Chapter 3
Diplomacy to Defend National Interests through Co-creation with the World
4 Disarmament and Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
(1) Nuclear Disarmament
As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan has the responsibility to lead the international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.
However, the path toward a world without nuclear weapons has become even more severe due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, North Korea's nuclear and missile development, and China's nuclear enhancement without transparency. Furthermore, as seen in the situation surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), there exists an apparent divergence of views on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, a divergence that exists not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States but also among non-nuclear-weapon States that are exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and those that are not. Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to persistently advance realistic and practical efforts, while bridge-building between states with divergent views, in order to promote nuclear disarmament.
With the aim of realizing a world without nuclear weapons, Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, is steadily advancing efforts toward nuclear disarmament. In particular, at the G7 Hiroshima Summit held in May in the atomic-bombed city of Hiroshima, the leaders of participating countries had the opportunity to learn firsthand the reality of atomic bombing. Furthermore, the G7 leaders engaged in candid discussions and affirmed their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. They also issued the “G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament,” the first stand-alone G7 leaders' document focusing on nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime, which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States participate in, and increased the momentum of the international community toward realizing a world without nuclear weapons. It is historically significant that the G7 leaders, who listened to the voices of atomic-bombing survivors, learned firsthand the reality of the atomic bombing, and learned directly of the feelings of people who wish for peace, have issued the “G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament.” Japan will continue realistic and practical efforts by building on this Vision as a solid platform, and implementing each of the initiatives under the “Hiroshima Action Plan”22 announced by Prime Minister Kishida at the NPT Review Conference in 2022.
Furthermore, Japan has continued to pursue bridge-building between states with divergent views. It has done this, for example, through holding meetings of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), submitting the Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the UN General Assembly, and cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries, including within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as well as individual consultations. Moreover, Japan intends to continue maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime through cumulative efforts including through building up realistic and practical efforts, such as encouraging states to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), promoting education on disarmament and non-proliferation, and further, discussions and exercises with nuclear-weapon States toward the realization of effective nuclear disarmament verification.
The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon State has joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon States. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic and practical measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S.
22 Proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the NPT Review Conference in August 2022. As the first step of a realistic roadmap to take us from the “reality” we face in the harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons, it is rooted in the following five actions alongside efforts to reduce nuclear risks: (1) shared recognition on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons; (2) enhancing transparency; (3) maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile; (4) securing nuclear non-proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, (5) encouraging visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by international leaders and others.
A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Japan places great importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NPT Review Conferences have been held once every five years with the aim of achieving the goals of the NPT and ensuring compliance with its provisions, and discussions that reflect the international situation of the time have been held since the NPT entered into force in 1970.
The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference in 2026 was convened from July 31 to August 11 at the UN Office in Vienna. State Minister for Foreign Affairs TAKEI Shunsuke represented Japan at this meeting, during which he delivered a statement at the general debate as the first speaker. He stated that, maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime is in the interest of the international community as a whole, especially because the path toward a world without nuclear weapons has become ever more challenging, and that Japan will continue to advance realistic and practical efforts under the “Hiroshima Action Plan.” He also referred to the contents of the Comprehensive Report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published in July regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water23 into the sea, and stated that Japan has provided sincere explanations based on scientific evidence to the international community in a highly transparent manner, and would continue to do so in the future.
While it was meaningful that States Parties demonstrated a common recognition of the importance of maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime toward the next NPT Review Conference in 2026, and held candid exchanges in person, it was regrettable that the Chair was ultimately unable to submit the Chair's Summary as a working paper due to opposing views from some countries. These divisions within the international community must be overcome in the future. Nevertheless, this meeting served to reaffirm the firm and widely shared recognition that maintaining and strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, is in the interest of the entire international community.
23 ALPS treated water is water which is processed by devices such as ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System) to ensure that the radioactive materials other than tritium surely meet the regulatory standards for safety. ALPS treated water is then sufficiently diluted so that the concentrations of the radioactive materials including tritium is far below the regulatory standards for safety, and then finally discharged into the sea.
B International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP)
In January 2022, Prime Minister Kishida announced in his Policy Speech to the Diet that the IGEP will serve as an opportunity for participants from nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as those from countries participating and not participating in the TPNW, to exchange ideas and thoughts beyond their respective national positions, with the involvement of former and incumbent political leaders of the world, and engage in candid discussions concerning a concrete path toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.
Following the first meeting held in December 2022, the second meeting was held in Tokyo on April 4 and 5. In addition to three Japanese members, including Chair SHIRAISHI Takashi (Chancellor of the Prefectural University of Kumamoto), six non-Japanese members from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States also attended the meeting, making nine members in total participating in person. Five other non-Japanese members also attended the meeting online. The IGEP members concurred on compiling a concrete message based on the discussions at this meeting as to provide input to the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 11th NPT Review Conference in 2026. Based on the recognition that the international community is facing grave and unprecedented nuclear challenges, and that it is imperative to transform the current crisis into an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in particular by upholding and strengthening the NPT regime, the message delivered set out the following priority measures that should be addressed in the next NPT review cycle starting from the first session of the Preparatory Committee: (1) “reinforcing and expanding norms,” such as prohibition of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons; (2) “taking concrete measures,” such as engaging in dialogue on establishing new arms control arrangements; and, (3) “revitalizing and strengthening the NPT review process.”
