Chapter 3

Japan Strengthening Its Presence in the International Community

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National Security Initiatives

(1) Security Environment Surrounding Japan

The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe at a more rapid pace than ever before. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. Against such a backdrop, competitions among states are prominently emerging, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as increase their influence. What is more, in the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has also been a security agenda. In the maritime domain, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlements or takes actions based on assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement to rights accorded under international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Given that national security has been expanding its scope to economic and technological fields in recent years, the enhancement of efforts regarding the security policy in these fields is necessary. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as increasingly complex international terrorism, remain a grave challenge for the international community. Against such a background, strong military powers are concentrating in the areas surrounding Japan, where clear trends are observed in further military buildup and an increase in military activities.

Facing such a security environment and other factors, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities. Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the economy, contribute even more proactively to securing the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, and achieve its own security as well as peace and stability in the region (for Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, see the Special Feature on page 183).

(2) Territorial integrity

Maintaining territorial integrity is a fundamental responsibility of the Government. Japan’s policy to resolutely protect its land, sea and airspace remains unchanged. Japan will continue to
One of the most important responsibilities of a government is to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any circumstances. March 2021 marks the fifth anniversary since the enforcement of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security in March 2016. After the enforcement of the legislation, Japan has been engaged in various forms of cooperation with the U.S. and other relevant countries. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than it has ever been, and Japan is contributing further to peace and stability in the region and the international community.

For example, according to Paragraph 2 of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law newly established in the Legislation for Peace and Security, it has become possible for the Self-Defense Forces to protect the weapons, etc., of U.S. Forces and other troops currently engaged in activities in cooperation with the Self-Defense Forces to contribute to Japan’s defense, from invasions that do not reach the level of an armed attack. From 2017 till the end of 2020, Japan escorted the U.S. Forces a total of 57 times on occasions such as joint exercises, information gathering, and warning and surveillance activities, including ballistic missile warnings. In November 2021, Japan also escorted the Australian Forces for the first time during a joint exercise.

In view of the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the U.S. entered into force in 2017 to facilitate more extensive and smooth security cooperation between the two countries. With the entering into force of the new Japan-U.S. ACSA, it became possible to also apply the same framework, as for the settlement procedures in the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA (entered into force in 1996, second amendment entered into force in 2004), to the provision of goods and services that the Self-Defense Forces could provide additionally to the U.S. Forces under the Legislation for Peace and Security (for example, goods and services for multilateral exercises that both the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces participate in). This further enhanced the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. cooperation.

In addition, Japan has also expanded and enhanced activities relating to cooperation on international peace and cooperation, such as UN Peacekeeping operations (PKO). In November 2016, new missions were assigned to the Japan engineering units deployed to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 to May 2017. The new missions included the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) by the Self-Defense Forces and joint defense of encampments with the forces of other countries, in response to emergency requests from NGOs or other parties under attack by rioters or others when they are engaged in activities in the vicinity of Self-Defense Forces working on PKO missions overseas.

The deployment of headquarter personnel to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) is also an activity that is not coordinated by the United Nations, and which has become possible for Japan to engage in with the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. MFO is an international organization that has been conducting ceasefire monitoring activities and providing support for dialogues and trust-building between Egypt and Israel on the Sinai Peninsula, since 1982. Japan began deploying international peacekeeping units to the Sinai Peninsula in April 2019, and currently has two headquarter personnel deployed to the organization. The deployment of headquarter personnel to MFO not only contributes to the peace and stability of the Middle East, which constitutes Japan’s cornerstone for peace and prosperity, but also leads to the
accumulation of useful knowledge for the future promotion of international cooperation on peacekeeping.

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan has been deepening cooperation not only with the U.S., but also with various other countries. Going forward, MOFA will strive to maintain and develop diplomatic relations that further advance mutual cooperation with other countries, with a view to securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people of Japan.

Japan-Australia joint exercise “Trident” (November. Photo: Ministry of Defense)

Headquarter personnel deployed to MFO (Photo: PKO Secretariat)

maintain its stance of responding firmly but in a calm manner. Based on this, the relevant government agencies are working in close cooperation to advance measures to ensure a seamless and adequate response to any form of unlawful acts. At the same time, the Government of Japan engages in proactive efforts to promote awareness of Japan’s position on territorial integrity among the international community, making use of the contacts and knowledge of our diplomatic missions overseas.

2 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

(1) Overview of Japan-U.S. Security Relationship

Under the security environment surrounding Japan, which is becoming increasingly severe at an ever more rapid pace, it is indispensable to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance not only for the peace and security of Japan, but also for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Japan and the U.S. are further enhancing their deterrence and response capabilities under the Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security. Through such efforts, Japan and the U.S. have been expanding and strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including ballistic missiles defense, cyberspace, space and maritime security. Japan and the U.S. have been working closely on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and other locations in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(2) Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in Various Fields

A Multilayered Efforts Under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were formulated in 2015, reviewed and updated the general framework and policy direction of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. Through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and other efforts established under these Guidelines, Japan and the U.S. have been sharing information closely, establishing a common understanding of the situation, and engaging in “seamless” responses and efforts from peacetime to contingencies. From the very
beginning, the Biden administration has made it clear that it places great importance on the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In March 2021, just two months after the inauguration of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, and Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, visited Japan in the first overseas trip made by cabinet members under the administration, and held a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting with Foreign Minister Motegi and Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo. The four Ministers reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and renewed the unwavering commitment of both countries to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. They also concurred to further deepen the coordination to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Furthermore, the U.S. underscored its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear. The four Ministers affirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and affirmed that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

In January 2022, the “2+2” meeting was convened virtually for the first time. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hayashi and Defense Minister Kishi from the Japanese side, and Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin from the U.S. side. The four Ministers engaged in candid and important discussions on how to advance the evolution of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and continue to effectively address current and future challenges. The outcome of the meeting is broadly summarized in the following three points. Firstly, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” They also held an in-depth discussion and aligned their understanding on the changing strategic environment in the region, including China’s efforts to undermine the rules-based order and North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. Secondly, they affirmed that they would advance concrete discussions toward fundamentally enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. Furthermore, they concurred on pursuing investments to ensure that the Alliance will maintain its competitive edge into the future, including in the field of space, cyber-space as well as emerging technologies. Thirdly, they concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and sharing information in a timely manner, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Also, in-person visits by senior U.S. defense officials continued to take place in 2021, Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, respectively visited Japan in June, while there were also visits...
by Admiral Charles A. Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, in July, and Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy, in October. Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, visited Japan once again in November, and was the first foreign dignitary to pay a courtesy call to Foreign Minister Hayashi after his inauguration. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue was held virtually in April. This Dialogue has been held on a regular basis since 2010 as part of security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. It provides an opportunity for the two governments to discuss regional security, Alliance defense posture, nuclear and missile defense policy, and arms control issues, to frankly exchange views on means to enhance alliance deterrence and to deepen mutual understanding. Through these multilayered efforts, Japan will continue to promote security and defense cooperation with the U.S., further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance.

**B Missile Defense**

Japan has been making steady efforts to develop and engage in the production of the BMD system while continuing cooperation with the U.S., including on the steady implementation of joint development and joint production of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3 Block IIA) since 2006, and Japan is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of its citizens from the threat of ballistic missiles to Japan under any circumstances.

**C Cyberspace**

Japan and the U.S. affirmed the importance of cyberspace in the field of security at the “2+2” meeting convened in March 2021, and, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in April 2021, declared that they would advance defense cooperation in the cyber domain. Based on these discussions, at the “2+2” meeting held in January 2022, the two sides confirmed that it was crucial for the Alliance to jointly respond to severe threats to, from and within space. Japan and the U.S. are continuing to cooperate on space security, including through mutual exchanges of information in the field of Space Situational Awareness and others, as well as concrete examinations of cooperation over hosted payloads (mission instruments loaded onto other entities’ satellites).

**D Space**

Japan and the U.S. affirmed the importance of space in the field of security at the “2+2” meeting convened in March 2021, and, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in April 2021, declared that they would advance defense cooperation in the space domain. Based on these discussions, at the “2+2” meeting held in January 2022, the two sides confirmed that it was crucial for the Alliance to jointly respond to severe threats to, from and within space. Japan and the U.S. are continuing to cooperate on space security, including through mutual exchanges of information in the field of Space Situational Awareness and others, as well as concrete examinations of cooperation over hosted payloads (mission instruments loaded onto other entities’ satellites).

**E Information Security**

Information security plays a crucial role in advancing cooperation within the context of the alliance. Based on this perspective, both countries continue to hold discussions designed to enhance their cooperation regarding information security, the importance of which was affirmed in the Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders’ Statement of April 2021 and the “2+2” Joint Statement of January 2022.

**F Maritime Security and Multilateral Cooperation**

In forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS)
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Japan and the U.S. stress the importance of peacefully resolving maritime issues in accordance with international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Guidelines announced in April 2015 also provide that Japan and the U.S. will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order in accordance with international law, including the freedom of navigation. Even under the conditions of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2021, Japan and the U.S. continued to conduct bilateral training and exercises in the surrounding waters in the region including the South China Sea, and strengthened their cooperation with regional partners including Australia and India through exercises such as MALABAR (Japan-U.S.-Australia-India joint exercise). Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. also conducted multilateral exercises with the UK, which deployed the UK Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific region, and with European partners such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, and affirmed that the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific is widely shared among these countries. Both Japan and the U.S. will continue to place importance on strengthening cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

(3) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

The Government of Japan will continue to make every effort to mitigate the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, by soundly promoting the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, while still maintaining the deterrence capabilities of said forces.

In the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement issued in April 2021, Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed the Guidelines announced in April 2015 also provide that Japan and the U.S. will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order in accordance with international law, including the freedom of navigation. Even under the conditions of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2021, Japan and the U.S. continued to conduct bilateral training and exercises in the surrounding waters in the region including the South China Sea, and strengthened their cooperation with regional partners including Australia and India through exercises such as MALABAR (Japan-U.S.-Australia-India joint exercise). Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. also conducted multilateral exercises with the UK, which deployed the UK Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific region, and with European partners such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, and affirmed that the importance of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific is widely shared among these countries. Both Japan and the U.S. will continue to place importance on strengthening cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

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In the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement issued in April 2021, Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed
their commitment to current arrangements on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma, the Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) Facility at Mageshima, and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam. Similarly, in the Joint Statement of the “2+2” issued in January 2022, the ministers confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on these force realignment efforts.

Japan and the U.S. will also continue to work closely on the steady implementation of plans for matters such as the relocation of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, and on the returns of land south of Kadena based on the April 2013 “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa.”

In particular, the return of lands in Okinawa has been realized by completing various return projects based on this Consolidation Plan, even after the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area (NTA, approximately 4,000 hectares) in December 2017. The return of all areas indicated as “Immediate Return” under the Consolidation Plan was achieved with the return of a portion of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran in March 2020. The land near Samashita Gate at Futenma Air Station was also returned in December 2020, followed by the return of the laundry factory area of Makiminato Service Area (land along National Route No. 58) in May 2021.

(4) Host Nation Support (HNS)

Since 1987, Japan has borne part of the costs which the U.S. is obliged to bear under the provision of Article XXIV of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), by concluding Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) as special measures relating to the SOFA, with a view to ensuring the effective operations of U.S. Forces in Japan amidst the growing severity of the security situation surrounding Japan.

The Governments of Japan and the U.S have been engaged in discussions on how HNS should be borne after April 1, 2022. Taking Japan’s difficult financial situation into consideration and amidst the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, Japan has been engaged in the consultations under the recognition that it is necessary to support the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan while also more effectively strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In December 2021, the two countries reached consensus, and the signing of the SMA took place on January 7, 2022, in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Hayashi and Mr. Raymond F. Greene, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of U.S.A. in Japan. Furthermore, as both parties concurred that the costs borne by Japan should be used to build a foundation upon which the Japan-U.S. Alliance will be further strengthened, the Japanese side decided to refer to this budget by a Japanese phrase that points to its goal of enhancing Alliance readiness and resiliency.

The outline of the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) during the effective period of the agreement (April 1, 2022 to March 31, 2027) is as follows. The annual average budget for HNS is approximately 211 billion Japanese yen.

Signing of the New Special Measures Agreement (SMA) (January 2022, Tokyo)
USFJ-related costs (FY2022 Budget)

- Cost for taking measures to improve the living environment in areas surrounding USFJ facilities ¥67.3 billion
- Rent for facilities ¥102.7 billion
- Relocation costs ¥3.4 billion
- Other costs (compensation for fishery, etc.) ¥32.1 billion

Total: ¥205.5 billion

Cost sharing under the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) (¥164.2 billion)

- Labor costs (Base pay, etc.) ¥128.1 billion
- Utilities costs ¥23.4 billion
- Training equipment and materials procurement costs ¥1 billion
- Training relocation costs (NLP) ¥1.1 billion

Total: ¥153.7 billion

Notes:
1 Training relocation costs under the SMA can be categorized into those that fall under HNS (cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ), SACO-related costs, or realignment-related costs.
2 The SACO-related costs refer to the costs for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the costs relating to measures to contributing to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. On the other hand, since HNS (cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ) is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.
3 The cost for stationing of USFJ includes the MOD related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥40 billion, FY2021 budget), and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.3 billion, FY2021 estimate).
4 Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

(1) New SMA

A. Labor costs: The Government of Japan will bear the labor costs (basic salary and other components) for 23,178 workers in U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas in Japan (maintaining the number of workers funded by Japan in FY2021, which was 23,178 workers).


C. Training equipment and materials procurement: The Government of Japan will newly bear expenditures related to the procurement of training equipment and materials (up to a maximum of 20 billion Japanese yen over five years), which will contribute, not only to the readiness of U.S. Forces in Japan but also to the enhancement of the interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the U.S. Forces.

D. Training relocation: The annual training relocation costs funded by the Government of Japan will be approximately equal to the budget amount of FY2021 (approximately 11.4 billion Japanese yen). Alaska will be confirmed as a permissible training relocation site for the Aviation Training Relocation program.
(2) Cost for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)

The Government of Japan will fund a maximum of 164.1 billion Japanese yen over five years to prioritize the promotion of projects that contribute to strengthening the readiness and resiliency of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(5) Various Issues Related to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

To ensure the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan as the linchpin of these arrangements, it is important to mitigate the impact of U.S. Forces’ activities on residents living in the vicinity and to gain their understanding and support regarding the presence of U.S. Forces. The Government of Japan has been making utmost efforts to make improvements in specific issues in light of the requests from local communities. Among these issues are preventing incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces, abating the noise by U.S. Forces’ aircraft, and dealing with environmental issues at U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas, including the sound implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship of 2015 and the Agreement on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan of 2017. For example, when the leakage of water containing Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) occurred at an army oil storage facility in June 2021, Japanese officials accessed the site based on the Supplementary Agreement on Environmental Stewardship, just as they did during the leakage accident at MCAS Futenma in April 2020, and conducted water sampling. With regard to the measures to combat COVID-19, the Government of Japan and U.S. Forces in Japan issued a Joint Press Release in June 2021 on vaccinating local employees of U.S. Forces in Japan. In response to the occurrence of COVID-19 cases in U.S. Forces in Japan facilities and areas as well as their surrounding municipalities across Japan since December 2021, the Government of Japan took the opportunity of the Japan-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ telephone call held on January 6, 2022, and the “2+2” meeting convened on the following day, to put forward strong requests to the U.S. authorities to take thorough measures to prevent the spread of infections and take steps to mitigate the anxiety within the local communities. Consequently, the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee Statement on Measures to Address the Spread of COVID-19 was issued on January 9, and at the Japan-U.S. Summit Video Teleconference Meeting held on January 21, the two governments agreed to continue working closely together to prevent the spread of COVID-19, Japan and the U.S. will continue to further strengthen cooperation to put in place thorough measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and to mitigate the anxiety among the local communities.

The TOFU: Think of Okinawa’s Future in the U.S. program provides an opportunity for high school and university students from Okinawa to witness for themselves what Japan’s alliance partner, the U.S., is truly like, and the role that Japan plays in the international community, as well as to promote mutual understanding between the two countries. Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, this program was implemented as a Tokyo Dispatch Program1 in March 2021. Meanwhile, since FY2020, the Project to Promote Exchanges and Enhance Mutual Understanding Between Japan and the United States has been implemented in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between Japanese and American middle and high school students (see the Column on page 192).

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1 Participants from Okinawa are invited to Tokyo to meet related persons involved in Japan-U.S. relations and experts active in the international community (including online meetings), as well as visit and tour various facilities.
(6) the United Nations forces and U.S.

Forces in Japan

Coincident with the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the UN forces was established in July of the same year based on the recommendation of the UN Security Council resolution 83 in June. Following the ceasefire agreement concluded in July 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) Headquarters was relocated to Seoul, South Korea in July 1957, and UNC-Rear (UNC-R) was established in Japan. Established at Yokota Air Base, UNC-R currently has a stationed commander and four other staff and military attachés from nine countries who are stationed at embassies in Tokyo as liaison officers for the UN forces. Based on Article 5 of the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, the UN forces in Japan may use the U.S. Forces’ facilities and areas in Japan to the minimum extent required to provide support for military logistics for the UN forces. At present, the UN forces in Japan is authorized to use the following seven facilities: Camp Zama, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Yokota Air Base, Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma and White Beach Area.

In July 2019, a joint board was held between the Government of Japan and UNC. The meetings saw discussions held over the situation on the Korean Peninsula, with the two sides reaching an agreement on notification procedures in case of unusual occurrences related to the UN forces in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue to work closely with the UN forces.

3 Global Security

(1) Regional Security

The security environment surrounding the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly severe for various reasons such as the shift in the global power balance. It is more important than ever to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the face of the increasingly severe security environment of the region. There is also a need for Japan to fundamentally reinforce its own defense capabilities. At the same time, by actively strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with each country, Japan has been making efforts to realize a desirable regional security environment for Japan.

ASEAN is located in a geopolitically strategic position and faces Japan’s important sea lane. A more stable and prosperous ASEAN region is crucial to the stability and prosperity not only of the East Asia region but also of the international community. From this perspective, Japan has, for example, continued to provide support to enhance maritime safety capabilities in the Philippines, Malaysia, Viet Nam, and Indonesia, through the provision of patrol vessels, among others. In March, Japan and Indonesia held the Second Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”), while they signed the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and concurred on further promoting bilateral security cooperation. Japan and Viet Nam also signed the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in September, and are accelerating bilateral discussions toward the realization of specific transfer of defense equipment including naval vessels. In November, Japan and the Philippines concurred on considering the launch of the “2+2” meeting.

Japan and India concurred to elevate the “Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership” to greater heights at the Japan-India Summit telephone call held in October, immediately after Prime Minister Kishida assumed office, and the Japan-India Foreign Ministers’ telephone call held in November, immediately after Foreign Minister Hayashi assumed office. In addition, they affirmed that they would coordinate to hold the Japan-India Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) at an early date. The Japan-India Consultations on Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Export Control (February),
Project to Promote Exchanges and Enhance Mutual Understanding between Japan and the U.S. (Youth Exchange Program)

Since 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA), has conducted exchange programs for the children of U.S. Forces personnel and local junior and high school students in communities that host U.S. Forces Japan. This program aims to nurture human resources who will take an active role in the international society as well as to increase mutual understanding between Japanese and American junior and senior high school students through cultural and educational exchanges.

In 2020, the program was held in Misawa City, Aomori Prefecture, followed by those in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture (twice), in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and in Misawa City, Aomori Prefecture in 2021. This column introduces the voices of Japanese students who participated in the programs in Iwakuni City and Sasebo City.

Horikawa Maria, Yamaguchi Prefectural Iwakuni High School

My future dream is to become a nurse, bilingual in English and Japanese, so I was really looking forward to participating in this program. Once the program started, however, I really struggled to convey what I was thinking due to my poor English, but the high school students on the American base were friendly and polite to me. Communicating actively in the group work projects of making flags and mascot characters was very worthwhile, as it helped us understand each country’s culture more deeply. Attending this program motivated me to keep interacting more with people from overseas. To do so, I will devote myself even more to learning English, conveying my thoughts and opinions while being considerate of others. I would like to participate again if a similar program is available.

