1. Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970.

2. The NPT regime, however, has been facing many difficult challenges, all the more so since the 2005 NPT Review Conference. It was extremely disappointing that the 2005 Review Conference was unable to reach substantive agreement. It was also regrettable that all reference to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was deleted from the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit. In 2006, we experienced a series of issues of deep concern: the proclaimed nuclear test by the DPRK on 9 October; continued and expanded uranium enrichment-related activities by Iran; and the threat of nuclear terrorism, underground proliferation networks and other new threats still requiring further attention.

3. On the other hand, there are some positive elements. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, not a single country denied the significance of the NPT. This indicates that the NPT continues to be a cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan’s resolution on nuclear disarmament, “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, which stresses the important role of the NPT, was adopted again with an overwhelming majority in the 2006 UNGA. The UNSC resolutions 1718 regarding the DPRK as well as 1737 and 1747 regarding Iran express the international community’s strong will in support of the NPT regime. Japan hopes these efforts will lead the international community towards success in the next NPT review process.

4. In order to make tangible contributions to the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference, Japan has put forward Ambassador Yukiya Amano for the chairman of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, whose chairmanship Japan believes will contribute to a successful outcome at the session.

5. In addition, Japan hosted a Seminar on the NPT, entitled “The NPT on trial: How should we respond to the challenges of maintaining and strengthening the treaty regime?”
which was held from 5 to 6 February 2007 in Vienna in order to provide a timely opportunity to pave the way to a successful outcome for the 2010 NPT Review Process.

6. Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings, continues to adhere to its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.” Successive cabinets of Japan, including the present Abe Cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” and there is no change in the position of the Government of Japan that it continues to uphold these principles.

7. Japan, since its accession to the NPT, has concluded a comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement and the additional protocol in an effort to ensure transparency in its nuclear related activities. Furthermore, in 1955, Japan promulgated “the Atomic Energy Basic Law”, which stipulates that the utilization of Japan’s atomic energy be strictly limited to peaceful purposes.

2. Nuclear disarmament

8. The NPT seeks both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The decision by an overwhelming majority of countries to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons is one of the most valuable achievements for international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States should take this achievement seriously. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package of “Principles and Objectives” that includes the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States are urged to respond to such resolute determination on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

9. The international community should realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. It is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States strengthen and continue to take disarmament measures. In this regard, Japan calls for all the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons with greater transparency and in an irreversible manner, as well as to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security. Japan also reaffirms, on this occasion, the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. As the only nation to suffer atomic bombings, Japan has strongly urged that nuclear devastation never be repeated. Japan is convinced that every effort should be expended to avoid its
reoccurrence. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be kept as high as possible. In this vein, Japan believes that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

10. It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to faithfully make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, in the process of working towards their elimination. In 2005, on the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan renewed its resolution on nuclear disarmament as “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” and has submitted it to each session of the UN General Assembly since then. These resolutions identify concrete steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the 2000 Review Conference outcome, and appeal to the international community for the necessity of progress in nuclear disarmament.

(a) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

11. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in that it restricts the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT is one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Efforts for universalizing the Treaty have resulted in the signature of 177 and ratification of 138 states in ten years since its adoption in 1996. However, the fact that the CTBT has not yet come into force, has a negative influence on the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and possibly undermines the credibility of the NPT.

12. Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT as extremely important and urgent, and has intensively worked to this end. Japan has been actively calling on all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT, in particular those States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so at the earliest opportunity both bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora. At the 61st UN General Assembly in 2006, the aforementioned UN resolution sponsored by Japan, which underlines the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT, was once again adopted with an overwhelming support.

13. Japan, together with Australia, Canada, Finland and Netherlands, co-hosted the CTBT Friends Ministerial Meeting in September 2006. The Joint Ministerial Statement issued at this meeting underlined that the progress on the early entry into force of the
CTBT would also contribute to a positive outcome of the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT.

14. In response to the Final Declaration of the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2005, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those ten States whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date. As an effort to promote the early ratification by the so-called Annex II States, in February 2007, Japan invited from Colombia, which has not yet ratified the CTBT, a delegation headed by the chairperson of the Colombian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to visit International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities and to exchange views with relevant parties in Japan.

