Chapter 3

Japan’s Foreign Policy to Promote National and Global Interests

Section 1 | Efforts for Peace and Stability of Japan and the International Community | 196

Section 2 | Japan’s International Cooperation (Development Cooperation and Response to Global Issues) | 263

Section 3 | Economic Diplomacy | 293

Section 4 | Efforts to Promote Understanding and Trust in Japan | 318
National Security Initiatives

(1) Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Today, Japan’s security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II. Military build-up, including nuclear and missile capabilities, is advancing rapidly around Japan. Further reinforcement of military capabilities and acceleration of military activities are becoming more prominent, and unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force are occurring more frequently than ever before. In the international community, a historical shift in the power balance is occurring, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Against this backdrop, some countries are attempting to change the existing international order based on their own historical views and values. Russia started its aggression against Ukraine in February. In the maritime domain, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlements or takes actions, based on assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order. These have generated undue infringement to rights under international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Under these circumstances, grey zone situations over territories, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, and information warfare through spread of disinformation, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime. Furthermore, the scope of security has expanded to include those fields previously considered non-military such as economic, technological and others, and thus the boundary between military and non-military fields has become blurred. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as responding to international terrorism, continue to pose serious challenges to the international community. In light of these developments, it is now necessary to strengthen efforts related to security policies across diverse sectors.

In December, Japan formulated a new National Security Strategy (NSS), along with the National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. While the NSS sets forth a wide range of security measures (fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, including possession of counterstrike capabilities; reinforcement of comprehensive defense architecture; consideration of revisions to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines; introduction of active cyber defense; significant reinforcement of maritime security capabilities and expansion of systems; promotion of economic security policies, among others), it establishes diplomatic capability first among the main elements of comprehensive national power for Japan’s national security. Based on this document, Japan will develop a strong diplomacy, to prevent crises before they occur, and to proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment (see the Special Feature on page 197).

(2) Enforcement of the “Legislation for Peace and Security,” and Initiatives based on the Legislation
In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, it is important to advance vibrant diplomacy to create a stable and predictable international environment. In addition, it is important to enable seamless responses to any situation, and to contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community based on the principle of international cooperation. To achieve these objectives, the “Legislation for Peace and Security” took effect in March 2016.

After the enforcement of the legislation, Japan has been engaged in various forms of cooperation with the U.S. and other relevant countries. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than it has ever been, and Japan is contributing further to peace and stability in the
On December 16, the National Security Council and the Cabinet decided and approved a new “National Security Strategy (NSS),” along with the “National Defense Strategy” and the “Defense Buildup Program” based on the NSS.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine launched in February is shaking the very foundation of the international order. Amid these circumstances, Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. The international community is standing at a historic crossroads, and maintaining and developing the free and open international order based on the rule of law is becoming more important than it has ever been. The new NSS was adopted against this backdrop.

The new NSS will dramatically transform Japan’s national security policy after the end of World War II from the aspect of its execution. It sets out policies to be implemented including the following major ones: (1) Develop diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”; (2) Fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities; (3) Reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture by promoting cross-governmental efforts in areas that complement and are inseparable from the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, namely research and development, public infrastructure development, cybersecurity, and international cooperation, to enhance deterrence capabilities of Japan and like-minded countries; (4) Consider revising, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance; (5) Introduce active cyber defense and establish a new organization that will comprehensively coordinate policies in the field of cybersecurity, in a centralized manner; (6) Significantly reinforce maritime law enforcement capabilities in conjunction with efforts to strengthen its organization; (7) Promote economic security policies.

In particular, the new NSS establishes diplomatic capability first among the main elements of comprehensive national power for Japan’s national security. Building on Japan’s long record of diplomatic undertakings and economic activities to promote the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, Japan will carry out vigorous diplomacy to prevent crises, strengthen diplomacy with the neighboring countries and regions, as well as efforts toward the resolution of various issues of concern including territorial issues, and proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, guided by significantly enhanced diplomatic implementation architecture.

Specifically, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, plays an indispensable role not only for the security of Japan but also for the realization of peace and stability in the international community, including in the Indo-Pacific region. From this perspective, Japan, while ensuring bilateral coordination at its strategic levels, will promote multilayered initiatives in coordination with the U.S. in all areas, including diplomacy, defense, and economy.

Moreover, Japan will further promote efforts to realize FOIP by deepening cooperation with like-minded countries with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone and through efforts such as the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) partnership. Japan will also further enhance diplomatic engagement with developing countries, which are economically growing and becoming more influential in the international arena. By doing so, Japan, together with as many countries as possible, will strengthen a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Guided by the vision of FOIP, Official Development Assistance (ODA) plays an extremely important role in maintaining and developing a free and open international order and in realizing coexistence and coprosperity in the international community. Therefore, Japan will continue to expand ODA while strategically utilizing it.

Furthermore, Japan will build a multilayered network among its ally and like-minded countries, expand it, and strengthen deterrence. To that end, while utilizing frameworks such as the Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia frameworks, Japan will enhance security cooperation with Australia, India, the ROK, European countries, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and others.

In addition, for the purpose of deepening security cooperation with like-minded countries, apart from ODA for the economic and social development of developing countries and other purposes, a new cooperation framework for the
benefit of armed forces and other related organizations will be established. Japan will provide equipment and supplies as well as assistance for the development of infrastructures to like-minded countries in view of strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities.

In pursuing such efforts, the stance of Japan since the end of World War II as a peace-loving nation remains unchanged. Japan will adhere to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan’s diplomatic policy, as before, to achieve coprosperity with other countries without sacrificing any country, is also unchanged. As one of the most mature and stable advanced democratic countries in the world, Japan will lead the international community by example.

region and the international community. For example, from 2017 till the end of 2021, Japan escorted the U.S. Forces a total of 79 times on occasions such as joint exercises, intelligence and surveillance operations, including ballistic missile warnings. In November 2021, Japan also escorted the Australian Forces for the first time during a joint exercise. In addition, Japan has also expanded and enhanced activities relating to cooperation on international peace and cooperation, such as UN Peacekeeping operations (PKO).

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan has been deepening cooperation not only with the U.S., but also with various other countries. Going forward, MOFA will strive to maintain and develop diplomatic relations that further advance mutual cooperation with other countries, with a view to securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people of Japan.

(3) Territorial Integrity
Maintaining territorial integrity is a fundamental responsibility of the Government. Japan’s policy to resolutely protect its land, sea and air space remains unchanged. Japan will continue to maintain its stance of responding firmly but in a calm manner. Based on this, the relevant government agencies are working in close cooperation to advance measures to ensure a seamless and adequate response to any form of unlawful acts. At the same time, the Government of Japan engages in proactive efforts to promote awareness of Japan’s position on territorial integrity among the international community, making use of the contacts and knowledge of its diplomatic missions overseas.

2 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

(1) Overview of Japan-U.S. Security Relationship
Under the security environment surrounding Japan, which is becoming increasingly severe at an ever more rapid pace, it is indispensable to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance not only for the peace and security of Japan, but also for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and the U.S. are further enhancing their deterrence and response capabilities under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“The Guidelines”) and the Legislation for Peace and Security. Through such efforts, Japan and the U.S. have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including missile defense, cyberspace, space and maritime security. While advancing these efforts, Japan and the U.S. have concurrently been working closely on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and other locations in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa.
(2) Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in Various Fields

A An Overview of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were formulated in 2015, reviewed and updated the general framework and policy direction of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and other efforts established under these Guidelines, Japan and the U.S. have been sharing information closely, establishing a common understanding of the situation, and engaging in “seamless” responses and efforts from peacetime to contingencies. From its inauguration till now, the Biden administration has consistently made it clear that it places great importance on the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

In January, the Japan-U.S. “2+2” was convened virtually for the first time. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister HAYASHI Yoshimasa and Defense Minister KISHI Nobuo from the Japanese side, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin from the U.S. side. The four Ministers engaged in candid and important discussions on how to advance the evolution of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and continue to effectively address current and future challenges. The outcome of the meeting is broadly summarized in the following three points.

Firstly, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” They also held an in-depth discussion and aligned their understanding on the changing strategic environment in the region, including China’s efforts to undermine the rules-based order and North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. Secondly, they affirmed that they would advance concrete discussions toward fundamentally enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. Furthermore, they concurred on pursuing investments to ensure that the Alliance will maintain its competitive edge into the future, including in the field of space, cyberspace as well as emerging technologies. Thirdly, they concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and sharing information in a timely manner, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

In January 2023, the Japan-U.S. “2+2” was convened in Washington D.C., in a timely manner, immediately after the release of strategic documents by the two countries. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hayashi and Defense Minister HAMADA Yasukazu from the Japanese side, and Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin from the U.S. side. The two sides welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. The following are the three broad outcomes of the meeting. Firstly, Japan and the U.S. carefully aligned their perception of the regional strategic environment, including the greatest strategic challenge of China’s foreign policy-based actions aimed at reshaping the international order for its own benefit, North Korea’s unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Secondly, the two sides affirmed future initiatives toward strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance amidst an increasingly severe security environment. Japan welcomed the U.S’ determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, and the two sides decided to continue close consultation on ways to further optimize U.S. force posture in Japan, including the readjustment of plans for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. They also took time to have in-depth discussions on extended deterrence at the ministerial level as one of the agenda, and reaffirmed the strong commitment of the U.S. to the defense of Japan, backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. Furthermore, the two sides also affirmed that attacks to, from or within space, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Thirdly, they reaffirmed the importance of efforts to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, and Foreign Minister Hayashi reiterated the request to the U.S. side for safe operation of the U.S. Forces with utmost consideration to the impact on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents.

1 Providing deterrence that a country possesses to its allies and others.
including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on environmental issues. On top of that, in the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in the same month, President Biden reiterated his unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan. The two leaders also welcomed the national security strategies of the two countries are aligned with each other and renewed their determination to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including seeking to create synergies in the implementation of the strategies. In addition, they instructed to further deepen concrete consultations regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation on the security front, taking into account the discussions at the Japan-U.S. “2+2.”

In 2022, Japan continued to engage in personnel exchanges with senior U.S. defense officials, including successive visits to Japan by Frank Kendall III, Secretary of the Air Force in August, General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and Charles A. Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific in September, Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in October, and Lt Gen. William M. Jurney, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific in December. In April, Foreign Minister Hayashi accepted an invitation from the U.S. to visit the USS Abraham Lincoln together with Ambassador of the U.S. to Japan, Rahm Emanuel. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue was held in the U.S. in June and Tokyo in November. This Dialogue was established in 2010, and as a part of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, it provides an opportunity for the two governments to discuss regional security, Alliance defense posture, nuclear and missile defense policy, and arms control issues, to engage in an in-depth exchange of views on means to sustain and strengthen extended deterrence, which is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and to deepen mutual understanding on alliance deterrence. As a part of this Dialogue, participants visited the Ohio-class submarine USS Maryland in June, and observed the “KEEN SWORD 23” Japan-US Bilateral Joint Exercise in November. Through such multilayered initiatives, Japan will continue to promote security and defense cooperation with the U.S., and to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance.

**B Missile Defense**

Japan has been making steady efforts to develop and engage in the production of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system while continuing cooperation with the U.S., including on the steady implementation of joint development and joint production of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3 Block IIA) since 2006, and Japan is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of its citizens from the threat of ballistic missiles to Japan under any circumstances. Japan is also advancing efforts to effectively address new aerial threats, including hypersonic weapons. At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” held in January 2023, based on the progress of joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology, the Ministers concurred to begin joint research on important elements including advanced materials and hypersonic testbeds, and also concurred to begin discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor.
Cyberspace
At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting convened in January 2023, Japan and the U.S. concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats. In light of the necessity for cross-governmental efforts by both Japan and the U.S., stakeholders from both sides engage in discussions, through frameworks such as the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, on bilateral cooperation across a wide range of areas. The two sides are continuing to cooperate on matters related to cyberspace, promoting bilateral policy coordination, strengthening systems and capabilities, and exchanging incident information, while taking into consideration Japan’s cyber security strategy and the cyber policies of the U.S.

Space
At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” convened in January 2023, Japan and the U.S. committed to deepening cooperation on space capabilities, and considered that attacks to, from, or within space, present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in the same month, the two sides concurred on further promoting Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of space. Japan and the U.S. are continuing to cooperate on space security, including through mutual exchanges of information in the field of Space Situational Awareness and others, as well as cooperation on hosted payloads (mission instruments loaded onto other entities’ satellites).

Information Security
Information security plays a crucial role in advancing cooperation within the context of the alliance. Based on this perspective, both countries continue to hold discussions designed to enhance their cooperation regarding information security, the importance of which was affirmed in the Japan-U.S Summit Meeting held in May 2023 and the Japan-U.S. “2+2” held in January 2023.

Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
While steadily advancing the efforts described above, the Government of Japan will continue to make every effort to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, by soundly promoting the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko.

Similarly in the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) released in January 2022, the two sides confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on these force realignment efforts. At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” held in January 2023, Japan and the U.S. affirmed the need to optimize the Alliance force posture based on the improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities, including the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan. They also confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities. In line with such policy, Japan and the U.S. affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in April 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa and the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025. This effort will be carried out while maintaining the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities. Japan and the U.S. also confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024.

In particular, the return of lands in Okinawa has been realized by completing various return projects based on the April 2013 “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa,” even after the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area (NTA, approximately 4,000 hectares) in December 2017. The return of all areas indicated as “Immediate Return” under the Consolidation Plan was achieved with the return of a portion of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran in March 2020. The land near Samashita Gate at Futenma Air Station was also returned in December 2020, followed by the return of
Under the New SMA signed on January 7 and (SMAs) which sets out special measures relating to the costs, by concluding the Special Measures Agreements working in Japan, utilities costs, and training relocation Japan has also borne the labor costs for U.S. Forces under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In addition, Programs (FIP), within the scope provided for under part of costs, such as the costs of Facility Improvement Projects to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency. The necessary preparations are underway toward the start of use in FY2023.

(4) Host Nation Support (HNS)

With a view to ensuring the effective operations of U.S. Forces in Japan amidst the growing severity of the security situation surrounding Japan, Japan bears a part of costs, such as the costs of Facility Improvement Programs (FIP), within the scope provided for under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In addition, Japan has also borne the labor costs for U.S. Forces working in Japan, utilities costs, and training relocation costs, by concluding the Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) which sets out special measures relating to the SOFA. Under the New SMA signed on January 7 and entered into force on April 1, it was decided that Japan will also bear the expenditures related to the procurement of training equipment and materials which will contribute, not only to the readiness of U.S. Forces in Japan but also to the enhancement of the interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Forces. Based on the SOFA and the New SMA, the Government of Japan will bear the HNS costs from FY2022 to FY2026.

In consultations on the New SMAs, as both parties concurred that the costs borne by Japan should be used to build a foundation upon which the Japan-U.S. Alliance will be further strengthened, the Japanese side decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency.

During the effective period of the new SMAs (April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2027), the annual average budget for HNS is approximately 211 billion Japanese yen.}

*In the “2+2” joint statement released in April, 2012, Japan and the U.S. decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam and land returns south of Kadena from progress on the relocations of MCAS Futenma

the laundry factory area of Makiminato Service Area (land along National Route No. 58) in May 2021. In May 2022, which marked the 50th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, Japan and the U.S. concurred to enable the public use of the Lower Plaza Housing Area of Camp Zukeran as a greenspace, ahead of its return to Japan. The necessary preparations are underway toward the start of use in FY2023.
Various Issues Related to the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan

To ensure the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan as the linchpin of these arrangements, it is important to mitigate the impact of U.S. Forces’ activities on residents living in the vicinity and to gain their understanding and support regarding the presence of U.S. Forces. The Government of Japan has been making utmost efforts to make improvements in specific issues in light of the requests from local communities. Among these issues are preventing and responding to incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces, abating the noise by U.S. Forces’ aircraft, and dealing with environmental issues at U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas, including the sound implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship of 2015 and the Agreement on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan of 2017. For example, when the leakage of water containing substances such as Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) occurred as a result of the spill of fire-fighting foam, at the Naval Air Facility Atsugi due to heavy rains in September, Japanese officials accessed the facility based on the Supplemental Agreement on Environmental Stewardship to conduct a site visit. Japan and the U.S. are also cooperating closely in the field of health and hygiene issues including infectious diseases such as the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). On January 28, the Quarantine Procedure Panel under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee was reorganized and upgraded to the new “Quarantine and Health Protection Subcommittee (QHS)” which the health authorities of both Japan and the U.S. participate in. Japan and the U.S. will continue to further strengthen cooperation to put in place thorough measures to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, and to mitigate the anxiety among the local communities.

The “TOFU: Think of Okinawa’s Future in the U.S.” program provides an opportunity for high school and university students from Okinawa to witness for themselves what Japan’s alliance partner, the U.S., is truly like, and the role that Japan plays in the international community, as well as to promote mutual understanding between the two countries. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, this program was implemented as a Tokyo Dispatch Program in March 2021. Meanwhile, the Project to Promote Exchanges and Enhance Mutual Understanding Between Japan and the United States, which has been implemented in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) from FY 2020 to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between Japanese and American middle and high school students, was organized on a larger scale in FY 2022 (see the Column on page 204).

The United Nations Forces and U.S. Forces in Japan

Coincident with the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the UN forces was established in July of the same year based on the recommendation of UN Security Council resolution 83 in June. Following the ceasefire agreement concluded in July 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) Headquarters was relocated to Seoul, South Korea in July 1957, and UNC-Rear (UNC-R) was established in Japan. Established at Yokota Air Base, UNC-R currently has four military staff members including a stationed commander, as well as military attachés from nine countries who are stationed at embassies in Tokyo as liaison officers for the UN forces. Based on Article 5 of the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, the UN forces in Japan may use the U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas in Japan to the minimum extent required to provide support for military logistics for the UN forces. At present, the UN forces in Japan may use the U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas in Japan to the minimum extent required to provide support for military logistics for the UN forces. At present, the UN forces in Japan may use the following seven facilities: Camp Zama, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Yokota Air Base, Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma and White Beach Area.

In July 2019, a joint board was held between the Government of Japan and UNC. The meetings saw discussions held over the situation on the Korean

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2 Participants from Okinawa are invited to Tokyo to meet related persons involved in Japan-U.S. relations and experts active in the international community (including online meetings), as well as visit and tour various facilities.
Since 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA), has conducted exchange programs for the children of U.S. Forces personnel and local junior and high school students in communities that host U.S. Forces Japan. This program aims to nurture human resources who will take an active role in the international society as well as to increase mutual understanding between Japanese and American junior and senior high school students through cultural and educational exchanges.

In 2022, the program was held at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture), Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) (Okinawa Prefecture), U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo (Nagasaki Prefecture), Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture), and Camp Zama (Kanagawa Prefecture). This column introduces the voices of both Japanese and U.S. students who participated in the program at Camp Kuwae in Okinawa Prefecture.

Yuina Pope, Lester Middle School
I am glad I was selected to participate in this exchange program. Even though the exchange students had little trouble communicating verbally, I realized that language might not be the only barrier to break down. This experience helped me learn the small cultural differences that I did not notice before. In the beginning, the way we communicated was like through a wall. However, the more time I spent with my groupmates, the more I started to see that we could be friends instead of diplomats. This short time will forever impact my perspective.

CHINEN Ami, Junior High School Attached to Faculty Education, Ryukyu University
I participated in this program on October 1 and 2, where I engaged in exchanges with students from Lester Middle School located in the air base. At the exchanges, in order to learn about the characteristics of our mutual cultures, we split up into four groups, each comprising junior high school students from Japan and the U.S., and worked to produce short plays and local character mascots featuring the characteristics of each country. In one of the short plays, the actor entered a rest room in Japan and, upon seeing too many buttons, became confused about which one to push to flush the toilet. This was a surprise to me. In addition, the tour of the American school made me realize the significant differences from Japanese ones. For example, the library was about four times larger than the one in our school, there were many sofas of various styles where students could relax, and there were rooms where students could make things with 3D printers, theater rooms, and others. I felt that both Japan and the U.S. have many of their own good points. I hope that this opportunity will bring about more exchanges between students of Japan and the U.S. in the future, and that we can incorporate the good aspects of our respective cultures for exchange programs that promote mutual understanding.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
YOSHIKAWA Yuumi, and Ginowan Mayor MATSUGAWA Masanori, interacting with students (October 2, Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture)
Peninsula, with the two sides reaching an agreement on notification procedures in case of unusual occurrences related to the UN forces in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue to work closely with the UN forces.

