

Third Party Evaluation Report 2017
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Evaluation of Japan's ODA to Africa through the TICAD Process for the Past 10 Years

March 2018

Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc.

Preface

This report, under the title *Evaluation of Japan's TICAD Process-Based Assistance to Africa for the Past 10 Years*, was undertaken by Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc., entrusted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) in fiscal year 2017.

Since its commencement in 1954, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has contributed to the development of partner countries, and has contributed to bringing solutions for international issues which vary over time. Recently, in both Japan and the international community, implementing ODA requires higher effectiveness and efficiency. MOFA has been conducting ODA evaluations every year, of which most are conducted at the policy level with two main objectives: to improve the management of ODA; and to ensure its accountability. The evaluations are conducted by third parties, to enhance transparency and objectivity.

This evaluation report comprehensively assesses the ODA that Japan has provided to Africa through the process related to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) for the last 10 years. The evaluation was made in consideration of international development cooperation trends, development needs of Africa, trends in Japan's initiatives, changes made to the development indicators for Africa, and the specific assistance processes. Moreover, it was conducted from diplomatic viewpoints as well as from development viewpoints, specifically by evaluating the influence that Japan has had on the international community and local societies through its ODA-based contributions. The study is designed to show lessons learned and make recommendations for the future formulation and implementation of Japan's assistance policies.

Katsuya Mochizuki, professor at the Department of International Cooperation, Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University, served as a chief evaluator to supervise the entire evaluation process, and Kiyoko Ikegami, chair of the Board of the Plan International Japan and professor at the Nagasaki University School of Tropical Medicine and Global Health, served as an advisor to share her expertise on global health. They have made enormous contributions from the beginning of the study to the completion of this report. In addition, in the course of this study both in Japan and in Ghana, we have benefited from the cooperation of MOFA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the local ODA Task Force, as well as government agencies in Ghana. The evaluation team would like to take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to all those who were involved in this study.

Finally, the Evaluation Team wishes to note that the opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Government of Japan.

March 2018

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Note: This English version of the Evaluation Report is a summary of the Japanese Evaluation Report of *Evaluation of Japan's ODA to Africa through the TICAD Process for the Past 10 Years*.

Evaluation of Japan's ODA to Africa through the TICAD Process for the Past 10 Years

<Overview>

Evaluation team members:

- Chief Evaluator: Katsuya Mochizuki, Professor at the Department of International Cooperation, Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University
- Advisor: Kiyoko Ikegami, Chair of the Board of the Plan International Japan, and Professor at the School of Tropical Medicine and Global Health of Nagasaki University
- Consultant: Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc.

Evaluation period: July 2017 to February 2018

Field study country: Ghana

[Photo, upper right: A community health facility in the Upper West Region, Ghana
Photo, lower right: Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research, Ghana]



Background, Objectives, and Scope of Evaluation

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is an international forum led by Japan that focuses on the development of Africa. The TICAD process is considered to provide the basis for Japan's policies on the development of Africa. The evaluation study addresses the measures formulated based on Japan's policies on assistance to Africa announced at the TICAD summit-level meetings held over the past 10 years.

Brief Summary of the Evaluation Results

● Development Viewpoints

(1) Relevance of Policies (Rating: B "satisfactory")

The relevance of Japan's policies on assistance to Africa, in regard to consistencies with (1) international initiatives and development cooperation trends; (2) Japan's relevant policies such as the Development Cooperation Charter; and (3) development needs of Africa, is generally high. With individual policy documents and events, however, there is partial lack of clear consistency, which seems to be caused by a deficiency of explanations about Japan's recognition of issues and the philosophical underpinnings of its policies on assistance to Africa.

(2) Effectiveness of Results (Rating: C “partially unsatisfactory”)^{※1,2}

For the results and achievements made through Japan’s ODA to Africa in terms of (1) Input; (2) Output; (3) Impact; and (4) Achievements in the Case-study country (Ghana), the rating is generally high for (2) and (4) in the country, while the size of (3) is unknown due to a lack of significant analysis results. As for (1), the target of increasing the amount spent in assistance to Africa was achieved, but the input amount is insufficient considering the economic size of Japan in comparison with the average input level of major donors and the relevant international targets.

(3) Appropriateness of Processes (Rating: B “satisfactory”)

The appropriateness of processes for Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa was rated highly as a whole. However, for (2), it was pointed out in the evaluation study that there was still room for enhancement and improvement regarding information sharing between the government and assistance implementation organizations.

● Diplomatic Viewpoints

From an economic perspective, the diplomatic importance of Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa seems to have increased step by step since 2008, when TICAD IV was held. The evaluation team verified the diplomatic effect of the policies in economic terms with regard to the (1) monetary value of Japan’s export to, import from and investment in Africa; (2) sales recorded by Japanese companies’ local subsidiaries in Africa; and (3) outlook for businesses run by Japanese companies targeting Africa. As a result, it was revealed that the economic effect or benefit of the policies had not yet been fully realized by Japan, but such effect might be forthcoming in the future as the amount of business conducted by Japanese companies in Africa is gradually increasing.

Recommendations

(1) Documentation of Japan’s recognition of issues and philosophical underpinnings of policies with regard to assistance to Africa^{※3}

The documents on Japan’s policies on ODA to Africa (detailed later) lack explanations about the country’s recognition of issues faced by Africa and about the underlying philosophy that shapes the policies formulated to tackle these issues. It is therefore recommended to: (1) replace the current compact “resume”-like documents describing Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa with “reading materials;” or (2) create explanatory documents a posteriori in addition to the documents describing the policies on assistance to Africa, thereby remedying the deficiency of explanations and helping those involved

※ MOFA’s divergence of opinions against the third-party Evaluation Team’s opinions of ※ 1, 2 and 3 are shown respectively on p. 16, p. 15, and pp. 11 and 20.

in ODA and related fields and the general public to deepen their understanding of the policies.

(2) Enhancement of regional/south-south cooperation

It is recommended that regional projects encompassing multiple countries in the region as well as south-south cooperation between African countries be fostered to enhance the sharing and transfer of development results across Africa. It is worthwhile to include descriptions on the “modality” in the documents describing Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa.

(3) Enhancement of cooperation with other donors and the African Union

TICAD is an open forum held by Japan in partnership with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Union Commission (AUC). Support from and collaboration with these international organizations would greatly help Japan achieve further results in its assistance to Africa. It is therefore recommended that Japan further enhance cooperation with other donors and the AU.

(4) Promotion of TICAD namesake projects and facilities

For Japan to raise the level of interest among domestic companies in doing business in Africa in order to implement projects actually undertaken in the region and thereby bring about economic benefits to Japan as a result of its ODA diplomacy, the country needs to attract more attention to and interest in TICAD and its policies on assistance to Africa. To this end, it is recommended that the government further promote TICAD namesake projects and facilities as a means of increasing public awareness of TICAD and Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa.

(5) Examination for the prompt implementation of core TICAD projects

Some point out that it takes a considerable amount of time for Japan to decide on the implementation of a development assistance project, and that accelerating the decision-making process would help increase Japan’s presence in Africa. It is therefore recommended that the government examine how to shorten the time required to make decisions on the implementation of projects in fields specified in the policies as core areas.