15. Continuously making efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime undertaken by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission is also important, including the IMS. The nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK in October 2006 demonstrated the effectiveness of the IMS. As a part of the establishment of the IMS, the construction of domestic monitoring facilities has progressed steadily under the supervision of the CTBT National Operation System of Japan. Japan also contributed to the adoption of principles and operating rules for the provision of data to tsunami warning organization by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in November 2006.

16. Japan condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006. Japan firmly believes that pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries have to maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion. Also, it must be recalled that in paragraph 3 of UNSC resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council called on all countries to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT. Japan once again strongly urges all States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions.

(b) Fissile material cut-off treaty

17. It is truly regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not yet commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. Pending the entry into force of the FMCT, all nuclear-weapon States and the non-States Parties to the NPT should maintain or declare their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons. The FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The conclusion of an FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and will contribute to the prevention of nuclear
proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such material through its verification system.

18. As a concrete contribution to the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, Japan presented a working paper on an FMCT to the CD in May 2006, aiming at deepening discussions on the substantive issues and facilitating the early commencement of its negotiations.

19. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT. Japan has redoubled its endeavors for this purpose through the dispatch of high-level representatives to the CD at various opportunities. During the 2006 session, both then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Akiko Yamanaka and the Speaker of the House of Representatives Yohei Kono delivered speeches stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. On 13 March 2007, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Hamada also made a statement at the CD, urging the CD members to commence negotiations on an FMCT in the second part of the current session building upon the positive results of its first part. In this context, Japan supports the proposal tabled by the Six Presidents on 23 March concerning the appointment of the four coordinators. Japan considers this proposal to be a realistic and carefully drafted compromise that could lead the CD to recommence substantive work including FMCT negotiations.

(c) Reduction of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States

20. Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, including reductions of nuclear forces in accordance with the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty).

21. Japan highly values the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ratified by the United States and the Russian Federation as guaranteeing, in a legally binding form, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons that the U.S. and the Russian Federation had already respectively declared. Japan encourages both States to implement fully this Treaty and to undertake nuclear weapons reductions beyond those provided for by the Treaty. In this context, Japan will follow closely the consultations between the U.S. and Russia on START I, which expires in 2009. Japan encourages the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake, unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions by the U.S. and the Russian Federation. In this regard, Japan acknowledges the UK’s decision on further reductions to its nuclear weapons, and encourages the nuclear-weapon State(s), which
has(have) so far not taken such measures to immediately start to reduce its(their) nuclear arsenals.

(d) Non-strategic nuclear weapons
22. It is imperative for all States that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to undertake measures to reduce them, while maintaining transparency, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is critically important for regional and international security, as well as for non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Japan encourages the U.S. and the Russian Federation to implement their initiatives on the reduction of their non-strategic nuclear forces completely and on a voluntary basis, as declared in 1991 and 1992, and to provide data on the status of implementation of these initiatives.

(e) Assistance for denuclearization in the Former Soviet Union States
23. In June 2002, Japan announced its intention to make a contribution amounting to over 200 million US dollars for the G8 Global Partnership, 100 million of which would be allocated to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium, and the rest to other projects such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines.

Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement
24. Japan has already extended assistance to the Russian Federation by providing a floating facility for processing liquid radioactive waste. In December 2003 Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first project for dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines (Victor III class), which was completed in December 2004. Currently, another five decommissioned nuclear submarines are to be dismantled consecutively (one of them is already in the process of being dismantled). Related to the nuclear submarine disarmament, Japan decided, in 2006, to cooperate for the construction of an On-shore Storage Facility for Reactor Compartment at Razvoynik Bay.

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
25. Japan signed the “Agreement for the Establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)” in 1992, and has been actively supporting the project ever since the inauguration of the ISTC head office in Moscow in March 1994.

