

Third Party Evaluation Report 2018  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

**Evaluation of Japan's Individual Grant Aid**  
(Non-Project Grant Aid to Togo in 2013)

March 2019

Global Link Management, Inc.

## Preface

This report, under the title “Evaluation of Japan’s Individual Grant Aid”, was undertaken by Global Link Management, Inc., entrusted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) in fiscal year 2018.

Since its commencement in 1954, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) has contributed to the development of partner countries and helped to provide solutions for international issues, which vary over time. Recently, in both Japan and the international community, implementing ODA has come to require greater effectiveness and efficiency. MOFA has been conducting ODA evaluations every year, of which most are conducted at the policy level with two main objectives: to improve the management of ODA, and to ensure its accountability. The evaluations are conducted by third parties to enhance transparency and objectivity.

At the grant level, MOFA started a third-party evaluation of individual grant aid implemented by MOFA (with an amount exceeding one billion Japanese Yen) in 2017 in order to further strengthen the feedback mechanism. The grant aid chosen in 2018 for the purpose of this evaluation was the Japan’s Non-Project Grant Aid to Togo in 2013.

Mr. Hiroshi SATO, Chief Senior Researcher of the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, served as the chief evaluator in supervising the entire evaluation process, and Dr. Yasushi KATSUMA, a professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) of Waseda University, served as an advisor to share his expertise on ODA. They have made enormous contributions to the completion of this report.

Also, this report was privileged to receive some valuable comments from Dr. Yuriko MINAMOTO, a professor at the Graduate School of Governance Studies of Meiji University, as an expert. In addition, during this study in Japan and Togo, we have benefited from the cooperation of MOFA, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Japan International Cooperation System (JICS), as well as government agencies in Togo and international organizations. We would like to take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to all those who were involved in this study.

Finally, the Evaluation Team wishes to note that the opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Government of Japan.

March 2019

Global Link Management, Inc.

Note: This report is an English summary of the Japanese version of the full report of “Evaluation of Japan’s Individual Grant Aid.”

## Evaluation of Japan's Individual Grant Aid: Non-Project Grant Aid to Togo in 2013 (Brief Summary)

### Evaluators (Evaluation Team)

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Advisor: Yasushi KATSUMA, Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) of Waseda University

Consultant: Global Link Management, Inc.

### Period of the Evaluation Study

July 2018 – March 2019

Field Survey Country: Togo, Cote d'Ivoire



Gasoline tanks in Lome, Togo

### Background, Objective, and Scope of Evaluation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) implemented “Non-Project Grant Aid to Togo in 2013 (1.1 billion Japanese yen)” to support Togo’s economic and social development and to contribute to poverty reduction. The main objectives of this evaluation are to improve management of ODA through the PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycle and to fulfill accountability to the people of Japan.

### Brief Summary of the Evaluation Results

#### ● **Development Viewpoints**

##### (1) Relevance of Grant Aid (Evaluation result: B Satisfactory)

Given the status of development indicators for Togo, the objective of this grant is relevant to Japan’s Development Assistance policy, country assistance strategy, Togolese development policy, and the international development agenda. The worldwide rise in oil prices in 2012 justified the use of the grant to import petroleum products for social stability. However, it seems that there was room to consider the procurement of products other than gasoline to further enhance the effectiveness of grant aid for poverty reduction.

##### (2) Effectiveness of Results (Evaluation result: B Satisfactory)

This grant was provided in the amount and period as stated in the Exchange of Notes (E/N) and gasoline was procured. As planned, gasoline was sold for domestic use, and nearly the same amount as the estimated revenue from the sales was deposited as the counterpart funds. Although verification of the effect on poverty reduction is limited to the scale of this grant, the counterpart funds were used in the health, education, and agricultural sectors. During the grant implementation period, the country’s poverty and social indicators improved, and this grant can be considered as one of the contributing factors for this improvement.

##### (3) Appropriateness of Processes (Evaluation result: C Partially unsatisfactory)

This grant was promptly implemented. However, some issues were identified. The records that would enable us to figure out how the grant preparation reflected lessons from similar grants provided in the past and how it considered alternative procurement items were not available. While the Embassy of Japan is not in Togo (in Cote d’Ivoire), no Japanese stakeholders visited Togo when the gasoline was delivered. In addition, no information was available on how Japanese stakeholders discussed the sales of the gasoline and the use of the counterpart funds with the Togolese government. These issues should be considered to improve the PDCA cycle and public relations.

## ● **Diplomatic Viewpoints**

### (1) Diplomatic Importance

This grant was prepared just before the 5th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and when Togo was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and it closely coordinated with Japan. Accordingly, the Japanese government considered this grant to be important in strengthening bilateral relations.

### (2) Diplomatic Impact

This grant contributed to Japan being ranked the second in OECD countries in terms of the total amount of ODA to Togo in 2013. Dialogue with the Japanese stakeholders throughout this grant has been appreciated by the Togolese government as having contributed to strengthening bilateral relations. However, the only publicity was in the beginning of the grant, for the signing ceremony of the E/N. While this grant had no direct benefits for Japanese companies and organizations, MOFA considers, in the long term, it will contribute to an environment conducive to the entry of Japanese companies and organizations through economic and social development and the stabilization of Togo.

## **Recommendations**

(1) Improvement in the preparation of grant aid implemented by MOFA: In the preparation document for grant aid titled "Economic and Social Development Programme" (formerly Non-Project Grant Aid), MOFA should include the following information: the reasons for selecting the sector and types of items to be procured, the expected outcome, and the lessons learned from previous grants. Ideally, information on previous procurement items by region and country would also be compiled as a reference for operations.

(2) Improvement of monitoring and recording from delivery of procured items to sales: Before procurement, Japanese stakeholders should check and record the following: the typical routes used in the distribution (selling) of goods to be procured, the anticipated amount of revenue for the government (as counterpart funds), and their consistency with the intention of the grant. At the time of delivery and preparation of the final report, the procurement agency should record the latest available information. MOFA should also consider making the procurement agents' final reports available for the public if the recipient governments agree.

(3) Improvement of information sharing on counterpart funds: MOFA should strengthen information sharing over the use and application of counterpart funds in advance with the recipient government. MOFA should also disclose information on the general outline of the counterpart funds, basic rules on use and reporting methods in English, and in the case of new grant aids, disclose information on whether the E/N includes a chapter on counterpart funds on the MOFA's website.