The third meeting was held in Nagasaki on December 8 and 9, and three Japanese members, including Chair Shiraishi, as well as 10 non-Japanese members from nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States attended the meeting, making a total of 13 members who attended the meeting in person. One non-Japanese member participated in the meeting virtually. In addition, the Rt Hon. the Lord Browne of Ladyton, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom (former Secretary of State for Defence) attended in person as a political leader, and Dr. TOMONAGA Masao, Honorary Director of the Japanese Red Cross Nagasaki Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Hospital participated in person in the capacity of an expert from the host city.
Third Meeting of the IGEP (December 8 to 9, Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture; Photo: Cabinet Public Affairs Office)
Prime Minister Kishida attended the closing session. In his statement, he expressed that the significance of the IGEP lies in renewing the shared determination to ensure that “Nagasaki is the last place to suffer an atomic bombing” through candid discussions, and that he will continue to demonstrate strong leadership toward a world without nuclear weapons, while also taking into account the sage views of the IGEP.
At this meeting, the IGEP members engaged in an in-depth review of the challenges in advancing nuclear disarmament from today's perspective of changes in the international security environment and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). They also began consideration of the final product of the IGEP for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. With the firm resolve to ensure that “Nagasaki is the last place to suffer an atomic bombing,” they concurred that further strengthening diplomatic efforts and political leadership are vital to avoid greater instability to the international security environment surrounding nuclear disarmament.
C Japan Chair for a world without nuclear weapons
In his address at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly on September 19, Prime Minister Kishida announced the establishment of “Japan Chair for a world without nuclear weapons” at overseas research institutes and think tanks with a 3 billion Japanese yen contribution, based on the recognition that multi-layered efforts, not just the government efforts, are important in order to steadily advance the trend of “mainstreaming” nuclear disarmament.
The “Japan Chair” initiative supports the establishment of specialized posts for nuclear disarmament (“Japan Chair for a world without nuclear weapons”) at leading overseas research institutes and think tanks, with a view to stimulating discussions on “realistic and practical nuclear disarmament” for which Japan advocates, as well as contributing to overcoming divisions in the international community. Activities are expected to commence in 2024.
D The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)
The NPDI, a group of 12 non-nuclear-weapon States from various regions established under the leadership of Japan and Australia in 2010 has served as a bridge between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It leads efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through its realistic and practical proposals. In August 2022, Prime Minister Kishida attended the 11th NPDI High-level Meeting held in New York, as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend this NPDI High-level Meeting. A Joint High-level Statement was released after the meeting, which expressed NPDI's resolve to remain committed to fostering the sustained, high-level political leadership and diplomatic dialogue needed to strengthen the implementation of the NPT.
The NPDI has actively contributed to the NPT review process through realistic and practical proposals, including the submission of 19 working papers to the Ninth NPT Review process and 18 to the Tenth NPT Review process. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference in 2026 held from July to August 2023, NPDI released a joint statement and submitted joint working papers on transparency (reporting) and accountability, as well as on strengthening review process of the NPT. In addition, at the working group on further strengthening the review process of the NPT, convened shortly before the Preparatory Committee, concrete discussions were held on the need to enhance transparency as well as accountability by presenting in national reports, for which Japan has long advocated through the NPDI.
E Initiatives Through the United Nations (Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons)
Since 1994, Japan has submitted draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. They incorporate issues of the time related to nuclear disarmament with a view to presenting a realistic and concrete nuclear disarmament approach proposed by Japan to the international community. Recognizing the need to present a way forward for realistic and practical measures to realize a world without nuclear weapons, the 2023 draft resolution submitted by Japan took into consideration discussions at the G7 Hiroshima Summit and the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference in 2026, and focused on calling on the international community to implement concrete measures particularly to advance efforts regarding a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and to enhance transparency, in order to further realize and promote the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the 10th NPT Review Conference in August 2022. The resolution was adopted with the broad support of 145 countries at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October and of 148 countries at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in December. The states supporting the resolution have divergent views, including nuclear-weapon States such as the U.S. and UK, as well as U.S. allies such as NATO member countries, Australia, the ROK, and the states advocating the TPNW. While other resolutions that comprehensively addressed nuclear disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly in addition to Japan's draft resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan has enjoyed support among a larger number of states. Every year, Japan's resolutions continue to enjoy the broad support of states with divergent views in the international community.
F Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Japan attaches great importance to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic measure of nuclear disarmament where both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States can participate.
The 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT was held in September during the UN General Assembly High-Level Week. Foreign Minister Kamikawa attended the conference and delivered a statement. She explained that Japan attaches great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic and practical nuclear disarmament measure, and emphasizing that the relevance of the CTBT has never been greater, called for cooperation of the international community to advance the Treaty.
Foreign Minister Kamikawa delivering a statement at the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT (September 22, New York, U.S.)
With regard to developments among states whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, which ratified the CTBT in 2000, signed a bill to revoke its ratification in November 2023, and the bill has entered into force. Taking into consideration that Russia is a state whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT, as well as the largest nuclear-weapon State among the States Signatories and States Parties of the CTBT, Russia's decision to revoke its ratification of the CTBT goes against the international community's longstanding efforts. In light of that, Japan has issued a Statement by Foreign Minister and other statements condemning Russia's decision.
G Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty24 (FMCT)
A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would have great significance for both disarmament and non-proliferation, as it would prevent the emergence of new states possessing nuclear-weapons by banning the production of fissile materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would limit the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, no consensus has been reached on commencing negotiations for a Treaty despite decades of discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Consequently, it was decided at the 71st UN General Assembly in 2016 to establish the FMCT High-Level Experts Preparatory Group, and Japan actively participated in the Group's discussions.
Furthermore, during the UN General Assembly High-Level Week in September 2023, Prime Minister Kishida co-hosted the Commemorative High-Level Event on an FMCT together with the Philippines and Australia. The purpose of this event was to refocus political attention toward an FMCT on the occasion of this year that marks the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for an FMCT. In his keynote speech, Prime Minister Kishida pointed out that, for the first time since the peak of the Cold War, the world is on the cusp of a reversal of the decreasing trend of the global number of nuclear arsenals, making it even more necessary to start early negotiations on an FMCT. Attendees from the respective countries engaged in active exchange of views, and this event provided an opportunity for refocusing political interest on an FMCT.
Prime Minister Kishida delivering an address at the Commemorative High-Level Event on an FMCT (September 19, New York, U.S.; Photo: Cabinet Public Affairs Office)
24 A treaty concept that aims to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile materials (such as enriched uranium and plutonium) that are used as materials to produce nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
H Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education
As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan places great importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Specifically, Japan has been actively engaged in efforts to convey the reality of atomic bombings to people around the world, through activities such as translating the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, invitations for young diplomats from various countries to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament,25 providing assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibitions overseas,26 and designating atomic bomb survivors who have given testimonies of their atomic bomb experiences as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.”
At the General Debate of the NPT Review Conference held in August 2022, Prime Minister Kishida announced that Japan would contribute 10 million U.S. dollars to the UN for the establishment of the “Youth Leader Fund for a World Without Nuclear Weapons.” The goal of this program is to create a global network of future generations with the shared goal toward the elimination of nuclear weapons by bringing future leaders such as young policymakers and researchers from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to Japan to learn firsthand the reality of atomic bombings. The training under this Fund commenced in December 2023.
Additionally, as the atomic bomb survivors are aging, it is becoming increasingly important to pass on the realities of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings across generations and borders. To this end, from 2013 to 2023, Japan conferred the designation of “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” on more than 600 youths in Japan and overseas.
25 Implemented since 1983 by the UN to nurture nuclear disarmament experts. Program participants are invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to promote understanding of the reality of atomic bombings through such means as museum tours and talks by atomic-bomb survivors about their experiences in the atomic bombings.
26 Opened as a permanent exhibition about the atomic bomb in New York, U.S.; Geneva, Switzerland; and Vienna, Austria, in cooperation with Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.
I Initiatives Toward Future Arms Control
In the area of nuclear disarmament, in addition to initiatives through multilateral frameworks such as the NPT, the U.S. and Russia have also concluded and maintained a bilateral arms control treaty. On February 3, 2021, the two countries agreed on an extension to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The New START Treaty demonstrates important progress in nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia, and Japan welcomed this extension. However, in August 2022, Russia announced the exemption of all its facilities from inspection activities temporarily. It also notified the U.S. about the postponement of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) scheduled for November the same year. In January 2023, the U.S. Department of State submitted a report to Congress stating that Russia cannot be certified as being in compliance with the New START Treaty. In February, President Putin announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly the suspension of the implementation of the New START Treaty. In light of these developments, the “G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament”, for example, also expressed deep regret over Russia's decision to undermine the New START Treaty, and called on Russia to enable a return to full implementation of the Treaty.
In view of the recent situations surrounding nuclear weapons, it is important to establish a new arms control mechanism that encompasses a wider range of countries beyond the U.S. and Russia, while also including a broader range of weapon systems. From this perspective, Japan has been explaining this issue to the relevant countries at various levels.
For example, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) convened in July, Foreign Minister Hayashi stated that Japan expected China to play an active role in enhancing transparency of nuclear forces in the region as a nuclear-weapon State and as an important player in the international community, and expressed strong hope for dialogues leading to the development of broader framework of arms control, where a wide variety of countries are involved to deal with a wider range of weapon systems.
Furthermore, the aforementioned Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons also reaffirms the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to initiate arms control dialogues on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing.
(2) Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security
A Japan's Efforts Toward Non-proliferation
To ensure Japan's security and to maintain peace and security of the international community, Japan has been making efforts concerning non-proliferation policy. The goal of such a policy is to prevent the proliferation of weapons that could threaten Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and biological/chemical weapons, as well as missiles with the ability to deliver those weapons and conventional weapons) and of related materials and technologies used to develop such weapons.
Amid the upheaval of the international order, there are growing concerns over non-proliferation in countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Non-proliferation risks are also growing on the back of many factors. For one, economic growth has enabled expanded capacity to produce and supply weapons as well as materials that could be diverted to the development of such weapons. In addition, distribution channels have become more complex alongside advancing globalization, and procurement methods for substances of concern and other materials have become increasingly sophisticated. The emergence of new technologies has also heightened the risk of the diversion of private sector technologies to military uses.