Assistance for denuclearization in the Former Soviet Union States other than the Russian Federation
26. For the Former Soviet Union States other than the Russian Federation, Japan has implemented a number of projects, such as assistance for establishing a State System for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, as well as
medical assistance to workers involved in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

(f) Reporting
27. The submission of regular reports by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI of the NPT is one of the thirteen practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and an effective means to facilitate the implementation of specific disarmament measures. Japan encourages all States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to submit reports as detailed as possible on their efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

(g) Agreement between the U.S. and India on civil nuclear cooperation
28. Japan recognizes India’s strategic importance, and taking into consideration global warming, understands its need to meet increasing energy demands by utilizing nuclear energy. On the other hand, concerning international civil nuclear cooperation with India, which is not a Party to the NPT, Japan needs to consider carefully its position, while examining the various factors including its implications on the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Based upon these viewpoints, the Government of Japan will continue to participate proactively in the discussions on this subject in the international fora.

3. Non-proliferation
(a) Strengthening of the commitment to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards
29. The IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan attaches great importance to strengthening the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards by maximizing the IAEA’s authority and capability.

30. The Additional Protocol, when fully implemented in addition to States’ comprehensive safeguards agreements, can provide the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The IAEA General Conference resolution, adopted on 22 September 2006 (GC(50)/RES/14), refers to additional protocols as among the essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system. Japan believes that IAEA safeguards, reinforced by universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, should constitute the NPT safeguards standard as required by paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT.

31. Japan calls on all States Parties to the NPT that have not yet done so to conclude additional protocols without further delay. Japan, on its part, has been actively taking initiatives, in cooperation with the IAEA and like-minded countries, to universalize the
Additional Protocol. Japan’s committed efforts toward this end include contributing financial and human resources to a series of IAEA seminars, and annually hosting the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) since 2003.

32. These efforts, together with those by other States and the IAEA Secretariat, have resulted in a shared awareness about the importance of the Additional Protocol and the steady increase in the number of States that have signed and/or concluded an additional protocol in recent years. Utilizing its seven years of experience in implementing its additional protocol, Japan is ready to assist the efforts by those countries that are determined to achieve maximum transparency with respect to their nuclear activities.

33. Moreover, strengthening the non-proliferation regime is a matter that should also involve non-States Parties to the NPT. Given the urgent need of enhancing non-proliferation, Japan calls upon non-States Parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and conclude additional protocols.

**Improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards**

34. Japan welcomes the application of integrated safeguards to those States Parties that have achieved a good track record on safeguards implementation based on both the comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Japan hopes that the application of integrated safeguards will start in as many States as possible, leading to a significant reduction in the costs and burden for both the IAEA and the States concerned.

35. Japan encourages the IAEA Secretariat to continue to study the extent to which the implementation of integrated safeguards in a State could lead to a corresponding reduction in the current level of verification efforts in that State, as well as reduction in the cost associated with such efforts.

36. Japan reminds all States Parties that the benefits gained through the application of integrated safeguards for a State include not only a reduction in safeguards related costs, but also the clearest confirmation of the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

**(b) Export controls**

37. The role of export controls, as required by paragraph 2 of the Article III of the NPT, is crucial to achieving nuclear non-proliferation. The revelations of Dr. Khan’s underground network have reinforced the importance of export controls as key to this goal.
38. In this regard, the multinational export control regimes for nuclear related materials, equipment and technology, i.e., the Zangger Committee (ZC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), have played an important role in ensuring the implementation of the obligations concerning export controls under the Treaty. Japan urges those States Parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate effective national rules and regulations on export controls over both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, based on the Zangger Committee Understandings (INFCIRC/209/Rev.2) and the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2). In connection with this, Japan notes that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004, requires all States to establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate, effective national export controls.

39. As called upon by previous NPT Review Conferences, the ZC and the NSG have been actively engaged in outreach activities to help the States Parties better understand the activities of the ZC and the NSG, and to also help them establish their domestic export control laws and regulations. Japan believes that these multinational export control regimes can play an even more crucial role in assisting the States Parties to establish and implement appropriate, effective national laws and regulations with regard to export controls, as required by the UNSCR 1540.

40. As a leading country in the area of export controls, Japan has been promoting increased awareness about the importance of an efficient and effective export control in Asia and to strengthening existing export control systems in the region, by dispatching experts, providing grant aid, and holding seminars. In 2007, Japan successfully held the 14th Asian Export Control Seminar with the participation of 25 countries and regions, the largest number in its 14 years of history.