(4) Strengthening consultation and information sharing about Japan's grant aid to countries with no Japanese Embassy in the country: The Embassy should compile the information on all grant aid implemented by MOFA, including the list of names of projects/programs funded by the grants and the counterpart funds. Such comprehensive information should be shared with the recipient's government and used for further consultation during limited visit opportunities. As part of these efforts to strengthen publicity, it could also be effective to hold events periodically to share all Japan ODA information with wider audiences, including the grants implemented by MOFA as well as JICA.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CFA	CFA Franc
CIF	Cost, Insurance and Freight
CSFPPP	Monitoring Committee for the Petroleum Price Fluctuations (Comité de suivi des fluctuations des prix des produits pétroliers)
E/N	Exchange of Notes
FOB	Free on Board
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JICS	Japan International Cooperation System
MAECA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération et de l'Intégration Africaine)
MCPSP	Ministry of Commerce and Private Sector Promotion (Ministère du Commerce et de la Promotion du Secteur Privé)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MT	Metric Ton
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPGA	Non-Project Grant Aid
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PDCA	Plan Do Check Action
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PUDC	Community Development Emergency Program (Programme d'Urgence de Développement Communautaire)
SCAPE	Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment (Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Promotion de l'Emploi)
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
STE	Togolese Warehousing Company (Société Togolaise d'Entreposage)
STSL	Togolese Storage Company of Lome (Société Togolaise de Stockage de Lomé)
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank

## Chapter 1 Background and Context


### 1-1 Overview of Japanese Grant Aid Cycle and Evaluation

Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) as bilateral aid can be divided into grants and loans. Grants include technical cooperation, as well as grant aid, which provides the necessary funds for the development of the countries without requiring repayment<sup>1</sup>. Grant aid can be further divided into two groups: (a) grant aid for which the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is responsible for their implementation and management<sup>2</sup>, and (b) grant aid that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) directly implements in light of diplomatic needs.

More specifically, grants implemented by MOFA<sup>3</sup> include those called "Non-Project Grant Aid" (known as the grant aid for "Economic and Social Development Programme"<sup>4</sup> since April 2015), "Food Assistance," "Emergency Grant Aid," and "Grassroots Projects." For these grants, the recipient countries often work with a procurement agent, international organization, and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to ensure the appropriate use of grant funds, depending on the scale and type of the grants.

This report is prepared for the ex-post evaluation of individual grant aid implemented by MOFA. It is part of the operation flow as shown in Figure 1-1 for grant aid in which funds are used for the procurement (import) of goods with a procurement agency and, if the procured goods are sold in a recipient country, all the revenues should be deposited as counterpart funds and used for economic and social development after consultation with the Embassy of Japan. While JICA has been conducting ex-post evaluations for individual grant aid implemented by JICA for years, MOFA has initiated such ex-post evaluations for grant aid implemented by MOFA since FY2017<sup>5</sup>, in addition to policy and program-level evaluations. The main objectives of ODA evaluations are to improve management of ODA through the PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycle and to fulfill accountability to the people of Japan and to promote public understanding by publicizing evaluation results.

**Figure 1-1. Operation Flow for Grant Aid (example)**



Note: \*The information specified in red boxes is for "Non-Project Grant Aid"(or "Economic and Social Development Programme") implemented by MOFA. \*\*The information in the parenthesis is for grant aid implemented by JICA but not by MOFA.

<sup>1</sup> MOFA White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017.

<sup>2</sup> After Cabinet's approval, the government of the partner country signs Exchange of Notes with the Japanese government, then signs a Grant Agreement with JICA. ([https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our\\_work/types\\_of\\_assistance/grant\\_aid/cycle.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/grant_aid/cycle.html))

<sup>3</sup> See the Japanese version of the evaluation report (Annex 9, Column 9-2) for details.

<sup>4</sup> This provides grants for import of goods to promote economic and social development efforts by the developing countries. See JICS's 2018 Annual Report (p.6-7) for the other grant aids.

<sup>5</sup> In the case of either MOFA or JICA, the ex-post evaluation of individual grant aid is for grants with contributions of 200 million yen or more, and the post-evaluation is to be done by the third party for grants with contributions of 1 billion yen or more (MOFA's ODA Evaluation Guidelines and JICA Annual Evaluation Report 2017). Japanese fiscal year (FY) starts in April.

## 1-2 Objectives of Evaluation and Methodology

The main objectives of this evaluation are to improve management of ODA through the PDCA cycle and to fulfill accountability to the people of Japan by releasing evaluation results which leads to increasing transparency of ODA. The methodology for this evaluation of grant aid is based on MOFA's ODA evaluation guidelines (11<sup>th</sup> edition). This evaluation was conducted by the third-party evaluation team, which was commissioned by MOFA (see Table 1-1). The evaluation team conducted interviews with stakeholders in Japan and the recipient country, in addition to document review (see Annexes 1 and 2). There were also three formal review meetings with MOFA and JICA officials at the initial, middle, and final stages of this evaluation to validate the information collected by the evaluation team and to exchange opinions regarding the analyses and recommendations.

**Table 1-1. Evaluation team**

Role	Name, Title, Organization
Chief evaluator	Hiroshi Sato*, Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
Advisor	Yasushi Katsuma*, Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University
Consultant	Yukiko Sueyoshi, Senior Researcher, Global Link Management, Inc. Takako Yuki*, Senior Researcher, Global Link Management, Inc. Chie Murakami, Researcher, Global Link Management, Inc.

Note: \*The team members visited the recipient country (Togo). The following two sub-contracted consultants also joined in the visit: Yasuo Sumita (Senior Researcher, TAC International, Inc.) and Didi N. Tometike (Translators Networks).

According to the guideline, this evaluation adopts the five evaluation criteria listed below (associated with a few evaluation questions per criteria): the first three criteria from a development viewpoint and the latter two criteria from a diplomatic viewpoint<sup>6</sup>.

### ***Evaluation criteria from the development viewpoint:***

- (1) Relevance of grant aid: The extent to which the grant's objectives and content were relevant to the recipient country's development needs, international agenda, Japan's ODA policies, other donors' activities, and Japan's comparative advantage.
- (2) Effectiveness of results: The extent to which the grant's input, output, and outcome/impact were achieved, or are expected to be achieved.
- (3) Appropriateness of processes: The extent to which the processes undertaken by the grant's stakeholders in Japan and the recipient country were appropriate in the grant's preparation and implementation and in coordination with other donors.