Urago Saki, Nagasaki Prefectural Sasebo Nishi High School

At first, I believed that I would have enjoyable conversations with ALTs and a good time with kids of the same age. However, when we tried to communicate, we couldn’t understand each other, and my initial confidence had almost disappeared by the time we had gotten half-way through the first day. Even still, American high school students talked to me in a very friendly way, and we managed to get the conversations going despite my poor English. I was really happy when we finally shared a laugh together. In the session where we created mascot characters symbolizing Japan-U.S. exchanges, sharing opinions about each other’s culture sparked my curiosity about the differences I wasn’t normally aware of. This program helped me widen my perspectives and area of interests, making it a very valuable experience for me.

Note: ALT stands for Assistant Language Teacher, a teacher from overseas whose native language is English.
the sixth Japan-India Maritime Affairs Dialogue (September), and the Second Meeting of the Japan-India Space Dialogue (November) were held online, and both sides exchanged views on the situation and potential for cooperation in the respective fields.

In relation to Australia, at the Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference Meeting held in January 2022, the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement was signed to facilitate cooperative activities between the JSDF and the Australian Defence Force, such as bilateral/multilateral exercises and disaster relief activities. At the same meeting, the two leaders also concurred on further deepening cooperation between the JSDF and the Australian Defence Force, on expanding the scope for cooperation to economic security and new domains such as space and cyber-space, and furthermore, on elevating the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries to greater heights with a view to realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” At this meeting, the two leaders also reaffirmed the importance of promoting not only bilateral cooperation, but also cooperation between Japan, Australia, India and the U.S., as well as between Japan, Australia and the U.S. At the ninth Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) held in June, the Ministers confirmed the importance of sharing their strategic awareness based on a consideration of regional security challenges, and of elevating security and defence cooperation between Japan and Australia to a new level so as to contribute to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

In relation to the UK, Japan’s “global strategic partner,” at the fourth Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) in February as well as at various leaders’ and foreign ministers’ meetings (including telephone calls), and in relation to France, Japan’s “exceptional partner,” at various meetings (including telephone calls) between the leaders and foreign ministers, Japan and both countries confirmed that they would strengthen their cooperation in areas such as maritime security, toward the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Japan’s security and defense cooperation with both the UK and France has advanced significantly in recent years. The UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG21) led by the British aircraft carrier “Queen Elizabeth” called at Japan in September and conducted joint exercises, and the first round of negotiations on the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement was held in October. The French training fleet “Jeanne d’Arc” visited Japan in May and conducted joint exercises, and the 23rd Japan-France Politico-Military (PM) Dialogue was held in Tokyo in October.

In relation to Germany, the first Japan-Germany Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) was held as an online meeting in April, and the Japan-Germany Politico-Military (PM) Dialogue was held in June. At these meetings, Japan and Germany affirmed that they would continue to work closely toward the realization of a FOIP. German Navy frigate “Bayern” also called on Japan in November and conducted a bilateral exercise. During the Japan-Netherlands Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in June, Japan and the Netherlands confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation toward the realization of a FOIP. In September, a Royal Netherlands Navy Frigate joined with CSG21 to visit Japan. Japan has also concurred with Italy (Japan-Italy Summit telephone call in March, and Japan-Italy Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in June) on working closely toward the realization
of a FOIP. In relation to the EU, the two sides concurred on strengthening Japan-EU cooperation in the Indo-Pacific at the Japan-EU Summit held in May, and the JSDF also engaged in joint exercises with the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) on several occasions. The EU also announced its Indo-Pacific Strategy in April and September. The September document clearly sets out “security and defense” as one of seven priority areas and touches on cooperation with Japan as one of its like-minded partners.

In relation to Canada, at the Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in May, the Ministers announced the “Shared Japan-Canada Priorities Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (hereafter referred to as “the six priority areas”) established with a view to the realization of a FOIP. At the Japan-Canada Summit Meeting in June, the two leaders agreed to further promote cooperation and coordination, in a concrete and robust manner, on these six priority areas. The six priority areas cover cooperation to address activities in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, such as ship-to-ship transfers, and to make the most of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), as well as cooperation on energy security, inter alia. The Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) has been convened four times to date. With regard to bilateral exercises with the Canadian Armed Forces, the bilateral training “KAEDEX,” which has been held every year since 2017, was conducted in November. Several multilateral joint military exercises were also conducted. With regard to ship-to-ship transfers, naval vessels and aircraft from the Canadian Armed Forces conducted surveillance activities from the middle of September and the middle of October respectively.

There are various issues of concern in relation with China, such as the rapid strengthening of its military with lack of transparency, increasing activities by its military in the waters and air spaces surrounding Japan, and its intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters, based on its own assertions in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan. Japan will continue to make use of opportunities at high-level dialogues, including summit meetings and foreign ministers’ meetings, to firmly assert its position and resolve the issues of concern one by one, as well as to take a calm and resolute approach while strongly requesting for China’s concrete action. As China’s military trends are matters of grave interest to Japan, Japan is working on communicating its policies through security dialogues such as the Japan-China Security Dialogue, as well as efforts to build multilayered channels for exchanges. At the same time, Japan is communicating its concerns and urging China to improve transparency in relation to its defense policies and military power, as well as to take more concrete actions to contribute to the security environment and to the region, including Japan. The Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China that commenced operation in June 2018 has great significance in the sense of promoting mutual understanding and confidence and avoiding unexpected collision.

In relation to the Republic of Korea, based on the recognition of the importance of Japan-ROK as well as Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation toward the denuclearization of North Korea, the two countries held Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (January (telephone call), May, September), Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (May, September), and a Japan-ROK Summit telephone call (October). The two sides confirmed that Japan and the ROK, as well as Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, would work closely together.

Peace and stability in the Middle East region is vital to the peace and prosperity of the international community including Japan. The Middle East is one of the world’s key energy suppliers and approximately 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports rely on the region. It is, therefore, extremely important to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in this region. As Japan’s
independent efforts toward ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East region and the safety of Japan-related vessels, the Government of Japan has made a Cabinet decision in December 2019 on (1) making further diplomatic efforts toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, (2) taking thorough measures for ensuring safety of navigation including robust information sharing with relevant stakeholders, and (3) utilizing vessels and aircraft of the SDF for strengthening its information gathering posture. Japan has continued to conduct information gathering activities using SDF vessels and aircraft in the waters of the Middle East since January 2020.

In addition, Japan has actively participated in and contributed to multilateral frameworks in the region, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), in order to strengthen security cooperation in the region. The ARF is an important security dialogue framework in which various entities participate including North Korea and the EU, and it aims to improve the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region through dialogues and cooperation on political and security issues. It is also an important forum that focuses on confidence-building through various initiatives. At the 28th ARF Ministerial Meeting held in August, participating ministers candidly exchanged views mainly on regional and international affairs, including issues concerning North Korea and the East and South China Seas, as well as the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan is also making a proactive contribution through, for example, serving as a co-chair of all the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Maritime Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, and ICTs Security.

Furthermore, in addition to government-to-government dialogues (track 1), Japan actively utilizes frameworks where participants from both public and private sectors exchange opinions and explain their security policies (track 1.5), as well as other means, as part of its efforts to promote other countries’ understanding of Japan’s security policies, and to facilitate cooperation and confidence-building in the region.

(2) Economic Security

A Trends Surrounding Economic Security

In recent years, various challenges have been surfacing in fields that cut across national security and the economy. The scope of the national security domain is expanding rapidly. For example, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT), which bring greater convenience to people’s lives, could be diverted to military uses and pose risks to national security. There are also growing moves by some countries to leverage economic dependency to coerce other countries or regions in order to achieve their own strategic interests. To address such security risks that are associated with economic activities, it is important to put in place comprehensive and effective economic measures that serve to ensure Japan’s self-determination of its economic structure, as well as ensure its technological advantage and make itself even more indispensable for the international community. Efforts to strengthen economic security, centered on this approach, are becoming increasingly important.

In light of this situation, MOFA is actively engaged in efforts to strengthen cooperation with ally and like-minded countries as well as to establish norms to address new issues, as the ministry responsible for promoting diplomatic policies related to national security and external economic relations and for concluding, interpreting and implementing treaties and other international agreements.

B Recent Initiatives by Other Countries

Other major countries have also been rapidly advancing initiatives to promote economic security in recent years.
In June, the U.S. published a report based on the reviews directed under Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” in which it set out the policy for the immediate implementation of initiatives including support for the domestic production of important pharmaceuticals, ensuring domestic supply chains for advanced storage batteries, investing in sustainable production and processing of critical minerals in the U.S. and abroad, and addressing the semiconductor shortage in cooperation with industries, allies and like-minded countries.

In May, the EU set out in its new industrial strategy the policy of reducing its dependency on specific regions for raw materials and technologies in strategic industries.

Australia formulated its International Cyber and Critical Tech Engagement Strategy in April. In this Strategy, it presented a policy of promoting initiatives such as identifying technologies that should be protected by Australia, while taking into consideration the geopolitical implications brought about by the development of critical technologies.

China is also rapidly promoting national strategies on economic security, including “Made in China 2025” and the new economic development model “dual circulation.” Efforts to develop the relevant domestic legislation are also advancing steadily. For example, the Data Security Law was enforced in September. This law, which pertains to data processing activities in and outside China, includes provisions that make it possible to pursue liability in cases where China’s safety, public interests, or the legitimate interests of its citizens or organizations have been damaged.

Japan’s Direction Toward the Promotion of Economic Security

Discussions are also accelerating within Japan. The “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2021” (Cabinet Decision in June 2021) sets out the strategic direction on economic security. For example, the Government decided to work on realizing and implementing measures to expand and deepen cooperation with like-minded countries under the international order based on fundamental values and rules; ensure Japan’s self-determination and acquire its advantage; from this perspective, strengthen its efforts to identify, protect, and develop critical technologies; and, enhance the resilience of essential industries.

The Kishida Cabinet, inaugurated in October, has positioned economic security as one of its priority issues and announced the formulation of a bill to promote Japan’s economic security in the policy speech. At the first meeting of the Council for the Promotion of Economic Security, convened in November, the following were identified as areas where legislative measures should be required: (1) Enhancing the resilience of supply chains; (2) Ensuring security and reliability of essential infrastructure; (3) Public-private cooperation regarding advanced critical technologies; and, (4) Non-publication of certain patent applications. In addition, the following three points were set out as the broad direction toward the promotion of economic security: enhancement of self-determination, acquisition of advantage and indispensability, and maintenance and strengthening of international order based on fundamental values and rules.

Economic Security Cooperation Between Japan and Other Countries

MOFA is playing an active role in efforts to strengthen cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries toward the maintenance and strengthening of an international order based on fundamental values and rules, and efforts toward the establishment of new norms.

For example, in the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement issued in April, the two leaders affirmed their commitment to the security and openness of 5th generation (5G) wireless networks, and concurred that it is important to rely on trustworthy vendors. They also confirmed that they will promote and protect the critical technologies that are
essential to the security and prosperity of both countries, and partner on sensitive supply chains, including on semiconductors. Furthermore, they affirmed that they will continue to work together, utilizing the G7 and WTO frameworks, to address the use of non-market and other unfair trade practices, including violations of intellectual property rights, forced technology transfer, excess capacity issues, and the use of trade distorting industrial subsidies. In the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, Japan and the U.S. also affirmed their commitment to promote Open Radio Access Networks (“Open-RAN”) through trusted suppliers and diversification of markets, and to strengthen competitiveness in the digital field by investing in secure networks, etc., such as 5G and next-generation mobile networks. The two countries also confirmed that they will cooperate on sensitive supply chains, including semiconductors, and on the promotion and protection of critical technologies, advance biotechnology including genome sequencing, and reinforce collaboration and partnerships between research institutions in the field of quantum science and technology. Furthermore, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in January 2022, Japan and the U.S. affirmed that they will advance and accelerate collaboration on emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and pursuing joint investments to secure the technological superiority of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

At the Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations held in June, the Ministers committed to further strengthening cooperation in the area of economic security. For example, they concurred on further deepening cooperation in areas such as addressing illicit technology transfer and building the resilience of supply chains. They also affirmed that, by deepening cooperation on cyber and critical technology, the two countries will promote regional capacity building and strengthen the industry resiliences. At the Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference Meeting held in January 2022, the leaders also pledged to strengthen bilateral cooperation on economic security, including addressing illicit technology transfer, building resilient supply chains, and strengthening the protection of critical infrastructures.

In addition to strengthening bilateral cooperation in these ways, Japan is also strengthening its cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries by utilizing initiatives such as the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. dialogue and G7.

At the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting held in May, the Ministers affirmed that the G7 members will work jointly to address arbitrary and coercive economic policies and practices, so as to foster global economic resilience. In relation to China, they also affirmed they will urge China to assume and fulfill its obligations and responsibilities commensurate with its global economic role.

At the G7 Summit held in June, the leaders affirmed that they would consider mechanisms and share best practices among members in order to address vulnerability risks in supply chains for critical minerals and semiconductors. They also concurred on cooperating in the modernization of global trade rules to protect against unfair practices such as forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, market-distorting actions of state owned enterprises, and harmful industrial subsidies. At the ministerial level, at the G7 Trade Ministers’ Meetings held in March, May and October, the Ministers concurred to work cohesively to correct unfair trade policies and practices.

At the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Leaders’ Video Conference held for the first time in March, the leaders put forward “The Spirit of the Quad” in relation to the need to govern and operate critical and emerging technologies based on shared interests and values, in order to establish a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. Under this spirit, they concurred on the following actions:
launch a critical and emerging technology working group; develop a statement of principles on technology design, development, and use; facilitate coordination on technology standards development; facilitate cooperation to monitor trends and opportunities in biotechnology, and; convene dialogues on critical technology supply chains.

At the Quad Leaders’ Summit held in September, the leaders affirmed that Japan, Australia India and the U.S. will cooperate on the following areas to guide toward responsible, open, high-standards innovation: development of technical standards on advanced communications and artificial intelligence; strengthening the resilience of supply chains of critical technologies and materials, including semiconductors; diversification of vendors for 5G networks including Open-RAN, and; monitoring of trends in the development of technologies including biotechnology. The “Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use” was also launched at the summit. The leaders affirmed the following points: the importance of universal values including freedom of expression and privacy; that technology should not be used for authoritarian surveillance and oppression; that they will advance cooperation with like-minded countries, etc., toward the development of resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains, and; that it is important to have a fair and open marketplace in order to bring about technological innovation and inclusive prosperity.

As for initiatives toward the establishment of new norms, in addition to issuing policy documents such as the aforementioned, various countries are also putting effort into diplomacy with a view to reflecting these norms in their domestic regulations and policies. For example, dozens of countries, including Japan, participated in the Prague 5G Security Conference convened in November and engaged in discussions on important principles relating to emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and quantum communications. These discussions covered points such as mitigating risks arising from unlawful foreign influence through subsidies and legal systems, and building trustworthy supply chains, as well as the diversification of suppliers and promoting competitiveness. As an outcome of the conference, Chairman’s statements were issued on the principles of the development and use of emerging technologies, and on the principles for promoting the diversification of telecommunications suppliers, such as suppliers of 5G equipment.

Economic Security Initiatives by MOFA

MOFA will continue to expand and deepen cooperation with like-minded countries under international order based on fundamental values and rules, while positioning the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of diplomacy and security. It will also play an active role in government-wide efforts including the enactment of necessary legislation to ensure economic security.

(3) Cyber

The advanced use of cyberspace has brought greater convenience to the lives of people, but cyberattacks have also increased the potential security risks to Japan’s economy and society as a whole. For example, the cyberattack on oil pipeline businesses that occurred in the U.S. in May had a major impact on socio-economic activities. Cyberspace has become a realm where countries compete with one another including during peacetime, in a way that reflects geopolitical tensions. With the growing threat of sophisticated cyberattacks that are prepared carefully and systematically, including attacks that states are suspected to be involved in, cyberspace is presenting an aspect that can no longer be described as a “peacetime situation.”

In light of this situation, Japan is cooperating with various relevant countries and putting in place initiatives to address and deter malicious cyber activities. One of these efforts is known as “public attribution,” which is to deter attackers by identifying them and condemning them publicly. Japan has publicly condemned North Korea’s
involvement behind the scenes of the WannaCry\(^{2}\) incident in 2017, as well as the long-running cyberattacks perpetrated by the China-based group APT10 in 2018. In July 2021, the Press Secretary of MOFA issued a statement on cyberattacks, assessing that a group known as APT40, which the Chinese government is behind, as well as a group known as Tick, which Unit 61419 of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is behind, were highly likely to have been involved in these cyberattacks, and firmly condemned these activities in coordination with Japan’s ally and like-minded countries.

From the perspective of deterring cyberattacks, it is also important to formulate and promote rules that contribute to the peace and stability of the international community as well as to the security of Japan, through means such as discussions in the international fora. From the viewpoint that existing international law is also applicable to activities involving the use of cyberspace, Japan participates actively in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), and contributes to discussions on how international law should be applied and the norms that countries should comply with. The Sixth GGE adopted a report that covered the application of existing international law to cyberspace and reaffirmed 11 norms that complement existing international law. At the OEWG, serious concerns were raised against cyberattacks on medical services and facilities amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, and Japan, as one of six countries including the U.S. and Australia, jointly recommended that medical services and facilities should be protected as a critical infrastructure in the same way as electric and water utilities. A report that incorporated these contents was adopted unanimously in March. After the agreement on this report, the new OEWG for the session spanning 2021 to 2025 was established with effect from June. Japan will continue to contribute to discussions toward ensuring a free, open and secure cyberspace.

In addition to deterrence efforts, gaining a better understanding of one another’s views and enhancing mutual confidence are critical to prevent unforeseen situations stemming from cyber activities. With this in mind, Japan served as the co-chair alongside Singapore and Malaysia at the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on ICTs Security held in April. During the meeting, opinions were exchanged on viewpoints about the regional and international cybersecurity environment as well as initiatives by various countries and regions. Japan also took the lead in discussions on confidence-building measures that should be taken in the future based on the outcome of efforts by the international community, including the United Nations.

In view of the borderless nature of cyberspace, it is important to enhance the capacity of other countries and regions in order to stabilize cyberspace and the security environment for Japan and the world as a whole. From this perspective, Japan has continued to provide capacity building support mainly to ASEAN countries. For example, since 2017, Japan has established the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC) and conducted cybersecurity exercises through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), among other initiatives. At the 14th ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Policy Meeting held in October, Japan and ASEAN member states confirmed the progress of various collaborative activities. Japan also contributes to the World Bank’s Cybersecurity Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which is dedicated to capacity building support in the field of cybersecurity in developing countries. Japan will continue to promote human resource development and other relevant efforts. Furthermore, the Basic Policy on Cybersecurity Capacity

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\(^{2}\) A malicious program that North Korea is believed to have been involved in. In May 2017, more than 300,000 computers in more than 150 countries were infected and ransom was demanded.
Building Support for Developing Countries was revised in December, and MOFA will actively promote cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies to support capacity building in developing countries.

Through these initiatives, Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of a free, fair and secure cyberspace.

(4) The Oceans and Seas

Japan is surrounded by the sea on all sides, and is blessed with a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and long coastlines. It is a maritime nation that has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Free, Open and Stable Seas,” “Free, Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based on the rule of law including freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than force, are essential for the peace and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. To maintain and develop “Free, Open and Stable Seas,” Japan promotes initiatives to ensure safe maritime transport and cooperate on maritime security. Such initiatives are also important toward securing Japan’s maritime interests, which form the basis for Japan’s economic survival.

Japan is advancing efforts toward the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” that aims to bring stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region, in particular, by strengthening maritime order in the region where important sea lanes are located.

**A Order at Sea**

**(A) Basic Stance**

There is an increasing number of cases where the interests of countries clash with each other from the perspective of securing maritime interests and national security. In particular, in the seas of Asia, there has been an increasing number of cases of tension arising from friction between countries, and the international community is closely monitoring these cases with much interest. At the 13th Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in Singapore in 2014, Prime Minister Abe shared the view that it was necessary to fully uphold the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” (see 6(2) on page 240).

Japan also utilizes frameworks such as the G7 and ASEAN-related meetings including the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to actively send a message regarding the importance of “Free, Open and Stable Seas” based on the rule of law, and Japan’s stance on maritime security as well as the importance of international cooperation in this area. At the EAS in October 2021, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan highly valued the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which upholds values such as openness, transparency, inclusiveness and the rule of law. He reiterated full support for the AOIP, which shares the fundamental principles with the FOIP, and called on each country for their support. In addition, at the ASEAN-Japan Summit Meeting in the same month, Prime Minister Kishida spoke about the steady progress of concrete cooperation in the four priority areas of AOIP, including maritime cooperation, that contributes to the fundamental principles of AOIP, based on the Joint Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Cooperation on ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific adopted by Japan and ASEAN in 2020.

