take place in April, 2005, to also play a significant role in enhancing global nuclear safety. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA in strengthening the global “safety culture” taking into account the guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the Agency’s activities. In this context, Japan has greatly contributed to the IAEA’s efforts, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, in improving the nuclear safety in the Asian region.

International technical cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear technology is one of the three pillars of IAEA, and plays a key role in achieving the goal of the NPT. Therefore, Japan will continue to make positive contributions towards the promotion of technical cooperation in this area. Japan has been a major contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and, since 1959, has paid its share of TCF in spite of recent economic difficulties. Japan firmly believes that Member States and the IAEA Secretariat should make efforts to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Program is implemented effectively, building on the principle of shared responsibility by all IAEA Member States and with efficient management by the IAEA secretariat. Japan also plays a leading role in regional cooperation in Asia in the Regional Co-operative Agreement known as RCA.

Japan acknowledges the remarkable role of the IAEA, not only in the area of power generation, but also in the field of medicine, agriculture, food, sanitary and water resources and will continue to make contributions to the Agency’s activities in these fields, in the hope that such activities will help promote a better public understanding of the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology.

Given the international nature of nuclear activities, the transport of radioactive materials, which a number of countries have been conducting, is an essential element in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, ensuring the smooth transport of radioactive materials is an important issue for all countries that support the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Radioactive material transport has been conducted in line with the right of navigation established in international law, with the most prudent precautionary measures taken to ensure safety in conformity with the international standards and guidelines set by credible international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IAEA. In addition, relevant information on radioactive transport has been, and will be, provided to the states concerned to the fullest possible extent on the basis of the due consideration of safety, security and the smooth implementation of such transport.

Maritime navigation rights and freedom, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relation to relevant international instruments, should be reaffirmed as legitimate rights to be exercised. Secondly, Japan wishes to point out that its current regulations provide a good basis for an effective regulatory process and a historically excellent safety record, and that such a
record can best be maintained by continuing efforts to improve the regulatory and operational practices, and ensure full compliance with relevant standards and the strict implementation of guidelines. Japan fully associates itself with the International Action Plan for the transport of radioactive materials adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, based on the result of the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material that was held in Vienna in July 2003. Japan expects that issues relating to the transport of radioactive materials will be discussed and dealt with as appropriate in the relevant international organizations within their respective competence.

5. Universality and Compliance

(1) Universality

Japan welcomes the fact that, in May 2003, Timor-Leste deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT, thereby becoming the 189th Party. Japan believes that Timor-Leste’s recent accession should lead to further strengthening of the NPT regime. The NPT has attained almost worldwide universality. In 1998, the NPT regime was challenged from the outside in the form of nuclear weapon test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan, but at the 2000 Review Conference, the States Parties made it clear that these two countries would not receive new nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever. Japan continues to urge these two countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to give their utmost consideration to the problem of nuclear proliferation. Lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT. Strenuous efforts should be maintained to urge early accession to the NPT by the remaining Non-Party States, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

(2) Compliance

(2) Compliance

(DPRK)

Japan is firmly convinced that the erosion of the credibility of the NPT and other related multilateral treaties is a cause for grave concern and is by no means in the interest of any State. From this viewpoint, Japan is deeply disturbed by the case of non-compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The DPRK has expressed or hinted, both formally and informally on a number of occasions, that it is developing nuclear weapons, or that it already possesses them. The nuclear programs pursued by the DPRK are a direct threat to Japan’s national security. They also threaten peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and are a grave challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

From this viewpoint, Japan has made the following positions clear and long urged the DPRK to accept them.
- The development, acquisition or possession, test or transfer of nuclear weapons by the DPRK can in no way be tolerated.
- The DPRK must comply with all its obligations under the NPT and, consequently, with obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
- The DPRK must promptly dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its covert uranium enrichment program, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Although the DPRK has, to date, shown little readiness to commit itself to those goals, Japan is determined to continue to do its utmost to peacefully resolve the DPRK nuclear issue through diplomatic means such as the Six-Party Talks. It is, however, the DPRK that must make a prompt decision and respond positively to the demands of the international community.