(1) Regional Security

In the international community, a historical shift in the power balance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, is occurring. In light of the numerous security challenges confronting this region, there is a need for Japan to cooperate with its allies and like-minded countries and others. In particular, it is more important than ever to further strengthen the deterrent and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S Alliance. There is also a need for Japan to fundamentally reinforce its own defense capabilities. At the same time, by actively strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with each country, Japan has been making efforts to realize a desirable regional security environment for Japan.

ASEAN is located in a geopolitically strategic position and faces Japan’s important sea lane. A stable and prosperous ASEAN region is crucial to the stability and prosperity not only of the East Asia region but also of the international community. The Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) was launched in April. At the inaugural meeting, the two sides concurred on starting to consider frameworks to facilitate reciprocal visits as well as reciprocal provision of supplies and services in order to further enhance and facilitate cooperation such as exercises between Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In May, Japan and Thailand signed an Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, accelerating consultations between the two countries toward the realization of concrete defense equipment transfer. In June, Japan and Singapore concurred to commence negotiations on the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. To ensure the rule of law in the seas, Japan also provides continuous support to the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, and other countries to improve the law enforcement capabilities of their coast guard authorities. “SAPPHIRE” is an initiative in which the Japan Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard collaborate to conduct training for third-country agencies, and the first program was conducted in May for the Philippine Coast Guard.

Japan and India held three summit meetings—during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to India in March, at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders’ Meeting in May, and at the state funeral for the late Prime Minister ABE Shinzo. At these talks, Japan and India affirmed that they would work to further develop the “Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” The second Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held in September, where the Ministers confirmed the substantial expansion of bilateral security and defense cooperation and concurred on continuing to conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises in a multilayered manner going forward. At the working-level, the Fourth Japan-India Cyber Dialogue was convened in June, and both sides exchanged views on their respective cyber policies and cooperation in the cyber domain, among other topics.

At the Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference Meeting in January, Japan and Australia signed the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), aimed at facilitating cooperation such as joint exercises, disaster relief activities, and other forms of cooperation between the JSDF and Australian Defense Force. At the Japan-Australia Leaders’ Meeting held in October during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Perth, the two leaders concurred on the recognition that the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries has been elevated to a new level. They also signed a new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The two leaders concurred that this Declaration is a compass that will guide the direction of Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation for the next 10 years, and that the two countries will further strengthen security and defense cooperation in accordance with the Declaration, including cooperation between the JSDF and Australian Defense Force. The
tenth Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) was held in December, where the four Ministers followed up promptly on the outcomes of the Leader’s Meeting held in October. They affirmed that they would identify the bilateral cooperation that should be implemented as soon as possible based on the aforementioned Declaration, and then work together on this identified cooperation toward realizing Japan-Australia cooperation and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation in the field of security going forward, alongside promoting multilayered cooperation between like-minded countries. With regard to ship-to-ship transfers,\(^3\) the Australian Defence Force carried out surveillance operations by their naval vessels in late June and late October and by their aircraft at the end of February.

In relation to the UK, which is Japan’s “Global strategic partner,” at the Japan-UK Summit Meeting held in May, the two countries affirmed their agreement in principle to the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement, which facilitates cooperation in areas such as joint exercises between the JSDF and the UK Armed Forces, disaster relief activities, and other forms of cooperation. Thereafter, at the Japan-UK Summit Meeting in January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister Rishi Sunak signed the Agreement, and the two leaders concurred in further deepening cooperation between the two countries.

In relation to Germany, the Chief of the German Air Force and German Air Force aircraft visited Japan in September and held the first Japan-German joint exercises in Japan. In addition, the Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) was held in November, where the Ministers concurred on promoting concrete measures to deepen Japan-Germany security and defense cooperation, including economic security.

At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in May, Japan welcomed the progress in Japan-Italy security cooperation, including joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden by the Japan Maritime SDF and the Italian Navy, and the training of Japan Air SDF pilots by the Italian Air Force, and valued the formulation of the documents on the Indo-Pacific published by Italy, based on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. At the three countries shared the view that they expect this cooperation to be a foundation for global safety, stability, and prosperity over the coming decades. With regard to ship-to-ship transfers, naval vessels from the UK Armed Forces engaged in surveillance operations in mid-January, early February, late February, and late September.

With France, which Japan shares an “Exceptional Partnership” with, the Sixth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) was convened in January. The Ministers shared the view of raising cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to a higher level and further promoting cooperation to address regional situations and challenges facing the international community. France dispatched its Navy frigate *Vendémiaire* in March and the Falcon 200 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) in October to the waters around Japan, including the East China Sea to conduct surveillance operations against illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean-flagged vessels. At the Japan-France Summit Meeting held in January 2023, the two leaders welcomed the progress in substantive cooperation, including reciprocal visits of assets and joint exercises between Japan and France, and concurred in deepening cooperation between the two countries.

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\(^3\) In this context, “ship-to-ship transfers” refers to the transfers to or from North Korea-flagged vessels of any goods or items at sea, which UN Security Council resolution 2375 (adopted in September 2017) prohibits the UN member states from facilitating or engaging in.
Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in January 2023, the two leaders concurred in upgrading the relationship between the two countries to that of “strategic partners,” and shared the view to establish consultations between the respective foreign and defense authorities as well as to further promote cooperation in the field of security.

In March, the EU released “The Strategic Compass of the European Union,” setting out its strategic guidelines for the next 10 years. In this document, the EU clearly stated that it aims to further develop partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, including Japan. At the Japan-EU Summit convened in May, both sides concurred on strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and on aiming to expand substantive cooperation in the fields of cyber security, addressing disinformation, maritime security, and crisis management. In relation to NATO, Prime Minister Kishida held a meeting with Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg in June during the NATO Summit, which was attended for the first time by a Prime Minister of Japan. At the meeting, the two sides concurred on the importance of deepening Japan-NATO cooperation more than ever before, based on the recognition that the security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific is inseparable.

At the Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in October, the two Ministers announced the “Japan-Canada Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region”, and concurred on further advancing concrete and robust cooperation and coordination between the two countries going forward. This Action Plan includes cooperation in response to violations of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers, which Canada has been proactively addressing since 2018, efforts to make the greatest use of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), and cooperation on energy security, among other matters. The fifth Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) was held in March and the 12th Japan-Canada Political-Military (PM) Dialogue in December. With regard to joint exercises with the Canadian Armed Forces, the Japan-Canada joint exercise “KAEDEX,” which has been conducted every year since 2017, was held in September. A number of multilateral joint exercises were also conducted. As for responding to illegal ship-to-ship transfers, a naval vessel of the Canadian Armed Forces conducted surveillance operations from mid-September, while aerial surveillance by aircraft was carried out for about one month from late April and about one month from early October.

There are various issues of concern in relation to China, such as its intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters, based on its own assertions in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the rapid strengthening of its military power without transparency, and increasing activities by its military in the waters and air spaces surrounding Japan. Japan will continue to make use of opportunities at high-level dialogues, including summit meetings and foreign ministers’ meetings, to firmly assert its position and resolve the issues of concern one by one, as well as to take a calm and resolute approach while strongly requesting for China’s concrete action. As China’s military trends are a matter of serious concern for Japan, Japan is working on communicating its policies through security dialogues such as the Japan-China Security Dialogue, as well as to build multilayered channels for exchanges. At the same time, Japan is communicating its concerns and urging China to improve transparency in relation to its defense policies and military power, as well as to take more concrete actions to contribute to the security environment and to the region, including Japan. The Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China that commenced operation in 2018 is aimed at promoting mutual understanding and confidence and avoiding unexpected collision, and the leaders of Japan and China concurred on the early launch of a
hotline under this Mechanism at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held in November.

In relation to the Republic of Korea (ROK), based on the recognition of the importance of Japan-ROK as well as Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation toward the denuclearization of North Korea, the two countries held a Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (November), Japan-ROK Leaders’ Meeting (September), Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Meeting (October), Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (February, July, August, September), Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Meeting (February, March, May, October, November (2 times)), Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (June, November), and Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (February, July, September), where the two sides affirmed that Japan and the ROK, as well as Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, would work closely together. In particular, at the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting held for the first time in three years, the two leaders affirmed cooperation on the issue concerning North Korea, and toward the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Based on the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in June, the three countries conducted joint exercises (August, September, October), in order to further promote trilateral cooperation to respond to regional security issues.

Peace and stability in the Middle East region is vital to the peace and prosperity of the international community including Japan. The Middle East is one of the world’s key energy suppliers, and approximately 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports rely on the region. It is, therefore, extremely important to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in this region. As Japan’s independent efforts toward ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East region and the safety of Japan-related vessels, the Government of Japan has made a Cabinet decision in December 2019 on (1) making further diplomatic efforts toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, (2) taking thorough measures for ensuring safety of navigation including robust information sharing with relevant stakeholders, and (3) utilizing vessels and aircraft of the SDF for strengthening its information gathering posture. Japan has continued to conduct information gathering activities using SDF vessels and aircraft in the waters of the Middle East since January 2020.

In addition, Japan has actively participated in and contributed to multilateral frameworks in the region, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), in order to strengthen security cooperation in the region. The ARF is an important framework for dialogue on security in which various entities participate including North Korea and the EU, with the aims of improving the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region through dialogues and cooperation on political and security issues. It is also an important forum that focuses on confidence-building through various initiatives. At the 29th ARF Ministerial Meeting held in August, participating ministers candidly exchanged views mainly on regional and international affairs, including issues concerning Ukraine, Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, North Korea, and Myanmar, as well as the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan is also making a pro-active contribution through, for example, serving as a co-chair of all the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Maritime Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, and ICTs Security.

Furthermore, in addition to government-to-government dialogues (track 1), Japan utilizes frameworks where participants from both public and private sectors exchange opinions and explain their security policies (track 1.5), as well as other means, as part of its efforts to promote other countries’ understanding of Japan’s security policies, and to facilitate cooperation and confidence-building in the region.

(2) Economic Security

A Trends Surrounding Economic Security

In recent years, various challenges have been surfacing in fields that cut across national security and the economy. The scope of the national security domain is expanding rapidly. Various risks are emerging, such as the risk of stolen or leaked advanced civilian technologies being converted to military use in other countries, the risk of suppliers influenced by foreign governments obstructing the stable operation of critical infrastructure such as telecommunications, the risk of disruptions to the supply of critical goods due to dependence on other countries, and the risk of being subjected to economic
coercion by some countries seeking to achieve political objectives by using their advantages in the supply chain or their purchasing power in the market as leverage.

In light of the emergence of various threats through economic means, securing Japan’s national interests such as peace, security, and economic prosperity by carrying out economic measures, in other words economic security, is becoming increasingly important. In view of this, Japan is accelerating efforts, such as the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act in May. This Act is centered around four pillars: enhancing the resilience of supply chains, ensuring security and reliability of essential infrastructure, public-private cooperation regarding specified critical technologies, and non-disclosure of selected patent applications.

B Recent Initiatives by Other Countries

Other countries have also been rapidly advancing initiatives to promote economic security in recent years.

The U.S. has taken the lead in adopting and implementing regulations and promotion measures from the perspectives of maintaining its technological advantage and addressing supply chain risks, as evidenced by its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, among others. As a part of these efforts, the U.S. enacted the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022, which provides for direct financial assistance and tax credits to companies that invest in semiconductor production in the U.S. In October, the U.S. released its National Security Strategy, which outlines the U.S. policy to strengthen its industry and innovation base through expanding investments in key areas and securing the safety of critical infrastructure and supply chains, with the goal to maintain and fortify its competitive edge. Moreover, it also set out the U.S. strategy to continue strengthening its resilience against malicious activities in cyberspace, and its responses to counter intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, and other attempts to harm its technological superiority. In November, the Federal Communications Commission issued an administrative order to prohibit the authorization of imports to and sale within the U.S., of communications equipment that could potentially pose a security threat to the country.

The EU promotes strengthening resilience against the risk of supply disruptions to critical technologies and materials, based on the concept of “strategic autonomy.” In February, the European Commission published the European Chips Act, which sets out the targets of establishing a supply chain within the region that covers the research and development, design, through to the production of advanced semiconductors, and of growing the EU’s global market share of next-generation semiconductors produced within the region to 20% or more by 2030. In September, the European Commission announced that it would put forward a bill on the European Critical Raw Materials Act and establish a new European Sovereignty Fund to strategically enhance the production capabilities, storage, and overall support for critical raw materials within the region. Furthermore, in the same month, the European Commission proposed a Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI), drawing from the lessons of the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The SMEI is aimed at securing goods with strategic importance and guaranteeing their free movement within the EU’s single market, in preparation for similar crises that may occur in the future. In addition, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) entered into force in January 2023. Under the FSR, the European Commission may conduct investigations in cases of suspected market distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies, in relation to activities by companies receiving subsidies from non-EU governments and operating within the EU market. Besides this, in December 2021, the European Commission proposed an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) to set out procedures and standards for initiating countermeasures as a means of “last resort” against economic coercion to EU Member States by third countries, in case consultations or other measures fail. Deliberations on the ACI are currently ongoing (as of January 2023).

Australia has, thus far, positioned the securing of national resilience and the protection of assets and infrastructure as its national interests, and advanced concrete measures to that end. These include the formulation of the International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy (April 2021), which sets out the policy for promoting the identification of technologies that should be protected, the tightening of investment screening systems for land and businesses related to sensitive national security (January
2021), and the establishment of the Next Generation Technologies Fund, which invests approximately 60 billion yen over 10 years from 2016 into game-changing technologies on national security. In December 2021, the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act 2022 came into effect. This law is aimed at strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and sets out the expansion of critical infrastructure departments and their responsibilities, as well as government support and intervention measures in the event of cyber security incidents.

In October, Canada announced the policy of prohibiting, in principle, significant transactions by foreign state-owned enterprises in Canada’s critical minerals sector, as a part of its efforts to strengthen the resilience of supply chains for batteries, electric vehicles, critical minerals, and others. In December, an act to amend the Investment Canada Act, including provisions on setting new application requirements when investing in prescribed business sectors, was submitted to the Parliament.

C Diplomatic Efforts Toward the Promotion of Economic Security

Diplomacy plays a significant role in promoting economic security. Japan, in cooperation with the international community, engages in diplomacy in areas such as further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, responding to issues based on existing rules, and rule-making to address new issues.

In relation to further strengthening cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries, Japan leverages cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee Meeting (the Economic “2+2”) or Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) and frameworks such as the G7 and others, as well as strengthens cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, to expand and deepen cooperation with like-minded countries with a view to developing common recognition and coordinating policies.

In responding to issues based on existing rules, Japan has worked on correcting unfair trade policies and practices of others in cooperation with like-minded countries from the perspective of consistency with existing rules including WTO agreements, EPAs, investment-related treaties, and others. Furthermore, Japan gathers and analyzes information on economic security measures and trade rules, drawing on the efforts of like-minded countries, and works to ensure that Japan’s economic security policy needs are appropriately met.

With regard to rule-making related to new issues, existing international agreements are not adequate for addressing areas such as data, critical and emerging technologies, including the fifth-generation mobile communications systems (5G), economic coercion, and others. In fields where there is a need to further develop international rules, Japan continues to play a leading part in international debates in cooperation with like-minded countries.

D Cooperation with its Ally and Like-minded Countries

Japan made particularly significant progress in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries in 2022. Firstly, during the Economic “2+2” in July, Japan and the U.S. engaged in discussions on responses to challenges to sovereignty of each country and the international order posed by the use of economic influence, such as economic coercion and unfair and opaque lending practices. During the talks, the Japanese side proposed deepening discussions on economic coercion leading up to the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit. At the meeting, the two sides concurred on promoting cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as with like-minded countries, in areas such as expanding the share of Open RAN4 in the global 5G market and the diffusion of related infrastructure. They also concurred on the need to build more resilient supply chains based on a rules-based multilateral free trade system and in cooperation with like-minded countries. In addition, the Ministers also exchanged views on bilateral cooperation on strengthening supply chain resilience in areas such as batteries and critical minerals.

At the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders’

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4 Refers to radio access networks (RAN) that can be built in an open way by a combination of multiple vendors. It offers the advantage of contributing to the mitigation of supply chain risks.
Meeting convened in May in Tokyo, in the field of critical and emerging technologies, the leaders concurred on continuing to cooperate in areas such as advancing interoperability and security of 5G, leveraging their complementary strengths across the supply chains, including semiconductors, strengthening cooperation at international standardization organizations such as the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and strengthening horizon scanning cooperation. In addition to announcing the launch of the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains, the relevant agencies of the four countries also signed a new Memorandum of Cooperation on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN.

Cooperation in economic security was also affirmed at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meetings held in May and November, and the G7 Summit in June. In particular, at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May, clear statements on economic security were set out in the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Communiqué for the first time. Furthermore, at the G7 Elmau Summit, the G7 Leaders’ Communiqué also clearly mentioned economic security for the first time, and affirmed the deepening of cooperation to respond to economic coercion. The G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement issued in November affirmed that the G7 will continue to enhance coordination and cooperation, within and beyond the G7, including on economic security challenges, and to stand up to acts of economic coercion.

With regard to Japan’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, the Joint Statement between Japan and the Kingdom of Cambodia, issued in March, stated that the two leaders expressed concerns about economic coercion and emphasized the importance of strengthening the international economic order to counter new challenges such as economic coercion. At the same meeting, the two leaders also confirmed the importance of advancing the development of secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond 5G networks (i.e. 6G) as well as the importance of principles such as openness or diversity for ensuring long term security, reliability and resilience of telecommunication infrastructures including 5G. The Joint Statement issued from the Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) held in April also expressed concern for and strong opposition to economic coercion to achieve political ends, stressed the importance of an international law-based economic order, and highlighted the importance of close coordination in dealing with economic coercion.

E Response to Economic Coercion
Among the new issues described in “C” above, economic coercion that involves using economic ties with a specific country and taking measures or threatening to take measures in an abusive, arbitrary, or opaque manner, in order to achieve political objectives, is becoming a particularly serious problem against the backdrop of globalization and the growing economic interdependence between countries. Such economic coercion poses challenges to a free, open and rules-based international order.

The new National Security Strategy formulated by the Government of Japan in December also sets out the policy for promoting effective efforts against economic coercion, while working with the ally and like-minded countries. As an issue that cannot be adequately addressed by existing international agreements, it is important to foster a common understanding within the international community by working with its ally and like-minded countries and strategically raising international awareness.

F MOFA’s Role
Changes in the global security environment have increased a need to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international economic order, while also taking into account the perspective of security. MOFA is the ministry that is responsible for security policies, external economic relations and international law, and it continues to lead diplomatic efforts related to economic security, as well as to work proactively to maintain and strengthen the international order.

(3) Cyber
Today, cross-border cyberspace has become an indispensable social infrastructure for conducting all activities in countries around the world. While its importance and public nature are growing due to its role as a public space that all citizens are engaged in, the risks that impede free access to and utilization of
cyberspace are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which the risk of exposure is relatively low and attackers have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks. It is highly likely that hybrid warfare, combining military and non-military means to achieve military objectives, will be conducted in an even more sophisticated form in the time ahead.

Based on this recognition, MOFA is promoting the following diplomatic efforts to realize a free, fair and secure cyberspace: promoting the rule of law, efforts to deter cyberattacks, promoting confidence-building measures, and cooperating on capacity building.

To promote the rule of law, establishing the rule of law in cyberspace is important for stabilizing relations between nations. From the viewpoint that existing international law is also applicable to activities involving the use of cyberspace, Japan participates actively in discussions in the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), which all UN member states participate in, for the term from 2021 to 2025.

As an initiative to deter cyberattacks, Japan has issued the “public attribution,” which is for each country to publicly condemn or express concerns about groups conducting cyberattacks. Japan has publicly condemned North Korea’s involvement behind the scenes on the WannaCry incident in 2017, as well as the long-running cyberattacks perpetrated by the China-based group APT10 in 2018. In July 2021, the Press Secretary of MOFA issued a statement on cyberattacks, assessing that a group known as APT40, which the Chinese government is behind, as well as a group known as Tick, which Unit 61419 of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is behind, were highly likely to have been involved in these cyberattacks, and firmly condemned these activities in coordination with Japan’s ally and likeminded countries. From the perspective of deterring cyberattacks, it is also important to promote the rule of law. Through means such as discussions in the international fora, it is necessary to formulate and promote rules for the international community that make a state accountable for a cyberattack carried out within its territory, even when the cyberattack is not attributed to the state actor, under certain conditions.

As a means of promoting confidence-building measures, Japan has engaged in consultations on cyber issues with 14 countries and regions to date, taking into account the need to deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between states in order to prevent the inadvertently heightening of tensions among states or aggravating of the situation between countries as a result of the highly anonymous and covert nature of cyberspace. Consultations were held with India in June 2022, and with France in July the same year. Japan also places importance on regional efforts, and engages in discussions on confidence-building measures that should be taken in the future at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in which ASEAN, the U.S., the EU among others participate.