Under these circumstances, Japan has been implementing its non-proliferation policies through international non-proliferation regimes and rules, taking non-proliferation measures domestically, and promoting close coordination with and capacity building support for other nations.
Measures for preventing proliferation include IAEA safeguards, export control, and counter-proliferation initiatives.
Safeguards refer to verification activities conducted in accordance with safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and aim to ensure that nuclear energy will not be diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Safeguards are a primary means of achieving nuclear non-proliferation, which is one of three pillars of the NPT, and strengthening safeguards is vital toward promoting nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear power. As a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors,27 Japan is advancing various efforts including supporting the IAEA's activities, supporting enhanced understanding and implementation capabilities toward safeguards, and promoting the universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP).28 Japan also contributes to capacity development in the area of safeguards in each country, such as through its contributions to the meetings of the Asia Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) and training projects conducted in Japan for Asian countries.
Export control is a measure in the so-called supply-side regulation toward countries of proliferation concern, terrorist organizations, and other entities attempting to acquire or distribute weapons or related materials or technologies. There are four export control frameworks (international export control regimes) in the international community. Japan has participated in all of them since their inception, engaging in international coordination and practicing strict export control. Each of the four regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons, the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missiles,29 and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for conventional weapons, establishes a list of dual-use items and technologies which contribute to the development of weapons that should be controlled. To ensure the non-proliferation of materials and technologies of concern, participating countries to the regimes implement export control measures on the listed items and technologies in accordance with their domestic laws. The international export control regimes also exchange information concerning trends in countries of proliferation concern and are engaged in outreach activities to non-participating countries to the regimes in order to strengthen their export control. The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna serves as the Point of Contact of the NSG, and Japan actively engages in such international rule-making and application of rules.
Furthermore, Japan is promoting counter-proliferation initiatives with a view to complementing such safeguards and the activities of the international export control regimes, and comprehensively addressing the proliferation and threat of weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Japan participates actively in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),30 and works to enhance coordination among countries and relevant institutions, such as by hosting the PSI interdiction exercise on four occasions. In June 2023, Japan participated in the exercise hosted by the ROK. In addition, with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540,31 which was adopted in 2004 with the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (missiles) to non-state actors, Japan contributes to maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes through means such as making financial contributions to support the implementation of the resolution by Asian nations. In 2023, Japan, as the G7 Presidency, hosted the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Working Group (GPWG)32 in Tokyo and Nagasaki.
Japan also holds the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)33 and the Asian Export Control Seminar34 every year in order to promote a better understanding of the non-proliferation regimes and strengthen regional efforts, mainly in Asian countries.
27 13 countries are designated by the IAEA Board of Governors. The designated member states include Japan and other countries with advanced nuclear energy capabilities.
28 In addition to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that is applied on all nuclear materials pertaining to the peaceful nuclear activities in that country, and that non-nuclear-weapon NPT States Parties are required to conclude with the IAEA pursuant to Article III Paragraph 1 of the NPT, an Additional Protocol is concluded between the IAEA and the respective State Parties. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol expands the scope of nuclear activity information that should be declared to the IAEA, and gives the IAEA strengthened measures to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As of December 2023, 142 countries have concluded the Additional Protocol.
29 Apart from export control regimes, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which includes the principle of exercising restraint in their development and deployment, addresses the issue of ballistic missiles. As of December 2023, 144 countries subscribe to the HCOC.
30 An initiative launched in 2003 for the purpose of implementing and considering possible measures consistent with relevant international laws and national legal authorities in order to interdict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, along with related materials. 106 countries participate in and support the PSI as of December 2023. In 2013, the six countries of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the U.S. agreed to conduct a yearly rotation exercise in the Asia Pacific region. Through the cooperation of agencies including MOFA, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance, the Japan Coast Guard and the Ministry of Defense, Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises in 2004, 2007, and 2018, PSI air interdiction exercises in 2012, and an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in 2010. Japan has also actively participated in training and related meetings hosted by other countries.
31 Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council resolution 1540 obliges all countries to: (1) refrain from providing support to terrorists and other non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction; (2) adopt and enforce laws prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors; and (3) implement domestic controls (protective measures, border control, export controls, etc.) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also establishes, under the UN Security Council, the 1540 Committee, which comprises Security Council members and has a mandate to review and report to the Security Council the level of resolution 1540 implementation by member states.
32 The establishment of the GPWG was agreed upon at the G8 Kananaskis Summit (Canada) in 2002. In the initial stages, nuclear non-proliferation projects were implemented, such as the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and destruction of chemical weapons in target countries such as Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where this was a pressing problem in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Today, the Working Group is convened about twice a year under the G7 host country, and it works to promote cooperation to reduce specific proliferation threats in places such as Ukraine and the Global South, in areas such as nuclear and radiological security, and biological and chemical security. Furthermore, it also works to match project contributors with beneficiary organizations.
33 A multilateral Director-General-level meeting launched in 2003 and hosted by Japan to discuss various issues related to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in Asia among the 10 ASEAN member states, China, India, the ROK, as well as the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and the EU, which have common interests in Asian regional security. Most recently, the 18th meeting was held in December 2023, and discussions were held on topics such as proliferation challenges in Asia and the strengthening of export control.