(Iran)
Japan welcomes Iran’s recent positive moves including the signing of the Additional Protocol. Japan also welcomes Iran’s recent active cooperation with the IAEA such as the agreement of an Action Plan, which includes Iran’s provision to the IAEA of detailed information regarding aspects of its centrifuge program by the end of April as well as its declaration under the Additional Protocol by mid-May. At the same time, Japan is deeply concerned about Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear activities including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation activities. Japan also notes that there are still outstanding issues to be resolved and clarified. Japan believes that it is essential for Iran to implement all the requests made by the IAEA Board in its resolutions of September and November, 2003 and March, 2004. Japan expects and trusts that Iran will, in order to dispel international concerns, respond to all outstanding requests contained in those resolutions, speedily move to the ratification of the Additional Protocol, provide explanations that are acceptable to the IAEA regarding any outstanding issues, and continue and intensify its forward-looking cooperation with the IAEA, in particular through the prompt provision of detailed information as requested by the IAEA.

(Libya)
Japan welcomes Libya’s decision announced on 19 December 2003 to abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction programs, while expressing concern over Libya’s past failures to meet the requirements of its Safeguards Agreement, which were identified by the IAEA Director General and, according to the IAEA Board, constituted non-compliance, and concern that it acquired nuclear weapons design and fabrication documents. Japan also welcomes Libya’s signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol on March 10 and its decision to implement the Additional Protocol before ratification, and calls upon Libya to promptly ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol. Japan strongly hopes that the DPRK and those states that are subject to suspicion for developing WMDs will follow Libya’s example.
6. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones and negative security assurance

(1) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security.

Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Japan hopes that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between the five nuclear-weapon States and the five countries of Central Asia, and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this view, Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the U.N. in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

Japan believes that progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East will further strengthen the credibility of the NPT.

(2) Negative security assurances

It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the idea that a programme of work, containing the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, will be agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament.

7. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole.

Japan welcomes the Report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”, which was prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. The Report stresses the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations and contains practical recommendations on the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Japan has been making various efforts to contribute to the implementation of these recommendations, such as inviting disarmament educators from overseas. During the UN Disarmament Conference held in Osaka last August, Japan co-sponsored with the UN a “Citizens’ Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education”.

In this regard, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited about 480 United Nations disarmament fellows to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and
long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in regions concerned. Every year, Japan supports the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a local city, thereby providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts, not only from the Asia and Pacific region, but also from around the world, to engage in useful discussions. Japan welcomes that the UN Disarmament Conference hosted by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs will be held in Sapporo in July this year.

Japan attaches importance to the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In view of the importance of dialogue with non-governmental organizations, which play a significant role in civil society, Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organization session is being held during this session of the Preparatory Committee.
A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons
(58th General Assembly UN (2003))

The General Assembly,


Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other,

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

Convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear devastation,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and welcoming the accession to the Treaty of Timor-Leste,

Bearing in mind that challenges to the Treaty and to the nuclear non-proliferation regime have further increased the necessity of full compliance and that the Treaty can fulfill its role only if there is confidence in compliance by all States parties,
Recognizing the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States on reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through their negotiations, including the recent entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament and the efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community,

Also reaffirming the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security,

Welcoming continuation of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since the last nuclear tests,

Welcoming the successful adoption of the Final Document at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and stressing the importance of implementing its conclusions,

Welcoming constructive discussions at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee in April-May 2003 for the NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005,

Also welcoming the successful convening of a series of seminars and conferences aiming at further reinforcement of IAEA safeguards, including the International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards, held in Tokyo last December, and sharing the hope that by making utmost use of the outcomes from the foregoing seminars and conferences, the IAEA safeguards system will be further strengthened by means of universalization of safeguards
agreements and their additional protocols,

Encouraging Russia and the United States to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between both States,

Also welcoming the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty convened in September 2003 in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty,

Recognizing the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or related materials, radioactive materials, equipment and technology and underlining the role of the IAEA in this regard,

Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, and welcoming recommendations in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly at its 57th session,

1. Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality of the NPT, and calls upon States not parties to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;

2. Also reaffirms the importance for all States parties to the NPT to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;

3. Stresses the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT
and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

(a) the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;

(b) the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2004 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to the conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

(c) the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2004 session in the context of establishing a programme of work;

(d) the inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

(e) an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the NPT are committed under Article VI;

(f) deep reductions by Russia and the United States in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening
strategic stability and international security;

(g) steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

- increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI of the NPT and as a voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

