

## **(1) Opening Remarks:**

### **Ms. Yuriya Teragaki (MC, JCCP):**

Let me start the seminar. Thank you very much for coming. Now we would like to have this Symposium "Information Gathering for Crisis Management for NGO Operations," sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (**MOFA**) with the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (**JCCP**) as the secretariat. I am Teragaki, from JCCP. During the seminar, we will be taking some pictures for our PR purposes.

Today we have "Information Gathering for Crisis Management for NGO Operations." Last week (November 17<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup>), we also held a workshop with about 30 participants, many of the NGO staff members and those of international institutions. During the workshop, they went through some practical training related to crisis management for the capacity building purposes. For this symposium, we expanded the scope of the audience so that we could share awareness of the danger in our work. And by doing so, we would also like to build better measures for crisis management.

First, I would like to invite Mr. Shigemi Jomori, Director of Nongovernmental Organizations (**NGO**) Assistance Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA.

### **Mr. Shigemi Jomori, Director, Non-Governmental Organizations Assistance Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, MOFA):**

Good evening. Thank you very much for your kind introduction. I am Shigemi Jomori from the Non-governmental Organizations Assistance Division of MOFA. Many NGO activities these days are conducted in dangerous areas. And I am sure that you are aware that you always have to deal with crises and dangers. Especially, the numbers of conflict areas are increasing nowadays, like Iraq and Afghanistan for example, and also places like Sudan and Bolivia have many refugees. And the NGO staff who are conducting activities in those areas are constantly in danger. Not only in those areas of conflicts, but also for others who are working in non-conflicted areas, there are always possible dangers due to changes in situation or environment of the areas. Because such

activities of NGOs overseas are always accompanied by some danger, we, MOFA, would like to protect you and ensure your safety by having this symposium "Information Gathering for Crisis Management for NGOs Operations." And we have asked JCCP for assistance as a secretariat.

Last Thursday and Friday, we invited some of those people who are in charge of crisis management for a two-days workshop, which was conducted in English, and I think all those participants gained a lot more knowledge about crisis management through the program. I am certain that this will be useful for better crisis management, as well as the safety of their staff. Today we have a wider variety of audience and I assume that you may be involved with either NGOs' or volunteer activities. I am sure that you must also be aware of those possible dangers, and this is why we decided to have a symposium like this for your benefit.

Today there are a wide variety of panelists from various fields. We are going to have a presentation from each of them, and I am sure that the information will be quite useful. And, together with you, we also want to acquire a deeper understanding of crisis management, so that whenever you are going to conduct some activities overseas, I hope what you will learn today from this symposium will be useful for you. Thank you.

**Ms. Yuriya Teragaki (MC, JCCP):**

Thank you, Mr. Jomori. First, we would like to have Mr. Beck to give the main presentation. Then we will have panelists for a panel discussion as well. From your left, I would like to briefly introduce the speakers from the International Crisis Group (ICG), Mr. Peter Beck. From MOFA, Mr. Fukada. Ms. Yoshida is a freelance journalist. From UNHCR, eCentre, Mr. John Campbell. From JCCP, we have our director, Professor Isezaki of Rikkyo University graduate school. Today's moderator will be Mr. Donowaki, Vice-Chairman of JCCP.

I would like to move on to the main presentation, by Mr. Peter Beck. He is the North East Asia Project Director of the ICG. He has been involved in activities such as analyzing the security policies of the North East Asia, based in Seoul, Korea. He is also a professor at several Korean universities and has participated in many international conferences. He will be speaking on "Information Gathering for Crisis Management for NGOs."

## **(2) Main Presentation:**

### **Mr. Peter Beck: North East Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group**

Good evening. I am Peter Beck, the Director for Northeast Asia for the International Crisis Group, and I would like to first thank JCCP for kindly inviting me to participate. I am a great admirer of JCCP's work, and I think our two organizations complement each other very well, because we are involved in trying to prevent conflicts and in policy analysis, and JCCP is actually involved in implementation. I also have the highest regard for MOFA, and every time I visit Tokyo, I try to meet with them to learn about the latest developments with North Korea. And, for one of the classes, I am teaching an NGO class right now in Seoul. And I am using UNHCR's work, actually the autobiography of their last head, who wrote a fantastic book. So I have great admiration for all of the organizations involved in this program tonight.

What I am going to talk about is security management and how we can balance the need to be effective as organizations, with maintaining our own personal safety as NGO personnel. Security management is an issue that my organization, the ICG, takes very seriously. In fact, this past summer one of our consultants was killed shortly after one of our reports appeared. And we are not sure whether the killing was linked or not to the release of our report, but we are very aware that, even though we are not in the business of humanitarian assistance or actual conflict prevention, our work does expose us to vulnerabilities.

Before I plunge in, I thought I would introduce our organization, since you might not be familiar with it. The ICG is an NGO based in Brussels. We have been in existence for about 10 years, and we have offices all over the world, including some of the most difficult areas to work in, such as Beirut, Kabul, Port Au Prince (in Haiti), Amman, Nairobi, just to name a few of the places where we have offices. Our slogan is "Working to prevent conflicts worldwide." And we are doing that through the written words. We write reports, which look something like this. And we are trying to provide an early-warning system for policymakers and analysts, as well as analyses and solutions.

So our work depends on field research. We are using all of the best materials that have been published that are on the Web, and then combining them with very extensive interviews. So it is very important for us to be in the

field and to be talking with everyone, from foreign ministers to taxi drivers to peddlers on the street, to get a real sense of the situation, of the security challenge or crisis that we may be facing. We are funded by a combination of governments and foundations. We try very hard to be neutral in our orientation and try not to take sides, necessarily, in a dispute. But we are not afraid to criticize. We are not part of the U.N. We are not beholding to any government for corporation. So we tend to speak very directly on the issues.