### ***Evaluation criteria from the diplomatic viewpoint:***

- (4) Diplomatic importance: The extent to which the grant was expected to contribute to global priority issues, the bilateral relationship, and Japanese companies and citizens.
- (5) Diplomatic impact: The extent to which the grant contributed to global priority issues, the bilateral relationship, and Japanese companies and citizens.

Furthermore, ratings were used for the three evaluation criteria from the development viewpoints. The rating is given on a scale of four, with A being highly satisfactory, B satisfactory, C partially satisfactory, and D unsatisfactory (see the guidelines for details). This four-scale rating was introduced in FY2017 to promote the visualization of evaluation.

<sup>6</sup> As explained in the next section, this report evaluates grant aid to Togo for which the Embassy of Japan is not located in Togo but in Côte d'Ivoire. According to MOFA data, there are 19 African countries that have no Embassy of Japan within their countries (as of 2017). We consider this issue in our analyses and recommendations.

### 1-3 Overview of the Evaluated Grant Aid

For this ex-post evaluation in FY2018, “Non-Project Grant Aid (NPGA) to Togo in 2013<sup>7</sup> (1.1 billion Japanese yen)” was selected from the individual grant aid which were executed by the MOFA between 2012 and 2017 in an amount exceeding one billion Japanese yen.

Togo is a country in West Africa, with a population of 7.8 million and a gross national income (GNI) per capita of \$610 (2017)<sup>8</sup>. It is defined as a least developed country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The southern end is a coast, where the capital Lomé is located. The Togo Logistics Corridor (total length 667km) from the port of Lomé to the Northern border with Burkina Faso (667km) is the lifeline for Togo's development and regional economy and is one of the targets of the Japanese government's assistance policy to Togo<sup>9</sup>.

As summarized in Table 1-2, this grant was requested by the Togolese government as a response to an inquiry for NPGA from the Japanese government in February 2013. After the request was examined and approved by the Japanese government, the Exchange of Notes (E/N) was signed between the two governments in April 2013.

The objective of this grant to Togo was to contribute to poverty reduction by (a) using the grant funds to import petroleum products required for the country’s development and (b) utilizing the revenue from its sales (called “counterpart funds” of the government of Togo) for economic and social development programs in the health, education and agricultural sectors. The grant was used to procure gasoline and the counterpart funds’ activities were implemented as shown in Tables 1-3 and 1-4.

**Table 1-2. Overview of Key Documents before Implementation**

<p><b>(1) “Application Form for Obtaining NPGA from Japan”</b> (February 2013) for request from the Togolese Government</p>
<p><b>(a) NPGA requested</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Grant funds will be used to procure petroleum products, which will help the country stabilize the price for all the different populations, especially the most vulnerable. It will reinforce “participatory, balanced, and sustainable development” (fifth strategic pillar of the national “Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment, or SCAPE”).</li> <li>➤ Counterpart funds will be used to finance government programs in the education, health, and agriculture sectors (construction of classrooms for schoolchildren, construction of a peripheral care unit and clinics, purchase of fertilizer to increase food production, etc.)</li> </ul> <p><b>(b) Past NPGA</b> (FY2009)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ The petroleum products purchased allowed Togo to maintain these products at acceptable prices.</li> <li>➤ Counterpart funds were used to pay mineral fertilizer bills to increase agricultural productivity.</li> </ul>
<p><b>(2) “Consultation Material for Financial Execution”</b> (February 2013) for review by the Japanese government</p>
<p><b>(a) Country context</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <i>Economic situation:</i> Economic growth had been stagnant due to political turmoil, but it has gradually improved since the currency devaluation in 1994, and the GDP growth rate reached 5.0% in 2011. However, external factors such as the international market downturn for phosphate ore, cotton, and</li> </ul>

<sup>7</sup> While the E/N for this grant was signed in FY2013, the grant funds were from the Japanese ODA budget for FY2012. Therefore, some documents (e.g. JICS reports) use 2012 instead of 2013 for this grant.

<sup>8</sup> <https://data.worldbank.org/>

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.ci.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000187823.pdf>

<p>cacao, which are the main source of foreign exchange earnings, have caused serious problems, including fiscal deficits and external debt.</p> <p>➤ <i>Economic structural reform and poverty reduction efforts:</i> The Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) that stipulates the development policy from March 2009 to 2011 was formulated and, with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the country is actively working on economic structural reform.</p> <p><b>(b) Grant</b></p> <p>➤ <i>Aid effect.</i> The development funding necessary for poverty reduction efforts is lacking due to the weak production of cotton and phosphate ore, the impact of soaring crude oil prices and food prices, and the vulnerable economic infrastructure. The support is also important from the viewpoint of human security. Strengthening ties with Togo is also significant from the perspective of diplomatic relations for Japan.</p>
<p><b>(3) “Exchange of Note (E/N)”</b> between the Embassy of Japan in Côte d'Ivoire and the Togolese Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) (April 22, 2013, Togo)</p> <p>➤ <b>Grant amount &amp; Purpose:</b> 1.1 billion Japanese yen to contribute to economic and social development</p> <p>➤ <b>Usage:</b> Purchase of products selected from the list* by both government agreements (*E/N's appendices include the list of 118 potential items). Re-exporting products is prohibited.</p> <p>➤ <b>Counterpart funds:</b> The full amount of revenues from sales and rental of products are to be deposited in the West African Central Bank in. In principle, this should amount to more than one-half of the Free on Board (FOB) value of goods purchased, within three years. The funds are to be used for the economic and social development of the country, the details of which will be discussed by both countries, and the Togolese government will submit an implementation report in a form required by the Japanese government after using the funds.</p> <p>➤ <b>Arrangement concerning the modalities of application (appendices):</b> Information concerning the list of potential items for procurement, the committee to be organized for this grant, the contract to be made with a procurement agent (specified as Japan International Cooperation System: JICS).</p>
<p><b>(4) “Press Release”</b> regarding the E/N (published on MOFA website, April 22, 2013) (<a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press6_000130.html">https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press6_000130.html</a> )</p> <p>➤ The purpose of the grant is for 1.1 billion Japanese yen to procure goods required for the economic and social development of Togo.</p> <p>➤ The production of cotton and phosphate rock is sluggish, and due to the vulnerable economic infrastructure, development funding necessary for poverty reduction efforts is lacking. There are concerns that the price of petroleum products will rise, and social tension will increase. This cooperation is expected to contribute to poverty reduction by supporting economic and social development.</p>

Source: MOFA. The first three documents have not been publicly disclosed, but MOFA made them available for the evaluation team. The original documents are written in French in the case of (1) and (3) and Japanese in the case of (2) and (4).