- the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

- concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

- a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

- the engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

(h) reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

4. Recognizes also that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps including deeper reductions by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination;

5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the
United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;

6. Emphasizes the importance of a successful Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2005 as the third Preparatory Committee will be convened in 2004;

7. Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes;

8. Stresses the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including IAEA safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

9. Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies are consistent with States' obligations under the NPT;

10. Calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those
materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;

11. Welcomes the adoption and stresses the importance of the resolution GC(47)/RES/11 which recommends that Member States of the IAEA continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in the resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and in the Agency's updated plan of action (April 2003), with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;

12. Encourages the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards

Chairman's Summary (10 December, 2002)

1. A total of 82 participants representing 36 States met in Tokyo on 9th-10th December 2002 to consider ways and means to bring about wider adherence to strengthened IAEA Safeguards.

2. The participants stressed the necessity of strengthening the IAEA Safeguards system, which plays a vital role in underpinning the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). This task is particularly urgent, in view of recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime e.g. verified compliance of Iraqi disarmament in terms of all weapons of mass destruction and reports of a concealed enrichment program in the DPRK. The participants reaffirmed the importance of universalizing the NPT regime.

3. In this regard, the participants agreed that impartial and critical inspections are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the Agency should be given the authority to provide credible assurance to the international community not only about the diversion of the declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

4. They discussed ways and means of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system - notably through universal adherence to additional protocols to safeguards agreements - in the light of the IAEA Action Plan and the outcomes of a series of regional seminars held in the past two years. The outcome of IAEA regional seminars for Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and South Caucasus, the Baltic Region and Africa provided variable inputs to the discussions at the Conference. Appreciations were expressed to the Governments of Estonia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Peru, and South Africa which hosted the seminars, as well as support provided by Australia, France, Sweden, and the United States.

5. It was noted that certain progress has been made since the Tokyo seminar held in June 2001, with 12 additional States having signed protocols and 9 States having brought protocols into force. However, at the time of the Conference, there are still only 67 States that have signed an additional protocol, and merely 28 States in which the protocol has entered into force. Moreover, NPT safeguards agreements with 48 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are still outstanding. The goal of universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols is far from achieved. Intensified and concerted efforts are urgently required to make progress toward wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards.

6. The participants shared the view that States should undertake in cooperation with the IAEA, collectively or individually, appropriate measures, specifically the following:

   a. In order to maintain the political momentum for strengthening the safeguards system, States concerned and the IAEA should co-operate closely in their outreach efforts, share information and continue to bring the issue to the forefront of international discourse. Specifically, the importance of strengthened safeguards should be raised in connection with the NPT review process, with a view to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties, as well as UN General Assembly and other international meetings dealing with disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation issues. A possibility of issuing a joint ministerial statement was suggested to raise political interest.

   b. The adherence by States to safeguards agreements that are further strengthened by additional protocols promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology and international collaboration in the field of nuclear activities. By fully implementing such agreements and protocols, States are able to further
demonstrate transparency concerning their nuclear activities, which could lead to regional peace and stabilization, to the strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to facilitating cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear application. States should consider deepening their contacts with other States and the IAEA to identify the area of cooperation and assistance toward this goal. The role of parliamentarians, the media and the civil society in general was emphasized in order to underline and disseminate the significance and benefits of strengthening IAEA safeguards system.

c. States should also recognize the role of the IAEA safeguards system in protecting against nuclear terrorism. The establishment of effective State Systems for Accounting and Control (SSAC), and cooperation between such systems and other relevant players are key measures in this regard.

d. In connection with efforts to strengthen SSACs, the IAEA should continue to play a significant role in facilitating the coordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and cooperation, and sharing of related information among bilateral donors and the IAEA.

e. Bilateral and required collaboration should be promoted to the maximum extent possible, through the provision of necessary information and assistance by States that have already concluded an additional protocol to States that have not yet done so, in order to facilitate the universal conclusion of additional protocols. This applies in particular to these States that are not Members of the IAEA. In this connection, several representatives, notably Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, expressed their readiness to offer expertise to help overcome technical and other obstacles that States might encounter in preparing for the conclusion and implementation of an additional protocol.

f. Regional and national seminars, workshops, briefings, and training courses to provide advice on policy, legal and technical aspects of strengthened IAEA safeguards continue to be useful mechanisms in order to promote wider adherence to strengthened safeguards. Due account should be taken of the different needs in this regard of States with nuclear material and facilities and those without, taking into account means available to meet these needs.

g. A suggestion was made to form an informal Friends of the Additional Protocol with participation of interested countries, particularly those having hosted regional seminars to coordinate their national and regional efforts and maintain the momentum.

