First of all, I would like to pay high tribute to the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations for holding this valuable joint conference. For me, it is a great pleasure to address this conference as we prepare for the 2005 Review Conference.

As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970. At this juncture, the success of the coming Review Conference is of particular importance. At the same time, we have several reasons to be pessimistic. Today, let me first point out reasons for which the success of the upcoming Review Conference is particularly important. Then, I would like to touch upon difficulties we are now facing. Lastly, I would like to enumerate key elements that should be included in the final product of the Review Conference.

A. Why it is important to succeed at the 2005 Review Conference

1) Nuclear non-proliferation: imminent task

The NPT regime is now challenged in many aspects. Incidents of cases, where compliance of one State with NPT obligations is called into
question, have multiplied in the past several years.

It would be safe to say that the collective endeavors of the international community have so far been effective in stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation, albeit with some caveats.

The threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq was finally dispelled by the use of force, although opinion was divided as to the appropriateness of this recourse.

The revelation of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran in 2002 heightened suspicion. So far, referral of the case to the Security Council has not taken place and the matter has been dealt with within the framework of the IAEA.

In January 2003 the NPT regime was again shaken, when North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The Six-Party Talks were launched in August 2003 to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution to this problem. Although no concrete solution has been reached, some valuable elements for future consensus have emerged from the process.

The challenges sketched above stem mainly from States. But the NPT regime has also been challenged by Non-State actors. The possibility of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists has come to be regarded as one of the most imminent threats to world peace, especially following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The revelation of Dr Khan’s clandestine network illustrated that Non-State actors could also play a significant role as proliferators.

Faced with these challenges, we are now fully aware of the necessity to fill in the loopholes and further strengthen the current non-proliferation regime. We have devised various schemes to deal with these new proliferation concerns including the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards, the G8Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative and UNSC Resolution 1540. In addition, discussions have been initiated in different international fora to deal with so-called “smart proliferation”, with the view to establishing a set of strengthened rules on highly sensitive activities such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

Not all of these new initiatives are directly linked to the NPT regime. However, the NPT Review Conference is certainly the most opportune and appropriate occasion to demonstrate our renewed resolve to tackle
the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. At this critical juncture, responsibility of the State Parties to the NPT is particularly heavy. If we, the State Parties fail to issue a clear message to that purport, we will fail to live up to the expectations of the world community. Such a failure would affect the very credibility of the NPT regime and could eventually even accelerate proliferation. This is the primary reason why it is important to succeed at the 2005 Review Conference.

ii) Nuclear Disarmament

The Importance of nuclear disarmament should not be overshadowed by that of nuclear non-proliferation. Both issues are equally important in the context of the NPT. They should be mutually reinforcing. Japan does not link the progress of one to that of the other. It is, however, essential to pursue these two objectives with the same consistency. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is our common goal.

Japan has presented a draft resolution entitled “a Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” to the General Assembly each year since 2000. This year also, the resolution was adopted with the support of an overwhelming majority. 165 countries voted in favor of it on December 3 this year. This resolution crystallizes the genuine aspiration of the international community to achieve a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons. If the coming Review Conference does not issue a clear message to this effect with specific commitments, it will fall short of this aspiration. Let me point out some additional factors, which should be taken into consideration.

First, I must recall the fact that the NPT places State Parties under different obligations, with nuclear weapon State obligations being different from non-nuclear weapon States. Under such an asymmetrical structure, if one group deems the other insincere in discharging its obligations, it may affect the motivation of the other. Such mutual distrust inevitably erodes confidence in the regime as a whole. Many countries are afraid that, while the non-proliferation agenda dominates the international scene, the nuclear disarmament agenda is put on the back burner. The Review Conference should provide a valuable occasion to enhance confidence, not to fuel distrust, among State Parties.
Second, the past two Review Conferences, in 1995 and 2000, have successfully accomplished significant results to promote nuclear disarmament. In 1995, the Review Conference adopted, by consensus, the decision on “Principles and Objectives” that listed the future nuclear disarmament measures to be taken mainly by the nuclear weapon states. In 2000 the Review Conference adopted the Final Document, which included thirteen “practical steps” “An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” was among these thirteen “practical steps”. These achievements at the past two conferences were highly appreciated as significant steps forward in terms of nuclear disarmament. Following these successes, we, the State Parties, must prepare to accomplish something significant for the nuclear disarmament, and live up to the high expectations of the world community.