With regard to capacity building support, in view of the borderless nature of cyberspace, enhancing the capacity of other countries and regions contributes to the security environment for the world as a whole. Relevant ministries and agencies including MOFA continue to provide support for capacity building and promote initiatives through international organizations, mainly to ASEAN, which is the core of the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, Japan contributes to the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC) through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), provides cybersecurity-related equipment through grant aid, implements the JICA Country/Knowledge Co-Creation Program (KCCP), and contributes to the Cybersecurity Multi-Donor Trust Fund through the World Bank, among other initiatives. The Quad Cybersecurity Partnership was launched at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders’ Meeting held in May, and the four leaders confirmed that they would advance concrete efforts, including providing support for capacity building in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan announced the new National Security Strategy in December, which states: “In order to ensure secure and stable use of cyberspace, especially

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5 A malicious program that North Korea is believed to have been involved in. In May 2017, more than 300,000 computers in more than 150 countries were infected and ransom was demanded.
the security of the nation and critical infrastructures, the response capabilities in the field of cyber security should be strengthened equal to or surpassing the level of leading Western countries.” To that end, it states the introduction of active cyber defense and the establishment of a new organization that will comprehensively coordinate policies in the field of cyber security in a centralized manner. The Strategy also states that Japan will improve coordination with other policies that contribute to the enhancement of cyber security, such as economic security and the enhancement of technical capabilities related to national security, and continue to work for the enhancement of information gathering and analysis, attribution and its public announcement, as well as formulation of international frameworks and rules in a coordinated manner with its ally, like-minded countries, and others.

Based on this Strategy, Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of a free, fair and secure cyberspace.

(4) The Oceans and Seas
Japan is surrounded by the sea on all sides and is blessed with a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and long coastlines. It is a maritime nation that has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Free, Open and Stable Seas.” “Free, Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based on the rule of law including freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than force, are essential for the peace and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. To maintain and develop “Free, Open and Stable Seas,” Japan promotes initiatives to ensure safe maritime transport and cooperate on maritime security. Such initiatives are also important toward securing Japan’s maritime interests, which form the basis for Japan’s economic survival.

Japan is advancing efforts toward the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” that aims to bring stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region, in particular, by strengthening maritime order in the region where important sea lanes are located.

A Maritime Order
(A) Basic Stance
There is an increasing number of cases where the interests of countries clash with each other from the perspective of securing maritime interests and national security. In particular, in the seas of Asia, there has been an increasing number of cases of tension arising from friction between countries, and the international community is paying attention to these cases with much interest. At the 13th Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in Singapore in 2014, Prime Minister Abe shared the view that it was necessary to fully uphold the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” (see 6(2) on page 252).

Japan also utilizes frameworks such as the G7 and ASEAN-related meetings including the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to actively send a message regarding the importance of “Free, Open and Stable Seas” based on the rule of law, and Japan’s stance on maritime security as well as the importance of international cooperation in this area. At the EAS held in October 2021, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan highly valued the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which upholds values such as openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and the rule of law. He reiterated full support for the AOIP, which shares fundamental principles with FOIP, and called on each country for their support. In addition, at the ASEAN-Japan Summit Meeting held in November 2022, Prime Minister Kishida spoke about the steady progress of concrete cooperation in the four priority areas of AOIP, including maritime cooperation, that contributes to the fundamental principles of AOIP, after the adoption of the Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific by Japan and ASEAN in 2020.

(B) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Also known as the “Constitution for the Oceans,” UNCLOS is the very basis of maritime order governed by the rule of law. Japan regards maritime order with

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6 Regional cooperative frameworks with the participation of the 10 ASEAN countries as well as various countries, regions and organizations. In addition to the EAS and ARF, other examples include the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, ROK) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

7 The four areas of maritime cooperation, connectivity, SDGs and economy.
the Convention at the core as the cornerstone that safeguards Japan’s maritime rights and interests while facilitating its maritime activities across the international community. As such, Japan actively contributes to discussions among concerned international organizations at conferences that include the Meetings of States Parties to the Convention, as well as to the sharing of ideas for achieving stability in the maritime legal order, in order to ensure that the convention will be even more widely applied and implemented appropriately (see 6(2) on page 252).

(C) Challenge to Japan’s Maritime Sovereignty (Situation Surrounding the East China Sea) (see Chapter 2, Section 2, 2(1) B(D) on page 50)
In the East China Sea, China Coast Guard vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial sea around the Senkaku Islands in rapid succession in 2022, and the number of days of navigation in the contiguous zone reached a record high of 336 days. Furthermore, there were repeated occurrences of China Coast Guard vessels intruding into the territorial sea and approaching Japanese fishing vessels, and the situation is becoming increasingly severe, with the number of hours of intrusion into the territorial sea hitting a record high of 72 hours and 45 minutes in December. Chinese military vessels and aircraft are also becoming increasingly active and expanding their operations. Furthermore, China has been continuing with unilateral resource development in areas where the EEZ and the continental shelf are pending delimitation. Additionally, in recent years, Japan has found numerous research projects being conducted by China in the waters surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, without Japan’s consent.

Given China’s continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea, Japan will carefully monitor the trends and movements around its air and sea spaces, and continue to respond in a firm but calm manner while making claims that should be made. At the same time, it will promote cooperation with the relevant countries including the U.S. in order to achieve peace and stability in the East China Sea.

(D) Challenge to the Maritime Order (Problems Surrounding the South China Sea) (see Chapter 2, Section 2, 7(2) on page 95)
In the South China Sea, China has been conducting unilateral attempts to change the status quo, which run counter to the rule of law and openness, as well as attempting to create faits accomplis. These include the further militarization of disputed features. China has also continued or enhanced actions that escalate tensions in the region. The international community, including Japan, has expressed serious concerns over these actions. Japan strongly opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and has consistently supported the full enforcement of the rule of law in the South China Sea, while focusing on ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and ensuring the safety of sea lanes. Japan has also emphasized the importance of all parties involved with the South China Sea to work toward the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law, in particular the UNCLOS.

The issue with regard to the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and constitutes a legitimate concern of the international community. The issue is also an important matter of concern for Japan, which depends on marine transport for much of its resources and energy and which is a stakeholder that utilizes the South China Sea. Cooperation within the international community is of great importance in maintaining and developing “Free, Open and Stable Seas” based on the rule of law. For this reason, Japan supports the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations. 8

B Ensuring Safe Maritime Transport
Japan actively contributes to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and safe maritime transport through counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close partnership and cooperation with other countries.

(A) Counter-piracy Measures in Asia
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

8 The U.S. Government explains its “freedom of navigation” operations as efforts to challenge excessive claims that can infringe freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right of lawful uses of the sea. One example of this is the navigation of the U.S. Navy’s USS Benfold guided-missile destroyer through the waters around the Spratly Islands on September 8, 2021.
■ Uotsuri Island of Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture

Photo: Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, Cabinet Secretariat

■ Large-scale, rapid outpost building in the South China Sea by China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before reclamation</th>
<th>2015 (After reclamation)</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiery Cross Reef</td>
<td>August 14, 2014</td>
<td>September 3, 2015</td>
<td>March 27, 2020</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><img src="before.png" alt="Fiery Cross Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2015.png" alt="Fiery Cross Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2020.png" alt="Fiery Cross Reef" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subi Reef</td>
<td>January 8, 2014</td>
<td>September 3, 2015</td>
<td>March 27, 2020</td>
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<td><img src="before.png" alt="Subi Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2015.png" alt="Subi Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2020.png" alt="Subi Reef" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mischief Reef</td>
<td>January 25, 2015</td>
<td>September 8, 2015</td>
<td>April 23, 2020</td>
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<td><img src="before.png" alt="Mischief Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2015.png" alt="Mischief Reef" /></td>
<td><img src="2020.png" alt="Mischief Reef" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the number of piracy cases in the seas of Southeast Asia was 62 in 2020, 56 in 2021, and 58 in 2022.

To encourage regional cooperation in coping with incidents such as acts of piracy in Asia, Japan took the initiative in formulating the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which entered into force in 2006. Each of the contracting parties provides information and cooperates on incidents such as acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and other regions, via the Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) established in Singapore. To date, Japan has been supporting the activities of ReCAAP-ISC by dispatching the Executive Directors (left office in March 2022) and Assistant Directors and making financial contributions. Moreover, Japan is carrying out programs to support enhancing maritime law enforcement and surveillance capabilities of coastal states in Asia, which have been highly acclaimed in the international community.

(B) Counter-piracy Measures Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

According to the IMB, the number of piracy and armed robbery cases off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden was 237 at its peak in 2011 but has since declined to a low level (zero in 2019 and 2020, one in 2021 (attempted attack), and zero in 2022). Despite efforts such as maritime operations of the navies and self-defense measures by merchant ships of various countries, the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia remain unresolved. There are presently still entities in these areas of the ocean that have the intention and capability to carry out acts of piracy.

Since 2009, Japan has been conducting counter-piracy operations by deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers (with coast guard officers on board) and P-3C patrol aircraft off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To solve the root causes of piracy in these areas, Japan has been making multilayered efforts that include support for enhancing the maritime security capabilities of Somalia and its neighboring countries and ensuring the stability of Somalia.

Japan has supported the establishment of Information Sharing Centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the construction of the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC) by contributing 15.53 million US dollars to date to a fund established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Moreover, Japan has contributed 4.5 million US dollars to an international trust fund that enhances capacity building for piracy prosecution, to support Somalia and its neighboring countries. In addition, Japan provided two patrol vessels to the Djibouti Coast Guard in 2015, and decided in 2021 to provide support for the construction of two patrol vessels as well as the improvement of a floating pier. Japan has also been supporting the enhancement of its capacity to secure maritime security through JICA’s technical cooperation and joint exercises with the Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement. Furthermore, with a view to promoting the stability of Somalia, Japan has provided a total of over 500 million US dollars since 2007 aimed at supporting the recovery of basic social services, enhancing public security maintenance functions through support for the police, as well as revitalization of the domestic industries through vocational training, among other measures.

(C) Counter-piracy Measures in the Gulf of Guinea

According to the IMB, while the number of piracy and armed robbery cases in the Gulf of Guinea had remained at a high level in recent years with 64 cases in 2019 and 84 cases in 2020, it fell to 35 cases in 2021 and 19 cases in 2022. Moreover, in recent years, piracy cases have been occurring more frequently along the Central African coast in a shift from the previous piracy hotbed of the Western African coast. While the strengthening of maritime law enforcement capabilities among coastal states remains a key issue, such efforts are limited by financial constraints. Japan provides the coastal states with capacity building assistance through trainings conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and JICA, and is also involved in discussions in the international community through participation in the “G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea,” a cooperative and
coordination mechanism to address illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea.

C **Cooperation on Maritime Security**

(A) **Capacity Building Assistance**

Japan provides seamless assistance to various countries for capacity building in the area of maritime security, through cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Coast Guard and other agencies.

MOFA provides capacity building assistance to law enforcement agencies and other organizations in developing countries, through the provision of equipment such as patrol vessels and human resource development implemented through bilateral ODA. With the aim of addressing the diverse illegal maritime activities that have been increasing further in recent years, MOFA provides support toward the Maritime Law Enforcement Capacity Building Project implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), and in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, develops training courses and conducts training and workshops related to measures against illegal maritime activities in the target countries.

The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have provided capacity building assistance in the area of maritime security to Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Brunei to date. Through these support initiatives, cooperative relations with partners that share strategic interests with Japan are strengthened.

To provide capacity building assistance to coast guard authorities of coastal states of the Indo-Pacific, the Japan Coast Guard dispatches highly skilled Japan Coast Guard officials with expert knowledge as well as the Japan Coast Guard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT), a special team that provides capacity building support, to the coast guard authorities of each country. In addition, the Japan Coast Guard also invites the coast guard officials from each country to Japan where it conducts training for them. It also administers the Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program, a Master’s level education program on maritime security policy that accepts coast guard officials from Asian countries. Through this program, the Japan Coast Guard contributes to the development of human resources with advanced practical and applied knowledge, knowledge on international law and international relations as well as research into the relevant case studies, the ability to conduct analysis and make proposals, and international communication skills.

When providing such capacity building assistance, Japan cooperates closely with like-minded countries including the U.S., Australia, India, the UK, and France.

(B) **Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)**

Consolidating and sharing a wide range of maritime information and understanding maritime domain effectively and efficiently are vital toward the realization of “Free, Open and Stable Seas.” Japan places great importance on international cooperation with like-minded countries, including Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) cooperation, in such maritime domain awareness (MDA) initiatives.

In recent years, progress has been made in the Indo-Pacific region to establish information sharing centers for the consolidation, analysis and sharing of maritime information, such as phenomena related to the safety of navigation and ship information. Japan has dispatched personnel, including Executive Directors (left office in March 2022) and Assistant Directors, to the ReCAAP-ISC based in Singapore, as well as liaison officers to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) established by the Republic of Singapore Navy, and the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) established by the Indian Navy. Furthermore, the authorities of Japan and India exchange information based on the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy, signed on the occasion of the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in October 2018.

Japan also organized two previous sessions of the “ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)” as an official
event of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security.

(5) Outer Space
In recent years, outer space has become congested due to its diversified use and increasing number of countries using space. In addition, the increase of space debris due to factors such as anti-satellite (ASAT) tests and satellite collisions poses a growing risk to the sustainable and stable use of outer space.

In order to cope with this situation, Japan has been engaging in initiatives such as strengthening Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance for space systems. Japan has also been working on international rule-making and international space cooperation.

A Realization of the Rule of Law in Outer Space
The international community has been vigorously discussing international rule-making concerning outer space activities in a variety of ways. Japan has also been actively involved in these efforts toward establishing and strengthening the rule of law in outer space.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a permanent committee established under the UN General Assembly, plays an important role in international rule-making related to civil space activities.

Apart from the Committee, which engages in comprehensive discussions, COPUOS has the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, which conducts reviews on issues related to space activities from scientific and technical aspects, and the Legal Subcommittee, which discusses legal matters arising from space activities.

At the session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee convened in February, active discussions were held on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, in addition to individual themes, such as space debris and remote sensing.

At the session of the Legal Subcommittee convened from March to April, discussions were held on issues related to the definition of outer space and equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit, as well as on Space Traffic Management (STM) and space resources, which have been attracting more attention in recent years. In particular, with reference to space resources, intensive discussions were held on how international rules regarding space resources should be at the Working Group on Space Resources, newly established under the Legal Subcommittee in 2021 (chaired by Professor AOKI Setsuko of the Keio University Law School).

With regard to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the Open-Ended Working Group, established for the period of 2022 to 2023 based on the resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” jointly proposed by Japan, the UK, and other countries, held its first meeting in May and its second meeting in September. During these meetings, active discussions were held on the international laws applied to outer space, and responsible or irresponsible behaviors in outer space.

In April, Vice President of the U.S. Kamala Harris announced that the Government of the U.S. would not conduct destructive, direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. In response, the Government of Japan released a statement by the Press Secretary of MOFA, welcoming and supporting the announcement by the U.S. In addition, the Government of Japan also announced in September, at the aforementioned Open-Ended Working Group meeting, that it has made the same decision as the U.S. in view of its stance to actively promote discussions in the international fora toward the development of norms regarding responsible behaviors.

With regard to the declaration by the U.S., like-minded countries, including the U.S. and Japan, jointly submitted a resolution promoting this matter to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The resolution was adopted at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in November, with the support of 154 countries.

Furthermore, with a view to contributing to the rule of law in outer space, Japan has been offering support to developing countries toward capacity building in the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws. Specifically, in May 2021, Japan announced that it would cooperate on the “Space Law for New Space Actors” project of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). Under this initiative, Japan provides support to emerging space-faring countries.
nations in the Asia Pacific region for the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws.

**B International Dialogues and Consultations on Outer Space**

Japan promotes dialogues and consultations on outer space primarily with major space-faring nations, represented by the U.S., and nations in the Asia-Pacific region (see D on page 201 about the relationship with the U.S.).

In particular, Japan regularly holds bilateral dialogues on outer space with the U.S., France, the EU, and India. In addition to exchanging information on their respective space policies, various exchanges of opinions are also held on subjects, including security cooperation and inter-agency cooperation.

As part of the efforts under the Quad (Japan-Australia-India-U.S.), at the Summit Meeting held in September 2021, the four leaders concurred on launching a working group on space to advance cooperation in the field of space. At the Quad Leaders’ Meeting held in May 2022, the Quad Satellite Data Portal was launched to aggregate links to satellite data resources held by the four countries, and the four leaders expressed their intention to support countries in the region through the utilization of space capabilities to respond to extreme precipitation events as well as efforts for the sustainable use of space.

With regard to multilateral meetings, the 28th session of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-28), co-organized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST), was held in November. At this Forum, discussions were held on expanding the space industry, promoting sustainable space activities for the future, and contributing to the resolution of social issues.

**C International Space Exploration and the International Space Station (ISS)**

The progress of space exploration and application for peaceful purposes is a common benefit for all humankind, and is also of diplomatic significance.

In 2019, Japan decided to participate in the Artemis Program, a U.S.-led international space exploration program. In 2020, with the Artemis Program in mind, eight countries, including Japan and the U.S., signed the Artemis Accords, which set out a political commitment to establish principles for creating a safe and transparent environment in promoting outer space activities. Thereafter, more countries signed the Artemis Accords, and the number of signatories increased to 21 countries as of July 2022.

In 2020, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. concluded a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the Civil Lunar Gateway, a human outpost in the lunar vicinity that will be developed as a part of the Artemis Program. In November 2022, MEXT and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) signed an Implementing Arrangement setting out the details of cooperation on the Civil Lunar Gateway.

Furthermore, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. advanced negotiations on the Framework Agreement between Japan and the United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which is a new legal framework to further facilitate Japan-U.S. space cooperation, represented by the exploration and use of outer space. The two governments signed the Agreement in January 2023.

With regard to the International Space Station (ISS), NASA announced in January that the U.S. would extend the operation period of the ISS until 2030. Following that, in November, Japan also announced its participation in the operational extension ahead of other countries and organizations.

In the ISS, Japan provides emerging space-faring nations with the opportunities to conduct experiments using the ISS/Japanese Experiment Module “Kibo” and to deploy cube satellites, with the aim of providing support for capacity building in the field of space. In August 2022, the Republic of Moldova’s first satellite, a nanosatellite, was deployed. The Workshop on Africa-Japan CubeSat Cooperation was held in the same month, co-organized by JAXA, Kyushu Institute of Technology, the Center for Spatial Information Science at the University of Tokyo, and organizations on the
Tunisian side. Seven African countries\(^\text{11}\) presented reports on the capabilities they have gained through the nanosatellites acquired with Japan's support as well as the issues they faced, and discussions were held on utilizing satellite data to build up satellite technologies and resolve social issues.

### D Addressing Global Issues through the Utilization of Space Technology

Amidst rising expectations of space technology’s potential in resolving global issues in recent years, Japan has been promoting international cooperation based on the utilization of its internationally superior space technologies, and contributing toward the achievement of the SDGs.

For example, the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) (Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis) contributed by Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in August, cites many scientific papers that used Japanese satellites and utilizes Earth observation satellite data from Japan. In these ways, Japanese knowhow and data are continuously provided to the international community. In addition, Japan has provided the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with examples of the utilization of space technology, such as the outcomes of observation of greenhouse gases from space, which Japan holds the world’s longest observation record for, and the JICA-JAXA Forest Early Warning System in the Tropics (JJ-FAST). These serve as useful information for the Global Stocktake (GST), which is a five-yearly evaluation process of the global progress status toward achieving the long-term targets of the Paris Agreement.

Japan also provides, at no charge, the Global Satellite Mapping of Precipitation (GSMaP) system, which utilizes multiple satellites to observe the global rainfall situation. This system is applied to a wide range of uses, including rainfall situation monitoring, disaster management and agriculture, in 141 countries and regions around the world. Furthermore, Japan took the lead in launching “Sentinel Asia,” an initiative to provide free observational satellite information during disasters to contribute to disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region. To date, this project has responded to more than 400 emergency requests from 36 countries. Japan also holds workshops for those who are involved in disaster readiness and response, and contributes to capacity building in the utilization of satellite data during disasters in Asian countries.

In light of the global spread of COVID-19, JAXA, NASA, and the European Space Agency (ESA) joined forces to implement an observation project to capture information on the Earth’s environment, economic activities, and other aspects (such as changes in carbon dioxide concentration in large cities, changes in airport hangars and car parks, etc.) before and after the pandemic. The results of their analysis are published on a dedicated website.