Contents

Preface	i
Report Overview	ii
Contents	v
Chapter 1 Outline of Evaluation	1
1-1 Background and Purpose of the Evaluation	1
1-2 Scope of the Evaluation	1
1-3 Evaluation Framework	2
1-4 Evaluation Procedures	3
Chapter 2 TICAD and Japan's Policies on Assistance to Africa	5
2-1 Outline of TICAD	5
2-2 Japan's Policies on Assistance to Africa Announced through TICAD	6
Chapter 3 Evaluation of Japan's TICAD Process-Based Assistance to Africa	8
3-1 Evaluation of the "Relevance of Policies"	8
3-2 Evaluation of the "Effectiveness of Results"	11
3-3 Evaluation of the "Appropriateness of Processes"	17
3-4 Evaluation from Diplomatic Viewpoints	18
Chapter 4 Recommendations	20
4-1 Documentation of Japan's Recognition of Issues and Philosophical Underpinnings of Policies with Regard to Assistance to Africa	20
4-2 Enhancement of Regional/South-South Cooperation	22
4-3 Enhancement of Cooperation with Other Donors and the African Union	23
4-4 Promotion of TICAD Namesake Projects and Facilities	24
4-5 Examination for the Prompt Implementation of Core TICAD Projects ..	25

Chapter 1

Outline of Evaluation

1-1 Background and Purpose of the Evaluation

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is a forerunner among international forums that focus on the development of Africa. Held in Japan every five years since 1993, the TICAD summit-level meeting was held in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya) for the first time in 2016, three years after the previous meeting held in Japan. Going forward, the meeting is planned to be held alternatively in Japan and Africa every three years.

The TICAD process is regarded as a process that provides the basis for Japan's policies on assistance to Africa, and the policy framework has been announced at each round of the TICAD summit-level meeting. The next summit-level meeting will be held again in Japan in 2019. In recognition of the following issues related to the international community, the evaluation team has assessed the measures formulated based on the policies on assistance to Africa announced by the Japanese government at each round of TICAD held over the past 10 years from both development viewpoints and diplomatic viewpoints. The evaluation study will contribute to the future formulation of Japan's policies on assistance to Africa.

- Recent high economic growth and remaining structural vulnerability in Africa
- Both progress and stagnation of social development addressed for 15 years under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and then continued under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- The rise of emerging donors and the private sector in the area of cooperation for and investment in African development

1-2 Scope of the Evaluation

This evaluation has addressed the measures formulated based on the documents describing Japan's policies on assistance to Africa, which were respectively announced at the summit-leveling meeting held at TICAD IV (2008), TICAD V (2013) and TICAD VI (2016): "Japan's initiatives at TICAD IV" (2008), "Japan's Assistance Package for Africa at TICAD V" (2013) and "Japan's measures for Africa at TICAD VI" (2016). These policy documents are

exhaustive, and measures formulated based on the documents include the entirety of ODA projects implemented by Japan for Africa.

1-3 Evaluation Framework

The evaluation study was conducted from development viewpoints and diplomatic viewpoints in line with the ODA Evaluation Guidelines (10th Edition) issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Evaluation from development viewpoints was carried out with regard to the following three items: “relevance of policies,” “effectiveness of results” and “appropriateness of processes,” and the evaluation team has also made assessments according to the rating scale as shown in Table 1 below. Table 2 shows the entire evaluation framework.

Table 1 Rating scale for the evaluation from development viewpoints

Viewpoints	Rating scale
Relevance of policies	A: highly satisfactory
	B: satisfactory
	C: partially unsatisfactory
	D: unsatisfactory
Effectiveness of results	A: highly satisfactory
	B: satisfactory
	C: partially unsatisfactory
	D: unsatisfactory
Appropriateness of processes	A: highly satisfactory
	B: satisfactory
	C: partially unsatisfactory
	D: unsatisfactory

Source: MOFA, “Third Party ODA Evaluation Rating Criteria Revision Proposal,” January 2018.

Table 2 Evaluation Framework

	Evaluation items	Evaluation contents
Relevance of policies	Consistency with international development cooperation trends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consistency with the MDGs ➤ Consistency with the SDGs ➤ Consistency with other international trends on African development
	Consistency with Japan’s high-level policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consistency with <i>ODA Charter</i> and <i>Development Cooperation Charter</i> ➤ Consistency with <i>Priority Policies for International/ Development Cooperation</i> ➤ Consistency with TICAD’s outcome documents

	Evaluation items	Evaluation contents
	Consistency with Africa's policies and needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Consistency with the <i>New Partnership for Africa's Development</i> and the African Union's <i>Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want</i> ➤ Consistency with Africa's needs seen in economic and social development indicators ➤ Consistency with needs in the case-study country (Ghana)
Effectiveness of results	Input	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Volume of Japan's ODA to Africa ➤ Share of African recipients in Japan's entire ODA move ➤ Recipient diversification of Japan's ODA to Africa ➤ Sectoral changes of Japan's ODA to Africa ➤ International comparison of ODA volume to Africa ➤ International comparison of ODA/GNI ratio to Africa
	Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Quantitative output targets and results
	Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Development indicators' movements in major African recipients of Japan's ODA ➤ Estimation of Japan's contribution to development impacts
	Case study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Outputs and outcomes in the case-study country (Ghana)
Appropriateness of processes	Policy making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Division of roles within MOFA ➤ Involvement of relevant organizations
	Policy application	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Country Assistance Policies ➤ JICA's Mid-term Plans and JICA Country Analysis Papers ➤ African governments
	Program/Project formulation and implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Program/project formulation and implementation processes ➤ Continuous grasp of recipients' needs ➤ Implementation system ➤ Understanding status of implementation ➤ Cooperation with other donors and international organizations
Diplomatic viewpoints	Diplomatic importance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Diplomatic importance of Japan's ODA based on African development cooperation policies (National interests expected through ODA)
	Diplomatic effect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Diplomatic effect of Japan's ODA based on African development cooperation policies (National interests realized through ODA)

Source: Evaluation team

1-4 Evaluation Procedures

The evaluation team led by the chief evaluator attended the first consultation meeting held with the related departments of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA to confirm the purpose, scope, methodology and work

schedule of the evaluation study and to decide on the implementation plan for the study.

Then, according to the evaluation scope and framework set in the implementation plan, the evaluation team conducted a literature survey by using the related documents (policy documents, reports on past aid projects, fundamental statistical records, academic papers and other relevant documents). In the survey, the team collected and sorted data related to the objectives, activity records/results and implementation processes of Japan's ODA to Africa.

Moreover, the team interviewed the related organizations in Japan.

Based on the results of the literature survey and interviews carried out in Japan, the team conducted a field survey in Ghana, which was the case-study country selected for the evaluation study. In the field survey, the team interviewed local organizations related to the Japanese government, governmental agencies of Ghana, and beneficiaries of the ODA, and also visited the related sites.

The team performed analyses and verifications based on the information collected through the surveys conducted in Japan and in Ghana and according to the evaluation framework. The team thereby created a draft report on which it sought input from the related departments of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA through consultation meetings. It then finalized the report by incorporating the views of the departments.

Chapter 2

TICAD and Japan's Policies on Assistance to Africa

2-1 Outline of TICAD

TICAD is an international conference on the development of Africa held under the leadership of the Japanese government and participated in by almost all African countries as well as many donor countries and international organizations. In a narrow sense, TICAD refers to the summit-level meetings that have been held every five or three years since 1993 and are differentiated by Roman numerals, such as “TICAD VI”. In a wider sense, TICAD also refers to the entirety of the meetings held as preparatory or follow-up meetings for the summit-level meeting, including ministerial-level meetings and senior officials’ meetings as well as meetings held on specific themes such as trade and investment, consolidation of peace, and environment and energy. In a latter sense, it is also called the “TICAD Process”.