Special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology

41. In particular, Japan recognizes the necessity of introducing additional measures to place special controls on the transfer of sensitive material, facilities, equipment and technology that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons, such as those related to enrichment and reprocessing, and urges all States Parties to exercise restraint in and vigilance over such transfers. In this regard, Japan joins with the NSG Participating Governments in the ongoing, dedicated efforts to update the NSG Guidelines by the NSG Participating Governments. Japan hopes that the Guidelines will be adequately modified in a timely manner to achieve a consensus on the concrete criteria with regard to the special control of such transfers.
IAEA Additional Protocol as a precondition of supply

42. With regard to the required safeguards in paragraph 2 of Article III of the Treaty, Japan urges the States Parties to reaffirm paragraph 12 of Decision 2 (Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, in which States Parties agreed that new nuclear supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the IAEA’s full-scope safeguards. Japan further urges the States Parties to agree that new nuclear supply arrangements of all the items in the Trigger List of the ZC Understandings and of the NSG Part 1 Guidelines to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, the conclusion of additional protocols. In this connection, Japan welcomes the continuing, devoted efforts to update the ZC Understandings and the NSG Guidelines by participating governments of the respective multinational export control regimes.

Means of delivery of nuclear weapons

43. Recalling that the preamble of the Treaty refers to the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be addressed in conjunction with the issue of the proliferation of their means of delivery.

44. In this regard, the multinational export control regime for the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and related materials, equipment and technology, i.e., the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), has played a significant role in confining the risk of proliferation of such means of delivery. Japan continues to maintain stringent export controls as a member of the MTCR to prevent the proliferation of the means of delivery of WMD, and related materials, equipment and technologies.

45. Furthermore, Japan was deeply involved in and contributed to the drafting of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Japan highly values the successful launch of HCOC in November 2002 and the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on HCOC, which the overwhelming majority supported in 2004 and 2005. In November 2005, Japan invited international observers from HCOC Subscribing Countries to a space center in Japan as part of its efforts to promote confidence-building measures. Furthermore, Japan has been making efforts to universalize HCOC by promoting dialogue with non-participating states, in particular ASEAN countries.

UNSCR 1540

46. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is significant as it provides the
international community with a basis for responding to the growing threats posed by non-State actors that may acquire, develop, traffic in or use Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Japan has taken a lead in ensuring the effective implementation of the resolution in the international community through various efforts including contribution to the work of the 1540 committee, participation in various regional seminars and workshops on 1540, and provision of capacity building assistance related to the implementation of this resolution.

(c) Measures against nuclear terrorism
47. Since 11 September 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons and material. In order to prevent terrorism involving nuclear weapons or materials, the international community must cooperate at regional and international levels, and exert individual and collective efforts in relation to the exchange of information, border control and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In this respect, Japan considers it critical for all States to become Parties, as soon as practicable, to the two universal instruments to combat nuclear terrorism; namely, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Japan, on its part, has submitted the former convention to the current session of the Diet for approval.

48. The IAEA has an essential role to play in this field. It has significant nuclear security programs financed through its Nuclear Security Fund, which is supported by the voluntary contributions of Member States. It also serves as the focal point for coordinating various international efforts to enhance nuclear security worldwide. Japan has therefore contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund, including this year’s contribution of around 150 thousand dollars, to support regional seminars and assisting States such as Kazakhstan to upgrade their nuclear security capabilities, in addition to its bilateral cooperative efforts in this field. Since the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is becoming increasingly important, Japan supports the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, endorsed at the IAEA General Conference in September 2003, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved at the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004. Japan calls upon the countries that have yet to do so to support and take necessary measures to implement these measures.

49. Japan welcomes the launch of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism proposed jointly by President Bush of the United States of America and President Putin of the Russian Federation at the 2006 G8 summit meeting. Japan regards this initiative as a significant vehicle for the enhancement of nuclear security world wide and will continue to
participate positively in activities to be undertaken through this initiative.

50. Japan is certain that the Additional Protocol can play a meaningful role in preventing sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists since it enables the IAEA to receive extra information on the export and import of nuclear source material, non-nuclear material and equipment, which are not covered by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The conclusion of additional protocols therefore should also be promoted from the viewpoint of anti-terrorism.

4. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

51. Under the NPT, all the States Parties enjoy the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with its Articles I, II and III.