(6) Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The international community is still experiencing regional and domestic conflicts as a result of various factors including differences in race, religion, and history, or due to the impact of poverty and disparity. In recent years, the protracted nature of these conflicts has particularly become a challenging problem. For this reason, in addition to post-conflict peacekeeping through the dispatch of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and other means, peacebuilding efforts with building a foundation for development in mind, are an agenda for the international community as a whole, in order to prevent conflicts and their recurrence, as well as post-conflict nation-building and the consolidation of sustainable peace.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 had a significant negative impact on the global economy, society and stability. For example, it gave rise to a serious humanitarian crisis due to rising food and energy prices. Furthermore, there have also been concerns in recent years about the impact of climate change on peace and stability. As issues facing the international community become more complex and diverse, peacebuilding initiatives are becoming increasingly important.

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\(^{11}\) Seven African countries: Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe
A On-the-Ground Initiatives

(A) UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)

As of December 31, 2022, 12 UN PKO missions are on active duty, primarily in the Middle East and Africa, to handle a wide range of duties that include monitoring cease-fires, promoting political process, and protecting civilians. More than 80,000 military, police, and civilian personnel have been deployed to these missions. In response to the increasing complexity and scale of the mandates and the associated shortages of personnel, equipment, and financial resources, discussions on more effective and efficient implementation of UN PKO are underway in various fora including the UN.

In addition to PKO missions, the UN has also established Special Political Missions (SPMs) mainly consisting of civilian personnel. SPMs fulfill diverse roles including the peaceful settlement of disputes, post-conflict peacebuilding, and conflict prevention.

Based on the Act on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Act), since 1992 Japan has dispatched more than 12,500 personnel to a total of 29 missions over the last 30 years, including UN PKO missions. More recently, since 2011, Japanese staff officers have been dispatched to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), while engineering units have been deployed there from 2012. The engineering units in the South Sudanese capital of Juba and the surrounding areas undertook such activities as developing infrastructure that included roads, the provision of water supplies to displaced persons, as well as site preparation, and concluded their activities in May 2017. As of December 31, 2022, four Self-Defense Forces of Japan (SDF) officers are on active duty at the UNMISS Headquarters, who continue to work toward peace and stability in South Sudan. Additionally, since April 2019, Japan has been conducting activities contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East by dispatching two SDF officers to the Headquarters for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which is stationed in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. On the basis of its past experiences of peacekeeping operations and making use of its own strengths, Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace cooperation in the future by means such as enhancing capacity building support and dispatching units and individuals.

(B) ODA and Other Cooperation to Facilitate Peacebuilding

In addressing prolonged conflicts and increasingly diverse humanitarian crises, peacebuilding and preventing the recurrence of conflict even in peacetime, in addition to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, are important toward the realization of an inclusive society. There is a greater need than before to address the root causes of crises through assistance for self-reliant development by building resilient nations and stabilizing societies from a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan has been providing support for peacebuilding based on this “humanitarian-development-peace nexus” approach, and positions peacebuilding as one of the priority issues in its Development Cooperation Charter. The following are some of the main initiatives implemented recently.

a. Middle East

Japan has provided comprehensive support for peace and stability in the Middle East. This includes providing food and refugee assistance, as well as support for the development of human resources who can play an active role in nation-building. Japan received 12 students from Syria in 2022 to offer education to young people who were deprived of opportunities to attend school due to the Syrian crisis. As for Palestine, in addition to an increase in the refugee population, it is also facing serious deterioration of the living environment, including the deteriorated refugee camp infrastructure as well as unemployment and poverty. In light of this, Japan worked on improving the living environment of refugees through the implementation of the Camp Improvement Project (CIP) at refugee camps in Palestine, as well as by providing support to educational facilities, and contributed to the stabilization and improvement of the people’s welfare based on human security.

b. Africa

At the Eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 8) in 2022, Japan presented its view of working with African countries to bring about a peaceful and stable Africa, so that the people of Africa can live in peace. Japan announced the appointment of an Ambassador, Special Envoy for the
“Horn of Africa,” with a view to establishing stability and democracy in the “Horn of Africa” region. While respecting Africa’s ownership, Japan provides support for African-led efforts under the New Approach for Peace and Stability in Africa (NAPSA), which approaches the root causes hampering human security, and peace and stability. These include consolidating democracy and promoting the rule of law, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and support toward strengthening the foundations of the community.

For example, Japan has conducted criminal justice training since 2014 for Francophone African countries, and has supported stabilization of the Sahel region by strengthening the capabilities of investigative and judicial bodies. Japan has also provided African countries with security equipment to improve their ability to maintain security against frequent terrorism attacks and transnational crimes, and provided support toward landmine clearance. In November 2022, Japan, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), decided to provide support to Guinea-Bissau, one of the countries covered in country-specific meetings of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). This support aims at promoting transparency and accountability in government administrations, with a view to preventing corruption and consolidating peace.

In South Sudan, along with dispatching personnel to UNMISS Headquarters, in response to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018, Japan has been supporting the implementation of the agreement and cease-fire monitoring through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization in East Africa, as well as other organizations. Furthermore, Japan, in collaboration with the UNDP, has disbursed a total of 63.8 million US dollars between 2008 and 2022 to Peacekeeping Training Centers located in 14 African countries, contributing to strengthening Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping activities.

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<th>B Initiatives within the UN</th>
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| Against the backdrop of the growing awareness within the international community of the need for peacebuilding efforts, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in 2006 as an advisory body of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, with the aim of providing consistent advice on assistance, from conflict resolution to recovery, reintegration and reconstruction. In addition to conducting discussions on the approach to peacebuilding in countries and regions, including its agenda countries, the PBC also engages in discussions on themes such as women, peace, and security (WPS) and security sector reform (SSR). In recent years, there have been increasing opportunities for the PBC to fulfill its advisory function to the Security Council and General Assembly. Japan has consistently served as a member of the core Organizational Committee since the PBC’s establishment and contributed actively in ways such as by advocating for the importance of institution building and human resources development as well as the need to strengthen cooperation between the PBC and key actors (UN agencies such as the Security Council, General Assembly, and PBC, donor countries, regional institutions, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, and the private sector, among others).

Japan has made active contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), established in 2006, as a major donor country. As of December 31, 2022, Japan has contributed a total of 61.3 million US dollars.

Japan will continue to address peacebuilding as one of its priorities during its two-year term on the UN Security Council starting from January 2023. Foreign Minister Hayashi also conveyed its commitment to further contribute to peacebuilding when Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, UN Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, visited Japan in November 2022. Japan hosted an open debate on peacebuilding as the President of the UN Security Council in January 2023.

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12 The “Horn of Africa” refers to the region on the northeastern part of the African continent that protrudes in the shape of a horn toward the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It encompasses the countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya.
13 As the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, issued in 2015, seemed to have stagnated, this Revitalized Agreement, bringing together stakeholders in South Sudan by IGAD, set out matters including the implementation schedule for the observance of cease-fire.
14 The four countries of Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Liberia and Burundi.
15 A fund established in October 2006 to provide support to regions, including Africa, for stopping the recurrence of regional conflicts and civil war after they have ended as well as preventing conflicts. Specifically, the fund supports peace processes and political dialogues, economic revitalization, institution building for nations, and the participation by women and youths in nation-building, among other initiatives.
C Human Resource Development

(A) The Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development

While highly skilled civilian experts with expertise have a substantial role to play in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding, the number of those capable of fulfilling the role is insufficient. Therefore, the development of relevant human resources remains a major challenge. Japan has been implementing a program for Human Resource Development in order to cultivate civilian experts who can play a leading role in the field. As of the end of 2022, more than 900 people have been trained. The participants who completed the program have gone on to play an active role in the field of peacebuilding and development in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, and have received high acclaim from both the UN and different countries. Out of the approximately 190 participants who have completed the training course for entry level human resources (hereafter, “Primary Course”) to date, close to 80 work as regular staff at international organizations. Hence, this program also contributes significantly to the career development of Japanese nationals, as well as the enhancement of their presence in international organizations in the fields of peacebuilding and development. In 2022, the Primary course and a training course for mid-career professionals with experience in the fields of peacebuilding and development were conducted (see the Column on page 224).

(B) Training for Peacekeepers of Various Countries

Japan has been supporting peacekeepers from various countries participating in UN PKO to enhance their capabilities. Since 2015, in conjunction with cooperative efforts among the UN, supporting member states, and troop contributing countries, Japan has been cooperating with the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), a framework for innovative cooperation aimed at addressing the urgent need to improve the capabilities of PKO personnel by providing necessary training and equipment. For example, Japan has funded and dispatched SDF personnel and other individuals as instructors. To date, Japan has conducted training on the operation of heavy engineering equipment for 312 personnel from eight African countries that expressed intentions to dispatch engineering units to UN PKO. Since 2018, the TPP has been extended to Asia and the surrounding regions. Following on from Vietnam, Japan has conducted training for 20 engineering personnel from Indonesia for the first time in Indonesia. Additionally, in October 2019 a lifesaving training program began in the medical field, a considerably problematic area for UN PKO, while support for the introduction of telemedicine into UN PKO missions was launched from 2021. The second trial training for the UN Field Medical Assistants Course (UNFMAC) was held in Uganda in June 2022, and Japan dispatched one SDF medical officer to the course. Japan has dispatched as many as 298 SDF personnel and other individuals as instructors for the operation of heavy engineering equipment and in the field of medicine. Other than TPP, Japan dispatches instructors and other personnel, as well as providing financial assistance, to Peacekeeping Training Centers in Asia and Africa.

(7) Initiatives to Combat Security Threats

Ensuring public security and protecting the lives of the people are the premise of various socioeconomic activities and the basic responsibilities of a country. To cope effectively with security threats such as international terrorism and organized crime, which are rapidly becoming more complex and severe in tandem with social changes such as the advancement of science and technology and the spread of COVID-19, it is vital for the international community to cooperate as a whole.

A Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Since the end of 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound impact not only on domestic politics, economy and society, but also on the international political and economic order, and furthermore, affected people’s behavior, mindsets and values. It has also had a major impact on the environment surrounding terrorism. Terrorists continue to carry out their terrorist activities in Asia and other parts of the world while adapting to the new social circumstances that have resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the weakening of governance as well as social divisions brought about by the manifestation of poverty and racial and ethnic issues. Furthermore, the worldwide dependence on information and communications...
Participating in the Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development

TAKAO Ryoko, UN Volunteer, Programme Policy Officer (Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus), World Food Programme (WFP) Philippines

My name is TAKAO Ryoko. Under the Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, I am working as a UN Volunteer at the World Food Programme (WFP) in the Philippines, the largest humanitarian aid organization in the world that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020.

Many Japanese companies operate in the Philippines, and it may often be perceived as a tourist destination because of places such as Cebu and Boracay. On the other hand, armed conflicts have been ongoing for more than 40 years on the island of Mindanao. A comprehensive peace agreement was concluded with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2014, resulting in the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. UN agencies including WFP, as well as various donor countries, are engaged in support to establish a completely autonomous government and consolidate peace.

The WFP Philippines Office provides support in all aspects of peacebuilding in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In addition to formulating projects based on detailed analysis of the causes of conflict through means such as conducting field surveys, it also verifies the effectiveness and suitability of projects during their implementation by introducing, on a trial basis, indicators to measure how much each WFP project contributes to peacebuilding. One of these indicators is conflict sensitivity (an approach that gives consideration to whether the implementation of a project unintentionally contributes to the causes of conflict). As a lecturer, I conducted conflict sensitivity training for WFP staff working in bases within BARMM and provided guidance on how to address factors of conflict such as land issues and conflicts between tribes. At the same time, I worked together with them to review and consolidate measures for easing tense situations. I am now conducting capacity building training on conflict sensitivity also for BARMM government staff on behalf of WFP. This training advises them to accelerate the peacebuilding process, while ensuring that WFP’s initiatives do not contribute to the conflict, by including former MILF combatants among those who receive support from WFP, and encouraging members of different tribes to participate in joint activities.

The WFP Philippines Office also provides support for peacebuilding and development of BARMM from the perspective of food security. Through grant aid from the Government of Japan, WFP provides food assistance and promotes the implementation of grant aid in cooperation with international organizations to support the improvement of livelihoods for smallholder farmers and fishermen. Studies conducted by WFP have pointed to the lack of means of livelihood as one of the factors of conflict in BARMM, and dissatisfaction among residents stemming from this can lead to future conflicts. To prevent this from happening, and with the aim of building a value chain that links the produce of smallholder farmers and fishermen to the market, WFP engages in discussions with BARMM government agencies on challenges and necessary support measures, while also introducing the digital app “Farm2Go.” Developed by WFP, this app enables producers and buyers to buy and sell online through agricultural cooperatives. Through the app, WFP supports sustainable business activities for smallholder farmers. I am involved in overall project planning and operation to further improve the performance of Farm2Go, namely by sharing knowledge and getting technical support from the WFP Headquarters and other offices that have already introduced the app, and providing guidance for securing budgets and for recruiting local IT consultants.
WFP advocates the transition from “arms to farms” (support for the social rehabilitation of former combatants through agriculture). Based on the comprehensive analysis of factors of conflict, I am engaged in efforts to socially integrate and improve the livelihood of former combatants, as well as to ease tensions between divided communities. I feel great joy and fulfillment in having the chance to contribute to the peace and development of BARMM, where impacts of conflicts affect the region.

technology has motivated terrorists and terrorist organizations to spread extremism through the Internet and social media, and moreover, to conduct illegal behavior that could lead to terrorism in cyberspace, such as acquisition of funding for terrorism. There is a pressing need to respond comprehensively to these developments.

Based on the “G7 Action Plan on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism” compiled at the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016, Japan has to date implemented the following actions: (1) measures to enhance counter-terrorism capacity, which include promoting the utilization of Interpol databases and measures against the funding of terrorism, (2) education and promotion of moderation in communities through dialogues and other means, in order to prevent violent extremism, which is a root cause of terrorism, and (3) support for capacity building of law enforcement agencies, including measures to support rehabilitation in prisons.

To steadily promote measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism, which is an issue that has gained importance due to changes in the environment surrounding terrorism under the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan has been implementing projects through cooperation with international organizations including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), among others, by using their respective advantages and expertise effectively.

As an initiative that Japan has carried out continuously for the past 17 years, Japan has also run an exchange program inviting Islamic school teachers from Indonesia and other countries and providing opportunities to experience interfaith dialogue, school visits, and cultural events in Japan. While this was suspended in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the program was resumed in 2022. Japan will continue to implement the program going forward, in order to help promote moderation and the creation of more tolerant societies that are receptive to different values.

Through bilateral and trilateral counter-terrorism consultations and the Quad (Japan-Australia-India-U.S.) Counter-Terrorism tabletop exercise, among other initiatives, Japan also exchanges information on the world terrorism situations and affirms the strengthening of partnerships in the field of countering terrorism, while developing practical cooperation with other countries.

The Government of Japan promotes counter-terrorism measures in collaboration with relevant countries and organizations. Based on the view that information gathering is critical for combating terrorism, the Government established the Counter Terrorism Unit - Japan (CTU-J) in December 2015 and has been making concerted efforts to gather information with the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower. Regarding the incident in which a Japanese national being detained in Syria was safely released in October 2018, this outcome is owed to CTU-J playing a key role in requesting the cooperation of the countries concerned and handling the situation by leveraging Japan’s information network. Following the series of terrorist bombings that occurred in Sri Lanka in April 2019, the Director General and other officials from CTU-J were immediately dispatched to the area to

Former MILF combatant receiving support for improving their livelihoods (Photo: Maria Roxanne Nicola, WFP)
gather information. To fulfill the critical responsibility of securing the safety of Japanese nationals overseas, Japan will continue to further enhance its information gathering through the CTU-J and take all possible measures to counter terrorism to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas.

**B Criminal Justice Initiatives**

The UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (“Congress”) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (both of which have their secretariats under UNODC) are in charge of shaping policy on crime prevention and criminal justice in the international community. In March 2021, the 14th Congress ("Kyoto Congress") was convened in Kyoto. In accordance with the overall theme, “Advancing crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law: towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda,” the political declaration ("Kyoto Declaration"), summarizing the matters that should be addressed over the medium- to long-term by the international community in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice, was adopted. Since then, in cooperation with UNODC and other organizations, Japan has been demonstrating its leadership in advancing such initiatives as: (1) regularly convening the Criminal Justice Forum for Asia and the Pacific as a platform for information sharing and exchanges of opinions between practitioners in the field of criminal justice in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) regularly holding the Global Youth Forum for a Culture of Lawfulness, with the aim of facilitating independent discussions among youths, and incorporating their views into policies; (3) working toward the formulation of UN model strategies to promote efforts by the international community to reduce reoffending. Japan proactively engages in following up on the Kyoto Declaration through efforts such as submitting resolutions for following up on the Kyoto Declaration within the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and supporting theme-based discussions on the Kyoto Declaration conducted by UNODC.

Furthermore, Japan provides support to improve prosecution capabilities and other criminal justice functions, to improve the operation of prisons, and to enhance capacities related to measures against cybercrime in Southeast Asian countries, by providing financial contributions to UNODC and Interpol, as well as contributions through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).

Japan is a State Party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which establishes a global legal framework for promoting cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime including terrorism more effectively. Japan advances international cooperation that includes providing international assistance in investigations in accordance with the UNTOC and reviewing the implementation of the Convention.

**C Anti-corruption Measures**

There is growing global interest in addressing corruption, which has been pointed out as a factor that threatens sustainable development and the rule of law. Against this backdrop, Japan, as a State Party to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which sets out provisions for international cooperation and measures to address corruption such as bribery and embezzlement of property by public officials, actively participates in discussions for the effective implementation of the UNCAC and the strengthening of international cooperation on preventing and combating corruption. In September, a country review was conducted on Japan’s implementation of the UNCAC regarding the provisions for criminalization and law enforcement (Chapter III) and international cooperation (Chapter IV) by reviewers who visited Japan from Bhutan and Libya. Japan also participates actively in the activities of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and has contributed to formulating political documents in areas related to anti-corruption, including enhancing the role of audits. In addition, Japan contributes to the capacity building of criminal justice practitioners in developing countries by conducting the International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption (UNCAC Training Programme) through the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI).

Japan is an active participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which verifies the implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions by each state party to prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.

D Measures to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism

Regarding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international framework that establishes the international standards that countries should implement and conducts peer reviews to assess levels of implementation. In recent years, the FATF has also been engaged in initiatives to prevent financing for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has issued the FATF statement that calls for the eradication of illegal financial activities by North Korea.

As a founding member, Japan has actively participated in these discussions. The Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report of Japan was adopted at the FATF Plenary held in June 2021, and was published at the end of August the same year. Japan is steadily making preparations and implementing measures to address the points for improvement raised in this Report.

In addition, Japan takes measures to combat the financing of terrorism as a State Party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and also implements measures to freeze the assets of terrorists and terrorist organizations in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1373, and designations by the UN Security Council Taliban Sanctions Committee or the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Japan added one organization designated by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in March as a subject for asset freezing measures. As of December 31, Japan has implemented asset freezing measures on 397 individuals and 119 organizations in total.

E Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants

Japan has strengthened its domestic system to combat trafficking in persons, for which methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated and obscure, while proactively providing assistance to developing countries, in accordance with “Japan’s 2014 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons.” For example, in 2022, Japan continued to conduct training programs through JICA to deepen mutual understanding on human trafficking countermeasures (especially prevention, protection and support to restore the financial independence of victims) of stakeholders in Asian countries, including Japan, and to promote more effective regional cooperation. Furthermore, Japan has been implementing a technical cooperation project with the Government of Thailand via JICA since January, and in August, held a workshop on human trafficking countermeasures to strengthen networks among those involved in such countermeasures in the Mekong region. With respect to cooperation with international organizations, in 2022, through funding to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Japan continued to provide assistance for the safe repatriation of foreign victims of trafficking in persons protected in Japan, and to carry out social reintegration assistance programs to prevent the recurrence of trafficking after they return to their countries. Japan also provided support to strengthen response capabilities, including training programs for law enforcement authorities, by funding projects organized by UNODC in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

As a State Party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Japan has also further deepened its cooperation with other countries with a view to combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

F Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking

In cooperation with UNODC, Japan is working to take measures against the global proliferation of illicit drugs by conducting status surveys and analyses on synthetic drug trafficking, strengthening the capacity for drug control at borders, and supporting the production of alternative crops to reduce illicit drug cultivation.
Disarmament and Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan has the responsibility to lead the international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

However, the path toward a world without nuclear weapons has become even more severe. As seen in the situation surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), there exists an apparent divergence of views on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, a divergence that exists not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States but also among non-nuclear-weapon States that are exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and those that are not. In the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races issued on January 3, the five nuclear-weapon States affirmed for the first time that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Regardless of this Joint Statement, amidst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which started on February 24, Russia has been making the threat to use nuclear weapons, and even the actual use of nuclear weapons is emerging as a real problem. Hence, there are growing concerns that the catastrophe of atomic bombings will be repeated. Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to persistently advance realistic and practical efforts, while bridge-building between states with divergent views, in order to promote nuclear disarmament.

