Ensuring World Peace and Stability

Judging from the domestic situation of the Soviet Union, the possibility of the Soviet Union's military invasion of other nations is considered to have become extremely low. The Soviet Union remains, however, a military superpower with huge military forces, including nuclear weapons. The Soviet situation is extremely fluid. In particular, it is extremely difficult to predict the direction of the reform, relations between the Soviet Union and its constituent Republics and relations among the Republics, as well as the future of ethnic problems. It is possible, therefore, that political and economic turmoil in the Soviet Union will influence its neighboring states. Furthermore, in the process of the movement toward independence which is accelerating in each Republic, including the setting up of military forces by individual Republics, the possibility cannot be excluded that problems will arise concerning the control of nuclear weapons which have so far been controlled tightly by the central government of the Soviet Union.

As for the developments in the Asia-Pacific region, the then Defense Minister Dmitriy T. Yazov announced in December 1990 that the Soviet Union completed the reduction of 500,000 forces including the part of the forces deployed in the Far East, which had been promised by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in December 1988. As for the Soviet military posture in Asia, the reduction of 12 divisions deployed in the Far East seems to have been almost completed. Of the four divisions deployed in Mongolia, three divisions withdrew, while the Soviet forces stationed along Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam are also partly being withdrawn.

Apart from the quantitative reduction of its armed forces, however, the Soviet Union pushes forward with the modernization of the weapon system as a whole in general. Regarding strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union continues to develop technology to improve the precision, durability and reliability of its weapons. It is changing the shares of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bomber forces to make them more balanced. In the field of conventional weapons, a major reduction is seen in Europe, including a withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe. But in Asia, the Soviet Union shifted some of the forces deployed in Europe to east of the Ural Mountains in connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. Furthermore, in the Far East, the Soviet Union modernized ground forces by deploying the most up-to-date tanks, T-80s. It also steadily pushes forward the modernization of naval and air forces in the Far East, by deploying a new type of naval ship in its Pacific Fleet, improving amphibious operations capability and increasing the number of Backfire bombers and 4th-generation fighters.

Against the background of changes in the security environment and pressures to reduce defense expenditures by the Congress, the United States pushes forward with the adjustment of military forces and the restructuring of military capability. On the assumption that the security environment will improve in the future, the United States plans to reduce its military forces by fiscal 1995 by about 25 percent of the fiscal 1990 level. As for the 126,000 forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, excluding Guam, the United States plans to gradually reduce them against the background of increasing fiscal deficits and changes in the international situation and has already started the reduction. Nevertheless, the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is based on bilateral relations with its allies and the forward deployment of U.S. forces. Accordingly, the U.S. commitment to maintain the forward deployed forces in this region has not changed.

At the Fourth Session of the 7th National Peoples' Congress held in March 1991, the necessity to modernize the national defense was emphasized. While China had been improving its relations with the Soviet Union until recently, it appears that the drastic development in the Soviet politics since August 1991 has driven Chinese leadership to reconsider its relations with the Soviet Union. In another respect, China has been reinforcing its naval presence in the South China Sea. With this trend, China has increased the percentage of defense expenditure in its national budget since 1989. Proper attention, therefore, should be paid to how this increase in China's defense expenditure will influence the actual military posture in the future.

There is no change in the fact that about 1.7 million forces of North Korea and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are confronting each other on the Korean Peninsula. However, along with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and the Soviet Union in September 1990 and the improvement in China-ROK relations centering on trade, moves toward the easing of tensions between the two Koreas have been discerned. These include the first meeting in September 1990 of the Prime Ministers of the two Koreas since their division and the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations in September 1991.

Nevertheless, North Korea is still diplomatically isolated from the world and it is being forced to change its foreign policy to cope with realities in the international community. North Korea, therefore, has begun to take a positive posture, as shown by the fact that negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea have started and that North Korea has begun to seek improvement in its relations with the United States, the Philippines and other Asian nations.

On the other hand, the world entertains strong doubts and apprehensions regarding the possible development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. While the Safeguards Agreement between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was approved by the IAEA's Executive Council in September 1991, North Korea is delaying its signing and implementation by attaching inappropriate conditions. It is important for Japan, which is pursuing the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, that North Korea's faithful implementation of the obligations based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that North Korea signed is confirmed. In addition to this, if North Korea is indeed engaged in the development of nuclear weapons, it is a serious problem not only for Japan's security but also for the security of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. It is also a grave defiance to the nuclear non-proliferation system. It is important for Japan, in cooperation with other nations, to urge the North Korean authorities to take responsible action.

As for Cambodia, which is another area of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, owing to Prince Sihanouk's leadership and efforts made by the co-chairing countries of the Paris Conference and other countries concerned, a considerable improvement was seen toward the realization of peace by the end of August 1991. This is shown by the fact that the Supreme National Council (SNC) started to function as the forum of dialogue among the Cambodians and that an agreement has been reached among various factions to reduce armed forces. Consequently, in order to realize just and ultimate peace by securing an appropriate intervention by the United Nations, a Paris Conference is expected to be held during the course of 1991 for final adjustments.

In the South China Sea area, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are still claiming their territorial sovereignty over the Spratley and Paracel Islands. On the other hand, a new development has been observed in this dispute. A non-official seminar on the issue was held in August 1991 at the proposal of the Indonesian Government, with the participation of the above countries and regions concerned. From a viewpoint of ensuring stability of the region, future developments are to be carefully observed.

Furthermore, the trend of the Indian naval forces have in recent years drawn the attention of neighboring countries and others. The Indian Ocean being an important sealane linking Japan with oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Japan should continue to pay attention to its strategic environment.

Japan's security policy consists of three pillars - U.S. deterrence secured through the Japan-U. S. security arrangements, Japan's own defense efforts and Japan's diplomatic efforts to ensure stability in international politics. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements, above all, have enabled Japan to ensure the security of the nation with the minimum required self-defense capability during the East-West confrontation.

Despite the recent changes in the international situation, the importance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements for Japan remains unchanged.

First, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty gives a stable political basis for the close alliance and cooperative relations between the two countries.

Second, close cooperative relations between the two countries symbolized by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements are one of the political frameworks supporting stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements are indispensable for maintaining the presence of the United States in this region, which each country in the region recognizes as a stabilizing factor. At the same time, the security arrangements give international credibility to Japan's policy of not becoming a major military power capable of threatening other nations.

Third, the difference in military capabilities between Japan, which firmly adheres to three non-nuclear principles, and the Soviet Union, which possess nuclear weapons, is starkly evident. In order to maintain peace and stability of Japan, therefore, the U.S. deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is necessary.

Fourth, the close relationship between Japan and the United States backed by the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is important in order for Japan to actively pursue dialogue with the Soviet Union and other countries. This is evident judging from the fact that East-West negotiations in Europe have progressed only because of the strong Western solidarity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In order to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and enhance their credibility, ceaseless efforts by the two countries are required. It must be pointed out, however, that while Japan greatly relies upon the United States in the military sphere, the United States is faced with economic difficulties. In consideration of Japan's huge surplus against the United States in the current balance of payments, in addition to the situations mentioned above, it is necessary to reinforce Japan's cooperation with the United States in order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and ensure their smooth and effective management. As part of this cooperation, Japan increased its host nation support for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan by concluding a new Host Nation Support Agreement and pushes forward cooperative research and development as well as joint studies with the United States in the defense field, including joint development of the next generation support fighter (FS-X), and thus promotes transfer of defense-related technology to the United States.

In order to maintain peace and security of Japan, it is vital for Japan to improve its defense capability together with maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In order to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important for Japan to make as much effort as possible in this respect.