Among the frameworks related to ASEAN, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security are frameworks that are focused on the maritime sector. At the 9th EAMF hosted

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3 Regional cooperative frameworks with the participation of the 10 ASEAN countries as well as various countries, regions and organizations. In addition to the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), other examples include the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, ROK) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

4 The four areas of maritime cooperation, connectivity, SDGs and economy.
by Brunei in November, Japan spoke about the importance of maritime order based on the rule of law, and Japan’s initiatives toward a sustainable ocean economy. An expert from Japan also made a presentation about international trends of and Japan’s contributions toward the issue of marine plastic litter, which is also a pressing regional issue.

Japan is also promoting bilateral coordination and dialogues in the maritime sector. The 6th Japan-India Maritime Affairs Dialogue was convened in September, and the 4th Meeting of the Japan-Philippines Maritime Dialogue was held in October. During these meetings, the participants affirmed the importance of free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and concurred on strengthening maritime cooperation in the future. In addition, at the Japan-Turkey Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in August, the Ministers agreed to establish a dialogue on maritime issues between Japan and Turkey with a view to deepening discussions on various maritime issues, including maritime order based on the rule of law.

(B) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Also known as the “Constitution for the Oceans,” UNCLOS is the very basis of maritime order governed by the rule of law. Japan regards maritime order with the Convention at the core as the cornerstone that safeguards Japan’s maritime rights and interests while facilitating its maritime activities across the international community. As such, Japan actively contributes to discussions among concerned international organizations at conferences that include the Meetings of States Parties to the Convention, as well as to the sharing of ideas for achieving stability in the maritime legal order, in order to ensure that the convention will be even more widely applied and implemented appropriately (see 6(2) on page 240).

(C) Challenge to Japan’s Maritime Sovereignty (Situation Surrounding the East China Sea) (see Chapter 2, Section 2, 2(1) B(D) on page 45)

In the East China Sea, China Coast Guard vessels have continued to intrude into Japan’s territorial sea around the Senkaku Islands in 2021. Incidents of China Coast Guard vessels approaching Japanese fishing vessels were repeated, and in some cases intrusions into the territorial sea took place for prolonged periods. The number of days of navigation in the contiguous zone by China Coast Guard vessels also reached a record high. Chinese military vessels and aircraft are also becoming increasingly active and expanding their operations. Furthermore, China has been continuing with unilateral resource development in areas where the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf are pending delimitation. Additionally, in recent years, Japan has found numerous research projects being conducted by China in the waters surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, without Japan’s consent.

Given China’s continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea, Japan will carefully monitor the trends and movements around its air and sea spaces, and continue to respond in a firm but calm manner while making claims that should be made. At the same time, it will promote cooperation with the relevant countries including the U.S. in order to achieve peace and stability in the East China Sea.

(D) Challenge to the Maritime Order (Problems Surrounding the South China Sea) (see Chapter 2, Section 2, 7 (2) on page 88)

In the South China Sea, China has been conducting unilateral attempts to change the status quo and that run counter to the rule of law and openness, as well as attempting to create a fait accompli. These include the further militarization of disputed features. China has also continued or enhanced actions that escalate tensions in the region. The international community, including Japan, has expressed serious concerns over
Uotsuri Island of Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture

Large-scale, rapid outpost building in the South China Sea by China

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<td>Mischief Reef</td>
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Source: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe
these actions. Japan strongly opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and has consistently supported the full enforcement of the rule of law in the South China Sea, while focusing on ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and ensuring the safety of sea lanes. Japan has also emphasized the importance of all parties involved with the South China Sea to work toward the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law, in particular the UNCLOS.

The issue with regard to the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and constitutes a legitimate concern of the international community. The issue is also an important matter of concern for Japan, which depends on marine transport for much of its resources and energy and which is a stakeholder that utilizes the South China Sea. Cooperation within the international community is of great importance in maintaining and developing “Free, Open and Stable Seas” based on the rule of law. For this reason, Japan supports the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations.

Ensuring Safe Maritime Transport

Japan actively contributes to ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight and safe maritime transport through counter-piracy measures in Asia and Africa as well as close partnership and cooperation with other countries.

(A) Counter-piracy Measures in Asia

According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the number of piracy cases in the seas of Southeast Asia was 62 in 2020 and 56 in 2021.

To encourage regional cooperation in coping with incidents such as acts of piracy in Asia, Japan took the initiative in formulating the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which entered into force in 2006. Each of the contracting parties provides information and cooperates on incidents such as acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and other regions, via the Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP-ISC) established in Singapore. Japan has been supporting the activities of ReCAAP-ISC by dispatching the Executive Directors and Assistant Directors and making financial contributions. Moreover, Japan is carrying out programs to support for enhancing maritime law enforcement and surveillance capabilities of coastal states in Asia, which have been highly acclaimed in the international community.

(B) Counter-piracy Measures Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

According to the IMB, the number of piracy and armed robbery cases off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden was 237 at its peak in 2011 but has since declined to a low level (zero in 2019 and 2020, and one in 2021). Despite efforts such as maritime operations of the navies and self-defense measures by merchant ships, the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia remain unresolved. Pirates off the coast of Somalia still have the intention and capability to carry out acts of piracy, which requires a careful watch on the situation.

Since 2009, Japan has been conducting counter-piracy operations by deploying Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers (with coast guard officers on board) and P-3C patrol aircraft off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To solve the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, Japan has been making multi-layered efforts that include support for enhancing the maritime security capabilities of Somalia and its neighboring countries and ensuring the stability of Somalia.

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5 The U.S. Government explains its “freedom of navigation” operations as efforts to challenge excessive claims that can infringe freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right of lawful uses of the sea. One example of this is the navigation of the U.S. Navy’s USS Benfold guided-missile destroyer through the waters around the Spratly Islands on September 8, 2021.
Japan has supported the establishment of Information Sharing Centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the construction of the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC) by contributing 15.53 million US dollars to date to a fund established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Moreover, Japan has contributed 4.5 million US dollars to an international trust fund that enhances capacity building for piracy prosecution, to support Somalia and its neighboring countries. In addition, Japan provided two patrol vessels to the Djibouti Coast Guard in 2015, and decided in 2021 to provide support for the construction of two patrol vessels as well as the improvement of a floating pier. Japan has also been supporting the enhancement of its capacity to secure maritime security through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)’s technical cooperation and joint exercises with the Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement. Furthermore, with a view to promoting the stability of Somalia, Japan has provided a total of 500 million US dollars since 2007 aimed at supporting improvement in basic services and public security through support for the police, as well as revitalization of the domestic economy through vocational training and job creation, among other measures.

(C) Counter-piracy Measures in the Gulf of Guinea

According to the IMB, while the number of piracy and armed robbery cases in the Gulf of Guinea had remained at a high level in recent years with 64 cases in 2019 and 84 cases in 2020, it fell to 35 cases in 2021. Although many of these used to occur in the territorial waters of coastal states, a growing number of cases has been occurring in the open seas in recent years. For this reason, coastal states are required to strengthen their maritime law enforcement capabilities and to enhance their ability to address piracy through coordination with other countries. Japan has provided coastal states with capacity building assistance through trainings conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and JICA. Japan has also been involved in discussions in the international community through participation in the “G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea,” a cooperative and coordination mechanism to address illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea.

C Cooperation on Maritime Security

(A) Capacity Building Assistance

Japan provides seamless assistance to various countries for capacity building in the area of maritime security, through cooperation between MOFA, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Coast Guard and other agencies. MOFA provides capacity building assistance to law enforcement agencies and other organizations in developing countries, through the provision of equipment such as patrol vessels and human resource development implemented through bilateral ODA, Japan has been providing support toward the Maritime Law Enforcement Capacity Building Project implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) under its Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), with the aim of addressing the diverse illegal maritime activities that have been increasing further in recent years. Through this project, MOFA is conducting training and workshops for practitioners involved in measures to address illegal maritime activities.

The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have provided capacity building assistance in the area of maritime security to Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Brunei to date. Through these support initiatives, it is strengthening cooperative relations with partners that share strategic interests with Japan.

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6 In addition to the G7, non-G7 countries and international organizations participate in the Group.
7 Assistance is currently suspended (as of December 2021)
To provide capacity building assistance to coast guard authorities of coastal states of the Indo-Pacific, the Japan Coast Guard dispatches highly skilled Japan Coast Guard officials with expert knowledge as well as the Japan Coast Guard Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT), a special team that provides capacity building support, to the coast guard authorities of each country. In addition, the Japan Coast Guard also invites the coast guard officials from each country to Japan where it conducts training for them. It also administers the Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program, a Master’s level education program on maritime policy that accepts coast guard officials from Asian countries. Through this program, the Japan Coast Guard contributes to the development of human resources with advanced practical and applied knowledge, knowledge on international law and international relations as well as research into the relevant case studies, the ability to conduct analysis and make proposals, and international communication skills.

When providing such capacity building assistance, Japan cooperates closely with like-minded countries including the U.S., Australia, India, the UK and France.

(B) Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Consolidating and sharing a wide range of maritime information and understanding maritime domain effectively and efficiently are vital toward the realization of “Free, Open and Stable Seas.” Japan places great importance on international cooperation in such maritime domain awareness (MDA) initiatives.

In recent years, progress has been made in the Indo-Pacific region to establish information sharing centers for the consolidation, analysis and sharing of maritime information, such as phenomena related to the safety of navigation and ship information. Japan has dispatched personnel (Executive Directors and Assistant Directors) to the ReCAAP-ISC based in Singapore, as well as liaison officers to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) established by the Republic of Singapore Navy, and the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) established by the Indian Navy. Furthermore, the authorities of Japan and India exchange information based on the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy, signed on the occasion of the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in October 2018.

Japan also organizes the “ARF Workshop on International Cooperation on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)” as an official event of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security.

(5) Outer Space

In recent years, outer space has become congested due to its diversified use and increasing number of countries using space. In addition, the increase of space debris due to factors such as Anti-Satellite (ASAT) tests and satellite collisions poses a growing risk to the sustainable and stable use of outer space.

In order to cope with this situation, Japan has been engaging in initiatives such as strengthening Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance for space systems, while working on international rule-making and international space cooperation, including cooperation with its ally, the U.S., in particular.

A Realizing the Rule of Law in Outer Space

Reflecting the changing situation concerning outer space, the international community has been vigorously discussing international rule-making concerning outer space activities in a variety of ways. Japan has also been actively involved in these efforts toward establishing and strengthening the rule of law in outer space.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is a permanent committee established under the UN General Assembly. It is becoming increasingly important as a forum for establishing international rules related to civil
space activities. Professor Aoki Setsuko of the Keio University Law School was the first Japanese person to chair the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee for the 2021 session. During her term, she contributed to the progress of the sustainable development and use of outer space (see the Column page on 207).

In recent years, there have been growing expectations toward the development and use of commercial space resources in Japan and abroad. Following from the U.S. and other countries, Japan enacted a domestic law on space resources (Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources) in June, and enforced it in December. Active discussions have also been held within COPUOS on the approach to international rules related to space resources, and Japan is working together with the governments of various countries to construct internationally consistent space resources frameworks.

With regard to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), in 2021, same as the previous year, the resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” was jointly proposed by the UK, Japan, and other countries at the UN General Assembly First Committee, and was adopted with the support of 163 countries. Thereafter, this draft resolution was adopted at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly with the support of 150 countries. Based on this resolution, an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established for the period of 2022 to 2023, with the aim of further deepening discussions on responsible behaviors. Japan will continue to engage actively in discussions in this OEWG and to promote international discussions on responsible behaviors, so as to prevent the escalation of an arms race in outer space.

In November, Russia conducted a test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile against its satellite. The destruction of a satellite, which generates a large amount of space debris, is an irresponsible behavior that undermines the sustainable and stable use of outer space. The Government of Japan expressed concerns toward the test and calls upon the Government of Russia not to conduct this kind of test in the future.

Furthermore, with a view to contributing to the rule of law in outer space, Japan has been offering support to developing countries toward capacity building in the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws. In May, Japan announced that it will cooperate on the “Space Law for New Space Actors” project of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). Under this initiative, Japan provides support to emerging space-faring nations in the Asia Pacific region for the development and implementation of domestic space-related laws. Through these efforts, Japan is contributing to the building of legal capacity of these nations necessary for the appropriate management and supervision of domestic space activities, including private sector activities.

**International Dialogues and Consultations on Outer Space**

Japan promotes dialogues and consultations on outer space primarily with major space-faring nations and nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

In relation to the U.S., at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) held in March, the two countries affirmed the importance of the space domain in terms of national security. At the Japan-US Summit Meeting held in April, the leaders declared that Japan and the U.S. will deepen cooperation in the space domain, both in the defense and the civilian sectors.

In relation to India, the Second Meeting of the Japan-India Space Dialogue was convened in November. In addition to exchanging information on the space policies of Japan and India, the two sides also exchanged views on topics including security, cooperation between the relevant organizations, the space industry, global navigation satellite systems, space situational awareness
I am currently serving as Chair of the Legal Subcommittee (two-year term) of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). COPUOS is a subsidiary organ under the UN General Assembly that was established as a permanent committee in 1959. With the aim of promoting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space through international cooperation, it provides support for research and information exchanges in space science and technology, encourages reviews on legal regime governing outer space, and reports the results of its activities to the UN General Assembly. There are two Subcommittees under the COPUOS: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. Every year, meetings are convened for two weeks for each Subcommittee and 10 days for the main Committee in Vienna, Austria, where the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs is based. Japanese Chairs at the COPUOS to date include Dr. Horikawa Yasushi, who served as the Chair of the main Committee from 2012 to 2014, and astronaut Dr. Mukai Chiaki, who chaired the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in 2018.

The Legal Subcommittee plays a pivotal role in formulating international space law. All five United Nations treaties on outer space, including the Outer Space Treaty (1967), were drafted by the Legal Subcommittee, and upon their adoption, a draft treaty was sent by the Committee to the UN General Assembly. After being adopted by the General Assembly, they were signed and ratified by each Member State before entering into force, and are serving as the core of international space law concerning space exploration and use.

In 2020, meetings of the Legal Subcommittee were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the scheduled discussions were postponed to the following year. In 2021, the situation did not improve dramatically, so the Legal Subcommittee meeting that is usually convened from the end of March to early April was held in hybrid format, both online and in-person, for two weeks from May 31 to June 11. As the meeting is held in the six official languages of the United Nations: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, a special online system was prepared to facilitate interpretation for the attendees. Agenda items discussed for the 2021 session included: space traffic management, space debris, small satellite activities, national space legislation, national implementation of non-legally binding UN instruments, and the legal issues of space resources. Among these, the greatest attention was paid to issues of space resources, which had been first included in agenda items in 2017. One of the greatest accomplishments of the 2021 session was the successful establishment of a space resources working group, where detailed and concrete discussions on legal norms on the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources would be held. The Outer Space Treaty provides non-appropriation of outer space, but does not set out provisions on the exploitation, extraction, and commercial use of space resources. Thus, it is a preferable step that the newly made working group would be the platform to clarify and collectively make new norms on space resources activities that remain vague today. I think the successful setting up of this working group could fully demonstrate a solid basis of international cooperation nurtured through decades of efforts.

The hybrid meeting format sometimes made discussions more difficult than usual, with problems such as the occasional instability in connections. However, this conversely brought out the cooperative spirit of delegations of States members, which enabled the effective and amicable discussions of the meeting as well as the adoption of the report of this Subcommittee during the morning session of the final day. Despite the difficult conditions, this was achieved through the delegations’ strong will to promote the peaceful uses of outer space for the benefit of all humanity. I feel deeply grateful and fortunate to have had the opportunity to witness this as the Japanese Chair of the Legal Subcommittee.
(SSA), and international rules and norms pertaining to outer space.

Furthermore, at the Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Summit Meeting in September, the parties concurred on launching a working group on space as a new initiative, in order to advance cooperation in the space domain. Specifically, the four countries will engage in discussions on the sharing of satellite data to address issues such as climate change, providing support for capacity building to other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and international rule-making.

With regard to multilateral meetings, the 27th session of the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF-27), co-organized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST), was held in November and December. At this Forum, discussions were held on the expansion of the space industry, promoting sustainable space activities for the future, and contributing to the resolution of social issues.

C Space Science and Exploration

The progress of space exploration and application for peaceful purposes is a common benefit for all humankind, and is also significant in terms of diplomacy.

In 2019, Japan decided to participate in international space exploration under the proposal of the U.S. (Artemis program). Thereafter, in 2020, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan and the Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) signed a Joint Exploration Declaration of Intent for Lunar Cooperation (JEDI), and announced the details of cooperation between Japan and the U.S. During the same year, eight countries including Japan and the U.S. signed the Artemis Accords, which set out a political commitment to establish principles for creating a safe and transparent environment in promoting outer space activities, including the Artemis program. In addition, Japan and the U.S. concluded a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation on the Civil Lunar Gateway, a human outpost in the lunar vicinity that will be developed as a part of the Artemis program. Afterwards, more countries signed the Artemis Accords, and the total number of signatories reached 13 countries with the addition of Poland in October 2021.

The International Space Station (ISS) is an epic project in which 15 countries participate and has become a symbol of international cooperation regarding outer space. With the aim of providing support for capacity building in the space field, Japan provides many emerging and developing countries with the opportunities to conduct experiments using the ISS/Japanese Experiment Module “Kibo” and to deploy CubeSats. In June, Mauritius’ first satellite was deployed through the KiboCUBE program, a cooperative framework between JAXA and UNOOSA that provides developing countries with the opportunity to deploy CubeSats from Kibo. Furthermore, continuing from 2020, the second Kibo Robot Programming Challenge (Second Kibo-RPC), an educational program for students from the Asia-Pacific region who represent the next generation, was held from July to October.

D International Cooperation through the Utilization of Space Technology

Outer space is a unique space that enables the constant observation of the Earth’s atmosphere, land and seas. In recent years, there have been growing expectations toward the role of space technology in resolving global issues such as climate change, forest conservation, water resources management, disaster prevention and food security. Japan promotes international cooperation through utilization of space technology, which is one of Japan’s strengths in the international arena, and contributes to the achievement of the SDGs.
For example, the world’s first greenhouse gases observing satellite “IBUKI” has been capturing information on the concentration of greenhouse gases on Earth for more than 10 years. The 2019 Refinement to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories defined, for the first time, the utilization of satellite data to improve the precision of emissions from each country and included examples from the utilization of IBUKI. In addition, the JICA-JAXA Forest Early Warning System in the Tropics (JJ-FAST), developed for the conservation of forests that serve as an important “carbon sink” for the absorption of greenhouse gases, uses data from the Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 “DAICHI-2” to provide free information on forest changes in 77 countries around the world. This system is used for purposes such as detecting illegal logging.

Japan also provides, at no charge, the Global Satellite Mapping of Precipitation (GSMaP) system, which utilizes multiple satellites to observe the global rainfall situation. This system is applied to a wide range of uses, including rainfall situation monitoring, disaster management and agriculture, in 141 countries and regions around the world. Furthermore, Japan took the lead in launching “Sentinel Asia,” an initiative to provide free observational satellite information during disasters to contribute to disaster management in the Asia-Pacific region. To date, this project has responded to more than 350 emergency requests from 35 countries.

In light of the global spread of COVID-19, JAXA, NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) joined forces to implement an observation project to capture information on the Earth’s environment, economic activities and other aspects (such as changes in carbon dioxide concentration in large cities, changes in airport hangars and car parks, etc.) before and after the pandemic. The results of their analysis are published on a dedicated website.

(6) Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
(A) On-the-Ground Initiatives
(A) UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO)

As of December 31, 2021, 12 UN PKO missions are on active duty, primarily in the Middle East and Africa, to handle a wide range of duties that include monitoring ceasefires, promoting the political process, and protecting civilians. More than 80,000 military, police, and civilian personnel have been deployed to these missions. In response to the increasing complexity and scale of the mandates and the associated shortages of personnel, equipment, and financial resources, discussions on more effective and efficient implementation of UN PKO are underway in various forums, primarily within the UN. In December, under the themes of technology and medical support, the 2021 Seoul UN Peacekeeping Ministerial was held as an online meeting in the Republic of Korea to address issues faced by UN PKO.