7. The conference was seen as an excellent opportunity to review progress on the basis of the outcomes of a series of regional seminars and related efforts by States and the IAEA Secretariat. The participants were able to share information with each other on their experience with such activities and on their perception on relevant issues to be solved, and agreed on the importance of continuous co-operation in this regard. In that context, they stressed the significance of the Conference and hoped for the continuation of such efforts in order to achieve wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards.

8. The participants expressed their hope that all States that had signed but not yet ratified additional protocols - notably, the remaining nuclear weapons States and EU member states - redouble their efforts to finalize their national ratification procedures promptly in order to maintain political momentum.

9. The participants expressed their appreciation of the efforts by some States, notably Japan, in hosting and supporting a series of regional seminars to States that supported these activities as well as the Secretariat of the IAEA.
Speech to be delivered at the 3rd Conference on Facilitating the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Your Excellency Mr. Touomioja,  President of the Conference,
Excellencies, Ladies and gentleman,

I would like to begin by extending my heartfelt congratulations to Your Excellency Mr. Touomioja on your election to the Presidency of this Conference.

Seven years have passed since the CTBT was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1996. Since then, 104 countries have ratified the CTBT, and the value of this treaty has been widely acknowledged in the international community. However, the requirements for the CTBT to enter into force have yet to be met. While it is encouraging to see delegations from so many countries gathered here today in the ardent hope for the early entry into force of the CTBT, it is at the same time regrettable that it was once again necessary for us to do so.

The CTBT was adopted forty years after India’s Prime Minister Nehru first advocated the ban on nuclear testing in April, 1954. Its adoption is a significant landmark in the history of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation after World War II. The CTBT illegalizes all types of nuclear testing. Thus, it contributes to both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The early entry into force of the CTBT will tangibly help realize the noble objective of a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons. Since Japan is the only country in the world to have suffered the tragedy of atomic bombings, we Japanese people have a particularly strong desire for a ban on nuclear testing. At this conference, it will be important for us to send a strong message once again, urging states that have not signed or ratified the CTBT to do so at the earliest date.
possible.

Mr. President,

Some nations in the international community are disheartened by the fact that the CTBT has still not entered into force, and therefore have doubts about the effectiveness of making efforts towards this end. I am not of this view. Rather, I consider it crucial that we maintain our efforts to promote the Treaty’s early entry into force. Furthermore, I believe it important to accord due recognition to the beneficial role that the CTBT is already playing in the international community. Prior to the adoption of the CTBT, all nuclear weapons states announced moratoria on nuclear testing. Both India and Pakistan, which conducted nuclear tests in 1998, have faced overwhelming international criticism and consequently announced moratoria on nuclear testing. It is thus clearly apparent for all to see that conducting nuclear tests in defiance of this Treaty will entail severe criticism from the international community. Our efforts toward the early entry into force of the CTBT have permeated international opinion and the norm has taken root that all types of nuclear tests should be banned. Thus, the CTBT, even before entering into force, is playing an important role as a strong deterrent against nuclear testing. It is important that we ceaselessly and tenaciously persevere in our efforts.

Mr. President,

Japan welcomes the fact that Algeria, one of the Annex II countries, deposited its instrument of ratification in July. On the other hand, twelve other Annex II countries have not yet ratified the Treaty, and early ratification by these countries is crucial. Japan has seized every high-level opportunity to convince these nations of the importance of the early ratification of the CTBT. Right before this Conference, together with Your Excellency President Tuomioja and Her Excellency Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, Foreign Minister of Austria, I sent a joint letter to the
remaining twelve countries, encouraging them to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Documents describing measures taken by Japan to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT have been distributed to your tables.

Japan again urges all countries that have not yet ratified the CTBT to do so at the earliest date possible. Japan urges Annex II countries, whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force, especially those nine countries that have signed but not ratified the Treaty, to ratify it, and those three countries that have neither signed nor ratified the Treaty to sign and ratify it.