Japan, under its Peace Constitution, has been developing moderate yet effective defense capability according to the basic principle of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and of not becoming a military power capable of threatening other nations. Currently, in accordance with the "Mid-term Defense Program" (from 1991 to 1995), and in consideration of recent changes in the international situation, efforts are being made to set up a moderate yet effective defense capability along with the basic thinking of the "National Defense Program Outline" of 1976, in respect of the maintenance of the level of defense capability stated in the outline.

It is a fact that some Asian countries are concerned that Japan might become a military power. Thus, it is important for Japan to explain its defense policy, including the exclusively defensive posture, at every opportunity available.

In light of ensuring long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is very important from the perspective of Japan's security to make further efforts in foreign affairs aiming at solving such pending issues as stability on the Korean Peninsula and peace in Cambodia and promoting further economic development in the countries in this region.

From a more global perspective, Japan's cooperation, within the range of the Constitution, in international efforts to keep peace, as shown in the Gulf Crisis, and in international efforts for arms control and disarmament contributes directly or indirectly to an improvement of the circumstances surrounding its own security. Such cooperation is a foreign policy objective to which Japan should attach significance from the viewpoint of fulfilling its responsibility in the international community as well as from the perspective of Japan's security.

In international politics concerning the security issues, there is a tendency to apply the European example to other regions. Such a tendency is strong particularly in the United States and Europe. When considering peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to consider the special features of this region in comparison with those of Europe.

Actually, the geopolitical conditions and the security environments in the Asia-Pacific region are different from those in Europe in many respects.

First of all, in sharp contrast to postwar Europe, where the reduction of military tension, including the threat of nuclear war, was the major preoccupation, the policy priorities of countries in the Asia-Pacific region are directed toward economic development, due to the fact that most countries in the region are developing countries.

Second, while in the European scene an East-West relationship in the form of bipolar confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had been dominant, the Asia-Pacific region contains a variety of factors, including the presence of China, which do not fall into a clear-cut East-West dichotomy, and the international political power relationship is multipolar. In addition, the alliances are mostly bilateral; the conflict of interests among nations is complex; their threat perceptions are diverse; all of which make the overall security configuration extremely complex.

Third, in contrast to Europe where border issues and other postwar problem had been settled before the process of CSCE was initiated, in the Asia-Pacific region, there are still various unresolved disputes and conflicts, such as the North-South confrontation in the Korean Peninsula, the Cambodian conflict, and the Northern Territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Fourth, while there is in Europe a major trend toward unification both politically and economically, led by the movement of EC integration, the Asia-Pacific region is pursuing economic interdependence based upon political, social, and cultural diversity among nations and areas and their differences in stages of economic development.

Thus, the security environments of the Asia-Pacific region largely differ from those in Europe. Even if the European approach of ensuring security as embodied in the CSCE were to be applied in the Asia-Pacific region, it would not function effectively. Japan has consistently pointed this out. This Japanese argument recently seems to have been shared by other countries concerned. Canada and Australia, which in the past took approaches deriving from ideas similar to the ones in the European approach, have recently shifted to a more realistic one. Though the Soviet Union also had very eagerly insisted on applying the CSCE-type approach to security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev did not refer to it during his visit to Japan.

In order to ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to consider political, economic and military aspects comprehensively. In particular, as mentioned earlier, in this region of many developing nations, economic development has indispensable importance in reinforcing the political and social resilience of the nations and enhancing stability within the region. From such a perspective, Japan has allocated more than 60 percent of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to this region to help promote the economic development of each country. Japan has participated in various economic cooperative organizations, such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), since their inauguration.

It is also important for the peace and stability of this region to solve regional disputes and conflicts, such as those in Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula and the Northern Territorial Issue between Japan and the Soviet Union. Concerning the Cambodian problem, Japan was a co-chairing country of the third working group on reconstruction and refugee questions at the Paris International Conference in 1989. Moreover, Japan made efforts for an early comprehensive solution of the Cambodian problem, such as hosting in 1990 the Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia in order to provide a forum for dialogue among the parties concerned.

Problems on the Korean Peninsula are to be solved, in the first place, through direct dialogue between the two Koreas. On the other hand, Japan has been supporting the progress of dialogue between the two Koreas and developments toward an eventual peaceful unification. In conducting negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, Japan is giving utmost consideration to the alleviation of tensions on the Peninsula and peace and stability in the region. As for suspicion about the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, Japan has been urging North Korea to conclude and implement immediately and unconditionally the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Furthermore, in this region where the role of the ocean in terms of security is considerable, the presence of the U.S. forces centering on naval capabilities is indispensable for the stability of the region. The importance of the U.S. naval presence is further enhanced today, as dramatic changes in international politics are taking place. Based on such recognition, Japan has provided the U.S. forces with more than 140 facilities and areas in Japan and bears over $3 billion in expenses annually to support the U.S. forces stationed in Japan (USFJ) under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Japan's support of the United States in this aspect is planned to cover the total expenses of the labor costs of civilian workers at U.S. military facilities and utility costs for those facilities, by 1995. It is expected that Japan's Host Nation Support will reach about 50 percent of all expenses of the USFJ.

In the Asia-Pacific region, there are already many bilateral and multilateral international cooperative frameworks and fora in various fields ranging from economic cooperation to security that as a whole are contributing to the political stability and economic development of the region. Each of them has developed with the background of the diversity of international politics in this region. With a view to ensuring long-term stability in this region hereafter, it would be most effective and realistic to utilize these existing frameworks and fora for international cooperation comprehensively and simultaneously.

Specifically, the existing cooperative frameworks or fora for dialogue are as follows:

First, in the field of economic cooperation, which is a vital issue for the stability of this region, there are several multilateral organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) and the Economic and Social Cooperation of Asia-Pacific (ESCAP), including some organizations managed by the private sector, in addition to bilateral cooperative relationsbips.

Second, in the field of diplomatic efforts to solve regional conflicts and confrontations, which are the immediate tasks for the stability of the region, such frameworks are being constructed as follows. As to the Cambodian problem, frameworks for a comprehensive solution are now being formed by the parties concerned, while various kinds of international dialogues concerning the Korean Peninsula, centering on the direct dialogue between the North and the South, are being held.

Third, as for the field of international cooperation for ensuring security in this region, there are many kinds of arrangements, including the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and other bilateral agreements between the United States and its allies or friendly countries, which as a whole contribute to the stability of the region.

In addition to cooperation in the three fields of economy, diplomacy and security, it is important for the countries in this region to increase political dialogue so that they can frankly exchange opinions on matters of common interest. In relation to this, it is important for Japan to recognize that the most urgent concern of many Asian nations is to what extent the United States will reduce its presence in the region, what role Japan intends to play in this region hereafter and whether Japan will expand its military activities. In the background lie their memories of the tragedy caused by Japan's past military actions and their apprehensions about Japan's future, which are rooted in those memories. All the more, it is indispensable for Japan to further deepen mutual trust with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Out of this recognition, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference held in July 1991 that the Conference should be used as a forum for "political dialogue for mutual reassurance among the friendly countries."

"Political dialogue for mutual reassurance among the friendly countries" is different in nature from the so-called confidence-building measures aimed at easing tensions between hostile countries or governments. Basically, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region put significance on relations with Japan and the United States, but they still remember the tragedy that Japan's past action has caused and entertain a strong apprehension of the likelihood that they would be put under the political influence of the so-called superpowers. In order to reinforce regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, which includes such countries, it is most important to strengthen the basis of cooperative relations by accumulating "political dialogue for mutual reassurance among the friendly countries."

Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) is provided to developing countries, based on the fundamental principles of the recognition of interdependence and humanitarian considerations, with the objectives of economic growth, stabilization of the people's livelihood and improvement in their welfare in the developing countries. It is implemented as support for their self-help efforts. Through economic and social development in the developing countries, it is noted that Japan's ODA with such objectives has traditionally helped the stabilization of the region, and has eventually contributed to the peace and stability of the whole world.