In addition to PKO missions, the UN has also established Special Political Missions (SPMs) mainly consisting of civilian personnel. SPMs fulfill diverse roles including conflict prevention and mediation, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Based on the Act on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Act), since 1992 Japan has dispatched more than 12,500 personnel to a total of 28 missions, including UN PKO. More recently, since 2011 Japanese staff officers have been dispatched to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), while engineering units used to be deployed there from 2012. The engineering units in the South Sudanese capital of Juba and the surrounding areas have undertaken such activities as developing infrastructure that includes roads, the provision of water supplies to displaced persons, as well as site preparation, and concluded their activities in May 2017. As of December 31, 2021, four Self-Defense Forces of Japan (SDF) officers are on active duty at the UNMISS Headquarters, who continue to work toward peace and stability in South Sudan. Additionally, since April 2019, Japan has been
conducting activities contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East by dispatching two SDF officers to the Force Headquarters for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which is stationed in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Under the banner of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” by building on the past experiences of peacekeeping operations and making use of its own strengths, Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace cooperation in the future by means such as enhancing capacity building support and dispatching units and individuals.

(B) ODA and Other Cooperation to Facilitate Peacebuilding

In addressing prolonged conflicts and increasingly diverse humanitarian crises, peacebuilding and preventing the recurrence of conflict even in peacetime, in addition to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, are important toward the realization of an inclusive society. There is a greater need than before to address the root causes of crises by providing support toward building resilient nations and stabilizing societies from a medium- to long-term perspective, and by supporting self-sustaining development. Japan has been providing support for peacebuilding based on this “humanitarian-development-peace nexus” approach, and positions peacebuilding as one of the priority issues in its Development Cooperation Charter. The following are some of the main initiatives implemented recently.

a. Middle East

Japan has provided comprehensive support for peace and stability in the Middle East. This includes providing food and refugee assistance, as well as support for the development of human resources who can play an active role in nation-building. Japan received 16 students from Syria in 2021 to offer education to young people who were deprived of opportunities to attend school due to the Syrian crisis. As for Palestine, in addition to an increase in the refugee population, it is also facing serious deterioration of the living environment, including the deteriorated refugee camp infrastructure as well as unemployment and poverty. In light of this, Japan worked on improving the living environment of refugees through the implementation of the Camp Improvement Project (CIP) at refugee camps in Palestine, as well as by providing support to educational facilities, and contributed to the stabilization and improvement of the people’s welfare based on human security.

b. Africa

At the Seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD7) in 2019, Japan announced the New Approach for Peace and Stability in Africa (NAPSA). Through support for institution building and enhancing governance, strengthening the resilience of local community, prevention of youth radicalization and other efforts, Japan supports African-led efforts and contributes to peace and stability in Africa under the banner of NAPSA which respects Africa’s ownership in conflict resolution and addresses the root causes that hamper peace and stability in Africa.

For example, Japan has conducted criminal justice training since 2014 for Francophone African countries, and has supported stabilization of the Sahel region by strengthening the capabilities of investigative and judicial bodies. In Guinea-Bissau, Japan worked in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to provide support for the capacity building of the National People’s Assembly, and to strengthen access to the judiciary in the southern region of the country. Japan is also supplying security equipment to strengthen countries’ ability to maintain security against frequent terrorist attacks and transnational crimes, and providing support for the removal of landmines.

In South Sudan, along with dispatching personnel to UNMISS headquarter, in response to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)\textsuperscript{8} signed in 2018, Japan has been supporting the implementation of the agreement and cease-fire monitoring through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization in East Africa. Furthermore, Japan, in collaboration with the UNDP, has disbursed a total of 63 million US dollars between 2008 and 2021 to Peacekeeping Training Centers located in 14 African countries, contributing to strengthening Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping activities.

\section{Initiatives within the UN (Peacebuilding)}

Based on the understanding that many regional conflicts and civil wars are rekindled even after the conflict has ended, and that it is extremely important to provide appropriate support in the post-conflict period, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in 2005 with the aim of offering consistent advice on assistance, from conflict resolution to recovery, reintegration and reconstruction. The PBC conducts discussions to identify priority issues and formulate peacebuilding strategies in the agenda countries.\textsuperscript{9} Japan has served as a member of the Organizational Committee since the PBC’s establishment and contributed to its activities while communicating the importance of institution and capacity building, the need to address the root causes of conflicts, and the strengthening of PBC’s relationships with key UN agencies and institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.

Based on the “Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture” including the PBC of April 2016, the UN Secretary-General issued a report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43) in February 2018. The report makes a variety of proposals for, inter alia: enhancing financing for peacebuilding; increasing operational and policy coherence of the PBC; and strengthening UN leadership, accountability and capacity. The third “Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture” was conducted in 2020, and the UN General Assembly resolution (A/RES/75/201) and Security Council resolution 2558 were adopted in December the same year. While welcoming progress on the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the past, the review affirmed that efforts will be made to continue with the implementation of these resolutions, the importance of the role of the PBC, and the convening of a meeting to discuss sustained financing.

Japan has contributed proactively to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) since its establishment in 2006. Announcing its aim to allocate 10 million US dollars in September 2016, Japan has contributed a total of 57.7 million US dollars (2.2 million US dollars in 2021) and ranks seventh among the major donor countries as of December 2021. In the address delivered by Prime Minister Suga at the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly in 2021, he announced that Japan will remain committed to peacebuilding.

\section{Human Resource Development}

\subsection{A The Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development}

While civilian experts with a high level of skill and expertise have a substantial role to play in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding, the number of those capable of fulfilling the role is insufficient, and therefore, the development of relevant human resources remains a major challenge. Japan has been implementing programs for human resource development in order to cultivate civilian experts who can play a leading role in the field of peacebuilding and development. As of the end of the FY2021, more than 800 people have been trained. The trainees who completed the programs have

\textsuperscript{8} As the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, issued in 2015, seemed to have stagnated, this Revitalized Agreement, bringing together stakeholders in South Sudan by IGAD, set out matters including the implementation schedule for the observance of ceasefire.

\textsuperscript{9} The four countries of Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Liberia and Burundi.
gone on to play an active role in the field of peacebuilding and development in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, and have received high acclaim from both the UN and other countries. Out of the approximately 180 people who have completed the training course for entry level human resources (hereafter, “entry level course”) to date, more than 50 work as regular employees of international organizations. Hence, this program also contributes significantly to the career development of Japanese nationals, as well as to enhancing their presence in international organizations in the fields of peacebuilding and development. In the FY2021 program, an entry level course and a training course for mid-career practitioners with experience in the fields of peacebuilding and development were conducted (see the Column on page 213).

(B) Training for Peacekeepers of Various Countries

Japan has been supporting peacekeepers from various countries participating in UN PKO to enhance their capabilities. Since 2015, in conjunction with cooperative efforts among the UN, supporting member states, and troop contributing countries, Japan has provided support for the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP), a framework for innovative cooperation aimed at addressing the urgent need to improve the capabilities of PKO personnel by providing necessary training and equipment to personnel deployed to UN PKO. For example, Japan has sent 172 SDF personnel and other individuals to Kenya and Uganda as instructors and conducted training on the operation of heavy engineering equipment for 277 personnel from eight African countries that expressed intentions to dispatch engineering units to UN PKO. Since 2018, this project has been extended to Asia and the surrounding regions. Japan has dispatched 68 SDF personnel and other individuals to Viet Nam and conducted training on the operation of heavy engineering equipment for 56 personnel from nine countries of Asia and the surrounding regions. Additionally, in October 2019 a lifesaving training program began in the medical field, a considerably problematic area for UN PKO, while support for the introduction of telemedicine into UN PKO missions was launched from 2021. In December the same year, training for the construction process management course in the field of military engineering was conducted remotely for the first time. Other than TPP, Japan dispatches instructors and other personnel, as well as provides financial assistance, to Peacekeeping Training Centers in Asia and Africa.

(7) Initiatives to Combat Security Threats

A Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Since the end of 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound impacts not only on domestic politics, economy and society, but also on the international political and economic order, and further, affected people’s behavior, mindsets and values. It has also had a major impact on the environment surrounding terrorism. Terrorists continue to carry out their terrorist activities in Asia and other parts of the world while adapting to the new social circumstances that have resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the weakening of governance as well as social divisions brought about by the manifestation of poverty and racial and ethnic issues. Furthermore, the increased dependence on information and communications technology by people around the world has motivated terrorists or terrorist organizations to spread extremism through the Internet and social media, and moreover, to conduct illegal behavior that could lead to terrorism in cyberspace, such as acquisition of funding for terrorism. There is a pressing need to respond comprehensively to these developments.

Based on the “G7 Action Plan on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism” compiled at the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016, Japan has to date implemented the following actions: (1) measures to enhance counter-terrorism capacity, which includes promoting the utilization of Interpol...
My name is Yamasaki Tomomi. Under the Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, I have been posted as a UN Volunteer to the Nigeria office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN organization that specializes in the migration issues of people around the world.

In Nigeria, IOM has the largest country office among UN entities and bodies and provides a wide range of support, including assistance to internally displaced persons, human trafficking countermeasures, and border control. My main role is to assist IOM in developing, monitoring and evaluating projects, mainly in the area of peacebuilding.

For example, as of July 2021, approximately 2.18 million people have been internally displaced in the northeastern part of Nigeria due to the presence of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) for over a decade. In order to address the causes of the forced migration, IOM has been assisting the Government of Nigeria through a program to promote disengagement, disassociation, reintegration, and reconciliation (DDRR) in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Under this program, activities are conducted to encourage NSAG associates to disengage from the organizations and return to civil society. I supported the development of new projects under the DDRR program to strengthen the capacity of the Government-run rehabilitation centers for former NSAG associates through activities including staff training and facility maintenance. I have also developed questionnaires as a monitoring tool for a series of town hall meetings that aimed to promote communities’ preparedness for the reinsertion and acceptance of former NSAG associates. The tool was helpful in assessing the impacts of the meetings and receiving feedback to improve the program.

While assistance by the international community has been focusing on the assistance in the northeastern part of the country, the northwestern part where the same level of support has not been provided is experiencing increased insecurity highlighted with organized crimes, such as kidnappings for ransom and robbery murders, which resulted in forced migration. In order to plan responses to the situations in northwest Nigeria, I participated in a field assessment and proposed possible interventions to IOM Nigeria.

The participation of diverse stakeholders, starting from the stage of project development, is vital in providing support for peacebuilding. This is why the processes are so time-consuming. Nevertheless, I feel greatly rewarded by my experience in the IOM, which contributes to the peace and stability of Nigeria through the development of new programs and projects while listening to the viewpoints of various parties, and the affirmation of project outcomes through monitoring and evaluation.
databases and measures against the funding of terrorism, (2) education and promotion of moderation in communities through dialogues and other means, in order to prevent violent extremism, which is a root cause of terrorism, and (3) support for capacity building of law enforcement agencies, including measures to support rehabilitation in prisons.

To steadily promote measures to counter terrorism and violent extremism, which is an issue that has gained importance as the COVID-19 pandemic becomes a protracted situation, Japan provided contributions in the amount of 2.1 billion Japanese yen (supplementary budget for FY2020) to the projects implemented by international organizations and funds, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the Hedayah, International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), among others, by using their respective strengths and expertise effectively.

As an initiative that Japan has carried out continuously for the past 16 years, Japan has also run an exchange program inviting Islamic school teachers and providing opportunities to experience interfaith dialogue, school visits and cultural events in Japan. However, this has been suspended since FY2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan will work toward the resumption of the program going forward, in order to help promote moderation and the creation of more tolerant societies that are receptive to different values.

Through bilateral and trilateral counter-terrorism consultations, Japan also exchanges information on the world terrorism situations and affirms the strengthening of cooperation in the field of countering terrorism with other countries.

The Government of Japan has promoted counter-terrorism measures in collaboration with relevant countries and organizations. Based on the view that information gathering is critical for combating terrorism, the Government established the Counter Terrorism Unit - Japan (CTU-J) in December 2015 and has been making concerted efforts to gather information with the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower. Regarding the incident in which a Japanese national being detained in Syria was safely released in October 2018, this outcome is owed to CTU-J playing a key role in requesting the cooperation of the countries concerned and handling the situation by leveraging Japan’s information network. Following the series of terrorist bombings that occurred in Sri Lanka in April 2019, the Director General and other officials from CTU-J were immediately dispatched to the area to gather information. To fulfill the critical responsibility of securing the safety of Japanese nationals overseas, Japan will continue to further enhance its information gathering through the CTU-J and take all possible measures to counter terrorism to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas.

**Criminal Justice Initiatives**

The UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (“Congress”) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (both of which have their secretariats under UNODC) are in charge of shaping policy on crime prevention and criminal justice in the international community. Despite inviting the Congress to Japan for the second time since the Fourth Congress held in 1970, the meeting was postponed for about a year due to the impact of COVID-19. In March 2021, the 14th Congress (“Kyoto Congress”) was convened in Kyoto. The hybrid meeting, combining online sessions and in-person participation, was attended by approximately 5,600 participants from 152 countries and regions, a record high. Under stringent border measures, foreign delegations, including Ministerial level participants from 13 countries, visited Japan to participate in the event. At the Kyoto Congress, Minister of Justice Kamikawa was elected as President of the Congress and delivered statements at the
opening and closing ceremonies. The opening ceremony was also attended by Prime Minister Suga and other key government officials, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres delivered a speech online via live stream. Japan, as the chair of the Congress, led discussions on the draft political declaration, and worked in cooperation with participating countries and international organizations, most of all the UNODC, toward the adoption of the political declaration. In accordance with the overall theme, “Advancing crime prevention, criminal justice and the rule of law: towards the achievement of the 2030 agenda,” the political declaration (“Kyoto Declaration”), summarizing the matters that should be addressed over the medium- to long-term by the international community in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice, was adopted. Going forward, it is important for the UN and member states to steadily implement the contents of the Kyoto Declaration. With a view to taking the lead in the implementation of the Kyoto Declaration, Japan will launch the Criminal Justice Forum for Asia and the Pacific, regularly hold the Global Youth Forum for a Culture of Lawfulness, and formulate model strategies on reducing reoffending. At the same time, Japan is also actively taking part in international meetings such as the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to promote its initiatives.

Furthermore, Japan provides support to improve prosecution capabilities and other criminal justice functions, to improve the operation of prisons, and to enhance capacities related to measures against cybercrime in Southeast Asian countries by providing financial contributions to UNODC and through financial contributions from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).

Japan is a State Party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which establishes a global legal framework for promoting cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime including terrorism more effectively. Japan advances international cooperation that includes providing international assistance in investigation in accordance with the UNTOC and reviewing the implementation of the Convention.

Anti-corruption Measures

As a State Party to the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which sets out provisions for international cooperation and measures to address corruption such as bribery and embezzlement of property by public officials, Japan has actively participated in discussions for the effective implementation of the UNCAC and strengthening international cooperation on preventing and combating corruption. In addition, Japan contributes to the capacity building of criminal justice practitioners in developing countries by conducting the International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption (UNCAC Training Programme) through the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). In order to promote the implementation of the UNCAC, the UN General Assembly Special Session against Corruption was held in June, during which State Minister for Foreign Affairs Uto Takashi delivered a speech on behalf of Japan. The political declaration adopted at this Session is significant from the perspective of strengthening the concerted efforts of the international community toward the further prevention and eradication of corruption. It also highlighted the continued commitment to promote the steady implementation of existing
international conventions, including the UNCAC and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention), and to contribute to international cooperation on anti-corruption measures.

Japan is an active participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which verifies the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by each state party to prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.

Measures to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism

Regarding anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international framework that establishes the international standards that countries should implement and conducts peer reviews to assess levels of implementation. In recent years, the FATF has also been engaged in initiatives to prevent financing for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has issued the FATF statement that calls for the eradication of illegal financial activities by North Korea.

As a founding member, Japan has actively participated in these discussions. The Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report of Japan was adopted at the FATF Plenary held in June, and was published at the end of August. Japan is steadily making preparations and implementing measures to address the points for improvement raised in this Report.

In addition, Japan takes measures to combat the financing of terrorism as a State Party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and also implements measures to freeze the assets of terrorists and terrorist organizations in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 1373, and designated by the UN Security Council Taliban Sanctions Committee or the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Japan added one individual designated by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in June and November, and two individuals and one organization were similarly designated in December, as subjects for asset freezing measures. As of December 31, Japan has implemented asset freezing measures on a total of 405 individuals and 121 organizations.

Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants

Japan has strengthened its domestic system to combat trafficking in persons, for which methods are becoming increasingly sophisticated and obscure, while proactively providing assistance to developing countries, in accordance with “Japan’s 2014 Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons.” For example, in 2021, Japan continued to conduct training programs through JICA to deepen mutual understanding on human trafficking countermeasures (especially prevention, protection and support to restore the financial independence of victims) of stakeholders in Asian countries, including Japan, and to promote more effective regional cooperation. With respect to cooperation with international organizations, in 2021, through funding to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Japan continued to provide assistance for the safe repatriation of foreign victims of trafficking in persons protected in Japan, and to carry out social rehabilitation support programs to prevent the recurrence of trafficking after they return to their countries. Japan also funded training programs and other awareness-raising activities for law enforcement authorities in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries through projects organized by UNODC, UN Women and other organizations.

Japan also implemented support projects mainly toward ASEAN and African countries, with a view to preventing the smuggling of migrants.

As a State Party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air, Japan has also further deepened its cooperation with other countries with a view to combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

Measures to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking

Japan works in cooperation with UNODC to investigate and analyze synthetic drugs, strengthen capacity for drug control at national borders, and provide support for the production of alternative crops, thereby working to take measures against illicit drug trafficking that is spreading across borders.

Disarmament and Non-proliferation and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(1) Nuclear Disarmament

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during wartime, Japan has the responsibility to lead the international efforts to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

The global security environment has been severe in recent years. As seen in the situation surrounding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that entered into force in January, there exists an apparent divergence of views on how best to advance nuclear disarmament, a divergence that exists not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states but also among non-nuclear-weapon states that are exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and those that are not. Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to persistently advance realistic measures while bridge-building between states with divergent views, in order to promote nuclear disarmament.

Japan has continued to pursue bridge-building between states with divergent views with the aim of realizing a world without nuclear weapons. It has done this through cooperation and collaboration with like-minded countries, in ways such as holding meetings of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament and the follow-up Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, submitting the Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament to the UN General Assembly, and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), as well as bilateral consultations. Moreover, Japan intends to continue maintaining and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime through cumulative efforts that include promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encouraging states to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and building up realistic efforts that nuclear-weapon states can also participate in, such as discussions and exercises toward the realization of effective nuclear disarmament verification.

The TPNW is an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons. However, not a single nuclear-weapon state has not joined the TPNW, even though the engagement of nuclear-weapon states is indispensable to change the reality. Therefore, instead of addressing the situation through signing and ratifying the TPNW, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during wartime, must make efforts to involve nuclear-weapon states. To that end, Japan first intends to advance realistic measures toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, based on the foundation of trust built with its only ally, the U.S.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Japan places great importance on maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NPT Review Conferences have been held once every five years with the aim of achieving the goals of the NPT and ensuring compliance with its provisions, and
discussions that reflect the international situation of the time have been held since the NPT entered into force in 1970. However, at the 9th Review Conference held in 2015, discussions failed to arrive at a consensus regarding the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and other issues, and the Conference ended without a consensus document.

2020 is a milestone year, marking 50 years since the NPT entered into force and 75 years since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Statement by the Foreign Minister was released on March 5 to coincide with the entering into force of the NPT. In the statement, Foreign Minister Motegi expressed appreciation for the NPT’s invaluable contribution to the consolidation and maintenance of international peace and security as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and spoke about the need to uphold and strengthen the NPT regime. Although the 10th NPT Review Conference was scheduled for April 2020, it has been postponed four times due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament and the Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament**

The “Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” (EPG; consisting of 17 experts from countries of different positions, including Japan) was launched by Japan in 2017 with the goals of rebuilding trust among countries with divergent views on how to proceed with nuclear disarmament and of obtaining recommendations that will contribute to the substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament. The Group held a total of five meetings leading up to July 2019, and the concrete outcomes were submitted to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In October 2019, the Chair’s Report, summarizing discussions at all five meetings of the Group held to date, was published.

Thereafter, Japan established “The Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” with the participation of experts and government officials from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, for the purpose of following up with, and further developing, the discussions of the EPG. At the Third Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, held online in December 2021, Prime Minister Kishida attended the meeting as Prime Minister for the first time, and delivered the opening remarks. At this meeting, discussions were held on the possible outcomes of the 10th NPT Review Conference, and in particular, the approach to producing outcomes that strike a balance between the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation, peaceful uses), and the approach to making progress in nuclear disarmament based on Article 6 of the NPT.