52. Japan is fully committed to respecting this right as long as the purpose of such development is exclusively peaceful.

53. Japan, as a State Party to the NPT, has been undertaking nuclear activities for peaceful purposes with the confidence of the international community. Japan has been fully complying with its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, and ensuring high transparency in its nuclear activities, including those relating to plutonium, in order to increase international confidence.

54. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to secure a stable energy supply, but also to prevent global warming. Japan is pursuing the research and development of innovative nuclear systems that would be safer, more efficient, as well as more diversion and proliferation-resistant, and that would help to extend the scope of the use of nuclear energy to new areas such as hydrogen production.

55. Japan also places the highest priority on the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan believes that the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management are of great importance and urges those countries that have yet to do so to conclude these Conventions as soon as possible. Japan wishes to note that the First Review Meeting on the Joint Convention, which took place in November 2003 in Vienna, contributed to enhancing the global safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. In this context, the Third Review Meeting pursuant to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April 2005, also played a significant role in enhancing global nuclear safety. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA in strengthening the
global “safety culture” taking into account the guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the IAEA’s activities. In this context, Japan has greatly contributed to the IAEA’s efforts, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, to improve the nuclear safety in the Asian region.

56. International technical cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear technology is one of the three pillars of the IAEA, and plays a key role in achieving the goals of the NPT. Therefore, Japan will continue to make positive contributions towards the promotion of technical cooperation in this area. Japan has been a major contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, and since 1959 has paid its share of TCF in full. Japan urges the IAEA Member States on the basis of shared responsibility to pay in full and on time their respective share of the TCF targets. Japan firmly believes that the IAEA Member States and Secretariat should make efforts to ensure that the Technical Cooperation Program is implemented effectively, with efficient management by the IAEA Secretariat. Japan will continue to take active part in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through various schemes, including the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific (RCA) as well as the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA). As Japan believes that the peaceful use of nuclear technology should contribute to the enhancement of the welfare and wellbeing of humankind, Japan gives high priority to technical cooperation in the areas of growing demand, such as human health. In RCA, Japan takes a leading role in cancer treatment by using radiation medicine techniques. Japan has also contributed approximately US$350,000 to an IAEA-led cancer initiative, the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy or PACT, thereby improving cancer care capacity in developing countries.

57. Japan acknowledges the significant role of the IAEA, not only in the area of power generation, but also in the field of human health, agriculture, food, sanitary and water resources. Japan will continue to contribute to the IAEA’s activities in these fields, in the hope that such activities will help promote a better public understanding of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

58. Given the international nature of nuclear activities, including in power generation and human health, the transport of radioactive materials, which a number of countries have been conducting, is an essential element of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore, ensuring the smooth transport of radioactive materials is an important issue for all countries that support the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Transport of radioactive materials has been conducted based on the right of navigation established in international law, with the most prudent precautionary measures taken to ensure safety in conformity with the international standards and guidelines set by credible international organizations,
such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IAEA. In addition, relevant information on radioactive transport has been, and will be provided on a voluntary basis to the states concerned to the fullest possible extent on the basis of the due consideration of safety, security and the smooth implementation of such transport.

59. Maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms should be reaffirmed, as provided for in international law and as reflected in the relevant international instruments. Japan wishes to point out that its current regulations provide a good basis for an effective regulatory process and a historically excellent safety record, and that such a record can best be maintained by continuing efforts to improve the regulatory and operational practices, and to ensure full compliance with relevant standards and the strict implementation of guidelines, including the IAEA’s regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. Japan received from the Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission to Japan in December 2005, a valid evaluation that the Transport Regulations are being implemented in accordance with IAEA requirements. Japan fully associates itself with the International Action Plan for the transport of radioactive materials adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, which is based on the results of the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material held in Vienna in July 2003.

(2) Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance

60. In recent years, the role of nuclear energy has been re-evaluated in light of increasing energy demand and global warming. On the other hand, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime needs urgent strengthening as demonstrated by the nuclear issues of the DPRK and Iran.

61. In light of these developments, various proposals have been made to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These include the MNA (Multilateral Nuclear Approaches) proposed by the IAEA Director General; the Russian initiative on international centers to provide nuclear fuel cycle services; the six-nation initiative proposed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel); and the GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership).