Mr. President,

The verification regime prescribed by the CTBT is unprecedented in the history of monitoring technology since it covers the earth with one unified monitoring system. The verification technology of the CTBT makes it extremely difficult to clandestinely conduct nuclear tests without having the world know about it. This verification technology thus represents a significant added deterrent against nuclear testing. The work being done by Mr. Hoffmann, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to set up the CTBT verification regime is highly valued by Japan.

Since Japan experiences earthquakes frequently, it possesses the world's most advanced seismological know-how. Japan has made use of this knowledge to provide technical assistance to developing nations. I would like to announce that Japan launched its “CTBT National Operation System” last year and has started constructing and preparing facilities in Japan for the International Monitoring System.
Mr. President,

All the states possessing nuclear weapons have now declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. Although moratoria on nuclear testing will not replace the Treaty, I value them and strongly urge these states to maintain their policies pending the entry into force of the Treaty. I also strongly urge all the states once again not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place.

Mr. President,

The CTBT has a crucial role to play in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime built up on the foundation of the NPT. "The importance and urgency of achieving the early entry into force of the CTBT," which was affirmed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, should certainly be reaffirmed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. However, I ardently hope that by that time, a major step will have been made toward the full realization of the Treaty. I can assure you that Japan will continue to make every possible effort to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT.

Thank you.

Document to be distributed:
Japan's Initiatives for Facilitating the CTBT's EIF

Commitment for the 3rd Conference on Facilitating the Early EIF of the CTBT

- Dispatching a joint letter from Japan, Finland, and Austria, urging high-level participation at the Conference and early signature and ratification of the Treaty (191 countries targeted)

Urging non-signatories and non-ratifiers to sign and ratify the CTBT

- Conducting a joint demarche with Finland and Austria to non-signatory and non-ratifier Annex II countries
- Hosting a "Friends of the CTBT" Foreign Ministers' Meeting (September 2002, New York)

Enhancement of international cooperation on the CTBT

- Technological cooperation through Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA); Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Continuation of the “Global Seismological Observation Training Course” (about 10 trainees annually, a total of 75 trainees accepted so far)
- On-Site Inspection (OSI) Workshop in Hiroshima (June 30-July 3, 2003) hosted by the CTBTO (50 participants from 14 countries attended the Workshop)
- Seminar on Benefits of CTBT Regime Membership dealing with civil and scientific applications of verification technology (September 4, 2003) hosted by the CTBTO
  - Dr. Fukao, Earthquake Research Institute, University of Tokyo, will attend the seminar.

Verification Regime in Japan

- Setting up the CTBT National Operation System of Japan (November 2002)
- Commencement of construction and establishment of monitoring facilities in Japan
(Provisional Translation)

Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-II of the DPRK National Defense Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.

Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship between Japan and the DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past between them and the outstanding issues of concern would be consistent with the fundamental interests of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

1. Both sides determined that, pursuant to the spirit and basic principles laid out in this Declaration, they would make every possible effort for an early normalization of the relations, and decided that they would resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks in October 2002.

Both sides expressed their strong determination that they would sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan and the DPRK based upon their mutual trust in the course of achieving the normalization.

2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks.

Both sides, pursuant to the basic principle that when the bilateral relationship is normalized both Japan and the DPRK would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945, decided that they would discuss this issue of property and claims concretely in the normalization talks.

Both sides decided that they would sincerely discuss the issue of the status of Korean residents in Japan and the issue of cultural property.

3. Both sides confirmed that they would comply with international law and would not commit conducts threatening the security of the other side. With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable incidents, that took place under the
abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

4. Both sides confirmed that they would co-operate with each other in order to maintain and strengthen the peace and stability of North East Asia.

Both sides confirmed the importance of establishing co-operative relationships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region, and shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building, as the relationships among these countries are normalized.

Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements.

Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned.

The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.

Both sides decided that they would discuss issues relating to security.

Prime Minister of Japan
Junichiro Koizumi

Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission
Kim Jong-Il

September 17, 2002
Pyongyang
Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)
Tokyo, 13th November, 2003
Chairman's Summary

1. The Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) was hosted by Japan on 13th November 2003 in Tokyo. 12 Asian nations, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, were represented in the meeting and Australia and the United States also participated. The meeting was chaired by Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

2. The participants welcomed the opening of the meeting as the first senior-level dialogue among the Asian countries dedicated specifically to the discussion of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) and their delivery means as well as their related materials and technology.