**Table 1-3. Overview of Implementation**

<p><b>(1) Procurement of goods and deposit of the revenues as counterpart funds:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Agent agreement: MEF concluded a contract with JICS as a procurement agent (June 2013).</li> <li>- Item to be procured: Gasoline (super 91 unleaded gasoline)</li> <li>- First bidding: International competitive bidding failed.</li> <li>- Second bidding: Sarpdoil Trading SA was selected and the contract was finalized (December 2013).</li> <li>- Delivery location: Tanks managed by Togolese Storage Company of Lome (STSL)</li> <li>- Recipient (end user): Monitoring Committee for the Petroleum Price Fluctuations (CSFPPP<sup>10</sup>) under the Ministry of Trade and Promotion of the Private Sector (MCPSP).</li> <li>- Sales: Distributer/company which bought gasoline from CSFPPP.</li> <li>- Counterpart funds: 4,863,526,746CFA deposited by December 2014.</li> </ul>
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<sup>10</sup> CSFPPP includes representatives from MCPSP, MEF, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Directorate General of Customs, labor unions, the oil industry, and a service station. It is a unique domestic organization that is responsible for importing gasoline from Togo from 2008. It is also responsible for setting a nationwide retail price every month adjusted for various taxes for the price of imported gasoline and other costs.

<b>(2) Planning and implementing counterpart fund activities:</b>
- Plans: The Togolese government submitted the initial request for approval in March 2015 and then the formal requests were organized in five programs (in a format given by the Japanese government) in February 2016 (see Table 1-4). All proposals were approved by the Japanese government in April 2016.
- Implementation Reports: All activities were completed within 2016. The implementation reports (in a format given by the Japanese government) were submitted to the Japanese government.
Source: JICS final report (June 2017) JICS monthly reports, and interviews.

**Table 1-4. Overview of Utilization of Counterpart Funds**

	Project/Program Name	Executing Agency	Cost (CFA)	Ending date
1	Strengthening of the sanitary system	Ministry of Health and Social Protection	1,660,667,000	July 2016
2	Improvement of school infrastructure in primary and secondary education	Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education	714,500,000	May 2016
3	Strengthening university infrastructure in Lomé and Kara	Ministry of Higher Education and Research	1,150,000,000	August 2016
4	Strengthening the supply of drinking water	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Hydraulics *	1,025,044,746	June 2016
5	Program to strengthen agricultural production	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Hydraulics*	313,315,000	July 2016
		(TOTAL)	(4,863,526,746)	

Source: Togolese government's use plans (formulaire de requete) and implementation reports (rapport sur l'exécution).

Note: \* The Ministry was reorganized recently and is now called "Minister of Water and Village Hydraulics" and "Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries".

## Chapter 2 Evaluation Results

### 2-1 Relevance of Grant Aid (Evaluation Results: B Satisfactory)

#### (a) Japanese development policies

As Table 2-1 indicates, the foundation of Japan's development cooperation policy was the ODA Charter (decided by the Cabinet in 2003) at the time of this grant preparation (2012-2013). Annual priority policies on Japanese ODA, country assistance policies, and rolling plans were set under this ODA Charter. "Human security," one of the Charter's five basic policies, and "poverty reduction," which is one of the four priority issues, are relevant to the objective of this grant aid. "Poverty reduction" was also the priority issue in the Rolling Plan to Togo (2012) and a cooperation program was planned for "development that balanced the enhancement of social services and the economic revitalization." The Priority Policy for Development Cooperation (2012) regarded "human security" as one of the major objectives, in which support for Africa was presented, and stated that efforts would be made to realize Japan's pledge expressed in the "Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) IV."

**Table 2-1: Japan's Development Assistance Policies at Global and Country Levels**

Global, long term	ODA Charter (2003), [Development Cooperation Charter (February 2015)]
Global, annual	Priority Policy for International Cooperation (every year)
Country, medium term	Rolling Plan to Togo (2012) [Country Assistance Policy to Togo (May 2015)]

Note: Policy documents in brackets were issued after this grant was initiated. Some of the above documents are available in English or/and French on the MOFA's website (<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/policy.html>).

### **(b) Togolese development needs**

The objective of the grant was also relevant to the country's needs. As highlighted in Table 2-2, poverty levels were high, and challenges remained in achieving the global goals (Millennium Development Goals: MDGs) at the time of grant preparation. In 2012, the government developed its second poverty reduction strategy (SCAPE: 2013-2017) and the grant was related to SCAPE's fifth strategic pillar in the government's request (see Table 1-2).

The price of petroleum products, mentioned in this request, rose globally in 2011 and peaked in 2012, and it was an element of social instability for the country, which entirely depends on imports to meet its petroleum needs. The government used subsidies to soften the increase in retail prices through monthly adjustments to the taxes it collected on petroleum products. Although the oil subsidy policy had not particularly targeted a vulnerable population, it did not seem to have been a topic discussed between the two governments during the grant preparation. In addition, there was no preparation document to assess differences among various petroleum products (e.g., gasoline vs. kerosene) in their potential effects on the relatively poor as compared with the rich population<sup>11</sup>.

**Table 2-2: Development Indicators in Togo, 2010-2015-most recent**

Indicators	2010	2015	2017
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population)	59	55	n.a.
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	54	49	n.a.
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	70	83	91
School enrollment, primary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)	0.90	0.95	0.95
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	90	78	73
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	393	368	n.a.
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	3.0	2.3	2.1

Source: WB open data (<https://data.worldbank.org/>) (as of February 2019).

Note: Poverty data in italics is for 2011. n.a. Not available.

### **(c) International agenda, other donors' activities, Japanese comparative advantage**

The objective of the grant and the plan of counterpart fund activities (in health and education) were highly relevant to MDGs. Broadly speaking, the grant was also relevant to other donors' activities for Togo given the fact that the grant was relevant to the government's national strategy (SCAPE), whose implementation was also supported by other donors. In general, the modality of this grant (categorized as "commodity assistance" in the OECD-DAC database) has the potential to address Japanese comparative advantages in technology and knowledge through specific products. However, this was not the case for this grant as the Togolese government's request was made for petroleum products.