**The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)**

The NPDI, a group of 12 non-nuclear-weapon states from various regions established under the leadership of Japan and Australia in 2010 has served as a bridge between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. It leads efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
through its realistic and practical proposals with the involvement of the foreign ministers of its member states. At the 10th NPDI Ministerial Meeting, co-organized by Japan and Australia and held during the G20 Aichi-Nagoya Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in November 2019, an NPDI Joint Ministerial Statement was issued concerning the importance of maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime.

The NPDI has actively contributed to the NPT review process through realistic and practical proposals, including the submission of 19 working papers to the 9th NPT Review process and 16 to the 10th NPT Review process. For example, with a view to the 10th NPT Review Conference, the NPDI submitted a working paper (“Landing-zone Paper”) that proposes the elements that should be incorporated into the final document concerning the three pillars of the NPT—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**E Initiatives Through the United Nations (Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament)**

Since 1994, Japan has submitted draft resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons to the UN General Assembly. They incorporate issues of the time related to nuclear disarmament, and are aimed at presenting a realistic and concrete nuclear disarmament approach proposed by Japan to the international community. As a means to facilitate the building of a common ground between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the 2021 resolution focused on joint courses of action to be taken immediately by the international community toward nuclear disarmament as well as the importance of future-oriented dialogues. The resolution was adopted with the broad support of 152 countries at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October and of 158 countries at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly in December. The states supporting the resolution have divergent views, and include nuclear-weapon states such as the U.S., the UK, and France as well as many non-nuclear-weapon states. While other resolutions that comprehensively addressed nuclear disarmament were submitted to the General Assembly in addition to Japan’s draft resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan has enjoyed support among a larger number of states. For more than 20 years, Japan’s resolutions have continued to enjoy the broad support of states with divergent views in the international community.

**F Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

Japan attaches great importance to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT as a realistic measure of nuclear disarmament where both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states can participate. Japan also has continued diplomatic efforts to call on all countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, including those countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force, to do so. In 2021, during the UN High-Level Meetings held in September, the 12th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was convened in hybrid format. Video messages from UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), as well as from the government representatives of various countries, were broadcast at the meeting. In his video statement issued to the Conference, Foreign Minister Motegi welcomed the progress in the universalization of the CTBT and the remarkable development of the verification regime over the 25 years since it opened for signatures. At the same time, he expressed Japan’s commitments toward the entering into force of the treaty, and stated that it is vital to realize the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea. The aforementioned Resolution on
Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for the CTBT to be signed and ratified by countries whose ratification is necessary for its entry-into-force.

**Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty**\(^{10}\) (FMCT)

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has great significance for both disarmament and non-proliferation as it would prevent the emergence of new states possessing nuclear-weapons by banning the production of fissile materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it limits the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states. For many years, however, no agreement has been reached on commencing negotiations for the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Consequently, it was decided at the 71st UN General Assembly in December 2016 to establish the FMCT High-Level Experts Preparatory Group, and Japan actively participated in the Group’s discussions. Through discussions at the first meeting (August 2017) and second meeting (June 2018), a report was adopted that includes possible options for the outline of a future treaty and contents to consider in negotiations. The report was submitted to the 73rd UN General Assembly in 2018. The aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for all countries to put every effort into immediate commencement of negotiations on the FMCT. Japan will actively continue to contribute to FMCT discussions.

**Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education**

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan places great importance on education in disarmament and non-proliferation. Specifically, Japan has been actively engaged in efforts to convey the realities of the devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons to people both within Japan and overseas, through activities such as translating the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors into other languages, invitations for young diplomats from other countries to go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki through the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament\(^{11}\) (in 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an online event was held to convey the realities of atomic bombing), providing assistance for holding atomic bomb exhibitions overseas,\(^{12}\) and designating atomic bomb survivors who have given testimonies of their atomic bomb experiences as “Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons.” The aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also incorporates a recommendation for all countries to put effort into nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education. Additionally, as the atomic bomb survivors age, it is becoming increasingly important to pass on the realities of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings across generations and borders. To this end, from 2013 to 2021, Japan conferred the designation of “Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons” for more than 400 youths in Japan and overseas.

**Initiatives Toward Future Arms Control**

In the area of nuclear disarmament, in addition to initiatives through multilateral frameworks such as the NPT, the U.S. and Russia have also concluded and maintained a bilateral arms control treaty. On February 3, 2021, the two countries agreed on an extension to the Treaty between

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10 A treaty concept that aims to prevent the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the production of fissile materials (such as enriched uranium and plutonium) that are used as materials to produce nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

11 Implemented since 1983 by the UN to nurture nuclear disarmament experts. Program participants are invited to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to promote understanding of the realities of atomic bombing through such means as museum tours and talks by victims about their experiences in the atomic bombings.

12 Opened as a permanent exhibition about the atomic bomb in New York, U.S.; Geneva, Switzerland; and Vienna, Austria, in cooperation with Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The New START Treaty demonstrates important progress in nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia, and Japan welcomed this extension. The U.S. and Russia also set up a dialogue on strategic stability after the extension of the treaty, and are continuing to hold dialogues that also cover the topic of arms control.

On the other hand, in view of the recent situation surrounding nuclear weapons, it is important to establish a new arms control mechanism that encompasses a wider range of countries beyond the U.S. and Russia, while also including a broader range of weapon systems. From this perspective, Japan has been communicating with China on this issue at various levels. For example, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting held in August, Foreign Minister Motegi, joining hands with other countries, expressed his desire to encourage China to continue its efforts to fulfil its responsibility as a nuclear weapon state and an important player in the international community, and engage in the bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and China on arms control in accordance with the obligation to negotiate in good faith under the NPT.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament also stresses the importance of concrete actions for transparency among nuclear-weapon states, and reaffirms the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon states to initiate arms control dialogues on effective measures to prevent nuclear arms racing.

(2) Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security

Japan’s Efforts Toward Non-proliferation

To ensure Japan’s security and to maintain peace and security of the international community, Japan has been making efforts concerning non-proliferation policy. The goal of such a policy is to prevent the proliferation of weapons that could threaten Japan and the international community (weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and biological/chemical weapons, as well as missiles with the ability to deliver those weapons and conventional weapons) and of related materials and technologies used to develop such weapons. In today’s international community, economic growth in emerging countries has enabled a growing capacity to produce and supply weapons in those countries as well as materials that could be diverted to the development of such weapons. Meanwhile, methods for procuring these materials are becoming more sophisticated, due in part to increasing complexity in means of distribution. Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies is spurring a growing potential for private sector technologies to be diverted to uses for military purposes, and increasing the proliferation risk of weapons that could pose a threat and of related materials and technologies. Under these circumstances, Japan has been implementing its non-proliferation policies, focusing on maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes and rules, taking appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and promoting close coordination with and capacity building support for other nations.

Japan’s three main measures of preventing proliferation are (1) IAEA safeguards, (2) export control, and (3) the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Safeguards refer to verification activities conducted in accordance with safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and aim to ensure that nuclear energy will not be diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As a designated member of
the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has made various efforts, including supporting the IAEA. For example, based on the view that the IAEA safeguards are at the core of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, Japan enhances the understanding and implementation capabilities of safeguards of other countries. Japan also encourages other countries to conclude the Additional Protocol (AP) to the IAEA safeguards agreements. Japan will continue providing utmost support at the IAEA General Conference, Board of Governors meetings, and other fora to Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, who has extensive knowledge and experience, and will continue to work with other member countries to strengthen the role of the IAEA.

Export control is a useful measure in the so-called supply-side regulation toward countries of proliferation concern, terrorist organizations, and other entities attempting to acquire or distribute weapons or related materials or technologies. There are currently four export control frameworks (international export control regimes) in the international community. Japan has participated in all of them since their inception, engaging in international coordination and practicing strict export control. Each of the four regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons, the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biological weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for missiles, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) for conventional weapons, establishes a list of dual-use items and technologies which contribute to weapons development. To ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, participating countries to the regimes implement export control measures on the listed items and technologies in accordance with their domestic laws. The export control regimes also exchange information concerning trends in countries of proliferation concern and are engaged in outreach activities to non-participating countries to the regimes in order to strengthen their export control. Japan actively engages in such international rule-making and application of rules, and makes various contributions. Additionally, in terms of international contributions in nuclear non-proliferation, the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna serves as the Point of Contact of the NSG.

Furthermore, Japan seeks to complement the activities of the international export control regimes by actively participating in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through efforts such as hosting the maritime interdiction exercise “Pacific Shield 18” in July 2018, Japan is working to enhance coordination among

13 Countries designated by the IAEA Board of Governors. The designated member states include Japan and other G7 countries with advanced nuclear energy capabilities.

14 In addition to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that is applied on all nuclear materials pertaining to the peaceful nuclear activities in that country, and that non-nuclear-weapon NPT States Parties must conclude with the IAEA pursuant to Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the NPT, an Additional Protocol is concluded between IAEA and the respective State Parties. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol expands the scope of nuclear activity information that should be declared to the IAEA, and gives the IAEA strengthened measures to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As of December 2021, 138 countries have concluded the Additional Protocol.

15 Apart from export control regimes, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which includes the principle of exercising restraint in their development and deployment, addresses the issue of ballistic missiles. As of December 2021, 143 countries subscribe to the HCOC.

16 An initiative launched in 2003 for the purpose of implementing and considering possible measures consistent with relevant international laws and national legal authorities in order to interdict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, along with related materials. 107 countries participate in and support the PSI as of December 2021. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and the U.S. have agreed to conduct a yearly rotation exercise in the Asia-Pacific region since 2014. Through the cooperation of agencies including MOFA, the National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, Japan Coast Guard and Ministry of Defense, Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises in 2004, 2007, and 2018, PSI air interdiction exercises in 2012, and an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in 2010. Japan has also actively participated in training and related meetings hosted by other countries.

17 Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the U.S. contributed assets and personnel to the exercise, which was held in Yokosuka City, in the sea and airspace off the Boso Peninsula, and in the airspace off the Izu Peninsula, and 19 countries from Indo-Pacific region and other countries sent observers.
countries and concerned institutions. In October 2021, Japan participated in an exercise hosted by Singapore (conducted in hybrid format).

Japan also holds Asia Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)\(^{18}\) and Asian Export Control Seminar\(^{19}\) every year in order to promote a better understanding of the non-proliferation regimes and strengthen regional efforts, mainly in Asian countries.

Furthermore, with regards to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540,\(^{20}\) which was adopted in 2004 with the aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (missiles) to non-state actors, Japan contributes to maintaining and strengthening international non-proliferation frameworks through Japan’s contributions to support the implementation of the resolution by Asian nations.

### Regional Non-proliferation Issues

North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

North Korea launched ballistic missiles twice in March 2021, and thereafter, repeatedly launched missiles, including ballistic missiles, over September and October, suggesting that its missile technology is improving steadily. The IAEA Director General’s report in August pointed out that North Korea’s nuclear activities continue to give rise to serious concerns. In particular, it pointed out that new indications of the operation of a 5MW nuclear reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing facility) in Yongbyon are deeply troubling, and that the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. Moreover, at the IAEA General Conference in September, a resolution based on the report was adopted by consensus, demonstrating the united position of IAEA member states toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Regardless of such efforts by the international community, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with extremely high frequency and in new ways since the beginning of 2022.

It is crucial that the international community makes concerted efforts to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions for dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner by North Korea. To that end, Japan will continue to coordinate closely with related countries, including the U.S. and the ROK, as well as international organizations such as the IAEA. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan will work on capacity building for export control particularly in Asia. Japan will also continue to contribute actively to discussions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and MTCR.

Since the withdrawal of the former U.S. administration of Trump from the Joint Comprehensive

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18 A multilateral Director-General-level meeting launched in 2003 and hosted by Japan to discuss various issues related to the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime in Asia among the 10 ASEAN Member States, China, India, the ROK, as well as the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, and the EU, which have common interests in Asian regional security. Most recently, the 16th meeting was held online in December 2020, and discussions were held on topics such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues and the strengthening of export control.

19 A seminar hosted by Japan to exchange views and information toward strengthening export controls in Asia, with the participation of export control officials from Asian countries and regions. It has been organized annually in Tokyo since 1993.

20 Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all countries to: (1) refrain from providing support to terrorists and other non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction; (2) adopt and enforce laws prohibiting the development of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors; and (3) implement domestic controls (protective measures, border control, export controls, etc.) to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also establishes, under the UN Security Council, the 1540 Committee, which comprises Security Council members and has a mandate to review and report to the Security Council the level of resolution 1540 implementation by member states.
Plan of Action (JCPOA)\textsuperscript{21} in 2018, Iran has continued with actions to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA. In January 2020, Iran announced that it would not be bound by the limit on the enrichment of uranium set forth in the JCPOA. Since the start of 2021, it has produced 20% enriched uranium in January, suspended the implementation of transparency measures under the JCPOA including the AP in February, and produced 60% enriched uranium in April. By August, it was confirmed that Iran had produced uranium metal enriched at up to 20%.

Japan has consistently supported the JCPOA, which contributes to the international non-proliferation regime, and is paying close attention to efforts by the relevant countries toward the return of both the U.S. and Iran to the JCPOA. Japan, being deeply concerned about Iran’s continued reduction of its commitments under the JCPOA, has repeatedly urged Iran to refrain from further measures that may undermine the JCPOA and to return fully to its commitments under the JCPOA.

In February, September, and November, IAEA Director General Grossi visited Iran to discuss these issues related to compliance with the JCPOA and the series of problems with safeguards (in which nuclear materials that had not been declared to the IAEA were found in Iran). During his visits in February and September, Iran and the IAEA issued joint statements and affirmed their mutual spirit of cooperation. However, the two parties failed to reach a final agreement during the visit in November, and a joint statement was not issued. In response, European and American countries expressed their concern. Thereafter, Iran and the IAEA affirmed a certain degree of cooperation in December.

In March 2022, Director General Grossi visited Iran again. The two parties issued a joint statement and agreed to set the aim to reporting the conclusions on the safeguards issue by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2022. Japan supports the IAEA’s efforts on Iran matters so far and will continue to call strongly upon Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Japan is also contributing to discussions on Iran’s nuclear and missile activities in international export control regimes such as the NSG and MTCR.

As for Syria, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 found that activities such as Syria’s undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor would constitute non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. To address this outstanding issue, Japan is calling upon Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA. It is important for Syria to sign, ratify and implement the AP.

\textbf{C Nuclear Security}

International cooperation is advancing in nuclear security to prevent acts of terrorism such as those involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These include the entering into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2007 and of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2015 respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit was held four times between 2010 and 2016. At the International Conference on Nuclear Security held by the IAEA in 2020, Mr. Wakamiya Kenji, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs participated in the ministerial conference as a representative of the Government of Japan and delivered a speech to share the view

\textsuperscript{21} Sets forth detailed procedures for imposing constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities while ensuring that they serve peaceful purposes, and for lifting the imposed sanctions.

\texttt{<Main measures undertaken by Iran>}

- Constraints on enriched uranium-related activities
  - Limit on the number of centrifuges in operation to 5,060 units
  - Upper limit on enriched uranium at 3.67%, and limit on the amount of stored enriched uranium at 300kg, etc.
- Constraints on the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor, and reprocessing
  - Redesign / remodeling of the Arak heavy-water nuclear reactor so that it is not able to produce weapon-grade plutonium and to transfer spent fuel out of the country
  - No reprocessing including for research purposes, no construction of reprocessing facilities, etc.
of Japan with other participants. Japan continues to actively participate in and contribute to these efforts.

In October 2019, relevant Japanese ministries and organizations conducted a table-top exercise on nuclear security measures for major public events with the participation of experts from the IAEA and the U.S.

On March 2 and 3, 2022, the IAEA Board of Governors convened an emergency meeting in Vienna to discuss the implications of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. At the meeting, participating countries condemned and expressed their concerns regarding Russia’s attacks on the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine from the perspective of nuclear safety, nuclear security, and safeguards. The resolution adopted by a majority at the meeting deplores Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which are posing serious and direct threats to the safety and security of nuclear facilities and civilian personnel. It also calls upon Russia to immediately cease all actions in order for Ukraine to preserve or promptly regain full control over nuclear facilities. Japan also strongly condemned the aggression by Russia, including seizing control of nuclear facilities, and will continue to respond appropriately while monitoring the relevant situation closely in cooperation with the IAEA and other parties.

(3) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

A Multilateral Efforts

Along with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the NPT. According to the treaty, it is the “inalienable right” for any country that meets its obligations to non-proliferation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Reflecting the increase in international energy demand, many countries use or are planning to use nuclear power.\(^{22}\)

On the other hand, these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies used for nuclear power generation can be diverted to uses for military purposes, and a nuclear accident in one country may have significant impacts on neighboring countries. For these reasons, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is vital to ensure the “3S”:\(^{23}\) that is, (1) Safeguards, (2) Nuclear Safety (e.g., measures to ensure safety to prevent nuclear accidents), and (3) Nuclear Security. As the country that experienced the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, it is Japan’s responsibility to share its experiences and lessons learned from the accident with other countries and to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety. In this regard, in 2013, the IAEA, in collaboration with Japan, designated the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) Capacity Building Centre (CBC) in Fukushima Prefecture. By December, they had conducted 26 workshops for Japanese and foreign officials to strengthen their capacity in the field of emergency preparedness and response. In November 2021, the IAEA held the International Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety, marking 10 years since the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, to reflect on the lessons and experiences drawn from the actions taken by participating countries and international organizations, and to identify pathways for further strengthening nuclear safety in the future.

The difficult work of decommissioning, contaminated water management, decontamination and environmental remediation has been progressing steadily at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station by leveraging the collective technologies and knowledge of the world, and in

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\(^{22}\) According to the IAEA, as of January 2022, 439 nuclear reactors are in operation worldwide and 50 reactors are under construction.

\(^{23}\) “3S” is used to refer to the IAEA’s efforts toward nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear safeguards, which are typical measures for non-proliferation.
cooperation with the IAEA, the expert organization in the field of nuclear energy. The Government of Japan announced its Basic Policy on the handling of the ALPS treated water\(^{24}\) in April, and signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) on Reviews of Safety Aspects of Handling ALPS treated Water with the IAEA in July. Under this TOR, Japan is cooperating with the IAEA to implement the IAEA reviews on the safety and regulatory aspects of ALPS treated water. This cooperation is facilitated by a task force established within the IAEA, which also includes experts identified by the IAEA from its member states. In November, experts from the IAEA and analytical agencies of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Germany and France conducted Marine Monitoring in Japan.

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) published a revised report in March on the levels and the impact of radiation from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident, based on the latest information.

In order to make progress in the decommissioning works and in recovery with a support and correct understanding of the international community, the Government of Japan periodically releases comprehensive reports through the IAEA that cover matters such as progress in decommissioning and contaminated water management at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, results of the monitoring of air dose rate and seawater radioactivity concentration, and food safety. In addition, Japan submits reports on the current situation to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo and to the IAEA basically every month. Furthermore, Japan has organized more than 100 briefing sessions to the Diplomatic Missions in Tokyo since the accident (held in April, August, September, November, and December in 2021), and provided information through Japanese diplomatic missions overseas.

The Government of Japan continues to provide an information thoroughly to the international community in a transparent manner, based on scientific evidence, and to provide firm explanations for claims that may cause reputational damage.

Nuclear energy is applied not only to the field of power generation, but also to other areas including human health, food and agriculture, environment, and industrial uses. Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such non-power applications and contributing to development issues are becoming increasingly important as developing countries make up the majority of NPT States Parties. The IAEA also contributes to technical cooperation for developing countries and to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In this context, Japan has been actively supporting the IAEA’s activities, with its technical cooperation based on the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and with its contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). In FY2020, Japan contributed 11 million euros toward measures to combat infectious diseases including COVID-19, and in FY2021 toward projects to address the problem of marine plastic pollution among others.

**Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement**

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements are concluded to establish a legal framework for securing a legal assurance from the recipient country on nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear-related material and equipment that are transferred between the two countries, so as to realize cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the two countries. Under such bilateral agreements, cooperation in areas such as the strengthening of nuclear safety can be promoted. Japan makes its decision on whether

\(^{24}\) “ALPS treated water” refers to water purified using multiple purification systems, including Advanced Liquid Processing Systems (ALPS).
or not to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement framework with another country, taking into account a wide range of factors such as non-proliferation efforts and nuclear energy policy of that country, its trust in and expectations for Japan, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries among others. As of the end of 2021, Japan has concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, Australia, China, the U.S., France, the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Kazakhstan, the ROK, Viet Nam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India. As for the UK, following the changes of safeguards applicable to the UK as a result of its withdrawal from EURATOM, Japan engaged in negotiations with the Government of the UK from June 2019 on the Protocol Amending the Japan-UK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This Protocol was signed in December 2020 and entered into force in September 2021.