3. The participants shared the view that prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials and technology is vitally important to international peace and security, while stressing the importance of efforts for disarmament of such weapons. They reported on their domestic systems and efforts for non-proliferation in the respective countries, as well as made various constructive proposals to strengthen regional cooperation in this field, contributing to a lively exchange of views.

(a) The meeting recalled the G8 Declaration on Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction adopted in June 2003, the Political Declaration on Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery adopted by the ASEM Foreign Ministers in July 2003, the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, and the APEC Leaders' Declaration adopted in October 2003, all of which stress the importance of continuing efforts on
disarmament and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials and technology, in accordance with relevant international conventions in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.

(b) Thus, the participants noted the aforesaid Political Declaration adopted by the ASEM Foreign Ministers to the effect that comprehensive and non-discriminatory implementation of, as well as efforts for gaining wider adherence to, the relevant international conventions are of great importance.

4. The meeting underscored the importance of regional cooperation in the Asian region.

(a) The participants reaffirmed their commitment to prevent terrorists or those who harbor them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means as well as their related materials and technology, as they unanimously viewed that the threat of terrorist activities is real in Asia, and that continued efforts to reduce this threat should be greatly encouraged.

(b) They also noted that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would contribute to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and that they look forward to concrete and verifiable progress towards a complete and permanent nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. The issues of Iran were also touched upon from the viewpoint of non-proliferation.

(c) The meeting encouraged the participating countries' efforts to prevent proliferation by reinforcing relevant national authorities in the respective countries. Participants discussed the need to further develop the national authorities, legislation and capabilities in order to strengthen the non-proliferation mechanisms of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

(d) The meeting took note of the 1st Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue
and the 11th Asian Export Control Seminar convened by Japan in October 2003 which stressed the importance of export control. The participants discussed the need to strengthen export control systems in Asian countries, and to further promote dialogues and cooperation on non-proliferation and disarmament within the Asian region so as to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the region. The participants welcomed increased cooperation between relevant national authorities, particularly with respect to sharing of information, experiences, best practices and expertise.

(e) The meeting also acknowledged that some participating states may require technical assistance in implementing necessary measures to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms, and called on participants to provide such assistance.

5. The participants appreciated the detailed explanation by Australia, Japan and the United States on the Proliferation Security Initiative and its Statement of Principles. They explained that the Initiative is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and their related materials worldwide, and that it seeks to impede and stop trafficking of such materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. There was useful exchange of views on various aspects of the PSI. The participants will report the explanation on the PSI to their respective capitals for their consideration.

6. The participants are deeply concerned about the threat posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In this context, participants took note of the launch of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) in November 2002, while recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles.

7. The participants emphasized the importance of the continuing the dialogue
as they appreciated the fruitful outcomes of the dialogue among the participants in addressing disarmament and non-proliferation issues in Asia.
Speech by Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi

to the Conference on Disarmament

September 4, 2003

Madam President,

It is a great pleasure for me to address this august body, the Conference on Disarmament. I would like to express my sincere congratulations to Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi on her assumption of the presidency of the Conference. Recognising the great responsibility held by the country presiding over the Conference on Disarmament at this particularly important juncture, I have decided to join you all here today.

Madam President,

I would like to take this opportunity to state Japan’s basic stance on disarmament and peace. After World War II, Japan chose to establish its position in the international community as a nation dedicated to peace, with a strong determination that the devastation of war never be repeated. Since then, deeply convinced of the philosophy of peace, Japan has pursued the following policy goals: achieving economic development through peace, not through military build-up, increasing the welfare of the Japanese people, and promoting international peace and stability as a prerequisite for these aims.

From this viewpoint, Japan considered it important to demonstrate that Japan, itself, would not pose a threat to the world, and hence renounced the option of nuclear armament. In 1955, Japan enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which limits nuclear activities in Japan exclusively to the peaceful purposes. Subsequently, in 1967, Japan announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,”
of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan,” and has upheld these principles. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the present Koizumi Cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, and there is no change in the position of Government of Japan in that it continues to uphold these principles.