With the aim of realizing a world without nuclear weapons, Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, has proposed the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which is rooted in five actions. This Plan, which Prime Minister Kishida presented himself, represents the first step of a realistic road map which would take us from the “reality” of a harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan has continued to pursue bridge-building between states with divergent views. It has done this, for example, through holding meetings of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), submitting the Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the UN General Assembly, and cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries, including within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as well as individual consultations. Moreover, Japan intends to continue maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime through cumulative efforts including through building up realistic and practical efforts, such as encouraging states to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), promoting education on disarmament and non-proliferation, and further, discussions and exercises with nuclear-weapon States toward the realization of effective nuclear disarmament verification.

The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon State has joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon States. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic and practical measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S.

A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Japan places great importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation regime. NPT Review Conferences have been held once every five years with the aim of achieving the goals of the NPT and ensuring compliance with its provisions, and discussions that reflect the international situation of the time have been held since the NPT entered into force in 1970.

The Tenth NPT Review Conference was held from August 1 to 26 at the UN Headquarters in New York, U.S. (see the Special Feature on page 230).

To ensure that this Conference achieves a meaningful outcome, Japan exerted all efforts prior to the Conference. Independently, Japan held meetings of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament and the Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament. Japan and the U.S. also worked together to issue the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January. Furthermore, as a part of its multilateral efforts, Japan submitted working papers through the NPDI and Stockholm Initiative.

At the Conference held in August, Prime Minister Kishida, as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend an NPT Review Conference, delivered a speech at the General Debate session on the first day. In his speech, as the first step of a realistic roadmap which would take us from the “reality” of the harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons, he advocated that the international community should continue to engage in nuclear risk reduction, and proposed the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which is rooted in the following five actions: (1) a shared recognition on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons, (2) enhancing transparency, (3) maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile, (4) securing nuclear non-proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (5) encouraging visits to the affected communities by international leaders and others. Prime Minister Kishida then called upon the States Parties to achieve a meaningful outcome at the Conference.

Japan has continued to make every possible effort. For example, State Minister for Foreign Affairs TAKEI Shunsuke attended the conference at the instruction of Prime Minister Kishida, where he called upon the President of the Conference, Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, and delegations of the respective countries to adopt the outcome document by consensus.

At the Conference, Russia expressed its objection at the final stage due to the issue surrounding Ukraine, resulting in the Conference’s failure to adopt the final document by consensus. Nevertheless, Japan considers it meaningful that a draft final document was created with the support of all States Parties except Russia through serious discussions among them.

As Foreign Minister Hayashi revealed in his statement released after the conclusion of the Conference, for Japan, while it is deeply regrettable that this Conference failed to adopt the final document due to the opposition of one country, Russia, it is a tremendous achievement that many of the ideas and proposals that Japan advocated at the Conference were reflected in the draft final document, and this would provide a basis for the international community to advance realistic discussions on nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, at the Conference, the timing of the next Review Conference and the process leading to it, as well as the establishment of a working group on further strengthening the review process, which Japan had long advocated through the NPDI, were agreed. This demonstrates the will of States Parties to maintain and strengthen the NPT, and Japan appreciates it.

### B International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP)

In January, Prime Minister Kishida announced in his Policy Speech to the Diet that the IGEP will serve as an opportunity for participants from nuclear-weapon

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17 A Group launched in 2017 for the aim of making a recommendation to contribute to the substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament. It comprises 17 experts from countries of different positions, including Japan. A total of five meetings have been held up till July 2019, and the concrete outcomes were submitted to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference. In October 2019, the Chair’s Report, summarizing discussions at all five meetings of the Group held to date, was published.

18 A meeting launched in 2020 with the participation of government officials and private-sector experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of following up with and further developing the outcomes of discussions by the Group of Eminent Persons for substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament.

19 The “Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” a group comprising 16 non-nuclear-weapon States that share a common recognition of the nuclear disarmament issue. It was launched by Sweden in 2019.

20 Adoption without a vote, but without any statements of dissent or objection.
The Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Tenth NPT Review Conference) was scheduled to be held in April 2020, but was postponed several times due to the spread of COVID-19. It was eventually held from August 1 to 26, 2022, at the UN Headquarters in New York, the U.S.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the States Parties to the treaty hold a review conference every five years to review its operation status and decide on the direction of future initiatives. During the previous 2015 NPT Review Conference, then-Foreign Minister Kishida delivered a general statement, in which he called for enhancing the transparency of nuclear force, reducing all nuclear weapons and, eventually, multilateralization in future nuclear weapons reduction negotiations, unifying the international community through a common recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, addressing regional non-proliferation issues such as North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, and the significance of having political leaders and youth visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although the Parties engaged in earnest negotiations thereafter, the respective State Parties could not reconcile their differences, mainly in relation to the concept of establishing a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (Note). The Conference ended without adopting a final document.

The Tenth NPT Review Conference was held under even more difficult circumstances due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, in addition to the existing deep divisions within the international community over nuclear disarmament. Due to these circumstances, it was unclear at the beginning of the Conference whether the final document would be adopted by consensus. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Kishida attended this NPT Review Conference with a strong sense of urgency, and as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend an NPT Review Conference, delivered a speech at the General Debate session. In his speech, he pointed out that, as the path towards a world without nuclear weapons has become even more severe, maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime is in the interest of the entire international community. Prime Minister Kishida called upon the States Parties to cooperate in the interest of our common goal, and expressed Japan's determination to firmly uphold the NPT as its guardian along with other States Parties. In addition, he emphasized that we should work on the “Hiroshima Action Plan” as the first step of a realistic road map, which would take us from the “reality” of the harsh security environment to the “ideal” of a world without nuclear weapons. This demonstrated Japan's firm commitment toward the NPT as well as its determination to realize a world without nuclear weapons to the international community. Japan's expression of strong commitment was well received by the respective countries in the Conference. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, who also delivered a speech at the General Debate, mentioned, “I noted that Prime Minister Kishida of Japan is here, which sends a very powerful message.”

Furthermore, at the instruction of Prime Minister Kishida, State Minister for Foreign Affairs TAKEI Shunsuke attended the Conference from August 21 to 26, the final day of the Conference. Throughout the period, he called upon the delegations of the respective countries to respond constructively by adopting a final document by consensus.

Eventually, Russia expressed its objection, resulting in the Conference's failure to adopt a consensus document. However, Japan's proposal, including the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida, gained support and appreciation from many States Parties, and the joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education submitted by Japan received support from a record high of 88 States Parties. Furthermore, many of Japan’s ideas and
proposals were reflected into the draft of the final document, including the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons and the importance of maintaining the decreasing trend of the global nuclear stockpile. This is a tremendous achievement for Japan, and will serve as a basis for promoting realistic discussions toward nuclear disarmament in the international community in the future. In addition, the timing of the next NPT Review Conference and the process leading to it, as well as the establishment of the working group on further strengthening the implementation process, which Japan has long been advocating through the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), were agreed. This demonstrates the will of States Parties to maintain and strengthen the NPT.

Even after the Conference, Japan has continued to advance concrete efforts in line with the “Hiroshima Action Plan.” At the UN General Assembly held in September, Prime Minister Kishida served as the co-chair, and held the Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the leader’s level for the first time. During this meeting, he declared Japan’s strong commitment toward the universalization of the CTBT and its early entry into force.

In October, Japan’s draft resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the contents of the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” was submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. This resolution was adopted with the support of many countries including nuclear-weapon States such as the U.S., the UK, and France. In December, the first meeting of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP) was held in Hiroshima. Incumbent and former political leaders of various countries, including former U.S. President Barack Obama, attended the meeting, and frank and candid discussions were held for the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.

The First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference will be held in the summer of 2023. The Government of Japan will persistently and steadily advance realistic and practical efforts step by step toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, in line with the “Hiroshima Action Plan.”

(Interjection: An attempt to establish a zone in the Middle East that is free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (non-WMD zone), States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as those from countries participating and not participating in the TPNW, to exchange ideas and thoughts beyond their respective national positions, with the involvement of former and incumbent political leaders of the world, and engage in candid discussions concerning a concrete path toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.

The first meeting was held on December 10 and 11 in Hiroshima. In addition to three Japanese members including Chair SHIRAISHI Takashi, Chancellor of the Prefectural University of Kumamoto, 10 non-Japanese members from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States also attended the meeting, making 13 members in total to participate in person. The Chairperson of Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, KOIZUMI Takashi, also attended in person, as an “expert from the host city.”

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Takei delivered Prime Minister Kishida’s address on his behalf while also delivering the welcoming remarks at the opening session. This was followed by the video messages from political leaders such as former U.S. President Barack Obama, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany, and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, as well as UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Rector of the College of Europe Federica Mogherini (former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission), and former Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A video message from former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa (a member of the IGEP) was also presented as he was unable to attend the meeting in person.

Through the four sessions over the two-day meeting, the IGEP members analyzed the current international situation and the security environment surrounding nuclear disarmament, while also having candid discussions regarding challenges in promoting nuclear disarmament, priorities on the nuclear disarmament front and how to advance future discussions in the IGEP.

To deepen their understanding of the realities of the atomic bombings, the IGEP members attended the talk on the experience of an atomic bombing by Ms. YAHATA Teruko, a victim of an atomic bombing. The members also offered flowers to the Cenotaph.
for the Atomic Bomb Victims and made a visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Finally, at the closing session, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his expectations that the IGEP will further discuss concrete measures to bring the harsh “reality” closer to the “ideal” and formulate useful outcomes with an eye on the next NPT Review Conference.

C The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

The NPDI, a group of 12 non-nuclear-weapon States from various regions established under the leadership of Japan and Australia in 2010 has served as a bridge between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It leads efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through its realistic and practical proposals. In August, Prime Minister Kishida attended the 11th NPDI High-level Meeting held in New York, as the first Prime Minister of Japan to attend this NPDI High-level Meeting. A Joint High-level Statement was released after the meeting. This statement strongly deplores that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and escalatory actions seriously undermine global efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including the NPT regime, and expresses NPDI’s resolve to remain committed to fostering the sustained, high-level political leadership and diplomatic dialogue needed to strengthen the implementation of the NPT.

The NPDI has actively contributed to the NPT review process through realistic and practical proposals, including the submission of 19 working papers to the Ninth NPT Review process and 18 to the Tenth NPT Review process. In particular, with a view to the Tenth NPT Review Conference, the NPDI submitted a working paper (“Landing-zone Paper”) that proposes the elements that should be incorporated into the final document concerning the three pillars of the NPT—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the draft final document incorporated many elements proposed by the NPDI in this working paper. Although the Tenth NPT Review Conference failed to adopt the final document, the establishment of a working group on strengthening the review process, which NPDI has consistently been proposing so far, was unanimously agreed.

D Initiatives Through the United Nations

(Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons)

Since 1994, Japan has submitted draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. They incorporate issues of the time related to nuclear disarmament with a view to presenting a realistic and concrete nuclear disarmament approach proposed by Japan to the international community. Taking into consideration the discussions at the Tenth NPT Review Conference held in August and recognizing the need to present a way forward for realistic and practical measures to realize a world without nuclear weapons, Japan submitted the 2022 draft resolution, which is based on the “Hiroshima Action Plan” proposed by Prime Minister Kishida at the Conference, with a focus on the importance of continuing the record of non-use of nuclear weapons, enhancing transparency as well as disarmament and non-proliferation education that fosters an accurate understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons use. The resolution was adopted with the broad support of 139 countries at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October and of 147 countries at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in December. The states supporting the resolution have divergent views, including nuclear-weapon States such as the U.S., the UK, and France, as well as U.S. allies such as NATO member countries, Australia, the ROK, and the states advocating the TPNW. While other resolutions that comprehensively addressed nuclear disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly in addition to Japan’s draft resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan has enjoyed support among a larger number of
states. Every year, Japan’s resolutions continue to enjoy the broad support of states with divergent views in the international community.

**Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

Japan attaches great importance to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic measure of nuclear disarmament where both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States can participate. Japan also continues with diplomatic efforts to call on all countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, including those countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force, to do so.

In his general debate speech at the NPT Review Conference in August, Prime Minister Kishida announced the convening of a first meeting of the CTBT Friends at the leader’s level. This meeting was held during the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly in September and attended by Prime Minister Kishida. In his statement delivered at the opening of the meeting, Prime Minister Kishida, while referring to the “Hiroshima Action Plan,” which he had announced at the NPT Review Conference in August, stated that the entry into force of the CTBT would be an important step in advancing the plan, and stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and its early entry into force, as well as the strengthening of the verification system. At the meeting, statements were also presented by Ms. NAKAMITSU Izumi, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the representative of the CTBTO Youth Group, as well as Mr. Sauli Niinistö, President of the Republic of Finland, a member state of CTBT Friends, and, as guest countries, Mr. Azali Assoumani, President of the Union of Comoros, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State of the Vatican, and Ms. Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand. At the end of the meeting, a joint statement of the meeting was adopted.

**Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)**

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would have great significance for both disarmament and non-proliferation as it would prevent the emergence of new states possessing nuclear-weapons by banning the production of fissile materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would limit the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. For many years, however, no consensus has been reached on commencing negotiations for the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Consequently, it was decided at the 71st UN General Assembly in December 2016 to establish the FMCT High-Level Experts Preparatory Group, and Japan actively participated in the Group’s discussions. Through discussions at the first meeting (August 2017) and second meeting (June 2018), a report was adopted that includes possible options for the outline of a future treaty and contents to consider in negotiations. The report was submitted to the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018. The aforementioned Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons also demands the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, and the declaration or the maintenance of the production moratorium for fissile materials (FM) for use in nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Japan will actively continue to contribute to the discussions on an FMCT.

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21 A group established in 2002 by Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands from the perspective of maintaining and boosting momentum toward promoting the entry into force of the CTBT. (Member states are Japan, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, and Germany.) Nine foreign ministers’ meetings have been held to date.

22 A treaty concept that aims to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile materials (such as enriched uranium and plutonium) that are used as materials to produce nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan places great importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Specifically, Japan has been actively engaged in efforts to convey the realities of nuclear weapons use to people around the world, through activities such as translating the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, invitations for young diplomats from various countries to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, providing assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibitions overseas, and designating atomic bomb survivors who have given testimonies of their atomic bomb experiences as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.”

At the General Debate of the NPT Review Conference held in August, Prime Minister Kishida announced that Japan would contribute 10 million US dollars to the UN for the establishment of the “Youth Leader Fund for a World Without Nuclear Weapons.” The goal of this program is to create a global network of future generations with the shared goal toward the elimination of nuclear weapons by bringing future leaders such as young policymakers and researchers from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to Japan to learn firsthand the realities of nuclear weapons use. At the same Conference, Japan also delivered a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education that emphasizes the importance of such education. This statement received support from a record high of 89 countries and regions (including Japan).

Additionally, as the atomic bomb survivors are aging, it is becoming increasingly important to pass on the realities of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings across generations and borders. To this end, from 2013 to 2022, Japan conferred the designation of “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” for more than 500 youths in Japan and overseas.

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23 Implemented since 1983 by the UN to nurture nuclear disarmament experts. Program participants are invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to promote understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons use through such means as museum tours and talks by victims about their experiences in the atomic bombings.

24 Opened as a permanent exhibition about the atomic bomb in New York, U.S.; Geneva, Switzerland; and Vienna, Austria, in cooperation with Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.
arrangements that reduce nuclear risks, increase transparency, and advance nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Resolution of the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons also reaffirms the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to initiate arms control dialogues on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing.

(2) Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security

A Japan’s Efforts Toward Non-proliferation

To ensure Japan’s security and to maintain peace and security of the international community, Japan has been making efforts concerning non-proliferation policy. The goal of such a policy is to prevent the proliferation of weapons that could threaten Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and biological/chemical weapons, as well as missiles with the ability to deliver those weapons and conventional weapons) and of related materials and technologies used to develop such weapons. In today’s international community, economic growth in emerging countries has enabled a growing capacity to produce and supply weapons in those countries as well as materials that could be diverted to the development of such weapons. Meanwhile, methods for procuring these materials are becoming more sophisticated, due in part to increasing complexity in means of distribution. Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies is spurring a growing potential for private sector technologies to be diverted to uses for military purposes, and increasing the proliferation risk of weapons that could pose a threat and of related materials and technologies. Under these circumstances, Japan has been implementing its non-proliferation policies, focusing on maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes and rules, taking appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and promoting close coordination with and capacity building support for other nations.

Japan’s three main measures of preventing proliferation are (1) IAEA safeguards, (2) export control, and (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Safeguards refer to verification activities conducted in accordance with safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and aim to ensure that nuclear energy will not be diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has made various efforts, including supporting the IAEA. For example, based on the view that the IAEA safeguards are at the core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Japan enhances the understanding and implementation capabilities of safeguards of other countries, and encourages other countries to conclude the Additional Protocol (AP) to the IAEA safeguards agreements.

Japan participates actively in regional and international efforts to strengthen safeguards. For example, the 13th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), which aims to strengthen safeguards in the Asia-Pacific region, was held in Viet Nam in December, and Japan led discussions on efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through capacity building and other means, and the implementation status of domestic safeguards, among other topics.

In May, following on from February 2020, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi was invited to Japan as a guest of MOFA. Through his courtesy call to Prime Minister Kishida and meeting with Foreign Minister Hayashi during the visit, Japan and the IAEA affirmed that they would further advance cooperation on the non-proliferation issues such as the ones related to North Korea and Iran, the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and other matters. Japan also took the opportunity to announce that it will provide a total of 2 million Euros toward the provision of related equipment and the dispatch of IAEA experts, as a part of its efforts to support Ukraine through the IAEA.

Japan provides utmost support at the IAEA General Conference, Board of Governors meetings, and other fora to Director General Grossi, who has extensive

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25 13 countries are designated by the IAEA Board of Governors. The designated member states include Japan and other G7 countries with advanced nuclear energy capabilities.

26 In addition to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that is applied on all nuclear materials pertaining to the peaceful nuclear activities in that country, and that non-nuclear-weapon NPT States Parties are required to conclude with the IAEA pursuant to Article III Paragraph 1 of the NPT, an Additional Protocol is concluded between the IAEA and the respective States Parties. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol expands the scope of nuclear activity information that should be declared to the IAEA, and gives the IAEA strengthened measures to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As of December 2022, 140 countries have concluded the Additional Protocol.
knowledge and experience, while continuing to work with other member countries to strengthen the role of the IAEA.

Export control is a useful measure in the so-called supply-side regulation toward countries of proliferation concern, terrorist organizations, and other entities attempting to acquire or distribute weapons or related materials or technologies. There are currently four export control frameworks (international export control regimes) in the international community. Japan has participated in all of them since their inception, engaging in international coordination and practicing strict export control. Each of the four regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons, the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missiles, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for conventional weapons, establishes a list of dual-use items and technologies which contribute to weapons development. To ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, participating countries to the regimes implement export control measures on the listed items and technologies in accordance with their domestic laws. The international export control regimes also exchange information concerning trends in countries of proliferation concern and are engaged in outreach activities to non-participating countries to the regimes in order to strengthen their export control.

Furthermore, Japan seeks to complement the activities of the international export control regimes by actively participating in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through efforts such as hosting the maritime interdiction exercise “Pacific Shield 18” in July 2018, Japan works to enhance coordination among countries and concerned institutions. In August 2022, Japan participated in an exercise hosted by the U.S.

Japan also holds the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and the Asian Export Control Seminar every year in order to promote a better understanding of the non-proliferation regimes and strengthen regional efforts, mainly in Asian countries.

Furthermore, with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which was adopted in 2004 with the aim of preventing the...
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (missiles) to non-state actors, Japan contributes to maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation frameworks through Japan’s contributions to support the implementation of the resolution by Asian nations.

### B Regional Non-proliferation Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

In 2022, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 31 times (at least 59 launches) with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners, including missiles that flew over Japan and ICBM-class ballistic missiles. The series of actions by North Korea, including the ballistic missile launches that exacerbate the situation, constitutes a grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security and poses a clear and serious challenge to the international community. It is totally unacceptable. The IAEA Director General’s report in September pointed out that North Korea’s nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern, and that the reopening of the tunnel at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri is deeply troubling. It also stated that the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. Moreover, at the IAEA General Conference convened in the same month, a resolution based on the report was adopted by consensus, demonstrating the united position of IAEA member states toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Japan, too, took opportunities such as the NPT Review Conference in August and the IAEA General Conference in September to proactively convey to the international community the importance of addressing North Korea’s nuclear issue.