62. The purposes of these initiatives are: (1) to establish a backup mechanism that would solve nuclear fuel supply problems which could occur in the future, (2) to establish a mechanism such as the international framework for management of nuclear
fuel cycle related facilities and the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, (3) to develop proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

63. At the September 2006 IAEA General Conference Special Event, Japan proposed an “IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply” with a view to complementing the aforementioned six-nation initiative on reliable access to nuclear fuel.

64. This Standby Arrangements System covers not only uranium enrichment but all phases of the whole front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium ore supply, conversion and fuel fabrication, uranium stock and reserves, so that many countries will be able to participate under certain conditions and to make contributions. It will also help prevent and respond to market failure.

65. The IAEA is expected to examine several key points for the future discussions. Japan, as a leading country in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapons State and as a model country that promotes both nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, will continue to take part in and contribute to international discussions at the IAEA and other fora in a constructive manner.

66. Japan welcome the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership(GNEP) as an initiative leading to the expansion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes worldwide in a safe and secure manner, while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. Japanese entities have made a concrete proposal in relation to the design of the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center and the Advanced Burner Reactor to be built up under the GNEP. Japan will continue to contribute to the realization and success of this initiative.

5. Universality and Compliance
(1) Universality
67. Japan welcomes Montenegro’s access to the NPT in June 2006. The NPT has attained almost worldwide universality. Japan continues to urge all States not yet party to the Treaty-namely India, Israel and Pakistan-to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States promptly and without conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States, the Non-States Parties should be also urged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty as well as to take practical steps in its support.
(2) Compliance

68. The NPT has served as a cornerstone of the international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970. States Parties must fulfill all their obligations under the Treaty to the fullest extent.

69. We are witnessing extremely regrettable challenges to the non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT lies at the heart: states parties, namely the DPRK and Iran, which have been determined by respective IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and UNSC resolutions as non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements are still far from returning to compliance. Instead, the DPRK conducted missile launches and proclaimed nuclear test, and Iran continues its nuclear activities without international community’s confidence.

70. Although the NPT does not contain in itself a rectification mechanism, these above challenges to the NPT have led to an unprecedented unified response at the UN Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as demonstrated by the adoption of UNSCRs 1695, 1696, 1718, 1737 and 1747.

71. Japan welcomes such demonstrations of the united will of the international community, as it clearly contributes to the further strengthening the effectiveness of the NPT regime. It is therefore essential for each Member State of the United Nations to translate the will of the international community expressed in the relevant UNSCRs into concrete implementation. Japan has been steadily implementing these resolutions, and calls on all the States to do so without delay.

72. In this context, Japan welcomes the modifications of the NSG Guidelines agreed at the 2005 NSG Plenary regarding the transfer of the items in the Trigger List in cases of violations against nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations.

DPRK

73. Japan expresses gravest concern over the DPRK’s nuclear programs. The DPRK’s announcement of a nuclear test on 9 October 2006, combined with its buildup of ballistic missiles that may be capable of delivering WMD, makes the DPRK’s nuclear programs a significant threat to the peace and security not only of Japan but also in East Asia and the entire international community. Japan also deplores the DPRK’s decision in 2003 to withdraw from the NPT, which continues to represent a serious challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. The development, acquisition, possession, test or transfer of nuclear weapons by the DPRK can in no way be tolerated.
74. Pursuant to UNSCR 1718, Japan urges the DPRK to promptly come into compliance with the NPT, abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to States Parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA. Japan also urges the DPRK to abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with UNSCR 1718.

75. Japan stresses that the Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized, while the peace, security and stability of the region should be strengthened and the legitimate interests and concerns of the relevant parties should be satisfied. Furthermore, Japan wishes to underline that UNSCR 1718 has created a wide range of new obligations and requirements on UN Member States to take necessary measures to prevent the DPRK’s future proliferation activities. Japan encourages the international community to fully implement the resolution in order to urge the DPRK to take concrete steps toward denuclearization.

76. Japan emphasizes the importance of peaceful resolution of this issue through diplomatic means within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks remain the most appropriate framework and should be fully utilized. It is of paramount importance that the DPRK expeditiously and completely implement the actions agreed to by all the Parties at the Six-Party Talks in February 2007, as the first step towards abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as stated in the Joint Statement of September 2005.