Madam President,

Japan’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976 was an important security decision. Japan joined the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and internationally promised to renounce the option of nuclear armament. And now the regime of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, with the NPT as its cornerstone, is a fundamental pillar of Japan’s security. At the same time, Japan accepted the IAEA safeguards to provide transparency of its nuclear activities. Japan promptly concluded the additional protocol in 1999. Evidently, Japan attaches crucial importance to the NPT regime for its peace and prosperity, and is convinced that this recognition is shared by an overwhelming majority of the international community.

Japan has been making active diplomatic efforts aimed at realizing a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. This is the tenth year since Japan submitted its draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly in 1994 for the first time. This year again, Japan is preparing for the submission to the UN General Assembly of the draft resolution on “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

As a concrete step to strengthening the NPT regime, Japan is seriously committed to promoting the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Yesterday, I attended the Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the CTBT in Vienna, at which I emphasized again the importance of achieving this goal.

In order for the NPT regime to serve as a cornerstone underpinning international peace and security, its universality is essential. Japan welcomes that Timor Leste, immediately after its independence, became the 189th State party to the NPT in May this year. Nevertheless, there are countries still remaining outside the NPT. I, myself, have seized every opportunity to convince these countries of the importance of their acceding to the Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon States should take seriously the fact that, to date, almost all countries have committed to renounce the option of nuclear armament under the NPT regime. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with "Principles and Objectives", which includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must respond to such resolute determination of non-nuclear weapon States, which are the overwhelming majority of the NPT States parties, by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Madam President,

Japan is currently tackling the question of peace and disarmament from a new perspective. Following the end of the Cold War, the international community underwent the hardships of numerous regional conflicts and civil wars, and we have learnt from past experiences that the cessation of conflicts does not necessarily result in sustainable peace. Today, Japan is eager to play a more proactive role to make peace sustainable. I refer this approach as "consolidation of peace". As a precondition to consolidating peace and promoting reconstruction, the population must be ensured a secure living
environment. Addressing the problems of anti-personnel landmines and small arms and light weapons is essential to this aim. In this view, the Official Development Assistance Charter, which lays out Japan's fundamental principles of ODA policy, places the concept of "consolidation of peace" as one of its top priorities.

Madam President,

At this point, I would like to reflect upon the last ten years' history of disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament. After the end of the Cold War, the CD made a significant contribution to building new disarmament norms. In 1991, immediately following the end of the Gulf War, then Foreign Minister of Japan, Dr. Taro Nakayama, addressed the CD, pointing out issues which remained unresolved at that time, expressing his strong desire for their early resolution. The CD went on to adequately meet his expectations. Achievements included the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. The historical importance of these treaties cannot be overvalued.

Since that time, the CD has been unable to accomplish any concrete results. However, even in this period when CD negotiations have stagnated, enthusiasm among the international community for tackling disarmament and non-proliferation issues has not wavered. Various developments have taken place outside the CD.

Firstly, important disarmament steps have been taken by some nuclear-weapon States. In December 2001, Russia and the US declared the completion of the implementation of their obligations under START I. Subsequently, in June this year, the Moscow Treaty, whereby Russia and the US agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads respectively to about one third, entered into
force. Another great achievement was the agreement on the “13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament”, as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which includes “an unequivocal undertaking” provided by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Secondly, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was launched last November. This constitutes a significant step forward as the first international norm which promotes the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and calls for maximum self-restraint in the development, testing and deployment of such weapons.

Thirdly, the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty in 1997 and the adoption of the “Programme of Action” at the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects are, among others, examples of substantial developments which have been made in the field of conventional weapons. In July this year, under Japan’s chairmanship, the UN First Biennial Meeting on small arms and light weapons was successfully concluded.

Madam President,

Despite these positive developments, we must also recognize the severe situation we are currently facing.

Firstly, problems of non-compliance with multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, including the NPT, have become more acute. Non-compliance cases which pose challenges to those treaties must be rectified in order to maintain their credibility and legitimacy. Japan is strongly concerned
that problems of non-compliance with the NPT, or related suspicions, have emerged over the past year.

In particular, Japan is deeply concerned about North Korea’s declaration of their intention to withdraw from the NPT. Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development, acquisition or possession, test and transfer of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Japan strongly urges North Korea to comply with all its obligations under the NPT and, consequently, obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to refreeze its nuclear related facilities and to take prompt actions to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Japan welcomes the convening of the first meeting of six-party talks and that this has given us a clue to solving the problem through dialogue.