B. **Reasons that do not allow us to be optimistic**

i) **Procedural Aspects**

Since the third Preparatory Committee, held from April to May this year, could neither adopt a provisional agenda nor mandate any entities to prepare background documents, we have to settle these procedural matters at the beginning of the Review Conference. This time we shall be burdened with an additional task. We should not waste any more our time on procedural problems before engaging in substantive discussion. The best way to accelerate our job on substance is to adopt by consensus on the first day the proposals on procedural matters to be put forward by the chair. In order to make such arrangements possible, I would like to urge all State Parties to show their utmost flexibility and fully cooperate with the chairman’s handling. In the lead up to the Review Conference, informal preparatory work to be conducted by the designate chairman, Ambassador Duarte of Brazil, is extremely important. Efforts to create a more cooperative atmosphere among State Parties is also of great value. The present conference will certainly contribute to this purpose. Japan will provide such opportunity by holding a seminar in February 2005.
ii) Substantive Aspects

As for substance, there are a number of factors that augur ill for the coming Review Conference. However, due to time constraints, I would like to focus today on the CTBT.

In the last two Review Conferences, the State Parties have made significant advancement on the CTBT. In 1995, the Review Conference agreed upon “the completion by the CD of the negotiation on a universal and international and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996.” Behind this decision was the fear on the part of the non-nuclear weapon States (NNWSs) that the indefinite extension of the NPT, upon which the State Parties agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, would perpetuate the distinction between the nuclear weapon States (NWSs) and NNWSs. The NNWSs were therefore firmly determined to have the NWSs clearly commit themselves to the objectives of nuclear disarmament, in return for supporting the indefinite extension of the Treaty. As promised, the CTBT was adopted in 1996. In the year 2000, the Review Conference identified the early entry into force of the CTBT as one of “the practical thirteen steps”.

With its ratification by the Republic of Congo this year, the number of countries whose ratification is needed for entry into force of the Treaty, was reduced to 11. Yet, the prospect for its entry into force is bleak. Some of the remaining countries are regarded “hard-cores” and each one of these 11 countries has virtually veto power to its entry into force.

Japan has spearheaded international efforts to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. In September this year, for example, Japan convened, with Australia, the Netherlands and Finland, the “CTBT Friends Foreign Ministers’ Meeting” on the margins of the General Assembly of the United Nations. At the end of the meeting, Foreign Ministers adopted a “Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT”, in which they “call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force”.

The total ban on nuclear explosive tests is a goal that the international community has been pursuing for decades. It is frustrating to see the Treaty is still unable to enter into force after 8 years since its
adoption. If we fail to issue a clear and strong message advocating the entry into force of the CTBT, this might be regarded as a regression from past achievements, especially given the two successful Review Conferences to date. Such dissatisfaction might deliver a serious blow to the credibility of the NPT review process and have a cascade effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

C. **Key Elements to be included in the final product**

Lastly, I would like to enumerate, in my personal capacity, key elements that should be included in the final product of the Review Conference for it to be a success. The list below is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Its coverage is confined to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

1. Commitment to further universalize the NPT
2. Commitment to the early entry into force of the CTBT and to a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending its entry into force
3. Commitment to the early commencement and conclusion of negotiations on the FMCT and to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
4. The Undertaking by all NWSs to further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals in all types of nuclear weapons
5. Commitment to further universalize the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
6. Commitment to promote physical protection measures
7. Endorsement of the Export control regimes for nuclear non-proliferation
8. Commitment to further promote disarmament and non-proliferation education
9. Regional affairs pertaining to compliance with the NPT obligations
10. Measures to strengthen the NPT Review process