By the first half of the 1990s, when TICAD was initiated, motivation to use development assistance strategically for diplomatic purposes had diminished with the end of the Cold War, and “donor fatigue” was becoming prevalent due to the failure of the approach taken by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under this approach, assistance was conditional on “structural adjustment,” including the stabilization of the primary balance and balance of payments, deregulation, economic liberalization and privatization. Meanwhile, Japan’s so-called bubble economy was making it the world’s largest donor country and, separate from the structural adjustment requirement, the Japanese government established the ODA Charter in 1992 in line with the basic philosophy of providing ODA to support the self-help efforts of developing countries based on good governance. Subsequently, the Japanese government formulated its sectoral development policies, called “Initiatives.” Launched against this backdrop, TICAD shows Japan’s strong commitment, as a major ODA provider on par with Western countries, to providing full assistance to the development of Africa, with which it has had no strong relationship historically, politically or economically, as compared to Asia¹. TICAD can therefore be

¹ At the MOFA website, it is stated as follows: “When the Cold War ended, developed countries’ interest in providing assistance to Africa began to wane. Under such circumstance, it was Japan that argued for the importance of Africa, and TICAD was the proof of Japan taking action.”

regarded as a generic term for Japan's development initiatives for Africa².

2-2 Japan's Policies on Assistance to Africa Announced through TICAD

As mentioned above, TICAD is a process initiated and led by Japan and encompasses Japan's initiatives for the development of Africa. It is also an open and inclusive international forum in which most African countries and many donor countries and international organizations participate. At the TICAD summit-level meeting, Japan has led the creation of declarations, plans and other output documents while also proposing unilateral assistance policies for Africa.

The measures formulated based on the documents describing Japan's policies on assistance to Africa announced at the three rounds of the summit-level meeting held at and after TICAD IV (2008) are the specific scope of this evaluation study. Each of the policy documents is a two- to four-page compact "resume," although they are original documents and not summaries of originals. Neither MOFA nor the Japanese government has created any official "Kommentar"-like documents to serve as policy documents.

Of the three policy documents, "Japan's initiatives at TICAD IV" is the most compact. This document briefly describes the assistance measures to be implemented for the focused areas of cooperation selected from the development agenda given in the Yokohama Action Plan, an outcome document of the 2008 summit-level meeting: (1) regional infrastructure development, (2) agriculture/food, (3) trade and investment, (4) community development, (5) education, (6) health, (7) water and (8) climate change. The first three are related to economic development³, and the remaining five are treating areas related to social development with somewhat less description than the first three. The structure of this policy document contrasts with that of "Japan's New Assistance Program for Africa in line with the TICAD II Agenda for Action" (1998), which lists the action agenda for social development before the agenda for economic development, and with that of the similar document released at the TICAD III in 2003, which lists "people-centered development" before the "eradication of poverty through economic growth."

² This paragraph's analysis depends on: Katsuya Mochizuki, "Nihon no Tai Afurika Kaihatsu Enjo" (Japan's Development Assistance to Africa), Shinichi Takeuchi ed., *Seicho suru Afurika* (Perspectives on Growing Africa), conference report, pp.13-14; and Motoki Takahashi, "TICAD no Hensen to Sekai" (Changes in TICADs and the World), *Africa Report*, No. 55, 2017, pp. 49-50.

³ However, for "Agriculture/food," emergency food aid is also referred to.

In “Japan’s Assistance Package for Africa at TICAD V” announced in 2013, “Boost the growth of Africa through trade and investment of private sector” is listed at the top of the document as Japan’s basic policy on assistance to Africa, and then measures based on the policy are listed: “Boosting economic growth” and “Accelerating infrastructure and capacity development.” The measures are strongly oriented toward economic growth. “Growth” is also used as a keyword for the measures listed after the aforementioned measures—“Empowering farmers as mainstream economic actors,” “Promoting sustainable and resilient growth (environment, climate change, disaster prevention)” and “Creating an inclusive society for growth (education and gender, health, water and sanitation)”—as in the outcome document for the TICAD V “Yokohama Action Plan 2013-2017.”

“Japan’s measures for Africa at TICAD VI,” which was announced in 2016, is structured in the same manner as the “Nairobi Implementation Plan,” the outcome document of the TICAD summit-level meeting held in the same year. In “Japan’s measures” (Japanese version) the original subtitles were added respectively to the three pillars of the “Nairobi Plan” as follows: the subtitle “Quality Africa” added to “Pillar 1: Promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialization”; “Resilient Africa” to “Pillar 2: Promoting resilient health systems for quality of life”; and “Stable Africa” to “Pillar 3: Promoting social stability for shared prosperity”. “Japan’s measures” were irregularly formulated during five-year valid duration of the previous “Japan’s Assistance Package for Africa at TICAD V” because the interval between TICAD V and VI shortened to three years, so that the new measures seemed to reorganize the continuous activities based on the previous package by using the keywords of “quality,” “resilient” and “stable”. Terms like “quality” and “resilient” have often been used to describe the merits in the Japanese ODA and foreign policy.

Chapter 3

Evaluation of Japan's TICAD Process-Based Assistance to Africa

3-1 Evaluation of the "Relevance of Policies"

Figure 1 below outlines a transition of agendas in Japan's policies on assistance to Africa by showing what was listed in "Japan's initiatives at TICAD IV" in 2008, "Japan's Assistance Package for Africa at TICAD V" in 2013 and "Japan's measures for Africa at TICAD VI" in 2016. The Evaluation Team comprehensively assessed the relevance of Japan's policies on assistance to Africa, based on which specific measures had been formulated, in regard to consistencies with: (1) international development cooperation trends, (2) Japan's high-level policies and (3) Africa's policies and contexts on development needs. The team also evaluated the mutual relevance of these policy documents from a dynamic perspective.


As for relevance to international development cooperation trends, the consistencies of aforementioned policy documents are higher with the SDGs set in 2015 and G7/G8 Summits' discussions in 2010s than with the MDGs set in 2000. Regarding the recent 10-year international "dynamics" including a shift from the MDGs to the SDGs, Japan's policies on assistance to Africa are indeed in line with and precedent for the transition. However, progress in the eradication of poverty and social development, which were the core goals of the MDGs, was (and still is) delayed in Africa, and the social development issues listed in the MDGs are also listed in the SDGs as their earlier goals. In light of this, some might take the view that Japan's alteration in its policies on assistance to Africa was slightly premature.

Also, regarding the consistencies of the policies on assistance to Africa and the ODA-related high-level policies, which now focus more on economic development following the shift from the ODA Charter to the Development Cooperation Charter[※], the policies are highly relevant to the high-level policies from a dynamic perspective.

[※] *Against this opinion of the third-party Evaluation Team, MOFA expresses its crucial divergence of opinions. Shown below is MOFA's divergent comment as expressed:*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan holds a view that social development and human development are important factors to achieve "Quality growth" and poverty eradication through such growth in the Development Cooperation Charter as well as in the Official Development Assistance Charter.