34 A seminar hosted by Japan to exchange views and information toward strengthening export controls in Asia, with the participation of export control officials from Asian countries and regions. It has been organized annually in Tokyo since 1993.
■Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA is an organization affiliated with the UN, which was established in 1957 with the aim of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and at the same time, ensuring that nuclear energy is not used for any military purpose. Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, sets out the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA safeguards with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear technology from peaceful uses to military uses.
Foreign Minister Hayashi meeting with IAEA Director General Grossi on his visit to Japan as a guest of MOFA (July 4, Tokyo)
The activities of the IAEA, which is known as the nuclear watchdog, range widely from implementing safeguards to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and measures to counter nuclear terrorism, to technical support related to nuclear power generation, and research and support for nuclear technologies in non-electric applications such as health, medicine, food and agriculture, water resource management, the environment, and industrial uses. It also plays a key role in nuclear non-proliferation in countries such as North Korea and Iran.
Since joining the IAEA as an original member state, Japan has contributed to discussions in the General Conference and Board of Governors meetings as a designated member state. It has also deepened cooperation with the IAEA traditionally in the nuclear non-proliferation field and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and actively supported IAEA activities in the human resources and financial aspects. Recently, in addition to cooperation on the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea by TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and on nuclear safety in Ukraine, Japan is also advancing cooperation on various initiatives that the IAEA is promoting against the backdrop of growing global interest and demand for the use of nuclear energy in areas such as medicine, food, and the environment. Some examples are the “Rays of Hope” (an initiative related to radioactive cancer treatment and diagnosis) advocated by the IAEA and “Atoms4Food” (an initiative related to food issues), aimed at the attainment of SDGs in developing countries. Japan contributes funding to such initiatives.
Through opportunities such as visits by Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to Japan as a guest of MOFA on three occasions, Japan is working to strengthen cooperation with the IAEA in these areas.
B Regional Non-proliferation Issues
In 2023, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 18 times, making at least 25 launches. This series of actions by North Korea is a flagrant violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and constitutes a grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security. At the same time, it also poses a clear and serious challenge to the international community, and is absolutely unacceptable. The IAEA Director General's report in August pointed out that North Korea's nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern, and that the continuation of North Korea's nuclear programme is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, at the IAEA General Conference convened in September, a resolution calling strongly on North Korea to take concrete steps toward achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear plans, as well as the prompt suspension of all related activities, was adopted by consensus. This demonstrated the united position of the IAEA member states toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Japan, too, took opportunities such as the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference in August, the IAEA General Conference in September, and the IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting in November, to proactively convey to the international community the importance of addressing North Korea's nuclear issue.
It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, by North Korea. To that end, Japan will continue to coordinate closely with related countries, including the U.S. and the ROK, as well as international organizations such as the UN and the IAEA. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will work on capacity building for export control, particularly in Asia. Japan will also continue to contribute actively to discussions on North Korea's nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.
Since the withdrawal of the previous U.S. administration under President Trump from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)35 in 2018 and the reimposition of independent sanctions on Iran, Iran has continued actions to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA. In February 2021, Iran suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA including the Additional Protocol (AP), and commenced production of 60% enriched uranium in April the same year.
Japan has consistently supported the JCPOA, which contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. From this perspective, it has continued to support efforts by relevant countries toward the return of both the U.S. and Iran to the JCPOA. Japan, being deeply concerned about Iran's continued reduction of its commitments under the JCPOA, has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from further measures that may undermine the JCPOA and to return fully to its commitments under the JCPOA.
In March 2023, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi revisited Iran to discuss these issues related to the implementation of the JCPOA and the series of safeguards issues (in which nuclear materials that had not been declared to the IAEA were found in Iran). The two sides issued a joint statement toward future cooperation on the safeguards issues and other matters. At the Board of Governor's meeting in September, a joint statement was issued by like-minded countries urging Iran to respond to the IAEA Director General's requests immediately. Later, the IAEA Director General's report published in November reported that cooperation based on the joint statement had appeared to be “frozen.” Japan will continue to call strongly on Iran to cooperate completely and unconditionally with the IAEA. Japan will also continue to contribute to discussions related to Iran's nuclear and missile activities in the international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.
As for Syria, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 found that activities such as Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor would constitute non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To address this outstanding issue, Japan has called upon Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. It is important for Syria to sign, ratify and implement the AP.
35 Sets forth detailed procedures for imposing constraints on Iran's nuclear activities while ensuring that they serve peaceful purposes, and for lifting the imposed sanctions.
<Main measures undertaken by Iran>
●Constraints on enriched uranium-related activities
・Limit on the number of centrifuges in operation to 5,060 units
・Upper limit on enriched uranium at 3.67%, and limit on the amount of stored enriched uranium at 300 kg, etc.
●Constraints on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor, and reprocessing
・Redesign / remodeling of the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor so that it is not able to produce weapon-grade plutonium and to transfer spent fuel out of the country
・No reprocessing, including for research purposes, no construction of reprocessing facilities, etc.