In fact, looking at the countries in Asia, to which a large part of Japan's assistance has been provided, these countries have achieved remarkable economic development based on a market economy and, through which Asia has become a region with political stability and vitality. This should be attributed mainly to the fact that Asian countries have made strenuous self-help efforts toward economic and social development and to their expansion in trade and investment. But, at the same time, it could be appreciated that Japan's ODA has helped and promoted their self-help efforts.

When looking at the international scene, various problems which many developing countries are faced with, including external debts, poverty and environmental problems, have deteriorated further, new problems are emerging, in the wake of the collapse of the post-Cold War international structure and the pursuit of a new order, all of which are accompanied by increased requirements for assistance and funds.

Japan has made clear, on many occasions, its policy of actively taking part in international efforts to construct a new world order, by making the most of Japan's economic and technological strength, as well as experience. ODA is an important pillar of Japan's foreign policy and Japan should participate in these international efforts through assistance.

The Gulf Crisis, which occurred under the international effort to establish a new order, posed a serious challenge for Japan in this respect, asking how Japan could join international efforts to restore peace in the Middle East and secure the peace and stability of the world. Naturally, the international community expected Japan's active contributions in the field of economic assistance. As the international community worked together for the liberation of Kuwait under the coordination by the United Nations, Japan answered to the expectations of the world by implementing ODA with the aim of making speedy, flexible and direct contributions to the peace and stability of the region. Japan came up with assistance measures in response to new developments and changes including the cease-fire. Japan provided emergency commodity loans to the affected countries in this region and, within the existing ODA frameworks, provided possible assistance to Asian nations, including Sri Lanka, the Philippines and India, which suffered an economic blow caused by the Gulf Crisis. Japan also contributed funds to international organizations engaged in refugee assistance and dispatched Japan Disaster Relief Teams, as well as experts and research teams on environmental problems, to the Gulf region.

Japan also has rapidly increased its assistance and support to Central and Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Peru, which are pushing forward with democratization and economic reforms. This is also considered as Japan's cooperation through contributing to the stability of those countries and regions, which are under accelerating changes resulting from structural changes in the international community. Specifically, concerning the assistance and support to Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to assisting Poland and Hungary, Japan expanded support to other countries. In the assistance package to Central and Eastern Europe, technical cooperation (the acceptance of trainees from and dispatch of experts to those countries) is an important element. Similarly, Japan has increased assistance to Mongolia, which is promoting democratization and rapid transformation to a market economy, and Peru, which has implemented a stringent economic policy for its economic reform under the initiatives of President Alberto Fujimori. In particular, on assistance to Mongolia, Japan took the initiative internationally by co-chairing the Mongolia Assistance Group Meeting with the World Bank in Tokyo in September 1991.

In addition to these individual and specific cases of assistance, a new development was made in the aid strategy itself. Specifically, against the background of dramatic changes in the international community, as public attention has increasingly been mounting on the role of Japan's ODA, a main pillar of Japan's foreign policy, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced in April 1991 the Japanese Government's stance to link Japan's ODA with military expenditures of the recipient countries.

This Japanese initiative drew worldwide attention. The issue of military expenditures of recipient countries was referred to for the first time internationally in a communique announced by the joint Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 1991. A Ministerial Conference of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held in June also addressed in a communique the idea that assistance should be linked to democratization, military expenditures and other factors of the recipient countries. It was also encouraged to take actions similar to Japan in a declaration of the London G-7 Summit held in July.

Amidst the fluid international situation when the world is undergoing structural transformations, the possibility of regional instabilities causing various problems, including the emergence of refugees and evacuees and economic difficulties of the countries involved, is undeniable. Japan's ODA will be implemented hereafter, as it has been in the past, primarily with the objective of helping developing countries' economic and social development, stabilization of their livelihood and improvement in their welfare. But it would also be important for Japan to further expand its ODA, while further promoting understanding among the Japanese public, taking into account Japan's contribution to the solution of the problems above.

The Political Declaration of the G-7 London Summit in July 1991 began as follows: "We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfill completely the promise and the visions of its founders. A revitalized United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the United Nations stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression." This statement shows that the international community united under the authority of the United Nations to overcome the Gulf Crisis and as a result, the role of the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the international community is being reassessed.

The United Nations was founded with a grand ideal of establishing permanent peace based on the tragic experiences of two world wars in the 20th Century. In the era of the Cold War, however, the collective security system centering on the U.N. Security Council, the pivotal system for maintaining international peace and security which is the primary objective of the United Nations, did not function sufficiently. The collective security system which the founders of the United Nations had envisaged is as follows: Member states of the United Nations pledge not to threaten or resort to the use of force. If a member state violates the pledge, other member states will jointly take non-military measures against the violator through a decision of the Security Council. Should the measures prove to be inadequate, U.N. forces are to be formed to restore peace. The details of the collective security system are stipulated in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, according to which all U.N. members undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance and facilities. And a special agreement for that purpose is to be concluded between the Security Council and member countries. Plans for the deployment of U.N. forces are to be determined with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff or their representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council.

However, no special agreement concerning the armed forces provided for in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter has been concluded yet. And while the Military Staff Committee was established, substantial activities have not been carried out. There has been no case of organizing the U.N. forces in accordance with this provision. After World War II, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union gradually intensified and both countries were involved in almost all regional disputes in one way or another. Accordingly, the direction of the conflicts was influenced by calculations of the two countries based on their respective world strategy. Since both the Eastern and Western blocs frequently executed vetoes at the Security Council, the Council fell in a pit of not being able to take effective action to solve the conflicts. As the universal security system under which the world is considered as one unit without any specific hypothetical enemy did not work, both the Eastern and Western blocs organized regional security systems. The Warsaw Pact (WP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which stipulates the inherent right of either individual or collective defense, regarded each other as the major potential enemy.

What is about to drastically change this situation is the new move for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As symbolized by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, this dramatic change in the East-West relations shows an irreversible direction, although there will be some turns and twists. The environment surrounding the United Nations is improving so considerably that the Security Council is gradually restoring its proper functions, paving the way for revitalization of the United Nations.

The United Nations succeeded in playing a major role in solving regional disputes in various parts of the world as follows: the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in April 1988; Iran and Iraq reached an agreement on a cease-fire in July 1988 and peace negotiations thereafter; Cuba agreed to withdraw its forces from Angola in December 1988; the independence of Namibia was realized in March 1990; and the anti-government guerrillas in Nicaragua were dissolved in June 1990. But what made the function and role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security movement into the limelight was the Gulf Crisis which suddenly occurred in August 1990.

Iraq's obvious challenge against international law and order roused the world's antipathy and Iraq was censured by the world.

Concerning the Gulf Crisis, a solution of the problem within the East-West framework was not sought, in which either the United States or the Soviet Union should have stopped the Iraqi action. Instead, the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, assumed the heavy responsibility of solving the problem. The response to the Gulf Crisis was regarded as an important test of whether the United Nations could effectively function under the new international relations of the post-Cold War era.

With the strong support of international public opinion, the Security Council identified Iraq's action as a breach of international peace and security and adopted Resolution 660 on August 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion, demanding Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally. On August 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, imposing comprehensive economic sanctions upon Iraq for not abiding by Resolution 660. Furthermore, the Security Council adopted Resolution 665 on August 25, which called upon the member states deploying maritime forces in the region to take necessary measures, including inspection of all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to ensure effectiveness of the economic sanctions. In only two previous occasions were economic sanctions imposed based on U.N. Security Council resolutions; these were against South Africa and Rhodesia. These economic sanctions had a limited effect and did not have a major impact on the world economy. The economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq, however, were comprehensive and accompanied by military deployments to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions. It was the first time for the United Nations to implement such large-scale economic sanctions.

