Section 6. Indochina Problem
1. Military situation
The military situation in Cambodia was re-activated with the arrival of the dry season of 1971, and communist attacks were made on petroleum facilities in Phnom Penh (September 20) and the Prek Thnot dam construction site. The attacks attracted attention as a breach of the tacit understanding on the maintenance of the status quo between the government side and the National United Front of Cambodia. The understanding had been regarded as the latter's strategic plan to assert its independence in a future political settlement of the Cambodian problem. In November, the communist side mounted attacks on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, with an artillery attack on the airport in the Cambodian capital (November 9) as the start. The attacks were designed to produce political and psychological effects as well as to check the operations of government forces along National Route 6. In December, a communist offensive was launched in the Plain of Jarres (December 17) in northern Laos, two months earlier than usual. The offensive attracted attention in that the communist side had mobilized more efficient troops and equipment than ever before, and its anti-air combat ability and artillery had been particularly improved. By early January 1972, the communist side had taken the Plain of Jarres and the Bolovens Highlands, and fighting then went on around Long Cheng, a strong-hold of the government forces in northern Laos. The U.S. side bombed North Vietnam to check communist supplies (September 21, December 26 through 30) and also as protective reaction from time to time. The communist side also made an artillery attack on Phnom Penh ( March 21) which was timed with the political instability in Cambodia.
The military situation in South Vietnam was relatively calm.
2. Paris peace talks
The 108th Paris peace talks (April 8, 1971), which was held after being postponed twice since the 107th talks (March 18), seemed to have made no remarkable progress.
At the 119th talks (July 1), Nguyen Thi Binh, the representative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, made a new seven-point proposal, which called for among other things the setting of a date for the complete withdrawal of American forces and the elimination of the Thieu regime, as a plan to clarify its ten-point proposal (May 8, 1969) and eight-point proposal (September 17, 1970), The U.S. side promised to study the proposal but did not offer a counter-proposal, and it appeared that the United States was watching the reactions of countries concerned to Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit China (July 16). Meantime, David K. E. Bruce was replaced as the chief American delegate (July 28) by William J. Porter. At the 128th talks (September 9), Porter made a proposal to hold secret negotiations, but the communist side did not accept it. The talks still did not make any progress, and at the 135th (November 4) and subsequent talks, Porter began to criticize the communist side in an increasingly strong tone.
President Nixon on January 25, 1972, disclosed that the United States had held 12 secret talks with North Vietnam since August 1969 and that, in the course of the talks, the U.S. side had made an eight-point proposal (the formal joint proposal of the U.S. and South Vietnam at the 142nd talks on January 27) and the North Vietnamese side had made a nine-point proposal (which was officially announced by North Vietnam on January 31) for making peace. The U.S. proposal, together with a two-point proposal made by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (February 3), attracted attention in that it was concessionary to the communist demands concerning the setting of a date for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and the election of a new South Vietnamese president. However, the talks made no further progress probably because both sides waited for the results of President Nixon's visits to China and the Soviet Union, and the talks were suspended at the proposal of the U.S. side at the 147th talks (March 23).
3. Moves of three nations in Indochina
(1) South Vietnam
The presidential election on October 3, 1971, was held with incumbent President Nguyen Van Thieu as the only candidate since Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky and General Euong Van Minh had decided not to run. President Thieu was re-elected with the overwhelming support of the general public, who recognized that a status quo had developed in the military situation and that public security had turned favorable. Despite the confusion over the attitude of the two principal opposition candidates, Ky and Minh, toward the election, the moves of the anti-government groups did not gather enough momentum, and the election resulted in endorsing the stability of South Vietnam's political setup. In the Lower Chamber election held on August 29, the Thieu faction obtained a majority of the seats.
(2) Cambodia
Although Premier Lon Nol's cabinet resigned for reasons of his health on April 20, 1971, the succeeding cabinet was formed with Lon Nol as premier and Sirik Matak as acting premier (May 6), and there was no change in Cambodia's policy line. Later, Khun Thay Ly, minister for commerce and industry, resigned (July 23) for reasons of the failure of the cabinet's economic policy and In Tam, first deputy premier, was dismissed (September 24) for reasons of poor maintenance of public peace and order. However, the political situation developed subsequently without any trouble, partly because the government seized provisionary legislative powers and extended the state of national emergency (October 18). In March 1972, the confrontation between the government and the assembly to establish a constitution reached the peak in the course of deliberations on the draft constitution, and the head of state was changed (March 10). The new regime that shifted to the presidential system (March 13) was led by President Lon Nol, Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh, and other ministers (March 21).
(3) Laos
In contacts for peace, Tiao Souk Vongsak, the special envoy of the Pathet Lao, made a two-point proposal (May 12) calling for a discussion of a cease-fire and the problem of forming a coalition government after the suspension of bombing. However, the government side did not respond to it (May 26), partly because it was believed that North Vietnam was strengthening the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although the talks were held subsequently, Special Envoy Vongsak returned to Sam Neua (August 6), and the talks made no progress thereafter, partly because Premier Souvanna Phouma left home (August 27) on a foreign tour. On January 2, 1972, Laos held general elections without the Pathet Lao taking part, After President Nixon announced his eight-point proposal, the Pathet Lao proposed (February 1) the sending of its special envoy again.