C Nuclear Security
International cooperation is advancing in nuclear security to prevent acts of terrorism such as those involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These include the entering into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2007 and of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2015, respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit was held four times between 2010 and 2016. Japan has actively participated in and contributed to these efforts. For example, at the International Conference on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in 2020, State Minister for Foreign Affairs WAKAMIYA Kenji participated in the ministerial conference as a representative of the Government of Japan and delivered a speech to share the view of Japan with other participants.
In Vienna in March 2022, the first Conference of the Parties since the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was held, and the validity and implementation status of the amended Convention were discussed. Japan expressed its intention to continue to support the IAEA in the areas of human resources development and technological development going forward, as well as to contribute to strengthening international nuclear security.
On March 2 and 3, 2022, upon Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the IAEA Board of Governors convened a meeting in Vienna to discuss the safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine. At the meeting, participating countries condemned and expressed their concerns regarding Russia's attacks on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine from the perspective of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The resolution adopted by a majority at the meeting deplores Russia's actions in Ukraine, which are posing serious and direct threats to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and civilian personnel. It also calls upon Russia to immediately cease all actions in order for Ukraine to preserve or promptly regain full control over nuclear facilities. Resolutions were also adopted by a majority at the Board of Governors' meeting in September and November of the same year. These resolutions express grave concern that Russia has not heeded the call of the Board to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, and call on Russia to enable the Ukrainian authorities to regain full control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to ensure its safe and secure operation, as well as to enable the IAEA to fully and safely conduct its safeguards verification activities. Furthermore, they also incorporate support for the efforts by the IAEA Director General and others to address the implications for the nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine, through means such as the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) and the continuous presence of the IAEA staff at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The resolution was also adopted by a majority at the IAEA General Conference in September 2023, reaffirming concern over the situation facing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and support for the relevant efforts by the IAEA. Japan also strongly condemns Russia's aggression, including its seizure of nuclear facilities, and will continue to support the IAEA's efforts for ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine.
(3) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
A Multilateral Efforts
Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the treaty, it is the “inalienable right” for any country that meets its obligations to non-proliferation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reflecting the increase in international energy demand, many countries use or are planning to use nuclear power.36
On the other hand, these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes, and a nuclear accident in one country may have significant impacts on neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”;37 that is, (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety (e.g., measures to ensure safety to prevent nuclear accidents), and (3) Nuclear Security. As the country that experienced the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, it is Japan's responsibility to share its experiences and lessons learned from the accident with other countries and to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety. In 2013, the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC) was designated in Fukushima Prefecture. At this Center, the IAEA and Japan cooperate to conduct training for Japanese and foreign officials to strengthen their capacity in the field of emergency preparedness and response.
Nuclear energy is applied not only to the field of power generation, but also to the field of non-power generation, including health, food and agriculture, the environment, and industrial uses. Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such non-power applications and contributing to development issues are becoming increasingly important as developing countries make up the majority of NPT States Parties. Therefore, the IAEA also contributes to technical cooperation for developing countries and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In this context, Japan has been actively supporting the IAEA's activities in the technical and financial aspects, for example, through its technical cooperation based on the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and with its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). Examples of support projects facilitated by Japan's contributions to the PUI include projects to address the problem of marine pollution caused by plastic waste, radiation treatment for cancer, and projects to address the food issue.
36 According to the IAEA, 412 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 59 reactors are under construction (IAEA website; as of January 2024).
37 “3S” is used to refer to the IAEA's efforts toward nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards, which are typical measures for non-proliferation.
B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to establish a legal framework required for securing a legal assurance from the recipient country on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear-related material and equipment that are transferred between the two countries, so as to realize cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the two countries. Under such bilateral agreements, cooperation in areas such as the strengthening of nuclear safety can be promoted. Japan makes its decision on whether or not to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with another country taking into account a wide range of factors such as non-proliferation efforts and nuclear energy policy of that country, its trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries among others. As of December 2023, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 14 countries and one organization, which in order of entry into force of the agreement are: Canada, France, Australia, China, the U.S., the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and India.
C Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Handling of ALPS Treated Water
The work of decommissioning, contaminated water management, decontamination and environmental remediation at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station are challenging. However, Japan is making steady progress in these areas by leveraging the collective technologies and knowledge of the world, and in close cooperation with the IAEA, the expert organization in the field of nuclear energy. In April 2021, the Government of Japan announced its basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water, and in July of the same year, signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS treated Water at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station with the IAEA. Based on this TOR, the IAEA Task Force consisting of the IAEA officials and international experts selected by the IAEA has conducted third-party reviews on the Government of Japan and TEPCO in safety and regulatory aspects. The review on regulatory-related aspects was conducted in January 2023, and a comprehensive review on the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea was conducted from May to June.
On July 4, 2023, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Japan and handed to Prime Minister Kishida the Comprehensive Report compiled by the IAEA, summarizing these reviews conducted based on the TOR. The report concluded that (1) the approach to the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, and the associated activities, are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) that the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment, and (3) indicated the IAEA's plans to continue implementing additional reviews and monitoring during and after the discharge.
After the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues and the Inter-Ministerial Council for Steady Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling ALPS Treated Water were held on August 22, the discharge of ALPS treated water commenced on August 24. Based on the monitoring results to date, it has been confirmed that ALPS treated water is being discharged safely and as planned.