Figure 1 Change of agendas in Japan's policies on assistance to Africa



Source: Evaluation team

With regard to Africa's development needs, the continent, in extricating itself from the "lost 20 years," is almost on a growth path, and Japan's policies on assistance to Africa are quite relevant to its development needs. However, Africa is still facing a range of social development issues and the African Union (AU) still focuses on the solution of social issues. In this context, there are some doubts about the relevance of the policies in regard to the development needs of Africa.

In consideration of the aforementioned points, the "relevance of policies" is generally high for Japan's policies on assistance to Africa, but the consistencies that the relevance is based on are partially difficult to understand clearly at least for the general public. Therefore, the relevance of policies cannot be rated as "A: highly satisfactory" and is rated as "B: satisfactory".

The partial unclearness of the consistency/relevance is perhaps due to the lack of explanations about the relevance, rather than because the relevance itself is lacking. In fact, social development issues have not once been left out of Japan's policies on assistance to Africa since 2008. The volume of assistance (in terms of monetary value) has been kept at the same level or even increased both in the education and health sectors. In other words, Japan has enhanced its assistance for economic development relative to social development without decreasing the absolute amount of assistance to social development. If Japan's recognition of issues and policy intentions had been fully explained in the policy documents, the relevance of policies would have been clearer, leading to a higher rating from a dynamic perspective.

However, the "resume-like" policy documents do not necessarily well communicate Japan's political intention or philosophy of emphasizing well-balanced assistance to the economic and social development of Africa. The policy documents describe the specific measures by sector and are practical documents. As such, they do not include sections describing Japan's recognition of the issues and basic philosophy that provide the basis for the entire set of policies. For readers of the policy documents, particularly the citizens, who are sovereign and taxpayers, the documents do not provide the details necessary for them to understand the policy intentions. Even for those actually engaged in development cooperation but in the policy formulation, it might be difficult to gain an understanding of the policy background and inten-

tions simply from reading the “resume-like” documents^{※3}.

Partially due to the lack of explanations as mentioned above, the rating is not “A: highly satisfactory” but “B: satisfactory” for “relevance of policies.”

3-2 Evaluation of the “Effectiveness of Results”

The evaluation team assessed the “effectiveness of results” for the measures formulated based on the policies on assistance to Africa announced by the Japanese government at TICAD IV (2008) and on other occasions in terms of: (1) “Input” (amount of Japan’s ODA spending in Africa); (2) “Output” (quantitative results described in the TICAD progress reports); (3) “Impact” (contribution to the improvement of development indicators including those related to the MDGs and SDGs); and (4) outputs and outcome in Ghana, which is the case-study country for this evaluation survey.

As for (4), the outputs and outcome are generally on a high level though they are evaluated qualitatively and not in comparison with the contributions made by other donors. In particular, in the health sector, Japan made the contributions to the country in line with the outcome documents of the TICAD summit-level meetings and with the policies on assistance to Africa formulated on the basis of those outcome documents. These survey results are favorable for the evaluation of the effectiveness of assistance, but further examinations were required on the results of assistance to Africa as a whole.

For (3) above, the evaluation team therefore analyzed the indicators in the health and infrastructure (logistics and energy) sectors, on which Japan focuses in its policies on assistance to Africa, to verify the impacts. This analysis revealed that many of African countries receiving substantial assistance from Japan in the health and infrastructure sectors showed a higher level of improvement in those sectors than the regional average (Table 3 below shows the analysis results in the maternal and child health subsector.). However, this finding does not provide the sound proof of the effectiveness of Japan’s assistance because it lacks analysis on other donors’ and recipient countries’ contributions. Therefore, the evaluation team conducted a further statistical

^{※3} *Against this opinion of the third-party Evaluation Team, MOFA expresses its crucial divergence of opinions. Shown below is MOFA’s divergent comment as expressed:*

Japan attaches great importance to social development such as education and healthcare as well as to economic growth, and MOFA believes that it has been clearly expressed in an easy-to-understand manner. An example of it is “Japan’s measures for Africa at TICAD VI”, announced in 2016, which mentions “human resource development” at the beginning, and embraces “Promoting Resilient Health Systems” as one of its three pillars.

analysis (multiple regression analysis) to estimate the interrelationships between Japan's assistance and the improvements observed in the development indicators, but no statistically significant results were obtained for assistance from individual donors including Japan. The results of the impact evaluation are therefore "neutral" and cannot be incorporated into the comprehensive evaluation results.

Table 3 Mortality rates in major recipients of Japan's health-sector ODA

	Gross ODA disbursements (2007-15 total)	Neonatal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)				
		1990	2000	08	15	2008→15
Nigeria	134	n.a.	n.a.	49	34.3	▲ 14.7
Kenya	102	n.a.	n.a.	33	22.2	▲ 10.8
Sudan	95	n.a.	n.a.	41	29.8	▲ 11.2
DR. Congo	90	n.a.	n.a.	56	30.1	▲ 25.9
Ghana	82	n.a.	n.a.	30	28.3	▲ 1.7
Uganda	80	n.a.	n.a.	31	18.7	▲ 12.3
Zambia	70	n.a.	n.a.	36	21.4	▲ 14.6
Ethiopia	55	n.a.	n.a.	39	27.7	▲ 11.3
Senegal	50	n.a.	n.a.	34	20.8	▲ 13.2
Tanzania	46	n.a.	n.a.	33	18.8	▲ 14.2
Africa	—	n.a.	n.a.	40	28.0	▲ 12.0
	Gross ODA disbursements (2007-15 total)	Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)				
		1990	2000	08	15	2008→15
Nigeria	134	230	207	186	108.8	▲ 77.2
Kenya	102	105	128	128	49.4	▲ 78.6
Sudan	95	125	115	109	70.1	▲ 38.9
DR. Congo	90	199	199	199	98.3	▲ 100.7
Ghana	82	118	111	76	61.6	▲ 14.4
Uganda	80	186	158	135	54.6	▲ 80.4
Zambia	70	172	169	148	64.0	▲ 84.0
Ethiopia	55	210	148	109	59.2	▲ 49.8
Senegal	50	149	131	108	47.2	▲ 60.8
Tanzania	46	157	139	103	48.7	▲ 54.3
Africa	—	182	165	142	81.3	▲ 60.7
	Gross ODA disbursements (2007-15 total)	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)				
		1990	2000	08	15	2008→15
Nigeria	134	1,100 [580–2,000]	980 [540–1,800]	840 [460–1,500]	814	▲ 26
Kenya	102	380 [220–650]	560 [340–850]	530 [320–850]	510	▲ 20
Sudan	95	830 [440–1,600]	770 [430–1,400]	750 [420–1,300]	311	▲ 439
DR. Congo	90	900 [470–1,600]	850 [450–1,600]	670 [340–1,300]	693	23
Ghana	82	630 [340–1,200]	500 [290–900]	350 [210–600]	319	▲ 31
Uganda	80	670 [360–1,100]	640 [360–940]	430 [240–670]	343	▲ 87
Zambia	70	390 [170–740]	600 [320–850]	470 [250–680]	224	▲ 246
Ethiopia	55	990 [540–1,700]	750 [420–1,300]	470 [270–790]	353	▲ 117
Senegal	50	750 [430–1,300]	560 [330–930]	410 [240–680]	315	▲ 95
Tanzania	46	880 [500–1,500]	920 [550–1,500]	790 [470–1,300]	398	▲ 392
Africa	—	850 [590–1,300]	780 [570–1,150]	620 [460–910]	542	▲ 78

Note: Countries in yellow cells made larger improvements than the African average. Gross ODA disbursement values are in million US dollar and are the total of the "health" sector and the "population policies/programmes and reproductive health" sector. .