<sup>11</sup> According to the analysis of African household data in WB (2012) "Africa's Pulse (Volume 5)", the universal subsidy policy of gasoline prices (not targeting to a low-income group) tends to bring more benefits in high-income households than the others even as compared to kerosene, and it is an inefficient way to fight poverty.

## **2-2 Effectiveness of Results** (Evaluation Results: B Satisfactory)

This grant's preparation documents (explained in Table 1-2) did not specifically set any result framework or indicators for monitoring the progress towards the objective, as in this type of grant implemented by MOFA. Therefore, the evaluation team defined such indicators using available information (see Annex 3) and analyzed the results as summarized below.

### **(a) Input**

The grant was promptly transferred from Japan to the Togolese government's bank account in the exact amount (1.1 billion yen) stated in the E/N within one month after the signature of the E/N. Petroleum products planned to be purchased at the Togolese government's request were specified as "gasoline (super 91)" and delivered by March 2014. The quantity of gasoline delivered was equivalent to the quantity that JICS estimated with the total contract amount (in monetary terms) and the planned unit cost (by adding the successful bid price, including shipping costs, inspection expenses, insurance and other fees to the FOB price of gasoline at the time of delivery).

### **(b) Output**

**Gasoline domestically sold:** In Togo, any imported gasoline is first stored in the tanks of STSL. As the recipient of the imported gasoline under this grant is CSFPPP, which generally manage gasoline for domestic use, according to STSL, the gasoline must have been transferred from STSL to Togo Warehouse Company (STE), an agency that stocks gasoline for domestic consumption. Therefore, it would not have been used for re-export, which is forbidden in the E/N. At that time, CSFPPP should have sold the gasoline to any of domestic gasoline distributors (around 10 companies existed then), but it was not possible to specify which company purchased it, given the mixture of the gasoline with the other imported gasoline in the tanks.

**Counterpart funds:** The amount of counterpart funds deposited as revenues from the sales of the procured gasoline within one year from the delivery was nearly twice the minimum standard agreed in the E/N (i.e., more than half of the FOB value of procured gasoline). Furthermore, it can be broadly considered to have met the other condition, that is, the full amount of the revenues explained in section 2-3(c) below.

### **(c) Outcome/Impact**

The gasoline procured under this grant was equivalent to about one month of Togo's domestic demand and consumption. Given the scale of this input, the impact of this grant on the gasoline retail price was considered to be relatively small, but the Togo government did not raise the gasoline retail price in 2013 but did raise it in 2014 (from December 2014, it fell in line with world market trends). However, the Togo government's gasoline retail price was not accompanied by policies that would make the price inexpensive, especially for vulnerable people.

The counterpart funds were used for five programs in the health, education, water, and agriculture sectors as planned. The purpose, content, and amounts of budgets were specified in the use plan for each program. The implementation reports were submitted to the Embassy of Japan for all programs after completion and the reports included the photographs of rehabilitated buildings and procured goods associated with the explanations of completed activities, actual expenses, and beneficiaries (e.g., the number

of students increased by 166% as a result of the school facilities expansion). The evaluation team also visited some of the sites in the implementation reports. The team observed that the supported health facilities, school furniture, and water pumps were utilized, for example. In Togo as a whole, economic and social indicators have improved over the implementation period of this grant (2013-2017). However, it was not possible to identify the extent of the Japanese contribution in the final report of SCAPE (2013-2017).

**Photo 2-1. Results of Use of Counterpart Funds of the Evaluated Grant Aid**

New desk-chair sets procured at a primary school	Health center rebuilt
	
University amphitheater being constructed (with partial contribution from the counterpart funds)	New water pump procured
	

**2-3 Appropriateness of Processes (Evaluation Result: C Partially unsatisfactory)**

**(a) Preparation process**


As indicated in Table 1-2, the E/N was signed only two months after the request from the Togolese government. According to MOFA, in general, the Embassy of Japan would consult with its counterpart country before the formal request, but there was no such record available for the evaluation of this grant. Although the review document by the Japanese government ("Consultation Material for Financial Execution") provides various information, it does not appear to explain the reasons for choosing "petroleum products" and any measures to address lessons learned from similar grants provided in the past.

**(b) Implementation structure**

Figure 2-1 shows an overview of the implementation structure of this grant. The main actors on the Japanese side were MOFA and Embassy of Japan in Cote d'Ivoire (responsible for Togo). In addition, as a procurement agency of the Togolese government, JICS carried out procurement procedures, managed the grant aid funds, and reported on the progress to both governments. On the Togolese side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Cooperation and African Integration (MAECA) was the contact point for communication with the Embassy of Japan, and MEF was the executing agency and the signer on the E/N. The committee for this grant included the representatives from these ministries and was intended to discuss any issues with the grant. The recipient and end user of the procured gasoline was CSFPPP. The programs utilizing counterpart funds were implemented by ministries which were responsible for the relevant sectors.

**Figure 2-1. Implementation Structure of the Evaluated Grant**



**(c) Process for procurement of gasoline and accumulation of counterpart funds**

In accordance with the E/N, MEF signed a procurement agency contract with JICS. At the time of signing, JICS visited Togo and confirmed that the government selected gasoline as the procurement goods. The minutes confirming procurement items and conditions were signed between MEF and JICS, and CSFPPP also signed up as a witness. Although JICS had never visited Togo since signing the contract, it conducted coordination on the telephone or through mail, and it had submitted monthly reports, quarterly reports (including outstanding amount and expenditure of grant funds), and a final report to MEF and Embassy of Japan. According to the Embassy of Japan, the information is usually shared with the Embassy when a committee is held in a recipient country for a grant. However, there is no such record for this grant.

The bidding was held twice. The first was international competitive bidding, but according to the Togolese government, its bid price was higher than usual, which resulted in bidding failure. The second time was bidding through an international nomination competition among five companies (two companies expressed their interest at the first bid and the other three companies were recommended by the Togolese Government). Three companies participated in the actual bidding, and the company that satisfied all the requirements and presented the lowest price was selected. At delivery, JICS confirmed that the numerical values of the inspection certificate of imported gasoline issued by the third-party inspection agency matched the information in the receipt of the STSL. However, there was no delivery ceremony attended by any Japanese representatives. According to the Embassy of Japan, in general, a procurement agency asks the Embassy about

attending the delivery ceremony, but no such record was available for this grant. However, it is not necessarily required for the Embassy to attend such a ceremony.