The IAEA experts and third-party analysis laboratories (Canada, China, and the ROK) conducted marine monitoring from October 16 to 23 (specifically, this involved the collection of sea water and sediment in the vicinity of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, fishery products in Fukushima Prefecture and preparation of the collected samples). From October 24 to 27, the IAEA Task Force visited Japan and conducted its first review after the start of the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea. The report on this review was published by the IAEA in January 2024.
Collecting samples of surface seawater for H-3 analysis off the coast of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (October, Fukushima Prefecture; Photo: Nuclear Regulation Authority)
In order to make progress in the decommissioning works and in recovery with the support and correct understanding of the international community, the Government of Japan periodically releases comprehensive reports through the IAEA that cover matters such as progress in decommissioning and contaminated water management at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, results of the monitoring of air dose rate and seawater radioactivity concentration, and food safety. In addition, Japan submits reports on the current situation to the relevant organizations, including Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo and to the IAEA. Furthermore, Japan has organized more than 100 briefing sessions to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo since the accident and provided and disseminated information through Japanese diplomatic missions overseas or through social media and other means.
Regarding the safety of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, the Government of Japan continues to provide information sincerely to the international community in a highly transparent manner, based on scientific evidence, and to respond appropriately to claims that may encourage reputational damage. (See the Special Feature on page 246).
On August 24, Tokyo Electric Power Company's (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea. As for the safety of the discharge of ALPS treated water, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Report has shown that the discharge is consistent with relevant international safety standards. The Government of Japan is taking the opportunity of international conferences and bilateral meetings to explain Japan's efforts based on scientific evidence in a highly transparent and sincere manner, as well as utilizing social media and other means to actively disseminate information to the world.
In April 2021, the Government of Japan announced its basic policy on the handling of ALPS treated water, and in July of the same year, signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS Treated Water at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station with the IAEA. Based on this TOR, the IAEA Task Force consisting of the IAEA officials and international experts selected by the IAEA has conducted third-party reviews on the Government of Japan and TEPCO in safety and regulatory aspects.
IAEA Director General Grossi paying a courtesy call to Prime Minister Kishida (July 4, Tokyo. Photo: Cabinet Public Affairs Office)
On July 4, 2023, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi presented to Prime Minister Kishida the IAEA Comprehensive Report, summarizing these reviews conducted based on the TOR. The report concluded that the approach to the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, and the associated activities, are consistent with relevant international safety standards, and that the discharge of ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment. The IAEA also indicated its plans to continue implementing additional reviews and monitoring during and after the discharge.
Even after the discharge of ALPS treated water commenced on August 24, Japan has continued to work closely with the IAEA to conduct multi-layered monitoring in the following three areas: (1) monitoring of treated water in tanks; (2) real time monitoring; and, (3) sea area monitoring. Based on the monitoring results to date, it has been confirmed that ALPS treated water is being discharged safely as planned. Furthermore, there is growing understanding toward the discharge of ALPS treated water, with countries in a broad range of regions expressing their support and appreciation for the IAEA's efforts.
Meeting between Foreign Minister Kamikawa and IAEA Director General Grossi, and signing ceremony (September 18, New York, U.S.)
On September 18, Foreign Minister Kamikawa and IAEA Director General Grossi signed the Memorandum of Cooperation between Japan and the IAEA concerning ALPS treated water. At the meeting following the signing ceremony, Foreign Minister Kamikawa stated that this memorandum reaffirms Japan's cooperation with the IAEA such as its continued involvement in review and monitoring and will further contribute to enhancing the international community's confidence in the safety of the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.
Going forward, the Government of Japan will continue to explain Japan's position sincerely and transparently to the international community as it undergoes reviews by the IAEA, as well as to disseminate information based on scientific evidence in a highly transparent manner, such as by promptly publishing the results of monitoring activities.
(4) Biological and Chemical Weapons
A Biological Weapons
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)38 is the only multilateral legal framework comprehensively prohibiting the development, production and possession of biological weapons. However, how to reinforce the Convention is a challenge as there are neither provisions on measures to verify compliance with the BWC nor an implementing organization for the Convention.
Since 2006, decisions have been made to establish the Implementation Support Unit (fulfilling the functions of a Secretariat) and to hold intersessional meetings twice a year in between the Review Conferences held every five years. During this time, progress has been made with respect to initiatives aimed at strengthening the BWC regime.
At the 9th Review Conference of the BWC held in 2022, it was decided that a working group open to all States Parties would be established, with a view to strengthening all aspects of the implementation of the BWC. The working group started meeting from 2023, and States Parties are discussing measures on international cooperation, the scientific and technological developments, and compliance and verification relevant to the BWC.
38 Entered into force in March 1975. As of December 2023, 185 countries or regions are parties to the BWC.
B Chemical Weapons
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)39 comprehensively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance is ensured through a verification system consisting of declarations and inspections, making this Convention a groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in The Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. Its extensive efforts toward the realization of a world without chemical weapons were highly acclaimed, and the Organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013. In May 2023, the Center for Chemistry and Technology (CCT), which Japan has also contributed funding to, was established. Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs YOSHIKAWA Yuumi attended the opening ceremony of this Center.