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Creditor Reporting System* database; and World Health Organization, *World Health Statistics*, 2010, 2011 and 2017 editions.

For the evaluation of (2) “Output,” the results were generally favorable according to the progress reports made by the Japanese government. The steady fulfillment of commitments is regarded as one of the merits of Japan’s assistance, and it is appreciable that such merit was apparent also in the TICAD process-based assistance to Africa. However, the effectiveness of the outputs depends on whether the output targets were set high enough to bring about substantial results, and it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the outputs based solely on whether the output targets have been achieved or not.

Also, for (1) “Input,” it is difficult to identify the amount to meet a need satisfactory to ensure the “effectiveness of results”. However, the need to increase ODA has been confirmed repeatedly on occasions such as the International Conference on Financing for Development, in which Japan participates, and has become an international consensus. In recent years, Japan has been expanding its ODA to Africa to attain the goals such as doubling the amount and is contributing to mobilizing both other official flows (OOF) separate to ODA and development funds coming from the private sector⁴. However, in light of Japan having the third largest economy, the amount of money invested by the Japanese government in ODA to Africa cannot be said to be sufficiently high. For the ratio of net ODA disbursements to Africa (including the amount invested through international organizations’ regular budgets) to gross national income (GNI), Japan ranks 19th among the 23 major member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (for average cost for the period from 2007 to 2016) (Table 4).

That Japan is behind most of the DAC countries, including small and medium-sized countries in Europe, is not because Japan’s ODA is mainly provided to Asian countries and the amount spent in Africa is relatively small. Developed countries are required to increase the ratio of their ODA spending to GNI to 0.7% as a target, as advocated in the UN General Assembly resolution of 1970⁵, as urged in the “Monterrey Consensus” reached at the First Interna-

⁴ *Addis Ababa Action Agenda*, adopted of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015, stated in its paragraph 54: “An important use of international public finance, including ODA, is to catalyse additional resource mobilization from other sources, public and private”. The investment balance from Japan to Africa increased 1.8 trillion Japanese yen for 10 years until 2016, which was comparable with Japan’s net ODA disbursements of 17.1 billion US dollar to Africa in the same period.

⁵ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), “International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,” 24 October 1970, Paragraph 43.

Table 4 GNI ratio of net ODA disbursements by major donors to Africa

Donor \ Year	2002	03	04	05	06	07	08	09
Luxembourg	0.35%	0.37%	0.35%	0.35%	0.43%	0.43%	0.45%	0.47%
Sweden	0.31%	0.32%	0.27%	0.37%	0.36%	0.36%	0.37%	0.40%
Denmark	0.37%	0.36%	0.36%	0.35%	0.39%	0.41%	0.39%	0.39%
Norway	0.36%	0.38%	0.37%	0.36%	0.35%	0.33%	0.33%	0.34%
Ireland	0.25%	0.24%	0.24%	0.24%	0.31%	0.30%	0.35%	0.32%
United Kingdom	0.10%	0.14%	0.16%	0.22%	0.31%	0.16%	0.17%	0.20%
Belgium	0.21%	0.40%	0.23%	0.25%	0.29%	0.22%	0.22%	0.26%
Netherlands	0.31%	0.31%	0.34%	0.33%	0.28%	0.31%	0.27%	0.24%
Finland	0.14%	0.14%	0.14%	0.15%	0.17%	0.17%	0.18%	0.23%
France	0.24%	0.25%	0.25%	0.29%	0.31%	0.21%	0.20%	0.26%
Portugal	0.11%	0.12%	0.53%	0.11%	0.12%	0.11%	0.16%	0.13%
Germany	0.09%	0.14%	0.11%	0.14%	0.18%	0.13%	0.14%	0.13%
Switzerland	0.09%	0.12%	0.10%	0.11%	0.12%	0.11%	0.11%	0.14%
Canada	0.08%	0.09%	0.09%	0.12%	0.13%	0.11%	0.14%	0.13%
Austria	0.10%	0.09%	0.10%	0.10%	0.24%	0.18%	0.09%	0.12%
Spain	0.08%	0.07%	0.07%	0.10%	0.10%	0.11%	0.14%	0.17%
Italy	0.11%	0.09%	0.06%	0.13%	0.10%	0.08%	0.08%	0.07%
United States	0.04%	0.05%	0.05%	0.04%	0.05%	0.05%	0.06%	0.07%
Japan	0.04%	0.04%	0.04%	0.05%	0.11%	0.05%	0.05%	0.05%
Greece	0.05%	0.04%	0.04%	0.04%	0.05%	0.05%	0.06%	0.05%
Australia	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.03%	0.03%	0.02%	0.02%
Republic of Korea	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	0.01%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%
New Zealand	0.02%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%	0.02%	0.03%	0.03%
Donor \ Year	2010	11	12	13	14	15	16	2007-16
Luxembourg	0.48%	0.42%	0.40%	0.41%	0.47%	0.44%	0.43%	0.44%
Sweden	0.33%	0.41%	0.37%	0.34%	0.34%	0.33%	0.29%	0.35%
Denmark	0.38%	0.38%	0.36%	0.31%	0.28%	0.23%	0.24%	0.34%
Norway	0.34%	0.33%	0.29%	0.31%	0.29%	0.27%	0.27%	0.31%
Ireland	0.31%	0.29%	0.27%	0.26%	0.21%	0.17%	0.16%	0.26%
United Kingdom	0.24%	0.24%	0.23%	0.28%	0.29%	0.28%	0.27%	0.24%
Belgium	0.35%	0.25%	0.24%	0.20%	0.19%	0.16%	0.20%	0.23%
Netherlands	0.25%	0.21%	0.18%	0.21%	0.17%	0.18%	0.19%	0.22%
Finland	0.22%	0.21%	0.23%	0.22%	0.26%	0.22%	0.15%	0.21%
France	0.26%	0.24%	0.23%	0.18%	0.16%	0.16%	0.16%	0.20%
Portugal	0.18%	0.21%	0.20%	0.15%	0.12%	0.08%	0.08%	0.14%
Germany	0.13%	0.13%	0.14%	0.12%	0.13%	0.13%	0.16%	0.13%
Switzerland	0.11%	0.13%	0.13%	0.13%	0.14%	0.15%	0.14%	0.13%
Canada	0.14%	0.13%	0.15%	0.12%	0.10%	0.11%	0.10%	0.12%
Austria	0.14%	0.10%	0.12%	0.09%	0.08%	0.08%	0.09%	0.11%
Spain	0.15%	0.10%	0.05%	0.06%	0.05%	0.03%	0.06%	0.10%
Italy	0.07%	0.09%	0.05%	0.06%	0.06%	0.06%	0.07%	0.07%
United States	0.06%	0.07%	0.07%	0.07%	0.07%	0.06%	0.07%	0.06%
Japan	0.06%	0.05%	0.05%	0.06%	0.06%	0.07%	0.06%	0.06%
Greece	0.05%	0.04%	0.04%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%	0.04%	0.04%
Australia	0.04%	0.04%	0.05%	0.04%	0.04%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%
Republic of Korea	0.02%	0.03%	0.04%	0.03%	0.04%	0.04%	0.04%	0.03%
New Zealand	0.02%	0.03%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%

Note: Calculated on net ODA disbursements including Imputed Multilateral ODA, which is estimated ODA flow from donors via multilateral organizations' regular budgets.