Regardless of such efforts by the international community, North Korea has continued to repeatedly launch ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in unprecedented manners thereafter.

It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner by North Korea. To that end, Japan will continue to coordinate closely with related countries, including the U.S. and the ROK, as well as international organizations such as the UN and the IAEA. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will work on capacity building for export control particularly in Asia. Japan will also continue to contribute actively to discussions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.

Since the withdrawal of the previous U.S. administration under President Trump from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran has continued actions to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA. In January 2020, Iran announced that it would not be bound by the limit on the enrichment of uranium set forth in the JCPOA. Since the start of 2021, it has produced 20% enriched uranium in January, suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA including the Additional Protocol (AP) in February, and produced 60% enriched uranium in April. In August 2021, it was confirmed that Iran had produced uranium metal enriched at up to 20%.

Japan has consistently supported the JCPOA, which contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and is paying close attention to the efforts by relevant countries toward the return of both the U.S. and Iran to the JCPOA. Japan, being

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33 Sets forth detailed procedures for imposing constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities while ensuring that they serve peaceful purposes, and for lifting the imposed sanctions.

- **Main measures undertaken by Iran**
  - Constraints on enriched uranium-related activities
    - Limit on the number of centrifuges in operation to 5,060 units
    - Upper limit on enriched uranium at 3.67%, and limit on the amount of stored enriched uranium at 300 kg, etc.
  - Constraints on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor, and reprocessing
    - Redesign/remodeling of the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor so that it is not able to produce weapon-grade plutonium and to transfer spent fuel out of the country
    - No reprocessing including for research purposes, no construction of reprocessing facilities, etc.
deeply concerned about Iran's continued reduction of its commitments under the JCPOA, has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from further measures that may undermine the JCPOA and to return fully to its commitments under the JCPOA.

In March, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Iran to discuss these issues related to the implementation of the JCPOA and the series of safeguards issues (in which nuclear materials that had not been declared to the IAEA were found in Iran). The two sides issued a joint statement setting out the measures that should be taken toward the resolution of the safeguards issues by the meeting of the Board of Governors in June. However, the IAEA Director General’s report issued at the end of May clearly stated that the issues remain unresolved as Iran had not provided the required technical explanations. In view of this situation, a resolution was adopted at the Board of Governors’ meeting in June requesting from Iran an immediate response to the IAEA Director General’s call to resolve the issues. Furthermore, a resolution was also adopted at the Board of Governors’ meeting in November that set out a decision on the concrete actions that Iran should take toward resolving the issues, and requested for the Director General to issue a report on the matter by March 2023. Japan has consistently been supporting the IAEA’s efforts with regard to Iran, and will continue to call strongly on Iran to cooperate completely with the IAEA. Japan will also continue to contribute to discussions related to Iran’s nuclear and missile activities in the international export control regimes such as the NSG and the MTCR.

As for Syria, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 found that activities such as Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor would constitute non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To address this outstanding issue, Japan is calling upon Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. It is important for Syria to sign, ratify and implement the AP. Similarly, at the NPT Review Conference held in August 2022, Japan participated in the joint statement on Syria’s non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. This statement mentioned the IAEA’s assessment pointing out the comparability between Syria’s domestic nuclear facilities and facilities in North Korea.

C Nuclear Security

International cooperation is advancing in nuclear security to prevent acts of terrorism such as those involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These include the entering into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2007 and of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2015 respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit was held four times between 2010 and 2016. Japan has actively participated in and contributed to these efforts. For example, at the International Conference on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in 2020, State Minister for Foreign Affairs WAKAMIYA Kenji participated in the ministerial conference as a representative of the Government of Japan and delivered a speech to share the view of Japan with other participants.

In Vienna in March 2022, the first Conference of the Parties since the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was held, and the validity and implementation status of the Convention were verified. Japan expressed that it would continue to support the IAEA in the areas of human resources development and technological development going forward, as well as contribute to strengthening international nuclear security.

On March 2 and 3, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors convened an emergency meeting in Vienna to discuss the implications of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. At the meeting, participating countries condemned and expressed their concerns regarding Russia’s attacks on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine from the perspective of nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. The resolution adopted by a majority at the meeting deplores Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which are posing serious and direct threats to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and civilian personnel. It also calls upon Russia to immediately cease all actions in order for Ukraine to preserve or promptly regain full control over nuclear facilities. Resolutions were also adopted by a majority at the Board of Governors’ meeting in September and November. These resolutions express grave concern that Russia has not heeded the call of
the Board to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, and call on Russia to enable the Ukrainian authorities to regain full control over the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant to ensure its safe and secure operation, as well as to enable the IAEA to fully and safely conduct its safeguards verification activities. Furthermore, they also incorporate support for the efforts by the IAEA Director General and others to address the implications for the nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine, through means such as the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) and the continuous presence of the IAEA staff at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Japan also strongly condemns Russia’s aggression including its seizure of nuclear facilities, and will continue to support the IAEA’s efforts for ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities in Ukraine.

(3) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A Multilateral Efforts

Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the treaty, it is the “inalienable right” for any country that meets its obligations to non-proliferation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reflecting the increase in international energy demand, many countries use or are planning to use nuclear power.34

On the other hand, these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes, and a nuclear accident in one country may have significant impacts on neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”;35 that is, (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety (e.g., measures to ensure safety to prevent nuclear accidents), and (3) Nuclear Security. As the country that experienced the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, it is Japan’s responsibility to share its experiences and lessons learned from the accident with other countries and to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety. In this regard, in 2013, the IAEA, in collaboration with Japan, designated the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC) in Fukushima Prefecture. By December 2022, they had conducted 26 workshops for Japanese and foreign officials to strengthen their capacity in the field of emergency preparedness and response.

The difficult work of decommissioning, contaminated water management, decontamination and environmental remediation has been progressing steadily at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station by leveraging the collective technologies and knowledge of the world, and in cooperation with the IAEA, the expert organization in the field of nuclear energy. The Government of Japan announced its Basic Policy on the handling of the ALPS treated water36 in April 2021, and signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS treated Water with the IAEA in July. Under this TOR, Japan is cooperating with the IAEA to implement the IAEA reviews on the safety and regulatory aspects of ALPS treated water. In May 2022, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Japan, during which he visited TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and stated that the IAEA could confirm that the discharge of treated water into the Pacific Ocean would be carried out in full compliance with international standards, and that the discharge does not have any adverse impact on the environment. Furthermore, safety and regulatory reviews (assessments) by third-parties, including international experts selected by the IAEA, were conducted in February and March, and the IAEA published the respective reports in April and June. The second safety review was conducted in November, after which IAEA Director General Grossi stated that points raised by the task force in the first mission in February 2022 have been fully reviewed and reflected through revisions to Japan’s plans. The IAEA is scheduled to continue conducting reviews going forward.

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34 According to the IAEA, as of January 2023, 423 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 56 reactors are under construction.
35 “3S” is used to refer to the IAEA’s efforts toward nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards, which are typical measures for non-proliferation.
36 “ALPS treated water” refers to water purified using multiple purification systems, including Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS), to ensure that the level of radioactive substances in the water (except for tritium) are below the regulatory standards for safety. Furthermore, it is assumed that the ALPS treated water is adequately diluted thereafter to reduce its concentration of radioactive substances, including tritium, to significantly below the level of regulatory standards for safety, before it is discharged into the sea.
We are observing more and more reports these days that contain references to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), such as reports about the nuclear issue in Iran and the situation in Ukraine. We can say that the global situation is having a greater impact on nuclear activities and giving rise to more international security problems that the IAEA should be involved in.

The IAEA is an organization established in 1957 with the aim of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear power and at the same time, ensuring that nuclear power is not used for military purposes. Under the leadership of Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, the IAEA contributes to member states by ascertaining the role that it should play in relation to issues surrounding the world, such as security issues, environmental issues, and development, and taking action swiftly.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, the agreement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached between Iran and six countries including the U.S. as well as the European Union in 2015, and a resolution regarding this agreement was adopted by the UN Security Council. The JCPOA stipulates lifting economic sanctions in return for significant restrictions to Iran’s nuclear activities. The IAEA played an important role in verifying whether Iran’s activities were in line with the plan. However, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA by the former Trump administration and the subsequent resumption of sanctions on Iran by the U.S. thereafter, Iran began taking retaliatory measures from May 2019 and gradually phased out its commitments under the JCPOA. In February 2021, Iran suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol, which allows for unannounced inspections by the IAEA. Currently, verification inspections by the IAEA are only conducted within a limited scope in comparison with the initial agreement. Director General Grossi has expressed his concerns on not clarifying and resolving the remaining issues on the presence of uranium particles at undeclared locations.

With regard to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the IAEA has expressed its concern for ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities and nuclear security from an early stage. In addition to dispatching experts to nuclear facilities to assess the situation and providing technical support such as the supply of necessary equipment, it has created a system for monitoring and reporting on the nuclear safety and security situation in real time by establishing a continued presence of IAEA staff at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, the vicinity of which has been hit by shelling. The Director General himself also makes visits to Russia and Ukraine in continued efforts to urge both parties to establish Nuclear Safety and Security Protection Zone. Despite the very challenging circumstances, the IAEA has continued to implement safeguards activities, such as inspections, in Ukraine in accordance with the safeguards agreement and continues to verify that nuclear materials under safeguards are being used for peaceful purposes, and nuclear facilities are being used as declared.

The IAEA is also addressing the security concerns and various issues surrounding the international community as an important part of its responsibilities. These include issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear development, IAEA’s assessment on Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor which constitutes non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and how to apply the IAEA safeguards to nuclear-powered submarines.

The IAEA also contributes to member states facing serious problems in a wide range of fields, such as the “Atoms4Climate” project, “Rays of Hope” project, “NUTEC Plastics” project, and “ZODIAC” project.

These activities require highly specialized technical knowledge, in fields such as physics, chemistry, and nuclear engineering, as well as experience in these fields. While I was in Japan, I was in charge of safety and safeguards of nuclear facilities, and participated verification of Iran’s nuclear activities and other states in my role as an IAEA inspector.
In July, Dr. Gillian Hirth, former Chair of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and Ms. Borislava Batandjiev-Metcalf, Secretary of UNSCEAR, and their delegation visited Japan. During the visit, they exchanged opinions with the Government of Japan, local residents, and other stakeholders on the UNSCEAR 2020/2021 Report published in March 2021 as a revised edition of the report on the levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The report concluded that “no adverse health effects among Fukushima residents have been documented that could be directly attributed to radiation exposure from the accident.”

In order to make progress in the decommissioning works and in recovery with the support and correct understanding of the international community, the Government of Japan periodically releases comprehensive reports through the IAEA that cover matters such as progress in decommissioning and contaminated water management at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, results of the monitoring of air dose rate and seawater radioactivity concentration, and food safety. In addition, Japan submits reports on the current situation to the relevant organizations, including Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo, and to the IAEA basically every month. Furthermore, Japan has organized more than 100 briefing sessions to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo since the accident (held in February, March, May, June, July, and November in 2022), and provided information through Japanese diplomatic missions overseas.

The Government of Japan continues to provide information thoroughly to the international community in a transparent manner, based on scientific evidence, and to provide highly transparent explanations for claims that may encourage reputational damage.

Nuclear energy is applied not only to the field of power generation, but also to other areas including human health, food and agriculture, environment, and industrial uses. Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such non-power applications and contributing to development issues are becoming increasingly important as developing countries make up the majority of NPT States Parties. The IAEA also contributes to technical cooperation for developing countries and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In this context, Japan has been actively supporting the IAEA’s activities, with its technical cooperation based on the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and with its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In FY2021, Japan contributed toward projects to address the problem of marine plastic pollution, and in FY2022, toward radiation cancer treatment projects, among others.
B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to establish a legal framework required for securing a legal assurance from the recipient country on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear-related material and equipment that are transferred between the two countries, so as to realize cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the two countries. Under such bilateral agreements, cooperation in areas such as the strengthening of nuclear safety can be promoted. Japan makes its decision on whether or not to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with another country taking into account a wide range of factors such as non-proliferation efforts and nuclear energy policy of that country, its trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries among others. As of October 2022, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 14 countries and one organization, which in order of entry into force of the agreement are: Canada, France, Australia, China, the U.S., the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India.

(4) Biological and Chemical Weapons

A Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)\(^{37}\) is the only multilateral legal framework, comprehensively prohibiting the development, production and possession of biological weapons. However, how to reinforce the Convention is a challenge as there are neither provisions governing means of verification of compliance with the BWC nor an implementing organization for the Convention.

Since 2006, decisions have been made to establish the Implementation Support Unit (fulfilling the functions of a Secretariat) and to hold intersessional meetings twice a year in between the Review Conferences held every five years. During this time, progress has been made with respect to initiatives aimed at strengthening the BWC regime.

At the 9th Review Conference of the BWC held in Geneva from November 28 to December 16, 2022, the final report, which included the establishment of a working group to discuss measures for strengthening the BWC, was adopted by consensus.

B Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)\(^{38}\) comprehensively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance is ensured through a verification system consisting of declarations and inspections, making this Convention a groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Its extensive efforts toward the realization of a world without chemical weapons were highly acclaimed, and the Organisation was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Japan, which has a highly developed chemicals industry and numerous chemicals factories, also accepts numerous OPCW inspections. Japan also actively cooperates with the OPCW in many other concrete ways, including measures to increase the number of member states and strengthening national implementation measures by States Parties with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention. Moreover, under the CWC, Japan aims to complete, as soon as possible, the destruction of chemical weapons of the former Japanese Army abandoned in Chinese territory by working in cooperation with China.

(5) Conventional Weapons

Conventional weapons generally refer to arms other than weapons of mass destruction and include a wide variety of weapons ranging from landmines, tanks, and artillery to small arms and light weapons such as handguns. The problem of conventional weapons, which

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\(^{37}\) Entered into force in March 1975. Total number of States Parties is 184 (as of December 2022).

\(^{38}\) Entered into force in April 1997. Total number of States Parties is 193 (as of December 2022).
are used in actual wars and cause injury and death to civilians, is serious in light of both national security and humanitarian concerns. The disarmament agenda presented in 2018 by UN Secretary-General Guterres categorizes disarmament of conventional weapons as one of the three pillars, “Disarmament that Saves Lives.” Japan is making active efforts involving cooperation and support based on international standards and principles concerning conventional weapons.

A Small Arms and Light Weapons
Described as "the real weapons of mass destruction" due to the many human lives they take, small arms and light weapons continue to proliferate due to the ease with which they can be obtained and used. They contribute to conflict prolongation and escalation, hindering the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 1995, Japan has been working with other countries to submit a resolution on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons to the UN General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year. In areas around the world, Japan has also provided support for projects to address the issue of small arms and light weapons, including training and the collection and destruction of weapons. In 2019, Japan contributed two million US dollars to a mechanism for preventing small arms established under UN Secretary-General Guterres’ disarmament agenda, and in 2022, through this mechanism, projects on small arms and light weapons were launched in Cameroon, Jamaica, and South Sudan.

B The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 39
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to establish common standards to regulate international trade in and prevent the illicit trade of conventional arms, entered into force in December 2014. As one of the original co-authors of the UN General Assembly resolution that initiated a consideration of the treaty, Japan has taken the lead in discussions and negotiations in the UN and contributed significantly to the establishment of the treaty. Even after the treaty entered into force, Japan has actively participated in discussions at Conferences of States Parties and other opportunities. Japan has continued to contribute in ways such as hosting the 4th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in Tokyo as the first chair country elected from the Asia-Pacific region in August 2018. Japan also places importance on the universal application of the ATT. To that end, it has been encouraging countries, in particular Asian countries, to participate in the ATT.

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. It comprises a framework convention that sets forth procedural and other matters, as well as five annexed protocols that regulate individual conventional arms. The framework convention entered into force in 1983. Japan has ratified the framework convention and annexed Protocols I to IV, including the amended Protocol II. Prompted by concerns in the international community about the rapidly advancing military applications of science and technology, meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been held under the CCW framework since 2017. In 2019, the Group formulated 11 guiding principles on LAWS, which were officially approved at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW held in November the same year. Japan has continued to contribute actively and constructively to such discussions on international rule-making. At the GGE held in March 2022, Japan submitted a proposal on “Principles and Good Practices on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” jointly with the U.S., the UK, Australia, Canada, and the ROK. Many working papers were also submitted by other countries, and the parties engaged in active discussions at the GGE convened in March and July as

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39 As of December 2022, there are 112 states and regions that are parties to the ATT. Japan signed the Treaty on the day that it was released for signing and became a State Party in May 2014.
40 As of December 2022, 126 countries and regions are parties to the CCW.
well as the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW convened in November.

Concerning Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), which has been discussed at the CCW and other fora, a political declaration was drawn up in 2022 by countries sharing the same concern under the leadership of Ireland. Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs YOSHIKAWA Yuumi attended the adoption ceremony for the declaration held in November and delivered a statement.

**D Anti-Personnel Mines**

Since the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) in 1998, Japan has continued to promote comprehensive measures with a focus on the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of support for mine-affected countries. Along with calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention, Japan has also been steadily engaged in international cooperation through landmine clearance, victim assistance and other activities in the international community, from the viewpoint of the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.”

At the 20th Meeting of the States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty held in Geneva in November, Japan presented its initiatives and achievements in supporting mine action, and also expressed its continued resolve toward playing an active role in achieving a mine-free world. As the Chair of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance of the Treaty, Japan also put every effort into promoting international assistance toward mine-affected countries.

**E Cluster Munitions**

The international community takes seriously the humanitarian consequences brought about by cluster munitions. Japan is therefore taking steps to address this issue via victim assistance and unexploded ordnance clearance. Japan is also continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). At the 10th Meeting of States Parties to the CCM held in August 2022, Japan participated in discussions concerning these issues and shared its proactive efforts.

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41 The Convention, which entered into force in March 1999, bans the use and production of anti-personnel mines while mandating the destruction of stockpiled mines and the clearance of buried mines. As of December 2022, there are 164 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.

42 Generally speaking, it refers to bombs or shells in the form of large containers that open midair and release submunitions that spread over a wide area. They are said to be highly likely to not explode on impact, leading to the problem of civilians being accidentally killed or injured.

43 $\text{See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts on international cooperation regarding cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines.}$

44 Entered into force in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while mandating the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions. There are 110 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan (as of December 31, 2022).
to obtain important posts (see Chapter 4, Section 1, 2(1)). Given the pressing challenge of making the UN an efficient organization that is effective and well-suited to the 21st century, Japan continues to proactively engage in the reformation of the UN, including the UN Security Council.

(2) Major Events in 2022
The High-Level Week of the 77th UN General Assembly convened in September, taking a fully in-person format for the first time in three years. Prime Minister Kishida and Foreign Minister Hayashi attended from Japan.

In the General Debate of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Kishida addressed the following three pillars on Japan’s determination to achieve the visions of the UN: (1) strengthening of the functions of the UN including the UN Security Council; (2) achieving a UN that promotes the rule of law in the international community; (3) promoting efforts based on the concept of human security in the new era. He noted lending a sincere ear to the voices of each country as well as demonstrating Japan’s strong commitment to the UN and to multilateralism.

Prime Minister Kishida also attended three other meetings during the High-Level Week. Delivering a speech at the “HeForShe” Summit organized by UN Women, Prime Minister Kishida as a HeForShe Champion said that “women’s economic independence” is at the core of the “New Form of Capitalism,” and spoke about the importance of enabling all women to choose their own paths in life. At the High-Level Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), he stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and its early entry into force, as well as the strengthening of the verification system. Furthermore, at the Global Fund’s Seventh Replenishment Conference hosted by President Biden of the U.S., Prime Minister Kishida stated that strengthening health systems under the initiative of the Global Fund will lead to better preparedness for future pandemics and contribute to achieving universal health coverage (UHC), and stressed the need for the international community to work together to accelerate such efforts. He also announced Japan’s intent of contributing up to 1.08 billion US dollars to the Global Fund over the next three years.

Prime Minister Kishida took the opportunity to hold six summit meetings and five informal talks with leaders of various countries, working tirelessly to exchange opinions on bilateral relations as well as on various issues in the international arena, such as the response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

During his stay in New York, Prime Minister Kishida also attended a reception to promote Japanese food culture. He also delivered remarks at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In doing so, he explained Japanese economic and fiscal policy directly to experts and business people, actively communicated the attractiveness of Japan, as well as called for investments in Japan. In addition, he held a dialogue with executives of the NYSE and U.S. businesses, as well as observed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the NYSE.

