CHAPTER TWO:

 

MAJOR TRENDS IN

THE WORLD IN 1981

 

 

 

 

1. General Characteristics

 

(1) With the Soviet military intervention of Afghanistan in late 1979 as a turning point, U.S.-Soviet relations have witnessed a large-scale retreat, without any sign of concrete restoration through 1981. The situation turned for the worse with the promulgation of martial law in Poland in December 1981.

Martial law in Poland proved to give a considerable impact on East-West relations and thus to the general international situation. The incident being basically interpreted as a principal threat to the trust fostered in past efforts at East-West cooperation and exchange, the U.S. and other Western nations proceeded to implement rigid countermeasures against Poland and the Soviet Union. Due to this reason, the U.S.-Soviet relations which were under search for dialogues such as foreign ministers' meetings and the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe came to a standstill and unstable situation of East-West relations continued to prevail during 1981.

(2) In the Middle East, though Egyptian-Israeli talks on the return of the Sinai Peninsula proceeded rather smoothly, the momentum for the realization of peace in the Middle East has hardly been promoted throughout 1981 as illustrated in the following situations: the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's assassination and the growing tension in the Lebanese situation as well as no progress in the Palestinian autonomy negotiations based on the Camp David Accord.

On the contrary, in the Persian Gulf region, the protraction of the fighting between Iran and Iraq and continuing domestic instability in Iran, together with the prolonged Afghan problem, proved to heighten international concern over the security in this region. Under such circumstances, the six gulf states, headed by Saudi Arabia, established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This embodies the concept of cooperation which has been created among the nations of this region as a measure to cope with growing tensions.

(3) The situations in Afghanistan and Cambodia are still at a stalemate, with an absence of any prospective realistic solution. There still exist elements of instability in other regions. In Central America, in particular, there was a problem in the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba-Nicaragua concerning the El Salvador issue and the situation remained very fluid.

(4) The 1981 world economy was in the process of adjusting to the second oil crisis of 1979. Advanced industrial nations were making attempts to overcome the tribulations carried over from the previous year, such as rising inflation, increasing unemployment, and an augmenting deficit in their current balance of payments. Nevertheless, their efforts only witnessed a low-pitched economic recovery.

On the other hand, non-oil-producing developing nations generally suffered from deteriorating trade terms and growing deficit in their current balance of payments, which resulted in aggravating difficulties in the administration of the economy. Furthermore, there were several nations among the oil-producing developing nations which curtailed the sales amount of petroleum due to the eased supply and demand in the international oil market, decreased their foreign currency reserves, and were thus, inevitably obliged to revise their economic development programs.

At the same time, the management of enormous debt accumulation of the Eastern European and developing nations has become anew task for the world throughout 1981.

 

2. Major Trends in the International Situation

 

(1) Interrelations among major countries

 

(a) The rapidly declining U.S.-Soviet relations since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, was then followed by the promulgation of martial law in Poland in December 1981. With the understanding that such an unusual condition was attributable to Soviet pressure, the U.S. and other Western nations decided to take measures against the Soviet Union and Poland, This further led to a freeze in the already cooling U.S.-Soviet relations.

Based on the perception that the unilateral Soviet action is causing considerable change in world strategic relations, the new Reagan Administration has been seeking Soviet "restraint" and "reciprocity" since its start. Domestically, aiming for a "strong U.S." the government has been increasing its defense budget, while at the same time, publicizing its program on strategic weapon system.

To this, the Soviet Union has been responding with a "wait and see" policy trying to find out the trend of the U.S. policy. In addition to the "Peace Proposals", including the call for an opening of a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in the report submitted to the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February, repeatedly criticized the U.S. in regard to the U.S. decision made in August to produce the neutron bomb, NATO's issue of modernizing nuclear weapons, and so on. Moreover, while supporting the heightening anti-nuclear/anti-war movements in Western Europe, General Secretary Brezhnev visited the Federal Republic of Germany in November. These and a series of other Soviet moves illustrate its intention to strengthen the peace offensive directed towards Western European nations.

