

**Preparatory Committee for the 2010
Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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CLUSTER 1: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working Paper submitted by Japan

I. Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970. The decision in 1995 by the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely is one of the most valuable achievements for international peace and security. At the same time, it should be recalled that the promotion of nuclear disarmament is an integral part of the "Principles and Objectives", which was adopted by consensus in 1995. It is necessary for the NPT States Parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to make progress in implementing to their fullest extent the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference, in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

II. Recent developments in the area of nuclear disarmament

2. Despite the many challenges the NPT faces, there have been several notable developments with respect to new nuclear disarmament initiatives. Recently, there have been important and

concrete decisions and initiatives by nuclear-weapons States. The nuclear disarmament efforts of the United States and the Russian Federation, including the broad nuclear stockpile reductions by the United States, are continuing. They are also continuing to develop a legally binding arrangement to succeed START I, as agreed to in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration on 6 April this year. The United Kingdom in collaboration with Norway is developing verification technologies for nuclear disarmament. France announced an action plan for the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference in addition to a significant cut in its nuclear arsenal. NPT States Parties should take advantage of these developments to promote constructive discussions on nuclear disarmament at the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

III. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps

3. With a view to contributing to such discussions, firstly Japan would like to emphasize the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the maintenance of existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending its entry into force. Japan also emphasizes the importance of immediately commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its early conclusion. Furthermore, pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

4. Japan would like to present the following practical nuclear disarmament measures to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States:

(A) To further reduce their nuclear weapons with transparency.

(a) Further reduction of nuclear weapons with transparency will serve to promote nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament. One of the agreed 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference consists of several sub-steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States. Included among these sub-steps is, “increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.”

- (b) Despite differences in the interpretation of “nuclear weapons capabilities” as well as in the depth and level of detail, nuclear-weapon States have exercised transparency in their statements and reports on the implementation of Article VI. Nuclear disarmament will further strengthen the trust among NPT States Parties if it is accompanied by transparency measures. Examples of information to be disclosed for increased transparency, although not exhaustive, could include:
- (i) extent of reduction in nuclear stockpiles,
 - (ii) number of reduced nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
 - (iii) number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as the pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
 - (iv) aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed,
 - (v) extent of reduction in nuclear weapons complex, including reduction in the square footage and the number of personnel,
 - (vi) years in which the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was ceased,
 - (vii) amount of fissile material declared excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition,
 - (viii) activities to assist in the removal of fissile material from dismantled weapons,
 - (ix) efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine,
 - (x) plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures.
- (c) During the 2010 NPT review process, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to provide transparency on the above-mentioned items.
- (B) To reaffirm the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility for nuclear disarmament as agreed to as one of the practical steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear disarmament with the application of irreversibility will pave the way

towards a world free from nuclear weapons. Exemplary measures on irreversibility that nuclear-weapon States have taken so far are the following:

- (i) dismantling nuclear warheads and delivery systems,
 - (ii) dismantling nuclear testing sites,
 - (iii) shutting down and dismantling its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes,
 - (iv) disposing fissile material declared as excess to national security requirements,
 - (v) confirming that fissile material voluntarily declared as excess as a result of nuclear disarmament have not been reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes.
- (C) To apply verifiability to nuclear disarmament.
- (D) To further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.
- (E) To diminish the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination, in a way that promotes international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- (F) To keep the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons as high as possible.

IV. Conclusion

5. Japan hopes that this working paper on nuclear disarmament will facilitate constructive discussions in the 2010 NPT Review process, leading to an agreement on nuclear disarmament measures to be incorporated into the Final Document or any agreed document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
