

**Working Paper of Japan for Submission to the Third Session
of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT**

1. Overview

As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970.

In light of the recent challenges to the NPT regime, such as the DPRK's nuclear programs and Dr. Khan's underground network, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially that of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery poses a significant threat to international peace and stability. In order to address this problem, all states must strengthen their non-proliferation policies, reaffirm their commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and norms, including the NPT, promote universalization of these treaties and ensure compliance with them.

The review process for the 2005 Review Conference was launched smoothly with constructive discussions on substantive issues at the first Preparatory Committee in 2002 and the second one in 2003. Given the current international security environment, Japan considers it crucial for the States Party to the NPT to unite and take effective actions to deal with emerging challenges to the NPT regime, and make efforts to further strengthen the NPT regime towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In this regard, Japan co-sponsored with Indonesia the NPT workshop entitled "Toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects" in March this year in order to provide an opportunity to disseminate information and encourage informal discussion before the third Preparatory Committee and thereby make a contribution to the success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, continues to adhere to its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," of "not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan". The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the present Koizumi cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles", and there is no change in the position of the Government of Japan in that it continues to uphold these principles.

Japan, since its accession to the NPT, has concluded the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol in an effort to ensure transparency of its nuclear related activities. Furthermore, in 1955, Japan promulgated "the Atomic Energy Basic Law" that stipulates that the utilization of Japan's atomic energy be limited to peaceful purposes. These points also testify that Japan has no intent to possess nuclear weapons.

2. Nuclear disarmament

The NPT pursues both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fact that an overwhelming majority of countries have decided to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons is epoch-making in international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This achievement should be taken seriously by nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with "Principles and Objectives", which includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States are urged to respond to such resolute determination on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

The international community should realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. It is imperative that nuclear-weapon States strengthen and continue to take disarmament measures. In recent years, concern over the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been expressed more frequently. As the only nation which suffered atomic bombing, Japan has strongly urged that nuclear devastation never be repeated. Japan is convinced that every effort should be made to avoid it. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be kept as high as possible. In this vein, Japan believes that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to faithfully strive to make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Japan has submitted a resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" at each session of the General Assembly since 2000. These resolutions identify concrete steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the 2000 Review Conference agreements, and appeal to

the international community for the necessity of progress in nuclear disarmament.

(1) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in that it restricts the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, together with the IAEA safeguards, has a significant role as one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards realizing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Efforts for universalizing the Treaty have resulted in the signature of 171 and ratification of 112 states in seven years since its adoption in 1996. However, the CTBT has not yet come into force, thus making the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation less certain, and it is feared that the NPT regime may be negatively affected.

Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important and urgent, and has worked actively to this end. Japan has been actively calling on all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT, in particular States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest opportunity both on bilateral occasions as well as in the multilateral fora. The aforementioned UN resolution sponsored by Japan that underlines the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT was once again adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 58th U.N. General Assembly in 2003. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi, attended the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2003 to make a strong personal appeal.

In response to the Final Declaration of the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those twelve states whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

It is also important that efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime undertaken by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission will continuously be made, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), and that the necessary budget will be ensured to establish such a regime. As a part of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the construction of domestic monitoring

facilities has progressed steadily under the supervision of the CTBT National Operation System of Japan.

Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, was elected as chairman of the Commission for 2004 and has been making every effort for the CTBT's early entry into force.

Japan firmly believes that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries have to maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear-explosions. Also, it must be recalled again that in paragraph 3 of its resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council called on all countries to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT. Japan once again strongly urges all states not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions.

(2) Fissile material cut-off treaty

It is truly regrettable that, despite the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not yet commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. All states, including nuclear-weapon States, should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of the FMCT. The FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A conclusion of the FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such materials through its verification system. Furthermore, the delay in entry into force of the CTBT should not justify the delay in the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

As a concrete contribution to the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT, Japan presented a working paper on the FMCT to the CD on August 14th 2003, aiming at deepening discussions on the substantive issues of the FMCT and facilitating the early commencement of its negotiations.

Japan regards it as a primary task to reach agreement on a programme of work at the CD, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD. Japan redoubled its endeavors for this purpose during its Presidency of the CD from August 18th to December 31st 2003; during this period, on September 4th, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Yoriko Kawaguchi, visited the CD and appealed for the early resumption of substantive discussion at the CD, stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

(3) Reduction of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States

Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the START I Treaty, the measures for unilateral reduction and the recent ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.