The U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers meetings, which were held twice taking the opportunity of the U.N. General Assembly in September, resulted in an agreement to hold a negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in late November in Geneva. Prior to this negotiation, on the other hand, President Reagan insistently adhered to his firm stance of strengthening the deterrent force against the Soviet Union as was shown in the modernization program of strategic nuclear forces. In November, President Reagan announced the following four point proposal which encompassed general arms control to the Soviet Union: (1) to reduce intermediate range nuclear forces (the "Zero Option") (2) to start Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) (3) to reduce conventional weapons and (4) to realize Soviet participation in European disarmament negotiations.

In response to this, General Secretary Brezhnev, during his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, rejected the U.S. proposal as demanding a unilateral Soviet reduction. At the same time, he disclosed a new proposal consisting of Soviet readiness for a partial reduction of its current intermediate range nuclear arms based on the past proposal for a moratorium. Subsequently, the move toward a U.S.-Soviet dialogue, centered around the main theme of arms control, appeared to have lost momentum following the promulgation of martial law in Poland.

(b) Likewise, in terms of the relations between the nations of Western Europe and the U.S., which faced a more intensified situation evoked by the Polish issue, 1981 proved to be the year where efforts toward the maintenance of consolidation and cooperation continued as in 1980. Nevertheless frictions were caused in trade between the two areas, such as the heightening U.S. criticisms against exports of agricultural products and iron and steel by EC nations.

Concerning economic relations between the East and West, the Ottawa Summit in July confirmed that future directions should be consistent with political and security interests. The U.S. later expressed its concern that the West Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline Project, which was proceeded between Europe and the Soviet Union would result in increased European dependency upon the Soviets for energy supplies, while European nations claimed that the project was necessary. Although a consensus was not observed between Europe and the U.S. regarding the project, West European nations and the U.S., which share similar value, extended their efforts to adjust their views through incessantly holding mutual discussions.

(c) U.S.-China relations throughout 1981 followed a deepening trend which is attributable to such bilateral efforts as Secretary of State Haig's visit to China (June), President Reagan and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's first summit meeting on the occasion of the North-South Summit (October) and other occasions. However, with the surfacing of the problem related to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in late 1981, the Chinese side disclosed its suspicion against U.S., stating that "U.S.-China relations are facing the greatest trial since normalization" (the People's Daily). For the improvement of the situations, Assistant-Secretary of State Holdridge and Vice President Bush both visited China (respectively in January and May of 1982) to proceed with persevering negotiations. These efforts resulted in the tentative settlement of the problem, with the announcement of the U.S.-China joint communique on August 17, 1982.

Chinese relations with the nations of Western Europe, on the other hand, continued to be strengthened through the China visits by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington (April 1981) and West German Foreign Minister Genscher, as well as others. Relations with Holland, however, were downgraded to the charge d'affaire level due to the problem concerning Dutch submarine exports to Taiwan.

(d) China-Soviet relations in 1981 maintained the conventional working-level relations with both sides retaining cautious attitudes. Bilateral negotiations for improved relations, which were terminated as a result of the Soviet military intervention of Afghanistan, showed no light of resumption. The Soviet proposal made in September for recovering the China-Soviet border talks have made no concrete progresses. As a whole China-Soviet relations in 1981 underwent no considerable changes from in 1980. General Secretary Brezhnev's address on the occasion of the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981 refrained from criticizing China, implying the Soviet expectations of some kind of change in China's Soviet policy under the new administrative structure. Notwithstanding such a Soviet attitude, China, at the 6th Plenary Session of the Communist Party in June 1981, reconfirmed its position of anti-hegemonism as a pilar of its basic foreign policy and did not specifically respond to the "confidence building measures in the Far East" advocated at the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress. In terms of working-level relations, the regular meeting of the China-Soviet Joint Committee for Boundary Rivers Navigation and the Annual Joint Conference for Border Railways were held and an agreement on trade payments for fiscal 1981 was concluded in June 1981.