Source: OECD, *OECD.Stat* database (Downloaded on 2 February 2018).

tional Conference on Financing for Development held in 2002 after the establishment of the MDGs⁶, and as reaffirmed in the “Addis Ababa Action Agenda”⁷ adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, in which the Japanese State Minister for Foreign Affairs participated. However, Japan’s ODA/GNI ratio has consistently sat at around 0.2%, about three-tenth of the targeted 0.7%. The 0.7% target is set for ODA spending as a whole (bilateral ODA to all developing countries and multilateral ODA through international organizations). In light of the fact that Japan’s ODA to Africa accounts for about 30% of its total ODA, the spending target for ODA to Africa could be considered around 0.2%. The actual ratio of Japan’s ODA to Africa to GNI is also only about three-tenth of 0.2% (Table 4), exactly reflecting the shortfall in total ODA/GNI ratio of Japan^{※2}.

The 0.7% target is indeed a high-level target to make *efforts* to achieve, and only a small number of countries have actually attained this target. Among the G7 economic powers, however, the United Kingdom has consistently achieved the target in recent years. Although no deadline is set for the achievement of the 0.7% target, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy announced their commitments to achieving the target by 2012 to 2015 at the G8 Gleneagles 2005 summit (even though only the United Kingdom has actually attained it). These announcements imply that not a few in the international community think that the 0.7% target should be attained nowadays, in 2010s. Despite this, Japan’s ODA/GNI ratio has been stuck at a low level, showing no upward tendency for the last 15 years. It cannot therefore be denied that Japan has failed to make sufficient *efforts* for the attainment of the target, even though it is one of the countries that have adopted the Monterrey Consensus and Addis Ababa Action Agenda.⁸

⁶ First International Conference on Financing for Development, *Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development*, 2003, Paragraph 42.

⁷ Third International Conference on Financing for Development, *Addis Ababa Action Agenda*, 2015, Paragraph 51. MOFA webpage on the Third International Conference on Financing for Development: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ic/gic/page22_002123.html

^{※2} *Against this opinion of the third-party Evaluation Team, MOFA expresses its crucial divergence of opinions. Shown below is MOFA’s divergent comment as expressed:*

Japan’s target for assistance to Africa is what has been announced on the occasions of the TICAD summit-level meetings. MOFA understands that the evaluation team created a 0.2% GNI target in this report as a unique target in their own terms.

⁸ The Center for Global Development, a council for US ODA-related organizations to promote ODA policies, calculated the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) 2017 for the 27 rich countries in the world, and evaluated Japan’s “aid quantity” as follows: “In 2016, it provided 0.20% of its GNI for development assistance. This is below the international commitment of 0.7% GNI and below the average among the CDI countries.” Japan was ranked 12th among the 27 countries for the score on “aid” with relatively high rating on “aid

Not only the amount of input matters to development cooperation. However, the idea of attributing importance to the amount of assistance, such as the “big push” theory, is persuasive to some extent and is in fact widely advocated. The “big push” helps developing countries to touch the bottom of the “ladder of economic development” by intensively assisting them with large investments so that they can escape the “poverty trap” and move up the ladder toward self-sustained development. In fact, based on this kind of idea, the United Nations commenced the Millennium Villages Project (MVP) in the first half of the 2000s, and Japan provided much of the MVP funding through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security.⁹ Setting aside the validity of the big push theory and the like¹⁰, the importance of the input amount in development cooperation cannot be denied.

As mentioned above, it is difficult to deny that the amount of Japan’s ODA to Africa is insufficient on an international level and in terms of the size of Japan’s economy. The evaluation team has therefore rated the “effectiveness of results” as “C: partially unsatisfactory” although the case study and output evaluation results are positive^{※1}.

quality”, but ranked 26th for the overall CDI with regards to “aid”, “finance,” “technology,” “environment,” “trade,” “security” and “migration”.

<https://www.cgdev.org/cdi-2017/country/JPN>

⁹ For the big push theory and the theory-based MVP (and the African Millennium Villages Initiative (AMV) implemented as part of the MVP), refer to Evaluation of Assistance to the African Millennium Villages Initiative (February 2014). The evaluation report (Japanese version) stated: the theory of “poverty trap” and “big push”, on which MVP was based, was somewhat persuasive and deserved trial for verification (p. 59), but AMV had hardly brought about “special effects” that “compensate” for the major issue of “aid maldistribution” (p. 130).

¹⁰ One of the most influential advocates of the big push theory is Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, author of *The End of Poverty* (2005). His advocacy is criticized by some, including Prof. William Easterly, author of *The White Man’s Burden* (2006).

※1 *Against this opinion of the third-party Evaluation Team, MOFA expresses its crucial divergence of opinions. Shown below is MOFA’s divergent comment as expressed:*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) considers the rating “C: Partially unsatisfactory” for “effectiveness of results” inappropriate, as MOFA believes that the Government of Japan utilizes the limited financial resources for its Official Development Assistance effectively to the extent possible, demonstrating high “effectiveness of results”. Furthermore, for the following reasons, MOFA considers that the rating was made without a reasonable basis by an inappropriate evaluation methodology: 1) The report states that the C rating is attributed to insufficiency in the volume of input, but the report fails to prove that what it claims insufficiency in “effectiveness of results” was caused by insufficiency in the volume of input, leaving the causal relationship uncertain, 2) The report states the volume of input is insufficient but it is measured against a target that applies beyond Africa without clear deadline, which goes beyond the scope of this evaluation of assistance to Africa in the past 10 years, and 3) The favorable results found in the evaluation of output and in the case study of Ghana are not adequately taken into consideration.

3-3 Evaluation of the “Appropriateness of Processes”

With regard to the measures formulated based on Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa announced by the Japanese government at the TICAD summit-level meetings held in the most recent 10-year period, the evaluation team assessed the “appropriateness of processes” from the following three aspects: (1) policy making by the Japanese government, (2) policy application to Japanese assistance organs and national governments in Africa, and (3) program/project formulation and implementation.

As for (1), the evaluation team has confirmed that the Japanese government has a process in place to seek opinions from various stakeholders, including JICA, MOFA, other governmental agencies, the private sector, African countries, and the AU and other joint organizers of TICAD. This process seems to make it possible for the government to collect additional information that would be unavailable through regular information exchange, including opinions from a macro perspective that sees Africa as a whole. The process to formulate policies on assistance to Africa is therefore evaluated as providing a possibility for generating additional values that could not be obtained solely through the formulation of Country Assistance Policies.

As for (2), the evaluation team has confirmed that Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa were incorporated into the Country Assistance Policies and JICA’s Mid-term Plans, Country Analysis Papers, and other cooperation policies. However, while JICA provides inputs for MOFA’s formulation of Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa, there were the cases in which JICA became aware of the details of the policies or the details of the numerical targets upheld in the policies only after MOFA publicly announced them. It is of course MOFA and the Cabinet that have the right to make final decisions on the policies on assistance to Africa. It is necessary for the government, however, to examine the need for prior consultation on the numerical targets with the related parties to avoid duplication of the targets in existing and new policies and to ensure the setting of highly effective and ambitious targets.