Japan highly values the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ratified by the United States and the Russian Federation as guaranteeing, in a legally binding form, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons which the U.S. and Russia had already respectively declared, and hopes for full implementation of this Treaty by both States. Japan believes that all nuclear-weapon States should reduce their nuclear arsenals and hopes that the other nuclear-weapon States will undertake, unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions of their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions to be undertaken by the United States and Russia. In this regard Japan hopes that the nuclear-weapon State(s), which has(have) not taken such measures so far, will immediately start to reduce its(their) nuclear weapons.

(4) Non-strategic nuclear weapons

It is imperative for all states that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to undertake measures to reduce them, while maintaining transparency, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is crucially important in terms of regional and international security, as well as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the U.S. and the Russian Federation implement their initiatives on the

reduction of their non-strategic nuclear forces completely and on a voluntary basis, as declared in 1991-1992, and provide data on the status of implementation of these initiatives.

(5) Assistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet States

Japan considers that making one practical and concrete step after another is the only way to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Thus, Japan has been actively taking the following practical measures.

In June 2002, Japan announced its intention to make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million US dollars for the G8 Global Partnership, 100 million of which would be allocated to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and the rest to other projects such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines.

(Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement)

Japan has already extended assistance to Russia by providing a floating facility for liquid radioactive waste treatment. In December 2003 Japan and Russia launched the first project of dismantling a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine and this project is scheduled to be finished by this autumn.

(Management and Disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium)

A significant amount of nuclear material, including weapon-grade plutonium, has been withdrawn from dismantled nuclear weapons as a result of ongoing nuclear disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia. It is an urgent task to prevent such material from being reused for military purposes or proliferated to a third country or terrorist group from the viewpoint of disarmament, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Japan's efforts in this field are twofold. Firstly, with the cooperation of Japan, twenty kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists, for the first time in the world. Secondly, as mentioned above, Japan has pledged 100 million US dollars for a multilateral disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and actively participated in the negotiations towards the establishment of such a program. Japan strongly hopes that the outstanding issues such as liability, disposition methods and program management be solved as soon as possible and that actual disposition can

start. Among others, Japan stresses the importance of verification that will be required to provide a reliable assurance of compliance with relevant agreements and of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes that the Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., Russia and the IAEA will be completed and implemented, and that adequate monitoring and inspections will be put in place.

(International Science and Technology Center (ISTC))

Japan signed the "Agreement for the Establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)" in 1992, and has been actively supporting the project since the inauguration of the ISTC head office in Moscow in March 1994.

(Assistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet Union States other than Russia)

As for the Former Soviet Union States other than Russia, Japan has implemented projects, such as assistance for establishing the State System for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control, and medical assistance to workers involved in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

(6) Reporting

The submission of regular reports by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the NPT is one of the thirteen practical disarmament steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and is an effective means to facilitate the implementation of specific disarmament measures.

It is encouraging that more reports were submitted to the second Preparatory Committee than to the first Preparatory Committee, thereby contributing to enhancing transparency. Japan submitted its comprehensive report to the first and the second session of the Preparatory Committee. Japan hopes that this trend will be maintained and further strengthened. Discussion on specific methods of reporting should be continued.

Japan looks forward to all States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, putting forward reports on their efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

3. Non-proliferation

(1) Strengthening of the commitment to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards

Japan attaches great importance to strengthening the reliability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and believes that the capability of the IAEA to detect

undeclared nuclear material and activities should be enhanced. In this respect, the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends, among others, the consideration of a possible plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion of the IAEA safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. Japan strongly supports this recommendation and regards it as urgent to promote the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

In view of the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol, Japan participated actively in formulating the "Plan of Action" and hosted the International Symposium for Further Reinforcement of IAEA Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific Region in June 2001 and the International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards in December 2002 in cooperation with the IAEA, and contributed financial and human resources to a series of other regional seminars. Japan has been taking a leading role in the Friends of the Additional Protocol organized in Vienna, consisting of representatives of interested member states as a follow-up to the International Conference of December 2002, in order to address various issues in cooperation with the IAEA such as: how to promote the conclusion of the Additional Protocol at bilateral and regional levels; how to draw political attention to the importance of the Additional Protocol; and how to eliminate legal, technical and other obstacles to the promotion of its conclusion.

Japan notes that these efforts, together with those by other States and the IAEA Secretariat, have led to a higher level of interest and understanding on the importance of the Additional Protocol and the steady increase in the number of States that have signed and/or concluded an Additional Protocol in recent years.