States parties need to work actively to demonstrate their compliance with the treaties to the international community. A high level of transparency can contribute to confidence building among States parties. This is particularly relevant for States which undertake, or are planning to undertake, advanced nuclear activity. From this viewpoint, Japan has called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA and to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement the Additional Protocol.

Secondly, the problem of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction must be addressed. The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought about a complete change in people’s “threat awareness”, bringing to light the imminent danger that such non-state actors as terrorists can threaten States’ security. In particular, the magnitude of the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists is immeasurable. The international community has taken new steps to respond to this “new threat”, and Japan has actively participated in these efforts. Besides, Japan has contributed to the fight against terrorism in
Afghanistan, through the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. In order for such new steps to be truly effective, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes must function effectively. It is now more important than ever to uphold and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

Madam President,

I would now like to touch upon the current situation of the Conference on Disarmament. Since the formulation of the CTBT in 1996, the CD has been unable to enter into substantial negotiations. This stalemate must be resolved promptly. Japan strongly hopes that the CD will agree on a programme of work as soon as possible and begin substantive discussion. Japan supports any constructive efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD.

Japan, in particular, places great importance on the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. It is highly regrettable that the CD has failed to commence FMCT negotiations, despite the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We believe such negotiations should begin without further delay. With this aim, Japan held a Workshop here in Geneva in March this year and recently presented to the CD a working paper on the FMCT. We sincerely hope that this working paper will deepen the discussions on the substantive issues of the FMCT and facilitate the early commencement of negotiations. Japan also believes that all States concerned, including the nuclear-weapon States, should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of the FMCT.

Madam President,
I would now like to outline the priority issues for Japan in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

First of all, Japan is aiming towards a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons based on a realistic and incremental approach, by building up concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. Every year, the draft resolution, “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, which reflects Japan’s position, has been adopted by the UN General Assembly with overwhelming support.

Secondly, as the only country that experienced the devastation caused by nuclear bombing, Japan takes it upon itself to ensure that the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain in the memories of mankind. Over the past 20 years, Japan has invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki a total of over 450 diplomats as a part of the UN Disarmament Fellowship Programme. I am pleased to learn that alumni of the Fellowship Programme are present among the delegations today. Japan will continue such efforts in the future.

Thirdly, in order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, and of civil society as a whole. To this aim, Japan puts a great emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation education, and is making active efforts, including inviting disarmament educators from overseas.

Regional disarmament conferences are effective means to enhance awareness of the importance of disarmament at a regional level. I am pleased to note that the UN Disarmament Conference has been held every year in different cities of Japan since 1989. Japan highly appreciates the meaningful discussion which took place during the UN Disarmament Conference in Osaka last month.
Madam President,

We must take action in order to promote disarmament. In addition to traditional approaches, which focus mainly on establishing rules and norms, concrete actions are required such as the disposal and collection of landmines or small arms and light weapons, and the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction.

From this point of view, Japan has been actively engaged in de-nuclearisation cooperation in Russia as a part of the G8 Global Partnership. In June this year, I visited Vladivostok and actually saw a decommissioned nuclear submarine, which is to be dismantled under Japan-Russia cooperation projects. These projects were named “Star of Hope” by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

Japan has also been actively involved in cooperation in mine clearance and the collection of small arms and light weapons. From an early stage, Japan has been engaged in de-mining projects in Afghanistan through United Nations organizations. When I visited Afghanistan last year, I realized the seriousness of the landmine problems and was moved by the enthusiasm of local staff members toiling toward this lofty end.

Surplus small arms and light weapons have hindered efforts for humanitarian aid operations and reconstruction and development activities by the United Nations and other organizations in the post-conflict phase, and they contribute to re-igniting conflicts and facilitating crime. Japan has implemented weapons collection projects to counter this problem, namely, “Weapons for Development” in Cambodia.

Japan is committed to further promoting such concrete actions toward disarmament.
Madam President,

Disarmament and non-proliferation has never been so important for the peace and security of humankind and the international community has great expectations for the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its role. We therefore owe it to ourselves to meet these expectations.

Japan ardently hopes that, making use of the wisdom of humankind, the CD will contribute to peace and prosperity for the generations to come. I can assure the Conference that Japan will continue to make every possible effort to promote disarmament and non-proliferation.

Thank you.