On November 29, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 678 authorizing the member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means unless Iraq fully implemented the foregoing resolutions on or before January 15, 1991. The Gulf Crisis, in effect, ended with the use of force against Iraq by the multinational forces, which was authorized by Resolution 678, but the procedure in the Security Council from the first resolution to this 11th one is very important. The procedure took place in accordance with the concept of the U.N. Charter that military measures should be taken only after non-military measures were thoroughly implemented. It is technically difficult to quantitatively measure the effects of economic sanctions. However, even if the economic sanctions bore certain effects to increasingly isolate Iraq from the world physically and psychologically, it was clear that the economic sanctions were insufficient to destroy the Iraqi will to continue the invasion and stop the violation of human rights in Kuwait at an earliest time so that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait could be terminated. The fact that when the international community took a series of actions, from accusing Iraq of invading Kuwait to the actual use of force, following the procedures required by the United Nations, proved that the international community united to restore international peace and security legitimately and legally. It was not that the situation was brought under control by some major power.

The series of measures taken by the U.N. Security Council during the Gulf Crisis became a very important precedence in considering how the international community should cope with regional conflicts which can occur in the future.

The use of force by the multinational forces was not a typical action to be taken by the U.N. forces based on a special agreement stipulated in the U.N. Charter and under the command of the Security Council. But it was conducted under the authority of the Security Council resolutions based on the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, the use of force by the multinational forces is a sanction in line with the fundamental concept of the U.N. collective security system, which is based on the collective decision of the Security Council. This indicates a policy direction to cope with an urgent request from the international community to restore international peace and security effectively under a decision by the Security Council in a circumstance where a special agreement based on the U.N. Charter has not yet been concluded.

The fact that the international community could unite under the United Nations to cope with the Gulf Crisis his led to the expectation that international peace and security can be maintained by promoting this kind of cooperation and establishing a collective security system with the United Nations as a pivot.

Nevertheless, there were special factors in the Gulf Crisis which enabled such unified action by the international community.

First, in the Gulf Crisis, it was obvious to the international community what party was to be criticized. Normally, all parties concerned in international conflicts have some grounds for their arguments, and it is difficult for the international community to reach a uniform judgment and take joint action. The Gulf Crisis was caused by too obvious a violation of international law by Iraq as to amalgamate Kuwait with the clear unilateral use of force. Furthermore, Iraq took foreigners as hostages, destroyed oil facilities to let oil run and set fire to oil wells. These inhuman actions and environmental destruction invited the anger of the international community from the viewpoint that these actions were a crime against humanity as a whole.

Second, when the Gulf Crisis occurred, the Soviet Union and China, which were both permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, needed to improve their respective relations with the United States and other Western nations and saw no benefit arising from supporting Iraq. The Soviet Union, which was pushing forward its economic and social reforms, needed a stable international situation and support from the Western countries and cooperation with the United States was important. China also saw an interest in taking a cooperative posture toward the international community to lift, in effect, economic sanctions imposed on China by major countries since the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989.

Third, as the Gulf region has overwhelmingly abundant oil resources which were of vital significance for the world economy, the consequence of the Gulf Crisis was a matter directly affecting the security and prosperity of many countries. Accordingly, each country was required to make a serious response. The combination of these three factors made none of the major countries see any interest in supporting Iraq.

It is uncertain whether another serious situation will emerge to which the experience of the Gulf Crisis could be applied and whether there will be a set of favorable conditions for the international community to unite in making individual countries determined to willingly make great sacrifices. Nevertheless, amid fundamental changes in the East-West relations, it is likely, in general, that both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as all of the permanent members of the Security Council, will increasingly find interest in bringing armed conflicts under control, paving the way for the possibility that the United Nations will play a more important role in solving regional conflicts.

It will be important in the future to steadily strengthen the U.N. collective security system through the efforts of all countries within the framework of the United Nations to solve armed conflicts, even in regions where the interest of the world's major countries is relatively high. The Political Declaration of the G-7 London Summit also emphasized as a lesson learned from the Gulf Crisis the importance of coping with regional disputes multinationally with the United Nations playing a central part. It is necessary for Japan, on its part, to actively contribute to the U.N.-based activities to maintain peace and security.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 687 demanding that Iraq meet the series of conditions set forth in the resolution so that a cease-fire could be effectuated between Iraq and the multinational forces. Among the conditions demanded, for example, was that Iraq and Kuwait respect the boundary once agreed upon between the two countries concerning the border dispute which Iraq used as an excuse to invade Kuwait. The resolution called on the Secretary-General to make arrangements for demarcation of the boundary between the two countries. This was practically equivalent to the Security Council demarcating the boundary between the two countries. The resolution not only demanded Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons and prohibited the redevelopment of those military capabilities, but also ensured the effectiveness of the destruction and prohibition of those weapons by providing for all procedures from inspections, destructions and continued monitoring under the supervision of an international organization. Furthermore, the resolution clearly stated the Iraqi liability for loss reparations and stipulated an effective procedure to establish funds to ensure payments to countries and nationals that suffered losses. Thus, this resolution is an epoch-making decision by the Security Council to maintain international order in that it not only deals at the time of the cease-fire with settling the situation caused directly by the Iraqi invasion, but also provides for measures to be taken addressing to the causes of the conflict, such as demarcation of the boundary, and sanction measures to prevent the dispute from recurring, such as limiting Iraq's military capabilities.

Peace-keeping Operations (PKO) by the United Nations have been established and developed through actual practices as practical means to help solve regional disputes throughout the world under the circumstances where the collective security system provided for in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter does not sufficiently function. Peace-keeping Operations are to fulfill tasks through the authority and persuasion of the United Nations in a neutral and non-aligned position. They are now one of the activities which draw the greatest attention of the world.

In 1988, the U.N. set up the U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) to observe the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to observe the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, and the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to verify the withdrawal of the Cuban Army from Angola. They paved the way for the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1989, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was established to support the independence of Namibia, while the U.N. Observers Group in Central America (ONUCA) and the Observation Mission of the U.N. for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) were set up. In 1991, four more Peace-keeping Operations were set up: the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM); the U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL); the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and UNAVEM-II.

Since the establishment of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948, Peace-keeping Operations have been a practical means of preventing regional disputes from worsening through the intermediation of the United Nations, contributing to a peaceful solution. The conventional forms of Peace-keeping Operations have been cease-fire observation missions and peace-keeping forces, composed mainly of military personnel. Recently, however, the Peace-keeping Operations by the United Nations have been expanded to new fields and their activity forms have diversified. A specific example is election monitoring missions. This was implemented for the first time when Namibia became independent. This operation was highly appraised by the international community and a new area of peace-keeping activities by civilians was opened. Based on the success of this operation, the ONUVEN was organized and the United Nations decided to send a mission to monitor a referendum in Western Sahara.

The problem in Western Sahara is a dispute over the jurisdiction of Western Sahara as to whether it should become an independent state or be merged into Morocco. It has long been one of the destabilizing factors in North Africa. Due to mediating efforts by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the disputing parties reached an agreement on a peaceful solution through a referendum. The United Nations is to be involved in a series of peaceful steps from administration of a cease-fire to observation of the referendum. Preparations are steadily made for holding the referendum in January 1992.

Discussions are underway within the United Nations to set up a Peace-keeping Operation in Cambodia in the near future, which is a very significant issue for Japan. A blueprint has already been drawn concerning how the United Nations should be involved in establishing peace in Cambodia. The establishment of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is being considered. In addition to activities in the military field, such as observation of a cease-fire and demilitarization, it is envisaged to engage in activities in the conduct and supervision of elections, as well as control and supervision of administration during the transitional period. UNTAC, therefore, is expected to be a very large operation, but its actual scale and activity will be discussed in due course.

While Japan had continued to make contributions to the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations, its contributions bad mainly been limited to financial support. However, with the recognition that financial contributions alone were no longer sufficient in the light of Japan's increasing international responsibility, Japan sent a political officer to a U.N. Peace-keeping Operation for the first time in 1988. Since then, Japan has steadily increased its contributions in terms of personnel, including dispatching civilians to the election monitoring missions in Namibia and Nicaragua. In 1991, Japan sent a political officer to UNIKOM. Under the present system, however, Japan's contributions to the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations with regard to personnel are inevitably limited considerably.