 

(2) Situation in Poland

 

(a) First Secretary Kanya's appointment of Defense Minister Jaruzelski as Premier in February 1981 demonstrated to the citizens and foreign nations his firm determination to gain control over the situation. On the other hand, despite the efforts by the moderates of Solidarity and the Catholic Church faction to deal with the situation, Solidarity stepped up its firm attitude of confrontation against the Party and the government. It is said that even Chairman Walesa had mentioned of the inevitability of confronting the Party and government at Solidarity's secret meeting in Radom in December1981. Moreover, within the party itself, demand for more democracy and heightening distrust and dissatisfaction among lower-ranked party members led to the resignation of First Secretary Kanya at the Party's Central Committee Congress in October. As a result, Jaruzelski was selected as the First Secretary, concurrently serving two other positions as Premier and Defense Minister. First Secretary Jaruzelski also followed the Kanya track of maintaining a dialogue with the people, whereby demonstrating his policy of overcoming the political, social and economic crises. Likewise, without even the slightest hint of improvements in the situation, Jaruzelski, in an effort to control the conditions, proceeded with a series of following measures: establishment of Military Council for National Salvation on December 13, and the proclamation of martial law and the imprisonment of Solidarity leaders.

(b) Prior to such aggravation of the Polish situation, the Soviet Union had been closely following the shifting political situation especially following the summer of 1980. It is deemed that the Soviet's dissatisfaction and precaution over the intensifying Polish domestic climate have been continuously growing. This may be portrayed by the Poland visits by Politburo member Suslov in April followed by Foreign Minister Gromyko in July. Additionally, large-scale maneuvers by Warsaw Pact nations repeated mainly around the Baltic coastline neighboring Poland also underpin the Soviet concern as well as its rigid attitude.

(c) Western nations responded to martial law declared in Poland in December by reconfirming their understanding that the problem should be resolved by the Polish people themselves, while simultaneously demanding the Polish government to lift martial law, release the prisoners, and to reconvene the dialogue with Solidarity and the Catholic Church. Based on the judgement that the Polish situation is the result of Soviet pressure, they also criticized the Soviet Union and demanded self-restraint. In cooperation with these countries of the West, Japan also demanded self-restraint on the part of the Soviet Union, while Japan requested the Polish government to immediately realize reconciliation among domestic powers in that country in order to promptly resolve the current abnormal situation. While giving due consideration so as not to undermine individual measures of each nation, the U.S. and other nations of the West enforced a series of political and economic measures against the Soviet Union. In addition, measures mainly focusing on economics such as suspending negotiations for deferring the repayment of liabilities and providing renewed public credit, and others were implemented against Poland.

 

(3) Situation in the Middle East

 

(a) As to the Middle East peace problem, in spite of the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981, the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt as planned in April, 1982. Although the autonomy talks on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip based on the Camp David Accords (CDA) were continued among the U.S., Egypt and Israel, little progress was made due to the great difference of views existing between Egypt and Israel.

On the other hand Saudi Arabian Prince Fahd issued an eight point proposal while Sadat was visiting the U.S. in August 1981.

In the meantime Israel carried out the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981. In December, Israel extended its law, jurisdiction and administration to the occupied Golan Heights, which was tantamount to annexation. The moves resulted in strong objection not only from the Arab world but from the Western countries as well.

(b) In Lebanon, armed conflict between the Syrian forces and the Phalangists' (Christian rightists) militia in the Bekaa valley in March 1981 led to the Syrian introduction of anti-aircraft missiles in the Bekaa Valley for the purpose of confronting Israel, a supporter of the Phalangists. Hence, the tensions between Syria and Israel increased rapidly. The Israeli bombing in July of the Palestinian guerilla bases located in southern Lebanon and the bombing of the headquarters in Beirut resulted in continuous artillery duel between the two forces over the Israeli-Lebanese border. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted a ceasefire resolution (Resolution 490) on July 21. The Israeli-PLO ceasefire was agreed upon in late July through U.S. special envoy Philip Habib's mediation efforts as well as by Saudi Arabia's intercession efforts with the PLO.

(c) Amidst the prolonged Iran-Iraq conflict, the promotion of regional cooperation by the Arab oil-producing countries along the Persian Gulf has been strengthened even more. Such a trend is evident in a decision in February for the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprised of the six countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Conflicts of interest among Arab countries, however, were all the more intensified as can be seen in the yet unresumed Arab summit meeting which was held in late 1981 but was adjourned.