(4) Biological and Chemical Weapons

A Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)\(^\text{25}\) is the only multilateral legal framework imposing a comprehensive ban on the development, production, and possession of biological weapons. However, the question of how to reinforce the Convention is a challenge as there are neither provisions governing the means of verifying compliance with the BWC nor an implementing organization for the Convention.

Since 2006, decisions have been made to establish the Implementation Support Unit (fulfilling the functions of a Secretariat) and to hold inter-sessional meetings twice a year in between the Review Conferences held every five years. During this time, progress has been made with respect to initiatives aimed at strengthening the regime of the BWC.

At the inter-sessional meetings up until the 9th Review Conference scheduled to be held in 2022, discussions were held on the five topics, namely international cooperation, reviews of developments in the field of science and technology, national implementation, assistance for preparedness and response, and institutional strengthening of the Convention.

B Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)\(^\text{26}\) imposes a comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, and stipulates that all existing chemical weapons must be destroyed. Compliance is ensured through a verification system consisting of declarations and inspections, making this Convention a groundbreaking international agreement on the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in the Hague, the Netherlands. Along with the UN, the OPCW has played a key role in the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Its extensive efforts toward the realization of a world without chemical weapons were highly acclaimed, and the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Japan, which has a highly developed chemicals industry and numerous chemicals factories, also accepts many OPCW inspections. Japan also actively cooperates with the OPCW in many other concrete ways, including measures to increase the number of member states and strengthening national implementation measures by States Parties with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Convention. Moreover, under the CWC, Japan aims to complete, as soon as possible, the destruction of chemical weapons of the former Japanese Army abandoned in Chinese territory by working in cooperation with China.

\(^{25}\) Entered into force in March 1975. Total number of state parties is 183 (as of December 2021).

\(^{26}\) Entered into force in April 1997. Total number of state parties is 193 (as of December 2021).
(5) Conventional Weapons

Conventional weapons generally refer to arms other than weapons of mass destruction and include a wide variety of weapons ranging from large weapons such as landmines, tanks, and artillery to small arms such as handguns. The problem of conventional weapons, which are used in actual wars and cause injury and death to civilians, is a serious one for both national security and humanitarian concerns. The disarmament agenda presented in 2018 by UN Secretary-General Guterres categorizes disarmament of conventional weapons as one of the three pillars, “Disarmament that Saves Lives.” Japan is making active efforts involving cooperation and support based on international standards and principles concerning conventional weapons.

A Small Arms

Described as “the real weapons of mass destruction” due to the many human lives they take, small arms continue to proliferate due to the ease with which they can be obtained and used. They contribute to conflict prolongation and escalation, hindering the restoration of public security and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Since 1995, Japan has been working with other countries to submit a resolution on the illicit trade of small arms to the UN General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year. In areas around the world, Japan has also provided support for projects to address the issue of small arms, including training and the collection and destruction of weapons. In 2019, Japan contributed two million US dollars to a mechanism for preventing small arms established under UN Secretary-General Guterres’ disarmament agenda.

B The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)27

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to establish common standards to regulate international trade in and prevent the illicit trade of conventional arms, entered into force in December 2014. As one of the original co-authors of the UN General Assembly resolution that initiated a consideration of the treaty, Japan has taken the lead in discussions and negotiations in the UN and contributed significantly to the establishment of the treaty. Even after the treaty entered into force, Japan has actively participated in discussions at Conferences of States Parties and other opportunities. Japan has continued to contribute in ways such as hosting the 4th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty in Tokyo as the first chair country elected from the Asia-Pacific region in August 2018. Japan also places importance on the universal application of the ATT. To that end, it has been encouraging countries, in particular Asian countries, to participate in the ATT.


The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons that are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. It comprises a framework convention that sets forth procedural and other matters, as well as five annexed protocols that regulate individual conventional arms. The framework convention entered into force in 1983. Japan has ratified the framework convention and annexed Protocols I to IV, including the amended Protocol II. Prompted by concerns in the international community about the rapidly advancing military applications of science and technology, meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous

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27 As of December 2021, there are 110 states and regions that are parties to the ATT. Japan signed the Treaty on the day that it was released for signing and became a State Party in May 2014.

28 As of December 2021, 125 countries and regions are parties to the CCW.
Weapons Systems (LAWS) have been held under the CCW framework since 2017. Meetings of the Group were held in March and August 2019, and the High Contracting Parties reached consensus on 11 guiding principles on LAWS. It was decided that discussions on matters including the guiding principles will be used as a basis for the clarification, consideration and development of normative and operational framework for the future. The 11 guiding principles were officially reached consensus at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW held in November 2019. In 2021, too, active discussions took place at the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) convened in August, September and December, and at the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW held in December. Japan continued to participate actively and constructively in the international rule-making, and contributed to discussions.

**D Anti-Personnel Mines**

Since the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) in 1998, Japan has continued to promote comprehensive measures with a focus on the effective prohibition of anti-personnel mines and strengthening of support for mine-affected countries. Along with calling on countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify or accede to the Convention, Japan has also been steadily engaged in international cooperation through landmine clearance, victim assistance and other activities in the international community, from the viewpoint of the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.”

At the 19th Meeting of the States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty held in Geneva in November 2021, Japan presented its initiatives and achievements in supporting mine action, and also expressed its continued resolve toward playing an active role in achieving a mine-free world.

**Cluster Munitions**

The international community takes seriously the humanitarian consequences brought about by cluster munitions. Japan is therefore taking steps to address this issue via victim assistance and unexploded ordnance clearance, while also continuing its efforts to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). At the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions held in 2021, Japan participated in discussions concerning these issues and shared its proactive efforts.

**Japan’s Efforts at the United Nations**

(1) **Japan-UN Relationship**

The UN is an international organization that nearly all the countries in the world are currently members of (193 countries as of December 2021). It addresses various challenges in diverse areas such as conflict resolution and peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, poverty and development, human rights, refugee issues, environment and climate change issues, disaster risk reduction and infectious diseases.

Since joining the UN in 1956, Japan has leveraged on both universality and expertise to realize

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29 The Convention, which entered into force in March 1999, bans the use and production of anti-personnel mines while mandating the destruction of stockpiled mines and the clearance of buried mines. As of December 2021, there are 164 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.

30 Generally speaking, it refers to bombs or shells in the form of large containers that open midair and release submunitions that spread over a wide area. They are said to be highly likely to not explode on impact, leading to the problem of civilians being accidentally killed or injured.

31 See the White Paper on Development Cooperation for specific efforts on international cooperation regarding cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines.

32 Entered into force in August 2010, it prohibits the use, possession, or production of cluster munitions, while mandating the clearance of cluster munitions in contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions. As of December 2021, there are 110 states and regions that are parties to the Convention, including Japan.
policy aims through multilateral cooperation in a wide range of areas, including the three pillars of the UN—peace and security, development and human rights. An important example of this is the key role that Japan has fulfilled in the maintenance of international peace and security, such as having served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council more frequently than any other UN Member State. In order to support such activities, the Government of Japan contributes financially to the UN while also actively engaging in the organizational aspects (management) of the UN. Japan also supports Japanese staff who intend to continue working in the UN, and puts effort into helping them gain appointment to important posts (see Chapter 4, Section 1, 2(1)). Since we face the pressing challenge of making the UN efficient, effective and suitable for the 21st century, Japan continues to proactively engage in UN reform, including UN Security Council reform.

(2) Major Events in 2021

Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the High-Level Week of the 76th UN General Assembly was convened in September in a hybrid format, through the screening of pre-recorded speeches and in-person participation. Prime Minister Suga sent a pre-recorded speech, while Foreign Minister Motegi attended the meeting in person.

In his address at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Suga spoke about Japan’s vision and contributions toward overcoming the COVID-19 crisis and guiding the world toward a better future. He introduced Japan’s efforts to overcome the COVID-19 crisis, and identified four priority areas in order for Japan to guide the world toward a better future: global health systems, decarbonization, building a free and open international order, and peace and security. He expressed that Japan will put active efforts into each area. Last but not least, referring to the 10-year mark after the Great East Japan Earthquake, he reaffirmed the importance of international coordination and emphasized Japan’s resolve to further promote multilateralism.

Prime Minister Suga also participated in four conferences through video messages. At the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) hosted by the U.S., he stated Japan’s commitments to reach net-zero by 2050, and expressed that Japan will exert its leadership in addressing climate change. At the SDG Moment 2021, Prime Minister Suga emphasized that Japan will do its utmost toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 and creating a hopeful future. Furthermore, at the Global COVID-19 Summit hosted by the U.S., he introduced Japan’s financial contributions to the COVAX facility and vaccine donations, including new pledges. At the same time, he expressed Japan’s resolve to lead international efforts toward achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC). At the UN Food Systems Summit, Prime Minister Suga stated that Japan will work toward establishing better global “food systems,” and expressed Japan’s determination to host the Tokyo Nutrition for Growth Summit 2021 in December with the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, and to lead international efforts to improve nutrition for people in the world, which has deteriorated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In addition to hosting the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the G4 Countries on UN Security Council Reform and participating in the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Extraordinary Meeting on Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Motegi also held foreign ministers’ meetings with the U.S., ROK, UK, France, Russia, Indonesia, Qatar, and Pakistan, and a Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Based on the personal relationships built with his counterparts, Foreign Minister Motegi engaged in diplomacy that strengthens the vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” and Japan’s footing in the international community, and confirmed close cooperation with the international community regarding regional affairs, including North Korea and Afghanistan. Foreign
Minister Motegi also conveyed Japan’s policies and standpoint to the international community, issuing video messages for the Ministerial Meeting of the Alliance for Multilateralism and the 12th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and co-hosting the High-level Side Event on UHC.

Foreign Minister Motegi also held a meeting with UN Secretary-General António Guterres. They exchanged views on addressing emerging challenges in the report issued by Secretary-General Guterres in September, titled “Our Common Agenda” (this report contains recommendations on how to address various issues that the international community is confronted by), and concurred on the importance of ensuring that efforts are tied in with the strengthening of human security. With regard to North Korea, Secretary-General Guterres expressed his renewed support for understanding and cooperation toward the early resolution of the abductions issue.

In August, Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid of the Maldives visited Japan ahead of his appointment as the President of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly. He paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Suga, and exchanged opinions with Foreign Minister Motegi on COVID-19, climate change, issues concerning North Korea, and UN Security Council reform, inter alia.

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and the exercise of its veto at the UN Security Council, the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly was convened in March, and the resolution on “Aggression against Ukraine” was adopted with 141 countries voting in favor, including Japan. Japan co-sponsored this resolution, and after its adoption, stated that Japan called on Russia to heed the overwhelming voice of the international community and implement the resolution.

(3) United Nations Security Council and its Reform

A United Nations Security Council

The UN Security Council holds the primary responsibility within the UN for maintaining international peace and security. It is composed of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent members that are elected by UN Member States (for two-year terms). Its agenda covers a wide range of areas, such as settlement of disputes, addressing new threats including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, peacebuilding and women, peace and security (see the Special Feature on page 233). Along with this, the scope of its activities, such as UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and UN Special Political Missions (SPM), is also growing in diversity.

Japan has been elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council 11 times, more frequently than any other UN Member State, and has contributed proactively to discussions in the Security Council. During its previous term on the Council from January 2016 to the end of December 2017, Japan made every effort to resolve North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, including contributions to drafting the six UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches and three nuclear tests conducted in January and September 2016 and September 2017. In addition to working proactively to respond to regional situations including in Africa and the Middle East, Japan has also led discussions toward improving the working methods of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, during its term, Japan contributed to discussions based on the concepts of human security and sustaining peace, to ensure that the UN Security Council addresses issues effectively from the perspectives of international peace and security. At the UN Security Council Briefing on Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in December 2019, Japan was fully engaged in discussions related to maintaining international...
peace and security by stating that North Korea’s ballistic missile launches were in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and posed a serious challenge not only for Japan but also for the international community as a whole, as well as calling for the importance of the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Japan will continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by seeking to become a non-permanent member of the Council as frequently as possible, until such time as reform, including the admission of Japan as a permanent member of the Council, is achieved. From this point of view, Japan is running for the Security Council non-permanent membership at the elections to be held in 2022.

**E Reform of the UN Security Council**

75 years have passed since the UN was established, and the structure of the international community has changed significantly while the UN’s functions have grown increasingly diverse. Despite this, the composition of the UN Security Council has largely remained unchanged to this day. In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, a resolution that deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by Russia was put to a vote in the UN Security Council. However, it was not adopted as Russia exercised its veto. Consequently, the UN Security Council was unable to take a coordinated response. This clearly shows that the UN Security Council cannot adequately fulfill the functions expected by the international community today. There is broad recognition among the international community of the necessity for promptly reforming the UN Security Council in a way that improves its legitimacy, effectiveness and representativeness. In particular, in the Declaration on the Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, all the leaders of the world committed to “instill new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council.”

To play an even more proactive role toward the realization of world peace and security through the UN, Japan has been making efforts to convince other countries to pursue the early realization of UN Security Council reform, with the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats and Japan’s admission as a permanent member.

**C Recent Activities Regarding UN Security Council Reform**

Since 2009, in the UN General Assembly, Member States have been engaging in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on UN Security Council reform. In 2021, the Intergovernmental Negotiations were held once a month from January till May. At the end of June, the decision for the 76th session to role over the work of the 75th session was adopted by consensus at the UN General Assembly, including the content “instill new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council.” In November, President Shahid of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly reappointed the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the UN, and newly appointed the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the UN as co-chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. The spotlight will be placed on how future discussions will progress under the new system.

Japan also places great importance on its initiatives as a member of the G4 (Japan, India, Germany and Brazil), a group that cooperates on promoting UN Security Council reform. Foreign Minister Motegi hosted the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the G4 Countries (Japan, India, Germany and Brazil) on UN Security Council Reform (September 22, New York, U.S.).
In the United Nations, there is widespread recognition that the global spread of COVID-19 is not only a global health issue, but also a problem that could have an implication on security. Some are also of the view that climate change exacerbates threats to security. Thus, adding to traditional UN security issues such as regional conflicts, disarmament and terrorism, a growing number of problems in recent years have been newly regarded as security issues. In line with this, issues covered by the UN Security Council (UNSC) are also changing. In other words, the UNSC is seeing changes to the scope of “Maintenance of international peace and security,” which is its primary responsibility set out in the United Nations Charter.

Traditional agenda items considered by the UNSC, firstly, include region-specific agenda. Matters related to Africa and the Middle East, including situations in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo make up approximately 80% of the agenda. There are also thematic agenda items, which include UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), the threat of terrorism, and peacebuilding. Furthermore, when discussing new issues that extend beyond such existing agenda, Members of the UNSC consult on the agenda items to be covered, considering the situation at the time.

Looking at the recent trends for the number of agenda items, while eight to 23 new agenda items were added every year from the 1990s to 2007, since 2008, just less than three agenda items have been added every year.

This is considered to result from a tendency for the UNSC since the 2010s to respond to new issues by adding new sub-items under existing agenda, rather than by increasing the number of new agenda items.

For example, the UNSC has responded to new issues in line with international trends by adding sub-items, such as “Transnational organized crime at sea,” “Climate and security,” and “Implications of COVID-19,” under “Maintenance of international peace and security,” which is one of its thematic agenda items.
At the same time, this trend can also be regarded as the result of adjustments within the UNSC in relation to the addition of new agenda items. For example, climate change is covered in the UNSC as a sub-item, “Climate and security,” under the agenda of “Maintenance of international peace and security.” In reality, however, Member States have different views; while some are of the view that climate change itself should be treated as an official agenda item of the UNSC (and not as a sub-item) under the recognition that climate change is a factor that increases the risk of conflicts, others are of the view that the UNSC is not a place for addressing climate change issues. Against the backdrop of such differences in the standpoints of Member States, there is still no UNSC Resolution that deals with climate and security as a main theme.

In cases where Members of the UNSC are unable to reach an accord on the agenda items covered at formal meetings of the Council, procedural vote is undertaken in the UNSC Chamber. Decisions on procedural matters are made by affirmative vote of nine members, regardless of whether they are permanent or non-permanent members. There is a growing number of examples whereby matters that are not official agenda items of the UNSC are addressed in informal fora (such as the Arria-formula Meeting) rather than at formal fora.

From the perspective that it is important for the UNSC to effectively address a wide range of complex contemporary challenges such as climate change, famine, and infectious diseases, Japan took the initiative to hold an Open Debate (official meeting) on “Addressing Complex Contemporary Challenges to International Peace and Security” during its previous term as a member of the UNSC from 2017 to 2018.

Japan is currently running for the election of non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2022. When elected, Japan will further contribute to the maintenance of peace and security as a member of the UNSC, while paying close attention to trends in the international community.
Ministers of the G4 countries in September in conjunction with the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly. At the meeting, the G4 Foreign Ministers shared their current understanding on the reform of the UN security Council, exchanged views on their collective efforts to bring about concrete progress on the reform, and reaffirmed their solidarity and resolve as the G4. The G4 Foreign Ministers also agreed to support the President of the General Assembly so as to see progress in the Intergovernmental Negotiations. The G4 Foreign Ministers expressed support to the Common African Position and agreed to cooperate to push forward the reform process such as the early commencement of text-based negotiations, while working in cooperation with Africa and other relevant countries. Japan will continue to engage proactively in the process for realizing UN Security Council reform, in close cooperation with reform-oriented countries.

(4) Organizational Aspects of the United Nations (Management)

A Management

In June, when he was reappointed for a second term, UN Secretary-General Guterres demonstrated his recognition of the need for continuous efforts toward reforms in the areas of peace and development, as well as the management of the UN, and stated that he will strengthen the reforms that he has been working on to date. In September, he issued a report titled “Our Common Agenda,” which proposed concrete measures for the UN to adapt to a new era. Through dialogues with member states and the UN Secretariat, Japan is supporting the objectives of the reform with the hope that these efforts will produce concrete results and that the UN will fulfill its mission more effectively and efficiently.

### UN regular budget scale of assessments of top contributors (%)

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<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>22.000</td>
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### UN PKO budget scale of assessments of top contributors (%)

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<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
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<th>2022</th>
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Budget

The UN budget is mainly composed of the regular budget for general activities (a biennial budget for the period from January to December of the next year; an annual budget from January to December of the same year has been implemented on a trial basis from 2020 to 2022), and the peacekeeping budget related to peacekeeping operations (an annual budget for the period from July to the following June).

With regard to the regular budget, a budget for 2022 amounting to approximately 3.12 billion US dollars was approved in December 2021 at the UN General Assembly. The budget for peacekeeping operations for the period of 2021-2022 amounting to approximately 6.38 billion US dollars in total was approved in June 2021 (a decrease of approximately 3.0% from the final budget of the previous period).33

The budget to support the UN activities is composed of assessed contributions paid by Member States and voluntary contributions provided in accordance with Member States’ policy needs. With regard to assessed contributions, Japan currently ranks third after the U.S. and China. Japan contributed approximately 247.72 million US dollars to the UN regular budget for 2021, and approximately 529.26 million US dollars to the peacekeeping budget for 2021/22. As a major financial contributor, Japan has been encouraging the UN to make more efficient and effective use of its financial resources. The scale of assessments, which provides the basis for calculating the amount of assessed contributions, is revised every three years based on the capacities to pay of the Member States. Japan’s scale of assessment, revised at the end of 2021, is 8.033% (2022-2024), just behind the U.S. and China.

Key bodies that address administrative and budgetary matters of the UN are the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee on Contributions. These are standing subsidiary committees of the General Assembly and are comprised of members serving in their personal capacities. The ACABQ reviews the overall administrative and budgetary issues of the UN and makes recommendations to the General Assembly, while the Committee on Contributions submits a proposal on the scale of assessments of the regular budget for a decision to be made by all Member States at the General Assembly. Hence, both committees play an important role. Members from Japan have served continuously on both of these committees.