The counterpart funds were deposited within the deadline (within three years after the E/N) in the account of the Togolese government at the West African Central Bank for this purpose. Both the government and JICS have the documents that indicate that the amount deposited for the counterpart funds is well above the minimum standard agreed in the E/N (i.e., more than half of the FOB value of procured gasoline). However, JICS has no record or information about whether the amount of the counterpart funds met the other criteria (the full amount of the revenues obtained from the sale of gasoline). According to CSFPPP, it was not practically possible to provide the information specific to the revenues from the gasoline delivered in 2014 under this grant, including the company name (out of 10 possible companies) and the sales price. This is because CSFPPP sold the gasoline as part of a regular operation (mixing with gasoline that was not procured under this grant). Instead, CSFPPP provided monthly information that was used by the government to determine the gasoline retail price over 2014, including the CIF (cost, insurance and freight) price of gasoline (super) imported (USD per MT) and other various expenses and taxes. Using the CIF price of gasoline, the evaluation team calculated the proxy amount of the revenues from the imported gasoline (10,501.614 MT) under this grant and the amount is almost the same as the amount of counterpart funds<sup>12</sup>.

#### **(d) Process for activities utilizing counterpart funds**

MEF managed the account holding the counterpart funds. The plans were discussed at the committee consisting of MEF, MAECA, and the Ministry of Development Planning, and the funds were withdrawn and executed according to the instructions of MAECA. In principle, a recipient government should consult with the Government of Japan about draft use plans before formalizing and implementing the plans. However, the Togolese government prepared the use plans as part of the government budget for 2015 and then requested approval from the Embassy of Japan in March 2015. Due to inadequacies in the form and information, the government needed to revise the plans into five programs (see Table 1-4). Accordingly, the official submissions were made in February 2016 and approvals were given by the Embassy of Japan in April 2016. As most of the activities had already been undertaken as part of the 2015 government's approved budgets<sup>13</sup>, all five programs were reported as completed within several months after the approval (within 2016). None of the sectoral ministries that served as implementation agencies for the counterpart funds recognized that the activities on the plans were funded by the counterpart funds, as the activities were part of the government budget book. MEF was not familiar with the procedure for using the counterpart funds set by the Japanese government and it was not easy to consult with the Embassy of Japan, which is not located in Togo but in Cote d'Ivoire. According to a Technical Advisor to the Office of the President of Togo, MEF consulted with the Embassy of Japan after discussions with the JICA expert (ODA adviser to MAECA at that time) and then made it possible to carry out the programs and complete the implementation reports.

#### **(e) Effective collaboration with Japan's other development assistance**

The main activity of this grant, i.e., procurement of petroleum products, is not necessarily relevant to Japan's other aid projects. With regards to the five programs financed with the

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<sup>12</sup> The Japanese version of this evaluation report (Annex 4) explains the details for data and calculations.

<sup>13</sup> The evaluation team was able to identify relevant activities in the government budget book for 2015, available online ("budget\_de\_letat\_gestion\_2015\_depenses.pdf").

counterpart funds, no information was available to indicate any collaboration or coordination with Japan's other grant aids in the same sectors (e.g., education, water)<sup>14</sup>. There was some collaboration with a JICA long-term expert, who had been on assignment in Togo since June 2013 as the first long-term expert to be dispatched to Togo in about 15 years. The objective of this dispatch was to advise on ODA to Togo, where there is no JICA office. Although the JICA expert did not have the authority to replace any part of the work on behalf of the Embassy of Japan, according to a former JICA long-term expert, there were times when they consulted together, particularly when a problem occurred.

#### **(f) Effective collaboration with other donors and international organizations**

There was no record of information sharing or consultation on the possibility of cooperation with other donors and international organization, either at the time of preparation or implementation for procurement of petroleum products or counterpart funds. More recently, there was a case in which the counterpart funds under another grant aid provided by Japan to Togo (Food Aid) was used under a program managed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) called the Community Development Emergency Program (PUDC)<sup>15</sup>.

## **2-4 Diplomatic Importance**

### **(a) International importance**

As for the international development agenda, as mentioned above, this grant aimed to contribute to Togo's poverty reduction and MDGs in education and health. In the total amount of ODA (gross) to Togo in 2013, the Japanese contribution, including this grant, was the second largest among OECD bilateral donors<sup>16</sup>.

### **(b) Importance of bilateral relations**

According to MOFA, Togo served as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2012 and 2013 and was also coordinating closely with Japan. According to the Embassy of Japan, the significance of further strengthening bilateral relations, in the light of TICAD V (held in Japan, June 2013) and Togo's friendly diplomacy (e.g., the visit of the Togolese President to the disaster area of the Great East Japan Earthquake in June 2011), was taken into consideration in making the decision on this grant.

Photo 2-2. Togolese President's Visit to Affected Areas



Source: Watari Town, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan

### **(c) Importance for Japanese citizens**

According to MOFA, the accumulation of Japan's development assistance over a long period of time lies behind the friendly relationship between Japan and Togo, and this grant is part of that. However, it is said that the examination of the direct significance of this grant for Japanese companies and organizations was not required in the process of preparation at that time.

<sup>14</sup> Other Japanese grant aid includes grant assistance for grassroots human security projects (about two projects per year over the past decade) and the grant aid project "Rural Water Supply Project in Maritime and Savanes Regions."

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.pudctogo.org/pudc-togo/1/contexte-1.html>

<sup>16</sup> Data extracted from OECD. Stat in August 2018.

## **2-5 Diplomatic Impact**

### **(a) Contribution in the international community**

As mentioned above, it can be inferred that this grant helped to raise Japan's presence among OECD countries giving assistance to Togo with regards to the amount of ODA. However, information on the content of this grant and the counterpart funds was not actively shared, and the contribution was not mentioned in either the final report of SCAPE (2013-2017) issued in 2017 or the annual aid reports of the Ministry of Planning and Development. We examined newspaper articles and websites and were able to confirm locally published articles on the signing ceremony of this grant (e.g., Togo Press), but we could not identify any published information on gasoline delivery or counterpart funds' utilization.

### **(b) Contribution to bilateral relations**

According to the Togolese government (MAECA), this grant reflected the interest of the Japanese government in the development of Togo and it contributed to strengthening bilateral relations with Japan through the dialogue among many stakeholders in the processes from request to completion. At a high level, the grant was also mentioned by the Japanese Prime Minister at the summit meeting with the Togolese President, who visited Japan for TICAD V in 2013<sup>17</sup>.