The three countries of Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia, on the other hand, held a summit meeting in Aden in August 1981, where they criticized the U.S. Middle East policy and formed a stronger military alliance under the title of the trilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation.

(d) Although the dismissal of President Bani Sadr in June 1981 in Iran was followed by a series of terrorist assualts and temporary unstable domestic rule in the aftermath, the Islamic Republic Party's regime gained more stable ground in the autumn.

Disregarding the Iranian counteroffensive after September, which showed new developments, no clue was found to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict since the gap towards a ceasefire was still large between the two countries.

Since the establishment of the Reagan Administration, the U.S. promoted a policy of placing emphasis on measures against the Soviet threat in the Middle East region. This may be exemplified by the U.S.'s joint military maneuvers in November with forces from Egypt, Sudan and Oman, the aim of which was grounded in efforts to promote strategic and military cooperation with the countries of the Middle East.

The U.S. also decided to sell the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia in October.

 

(4) Afghan Problem and the Situation in Southwest Asia

 

(a) Since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the fighting has continued between the Soviet forces and the Afghan regular army on one side and the Afghan guerillas on the other, resulting in the mere continuation of the Soviet occupation.

Western concern yet remains focused on the development in this situation. Moreover, a series of anti-Soviet measures regarding the intervention are still basically being enforced with the exception of certain revisions such as the lifting of U.S. grain embargo as well as other measures.

The year 1981 proved to witness diversified diplomatic endeavors to resolve the Afghan problem such as resolutions, declarations, and so on at the Summit Meeting of Islamic nations (January), the Conference of Non-Aligned countries (February), the European Council (June), the Ottawa Summit (July), and the U.N. General Assembly (November). Nevertheless, none of them proved to be effective or fruitful. However, Perez de Cuellar, as a personal representative of U.N. Secretary General, visited Pakistan and Afghanistan in April and August, respectively, for the purpose of exchanging views concerning the United Nations' possible role in the settlement of the problems. Such U.N. efforts toward settlement have been continued.

(b) Regarding the Southwest Asian region, India has taken the posture of improving relations with Pakistan and China. It has also been illustrating its diplomatic stance to strengthen the relation with the countries of the West, while keeping a certain distance with the Soveit Union, by means of emphasizing its policy of non-alignment, receiving enormous capital loans from the IMF, and diversifying its arms suppliers.

Indo-Pakistani relations witnessed gradual improvements through the efforts made in the mutual visits of the foreign ministers with a view to signing a non-aggression pact and to establishing a joint commission.

U.S.-Pakistani relations are showing concrete development as illustrated by the $3.2 billion military and economic aid extended to Pakistan by the U.S. for the period of six years. Pakistan-China relations are also enjoying a favorable climate as was the case in the past.

Regional cooperation in South Asia, in which seven countries in the region participate, has been showing steady developments. The situations in the region proved to follow a course of gradual progress towards stabilization, despite a coup d'etat occurred in March 1982 in Bangladesh.

 

(5) Situation in Asia

 

(a) The appointment of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan under the new constitution in February 1981 was followed by an election of its congress members in March of the same year, which together meant the establishment of the 5th Republic in both name and reality. Following this, efforts for the formation of an open and democratic society were launched and one of its symbolic measures may have been the removal of the 30 year old "curfew order" in January 1982.

In terms of diplomacy, efforts by the Republic of Korea can be demonstrated by the U.S.-R.O.K. Summit Meeting in February 1981, President Chun's visit to the five ASEAN nations from late June to early July, Prime Minister Nam's visit to the Northern European nations from late August to early September, and the development of relations with non-aligned countries. Furthermore, concerning relations with North Korea, the Republic of Korea repeatedly proposed the resumption of North-South dialogue including the mutual visits by the leaders of the two nations.

Although North Korea has been actively promoting its diplomacy of non-alignment movements, it merely continued to adhere to the former advocacies in response to the South Korean appeal for a dialogue. As a result, the dialogue was not reconvened.