The Additional Protocol can play a pivotal role in increasing the transparency of States' nuclear related activities, by providing the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability to, *inter alia*, verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities as well as additional information on nuclear-related research and development, export and import. Therefore, Japan strongly believes that the universalization of the Additional Protocol remains as the most realistic and effective means to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. Japan strongly urges all states that have signed but not yet ratified an Additional Protocol to redouble their efforts to complete their national ratification procedures promptly.

Japan firmly believes that the more advanced nuclear technology a State has and the

larger the scale of its nuclear activity, the higher the degree of responsibility and transparency it should have in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the light of this belief, Japan calls upon all countries with nuclear activities, and especially those with reprocessing and/ or uranium enrichment and/or heavy water production related activities, to discharge their responsibility by, among others, concluding the Additional Protocol.

Moreover, strengthening the non-proliferation regime is a matter which should also involve non Party States to the NPT. Given the imminent importance of enhancing non-proliferation, Japan wishes to call upon non Party States to conclude an Additional Protocol to their own safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Japan also emphasizes the importance of maximizing the efficiency of safeguards methods, given the limited safeguards resources and ever-growing verification needs. In this sense, implementation of Integrated Safeguards, which refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, should be widely promoted in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

(2) Export control

The International export control frameworks for nuclear related materials and technologies, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), have played an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT by the States Parties. The coordinated export control policy, in line with common guidelines of the NSG and the ZC as well as their outreach activities, are of great significance for the effective deterrence and prevention of proliferation from the supply side. In this respect, Japan urges that the roles of the NSG and the ZC be explicitly endorsed in the NPT review process towards the 2005 Review Conference as important mechanisms to help ensure strict compliance with the NPT.

These export control regimes have been subject to continuous improvements. Among others, Japan supports the idea of making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for civilian nuclear programs. Japan believes that the signing of the Additional Protocol is not sufficient and its ratification should be required as a condition. Japan also adheres to the principle stipulated in the NSG Guidelines of preventing the transfer of not only uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology,

but all nuclear related material, equipment and technology to states with nuclear proliferation concerns.

Japan, considering the significance of the export control regimes in connection with the NPT, has been actively participating in the activities of these regimes, by acting as the Point of Contact of the NSG, for instance. Japan calls for a redoubling of efforts of the international community towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the stringent implementation of export control on nuclear related items that may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, so as to complement nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is necessary for the international community as a whole to prevent proliferation of the means of delivery of nuclear materials. In this regard, Japan was deeply involved in and contributed to the drafting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Japan highly values the successful launch of the HCOC in November 2002 as an important step, and is making efforts to universalize the HCOC by promoting dialogue with non-participating states, in particular ASEAN countries.

(3) Measures against nuclear terrorism

Since September 11 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons and material. In order to prevent terrorism involving nuclear weapons or material, the international community must cooperate at regional and international levels, and exert individual and collective efforts in relation to exchanges of information, border control and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In this respect, Japan welcomes the current efforts to amend the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to extend its scope.

The IAEA also has an essential role to play in this area. Japan has already contributed half a million US dollars to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, and will finance, jointly with other like-minded countries, the project to upgrade the nuclear material accounting and control system in the ULBA Fuel Fabrication Facility in Kazakhstan. Since the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is becoming increasingly important, Japan supports the US proposal to improve global control of radioactive sources. Japan also supports the revised *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*, endorsed at the IAEA General Conference last year, and calls upon other countries to support and take necessary

measures to implement the Code. Furthermore, Japan encourages the IAEA to continue its efforts in line with the *Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources*.

Japan is certain that the Additional Protocol can play a meaningful role in preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists because it provides additional information to the IAEA on the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment. The conclusion of the Additional Protocols should therefore be promoted also from the viewpoint of anti-terrorism.

(4) Japan's efforts to promote cooperation for Non-Proliferation in Asia

Recognizing the growing risk of Asia becoming more and more an active region for transshipment and procurement activities of proliferators, Japan attaches great importance to the strengthening of non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia. Following the APEC leaders' commitment in October 2003 to "take all essential actions to eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by strengthening international non-proliferation regimes," Japan organized the first Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo November 2003 to hold policy dialogue on various non-proliferation matters with the participation of all the ASEAN countries, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. This ASTOP meeting deserves credit as being the first Director-General level meeting in Asia specifically dedicated to talks on non-proliferation. The participants all shared the view that the prevention of the proliferation of WMD, their delivery means, and related materials, equipment, and technologies is vitally important to international peace and security.

This shared view was fully reflected in the Japan-ASEAN Tokyo Declaration and the Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action issued at the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2003, in which the leaders agreed to "enhance cooperation in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and related materials." This was a great step forward towards further strengthening non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia.