For (3), the evaluation team has confirmed that references to Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa in the process of program/project formation do promote the adoption of the projects, and the policies facilitate the implementation of specific programs/projects to meet the needs of African countries. The team has also confirmed that efforts are made for the following purposes in an appropriate manner: continuous identification of the needs of the African governments, implementation of the programs/projects based on the policies,


monitoring of the policy implementation, and appropriate cooperation with other donor countries and international organizations.

The “appropriateness of processes” is therefore rated highly in a general way. However, there is still room for enhancement and improvement regarding information sharing between the Japanese government and assistance implementation agencies. The evaluation team has therefore rated the appropriateness as “B: satisfactory.”

3-4 Evaluation from Diplomatic Viewpoints

In the 2000s, when the amount Japan invested in ODA was decreasing against a backdrop of continued economic stagnation, the movement to utilize ODA to enable Japan to acquire economic benefits gradually strengthened and then gained prominence with the launch of the Abe administration following the electoral victory of the Liberal Democratic Party in December 2012. Since TICAD IV, held in 2008, Japan’s focus on assistance to Africa has clearly shifted to economic development assistance and so ODA diplomacy is evaluated as being highly important for the economy of Japan. It can be said that ODA measures formulated based on such policies could deliver economic benefits to Japan.

Figure 2 Japan’s trade with and direct investments to Africa




Note: US-dollar values are converted from original Japanese-yen values. Direct investments’ values are net flow ones, and negative values indicate that divestments surpass investments.

Source: Japan External Trade Organization, *JETRO Global Trade and Investment Report*, various issues.

In reality, the ODA measures have not yet brought about sufficient diplomatic effects or economic benefits to Japan according to the trade results (Figure 2) and sales recorded by Japanese companies' overseas affiliates in Africa. However, investments in Africa are on the rise and Japanese companies are showing brighter prospects for conducting business on the continent (Figure 3), implying the possibility that more diplomatic effects could be gained from Japan's ODA to Africa that would benefit the Japanese economy.

Figure 3 Japanese manufactures' mid-term prospects for African business



Source: Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Chapter 4

Recommendations

4-1 Documentation of Japan's Recognition of Issues and Philosophical Underpinnings of Policies with Regard to Assistance to Africa

For “relevance of policies,” the evaluation team pointed out as follows in the preceding chapter: (1) Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa are highly relevant to the needs of Africa and align with international development cooperation trends from multiple and dynamic perspectives, but there are some doubts regarding their relevance with regard to individual policy documents and events; and (2) such doubts arise out of the lack of explanations about Japan’s recognition of issues and the philosophical underpinnings of policies in the country’s documents describing its policies on assistance to Africa, including explanations about Japan’s recognition of the need to help Africa, which is returning to a growth path, to achieve self-sustained growth as well as explanations about Japan’s commitment to supporting the social development of Africa while enhancing its economic development assistance to the region^{※3}.

The documents describing Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa are “resume-like” documents that are too compact to include the government’s recognition of issues and the philosophy on which its policies are based. Brief resume-like documents themselves are not bad per se, but resumes alone are not enough. “Reading material-like” documents are also helpful for readers, including both those engaged in development cooperation based on Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa as well as the sovereign and taxpaying citizens, to deepen their understanding of Japan’s important policies along with the backgrounds to them. Also, “reading material”-like documents will be more appropriate than resumes in terms of African countries being able to grasp Japan’s policies on assistance to them, as was pointed out through the survey conducted in the case-study country chosen for this evaluation study.

As a method for providing such documentation, it would be possible for the Japanese government to newly create a “reading material”-like document on its

^{※3} *Against this opinion of the third-party Evaluation Team, MOFA expresses its crucial divergence of opinions. Shown below is MOFA’s divergent comment as expressed:*

Japan attaches great importance to social development such as education and healthcare as well as to economic growth, and MOFA believes that it has been clearly expressed in an easy-to-understand manner. An example of it is “Japan’s measures for Africa at TICAD VI”, announced in 2016, which mentions “human resource development” at the beginning, and embraces “Promoting Resilient Health Systems” as one of its three pillars.

policies on assistance to Africa that is similar to the text of the Development Cooperation Charter and at the same time create a “resume”-like document that is similar to the Outline of the Charter to replace the conventional policy document.

As another method for making such documentation available, the government could separately create a “Kommentar”-like explanatory document in addition to the conventional policy document on assistance to Africa. In fact, JICA published a document of about 50 pages titled “TICAD VI eno Torikumi (Actions toward TICAD VI)” as an explanatory document provided in the Japanese language at the end of 2016¹¹. In the “Introduction” section, the purpose of creating the document and the need to provide additional explanations to the general public and also to those engaged in development cooperation is stated as follows (emphasis added):

“As the leader of the TICAD process, Japan assumes the responsibility to implement a group of measures classified into the three priority areas (set in the Nairobi Declaration and other announcements). The country should steadily implement these measures and maximize the results in line with the investment plan announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—spending of a total of 30 billion dollars (about 3 trillion yen) in the assistance by the public and private sectors. To this end, multiple actors are required to be constantly aware of the need for mutual collaboration.

Based on the aforementioned recognition, JICA created this brochure *to explain to all those related* how JICA, one of the members of the community committed to supporting Africa, will implement measures to give assistance to Africa. We included the projects announced as new initiatives at TICAD VI in the target of explanation in addition to the measures that have been implemented through the past TICAD meetings. We would ask you to read through this document, which is designed to show the whole picture of JICA’s assistance to Africa.”

If the Japanese government chooses the second method, which is to create a “Kommentar” document, it would give it an extra time advantage, namely, the government would be able to take its (relatively extended) time to create a long document after each TICAD summit-level meeting ends. Also, through the document creation process, for which a certain number of people will collaborate, information sharing and opinion exchange will be promoted between the government (MOFA and others) and assistance implementation agencies (mainly JICA), which will in turn

¹¹ https://www.jica.go.jp/publication/pamph/ku57pq0000najg5-att/support_of_JICA_TICADV1.pdf

contribute to the formulation of better policies on assistance to Africa and of ODA projects undertaken by the government.

In fact, JICA has already adopted the second method, and the government could also practically adopt it. It is therefore recommended that the government create such a document after TICAD VII, which will be held in Japan, as a means of helping Japanese citizens, who are the “owners” of Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa, to deepen their understanding of the policies.

4-2 Enhancement of Regional/South-South Cooperation

Japan has been providing development cooperation upon requests being received from various developing countries, not limited to African nations. This has generally been done in an appropriate manner by holding a series of discussions with beneficiary countries to understanding the needs and local situations of the specific countries and in cooperation with other donors. The needs of African countries largely differ by country, and JICA points out that the need to identify the needs of individual African countries, not the needs of Africa as a whole, has been growing in importance and that differences in the growth level of African countries imply a need to diversify methods of cooperation.¹²

Under such circumstances, if Japan continues to announce its policies on assistance to Africa as a whole at future TICAD summit-level meetings, the policies should basically serve as a “catalyst” to foster and facilitate development cooperation directed at each country, and this “catalyst” function needs to be further enhanced.

The most powerful type of development cooperation for which the policies need to serve as a “catalyst” would be regional cooperation targeting multiple countries and south-south cooperation enabling African countries to share and transfer development results with and to each other. The regional logistics corridor development projects and the regional center construction projects such as the project implemented at the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research are good examples of such cooperation. The Japanese government is expected to place even more focus on such projects in its policies on assistance to Africa. In the aforementioned evaluation of “appropriateness of processes,” it was pointed out that Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa contributed to the promotion of regional and south-south cooperation and to the facilitation of project formulation and budgeting.