During the period, bilateral military tensions still prevailed with the infiltration of armed spies from the North, the North's invasion of territorial air space, and the North's anti-aircraft missile firing at a U.S. reconnaissance plane (all of which were denied or ignored by North Korea).

(b) Regarding the Cambodian problem, ASEAN-initiated international efforts were extended in pursuit of a comprehensive political settlement. As a result, the International Conference on Kampuchea, sponsored by the U.N., was convened in July. Although the Soviet Union, Viet Nam and certain other countries did not participate in the Conference, the Declaration on Kampuchea as well as a resolution were adopted, seeking a comprehensive political settlement of the problem.

In September, a tripartite meeting by leaders of anti-Viet Nam forces took place in Singapore, with the attendance of Prime Minister Khieu Samphan of Democratic Kampuchea, Prince Sihanouk, and President Son Sann of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, with the aim of forming a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea.

At the 36th U.N. General Assembly, the Democratic Kampuchean representation at the U.N. was maintained with the support of 79 countries, a figure exceeding that of the previous year.

Viet Nam, on the other hand, called for dialogue with ASEAN countries at the Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conferences (January and June), but no change was observed in the basic Vietnamese attitude of pursuing a fait accompli through their support of the Heng Samrin regime and the stationing of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

Aggravated relations between China and Viet Nam continued. China rejected the Vietnamese proposal for a third round of talks at the Deputy Foreign Minister level.

Following the above mentioned anti- Viet Nam tripartite meeting, the three parties proceeded to hold talks for the establishment of a coalition government, but did not succeed in reaching a conclusion during 1981.

 

(6) Situation in Latin America (the term 'Latin America' used in this Blue Book includes the Caribbean area)

 

The focus of the situations in Latin America was on the situations in Central America in 1981. As symbolized in the case of El Salvador, Central America is characterized by several unstable factors such as delayed economic development, the existence of social inequalities, and external support to anti-government forces which is taking advantage of such inequalities. Thus, the development of the situations in this area has attracted international concern from the point of view of East-West relations as well. The election of the members of the constituent assembly was smoothly implemented in El Salvador in March 1982 with the participation of the national majority. Although guerilla activities are still being carried out in the country, it is understood that the smooth implementation of the election of the constituent assembly members revealed the limit of influence by the guerillas. In Nicaragua, the tendency of the Sandinista dictatorship has been strengthened. This resulted in strained relationships with the surrounding nations and the U.S.

For the purpose of speeding up the delayed economic development and eradicating social inequality which are the basic causes of instability in Central America and the Caribbean area, the Caribbean Basin Initiative was proposed by the U.S., Mexico, Venezuela, Canada and its future development is now the center of attention.

The Reagan Administration has begun repairing the relationship with such South American nations as Argentina, Chile and Bolivia which lacked smoothness due to the human right diplomacy of the former Carter Administration. There were noteworthy developments taken by the new Administration such as the promotion of personnel exchanges, and measures to resume the supply of arms and export credits.

Throughout the year of 1981, the Latin American region has also been influenced by the stagnant world economy. As a result, the exports of products including primary goods were dull, the economic growth rate slowed down, accelerated inflation became apparent, and the accumulation of foreign debts expanded. It is a matter of concern that such a deteriorated economic situation may influence the stabilization of security and democratization of domestic political systems which are the major tasks of most of the nations in this area.

 

(7) Situation in Africa

 

Africa, in 1981, on one hand, witnessed continuing unstable conditions in such regions as Chad, Angola, and others, but on the other hand, comparatively bright developments toward a solution were also under way regarding the problems in West Sahara, Namibia, and other regions. Meanwhile, because of the aggravated U.S.-Libya relations and the formation of trilateral alliance by Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen, the U.S., Egypt and Sudan strengthened their trilateral military cooperation. The Soviet Union and other East European nations on their part attempted to maintain and deepen relations with Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, and attempted to strengthen its presence in Angola and other parts of Southern Africa.

Following the birth of the new Mitterand Administration in France, disharmony appeared briefly in a part of traditionally intimate relationships between France and Francophone African nations. Nevertheless, there were no substantial changes.