The Rule of Law in the International Community

The rule of law is, generally, the concept that recognizes the superiority of the law over all forms of power. It is the basis of the international order that consists of friendly and equitable relations between states, as well as an essential cornerstone of a fair and just society within a country. The rule of law is also an important factor in ensuring peaceful settlement of disputes between states and in promoting “good governance” in each state. Based on this view, Japan promotes bilateral and multilateral rule-making and the proper implementation of these rules in various fields that include security, economic and social affairs and criminal justice. Furthermore, in order to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international legal order, Japan actively cooperates with international judicial organizations such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to strengthen their functions.

33 Information on the changes in the UN regular budget and on the changes in the PKO budget and the number of missions are available on the MOFA website (Japanese only):
Changes in the UN regular budget (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100091314.pdf)
Changes in the PKO budget and the number of missions (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100091315.pdf)
via both human and financial resource contributions. In addition, Japan has been working to enhance the rule of law in the international community, including Asian countries, through supporting the improvement of legal systems, participating in international conferences, exchanging views with various countries, and hosting events on international law.

(1) Japan’s Diplomacy to Strengthen the Rule of Law

Strengthening the rule of law is one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy. Japan opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, and strives to maintain its territorial integrity, secure its maritime and economic interests, and protect its citizens. Examples of Japan’s efforts in this regard include the consistent affirmation of, and initiatives to promote, the maintenance and enhancement of a free and open international order based on the rule of law at various fora, including international conferences such as the UN General Assembly and meetings with relevant states. With a view to promoting the rule of law in the international community, Japan has been contributing to the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes based on international law, the formation and development of a new international legal order, and the development of legal systems and human resources in various countries.

A Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

In order to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes via international judicial institutions while striving to comply faithfully with international law, Japan accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the UN, and constructively contributes to establishing the rule of law in the international community via cooperation in providing human and financial resources to numerous international courts. For example, Japan is the largest financial contributor to the ICC and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In terms of human resources, there have been a number of Japanese judges serving on international judicial bodies, including ICJ Judge Iwasawa Yuji (incumbent since 2018, ICJ’s fourth Japanese judge to date), Judge Yanai Shunji to the ITLOS (incumbent since 2005, the President of the ITLOS from October 2011 to September 2014), and Judge Akane Tomoko to the ICC (incumbent since March 2018). Through these contributions, Japan strives to enhance the effectiveness and universality of international courts and tribunals. In 2020, the Support Program for Internships at International Courts and other International Organizations was launched with the aim of developing human resources who can play an active role in international litigations in the future. Through this project, active support is provided to Japanese interns at international judicial organizations.

To further strengthen the capability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in dealing with international litigations, efforts are ongoing to enhance expertise on international judicial proceedings as well as to build up strengthened networks with lawyers in and outside Japan, especially by the International Judicial Proceedings Division (established in 2015) and the Economic Dispute Settlement Division (established in 2020). To win in an international litigation, it is vital to have full knowledge of the context of the trial and its specific legal proceedings. The procedural laws that are applicable to trials in courts such as the ICJ, the ITLOS, and the PCA are not necessarily stipulated clearly in writing, and there are also norms that have been accumulated through judicial precedents. In addition, procedural laws are also developing alongside the growing complexity of the facts that are disputed in international trials. The International Judicial Proceedings Division

34 A declaration that States Parties to the Statute of the ICJ recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2 of its Statute. Only 73 countries, including Japan, have made such declaration to date.
captures information on the trends and developments in law firms and among lawyers who are active in major international trials, and also works together with these lawyers to create an organization that can perform well in international trials. When it comes to addressing disputes of economic nature, the increasing importance of dispute settlements based on international agreements (the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and investment agreements) has resulted in growing demand for strengthening MOFA’s capability to achieve more strategic and effective resolution of the disputes. To this end, with the view to consolidating the legal experts versed in economic dispute settlement, the Economic Dispute Settlement Division was established in August 2020. In the handling of dispute settlements under the WTO agreements and other agreements, the division engages in litigation work (preparation of written submissions, handling of evidence, preparation and participation in oral proceedings, etc.), analysis of case law and academic theories, and also engages in dispute prevention. All those works are carried out in close collaboration with the relevant ministries and agencies, as well as with private law firms and academic experts and practitioners specializing in international economic law both in Japan and abroad.

**B International Rule-making**

International rule-making to respond to issues the global community faces is one of the important efforts toward strengthening the rule of law. Along with actively promoting the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at building a legal foundation for achieving goals it shares with other countries, Japan is demonstrating initiative starting at the planning phase in creating rules for developing international laws that reflect its ideals and positions in cross-sectoral efforts in the framework of the UN and other fora. Specifically, Japan has been actively involved in the rule-making processes within various international frameworks that include codification work in the field of public international law at the International Law Commission (ILC) and the sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, as well as the preparation of conventions and model laws in the field of private international law at fora such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). In the ILC, Dr. Murase Shinya (Professor Emeritus of Sophia University, whose term is from 2009 to 2022), serves as a Special Rapporteur on the topic of “Protection of the Atmosphere,” contributing to the development of international law through the deliberations in the ILC, especially those on the draft guidelines of the said topic (see Column on page 239). At the ILC elections held in November, Professor Asada Masahiko, Professor of Doshisha University and Professor Emeritus of Kyoto University, was elected (for the term from 2023 to 2027, making him the sixth Japanese member of the ILC to date). Japan also sends Government representatives to various meetings of the HCCH, UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT, taking an active lead in the discussions. In addition, Dr. Kanda Hideki, Professor of Gakushuin University, chairs the Digital Assets and Private Law working group in UNIDROIT, and contributes to leading-edge discussions on digital finance. Japan has also been showing its presence as a member state of UNCITRAL since the founding of the commission, such as by leading discussions and realizing the enlargement of the membership of UNCITRAL, and proposing new projects in the field of dispute settlement.

**C Development of Domestic Legislation and Other Matters**

Japan not only takes steps to appropriately improve its own national laws so as to comply with international law, but also actively supports the development of legal systems, especially in Asian countries, while cooperating internationally...
The International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations was established in 1947 with the mission of promoting the codification and the progressive development of international law. It is a unique commission in the United Nations in that its members (34 members) sit in their individual capacity, and the members are not to take instructions from any States.

When I decided to specialize in international law at graduate school in 1967, I became interested in the activities of the ILC. Later, I started teaching at university, and I participated in the International Law Seminar organized by the ILC in 1975, and became involved in the work of the ILC as a Legal Officer of the UN Secretariat from 1980 to 1982. I continued to receive ILC documents from the Secretariat after that. I was elected as a member of the ILC in 2009, and my term will finally end at the end of 2022. Thus, I have been watching the ILC, from outside and inside, for more than half a century.

Shortly after I assumed office as an ILC member, I proposed that the ILC should work on the topic “Protection of the atmosphere,” with a view to developing international law on air pollution and climate change, and this proposal was adopted. Initially, I faced strong opposition from the members of the five major powers, and I felt indignant that I had never been more humiliated in my life. However, my effort and perseverance were rewarded, and the guidelines were adopted in the 2021 session. Although it may take years, I hope that a comprehensive “Convention on the Protection of the atmosphere” comparable to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea will be enacted based on these guidelines.

As members sit on the Commission in their individual capacity, intense clashes of egos sometimes occur among the members at the ILC. It is said that once the members from the United Kingdom and France became so aggravated that they nearly came to blows. As such a reserved person, I did not feel equal to the task; however, I think I have become considerably well-trained as I continue to serve on the Commission. Apart from “Protection of the atmosphere,” the ILC also has seven to eight items on its programme of work, and I always make myself be the first to speak. While it takes much preparation and courage to be the first to speak, I do so because it can have a certain impact on the flow of discussions in the Commission. When other members make unreasonable arguments, I exercise my right of reply and criticize immediately and severely. Having learned how to engage in legal arguments in seminars at Harvard Law School when I was young is helping me tremendously.

The most important thing in the international community is the establishment of “the rule of law.” In order to establish this, it is first of all necessary to clearly formulate laws of the international community, that is, international law. International law before the Second World War mostly consisted of unwritten customary international law and often lacked certainty, which frequently led them to be a source of dispute between States. The role of the ILC has been to codify this customary law and systematize it into multilateral treaties as clear written law. At the same time, it is also necessary to promote the “progressive development” of international law based on the direction in which the international community should be heading. Thus, the ILC has adopted numerous multilateral conventions to date.

The international community still needs international law-making in various areas, and Japan’s contribution is highly expected. To meet these expectations, it is desirable that not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Society of International Law, but Japan as a whole makes a collective effort to develop human resources who can take on the role.
on efforts related to further developing the rule of law. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Society of International Law, supported by the Nippon Foundation, co-organize the Asia Cup. The Asia Cup is an international law moot court competition for students in Asia including Japan, which aims to raise awareness about the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, nurture future generations in the field of international law, and strengthen exchange and communication among them (the 22nd Asia Cup was held in 2021). Japan is also engaging in cooperation concerning human resources and finances with the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO), the only inter-governmental organization in the Asia/Africa region that is engaged in international law.

(2) Initiatives in the Maritime Sector

For Japan, as a maritime nation, maintaining and strengthening maritime order based on the rule of law is an issue of the utmost importance. In his keynote address at the 13th Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in May 2014, Prime Minister Abe proposed the “Three Principles of the Rule of Law at Sea” to be followed by every nation: (1) making and clarifying claims based on international law; (2) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and (3) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. Ever since then, Japan has consistently advocated these principles. For example, at the 15th East Asia Summit (EAS), held in November 2020, Prime Minister Suga emphasized that a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law forms the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as a foundation for the rule of law at sea. The Convention has been ratified by 167 countries, including Japan (including some regions not officially recognized as nations by Japan), and the EU. The Convention comprehensively provides for principles governing the sea, including the freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas. It also stipulates rights and obligations under international law on the development and regulation of marine resources, among other things. The provisions of the Convention that concern areas such as territorial sea and exclusive economic zones are widely accepted as established customary international law. In addition, the recognition that activities conducted on the seas ought to be carried out according to the provisions of the Convention is widely shared among the international community. As problems concerning the oceans and seas grow more complex and diverse, it is important to preserve and strengthen the maritime order based on the Convention, which serves as a comprehensive and universal legal framework.

Under the UNCLOS, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established in 1996 in Hamburg, Germany for the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and the preservation and advancement of law and order at sea. The ITLOS deals with a wide range of cases, including the delimitation of maritime boundaries in recent years in particular, and the importance of the Tribunal has been growing. Japan attaches importance to the role played by the ITLOS and has successively dispatched two Japanese judges to the tribunal since its establishment (currently Judge Yanai Shunji (as of December 31, 2021)).

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) established pursuant to the UNCLOS also plays an important role in the operation of the system for delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf. Since the establishment of CLCS, Japan has continued to cooperate with the Commission in terms of both human and financial resources through means such as continuously producing members (Japan’s current member of the Commission is Professor Yamazaki Toshitsugu from the University of Tokyo (as of December 31, 2021)). In the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which was established pursuant to the UNCLOS for the primary purpose of managing deep sea-bed mineral resources, work such
as the formulation of the relevant standards and guidelines concerning the exploitation of deep sea-bed mineral resources progressed even during the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan works actively to ensure that its standpoint is reflected in these documents, and has been taking the lead in the creation of rules governing the deep sea-bed.

The decision was made to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to formulate a new international agreement under the UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), which was adopted by resolution 72/249 of the UN General Assembly in December 2017. Three meetings of the IGC were held by August 2019. Although the fourth meeting had been scheduled for March 2020, it was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government of Japan actively takes part in discussions in order to ensure that Japan’s perspective is reflected in the new international agreement by putting its emphasis on striking a balance between the dual aspects of conservation and sustainable use of the BBNJ.

(3) Initiatives in the Political and Security Fields

In order to strengthen its legal basis for diplomatic activities, Japan is actively engaged in concluding international agreements in the political and security fields. In the field of security, Japan advanced efforts to conclude Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), which set out the settlement procedures and other matters on the mutual provision of supplies and services between the JSDF and foreign armed forces. Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, which set out provisions on the handling of defence equipment and technologies to be transferred, and Agreements on the Security of Information, which serve as the basis for the sharing of classified information on security with the relevant countries. Japan’s ACSA with India entered into force in July, while Japan signed Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with Indonesia in March and with Viet Nam in September (entered into force on the same day). Japan also signed an Agreement on the Security of Information with Germany in March (entered into force on the same day). In the area of nuclear energy, the Protocol Amending the Japan-UK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed between Japan and the UK in December 2020 in light of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), entered into force in September.

(4) Initiatives in the Fields of the Economy and Society

The conclusion and implementation of international agreements that bring legal discipline to cooperative relationships with other countries in the economic sphere is becoming increasingly important for promoting the liberalization of trade and investment, as well as people-to-people exchanges, and for strengthening the foundations for the overseas activities of Japanese citizens and companies. The agreements that Japan negotiated and signed or concluded in 2021 include tax conventions, investment treaties, and social security agreements with various countries and regions. Furthermore, Japan also engaged actively in negotiations on EPAs and other agreements, with the aim of expanding free and fair economic spheres and strengthening wide-ranging economic relationships.


Furthermore, with a view to protecting and enhancing the livelihoods and activities of Japanese citizens and companies, Japan is working on the proper implementation of existing
international agreements as well as utilizing the dispute settlement system of the WTO.

In social areas such as human rights, the environment, fisheries, maritime affairs, aviation, labor and social security, which are closely linked to the daily lives of the people, Japan actively participates in negotiations of international agreements to ensure that Japan’s positions are reflected and also concludes such agreements. For example, in the aviation sector, Japan signed the Agreement on Civil Aviation Safety between Japan and the European Union in June. In the field of maritime affairs, Japan concluded the Convention on the International Organization for Marine Aids to Navigation in July. In the fisheries sector, Japan concluded the Protocol to amend the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in July.

(5) Initiatives in the Field of Criminal Justice

The ICC is the first-ever permanent international criminal court to prosecute and punish, in accordance with international law, individuals who have committed the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Since becoming a State Party to the ICC Rome Statute in October 2007, Japan has consistently supported the ICC’s activities and cooperated with the Court in various ways. Fiscally, Japan is the largest contributor to the ICC, accounting for approximately 16% of the entire assessed contributions to the Court as of 2021. With regard to human resources, Japan has consistently produced judges since its accession to the ICC. The current judge, Ms. Akane Tomoko, former Ambassador for International Judicial Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office of Japan, began serving her nine-year term in March 2018. In addition, Japan has cooperated with activities of the ICC from various positions, with Ms. Harimoto Yukiko serving on the Committee on Budget and Finance, among others. As the ICC evolves into a full-fledged international criminal justice institution, it is imperative to secure cooperation with the ICC, establish the principle of complementarity, and to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in its judicial procedures. Japan actively engages in addressing these challenges, such as through its participation in the working groups of the Assembly of States Parties.

Along with these efforts, in the face of an increase of cross-border crimes in recent years, Japan is further working on ensuring judicial cooperation, such as the mutual submission of necessary evidence. Specifically, as efforts to improve legal frameworks for promoting international cooperation in the field of criminal justice, Japan has been working on negotiations toward concluding international agreements such as the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT), the Treaty on Extradition, and the Treaty on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. In November, Japan and Viet Nam signed a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.

7 Human Rights

There is growing international concern about the human rights situations in various parts of the world. The protection and promotion of human rights provide the foundation for peace and stability in the international community. Japan recognizes that the protection of human rights, which is a universal value, is the basic responsibility of all countries, regardless of differences in the method of achieving this goal and their cultures. While

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35 A legal framework that allows for efficient and prompt cooperation with legal authorities of other countries in investigations, prosecution, and other criminal procedures.
36 A legal framework having comprehensive and detailed provisions regarding the extradition of criminals to enable more effective cooperation for repressing crime.
37 A legal framework aiming to facilitate the social rehabilitation of sentenced persons by giving them the opportunity to serve their sentences in their own countries.
speaking out firmly against any serious violation of human rights, Japan considers, under the basic principle of “dialogue” and “cooperation,” that it is important to promote voluntary efforts through bilateral dialogues and cooperation between countries that are working toward democratization and the protection of human rights. In addition, in the area of human rights, with the standpoint of bridge-building in Asia and protection of the socially vulnerable people, Japan puts effort into improving the global human rights situation through bilateral dialogues, proactive participation in multilateral forums such as the UN, and constructive dialogues with the UN human rights mechanisms. (See the Special Feature on page 247 for Japan’s basic stance on human rights diplomacy and specific examples of its efforts.)

(1) Initiatives within the UN

A UN Human Rights Council

The UN Human Rights Council was established in 2006 as a restructured version of the UN Commission on Human Rights in order to strengthen the UN’s ability to address human rights issues as part of a movement toward mainstreaming human rights in the UN. The Human Rights Council holds sessions throughout the year in Geneva (three regular sessions per year, lasting about 10 weeks in total) to discuss issues and make recommendations concerning the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Japan served as a member of the Council from June 2006 to June 2011 (the first and the second terms), January 2013 to December 2015 (the third term), and January 2017 to December 2019 (fourth term). Most recently, Japan was elected in the election held in October 2019, and currently serves as a member of the Council from January 2020 to December 2022 (fifth term).

At the high-level segment (meeting of the main representatives of each country) of the 46th Session in February and March, Foreign Minister Motegi delivered a statement through a video message. In the statement, he spoke about Japan’s continued dedication to contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights in Asia and the world, stressed the importance of early resolution of the abductions issue, expressed Japan’s serious concerns over the situation in China including Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and urged China to take concrete actions. He also introduced Japan’s latest initiatives in the fields of business and human rights, eradication of violence against children, elimination of discrimination against leprosy, the realization of a society where the dignity of the indigenous Ainu people is respected, women’s empowerment, and the protection and promotion of women’s human rights. The resolution on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), submitted by the EU and co-sponsored by Japan, was adopted without a vote at the same session (adopted for 14 consecutive years). This resolution refers to the urgency and importance of the abductions issue and of the immediate return of all abductees, the long years of suffering experienced by abductees and their families, the realization of the immediate return of all abductees of Japan as well as the faithful provision of accurate and detailed information to the families of victims on the fates and whereabouts of their missing relatives.

At the 48th session from September to October, Japan, as the main sponsor, submitted a resolution on the human rights situation in Cambodia. This resolution was adopted without a vote. The resolution reflects the international community’s concerns over the human rights situation in Cambodia, and encourages the Government of Cambodia to put effort into improving the human rights situation. In addition, it also decided the extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia for two years.

B The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly

The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly is, along with the Human Rights
Council, the UN’s main forum focused on human rights. Generally, in October and November, the Committee discusses a wide range of issues, including those concerning social development, women, children, racial discrimination, refugees, crime prevention and criminal justice, as well as the human rights situations in North Korea, Syria and Iran, among others. Resolutions adopted by the Third Committee are then adopted by a plenary session of the general assembly, contributing to the development of international norms.

At the 76th session of the General Assembly, the resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, submitted by the EU and co-sponsored by Japan, was adopted without a vote at a session of the Third Committee in November and a plenary session of the UN General Assembly in December (adopted for the 17th consecutive year). The resolution refers to the urgency and importance of the abductions issue, which involves a serious violation of human rights, and of the immediate return of all abductees, the long years of suffering experienced by abductees and their families, grave concern over the lack of any concrete or positive actions by DPRK, the realization of the immediate return of all abductees of Japan as well as the faithful provision of accurate and detailed information to the families of the victims on the fates and whereabouts of their missing relatives.

In addition, Japan participated actively in discussions in the international community toward protecting and promoting human rights, including discussions on the human rights situations in some countries such as Syria, Iran, and Myanmar, as well as discussions on various human rights issues that include social development and the rights of the child.

**Ending Violence Against Children**

Since 2018, when Japan participated in the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children (GPeVAC), Japan has been actively involved in Partnership activities as a “pathfinding country,” engaging in ending violence against children. As part of this effort, the National Action Plan to End Violence Against Children was formulated in August. This Action Plan aims to contribute to the achievement of Target 16.2 of the SDGs, which is to “End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.” Japan will continue promoting efforts to end violence against children at home and abroad, in collaboration with the international community.