The Gulf Crisis gave the Japanese an opportunity to reconsider the issue of how to maintain peace and security. At the same time, this activated the discussions on how Japan should participate in and cooperate with these international efforts. Against this background, from the perspective of the urgent need of establishing a system to send personnel to the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations, including the legal aspects, the Government of Japan submitted a bill on the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations in the extraordinary session of the Diet at the end of 1990. But the bill was not enacted because debate was not completed.

Nevertheless, through national discussions including the Diet deliberations on the bill, the recognition that it is indispensable for Japan to make sufficient contributions to the maintenance of the peace and security of the world has won increasing support among the public. A cooperation with U.N. Peace-keeping Operations - in particular, by means of sending personnel to non-armed cease-fire observer missions, as well as the Peace-keeping forces where use of weapons is strictly limited to the purpose of self-defense, both of which are to be dispatched with the consent of the countries concerned and to operate in a neutral position - has been gaining increasing support in the Japanese public and considered to be an appropriate contribution of Japan with its peace Constitution.

It will be necessary for the Government of Japan to proceed with necessary steps to decide upon actual ways for cooperating with the Peace-keeping Operations with personnel in accordance with the present Constitution, respecting public opinion and making sufficient explanations within and out of the country.

As mentioned earlier, the United Nations has a function of solving conflicts. Japan also stresses the reinforcement of the U.N. function to prevent conflicts from occurring, as part of its foreign policy. For this purpose, Japan deems it practical to strengthen the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specifically, Japan has proposed to set up a U.N. Conflict Prevention System under the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General will: (1) monitor constantly a situation which is likely to become a threat to international peace and security and implement studies and research on it; (2) organize survey teams of experts to be sent by individual nations and send survey teams to areas where the situation is likely to deteriorate in order to study its causes, as well as the ongoing situation; (3) based on the survey result conducted by the team, write a report to be submitted to the Security Council and give warning, if necessary, at an early stage to call the attention of the international community; and (4) attempt to prevent conflicts by playing the role of an intermediary between the parties concerned. The Government of Japan will strongly advocate the establishment of such a conflict prevention system and engage in discussions with other countries on this proposal.

During the Gulf Crisis, Japan, not being a member of the Security Council, did not have opportunities to assert itself sufficiently in the resolutions which were adopted in the Security Council. Amid the formation of a new international order, it has become very important for Japan to be seated in the Security Council which assumes a very significant responsibility and plays an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since Japan joined the United Nations in 1956, Japan was elected six times as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Japan is now campaigning to run as a candidate for the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council to be held in the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1991. If Japan is elected, it will assume the position for the seventh time (the term is two years from January 1992 to December 1993), a record achieved by no other country. As Japan's position in the international community rises, expectations for Japan's appropriate role in the United Nations are growing.

Japan has consistently taken the position of attaching importance to the United Nations since joining the organization. In particular, it has recently become a national consensus that Japan should actively make contributions to the United Nations activities It is considered that the so-called former enemy-state clauses (Note) which still remain in the U.N. Charter shall never be applied to Japan after having been admitted membership to the United Nations. The former enemy-state clauses are not acceptable to the Japanese national sentiment. The Government of Japan has made utmost efforts to delete these clauses, as seen in Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's speech at the U.N. General Assembly in 1990. Many countries already expressed understanding for and consent to Japan's position. On the other hand, the deletion of the clauses is an issue involving an amendment to the present Charter. As many countries have their own motives to amend the Charter, further efforts are needed to realize this amendment without affecting other problems.

Amid the current of East-West relations shifting from confrontation to dialogue and the end of the Cold War, respect for human rights and the pursuit of the value of freedom and democracy have become increasingly a greater concern and interest in the present international community. This is symbolized by the declaration on human rights announced by the Arche G-7 Summit in 1989 that human rights are a matter of legitimate international concern. It was also confirmed, in the Economic Declaration of the London G-7 Summit in 1991, that in building a global partnership based on common values and in strengthening the international order, democracy, human rights and the rule of law should be underpinned as our aim. Looking back at the path Japan itself has walked, Japan's present peace and prosperity have been built on the accumulation of ceaseless efforts consistently made since the end of World War II toward the construction of a society based on respect for fundamental human rights, freedom and democracy. In consideration of these experiences, it has become increasingly important for Japan to take action in conformity with a basic concept that human rights have a universal value for mankind and are the foundation of the world's peace and stability.

It is important, therefore, that in providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries, special attention should be paid to respect human rights and democratization in these developing countries. From such a viewpoint, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu stated in the Diet session in April 1991 that in extending Japan's ODA, recipient countries' efforts for promoting democratization and securing basic human rights and freedom are taken fully into account.

In the field of human rights protection, the United Nations has been playing a very significant role. Japan has actively participated in the U.N. activities for human rights, through successive membership in the Commission on Human Rights since 1982. Moreover, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities under the Commission on Human Rights has had a Japanese member since 1984. The Human Rights Committee set up on the basis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has had a Japanese member since 1987. Both of them are elected and serving in their respective organs in their personal capacities.

In the U.N. General Assembly held in 1990, a resolution to convene the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 was adopted. This conference on human rights will be held for the first time in 25 years since the previous one held in Teheran in 1968. In the forthcoming conference, it is anticipated that the developing countries which proposed convening the conference will link the human rights issue with the North-South problem, seeking recognition of their "right to develop," and will launch discussions and demands from such a perspective. In order that the forthcoming conference should succeed as a truly meaningful conference for the enhancement of respect for human rights and democracy in the world, all efforts should be made so that human rights issues may not be replaced with the North-South problem in the discussions of the conference. A resolution to designate the year 1993 as the "International Year for the World's Indigenous Peoples" was also adopted in the U.N. General Assembly in 1990.

Among the international treaties adopted in the field of human rights in 1990 was the "International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Family Members." The objective of this treaty is to protect the rights of migrant workers and their family members against the background of a notable increase in transnational moves of the labor force throughout the world. Mexico, Morocco, Algeria, India and other developing countries from which a large number of workers go abroad to work have strenuously promoted the adoption of this convention, on which work had been done for elaboration since 1980. While there was no country which opposed the thrust of this convention, several industrialized countries, including Japan, expressed a view that the convention has several problems in terms of labor policy, immigration system and others. As of July 1991, no country but Mexico had signed the convention and no country has ratified it.

Japan signed in September 1990 the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in the U.N. General Assembly of 1989. The Government is expediting its deliberations to conclude this convention as soon as possible.

As for deliberations on human rights by member countries in the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Apartheid in South Africa and human rights situations in Iran were again taken up as in previous years. It must also be noted that the international community severely criticized the behavior of Iraq against the background of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait since August 1990. Specifically in the U.N. General Assembly in late 1990 and in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at the beginning of 1991, resolutions were adopted accusing Iraq of violating the human rights of Kuwaitis and foreigners during the invasion of Kuwait. In the Commission on Human Rights, a resolution was also adopted expressing concern over the situation related to human rights in Iraq, including arbitrary and extra-judicial executions and increasing cases for disappearances. This resolution was adopted with an overwhelming majority of votes, including that of Japan. After many of its nationals having been held hostages in Iraq, Japan submitted a draft resolution condemning the hostage-taking, which was adopted without a vote.

The Commission on Human Rights also discussed a problem of human rights in Cuba and requested a special representative to carry out this mandate. With regard to the Soviet intervention and the use of military force on the moves for democratization in Lithuania and Latvia, which produced casualties, many countries, including Japan, expressed great concern. The Chairman announced a statement expressing great concern about the use of force by the Soviet Union in Lithuania and Latvia.