After these commitments were made at the summit level for non-proliferation, relevant ministries and agencies of the Government of Japan, headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formed an inter-agency "Japan-ASEAN Non-Proliferation Cooperation Mission". This Mission visited all 10 ASEAN countries in February 2004.

The success of the Mission has enabled Japan and ASEAN countries to further understand each other's views and to recognize concrete areas in which cooperation is needed.

Based on the results of the Mission, Japan now plans to hold an "Asia Non-Proliferation Seminar focusing on Maritime Cooperation" in May 2004 for ASEAN countries in need of cooperation, notably in the field of maritime law enforcement in relation to non-proliferation. Japan continues to host the Asia Export Control Seminar, which has been held for the last 11 years, to cooperate with Asian countries in strengthening export controls. The 2nd ASTOP meeting is planned to be held sometime in fall 2004. All these efforts have provided, and will continue to provide, the countries in the region with opportunities to "think together," which Japan strongly believes is a very important approach in tackling non-proliferation issues.

4. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Under the NPT, all the States Parties enjoy the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with its Articles I and II.

Japan is fully committed to respecting this right as long as the purpose of such development is exclusively peaceful. At the same time, however, recent cases relating to compliance with NPT obligations have indicated that the international community should be vigilant against possible exploitation of this right under the cover of "peaceful" purposes.

Safeguards by the IAEA have been incorporated as an essential part in the NPT in order to prevent such exploitation. Therefore, it is vitally important for all the States Parties to fully comply with all obligations under the NPT, including those of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to accept safeguards, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In light of the importance of this issue, Japan is ready to actively participate in discussions on how to address the issue of the possible exploitation of the right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Japan, on its part as a State Party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right of

the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, Japan has fully complied with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol, and ensured transparency in its nuclear activities, including those relating to plutonium, in order to increase international confidence.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preventing global warming. Japan is pursuing the research and development of innovative nuclear systems that would be safer, more efficient, as well as more diversion and proliferation-resistant, and that would help to extend the scope of the use of nuclear energy to new areas such as hydrogen production.

Japan also places the highest priority on the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan believes that the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management are of great importance and urges those countries that have not yet concluded these Conventions to do so as soon as possible. Japan wishes to note that the First Review Meeting on the Joint Convention, which took place in November, 2003, in Vienna, contributed to enhancing the global safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. In this context, we expect the Third Review Meeting pursuant to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which is scheduled to take place in April, 2005, to also play a significant role in enhancing global nuclear safety. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA in strengthening the global "safety culture" taking into account the guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities. In this context, Japan has greatly contributed to the IAEA's efforts, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, in improving the nuclear safety in the Asian region.

International technical cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear technology is one of the three pillars of IAEA, and plays a key role in achieving the goal of the NPT. Therefore, Japan will continue to make positive contributions towards the promotion of technical cooperation in this area. Japan has been a major contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and, since 1959, has paid its share of TCF in spite of recent economic difficulties. Japan firmly believes that Member States and the IAEA Secretariat should make efforts to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Program is implemented effectively, building on the principle of shared responsibility by all IAEA Member States and with efficient management

by the IAEA secretariat. Japan also plays a leading role in regional cooperation in Asia in the Regional Co-operative Agreement known as RCA.

Japan acknowledges the remarkable role of the IAEA, not only in the area of power generation, but also in the field of medicine, agriculture, food, sanitary and water resources and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities in these fields, in the hope that such activities will help promote a better public understanding of the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology.

Given the international nature of nuclear activities, the transport of radioactive materials, which a number of countries have been conducting, is an essential element in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, ensuring the smooth transport of radioactive materials is an important issue for all countries that support the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Radioactive material transport has been conducted in line with the right of navigation established in international law, with the most prudent precautionary measures taken to ensure safety in conformity with the international standards and guidelines set by credible international organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IAEA. In addition, relevant information on radioactive transport has been, and will be, provided to the states concerned to the fullest possible extent on the basis of the due consideration of safety, security and the smooth implementation of such transport.

Maritime navigation rights and freedom, as provided for in international law and as reflected in relation to relevant international instruments, should be reaffirmed as legitimate rights to be exercised. Secondly, Japan wishes to point out that its current regulations provide a good basis for an effective regulatory process and a historically excellent safety record, and that such a record can best be maintained by continuing efforts to improve the regulatory and operational practices, and ensure full compliance with relevant standards and the strict implementation of guidelines. Japan fully associates itself with the International Action Plan for the transport of radioactive materials adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, based on the result of the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material that was held in Vienna in July 2003. Japan expects that issues relating to the transport of radioactive materials will be discussed and dealt with as appropriate in the relevant international organizations within their respective competence.

