STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. MARI AMANO

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

FOR THE 2015 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY

ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- CLUSTER I -

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are both indispensable wheels of a vehicle driving towards a world without nuclear weapons. The association between the two should not be based on a negative linkage, in which one cannot be advanced without the other’s progress, but the two must move forward together in a well balanced manner.

In our opinion, it is the NPT regime that offers the right stage for this association to take place. In order to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime, a mutual confidence between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states is essential. In this regard, it is regrettable that nuclear disarmament has not yet shown as much progress as hoped by non-nuclear-weapon states. Japan calls upon all the nuclear-weapon states to further increase their concrete disarmament efforts in good faith as required by Article 6 of the NPT.

One of the keys to build the mutual confidence is for the nuclear-weapon states to demonstrate the transparency of information related to their nuclear arsenals. The 2010 NPT Review Conference identifies transparency as an important part of the nuclear disarmament process and calls upon all nuclear-weapon states to report their nuclear disarmament undertakings by the 2014 Preparatory Committee. In this respect, I would like to take this opportunity to remind all states that the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDl) developed a draft reporting form to facilitate discussions between the nuclear-weapon states on transparency, which was promoted by Action 21 in the 2010 NPT Action Plan and was submitted at the last PrepCom. We expect that the NPDl’s input contributes to an agreement by the nuclear-weapon states on a standard reporting form, as well as appropriate reporting intervals.

Needless to say, when implementing nuclear disarmament measures, not only the transparency, but also the principles of irreversibility and verifiability as mentioned in Action 2 are crucial.

Mr. Chairman,
The 2010 Action Plan calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to honor their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to make further efforts to reduce all types of nuclear weapons. Japan values the steady implementation of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States. At the same time, we encourage them to begin a discussion to further reduce weapons including those other than their deployed strategic nuclear warheads. These efforts by the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals will provide a thrust for all states possessing nuclear weapons to begin multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts. We strongly hope that a multilateral process will start with concrete disarmament progress at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, we appeal to all states holding nuclear weapons to make an early commitment to reducing, or at least not increasing, their nuclear holding pending the realization of multilateral and global nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, global efforts on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons will be conducive not only to the implementation of the Action Plan, but also to improve regional security environments and strengthen nuclear security. The 2008 joint proposal by the United States and the Russian Federation to discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to the INF Treaty is worth exploring.

In parallel with quantitative reduction, I also would like to put emphasis on the importance of the qualitative reduction of nuclear weapons. The 2010 Action Plan states the necessity of diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons. We strongly believe that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences caused by the use of nuclear weapons must never be repeated. It is imperative that the 68 years of nuclear weapon non-use be extended to a permanent basis. To strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the role of nuclear weapons should be limited to the absolute minimum not only in security and military, but also in political aspects.

Mr. Chairman,

Japan believes that the closest way to achieve total elimination of nuclear weapons is to advance nuclear disarmament in a steady manner. In this regard,
quality capping by comprehensively banning nuclear testing and quantity capping by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are the two indispensable steps.

Japan is convinced that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) is the next logical step towards this goal. Action 15 urges the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to immediately begin negotiations on such a treaty. It is thus regrettable that, despite the support and the common recognition by the international community, there are not any emerging prospects in the CD. We support a group of government experts (GGE) on an FMCT which will commence its work next year. Also, we expect states that participate in the GGE will have broad knowledge and experience in the area of nuclear activities. This will result in making meaningful contributions to the commencement of future negotiations. In the meantime, Japan urges all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes pending the entry into force of an FMCT.

Along with an FMCT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also needs to be brought into force as soon as possible. The recent announcement of conducting nuclear testing by DPRK, which Japan condemns with its strongest terms, reminded us the urgency of finalizing this step. Japan has seized every opportunity to urge all non-states parties, particularly the remaining eight Annex II states, to promptly sign and ratify the CTBT, and we intend to continue these activities. It is also important to advance the CTBT’s verification regime, including the International Monitoring System. In this regard, we have provided – and indeed will continue to provide – technical assistance to developing countries. Furthermore, pending the entry into force of the treaty, it is important for all states to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

Mr. Chairman,

Before concluding my intervention, I would like to refer to the issue raised by the joint statement on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons delivered by
South Africa during the General Debate.

Japan has carefully and earnestly examined the contents of the joint statement.

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan shares concerns about the humanitarian impact caused by the use of nuclear weapons. Japan supports the fundamental message regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, including points referred to in the joint statement regarding the immediate damage as well as the unbearable socioeconomic and cross-generational losses brought about by nuclear weapon use.

On the other hand, taking into account the security environment surrounding Japan, we carefully and earnestly examined the compatibility of the characterizations in the statement and engaged in consultations on their revision. Unfortunately, this did not produce a mutually agreeable result and Japan decided to forgo joining the statement. However, Japan wishes to explore seriously the possibility of joining a statement with the same theme in the future.

Japan understands better than any other country the inhumane consequences of nuclear weapon use. We will continue to fulfill our solemn duty to convey to the world and succeeding generations the reality of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.