

## 国際NGOの(現地での)装備

リスク・マネジメントのマニュアル	危険な事態を想定→それを防ぐ方策を考案→明文化して情報共有・実行
クライシス・マネジメントのマニュアル	大規模災害や戦争などで広範囲に通信、運輸、電力、水が普通になったときの対応
治安情報を得るための知見とネットワーク	現地の重要な人物・組織を探しだし、彼らと良好な関係を結ぶ
業務に関する専門技術	専門家を雇用して派遣するためのネットワークを持ち、ニーズに合わせて投入
語学力・国際法の知識	ジュネーブ条約などに関する知識、英語での交渉、文章表現力
通信機器	無線、パソコン、衛生携帯電話、アンテナ、ラジオ、カメラ、ビデオ、各数台
ガードマン、多数の車輛と運転手	常時事務所の建物と職員の生命を守る体制を作る

*"There is no greater sorrow on earth  
than the loss of one's native land."  
— Euripides, 431 B.C.*



**UNITED NATIONS  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES**

**John Campbell  
Training Coordinator  
Tokyo**



# Practical Security in Conflict Zones



# Objectives

- Illustrate the importance of practical security in conflict zones
- Means to address the threat
- How to make it safer

**June 3, 2004**

**Five staff working for Médecins Sans Frontières  
were killed on the road between Khairkhana and  
Qala-I-Naw, resulting in the suspension of  
MSF's activities in Afghanistan.**

**ambushed**

“...In particular, the UN security system failed adequately to analyze and utilize information made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises.”

*Report of the Independent Panel on  
Safety and Security of UN  
Personnel in Iraq of 20 October,  
2003 (Ahtissari Report)*








**Field Office Atambua after killing  
of 3 staff members. 2000**

“Decisions on starting such operations must be based on a thorough assessment of the risks, the degree to which running these risks may be warranted by humanitarian imperatives, and the political context. This assessment should be formally recorded.”

*Recommendation #1 from Report of the Inquiry into the Deaths of Three UNHCR Staff Members in Atambua, Indonesia, on 06 September 2000*





# Threats

Angola	Chad	Macedonia	BiH	Pakistan
South Africa	Chile	Indonesia	SL	Senegal
Sudan	Egypt	Myanmar	Oman	Rwanda
Afghanistan	Niger	Guatemala	Bolivia	Palestine
Cambodia	Lao	Equador	Serbia	Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka	Nepal	Vietnam	USA	UK
Bangladesh	India	Uzbekistan	Bolivia	Japan

# Sources of information

- National staff
- Partner agencies and NGOs
- Security Forces (regular and irregular)
- Government interlocutors
- Community leaders
- The Media
- The Diplomatic community
- Refugees (beneficiaries)
- Other...

# UN Security Phases

**1. *Precautionary:*** Be on alert. UN Staff request security clearance

**2. *Restricted Movement:*** Higher alert. Travel authorised by senior management

**3. *Relocation: Essential staff only – families evacuate***

**4. *Emergency Operations:*** Mostly all out except those directly concerned with emergency, humanitarian relief operations or security matters. National staff may remain

**5. *Evacuation:*** All remaining internationally-recruited UN staff & consultants required to leave

# What security risk management is...

- A systematic and analytic process of identifying threats to your staff, assets and programmes, and actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of attack.
- A management tool to support decision-making
- *Mostly something you are doing already! You do it without thinking – the more experienced you are the more readily this is a fact.*

# Security risk management is NOT

- **A magic answer to convince others that the situation is safe.**
- **A procedure that will save you from getting hurt**
- **Rocket science !**



# Security risk assessment: four good reasons

- It leads to better risk management decisions
- It heightens staff morale confidence
- It provides a common language among partners, leading to common understanding and concerted action
- It supports accountability

# Ways of viewing the threat

## Mapping by vulnerable locations



### In the office

- Armed attack
- Interethnic fighting
- Crowd violence
- Robbery
- Harassment
- Stress



...Etc...

### On the road

- Ambush
- Hostage-taking
- Car-jacking
- Crowd violence
- Landmines/UXO

**Market**

...Etc...

### At the worksite:

- Cross-border attack
- Cross-border shelling
- Interethnic fighting
- Crowd unrest
- Dispute between refugees
- Robbery
- Pilferage
- Harassment



# Ways of viewing the threat

## By potential sources

### The population



- Armed attack
- Interethnic fighting
- Crowd violence
- Hostage taking
- Robbery
- Harassment and intimidation




- Crowd unrest or violence
- Individual disputes

### Extremists



- Terrorist attack
- Inciting of crowd violence
- Kidnapping
- Harassment and intimidation

# Threat assessment



# BEFORE


Threat	Low Risk	Moderate Risk	High Risk	Extreme Risk
Direct Bomb at Building				
Collateral Bomb Damage				
Local Demonstrations				
Local Occupation				
Refugee Demonstration				
Occupation by Refugees				
Assault by Refugee				
Refugee suicide				
Natural Disaster				



# AFTER

Threat	Low Risk	Moderate Risk	High Risk	Extreme Risk
Direct Bomb at Building				
Collateral Bomb Damage				
Local Demonstrations				
Local Occupation				
Refugee Demonstration				
Occupation by Refugees				
Assault by Refugee				
Refugee suicide				
Natural Disaster				

NGOは、どうやって身を守るか？



# Military Threat Indicator

## (example of UNTAET PKF Suai)

Indicator	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Direct Opposition Not Expected		X	X		
Injury		X	X		
Illness		X	X		
Local Intelligence		X	X		
Locals Identifying Militia		X	X		
Terrorist Activity		X	X		
Civil Disturbance		X	X		
Casualty Possible			X		
Visual Contact of Threat Group			X		
Opposition Not Necessarily Directed at PKF			X		
Direct Fire			X	X	X
Size of Threat Group			Individual	Section	Platoon
Opposition Directed at PKF				X	X



# United Nations Security Phases

- Phase ONE: *“Precautionary”*
- Phase TWO: *“Restricted Movement”*
- Phase Three: *“Relocation”*
- Phase Four: *“Program Suspension”*
- Phase Five: *“Evacuation”*





# 国連、NGOへの対応

- MoU to establish a framework for a security relationship between UN organizations and their NGO implementing partners, UNSECOORD 1996
- SG's report to GA "Safety and security of UN personnel" Oct 2000
- SG's report to GA "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel" Sep 2001



# 国連、NGOへの対応

問題点;

- 「有事における国連の指揮命令」 vs 「NGOの独立性」
- 現地スタッフ
- “請求書”

NGOとして  
“軍”と、どう対峙するか？

## ディリにおける暴動の状況(ディリ市街地)



豪大使館近くの暴徒



炎上する商品



炎上した車両



襲撃されたレストラン



# 自衛隊による民生活動 於東チモール



防衛庁 山田一等陸佐(元UNMISET PKF工兵課長)提供

# 特に、日本のNGOにとって

- 自衛隊の国連PKOへの派兵をどう捉えるか？
- 自衛隊の有志連合作戦への派兵をどう捉えるか？
- それが、“大儀”を得られたものでない時は？
- その中で、“公的資金”に依存するとは？

# 日本のNGOにとって、憲法9条とは？

- 身を守る“武器”か？
- 国家の責任遂行を妨げる障害か？
- 国家から“決別”するか？
- その際の“自己資金”は？
- NGOは自ら“武装”するか？