Iran
77. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran’s many past failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement constituted non-compliance with the IAEA Statute. Japan regrets that Iran has yet to respond appropriately to a number of requirements set by the relevant IAEA Board resolutions and UN Security Council Resolutions 1696 and 1737, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and projects related to heavy water. In particular, it is a matter of deep concern that Iran is expanding its enrichment-related activities by accelerating its work at its Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz in defiance of the calls from the international community. Iran’s reaction does
not contribute to restoring the confidence of the international community, nor does it help the IAEA make progress in its investigation.

78. Given this situation, the UN Security Council, on 24 March 2007, unanimously adopted Resolution 1747. Japan sincerely hopes that Iran meets all the requirements set forth by relevant IAEA Board resolutions and UN Security Council resolutions. Japan considers that this issue should be resolved peacefully through negotiations and strongly urges Iran to implement the relevant resolutions and come back to the negotiation process without further delay.

6. Withdrawal from the NPT

79. Japan takes the issue of withdrawal from the NPT extremely seriously. It should not be tolerated that a State withdraws from the Treaty after having developed a nuclear weapons capability under false pretenses. Withdrawal of any State from the Treaty would significantly undermine the universality of the NPT and the confidence of the States Parties in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.

80. Japan believes that the best way to deal with this issue is to deter withdrawal by making it more costly. For that purpose, Japan believes that the States Parties should reaffirm that a State which has withdrawn from the NPT remains responsible for violations it committed while a Party to the Treaty.

81. Moreover, a State withdrawing from the Treaty should not be allowed to militarily use the nuclear capabilities it acquired under the pretext of peaceful use of nuclear energy while a Party to the Treaty, by virtue of the Article IV of the Treaty. In this regards, Japan also believes that the State Parties should urge any supplier country of the nuclear material, facilities, equipment, etc., to make necessary arrangements to retrieve from the withdrawing Party any nuclear material, facilities, equipment, etc. transferred prior to the withdrawal or to achieve their neutralization.

82. At the Subsidiary Body of Main Committee III of the 2005 Review Conference, the States Parties addressed the issue of withdrawal and achieved a convergence of views. Building upon the results of the useful discussions at the 2005 Review Conference, the States Parties should deepen the discussions at this review process in order to reach an agreement on concrete measures conducive to deterring withdrawal from the Treaty in the 2010 Review Conference.

7. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones and negative security assurance
(a) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

83. Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. In this regard, the lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious concern. Japan supported, and continues to fully support, the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - and their delivery systems. Japan believes that progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East will further strengthen the credibility of the NPT.

84. Japan is firmly committed to supporting the Middle East peace process, a key to achieving regional stability. Such stability is a vital factor to establishing the conditions for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Japan will continue to make its efforts towards the realization of peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity between the two nations, Israel and Palestine through promoting political dialogues and confidence building as well as providing assistance to the Palestinians.

85. Japan believes that the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed on 8 September 2006 is the manifestation of the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to strengthen peace and security in the region. Japan will pay close attention to future consultations among States directly concerned.

(b) Negative security assurances

86. It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for the NPT non-nuclear weapon States, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of the nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the engagement of the Conference on Disarmament in the substantive discussions dealing with appropriate international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Japan believes that, as for the negative security assurances, ensuring the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapon free zones, including working towards their entry into force is a practical and realistic step.

8. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

87. In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole.
88. Japan attaches great importance to the Report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”, which was prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education. The Report stresses the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations and contains practical recommendations on the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Japan has been making various efforts to contribute to the implementation of these recommendations, such as inviting disarmament educators from overseas. During the UN Disarmament Conference held in Osaka in August 2003 and in Sapporo in July 2004, Japan co-sponsored with the UN the “Citizens’ Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education.”

89. In this regard, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited more than 620 participants from the United Nations disarmament fellowship program to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

90. A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in regions concerned. Every year, Japan supports the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a local Japanese city, thereby providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts, not only from the Asia Pacific region but also from around the world, to engage in useful discussions.

91. Japan attaches importance to the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In view of the importance of dialogue with non-governmental organizations, Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organization session is being held during this Preparatory Committee.