4. Moves of the United States
After the termination of the advance in March 1971 of South Vietnamese troops into Laos (March 24), President Nixon announced his fifth troops withdrawal plan (April 7) which said another 100,000 troops would be withdrawn to reduce by the end of November the maximum level of U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam to 184,000. However, pressure for an early end to U.S. intervention in Indochina did not abate, and the U.S. Senate Foreign Relation Committee held a series of public hearings on Vietnam (which opened on April 20), and an antiwar demonstration was held on April 24. In June, there was the disclosure by the New York Times and other newspapers of secret reports on the Vietnam problem (on and after June 13), which developed into an incident that affected the prestige of the U.S. Government at home and abroad. It is believed that the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam made its seven-point proposal of July 1 by taking full advantage of the situation. However, President Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit China (July 16) lessened international interest in the incident. The incident calmed down partly because of the South Vietnamese presidential election in which President Thieu was re-elected unopposed. However, moves were made again to oppose U.S. intervention in Indochina, through Congressional deliberation on the armed services procurement act and foreign aid bills, Meantime, the United States announced on November 12 its sixth troop withdrawal plan (whereby the maximum level of U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam would be reduced to 139,000 by the end of January 1972). Later, President Nixon clarified in a New Year press conference (January 2, 1972) that, with the stabilization of the South Vietnamese situation as the background, the general withdrawal of U.S. troops was solely dependent on the release of U.S. prisoners-of-war. After the turn of the year, the U.S. announced its seventh withdrawal plan (January 13) which would reduce remaining U.S. troops to 69,000. President Nixon also announced (January 25) the eight-point proposal mentioned in 2. above, but Senator Edmund S. Muskie criticized it and proposed (February 2) the setting of a time limit for the general withdrawal of troops and also a reconciliation between the South Vietnamese Government and all political forces.
5. Moves of the Communist side
(1) North Vietnam
North Vietnam held its fourth National Assembly elections (April 11, 1971), the first in seven years, and the third meeting of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (December 14 through 17), the first in 10 years, which apparently were designed to raise the morale of the people in the anti-American struggle and also to promote their enthusiasm for national construction. That the seats allotted to representatives of South Vietnam were eliminated in the elections was viewed as North Vietnam's recognition of the independence of the South Vietnamese liberation forces. There was a great flood, reportedly the worst since the founding of North Vietnam, toward the end of August, and it is believed that the priority given to the reconstruction of the flood disaster will affect North Vietnam's domestic and foreign policies.
Externally, since Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit China, North Vietnam has been assuming a cautious attitude toward moves of a Sino-American rapprochement for fear of a direct deal between the two countries. The People's Republic of China seems to be appeasing North Vietnam, and Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's visit to North Vietnam (September 23 through 28), North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to China (November 20 through 27) and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi, which was disclosed by Prince Sihanouk (March 9) after the Nixon visit to China, can be taken as related to such moves of North Vietnam. In its relations with the Soviet Union, First Secretary Le Duan visited the Soviet Union (March 27 through May 9), while Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, visited North Vietnam (October 3 through 8). In view of the attitude of both the Soviet Union and North Vietnam which became cautious toward Nixon's visit to China as an attempt to split the socialist camp, relations between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union are believed to have become even closer since around President Podgorny's visit. The decision by India, chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, to exchange ambassadors with North Vietnam (January 7, 1972) is also believed to reflect that trend.
(2) People's Republic of China
The unusual speed with which the People's Republic of China expressed its wholehearted support (July 4, 1971) for the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Government of South Vietnam attracted attention as a manifestation that China was not necessarily opposed to negotiations for peace in Vietnam.
It was made clear that Henry Kissinger, the U.S. presidential advisor, discussed with Premier Chou En-lai the problem of obtaining the release of American prisoners-of-war during his two visits to China (the disclosure came during Nixon's press conference on January 2, 1972). After Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit China, the People's Republic of China tried to dispel North Vietnam's distrust in China, saying that the Indochina problem should be settled between the parties concerned through the Paris talks, etc., and that there could be no direct deal without consulting North Vietnam.
(3) Soviet Union
It seems that the Soviet Union aims at increasing its influence in Indochina relative to the People's Republic of China by taking advantage of North Vietnam's sense of caution against any attempt between the United States and China to ease tensions in Asia at the sacrifice of North Vietnam's interests, and increased Soviet support for North Vietnam is regarded as an effort toward that end. It can be said that the improved equipment of the communist troops as evidenced in the offensive in Laos during the dry season that began at the end of 1971, and also reports of a sharply increased number of Soviet ships visiting North Vietnam also endorse this.
Relations between the Soviet Union and the Sihanouk faction reportedly improved outwardly as a result of the visit to the Soviet Union of a mission of the National United Front of Cambodia (September 1 through 10, 1971). However, it seems that there has been no remarkable progress in their relations, partly because of an exchange of words over Sihanouk's statement that the Russians, who are white people, did not want a victory of the Indo-Chinese, who are yellow people, and also because of the effects of the intensified controversy between China and the Soviet Union after the U.N. General Assembly.