Regional cooperation and south-south cooperation are not about what sector to cooperate for but how to cooperate. The documents describing Japan’s policies on

¹² See *TICAD VI eno Torikumi* (Actions toward TICAD IV) (pp.2-3) issued by JICA.

assistance to Africa announced at and after TICAD IV (2008) are all structured by development cooperation sector and contain no sections that focus on ways to cooperate. However, “Japan’s New Assistance Program for Africa in line with the TICAD II Agenda for action,” which was announced in 1998, refers to ways of cooperation in the sections titled “South-South Cooperation” and “Strengthening Coordination,” along with development cooperation sectors, such as “Social Development” and “Economic Development.” For the Japanese government, it would be worth examining the incorporation of sections focusing on how to cooperate in the documents describing its policies on assistance to Africa.

In order to foster regional cooperation, cooperation with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as the East African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), might be necessary, but the lack of international agreements between the RECs and the Japanese government might hinder such cooperation. This is because the Act on the Japan International Cooperation Agency, Independent Administrative Agency requires the Japanese government to conclude international agreements with the related parties on technical cooperation, grant aid, loan aid and other forms of assistance. At present, technical and financial cooperation by Japan with NEPAD and RECs is therefore impossible. Also, for the dispatch of experts from Japan, the countries to which experts will be sent are required to provide some guarantees, including tax exemption, and as a precondition for experts to be dispatched from Japan to NEPAD and RECs, coordination should be made for such guarantees between the Japanese government and the governments of the countries where the headquarters/secretariat of each regional organization is located.

4-3 Enhancement of Cooperation with Other Donors and the African Union

As already mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is recommended that documents describing Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa include sections that focus on how to cooperate in order to foster regional and south-south cooperation. The same applies to the promotion of Japan’s cooperation with international organizations.

TICAD, which provides the basis for Japan’s policies on assistance to Africa, is an open forum held by Japan in partnership with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African Union Commission (AUC) and other entities. In light of this unique feature of TICAD, it is recommended that Japan focus more on collaboration with the joint organizers of TICAD, including the World Bank and UNDP on the donor side and the African Union (AU) representing the African side, and propose more proactive measures to enhance the collaboration in the documents

describing Japan's policies on assistance to Africa. The AUC is an arm of the AU and NEPAD is an programme of the AU, and so the AU and NEPAD can be said to represent the needs of Africa. Therefore, extending proactive cooperation to them will help Japan to further increase the relevance of its policies to the needs of Africa and enhance the appropriateness of the policies. Japan has already implemented a range of collaboration projects with the multiple international organizations, and it is still recommended that the government focus more on the promotion of such international cooperation in the documents describing its policies on assistance to Africa.

Some might point out that collaboration with international organizations tends to obscure the "face" of the donor country, but if Japan publicly and widely announces that it will proactively foster cooperation with international organizations for assistance to Africa, this drawback will be offset to some extent.

4-4 Promotion of TICAD Namesake Projects and Facilities

As discussed in the section on the "evaluation from diplomatic viewpoints," Japan shifted the focus of its assistance to Africa to economic development cooperation at TICAD IV held in 2008 in line with its own national growth strategy. However, the full-scale diplomatic effect of the assistance, namely, economic benefits derived from the assistance, has not yet materialized for Japan. Although Japanese companies are increasingly interested in doing business in Africa, the actual implementation of such business by the companies is yet to be promoted in such a way as would allow Japan to enjoy economic benefits from its assistance to Africa. To this end it is recommended that the country draw even more attention to TICAD and its policies on assistance to Africa, and make more people aware of the possibility that Japan's measures will further improve the business environment of Africa.

Accordingly, it is recommended that names incorporating the term "TICAD" be given to the projects for which Japan's policies on assistance to Africa announced at TICAD will serve as "catalysts" as mentioned in 4-1 and 4-2 above and to the facilities established through such projects. This could increase the public visibility of Japan's policies on assistance to Africa announced at TICAD and through the TICAD process and could expand the diplomatic effect of the policies. Already in the past, the establishment of the TICAD Human Resource Development Center for Industries was announced at TICAD V in 2013, and fostering the implementation of TICAD namesake projects and facilities is sure to help boost the effect of TICAD-related initiatives.

4-5 Examination for the Prompt Implementation of Core TICAD Projects

In the survey conducted in Ghana, the case-study country selected for this evaluation study, Japan's development cooperation was rated highly in general terms. However, with respect to "appropriateness of processes," some pointed out that it took a long time for Japan to decide on the implementation of a project in the country, which of course is a longstanding complaint often heard in regard to Japan's assistance. There are reasons why it takes Japan a certain length of time to make decisions and, as already mentioned in the section on the "Output" evaluation related to "effectiveness of results," it is one of the positive features of Japan's ODA that once the implementation of a project is decided, it will definitely go ahead. However, China is increasing its presence in Africa as a donor country and the fact that the Chinese assistance projects are at least started quite quickly could highlight the aforementioned drawback of Japan's assistance in Africa.

It is therefore recommended that the Japanese government devise measures to shorten the time required to decide on the program/project implementation in the core areas that are focused on in its policies on assistance to Africa announced at TICAD¹³, thereby meeting the needs of Africa more quickly and improving the public image of Japan's initiatives implemented based on the policies. This could help Japan increase the diplomatic effect of the assistance policies, including increasing its presence within those sections of the international community that are engaged in providing support to Africa.

To ensure diplomatic effect, the Japanese government has already been making efforts to accelerate its ODA-related decision-making and implementation process, for example, through the Grant Aid for Promotion of Japanese Standards (GAPJS). Although there seems to be some cases in which the delivery of procured equipment is not smoothly progressed after the decision-making and implementation process has been promptly conducted under GAPJS¹⁴, the government could capitalize on past achievements, including this example, to accelerate the implementation of initiatives based on its policies on assistance to Africa (and possibly to establish a system for prompt implementation). If the initiatives are implemented more promptly, even if not as promptly as the implementation of "fast-track" initiatives through TICAD, the satisfaction level of the African side and their evaluation of the TICAD process could be

¹³ It should be noted that it naturally takes some time for the Japanese government to examine local needs, intentions of the beneficiary countries, and the feasibility of the project while also giving due consideration to environmental and social issues.

¹⁴ See the Third Party Evaluation Report 2016, *Evaluation of Grant Aid for Promotion of Japanese Standards* (Japanese edition), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 2017, pp. 97-99.

raised to a higher level than present.

Table 5 Areas of Recommendations

Recommendation level	Recommendations	Relevant entity		Timeframe
		Headquarter MOFA HQ JICA HQ	Local Embassy JICA Office	
Modality and procedures	(1) Documentation of Japan's recognition of issues and philosophical underpinnings of policies	○		Short term
	(5) Examination for the prompt implementation of core TICAD projects	○	○	Short to mid-term
Policy and strategy	(2) Enhancement of regional/south-south cooperation	○	○	Mid-term
	(3) Enhancement of cooperation with other donors and the African Union	○	○	Mid-term
	(4) Promotion of TICAD namesake projects and facilities	○	○	Short to mid-term

Source: Evaluation Team.