As for the human rights question in Myanmar, Western countries submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly of 1990 expressing concern about the fact that the Myanmar people's will calling for the implementation of the result of the elections in May 1990 had not yet been realized. The resolution urged that citizens detained due to political reasons be released immediately and that their political rights be restored. But developing countries united in support of Myanmar to strongly oppose the resolution, accusing the industrialized countries of addressing human rights problems in developing countries arbitrarily. Heated discussions were held between the two sides. Japan made efforts to play a mediating role and proposed that the handling of the resolution be left until the General Assembly in Autumn 1991. The decision was thus postponed. For the Western countries, it was clear that the resolution would be rejected by voting since the developing countries overwhelmed them in number. Nevertheless, should the industrialized countries withdraw the resolution, a misperception would prevail in Myanmar that they were no longer concerned about the problem. Given this dilemma, Japan's efforts as a mediator were thus appraised not only by Myanmar but also by the Western countries. The Myanmar problem, in continuation of 1990, was discussed in the Commission on Human Rights in 1991 in the form of closed deliberations.

Despite the increase in the activities of the United Nations in all fields, its financial basis is not necessarily sufficient for the activities due in part to delays in the payment of contributions by some countries.

The Political Declaration of the London G-7 Summit not only said that the United Nations should play a vital role in the maintenance of peace and security, but also called for the United Nations to reinforce its function in the field of relief activities in emergencies, including natural disasters. How to make financial arrangement for such activities is a major problem the present international community is faced with. The efficient management of the United Nations and the restructuring of unnecessary organizations are urgent subjects to be tackled. Several reforms have so far been attempted from this perspective, but results have been insufficient. Now that the international community reconfirms the importance of the United Nations today, it is a good opportunity to transform the United Nations into a more effective organization.

Japan's contribution to the United Nations is the second largest after the United States. In addition, Japan has made voluntary contributions to various important United Nations activities. Accordingly, Japan is an indispensable member state of the United Nations that supports the United Nations activities financially.

Japan exerts efforts to streamline the structure of the United Nations so that the organization can work efficiently and effectively in compliance with the needs of the new era.

Changes in the Cold War structure of international politics have helped to promote negotiations on arms control and disarmament between East and West. With a background of the changes, the problems of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transfer of conventional weapons from the North to the South has come to be clearly recognized as a destabilizing factor in the world. This major current in arms control and disarmament was made even clearer by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and it brought home to the international community the importance of addressing the problems of the proliferation and transfer of arms in order to prevent conflicts from occurring or exacerbating. Following the statement of the Houston Summit of 1990 on transnational issues which addresses the issue of non-proliferation, the London Summit of 1991 adopted the Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) Non-proliferation, attesting to the rising recognition of the problems.

With a view to ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, Japan has been making great efforts to promote nuclear disarmament, including the proposal of a step-by-step approach to nuclear testing issues presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In light of recent changes in the international situation, Japan has strengthened its efforts to tackle the problems of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of international transfers of conventional weapons. Since Japan takes a unique stance in this field, which includes the adoption of the "Three Non-nuclear Principles and the Three Principles on Arms Exports," the country is expected to contribute even more to the world in this respect.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in principle in June 1990, and it was expected to be signed by the end of 1990 together with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

However, against the background of a temporary cooling of relations between the two countries due to problems concerning the CFE Treaty and the situation in the Baltic states, negotiations on some remaining issues proved to be difficult, stalling at the final stage. The remaining issues requiring fine tuning were: (1) the definition of new-type missiles; (2) down loading (Note); and (3) a ban on concealment of data on missile tests. The problems of the CFE Treaty were resolved in mid-June 1991, and negotiations on START accelerated and most of the problems were solved on July 11 at the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. At the Moscow Summit on July 31, the two Presidents signed the treaty, concluding the lengthy negotiations of nine years and one month.

The START Treaty reduces strategic nuclear arsenals (about a 40 percent cut in the number of nuclear warheads) for the first time in history and stipulates details of verification measures. The signing of the Treaty gave impetus to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, it contributes to improving and reinforcing bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as to constructing a new international order in which cooperation between the two countries is to be of great significance.

Japan has consistently supported efforts by the United States in the START negotiations as a member of the Western bloc. Japan would like to see further stabilization of Soviet-U.S. relations, as well as the whole East-West relations, through the signing of the treaty, which enhance the security of all nations, including Japan. Japan looks forward to further progress in arms control and disarmament between the two countries including the field of strategic nuclear weapons.

The Outline of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START)

1.	Objective
	To strengthen strategic stability (Large reduction of strategic arms)

2.	Parties to the Treaty
	The United States and the Soviet Union

3.	Negotiation Period
	From June 29, 1982 to July 31, 1991 (signed in Moscow)

4.	Weapons to be reduced (setting the ceiling for Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and their warheads)
	(1)	The ceiling for SNDVs: 1,600
	(2)	The accountable number of strategic nuclear warheads: 6,000 of which ballistic missile warheads: 4,900 [the total of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)].
	(3)	A 50 percent reduction in current Soviet heavy ICBMs: 154 missiles, 1,540 warheads
	(4)	Aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs: equal to about 54 percent of the current Soviet aggregate throw-weight (3,600 metric tons)
	(5)	The ceiling for deployed mobile ICBM warheads: 1,100
	(6)	Long-Range, Nuclear ALCMs
		(a)	Object of regulation (with a range in excess of 600km)
		(b)	Attributed counting rule (Note 1): 10 for U.S. heavy bomber and 8 for Soviet heavy bomber
	(7)	Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), not constrained by the treaty
		(a)	Object of regulation (with a range greater than 600km)
		(b)	The ceiling for nuclear-armed SLCM warheads: 880 "declaration form" (Note 2) (Each side will make an annual declaration of the maximum number of nuclear-armed warheads that it plans to deploy for each of the following five years)
	(8)	Soviet Backfire Bomber
		Limit the number to 500 (air force: 300, navy: 200)
		Will not be given intercontinental capability. "Declaration form"

5.	Reduction method
	Elimination or diversion

6.	Timetable for reduction
	7 years, in 3 phases (with equal levels at the end of each phase)

7.	Verification
	On-site inspections, continuous monitoring activities, NTM (National Technology Measures), etc.

8.	Treaty duration
	15 years (May be extended for successive five-year periods.)

Note1:Attributed counting rule : Since verification of warheads loaded on airplanes are difficult, the number of warheads is attributed to a bomber aircraft for the counting rule. Note2:Declaration form : The ceiling for the number or other limitations may be set by a politically binding declaration. It has no legal binding and is not an object for inspection.

Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which had been making steady progress against the background of democratization in Eastern Europe and easing of confrontation between East and West since the Summer of 1989, were concluded at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Paris on November 19, 1990. The CFE Treaty was signed by the beads of the 16 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the six members of the Warsaw Pact. The CFE Treaty is the first agreement after World War II on reductions of conventional forces. The objectives of this Treaty are to correct the imbalance in conventional forces deployed in Europe, which has been advantageous to the East, and to remove the capability of surprise attacks and grand-scale invasions by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. It is expected that the CFE Treaty will bring about stabilization with regard to conventional forces at a considerably low level and lay the foundation to build a new framework for security in Europe with progress in the CSCE.

Nevertheless, prior to the signing of the Treaty, the Soviet Union transferred three army divisions to the navy in order to evade regulations of the Treaty and transferred a large volume of weapons to the East of the Urals, which is a territory not covered in the Treaty. Not only the NATO countries, but also Central and Eastern European countries found this problematic and postponed the ratification of the Treaty. Due to these problems, successive negotiations (Note 1) on the CFE, scheduled to start immediately after the signing of the Treaty, and substantive discussions of negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in Europe (Note 2) were suspended. The Soviet Union initially took such a tough stance on the problem of integrating army divisions into naval forces as to reject even discussing the matter. The NATO countries took a firm and unified stance on it. Eventually, at the special conference of the signatory countries of the Treaty in mid-June 1991, the Soviet Union conceded and agreed to include the weapons which it has transferred to the navy into the countings within the framework of the Treaty and the deadlock was broken in the way on which the NATO countries had basically insisted.