**Promoting the Introduction of Human Rights Due Diligence**

Japan is actively engaged in efforts toward the implementation of the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)” that was endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council. As a part of these efforts, Japan has been conducting awareness-raising activities including the introduction of human rights due diligence with a view to raising awareness of human rights among business enterprises, through the steady implementation of the NAP on Business and Human Rights formulated by the Government of Japan in October 2020. Awareness-raising activities have been carried out, alongside the promotion of the concept of respect for human rights in the context of business activities through efforts such as the establishment of a portal site on the MOFA website to post videos introducing the NAP and other information, and to publish “A Compilation of Case Studies on Business and Human Rights.” In March, an Inter-Ministerial Committee was established to promote cooperation among the relevant ministries and agencies on the necessary reviews and decisions with regard to following the

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**38** Human rights due diligence: To identify, prevent, mitigate, and address, as well as to provide information on, the impact of corporate activities on human rights.
progress of the implementation status of the NAP. At the same time, the first roundtable meeting was held in July to facilitate dialogues among a wide range of stakeholders. As a part of the follow-up of the NAP, the “Questionnaire Survey on the Status of Efforts on Human Rights in the Supply Chains of Japanese Companies” was conducted from September to October jointly with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). In addition, the abovementioned Inter-Ministerial Committee was reorganized in December, and the first meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Policy Promotion for the Implementation of Japan’s National Plan on Business and Human Rights was convened. Going forward, Japan will continue to steadily implement the NAP.

The Summit for Democracy

In December, the U.S. hosted the virtual Summit for Democracy. Prime Minister Kishida took part in a session. He shared and explained Japan’s stance and initiatives on protecting democracy and promoting human rights around the world from the viewpoint of attaching great importance to universal values, including democracy.

(2) Initiatives Concerning International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law

A International Human Rights Law

In November, at the elections of members of the Committee against Torture held at the 18th Meeting of States parties to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment at the UN Headquarters in New York, Professor Maeda Naoko (Faculty of Law, Kyoto Women’s University), Japan’s candidate, was elected to the Committee with the largest number of votes. Furthermore, with respect to the human rights treaties that Japan has concluded, Japan has faithfully responded to periodic reviews of government reports on the implementation status of the treaties in Japan, pursuant to the rules set forth in those treaties.

E International Humanitarian Law

Japan has actively been engaged in efforts for strengthening the national implementation of international humanitarian law (IHL). In May, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Uto Takashi issued a video message on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2286 on the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel in armed conflict (2016). In his message, he urged the international community to cooperate further on healthcare in armed conflict, including ensuring access to medical services during the COVID-19 pandemic and protecting medical personnel. In October, Japan participated in a regional meeting of the national IHL committees of Asia-Pacific countries, and from November to December, Japan participated in the Fifth Universal Meeting of National Committees and Similar Entities on International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Furthermore, as it does every year, Japan dispatched an instructor to play the part of the jury to the IHL Moot Court and Role Play Competitions, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as part of awareness-raising efforts for IHL.

(3) Initiatives Undertaken via Bilateral Dialogue

In addition to initiatives within the UN and other multilateral frameworks, Japan recognizes the importance of bilateral dialogues in order to protect and promote human rights. The 25th Japan-EU Human Rights Dialogue was held in June (via videoconference), and the 11th Japan-Cambodia Human Rights Dialogue was held in September (via videoconference). While sharing information on their respective initiatives in the field of human rights, the parties to these dialogues exchanged opinions concerning cooperation in multilateral fora such as the UN. Japan also attended a workshop on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), hosted by Viet Nam, via videoconference and shared its experiences in the UPR.
(4) Contribution to Refugee Issues

From the perspective of international contribution and humanitarian aid, Japan started accepting refugees from Myanmar who were temporarily residing in Thailand, under a resettlement program that ran from FY2010 to FY2014 (the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to a third country that agrees to accept them for long-term settlement).

In addition to accepting refugees from Myanmar who had been residing temporarily in Malaysia since FY2015, the Government of Japan allowed accepting eligible family members of those who already resettled in Japan on the condition that mutual aid be provided with those remaining in Thailand. From FY2010 to FY2019, a total of 194 people from 50 families came to Japan under this program.

Refugees arriving in Japan live independently in their respective areas of resettlement following the completion of a six-month training program. Initially, local governments in the Tokyo metropolitan region played a central role in operations concerning the resettlement destinations for refugees. However, from the perspective of promoting a better national understanding of the refugee issue, active efforts have been made to resettle refugees in municipalities outside the Tokyo Metropolitan area since 2018.

The international situation surrounding refugees is undergoing dramatic change. In light of this movement among the international community and to better balance the burden for the refugee problem among the international community, Japan made the decision in June 2019 to accept more refugees resettling from third countries under part of a new framework. Specifically, beginning in FY2020, Japan will now accept up to 60 refugees temporarily residing in Asia once or twice a year without restriction on their birthplace or region of residence, and any of the family members of the refugees who have already been accepted in Japan under a resettlement program.

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic situation in Japan and abroad, the acceptance of refugees for FY2020 was postponed, and the appropriate time for accepting refugees is currently under consideration.

While the acceptance of resettled refugees has been done primarily by Western countries, Japan is the first country in Asia to accept resettled refugees.
This Special Feature sets out once again the aspects that Japan places particular focus on in addressing human rights issues in the international community, and introduces some of the concrete efforts that Japan has based on this stance.

1. Japan’s Basic Stance on Human Rights Diplomacy

Human rights and fundamental freedom are universal values, and the human rights situation in each country is a legitimate interest of the international community.

While there are differences in the method and speed at which the protection of human rights is achieved, Japan takes the stance that human rights should be respected regardless of culture, traditions, political and economic systems, and stage of socioeconomic development, and that the protection of human rights is the most basic responsibility of all countries. Based on this stance, while speaking out firmly against any serious violation of human rights, Japan takes the basic principle of “dialogue” and “cooperation” between countries that are working toward democratization and the protection of human rights. Through bilateral dialogues and multinational fora such as the UN, Japan calls for improvements to human rights issues that Japan and the international community are concerned about. At the same time, Japan also engages in necessary and feasible forms of cooperation through technical cooperation and other means, and urges such countries to make voluntary efforts.

While applying such unique contributions to the best of its ability, Japan makes no compromise on universal values and will proactively and positively promote human rights diplomacy of its own, in light of the current international situation.

2. Concrete Efforts Toward Improving the Human Rights Situation

(1) Resolution on the human rights situation in Cambodia, Japan-Cambodia Human Rights Dialogue

Cambodia is experiencing rapid economic development recently after suffering through a prolonged turmoil period. However, the international community remains concerned about its human rights situation.

At the 48th Human Rights Council session in the UN, convened from September to October, Japan drafted and submitted a resolution on the human rights situation in Cambodia. This resolution reflects the voice of the international community with regard to the human rights situation in Cambodia, and in particular, expresses deep concern over the deterioration of the civil and political environment while touching on examples such as the arrests of the members of political parties and civil society. At the same time, this resolution encourages the Government of Cambodia to put effort into improving the human rights situation, and decides the extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia for two years.

Japan has continued to submit this resolution since 1999, and the resolution has always been adopted by consensus (adopted without a vote).

In drafting the resolution, Japan considers that in order to improve the human rights situation in Cambodia, specific concerns need to be clearly pointed out in the resolution, and also at the same time, there must be an effort to improve the situation by Cambodia themselves. From this perspective, Japan has done its utmost to consult and coordinate with Cambodia, the EU, and other relevant countries to ensure that the resolution strikes a balance between encouraging Cambodia’s efforts to improve its human rights situation based on its own conviction and consent, and monitoring and promotion of these efforts by the international community through activities in the field by the Special Rapporteur and the provision of opportunities to report to the Human Rights Council.

Meanwhile, in September, the 11th Japan-Cambodia Human Rights Dialogue was held online. During the dialogue, discussions were held on efforts and issues in the area of human rights, including freedom of
political activities, freedom of expression, assembly and association, and the independence of the judiciary. The Japanese side spoke candidly about the issues related to the environment for free and fair elections in Cambodia as well as the approach to activities in the civil society, and exchanged views on the cooperation in the field of human rights in the international arena.

Japan's coordination efforts in this area have been highly appraised by Cambodia and the international community, including Europe and the U.S. At the Human Rights Council session held in October, the resolution on the human rights situation in Cambodia was adopted by consensus.

Japan pays close attention to the human rights situation in Cambodia, and has provided support for electoral reforms and invited young politicians to Japan, among other efforts. In FY2020, Japan allocated a part of its contributions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) toward expenditures for activities related to improving the human rights situation undertaken by the OHCHR Cambodia country office. Along with the adoption of the resolution, Japan’s efforts are expected to support and promote the Government of Cambodia to put effort into improving the human rights situation, and to bring about improvements to the human rights situation in Cambodia.

(2) Examples of Japan making its voice heard (Joint Statement – Human Rights Situation in China)

Japan is also speaking out firmly with regard to the human rights situation in China. For example, Prime Minister Kishida raised the issues of the Hong Kong situation and the human rights situation in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to President Xi Jinping at the Japan-China Summit telephone call in October. Similarly, Foreign Minister Motegi and Foreign Minister Hayashi expressed serious concerns at the Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ telephone calls held in April and November respectively.

In addition to such bilateral efforts, Japan also expresses its concerns through individual statements issued at the UN and other fora. At the high-level Segment of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council held in February, Foreign Minister Motegi delivered a statement through a video message. In the statement, he expressed serious concerns over the situation in China, including Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and urged China to take concrete actions.

At the 47th Human Rights Council session convened in June, Canada delivered a joint statement on the human rights situation in China including the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on behalf of 44 countries, and Japan was the only participating country from Asia. This statement shares concerns expressed by UN Special Procedures in their statement on the alleged detention, forced labor, and transfers of Uyghurs and others. At the same time, it urges China to allow immediate, meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for independent observers, including the High Commissioner. Furthermore, it states that the countries delivering the statement continue to be deeply concerned about the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong under the National Security Law and about the human rights situation in Tibet.

At the Third Committee of the 76th session of UN General Assembly convened in October, France delivered a joint statement on the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on behalf of 43 countries, and Japan was the only participating country from Asia. (Note1) This statement expresses particular concerns about the situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and calls on China to allow meaningful access to Xinjiang for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In addition, at the 16th East Asia Summit held in October and the 13th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit held in November, both of which China also participated in, Japan expressed serious concerns about the Hong Kong situation and the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

It is important for all countries, including China, to provide guarantees for fundamental human rights. Hence, it is important for the international community to continue cooperating closely and appealing to China in this regard.

(3) Examples of ODA that contribute to human rights

With a view to improving the human rights situation for people living in developing countries and regions, Japan provides support in the area of governance, including support for the development of legal systems...
and the strengthening of media and journalism, as well as assistance to vulnerable persons, including women, children, and persons with disabilities.

A. Developing countries have faced challenges such as underdeveloped legal systems, inadequate implementation and enforcement of laws, and barriers to information access. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), in cooperation with the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and the relevant universities, has been providing support to countries in Asia and Africa since the latter half of the 1990s, with a focus on the development and implementation of legal systems, and improvement of access to justice.

Japan began providing support to Laos for the development of its legal system in 1998. Under the “Project for Promoting Development and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the Legal Sector of Lao PDR” (2018 to 2023), Japan is cooperating with Laos on improvements to the research and analysis of legal theories in civil laws and criminal laws, to legal education, and to training of prospective and in-service legal professionals. This Project has long provided support for the development of the first Civil Code in Laos, which was enforced in May 2020. In 2021, the Project conducted activities such as the preparation of research papers that explain the objectives and background of the civil code, and reference materials concerning law on criminal evidence. In addition, the Project conducted online seminars on topics such as sentencing and development of legal human resources to contribute to improving court practices and thereby the protection of citizens’ rights.

B. Amidst the increasing movement of people accompanying the rapid globalization of the economy and information, human trafficking is becoming a serious, cross-border human rights issue common to many countries. In particular, there are concerns over the rise in trafficking in persons in the Mekong region alongside ASEAN integration. In this regard, Japan has cooperated with Thailand, Myanmar, and other relevant countries. The “Project for Strengthening the Operation of Hotline for Counseling and Supporting Trafficked Survivors” (2018 to 2022) was also implemented in Viet Nam. The objective of this Project was to further strengthen the cooperative system between the relevant organizations. To this end, efforts have been made by operating a hotline that can serve an even larger number of people and strengthening the operation of a call center whose objective is to prevent victimization from trafficking in persons and support women and girls who are victims of trafficking in persons. In 2021, activities including holding workshops aimed at amending government ordinances and external evaluation to improve the quality of counseling were conducted. An agreement was also concluded for greater cooperation between the relevant ministries and agencies. Publicity activities were also carried out through the media. In 2021, the number of calls to the call center reached approximately 3,100 (as of the end of November), and 131 personnel (telephone counsellors, social workers, NGO officers, etc.) were nurtured under this Project.

C. In addition to the abovementioned, as of December 2021, Japan has provided support to more than 74 countries around the world, with a particular focus on Asia, in the areas of human resource development, strengthening freedom of the media, and the building and development of various systems including electoral and judicial systems.
3. Business and Human Rights (Note2)

With the globalization of supply chains today, attention is increasingly being placed on respect for human rights in corporate activities. Business enterprises themselves face an urgent need to identify human rights risks and put in place the necessary countermeasures. There are also growing moves in Europe and the U.S. toward making it mandatory for companies to take initiatives in the area of human rights. Given that the recognition of "business and human rights" in Japan is not necessarily as widespread, Japan has been steadily implementing the National Action Plan (NAP) on Business and Human Rights formulated in October 2020, and putting efforts into raising awareness to promote the introduction of human rights due diligence (identifying, preventing and mitigating, and addressing the impact of corporate activities on human rights, as well as the provision of such information) through understanding the status of initiatives by companies.

In the international arena, Japan is putting effort into strengthening peer learning (learning through mutual cooperation) in Asia through the introduction of Japan’s initiatives at UN seminars and regional meetings hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. Furthermore, with the aim of addressing human rights violations in the global supply chain, Japan will work closely with the governments of a wide range of developing countries, including Asia, to promote initiatives toward the realization of responsible business conduct through means such as developing legal systems, policymaking, and improving practices. Through such activities, Japan aims to establish a more desirable international environment for the expansion of Japanese corporations overseas in an appropriate manner.

Japan considers that spreading widely across the world the movement of not engaging in business practices that could lead to the violation of human rights contributes to preventing human rights violation worldwide and to strengthening the international competitiveness of business enterprises that respect human rights.

Note1: Key points of the Statement
(1) We are particularly concerned about the situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Credible-based reports indicate the existence of a large network of “political re-education” camps where over a million people have been arbitrarily detained. We have seen an increasing number of reports of widespread and systematic human rights violations, including reports documenting torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, forced sterilization, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced separation of children. There are severe restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and the freedoms of movement, association and expression as well as on Uyghur culture. There is also widespread surveillance targeting Uyghurs.
(2) We also share the concerns expressed by UN Special Procedures and UN experts describing collective repression of religious and ethnic minorities.
(3) We thus call on China to allow immediate, meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for independent observers, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and her Office, and relevant special procedure mandate holders, as well as to urgently implement CERD’s eight recommendations related to Xinjiang. We welcome the High Commissioner’s announcement to present her findings to date and encouraging publication as soon as possible.
(4) In view of our concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, we call on all countries to respect the principle of non-refoulement ([in principle, not repatriating foreigners to the countries or regions where they are persecuted]). We also call on China to ratify without delay the ICCPR.
(5) We urge China to ensure full respect for the rule of law and to comply with its obligations under national and international law with regard to the protection of human rights.

Note2: MOFA website on “business and human rights”:
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the existing gender inequalities. For this reason, the realization of gender equality and the promotion of women’s empowerment have been prioritized as one of the most important issues in Japan and abroad, and it is vital to focus on various policies and measures for women and girls in building back better from the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of the vulnerable position that women are placed in situations of conflict, it is also important for Japan to contribute actively to international efforts to prevent the use of sexual violence as a weapon in conflict, and to protect the human rights of women and promote the provision of relief and assistance to women. Against this backdrop, as clearly stated in the Fifth Basic Plan for Gender Equality, Japan will continue to contribute to the realization of gender equality and the promotion of women’s empowerment while hosting international conferences on women and vigorously promoting assistance to developing countries through cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

(1) G7

Gender equality is positioned at the heart of an open, inclusive, and just society within the G7 process under the UK’s Presidency, which sets out three priority items in this area: educating girls, empowering women, and ending violence against women and girls. The Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, issued by the G7 Cornwall Summit held in June, included, inter alia, the G7’s pledge to allocate a total of 2.75 billion US dollars over the next five years to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).

(2) G20

Under Italy’s Presidency, the first G20 Conference on Women’s Empowerment was held at Santa Margherita Ligure in August. Japan’s Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment, Marukawa Tamayo, participated in the opening session online. In the Leaders’ Declaration issued at the G20 Rome Summit in October, the leaders reaffirmed initiatives toward the resolution of various issues of women and girls being impacted disproportionately by the COVID-19 pandemic, including gender-based violence and unpaid care work, as well as actions and sharing of annual progress toward the Brisbane Goal.

(3) International Cooperation for the Empowerment of Women in Developing Countries

Through JICA and international organizations, Japan is engaged in educational support and human resource development, as well as efforts toward the economic empowerment of women and the elimination of gender-based violence in developing countries.

A Educational Support and Human Resource Development

At the G7 Charlevoix Summit held in 2018, Japan announced that it would be allocating 200 million US dollars to provide quality education and human resource development support to women and girls, and this has been implemented. At the 5th World Assembly for Women (WAW!), held in March 2019, Prime Minister Abe affirmed his pledge to provide high-quality education and career development opportunities to at least 4 million women and girls over the three years between 2018 and 2020 as a means to expand educational opportunities for women in developing countries. This is being steadily implemented. At the Global Education Summit held in July 2021, Japan also pledged to provide support for girls’ education and human resource development to at least 7.5 million people in developing countries.

B Supporting Women Through JICA

To promote the economic empowerment of women, Japan has provided support to improve
the lives of home-based workers in Pakistan, the majority of whom are low-income and female, and promoted the provision of financial services that meet the needs of women in Viet Nam. To promote peace and security for women, it also provides support to strengthen coordination as well as the capacity of organizations involved in addressing human trafficking in the Mekong region. At the same time, Japan has also launched cooperation aimed at protecting the survivors of gender-based violence, and providing support for them to gain independence in South Sudan and Pakistan.

C Dealing with Sexual Violence in Conflict

Sexual violence is used as a tactic of war, which cannot be overlooked. It is vital to put an end to impunity and to support victims of violence. Japan has been actively working to ensure that women do not suffer human rights violations in the 21st century. Japan prioritizes cooperation with international organizations such as the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC), and participating in discussions at the international fora.

In 2021, Japan provided financial support of approximately 0.9 million US dollars to the Office of the SRSG-SVC, supporting female victims of sexual violence in conflict and gender-based violence in the Middle East, where COVID-19 was spreading widely, including Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In 2021, as in 2020, Japan contributed 2 million Euros to the Global Survivors Fund (GSF), founded by 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureates Dr. Denis Mukwege and Ms. Nadia Murad and participates actively in the operation of GSF as a member of the Board. Furthermore, Japan continues to make voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court (ICC), earmarking contributions for victims of sexual violence and putting efforts into protecting victims of such violence.

In addition, Japan also provides support through UN Women.

(4) Initiatives in the UN

A Cooperation with UN Women

Japan has increased its contribution to UN Women from approximately 2 million US dollars in 2013 to 21 million US dollars in 2021 and strengthened cooperation with the entity. In particular, through UN Women, Japan supported awareness-raising activities among women and girls in developing countries on the prevention of COVID-19 infections, economic empowerment of women such as livelihood and entrepreneurship support during the COVID-19 pandemic, and measures against gender-based violence, including online violence. Japan also provides support for women’s economic empowerment through job creation and vocational training, awareness-raising of women’s rights and eliminating violence against women, and psychological and social support. To prevent violent extremism, Japan is engaging in resilient community-building by empowering women in South and Southeast Asia.

B Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

Since 1987, Japan has continued to provide members for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which comprises 23 independent experts. In September, Japan submitted its Ninth Periodic Report on the implementation of the Convention.
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)

The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women downsized and shortened its 64th session (CSW64) in March, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. While relevant parties presented opening statements and the Commission adopted political declarations and resolutions, member states did not have opportunities to make remarks.

Women, Peace and Security (WPS)

Japan continues to contribute to WPS in the Middle East, Africa and Asia through its financial contributions to international organizations, primarily UN Women and SRSG-SVC Office, in line with the second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (action plan toward the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions on women, peace, and security). In addition, Japan conducts monitoring of the implementation status and compiles evaluation reports. In March, Japan hosted a webinar to commemorate International Women’s Day, during which WPS was raised as one of the themes for discussion.