5. Universality and Compliance

(1) Universality

Japan welcomes the fact that, in May 2003, Timor-Leste deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT, thereby becoming the 189th Party. Japan believes that Timor-Leste's recent accession should lead to further strengthening of the NPT regime. The NPT has attained almost worldwide universality. In 1998, the NPT regime was challenged from the outside in the form of nuclear weapon test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan, but at the 2000 Review Conference, the States Parties made it clear that these two countries would not receive new nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever. Japan continues to urge these two countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to give their utmost consideration to the problem of nuclear proliferation. Lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT. Strenuous efforts should be maintained to urge early accession to the NPT by the remaining Non-Party States, namely India, Israel and Pakistan, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

(2) Compliance

(2) Compliance

(DPRK)

Japan is firmly convinced that the erosion of the credibility of the NPT and other related multilateral treaties is a cause for grave concern and is by no means in the interest of any State. From this viewpoint, Japan is deeply disturbed by the case of non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The DPRK has expressed or hinted, both formally and informally on a number of occasions, that it is developing nuclear weapons, or that it already possesses them. The nuclear programs pursued by the DPRK are a direct threat to Japan's national security. They also threaten peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and are a grave challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

From this viewpoint, Japan has made the following positions clear and long urged the DPRK to accept them.

- The development, acquisition or possession, test or transfer of nuclear weapons by the DPRK can in no way be tolerated.

- The DPRK must comply with all its obligations under the NPT and, consequently, with obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
- The DPRK must promptly dismantle all of its nuclear programs, including its covert uranium enrichment program, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Although the DPRK has, to date, shown little readiness to commit itself to those goals, Japan is determined to continue to do its utmost to peacefully resolve the DPRK nuclear issue through diplomatic means such as the Six-Party Talks. It is, however, the DPRK that must make a prompt decision and respond positively to the demands of the international community.

(Iran)

Japan welcomes Iran's recent positive moves including the signing of the Additional Protocol. Japan also welcomes Iran's recent active cooperation with the IAEA such as the agreement of an Action Plan, which includes Iran's provision to the IAEA of detailed information regarding aspects of its centrifuge program by the end of April as well as its declaration under the Additional Protocol by mid-May. At the same time, Japan is deeply concerned about Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear activities including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation activities. Japan also notes that there are still outstanding issues to be resolved and clarified.

Japan believes that it is essential for Iran to implement all the requests made by the IAEA Board in its resolutions of September and November, 2003 and March, 2004. Japan expects and trusts that Iran will, in order to dispel international concerns, respond to all outstanding requests contained in those resolutions, speedily move to the ratification of the Additional Protocol, provide explanations that are acceptable to the IAEA regarding any outstanding issues, and continue and intensify its forward-looking cooperation with the IAEA, in particular through the prompt provision of detailed information as requested by the IAEA.

(Libya)

Japan welcomes Libya's decision announced on 19 December 2003 to abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction programs, while expressing concern over Libya's past failures to meet the requirements of its Safeguards Agreement, which were identified by the IAEA Director General and, according to the IAEA Board, constituted

non-compliance, and concern that it acquired nuclear weapons design and fabrication documents. Japan also welcomes Libya's signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol on March 10 and its decision to implement the Additional Protocol before ratification, and calls upon Libya to promptly ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol. Japan strongly hopes that the DPRK and those states that are subject to suspicion for developing WMDs will follow Libya's example.

6. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones and negative security assurance

(1) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security.

Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Japan hopes that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between the five nuclear-weapon States and the five countries of Central Asia, and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this view, Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the U.N. in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

Japan believes that progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East will further strengthen the credibility of the NPT.

(2) Negative security assurances

It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the idea that a programme of work, containing the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on negative security assurances, will be agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament.

7. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole.

Japan welcomes the Report of the Secretary-General entitled "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education", which was prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. The Report stresses the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations and contains practical recommendations on the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Japan has been making various efforts to contribute to the implementation of these recommendations, such as inviting disarmament educators from overseas. During the UN Disarmament Conference held in Osaka last August, Japan co-sponsored with the UN a "Citizens' Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education".

In this regard, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited about 480 United Nations disarmament fellows to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in regions concerned. Every year, Japan supports the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a local city, thereby providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts, not only from the Asia and Pacific region, but also from around the world, to engage in useful discussions. Japan welcomes that the UN Disarmament Conference hosted by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs will be held in Sapporo in July this year.

Japan attaches importance to the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In view of the importance of dialogue with non-governmental organizations, which play a significant role in civil society, Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organization session is being held during this session of the Preparatory Committee.