### **(c) Contribution to Japanese citizens**

According to JICS, there was one Japanese company that expressed interest in the bidding for procurement of gasoline under this grant, but it did not bid. As a result, there was no direct benefit to Japanese companies in the procurement of gasoline under this grant. Regarding the counterpart funds' activities, there was no information on the involvement of Japanese companies or NGOs, either. However, Japanese involvement could be less than in other countries, judging from the data on the number of Japanese residents in Togo and the number of companies and NGOs that have activities in Togo. Incidentally, the number of Japanese residing in Togo is increasing compared to before this grant. According to MOFA, in the long term, Togo's economic growth and the stabilization of society are expected to contribute to the creation of an environment that Japanese citizens can easily visit.

## **Chapter 3 Recommendations**

This chapter, based on the above analyses, will make recommendations for grant aid implemented by MOFA.

### **(1) Improvement in the preparation of grant aid**

The information available for the evaluation team was not enough to fully assess the appropriateness or quality of the grant preparation. In the preparation document for grant aid titled "Economic and Social Development Programme" (formerly Non-Project Grant Aid), MOFA should include the following information: the reasons for selecting the sector and types of items to be procured, the expected outcome, and the lessons learned from previous grant aid. When the local committee of the grant decides to procure a more specific item after signing the E/N, the local committee should also record the reason for its selection.

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<sup>17</sup> [https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e\\_000042.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000042.html)

In addition, in order to ensure the prompt consultations required locally at the time of grant preparation, MOFA should compile information on previous procurement items by region and country as an operational reference. Furthermore, ideally MOFA should carry out reviews of the typical procured items listed in the appendix of the E/N (e.g., about 100 items listed for this evaluated grant aid) in light of the current international priority agenda towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, it should assess whether petroleum products, as fossil fuels, should remain an option or not in view of Goal 13, which is “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.”

## **(2) Improvement of monitoring and recording from delivery of procured items to sale**

In this evaluation, it was not possible to trace the procured goods (gasoline) up to specific distributors and consumers and to figure out the total amount of revenues from the sales' records, although the approximate total amount was calculated by the evaluation team using reference data obtained from the Togolese government. Even if it is a product with less definite shape, Japanese stakeholders (MOFA, Embassy of Japan, procurement agency) should identify the usual import and distribution system with the recipient government, the plan for selling or distributing the procured products (anticipated types of distributors, consumers and revenues), and their relevance to the objective and intention of the E/N, prior to procurement. Also, at the time of delivery and preparation of the final report, the procurement agent should record the latest available information regarding the distribution and sales of the procured goods, revenues from the sales, and counterpart funds. If it is significantly different from the initial plan, the procurement agent should also record a reason. MOFA should also consider making procurement agents' final reports available for the public if the recipient governments agree.

## **(3) Improvement of information sharing on counterpart funds**

This evaluation observed the achievements of counterpart funds (e.g., health centers) through site visits and the implementation reports of the recipient government. On the other hand, there were some issues that should be improved in the process of planning activities for the counterpart funds and the degree of recognition of the recipient government's implementation agencies and donors regarding counterpart funds. MOFA should strengthen prior information sharing with the recipient government regarding how to apply and use counterpart funds. At the key timing of the grant (e.g., signing the E/N, delivery of main procured products), Japanese stakeholders (Embassy of Japan and/or procurement agency) should explain to the recipient government about how to deposit and use counterpart funds with relevant materials. In addition, the MOFA should make more information available in public in Japanese and English<sup>18</sup> with regards to the counterpart funds' general outline, basic rules of use, and reporting method for the relevant grant aids (e.g. “Economic and Social Development Programme” and “Food Aid”). In the case of new grant aids, information should also be disclosed on whether the E/N includes the chapter on counterpart funds on the MOFA's website. In addition, disclosure by the recipient government of plans and achievements in the use of counterpart funds on the website where it is appropriate, for example, could be a way to improve public relations.

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<sup>18</sup> In this evaluation study, Togo is a French-speaking country, and it is desirable to create a document in French, but the translation to other languages including French must be made easier by creating common information first in English.

**(4) Strengthening consultation and information sharing about Japan's grant aid to countries with no Japanese Embassy in the country**

In the case of this evaluated grant aid, the Embassy of Japan did not send any representative to Togo other than to the signing ceremony for the E/N. The Japanese procurement agency (JICS) also visited Togo only once for the contract signing. In order to improve implementation processes and public relations, local consultation and information sharing should be strengthened.

First, the Embassy of Japan should compile the information on all grant aid implemented by MOFA, including the list of names of projects/programs funded by the grants and the counterpart funds. Such comprehensive information should be shared with the recipient's government and used for further consultation during limited visit opportunities. Also, as far as possible, ideally Japanese representatives would attend at the time of delivery, regardless of the nature of the main procured goods, which can also contribute to the visualization of Japan's ODA and the transparency of the post-delivery process. Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen publicity, it could also be effective to hold periodic events to share all Japan ODA information, including the grants implemented by MOFA as well as JICA with wider audiences. Such an example was the "Japan-Togo Week", an event held in Togo, November 2018, that included a seminar and visits to Japan's past and present ODA project sites with Togolese government officials, as well as press representatives<sup>19</sup>. Holding such events regularly could be an effective way to continually improve the recognition of collaboration between the recipient county and Japan.

Finally, an effective way to strengthen Japan's support structure in countries with no Japanese Embassy with a long-term perspective would be to have human resources who have knowledge of Japan and experiences related to Japan on the side of the recipient government. One way of accomplishing this would be for MOFA to pay attention to such countries in deciding on the allocation of training courses in Japan for administrative officers from developing countries.

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<sup>19</sup> <https://www.republicoftogo.com/Toutes-les-rubriques/Cooperation/Partenariat-multiforme>

## Annex 1 Information on Visits to Togo

**Table A1-1. List of Main Interviews by the Evaluation Team in in Togo**

Organization	Role
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration	Director for International Cooperation, Officer in Charge for Studies, ODA Advisor (JICA long-term Expert)
Ministry of Economy and Finance	Director for Public Debt and Financing, Finance Administrator in Charge for Studies
Office of the President of the Republic of Togo	Technical Advisor Infrastructure Development and Management
Monitoring Committee for the Petroleum Price Fluctuations (CSFPPP) under Ministry of Trade and Promotion of the Private Sector	Technical Adviser, and others
Togolese Storage Company of Lomé (STSL)	Executive Director Operations Director
UNDP	Deputy Resident Representative Director of PUDC Operations
IMF	Economist
WB	Principal Economist Operations Officer

Note: The team visited the Embassy of Japan and JICA offices in Cote d'Ivoire.