Foreign Minister Hayashi engaged in active diplomacy during the High-Level Week, attending a total of eight multilateral conferences, including the G7

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45 The “HeForShe” Summit is an event organized as a part of the HeForShe Movement conducted by UN Women with the aim of raising awareness and involvement among men in initiatives aimed at realizing gender equality. The events participants include male leaders and stakeholders from the government, private companies, educational institutions, and non-profit organizations. HeForShe Champions refer to male leaders from various sectors selected in this movement.

46 Established in 2002, the Global Fund has served as a public-private partnership for countermeasures against infectious diseases, which were first addressed as a major summit agenda item at the G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit in 2000. It provides financial assistance toward strengthening public health systems and implementing countermeasures in developing countries against the three major infectious diseases (HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria), and contributes to efforts to achieve the SDGs. It is a major organization that supports infectious disease countermeasures. Japan has contributed approximately 4.3 billion US dollars cumulatively (as of 2022), ranking fifth among the donor countries.
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the G4 countries on UN Security Council Reform, and Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, as well as 15 bilateral meetings and two summit meetings. In his meetings with various countries, Foreign Minister Hayashi engaged in discussions focusing on strengthening the functions of the UN as a whole, including UN Security Council reform, restoring trust in the UN, and thoroughly upholding the rule of law, while reflecting the contents of Prime Minister Kishida’s address at the General Debate. Furthermore, he affirmed cooperation on regional situations including Ukraine, China, and North Korea, and communicated Japan’s stance on issues such as food and energy security, and UHC, to the international community.

Foreign Minister Hayashi held a meeting with UN General Assembly President Kőrösi Csaba, during which he expressed his support for strengthening the functions of the General Assembly and for President Kőrösi’s leadership.

In August, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Japan. During the visit, he attended the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony held in Hiroshima and held a meeting with Prime Minister Kishida. Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during wartime, will lead international efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons. Both parties concurred to continue to work closely. Prime Minister Kishida also took the opportunity to meet with UN Secretary General Guterres during the NPT Review Conference held the same month.

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine from February and Russia’s exercising of its veto in the UN Security Council on two occasions, six emergency special sessions of the UN General Assembly were held up till February 2023, and General Assembly resolutions were adopted at each of these sessions (See the Special Feature Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine and Japan’s Response on page 27). Japan became a co-sponsor of these resolutions, and urged Russia to listen carefully to the overwhelming voices of the international community and to implement the resolutions.

(3) United Nations Security Council and its Reform

A United Nations Security Council

The UN Security Council holds the primary responsibility within the UN for maintaining international peace and security. It is composed of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members that are elected by UN Member States (for two-year terms). Japan was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in June, and will serve a two-year term from January 2023 as a non-permanent member for the 12th time, which is more than any other UN Member State. In January, the month that Japan held the Security Council presidency, Foreign Minister Hayashi visited New York and hosted the ministerial Open Debate on the rule of law. Japan also hosted the ambassadorial-level meeting on peacebuilding during its presidency. The UN Security Council’s agenda covers a wide range of areas from the peaceful settlement of disputes and addressing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, to peacebuilding and women, peace and security. In recent years, new themes such as climate change and food security have also been covered. The UN Security Council also has a mandate to determine the details of activities in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and UN Special Political Missions (SPM).

The UN Security Council has not been functioning effectively, as shown by Russia’s (a permanent member of the Council) aggression against Ukraine and North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities that repeat violations of UN Security Council resolutions and threaten the peace and security of Japan, the region and the international community. Under such circumstances, Japan will communicate closely with each country and
engage in dialogues, throughout its two-year term on
the Council, with the aim of maintaining and strength-
ening international order based on the rule of law while
cooperating to enable the UN Security Council to ful-
fill its expected role. Japan will also contribute actively
to discussions on the response to regional issues in the
Middle East, Africa, and other regions, as well as on
global issues such as climate change. As it has contrib-
uted during previous terms, Japan will continue to
work on improving the procedures of the UN Security
Council, including enhancing the efficiency and trans-
parency of the Council.

B Reform of the UN Security Council

More than 75 years have passed since the UN was
established, and the structure of the international
community has significantly changed while the UN’s
functions have become diverse. Despite this, the
composition of the UN Security Council has largely
remained unchanged to this day. In response to Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine in February, a resolution
that deplores the aggression by Russia was put to a
vote in the UN Security Council. However, it was not
adopted as Russia exercised its veto. Consequently,
the UN Security Council was unable to take a coor-
dinated response. This clearly shows that the UN
Security Council cannot adequately fulfill the func-
tions expected by the international community today.
There is a broadly shared view among the international
community that an early reform of the UN Security
Council is necessary to make the body more legitimate,
effective and representative.

To play an even more proactive role toward the real-
ization of world peace and security through the UN,
Japan has been making efforts to convince other coun-
tries to pursue an early UN Security Council reform,
with the expansion of both permanent and non-per-
manent seats and Japan’s admission as a permanent
member.

C Recent Activities Regarding UN Security
Council Reform

Since 2009, in the UN General Assembly, Member
States have been engaging in the Intergovernmental
Negotiations on UN Security Council reform. In 2022,
five meetings took place between February and May. At
the end of June, the decision for the 77th session to roll
over the work of the 76th session including the expres-
sion “instill new life in the discussions on the reform
of the Security Council,” was adopted by consensus
at the UN General Assembly. In October, about one
month earlier than in 2021, President Kőrösi of the
77th session of the UN General Assembly appointed
the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Slovakia
to the UN as co-chairs of the Intergovernmental
Negotiations. The spotlight will be placed on how
future discussions will progress under the new system.

Japan also places great importance on its initiatives
as a member of the G4 (Japan, India, Germany and
Brazil), a group that cooperates on promoting UN
Security Council reform. Foreign Minister Hayashi
attended the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
G4 countries in September in conjunction with the
High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly. At
the meeting, the G4 Foreign Ministers shared their
understanding of the current situation of UN Security
Council reform and discussed future directions for
their cooperation with member countries, based on
the view that the foundation of the international order,
which the UN has been playing a central role in the
development of, is being shaken due to Russia’s aggres-
sion against Ukraine and other challenges. With a view
to restoring confidence in the UN and bearing in mind
that many countries have mixed expectations and dis-
satisfaction toward the UN Security Council, Foreign
Minister Hayashi suggested that Security Council
reform be put in the context of strengthening the func-
tions of the entire UN, including efforts to strengthen

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Odawara attending the election for non-per-
manent members of the UN Security Council—the moment when Japan was
elected (Left in the photo) (June 9, New York)
the roles of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to increase momentum of the reform. To realize Security Council reform, the Ministers agreed to cooperate closely with the President of the General Assembly to launch text-based negotiations in the Intergovernmental Negotiations, to work with relevant countries such as Africa and the U.S., and to seek concrete progress as early as possible. On December 14, State Minister for Foreign Affairs YAMADA Kenji attended the Security Council Open Debate on New Orientation for Reformed Multilateralism, including UN Security Council reform. He emphasized that UN Security Council reform is possible and achievable, and strives to raise momentum toward it. Japan will continue to cooperate closely with countries that support the reform, and to be positively involved in the process toward the realization of UN Security Council reform.

(4) Organizational Aspects of the United Nations (Management)

A Management
UN Secretary-General Guterres positions peace efforts and development along with reforms in the management of the UN as issues of priority, and works continuously to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN Secretariat’s functions. In 2021, he issued a report titled “Our Common Agenda” which proposed concrete measures for the UN to adapt to a new era. Discussions are ongoing among UN Member States and other stakeholders to bring about the realization of these recommendations. Japan supports the objectives of the reform with the hope that the UN will fulfill its mission more effectively and efficiently.

B Budget
The UN budget is mainly composed of the regular budget for general activities (an annual budget for the period from January to December, implemented on a trial basis from 2020 to 2022), and the peacekeeping budget related to peacekeeping operations (an annual budget for the period from July to the following June).

With regard to the regular budget, a budget for 2023 amounting to approximately 3.4 billion US dollars was approved in December 2022 at the UN General Assembly. The budget for peacekeeping operations for the period of 2022-2023 amounting to approximately 6.45 billion US dollars in total was approved in June 2022 (an increase of approximately 1.2% from the final budget of the previous period).

The budget to support UN activities is composed of assessed contributions paid by Member States and voluntary contributions provided in accordance with Member States’ policy needs. With regard to assessed contributions, Japan currently ranks third after the U.S. and China. Japan contributed approximately 230.76 million US dollars to the UN regular budget for 2022, and approximately 518.33 million US dollars to the peacekeeping budget for 2022/23. As a major financial contributor, Japan has been encouraging the UN to make more efficient and effective use of its financial resources. The scale of assessments, which provides the basis for calculating the amount of assessed contributions, is revised every three years based on the
capacities to pay of the Member States. Japan’s scale of assessment, revised at the end of 2021, is 8.033% (2022-2024), behind the U.S. and China.

Key bodies that address administrative and budgetary matters of the UN are the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee on Contributions. Both are standing subsidiary committees of the General Assembly and are comprised of members serving in their personal capacities. The ACABQ reviews the overall administrative and budgetary issues of the UN and makes recommendations to the General Assembly, while the Committee on Contributions submits a proposal on the scale of assessments of the regular budget for a decision to be made by all Member States at the General Assembly. Hence, both committees play an important role. Members from Japan have served continuously on both of these committees.
The rule of law is, generally, the concept that recognizes the superiority of the law over all forms of power. It is an essential cornerstone of a fair and just society within a country. At the same time, it contributes to peace and stability in the international community and constitutes the basis of the international order that consists of friendly and equitable relations between states. In the international community, under the rule of law, we must not allow rule by force, all countries must observe international law in good faith, and there must be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. Japan promotes strengthening the rule of law as one of the pillars of its foreign policy, and promotes rule-making in various fields as well as ensuring their proper implementation.

(1) Japan’s Diplomacy to Strengthen the Rule of Law

Japan makes use of various opportunities, including international conferences, to affirm with each country the importance of a free and open international order based on the rule of law. In addition, it participates actively in rule-making in various sectors, contributing to the formation and development of a new international legal order. In order to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of legal order, Japan also actively cooperates with judicial organizations to strengthen their functions via both human resource and financial resource contributions, and works proactively on international cooperation in relation to the rule of law, such as by supporting the improvement of legal systems and organizing events on international law.

With the very foundation of the international order being shaken as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is becoming even more important to strengthen the rule of law. In his statement at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly held in September, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized the importance of the following three principles based on “The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States” (Friendly Relations Declaration) adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1970: (1) break away from “rule by force” and pursue “rule of law” through observing international law in good faith; (2) in this regard, do not allow any attempts to change the status quo of territories and areas by force or coercion; and, (3) cooperate with one another against serious violations of the principles of the UN Charter. He also expressed Japan’s strong resolve toward realizing a UN that promotes the rule of law in the international community.

A Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

In order to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes via international judicial institutions while striving to comply faithfully with international law, Japan accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the UN, and constructively contributes to establishing the rule of law in the international community via cooperation in providing human and financial resources. For example, Japan is the largest financial contributor to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (as of December 31, 2022 for the PCA). In terms of human resources, a number of Japanese judges serve on international judicial bodies as of 2022, including ICJ Judge IWASAWA Yuji (incumbent since 2018), Judge YANAI Shunji to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (incumbent since 2005), and Judge AKANE Tomoko to the ICC (incumbent since March 2018). Through these contributions, Japan strives to enhance the effectiveness and universality of international courts and tribunals (see the Column on page 253). With the aim of fostering people who can play an active role in international litigations in the future, Japan provides active support to Japanese nationals including those who intern at international judicial organizations through the Support Program.
for Internships at International Courts and other International Organizations.

At the same time, in order to further strengthen the capacity in dealing with international litigations, Japan is engaged in efforts to enhance expertise on international judicial proceedings, and to create a strong organization that can perform well in international trials by strengthening relationships with lawyers and law firms in and outside Japan, that are mainly active in the field of international justice. In the field of economy, the importance of dispute settlements based on World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), and investment agreements has been growing in recent years. Against this backdrop, in the handling of dispute settlements under the WTO agreements and others, Japan engages in litigation work, such as preparation of written submissions, handling of evidence, and preparation and participation in oral proceedings, in close cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies as well as academic experts and practitioners specializing in international economic law both in Japan and abroad. It also advances initiatives such as analyzing of case law and academic theories, and engages in dispute prevention. In these ways, Japan strives to strengthen the capacity for strategic and effective dispute settlement.

B International Rule-making

International rule-making to respond to issues the global community faces is one of the important efforts toward strengthening the rule of law. Along with actively promoting the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at building a legal foundation for achieving goals it shares with other countries, Japan is demonstrating initiative starting at the planning phase in creating rules for developing international laws that reflect its ideals and positions in cross-sectoral efforts in the framework of the UN and other fora. Specifically, Japan has been actively involved in the rule-making processes within various international frameworks that include codification work in the field of public international law at the International Law Commission (ILC) and the sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, as well as the preparation of conventions and model laws in the field of private international law at fora such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). In the ILC, MURASE Shinya, Professor Emeritus of Sophia University, whose term is from 2009 to 2022, serves as a Special Rapporteur on the topic of “Protection of the Atmosphere.” In this role, he has long been contributing to the development of international law by participating in deliberations in the ILC, including guiding draft guidelines of the said topic through to adoption. From 2023, ASADA Masahiko, Professor of Doshisha University and Professor Emeritus of Kyoto University, will serve as a member of the ILC (for the term from 2023 to 2027). Japan also sends Government representatives to various meetings of the HCCH, UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, taking an active lead in the discussions. For example, Dr. Kanda Hideki, Professor of Gakushuin University, chairs the Digital Assets and Private Law working group in UNIDROIT, and contributes to leading-edge discussions on digital finance. Japan has also been showing its presence as a member state of UNCITRAL since the founding of the commission, such as by proposing and realizing the enlargement of the membership of UNCITRAL as well as projects in the field of dispute settlement.

C Development of Domestic Legislation and Other Matters

Japan not only takes steps to appropriately improve its own national laws so as to comply with international law, but also actively supports the development of legal systems, especially in Asian countries, while cooperating internationally on efforts related to further developing the rule of law. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Society of International Law, supported by the Nippon Foundation, co-organize the Asia Cup. The Asia Cup is an international law moot court competition for students in Asia including Japan, which aims to raise awareness about the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, nurture future generations in the field of international law, and strengthen exchange and communication among them (the 23rd Asia Cup was held in 2022). Japan also participates in constructive discussions and engages in cooperation concerning human resources and finances with
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), the only inter-governmental organization in the Asia/Africa region that is engaged in international law.

(2) Initiatives in the Maritime Sector

For Japan, as a maritime nation, maintaining and strengthening maritime order based on the rule of law is an issue of the utmost importance. Therefore, Japan has consistently advocated for the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” to be followed by every nation: (1) making and clarifying claims based on international law; (2) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (3) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. For example, at the 16th East Asia Summit (EAS), held in October 2021, Prime Minister Kishida pointed out that it is in our common interest to make the Indo-Pacific a free and open sea.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as a foundation for the rule of law at sea. The Convention has been ratified by 167 countries, including Japan (including some regions not officially recognized as nations by Japan), and the EU. The Convention comprehensively provides for principles governing the sea, including the freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas. It also stipulates rights and obligations under international law on the development and regulation of marine resources, among other things. The provisions of the Convention that concern areas such as territorial sea and exclusive economic zones are widely accepted as established customary international law. In addition, the recognition that activities conducted on the seas ought to be carried out according to the provisions of the Convention is widely shared among the international community. As problems concerning the oceans and seas grow more complex and diverse, it is important to preserve and strengthen the maritime order based on the Convention, which serves as a comprehensive and universal legal framework.

To achieve the objectives of UNCLOS, several international organizations have been established based on UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established in 1996 for the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and the preservation and advancement of law and order at sea. The ITLOS deals with a wide range of cases, including the delimitation of maritime boundaries in recent years in particular, and the importance of the Tribunal has been growing. Japan attaches importance to the role played by the ITLOS and has successively dispatched two Japanese judges to the Tribunal since its establishment (currently Judge YANAI Shunji (term ends at the end of September 2023)). The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) plays an important role in the operation of the system for establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf. Since its establishment, Japan has continued to cooperate with the Commission in terms of both human and financial resources, through means such as continuously producing members (Japan’s current member is Professor YAMAZAKI Toshitsugu from the University of Tokyo (term ends on June 15, 2028)). In the International Seabed Authority (ISA) established for the primary purpose of administering deep sea-bed mineral resources, during three parts of the Council’s Session held in 2022, deliberations were held on regulations concerning the exploitation of deep sea-bed mineral resources, and work was also carried out to formulate the relevant standards and guidelines. Japan participates actively in negotiations to ensure that its position is reflected in the regulations. Since before, Japan has also supported developing countries in capacity building for deep sea-bed technologies, and takes the lead in the creation of rules governing the deep sea-bed. Since 2018, an intergovernmental conference (GC) has been convened to formulate a new international agreement under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). Japan has continued to participate actively in these discussions, including in the 5th conference held in August 2022.

(3) Initiatives in the Political and Security Fields

In order to strengthen its legal basis for diplomatic activities, Japan is actively engaged in concluding international agreements in the political and security fields. In January, Japan signed the New Special Measures Agreement on HNS (“Host Nation Support”) with the U.S., and this Agreement entered into force in April with approval from the National Diet. In January, Japan also signed the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access
Peaceful Settlement of Maritime Disputes and the Rule of Law

YANAI Shunji, former Ambassador of Japan to the United States, Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)

International relations regarding the seas and oceans are regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 and is also known as the “Constitution for the Oceans.” This convention has expanded the maritime areas of states, establishing the width of the territorial sea of a state up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles while creating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles and granting wide continental shelves to coastal states. On the other hand, it stipulates the international management of the deep seabed that extends beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the mineral resources on such seabed, as the “common heritage of mankind.” As disputes over the delimitation of EEZ and continental shelves, as well as over marine resources and navigation, were expected to arise frequently under this convention, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which specializes in the law of the sea, was established in Hamburg (Germany) in addition to the existing International Court of Justice and arbitral procedures.

In 2005, I assumed office as a Judge of ITLOS and the second Japanese Judge in the Tribunal after the late Judge YAMAMOTO Soji. I have now served in the Tribunal for close to 18 years, including three years as its President. ITLOS has handled 31 cases of maritime disputes over the quarter century since its establishment, and it contributes not only to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and to the rule of law at sea, but also to the progressive development of the Law of the Sea through its jurisprudence. ITLOS has also provided advisory opinions to clarify the interpretations of provisions of UNCLOS in relation to the deep seabed and fishery. The dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the delimitation of the maritime boundary is an example of an ITLOS judgement that was particularly welcomed by the parties of a dispute. More than 30 years of negotiations between the two countries had not led to a successful conclusion, but ITLOS settled the dispute in about two years and three months.

There are two matters that I feel strongly about in my experience as a Judge of ITLOS. The first is the sense of solidarity and common purpose among the 21 Judges. When hearing cases, various opinions are put forward in the beginning and the situation may appear to be out of control. However, as deliberations proceed, a majority view emerges. I believe this is because the Judges are in accord with one another on their desire to come up with the best solution for the dispute before them, even when there is a wide range of opinions.

Another matter is that we share a common logic and way of thinking about the law. The 21 Judges all come from different countries and have different backgrounds, including cultures, languages, and legal systems. In spite of such differences, as long as the legal opinion is logically clear, these differences do not hinder mutual communication at all.

I think that it is very important for the international community to make greater use of institutions such as ITLOS to settle disputes peacefully, and to establish the rule of law at sea.
Agreement, which establishes procedures between Japan and Australia for the cooperative activities conducted by defence forces of one country while visiting the other country, and defines the status of the visiting force. In January 2023, Japan signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the UK. Japan advanced efforts to conclude Exchange of Notes and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, which set out provisions on the handling of defense equipment and technologies to be transferred, and Agreements on the Security of Information, which serve as the basis for the sharing of classified information on security with the relevant countries. With regard to the defense equipment and technologies to be transferred, Japan signed and exchanged notes with Ukraine on March 8 (entry into force on the same day) for the grant of equipment and goods of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to Ukraine. It also signed an Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Thailand on May 2 (entry into force on the same day). In the nuclear sector, in order to enable the reprocessing, in France, of spent fuel generated in research reactors owned by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan signed and exchanged notes with France on June 15 (entry into force on the same day) on the transportation and reprocessing of spent fuel and the return of radioactive waste.