Japan, which has a highly developed chemicals industry and numerous chemicals factories, also accepts numerous OPCW inspections. Japan also actively cooperates with the OPCW in many other concrete ways, including measures to increase the number of member states and strengthening national implementation measures by States Parties with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention. Moreover, under the CWC, Japan aims to complete, as soon as possible, the destruction of chemical weapons of the former Japanese Army abandoned in Chinese territory by working in cooperation with China.
39 Entered into force in April 1997. As of December 2023, 193 countries or regions are parties to the CWC.
(5) Conventional Weapons
Conventional weapons generally refer to arms other than weapons of mass destruction and include a wide variety of weapons ranging from landmines, tanks, and artillery to small arms and light weapons such as handguns. The problem of conventional weapons, which are used widely in actual wars and cause injury and death to civilians, is serious in light of both national security and humanitarian concerns. The disarmament agenda presented in 2018 by UN Secretary-General António Guterres categorizes disarmament of conventional weapons as one of the three pillars, “Disarmament that Saves Lives.” Japan continues to make active efforts through international cooperation and support toward matters concerning conventional weapons, and participates in discussions at the relevant conferences.
A Small Arms and Light Weapons
Described as “the real weapons of mass destruction” due to the many human lives they take, small arms and light weapons continue to proliferate due to the ease with which they can be obtained and used. They contribute to conflict prolongation and escalation, hindering the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 2001, Japan has been working with other countries to submit a resolution on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons to the UN General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year. In 2023, Japan served in the role of drafting this resolution. In areas around the world, Japan has also provided support for projects to address the issue of small arms and light weapons, including training and the collection and destruction of weapons. In 2019, Japan contributed 2 million U.S. dollars to a mechanism for preventing small arms established under UN Secretary-General Guterres' disarmament agenda, and in 2022, through this mechanism, projects on small arms and light weapons were launched in Cameroon, Jamaica, and South Sudan.
B The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)40
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to establish common standards to regulate international trade and prevent the illicit transfer of arms, entered into force in December 2014. As one of the original co-authors of the UN General Assembly resolution that initiated a consideration of the Treaty, Japan has taken the lead in discussions and negotiations in the UN and contributed significantly to the establishment of the Treaty. Moreover, after the Treaty entered into force, Japan has continued to contribute actively in ways such as hosting the Fourth Conference of States Parties to the ATT in Tokyo as the first chair country elected from the Asia-Pacific region in August 2018. At the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, Japan contributed actively to discussions related to the universalization of the treaty, transparency and reporting, and promotion of implementation.
40 As of December 2023, there are 113 states and regions that are parties to the ATT. Japan signed the Treaty on the day that it was released for signing and became a State Party in May 2014.
C Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW)41
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. It comprises a framework convention that sets forth procedural and other matters, as well as five annexed protocols that regulate individual conventional arms. The framework convention entered into force in 1983. Japan has ratified the framework convention and annexed Protocols I to IV, including the amended Protocol II. Prompted by concerns in the international community about the rapidly advancing military applications of science and technology, meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been held under the CCW framework since 2017, and 11 guiding principles on LAWS were formulated in 2019. Japan has continued to contribute actively and constructively to such discussions on international rule-making. In March 2023, Japan submitted the “Draft articles on autonomous weapon systems – prohibitions and other regulatory measures on the basis of international humanitarian law” to the GGE, jointly with the U.S., the UK, Australia, Canada, and the ROK. As a result of active discussions at the GGE in March and May, the report was adopted by consensus which includes the view that weapon systems must not be used if they are incapable of being used in compliance with IHL, and that other weapon systems should be subject to necessary restrictions to ensure compliance with IHL.
Against the backdrop of increasingly active discussions on the impact of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) on the military domain, the first Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) Summit was held in the Netherlands in February. Furthermore, the first meeting on the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, led by the U.S., was held in November.
41 As of December 2023, 126 countries and regions are parties to the CCW.
D Anti-Personnel Mines
Since the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)42 in 1998, Japan has continued to promote comprehensive measures under the Convention, including the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of support for mine-affected countries. Along with calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention, Japan has also been steadily engaged in international cooperation through landmine clearance, victim assistance and other activities in the international community, from the viewpoint of the “Humanitarian- Development-Peace Nexus.”
At the 21st Meeting of the States Parties of the Ottawa Convention held in Geneva in November, approval was granted for Cambodia to preside over the Fifth Review Conference in 2024, and for Japan to preside over the 22nd Meeting of the States Parties in 2025.
42 The Convention, which entered into force in March 1999, bans the use and production of anti-personnel mines while mandating the destruction of stockpiled mines and the clearance of buried mines. As of December 2023, there are 164 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.
E Cluster Munitions43
The international community takes seriously the humanitarian consequences brought about by cluster munitions. Japan is therefore taking steps to address this issue via victim assistance and unexploded ordnance clearance.44 Japan is also continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).45 At the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the CCM held in September, Japan participated in discussions concerning these issues and shared its proactive efforts.
43 Generally speaking, it refers to bombs or shells in the form of large containers that open midair and release submunitions that spread over a wide area. They are said to be highly likely to not explode on impact, leading to the problem of civilians being accidentally killed or injured.
44 See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts on international cooperation regarding cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines.
45 Entered into force in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while mandating the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions. There are 112 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan (as of December 2023)