The Outline of Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

1.	Objective

	(1)	Establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels than heretofore
	(2)	Eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security
	(3)	Eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action

2.	Parties to the Treaty

	22 member countries of NATO and WP (each called as a "group of States Parties")

3.	Negotiation Period

	From March 9, 1989 to November 19, 1990

4.	The Area of Application

	The European region from the Ural mountains to the Atlantic Ocean

5.	The Limitation of Arms Holding

	Setting the ceiling for five categories of conventional armed forces (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artilleries, combat, aircrafts and attack helicopters) for each group of States Parties, single States Party and area.

	For the group of States Parties

	(1) battle tanks		: 20,000
	(2) armored combat vehicles		: 30,000
	(3) artilleries		: 20,000
	(4) combat aircrafts		: 6,800
	(5) attacking helicopters		: 2,000

6.	Methods of Reducing Weapons

	In principle, by destruction. (Some tanks and armored combat vehicles are allowed to be diverted for non-military purpose.)

7.	Timetable for Reduction

	Shall be completed no later than 40 months (in three phases) after entry into force of this Treaty.

8.	Verification

	On-site inspections, NTM (National Technology Measures), etc.

9.	Duration of the Treaty

	Unlimited duration.

As for the transfer of weapons to the East of the Urals by the Soviet Union, Japan raised this problem and urged the Soviet Union on various occasions, including the summit meeting of the two countries, from a viewpoint of security in the Far East and Asia. This problem was also settled in general at the special conference of the signatories of the CFE Treaty, but it is necessary to continuously pay attention to the moves of the transferred weapons.

In the Gulf Crisis, Iraq used Scud missiles and after the cease-fire, it was revealed through inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that in violation of international law, Iraq had secretly produced enriched uranium, which could be used as a material for nuclear weapons. As a result, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has become an actual problem. Furthermore, it was also made known that some Western corporations and experts were actually involved in the development of chemical weapons of Iraq. Against such a background, international efforts to improve and reinforce the safeguards system of the IAFA and to strengthen export control of individual countries have been animated in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Japan actively contributes to these international efforts.

In the course of one year after August 1990, the international community was deeply concerned about the problems of nuclear proliferation; this concern was especially aggravated by such events as possible development of nuclear weapons by Iraq, which was recognized to be particularly alarming through the Gulf Crisis and North Korea's refusal to conclude safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In consequence, international moves toward improvement and reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation system have been stimulated.

On the other hand, in June 1991, France announced that it had, in principle, an intention of signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania signed the NPT in July, April and May 1991, respectively. Furthermore, China also conveyed to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during his visit to China in August 1991 that the country decided in principle to join the NPT. In November 1990, Brazil and Argentina announced a common nuclear policy and their intention to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAFA and commenced negotiations with the IAEA. Thus, moves toward nuclear non-proliferation are discerned in areas which have so far seemed to have a danger of nuclear proliferation and the nuclear non-proliferation system has become more widely accepted.

Deeply convinced that it is of vital interest, not only for Japan's own security but also for world peace, to maintain and to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Japan adopts a very strict policy in this field. In implementing Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan decided in April 1991 to take into consideration the recipient countries' efforts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, which commenced in January 1991, Japan has consistently urged North Korea to conclude and implement the full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Furthermore, at the IAEA, Japan endeavored to demand that North Korea conclude and implement the agreement by mobilizing opinions of member countries and tabling resolutions.

Japan has continuously asked countries which are not yet parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty not only in bilateral talks, but also on other occasions. As shown in China's decision to sign the Treaty, Japan's efforts are thus gradually bearing concrete fruits.

The resolution on the cease-fire with Iraq, which was adopted by the U.N. Security Council in April 1991 (UNSC Resolution 687), obligated Iraq to make a report on nuclear-related substances and facilities. At the same time, the resolution requested the IAEA to inspect, destroy and dismantle Iraq's lethal arsenal in order to eliminate Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weapons. It is unprecedented that the United Nations is authorized to take such compulsory measures to correct a situation in violation of the NPT or of the safeguards agreement of the IAEA. It is also the first time that the IAEA was invested with such a strong authority. While there is a special element in the case, since such a strong measure was taken as a consequence of the U.N. actions to counter Iraq's invasion, it is epoch-making in that it will constitute a precedent for similar situations in the future.

In the process of implementing this resolution by the United Nations, it was revealed that although Iraq is a party to the NPT and had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, it had enriched uranium in violation of the obligations stipulated by international law. It was the first time that a violation of the full-scope safeguards agreement was detected, which created great concern that the Iraqi behavior threatens the basis of the international nuclear non-proliferation system itself. Japan also severely criticized the Iraqi violation of international law. It is important to destroy Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weapons in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution so that a recurrence of similar incidents can be prevented and the confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation system can be maintained and strengthened.

The Review Conference of the NPT (Note) was held from August to September 1990 with the participation of 84 countries, including Japan, out of 141 party to the Treaty. Although a final declaration was not adopted at the Conference, recognition of the necessity to maintain and reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation system was unanimously shown by participating countries. For the first time, China and France attended the meeting as observers and the declarations by the five nuclear powers on the security of non-nuclear countries were reconfirmed. Other achievements included agreement in general on the necessity of reinforcing the IAEA's full-scope safeguards measures and restrictions on exports of nuclear-related items.

The international community has now two major export-control regimes in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation, that is to say, the so-called London Guidelines and the Zanger Committee. In March 1991, all 26 member countries of the London Guidelines, including Japan, met in the Hague for the first time in 13 years since its creation in order to broadly discuss a wide range of subjects to improve and to strengthen the export-control system in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The following items were decided at the meeting: (1) to create a framework to regulate exports of nuclear-related dual-use items; (2) to harmonize the lists of items of the two existing systems; (3) to request newly emerging supplier states of nuclear-related items which have not yet joined the system of export control to do so; and (4) to convene regularly a conference of nuclear supplier states.

The IAEA Secretariat has commenced the review of the safeguards system, responding to the call for an improvement and reinforcement of the system presented at the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT. Japan also considers it important to enhance the effectiveness of the system, which plays a vital role in maintaining and reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation system, and takes a positive posture in the discussion, suggesting specific measures for improving the system.

During the Gulf Crisis, the multinational forces, the Gulf countries and Israel were exposed to the threat of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. This convinced the world much more acutely than before of the urgency to realize disarmament of chemical weapons. On the other hand, in view of the performance of high technology weapons used by the multinational forces, it was also recognized that the usefulness and deterrent effect of chemical weapons were not necessarily absolute. In these circumstances, the new initiative concerning CWC negotiations, announced by U.S. President George Bush in May 1991, was highly appreciated by many participating countries of the negotiations as showing a flexible attitude of the United States toward the problems which remain unsettled in the CWC negotiations. The initiative contains the decision not to use chemical weapons including in retaliation, unconditional destruction of existing chemical weapons within 10 years and conclusion of the CWC negotiations by May 1992. Due to the U.S. proposal, it is expected that the CWC negotiations in Geneva will rapidly make progress.

Although the CWC negotiations seem to have entered the final stage, heated discussions continue on: (a) the universal inspection and verification system, particularly on a challenge inspection, which are to be the pillars of the convention; (b) the objectives and scope of the verification regime on the chemical industry; and (c) the question of the organization to implement the convention, including administrative and financial issues. As for specific measures to secure as many participating countries as possible and to make the CWC a universal treaty, discussions have just started. Discussions are also under way concerning technical methods of destruction of chemical weapons and the environmental impact caused by the destruction. It cannot be predicted whether the negotiations will be concluded by May 1992 as proposed by the United States.