(4) Initiatives in the Fields of the Economy and Society
The conclusion and implementation of international agreements that bring legal discipline to cooperative relationships with other countries in the economic sphere remain important for promoting the liberalization of trade and investment, as well as people-to-people exchanges, and for strengthening the foundations for the overseas activities of Japanese citizens and companies. The agreements that Japan negotiated and signed or concluded in 2022 include tax conventions, investment treaties, and social security agreements with various countries and regions. Furthermore, Japan also engaged actively in negotiations on EPAs and other agreements, with the aim of expanding free and fair economic spheres and strengthening wide-ranging economic relationships.

With regard to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Japan, as the chair of the Accession Working Group, actively advanced negotiations toward the UK acceding to the CPTPP. As for the Japan-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement), formal negotiations with the EU commenced in October to include provisions on the free flow of data into the EPA. The Protocol Amending the Trade Agreement between Japan and the United States of America was signed in June and entered into force in January 2023.

Furthermore, with a view to protecting and enhancing the livelihoods and activities of Japanese citizens and companies, Japan is working on the proper implementation of existing international agreements as well as utilizing the dispute settlement system of the WTO.

In social areas such as human rights, the environment, fisheries, maritime affairs, aviation, health, labor and postal affairs, which are closely linked to the daily lives of the people, Japan actively participates in negotiations of international agreements to ensure that Japan’s positions are reflected and also concludes such agreements. For example, in the labor sector, Japan ratified the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (Convention 105) in July. In the postal field, Japan concluded in June 2022 related documents including Additional Protocols to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) drawn up by the Universal Postal Union in 2018 and 2021.

(5) Initiatives in the Field of Criminal Justice
The ICC is the first-ever permanent international criminal court to prosecute and punish, in accordance with international law, individuals who have committed the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Since becoming a State Party to the ICC Rome Statute in October 2007, Japan has consistently supported the ICC’s activities and cooperated with the Court in various ways. Fiscally, Japan is the largest contributor to the ICC, accounting for approximately 15% of the entire assessed contributions to the Court as of 2022. Moreover, Japan has consistently produced judges since its accession to the ICC. As of 2022, AKANE Tomoko, former Ambassador for International Judicial Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Prosecutor at the Supreme
Public Prosecutors Office of Japan, is serving as a judge. Japan also cooperates on the activities of the ICC in the aspect of human resources, with HARIMOTO Yukiko serving on the Committee on Budget and Finance, among others. As the ICC evolves into a full-fledged international criminal justice institution, it is imperative to secure cooperation with the ICC, establish the principle of complementarity, and to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in its judicial procedures. Japan actively engages in addressing these challenges, such as through its participation in the working groups of the Assembly of States Parties. In March, from the perspective of expressing clear support for the ICC investigation of the situation in Ukraine, Japan, as the only Asian country, referred the situation in Ukraine to the ICC (see the Special Feature Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine and Japan's Response on page 26). Furthermore, in the face of an increase of cross-border crimes in recent years, Japan is further working on ensuring judicial cooperation in the criminal sector, such as the mutual submission of necessary evidence with other countries. Specifically, as efforts to improve legal frameworks for promoting international cooperation in the field of criminal justice, Japan has been working on negotiations toward concluding international agreements such as the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT), the Treaty on Extradition, and the Treaty on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. In May, Japan signed the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, which is a multilateral framework related to international cooperation, and in August, the Treaty between Japan and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force.

Human Rights

There is growing international concern about the human rights situations in various parts of the world. The protection and promotion of human rights is the foundation for peace and stability in the international community. Japan recognizes that human rights are universal values and that the protection of human rights is the basic responsibility of all countries, regardless of differences in the method of achieving this goal and their cultures. While speaking out firmly against any serious violation of human rights, Japan considers, under the basic principle of “dialogue” and “cooperation,” that it is important to promote voluntary efforts of each country through bilateral dialogues and cooperation with countries that are working toward democratization and the protection of human rights. In addition, in the area of human rights, with the standpoint of bridge-building in Asia and protection of socially vulnerable people, Japan puts effort into improving the global human rights situation through bilateral dialogues, proactive participation in multilateral forums such as the UN, and constructive dialogues with the UN human rights mechanisms.

(1) Initiatives within the UN

A UN Human Rights Council

The Human Rights Council holds sessions throughout the year in Geneva (three regular sessions per year, lasting about 10 weeks in total) to discuss issues and make recommendations concerning the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Special sessions to address the human rights situation in Ukraine and Iran were held in May and November, respectively, and resolutions were adopted, including on the investigation of the human rights situations in the two countries. To date, Japan has served as a member of the Council for five terms (most recently, Japan was elected in the elections held in October 2019 for the term from January 2020 to December 2022).

At the high-level segment of the 49th Session of the Human Rights Council held in February and...
March, NAKATANI Gen, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Japan for international human rights issues, delivered a statement. In his statement, he condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms, and strongly demanded that the obligations under international law including international humanitarian law should be fulfilled. He also spoke about Japan’s continued determination to contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights in Asia and the world, and stressed the importance of the immediate resolution of the abductions issue. Furthermore, he expressed Japan’s deep concerns over the situation in China including Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and urged China to take concrete actions. He also introduced Japan’s latest initiatives in the fields of business and human rights, eradication of violence against children, elimination of discrimination against leprosy, the realization of a society where the pride of the indigenous Ainu people is respected, and the protection and promotion of women’s human rights. The resolution on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), submitted by the EU and co-sponsored by Japan, was adopted without a vote at the same session (adopted for 15 consecutive years). This resolution refers to the urgency and importance of the abductions issue and of the immediate return of all abductees, the long years of severe suffering experienced by abductees and their families, grave concern over the lack of any concrete or positive action by DPRK, as well as the faithful provision of accurate and detailed information to the families of victims on the fates and whereabouts of the victims.

At the 50th session convened in June, the Netherlands delivered a joint statement on behalf of 47 countries, on concerns over the human rights situation in China, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Japan was the only participating country from Asia.

The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly

The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly is, along with the Human Rights Council, the UN’s main forum focused on human rights. Generally, in October and November, the Committee discusses a wide range of issues, including those concerning social development, women, children, racial discrimination, refugees, crime prevention and criminal justice, as well as the human rights situations in North Korea, Syria and Iran, among others. Resolutions adopted by the Third Committee are then adopted by a plenary session of the General Assembly, contributing to the development of international norms.

At the 77th session of the General Assembly, the resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, submitted by the EU and co-sponsored by Japan, was adopted without a vote at a session of the Third Committee in November and a plenary session of the UN General Assembly in December (adopted for the 18th consecutive year). The resolution refers once again to the contents of previous resolutions, including the urgency and importance of the abductions issue, which involves a serious violation of human rights, and of the immediate return of all abductees, and also strongly demands that North Korea sincerely listen to the voices of the victims and their families, faithfully provide accurate and detailed information to their families on their fates and whereabouts, and engage in constructive dialogue with the parties concerned. At the same session, Canada, on behalf of 50 countries, delivered a joint statement expressing grave concerns over the human rights situations in China, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Japan was the only participating country from Asia.

In addition, Japan participated actively in discussions in the international community toward protecting and promoting human rights, including discussions on the human rights situations in countries such as Syria, Iran, and Myanmar, as well as on various human rights issues that include social development and the rights of the child.
C Promoting the Introduction of Human Rights Due Diligence through the Implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) on Business and Human Rights

Toward the implementation of “the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)” endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council, Japan has been promoting respect for human rights in the context of business activities under the NAP on Business and Human Rights, formulated by the Government of Japan in 2020. As a part of these efforts, Japan is actively introducing its initiatives and sharing knowledge by attending international conferences and through consultations with foreign governments, with a view to promoting “Business and Human Rights.” Furthermore, in order to support efforts by business enterprises to respect human rights, the Government of Japan released the cross-industry guidelines on human rights due diligence in September. Immediately after that, NAKATANI Gen, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, visited Viet Nam and Thailand. He participated in a regional forum organized by an international organization in Thailand, and held dialogues with government officials as well as with local organizations in both countries, conveying Japan’s initiatives including the release of the aforementioned guidelines. To promote and raise awareness of the guidelines among Japanese business enterprises and provide support for the implementation of human rights due diligence, Japan is also actively engaged in support projects through contributions to international organizations, and holding overseas seminars, among other initiatives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to steadily implement the NAP in cooperation with the relevant ministries and agencies, while continuing to engage in dialogues with the stakeholders.

B International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

Japan has actively been engaged in efforts for strengthening the national implementation of IHL. In November, Japan participated in the North-East, South-East Asia and the Pacific Regional Conference on IHL. Furthermore, as it does every year, Japan dispatched an instructor to play the part of the jury to the IHL Moot Court and Role Play Competitions, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as part of awareness-raising efforts for IHL.

(3) Contribution to Refugee Issues

From the perspective of international contribution and humanitarian aid, Japan has been accepting refugees from Myanmar who were temporarily residing in Thailand, under a resettlement program that ran from FY2010 to FY2014 (the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to a third country that agrees to accept them for long-term settlement). Japan has been accepting refugees from Myanmar who had been residing temporarily in Malaysia since FY2015, and allowed accepting eligible family members of those who already resettled in Japan from Thailand on the condition that mutual aid be provided with them.

Thereafter, in light of dramatic changes to the international situation surrounding refugees and trends in the international community, and from the perspective of better balancing the burden for the refugee problem among the international community, Japan made the decision in June 2019 to accept more refugees resettling from third countries under part of a new framework. Specifically, beginning in FY2020, Japan will now

Human rights due diligence: To identify, prevent, mitigate, and address, as well as to provide information on, the impact of business activities on human rights.
accept once or twice a year refugees temporarily residing in Asia without restriction on their birthplace and family members of the refugees who have already been accepted in Japan under a resettlement program (up to 60 people can be accepted a year).

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic situation in Japan and abroad, the acceptance of refugees for FY2020 was postponed, but this was resumed in March 2022. A total of 74 households (229 people) came to Japan from FY2010 to the end of 2022.

Refugees arriving in Japan undergo a six-month training program, which includes language studies for daily life and employment support services. Those who have completed the training program live independently in their respective areas of resettlement. Initially, local governments in the Tokyo metropolitan region played a central role in operations concerning the resettlement of refugees. However, from the perspective of promoting national understanding of the refugee issue, active efforts have been made to resettle refugees in municipalities outside the Tokyo Metropolitan area since 2018.

While the acceptance of resettled refugees has been done primarily by Western countries, Japan is the first country in Asia to accept resettled refugees.

8 Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

The further deterioration of the global economy due to the spread of COVID-19 and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has not only exacerbated the poverty of women, but also brought about an increase in gender-based violence such as domestic violence (DV), human trafficking, and child marriages. In this conflict situation, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has seriously affected particularly women and girls and further highlighted existing gender inequalities. For this reason, it is necessary to prioritize the realization of gender equality and the promotion of women’s empowerment as one of the most important issues for peace and prosperity in Japan and the world, and it is vital to focus on various policies and measures for women and girls in order to realize a more peaceful and prosperous society. In this sense, gender mainstreaming, which is to incorporate the gender perspective into all policies is becoming increasingly important in the international community. It is also important for Japan, as a member of the international community, to contribute actively to international efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict, protect the human rights of women and promote the provision of relief and assistance to women. Since in the Fifth Basic Plan for Gender Equality, it is clearly stated that Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of gender equality and the promotion of women’s empowerment by hosting international conferences on women, vigorously supporting developing countries through development assistance as well as international cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

(1) G7

The G7 Leaders’ Communique from the G7 Summit in Elmau held in June referred to mainstreaming gender equality into all policy areas in the spirit of feminist development, foreign and trade policies. With an aim to continuously monitor G7 commitments, it endorsed the G7 Dashboard on Gender Gaps, which selects 12 indicators from the areas of education, employment and social security, entrepreneurship, leadership, health and well-being, and funds for development cooperation, and maps the progress of gender equality in the G7 countries and EU. It also committed to making every effort to increase the share of the G7’s bilateral allocable ODA for gender-related initiatives. Furthermore, it referred to the recognition, reduction, and redistribution of unpaid care work, and incorporated support of 79 million US dollars for the Childcare Incentive Fund. The G7 Gender Equality Ministers Meeting was held in October for the first time in three years, and was attended by OGURA Masanobu, Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment and Minister of State for Gender Equality.
(2) G20
In August, the second G20 Ministerial Conference on Women’s Empowerment was convened in Bali under the Indonesian G20 Presidency. Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment and Minister of State for Gender Equality Ogura attended an online session on “Closing the Digital Gender Gap.” In the G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration issued by the G20 Bali Summit in November, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to putting gender equality and women’s empowerment at the core of their efforts for an inclusive recovery and sustainable development as women and girls continue to be disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises.

(3) World Assembly for Women (WAW!)
Since 2014, Japan has been organizing WAW! as a forum for top leaders from Japan and abroad who are active on the frontlines of the political, economic and social arenas, to engage in discussions on various issues surrounding women, and to disseminate information about Japan’s initiatives to promote women’s empowerment within and outside Japan. The sixth edition of the assembly, WAW!2022 was held for the first time in three years since March 2019 in hybrid format (combination of in-person and online events). At WAW!2022, under the main theme “WAW! for Mainstreaming Gender into a New Form of Capitalism,” participants including youth and women in rural areas exchanged views toward the realization of gender equality and the creation of a peaceful and prosperous society (see the Special Feature on page 261).

(4) International Cooperation for the Empowerment of Women in Developing Countries
Through JICA and international organizations, Japan is engaged in educational support and human resource development, as well as efforts toward the economic empowerment of women and the elimination of gender-based violence in developing countries.

A Educational Support and Human Resource Development
At the Global Education Summit held in July 2021, Foreign Minister Motegi announced in his video message that Japan will provide education support of more than 1.5 billion US dollars over a five-year period, and support the provision of opportunities for quality education and human resource development to at least 7.5 million girls in developing countries. At the 77th UN General Assembly convened in September 2022, Prime Minister Kishida declared that Japan will focus on human resource development and capacity building while putting the emphasis on “investment in
people.” He also assumed the position of “Education Champion” and stated that he will promote cooperation through human resource development based on the outcome of the UN Transforming Education Summit.

**B Supporting Women Through JICA**

To promote the economic empowerment of women, Japan has provided support to improve the livelihoods of low-income female home-based workers in Pakistan, and promoted the provision of financial services that meet the needs of women in Viet Nam. To promote peace and security for women, it also provides support to strengthen coordination as well as the capacity of organizations involved in addressing trafficking in persons in the Mekong region. Furthermore, in South Sudan and Pakistan, Japan has provided cooperation aimed at protecting the survivors of gender-based violence and supporting them to gain independence. Japan also conducted training with participants from 12 countries, on the theme of eradicating sexual and gender-based violence.

**C Dealing with Sexual Violence in Conflict**

Sexual violence as tactics of war is a problem that cannot be overlooked. It is vital to put an end to impunity and to support victims. Japan has been actively working in this field to eliminate human rights violations against women in the 21st century. Japan prioritizes cooperation with international organizations such as the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (OSRSG-SVC), and participation in discussions at the international fora.

In 2022, Japan provided financial support of approximately 0.5 million US dollars to the OSRSG-SVC, providing legal assistance and support for COVID-19 countermeasures to victims of gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2022, Japan contributed an additional 2 million Euros to the Global Survivors Fund (GSF), founded by 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureates Dr. Denis Mukwege and Ms. Nadia Murad and this brings Japan’s total contributions to 6 million Euros by 2022. As a member of the board, Japan is also actively involved in the management of this Fund. At WAW!2022 held in December, Dr. Mukwege delivered a speech online. Furthermore, Japan continues to make voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court (ICC), earmarking contributions for victims of sexual violence and putting efforts into protecting victims of such violence. In addition, Japan also provides support through UN Women.

(4) Initiatives in the UN

**A Cooperation with UN Women**

Japan strengthened its cooperation with UN Women and increased its contribution from approximately 2 million US dollars (2013) to 13.8 million US dollars (2022). In particular, through UN Women, Japan works on awareness-raising activities among women and girls in developing countries on COVID-19 prevention, economic empowerment of women such as livelihood and entrepreneurship support, and support for female victims of gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan’s support also includes support of women’s economic empowerment through providing daily necessities to women and girls who have been affected by conflict and natural disasters, and job creation and vocational training. In September, Prime Minister Kishida took up his role as the HeForShe Champion (male leaders from various sectors selected under the UN Women’s HeForShe Campaign, with the aim of raising awareness and involvement among men toward gender equality).

**B Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)**

Since 1987, Japan has continuously secured a member seat in the CEDAW, which comprises 23 experts of independent capacity. In March, a webinar entitled “Do you know about the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women?” was organized. Moderated by CEDAW member AKIZUKI Hiroko, serving CEDAW members from four countries delivered lectures and engaged in discussions on

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52 In September, Prime Minister Kishida, at the request of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, assumed the position of the first “Education Champion,” fulfilling the role as a leader who promotes education in the international community.
the contents of the Convention as well as on the significance of complying with the Convention.

C United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)

The CSW held its 66th session (CSW66) in March in a hybrid format, both in person and online, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The session hosted discussions on the priority theme of “Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes.” NODA Seiko, Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment and Minister of State for Gender Equality delivered statements (via recording) at the General discussions and the ministerial roundtables.

D Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

Japan continues to contribute to implementation of the WPS agenda in the Middle East, Africa and Asia through its financial contributions to international organizations, primarily UN Women and SRSG-SVC Office, in line with the second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (action plan toward the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 and related resolutions on women, peace, and security). In addition, Japan conducts monitoring of the implementation status and compiles evaluation reports. WPS was one of the sessions at WAW!2022 held in December in Tokyo. Under the session theme “Women’s Participation in Peace and Security,” preventing sexual violence in conflict, women’s participation in PKO, and women’s participation in peace negotiations and other aspects of peacebuilding were discussed.

World Assembly for Women: WAW! 2022
- WAW! for Mainstreaming Gender into a New Form of Capitalism

The World Assembly for Women: WAW! 2022, organized by the Government of Japan, was held on December 3 for the first time in about three years. WAW! 2022 was held as a hybrid conference with in-person and online participants as the new approach linking up Tokyo and 22 satellite venues. 119 speakers from 26 countries participated in WAW! 2022 across borders, regions, and generations. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and recent global situations have raised a renewed awareness of the importance of gender equality in the international community. Based on the present situations, WAW! 2022 with the main theme “WAW! For Mainstreaming Gender into a New Form of Capitalism,” had 10 separate sessions, in order to engage in wide-ranging and comprehensive discussions including the gender wage gap, women’s participation in peace and security, women and disaster risk reduction, and two special sessions focusing on rural women and youth.

In his opening remarks, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized the importance of “gender mainstreaming” in promoting a “New Form of Capitalism,” and spoke about his expectations that discussions in WAW! would serve as momentum to realize a society where everyone can feel fulfilled in life. Next, keynote speeches were presented by Dr. Guðni Thórðarson Johannesson, President of Iceland, and Ms. Sima Bahous, Executive Director of UN Women. President Johannesson spoke about efforts for gender equality in Iceland, which ranks first in the Global Gender Gap Index(Note), as well as the importance of enhancing awareness and engagement of men in the gender equality. Executive Director Bahous covered the issues in gender fields in the world and referred to concrete measures to realize gender equality.
The High-Level Roundtable welcomed the following speakers: President of Moldova Maia Sandu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia Batmunkh Battsetseg, Minister for Social and Family Development of Singapore Masagos Zulkifli, Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment OGURA Masanobu, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Japan on Women’s Empowerment MORI Masako, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs YAMADA Kenji. They contributed knowledge from their respective countries on initiatives to promote “gender mainstreaming,” and many of the speakers pointed out that realizing gender equality benefits not only women, but society as a whole.

The 10 separate sessions and two special sessions brought together experts, entrepreneurs, and youths who will be leaders of the next-generation, to contribute their views from a wide range of perspectives. Youths from each separate session were assigned as rapporteurs to present recommendations on their respective discussions at the Closing Session. For example, the session about women’s participation in decision-making processes proposed incorporating continuous and meaningful gender education into the curriculum from primary education, while the session about women and disaster risk reduction recommended enhancing the resilience of women and girls in times of peace as part of disaster risk reduction measures. In addition, the session on women’s participation in peace and security, which was joined online by Dr. Denis Mukwege, 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, emphasized the need to promote gender mainstreaming in peace and security policies and diplomatic policies. Furthermore, the special sessions “Listening to the Voice of Youth: Proposal for the Future” proposed creating a system to facilitate political involvement and engagement among youth.

(Note) Global Gender Gap Index: An index measuring gender gap in each country, which is released each year by the World Economic Forum (WEF). This index is drawn up based on data from four areas: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Education Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment, with a score of “0” indicating complete inequality and a score of “1” indicating complete equality.