**Table A1-2. List of Site Visits by the Evaluation Team in Togo**

Sector	Name of site
Health	1. CMS (Centre Médico-social; Social health center) in Baguida 2. CHU Campus (Centre Hospitalier et Universitaire; university hospital center), Lomé University
Primary and secondary education	1. EEP (public primary school) in Amadahome, West Lomé 2. EEP (public primary school) in Kleme Agokpanou, West Lomé. 3. Lycee (secondary school) Adidogome II
Higher education	1,500-seat amphitheater/lecture hall of Lomé University
Rural water supply	Drilling rehabilitated in the village of Tonoukouti, canton of Adeti Kope, Zio

Note: Sites which received activities supported fully or partially by the counterpart funds of the evaluated grant aid

## **Annex 2 Main Reference in English or French**

(See the Japanese version of the evaluation report for the full reference.)

### **[Japan's ODA-related documents]**

MOFA. 2018. White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000406627.pdf>

MOFA. 2019. ODA Evaluation Guidelines (11<sup>th</sup> Edition).

[https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/basic\\_documents/pdfs/guidelines11th.pdf](https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/basic_documents/pdfs/guidelines11th.pdf)

JICA. 2018. Annual Report.

<https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2018/index.html>

JICA. 2017. Annual Evaluation Report 2017.

[https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our\\_work/evaluation/reports/2017/index.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/reports/2017/index.html)

JICS. 2018. Annual Report.

[https://www.jics.or.jp/jics\\_html-e/profile/pdf/jics2018\\_e\\_2.pdf](https://www.jics.or.jp/jics_html-e/profile/pdf/jics2018_e_2.pdf)

JICS. 2017. Rapport Final for Aide Financière Non-Remboursable Hours Projet de L'Exercice 2012 pr Le Gouvernement du Japon Pour La République Togolaise.

### **[Documents and other on Togolese development]**

PUDC/UNDP. 2018. Achievement 2017-2018.

<http://www.pudctogo.org/public/images/ressource/pudctogo-20042018180950-PUDC-TOGO-achievements-2017-2018.pdf>

République Togolaise. 2018. Plan National De Developpment (PND) 2018-2022, Version Finale

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IMF. 2014. Togo 2013 Article IV Consultation.

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World Bank. 2017. Togo: Completion and Learning Review for FY2008-2015, Including Interim Strategy Notes for FY2008-2010 and FY2012-2013.

World Bank. 2017. Implementation Completion and Results Report for Togo - Economic Growth and Governance Credit Project.

World Bank. 2018. Implementation Completion and Results Report for Togo - Community Development and Safety Nets Project.

### Annex 3. Results Framework for the Evaluated Grant Aid: Plan and Actual Status

	Plan* (February-June 2013)	Actual **(April 2013-June 2017)
Input	1. Grant funds (1.1billion Japanese yen) 2. Petroleum products to be procured	1. The planned amount was transferred in full to the Togolese government's account (May 2013) <sup>a/</sup> 2. Gasoline procured and delivered (January, March 2014) : 10,501.614 Metric Ton (MT) <sup>***</sup> , USD10,462, 232.95 <sup>a/</sup>
Output	1. Distribution/sale of procured petroleum product in domestic market (not for re-export) 2. Counterpart funds deposited: 2a. Full amount of the revenue from the sale of procured items 2b. More than one-half of FOB value of procured items	1. The recipient (CSFPPP) was responsible for selling the imported gasoline to domestic distributors <sup>a/</sup> 2. Counterpart funds deposited : 4,863,526,746CFA <sup>a/</sup> 2a. Nearly the same as the estimated amount of the revenues <sup>b/</sup> 2b. Nearly double one-half of FOB value of the imported gasoline (2,504,719,768CFA) <sup>a/</sup>
Outcome/Impact	The procured petroleum product contributed to the following: 1. Domestic consumption of gasoline 2. Stable retail price of gasoline (especially for the vulnerable) 3. Improved government finances 4. Economic and social development through the utilization of the counterpart funds 5. Economic growth and poverty reduction	1. The quantity of imported gasoline accounted for around a one-month volume of Togo's total imported gasoline <sup>b/</sup> 2. Gasoline retail prices did not rise in 2013 <sup>c/</sup> (no information on measures to benefit the vulnerable population) 3. Trends in the domestic primary balance over 2012-2015 did not show an improvement in 2013 or 2014. <sup>d/</sup> 4. The counterpart funds were used for the intended social sectors. <sup>e/</sup> 5. GDP real growth rate remained at over 4% in 2013-2017, Poverty headcount ratio (at \$1.90 a day) decreased from 54% in 2011 to 49% in 2015 <sup>f/</sup>

Source: \*The E/N and the request. \*\* Various sources include: a) JICS final report (June 2017) and monthly report (May 2015), and interviews; b) Interview and estimate by the evaluation team using the data from CSFPPP on annual imported gasoline (super 91) in 2013 and 2014 from CSFPPP; c) CSFPPP; d) IMF (2013, 2014) "Togo Article IV Consultation"; e) Same for Table 1-4; f) Republic of Togo (2017) "Report of the Implementation of SCAPE", and World bank open data. <sup>\*\*\*</sup>January 2014 for 9,915.005MT and March 2014 for 586.609MT. Due to the limited space of STSL tanks, the delivery needed to be divided.

### Annex 4. Transactions with the Evaluated Grant's Funds

**Table A4. Balance of Completed Transactions**

	Government account	JICS supply account in JPY	JICS supply account in USD
Total Donation Amount	¥ 1.1 billion		
Transfer of the Fund to Supply Accounts	- ¥ 1.1 billion	¥ 33,000,000	\$ 10,477,219.17
Amount of Compensation Agent (JICS)		- ¥ 33,000,000	
Interests			\$ 603.59
Total Amount of Products and Affected Services			-\$ 10,462,232.95
Total Amount of Banking Fees			-\$ 2719.28
Refund*			-\$ 12,870.53
Total	¥ 0	¥ 0	\$ 0

Source: JICS Final Report (June 2017)

Note: The positive numbers are for credit. The negative numbers are for debits. \* After all the acquisitions of the products, there was a remainder (12,924.75 USD). This amount was refunded to the Togolese Government according to the terms of the application appended to the E/N. The refund was made to purchase a copier and toner.