Economic situations were, in general, unfavorable, with the influence of the worldwide economic recession. African countries were faced with such problems as domestic inflation, unemployment, a stagnant international market for primary products which are major export items, increases in accumulated debts, and refugee problems in certain areas. All of these problems represent obstacles to achieving economic development.

 

(8) Trends in the International Economy

 

(a) The world economy in 1981 was in the process of adjusting to the second oil crisis of 1979.

Developed nations maintained a tight financial policy, centered around giving priority to anti-inflation measures such as restraining the money supply. Although the U.S. economy recorded rapid growth from January to March, the latter half of the year exhibited proclivity towards recession. Due to the tight U.S. monetary policy, Western European nations suffered from high interest rates in respective domestic money market, while the exchange market was also largely affected. This led to the narrowing of the selection of individual national policy measures, resulting in advanced inflation, and the incapacity to put the brakes on increasing unemployment and declining growth rate. Increased unemployment among the youth, in particular, intensified even to the extent of creating serious social problems.

In the non-oil producing developing nations, an annual inflation rate exceeding 30 percent was accompanied by stagnant exports and an increasing burden of defrayal interest due to the high interest rates and declining domestic demand in developed nations. As a result, the current balance of payments of these nations were even further exposed to greater pressure, marking accumulated liabilities totalling $430 billion by the end of 1981. Thus, the North-South gap tended to expand still further.

(b) Against the background of economic difficulties such as continuous inflation, increased unemployment and aggravated international balance of payments, many developed nations experienced mounting protectionist pressure.

As a consequence, the OECD Meeting at Ministerial Level in June and the Ottawa Summit in July reconfirmed the strong commitment of the developed nations to eliminate protectionist pressure and to maintain and strengthen an open and free trade system. Moreover GATT also reached a decision to convene a ministerial meeting in November 1982, for the purpose of supplying new political boost to an open and multilateral trade system.

On the other hand, among the three economic powers of Japan, the U.S. and the EC, which account for approximately 60 percent of world trade, trade problems surfaced in the relations between Japan and the U.S., between Japan and the E.C., and between the U.S. and the E.C.

(c) Regarding the North-South problem, the Ottawa Summit expressed a cooperative attitude toward the developing countries. Furthermore, the Preparatory Meeting (August) of the 22 foreign ministers of the prospective participants of the Cancun Summit, inclusive of Japan, was followed by an unprecedented North-South Summit in the history of North-South relations. Participating heads of state and government, with a common understanding that antagonistic attitudes would not contribute to any solution, agreed to manage the world economy based on a common recognition of the importance of North-South interdependence. Under this common recognition, frank and free discussions were held on the pending U.N. Global Negotiations (GN), and a positive agreement was reached which included the efforts of the U.S. to continue talks for the launching of GN.

(d) In the field of energy, economic stagnation, conservation efforts, the development and introduction of alternative energy sources, and so on in industrial consumer nations led to declining demand in 1981. This together with a high level of oil stockpile, resulted in a relaxed trend in the international supply and demand of oil since spring. Under such an international oil market situation, certain oil-producing nations were inevitably forced to cut back oil production and lower the price thereby giving rise to their concern over its financial implications. As for the split prices of OPEC crudes, a unification of the pricing system was adopted and the official price of the marker crude was set at $34 per barrel at the OPEC Conference held at the end of October due to the heightened recognition that they must face the reality of the market and engage in reconciliatory measures. The Conference also decided to freeze the price of the marker crude until the end of 1982. The fine tuning of price differentials among different types of oil was also done at the Conference in December.

On the other hand, industrial consumer countries placed emphasis on thorough measures for mid- and long-term structural changes towards reducing dependence on oil, avoiding complacency due to the relaxing trend in the international oil supply and demand. At the same time, in the light of the past experiences of supply shortages in certain consuming countries resulting from the Iran-Iraq conflict, countermeasures to cope with short term supply problems were reviewed particularly at IEA meetings. At the Governing Board meeting in December, an agreement was reached on the establishment of a reporting system of inventories to be operated in normal times as well as on other measures.

Regarding the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in his presidential statement in July, the U.S. President demonstrated his positive attitude, saying "the Administration will also not inhibit or set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk."

 

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