Since chemical weapons can easily proliferate and they have the danger of destabilizing the international community if they are not controlled, the necessity of the early elimination of chemical weapons by concluding the CWC is now broadly recognized by the international community. After the Gulf Crisis, international voices calling for an effective control and reduction of weapons of mass destruction have mounted. Taking this as a good opportunity for the successful conclusion of the protracted CWC negotiations, the second Ministerial Conference has been proposed to promote the negotiations. (The first Conference was held in Paris in January, 1989). Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in June 1991 to convene a meeting of high-ranking officials within 1991 to pave the way for the Ministerial Conference.

Concerning the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, 20 countries in the Western world, including Japan, organized the Australia group in 1985 and since then, they have met regularly. The group has put export control on chemical substances to be used as raw materials of chemical weapons. At the meeting in May 1991, based on Japan's proposal, the group agreed that the participating countries would also control exports of dual-use equipment which could be used to produce chemical weapons.

Furthermore, discussions are under way among the participating countries regarding measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons.

Regarding the non-proliferation of missiles, Western countries, including Japan, have been implementing export controls on equipment and technology which can be used to manufacture missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in accordance with common guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Against the background of increasing apprehension about the proliferation of missiles, the participating countries in the MTCR increased to 16 as of June 1991 from the original seven. The MTCR participating countries have also been lobbying non-participating countries for adoption of the guidelines. In March 1991, immediately after the end of the Gulf Crisis, a meeting of the MTCR was held in Tokyo, hosted by the Government of Japan. The meeting announced a joint appeal to all states calling for the implementation of the guidelines. In May, the Annex to the guidelines, which lists the items to be controlled, was reviewed and the items were further articulated.

The international transfer of conventional weapons is an old yet unsolved problem, and trials and errors have long been repeated on its control. There are considerable differences in opinions about this problem in the international community, making the implementation of control considerably difficult. This can be attributed mainly to the stark fact that military forces are necessary to deter and oppose military invasion in today's world where sovereign states co-exist. In this situation, the possession of conventional weapons concerns the minimum requirement for national security. Self-defense is a legitimate right of a sovereign state, recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Accordingly, every country has the right to acquire the necessary weapons within that need, but it is difficult to uniformly judge what level of military equipment is needed for a country's self-defense.

Recognizing the complexity of the problem of the international transfer of conventional weapons, the international community tackles this problem in the following direction.

If the transparency and openness of the transfer of conventional weapons are enhanced, the international community will be able to know quickly any possibility that a dangerous accumulation of weapons is under way beyond the extent required for self-defense purposes. The enhanced transparency and openness can build confidence among countries. Based on this recognition, the necessity of a mechanism for that purpose is increasingly realized.

In accordance with a U.N. resolution proposed by Colombia and other countries in 1988, a group of experts was set up. Deliberations are under way by experts from 19 countries, including Japan. The result of the work of the group is scheduled to be submitted to the U.N. General Assembly in the Autumn of 1991.

In a package proposal titled "Japanese Near-term Responses to the Problems in the Middle East" announced in March 1991, Japan proposed the establishment of a register system of international arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations. At the United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament in May 1991, held at the initiative of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, he announced in his keynote speech that Japan would submit a draft resolution on the establishment of a U.N. register system of international arms transfers to the U.N. General Assembly in the Autumn of 1991, taking into account the progress in the work of the group of experts. This active proposal by Japan was specifically referred to in the Declaration of the London Summit: "We support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early adoption." Japan is now consulting with the European Community (EC), which made a similar proposal and other countries concerned on the realization of the system and the draft resolution to be submitted to the U.N. General Assembly.

(b) Improvement and Reinforcement of the Framework of Voluntary Restrictions by Arms-supplying Countries

An excessive concentration of conventional weapons, which could tilt the military balance and induce conflict in a given region, can be prevented to a considerable extent through voluntary restrictions mainly by supplying countries of the weapons. Thus, the necessity of an appropriate framework for the voluntary restriction is widely discussed. Japan has been taking a very strict policy on exports of weapons for over 20 years in accordance with its "Three Principles on Arms Exports." From this standpoint, Japan emphasized the importance of voluntary restrictions by individual countries in the "Japanese Near-term Responses to the Problems in the Middle East" in Prime Minister Kaifu's speech at the United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament and in the speech by Foreign Minister Nakayama at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in June 1991. In May 1991, U.S. President George Bush proposed to establish common guidelines and a consultation mechanism among the five major arms suppliers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France, with regard to arms exports to the Middle East. The five countries accepted the proposal and the first meeting was held on July 8 and 9 in Paris. In the Declaration of the London Summit, it was welcomed that discussions, including the Paris meeting, had commenced among the leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines applied in the transfer of conventional weapons.

5-5. Deliberations at the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

The 45th session of the U.N. General Assembly was held in the Autumn of 1990 under circumstances where the Cold War structure between East and West was changing fundamentally and great achievements had been made in the field of arms control and disarmament, such as the U.S.-Soviet agreement on chemical weapons and the signing of the CFE Treaty. It was made clear by differences shown in votings of the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries that they no longer form an independent political group reflecting the progress in democratization in the Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, the non-aligned countries lost support for resolutions which they had been submitting for a long time. Great efforts were made to rationalize the work of the First Committee (Security Disarmament) of the General Assembly by reducing the number of draft resolutions and adopting more resolutions by consensus.

Deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1990 took place from February to April (Spring session) and from June to August (Summer session) with eight items on the agenda, including nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space. In consideration of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had not attained results comparable to the progress made in disarmament between East and West such as in the CFE negotiations, discussions focused on how to make the operation of the conference more effective. As a result, it was decided to convene three sessions a year from 1991, instead of two sessions as previously held.

Concerning nuclear testing, the ad hoc committee to discuss problems of the nuclear test ban, which had been suspended since 1984 due to differences in opinions, was re-established during the Summer session of 1990 owing in part to a strong request by Japan. The committee resumed its substantive work with the chairmanship of the Japanese representative. The ad hoc committee was re-established in 1991.

As for the CWC, serious discussions took place at the Conference on Disarmament, even when the whole conference was out of session, with the aim of concluding the convention by May 1992.

In order to make active contributions to arms control and disarmament after the Gulf Crisis, Foreign Minister Nakayama, following the United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament, delivered a speech articulating the basic stance of Japan on arms control and disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament in June 1991, for the first time as a Japanese Foreign Minister in seven years since former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe had attended it in 1984. This was highly appraised both at home and abroad as showing Japan's serious attitude toward disarmament issues.

One of the pillars of Japan's concept of international cooperation is "cooperation for peace." Based on this concept and realizing that Japan should greatly contribute to international efforts in arms control and disarmament after the Gulf Crisis, Japan announced its basic policy on the problems of international transfers of conventional weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the "Japanese Near-term Responses to the Problems in the Middle East" in March 1991. Such a positive attitude was further shown by the fact that Japan proposed and supported the United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament in May 1991 with the participation of Prime Minister Kaifu and Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto, and that Foreign Minister Nakayama attended the Conference on Disarmament in June. Moreover, Japan's positive attitude is demonstrated by its proposal for the establishment of a U.N. reporting system on transfers of conventional weapons as well as its request to the Soviet Union, China and other countries to voluntarily restrict exports of conventional weapons. With respect to nuclear non-proliferation, Prime Minister Kaifu endeavored to strengthen the NPT by calling on the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT in April and May 1990. At the United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament, the Prime Minister proposed to reinforce the IAEA safeguards system. Concerning the non-proliferation of missiles, Japan chaired a meeting of the MTCR in Tokyo in March 1991, contributing to the adoption of a joint appeal calling on all countries of the world to comply with the MTCR guideline. All of these moves reflect Japan's positive stance.