We got our start in the Balkans and in Africa 10 years ago and have gradually expanded around the world under our current president Gareth Evans, who is a former foreign minister of Australia. We have four hub offices in Asia. I just opened our hub for Northeast Asia last year. Our office in Northeast Asia is probably one of the most secure offices that we have in the world. So our vice president was very surprised: "You're speaking on security issues? You have the safest office in the world!" But I have been working with our other directors and learning about their experiences and about our organization. And we will try to share some of their insights with you. But we opened an office in Seoul. It is a bit unique. It is our only field office in a developed country. It is our only field office that is not in the country of focus, which in this case is North Korea. And we set this office up primarily because of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Yes, human rights are horrible in North Korea. And, of course, for Japanese, the kidnapping issue is paramount. But for us, security issues come first. We must resolve the security issues that we face with North Korea.

We are also looking at China and Taiwan. We just published a report a couple of months ago on the detente that sort of slowly seems to be taking effect between China and Taiwan. When we set up our office, we were not planning to focus much on Japan. Our fourth report, actually, is on Japan and North Korea, looking at just how the kidnapping issue, how North Korea - Russia and other factors have driven Japanese policymaking toward North Korea. And we thought that was going to be the end of our work on Japan when we were making our report agenda last fall, this time a year ago, and had no other plans to work on Japan. But then, the Tokdo, or Takeshima, issue came up. The textbook issue, history issue, came up again. And Yasukuni Shrine. So we changed our research agenda. And actually, we are finishing up a report right now that is focusing on these territorial and textbook tensions that have been rising in Asia.

Again, this was not our plan one year ago. But this came up this past spring. So frankly, I welcome the opportunity from JCCP to be able to visit Tokyo. But this is going to make tensions worse in East Asia before they get better. So unfortunately, we were focusing more on Japan than we had expected. So in a few weeks we will be publishing a report that I would be happy to share with you.

I would like to turn to our main topic at hand. That is balancing the need to be effective as organizations with the need for personnel and staff safety. And this is really a dilemma that cannot be easily solved. Like all NGOs, we are not a fortress like most American embassies. We cannot barricade ourselves behind walls and many layers of defense. Nor would we want to, because frankly I think the United States is defending its missions abroad at great cost to maintain contacts with the publics, that they are trying to serve in the various countries where we have U.S. missions.

So they may be much more secure, but this comes at a cost. And our measure of effectiveness is our ability to talk to people, just as your ability in your organization may be to train people or to provide assistance. For us, it is talking to people. And we cannot do that if we are behind barricades. So accessibility of people is very important for our organization.

Many of our offices, such as the ones I mentioned (Beirut, Kabul, and others) are in very unstable, potentially violent, very dangerous environments. And it is not just the fact that there may be civil unrest or war even in the areas that we cover. But our reports themselves may trigger something. Some governments and some organizations do not like our reports, because we criticize those who we think should be criticized, whether it is Serbs, who have massacred Muslims or focusing on Jemaah Islamiyah, the fundamentalist Islamic group, in Indonesia.

And quite frankly, I am very worried about my counterpart, our director in Jakarta. She is a very small American. Of course, I am a big target; I could be hit more easily, I suppose. But she is a very small American woman with very powerful depth of knowledge on the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Indonesia and was writing about it before the first Bali bombing, actually two months before the first bombing. She was trying to warn the world that we faced a potentially serious and deadly insurgency. I saw her just a couple of weeks ago. We had a retreat in Montenegro. And I told her that I was worried about her. But she's very confident that she knows how to

take care of herself. So I'll try to share some of her insights with you.

So some of our personnel are at risk, again, not just because of the environment that they are in but because of the particular work that we do. The first priority for us is that each of our offices must have a written set of security guidelines. We have a general set that all of our staff members receive, but because we cover the entire world each office must draft its own unique set of security guidelines that are adapted to the environment that the office is in. And all employees must sign on to these guidelines to show that they are aware of how we are managing security in each of our offices. Also important for our organization is having a 24-hour hotline. All offices have a number that they can call to get assistance if a situation is suddenly deteriorating. So having your headquarters provide support for your field offices is very important.

But this system does not always work perfectly, I must say. When I was at a retreat, I was talking with our Katmandu office. It is not even an official office. The Nepali government will not allow us officially to have an office. And, of course, they do not like us very much, because of the work that we are doing criticizing the conditions and the situation in Nepal. But there was a coup. There was a palace coup in Nepal and civil unrest. And the director called our headquarters in Brussels. And it turned out that there was a party, and everyone in the entire office was out drinking. So no one was in the headquarters able to provide support. Fortunately, nothing serious happened. But this is a way of saying that even with the best security and even with the best support, when you are a relatively small NGO (with 100 so employees) it is hard to cover everyone at everywhere all the time. The bottom line is that much of this comes down to your own ability to take care of yourself. And really, if a situation is unfolding, it can be very difficult for the headquarters to help you.

All of our offices are also required to have a concrete evacuation plan for contingencies when a situation deteriorates. And this covers communication systems, assuming that ordinary cell-phone networks or telephone networks might break down. You need transportation: Is there a way to be airlifted out? And we have to coordinate, first with the embassies of the countries that are citizens of, but also other NGOs, so that we can coordinate evacuation plans.

For the Seoul offices, this is not an everyday concern, but there is always the small possibility that North

Korea will implode or explode, and the consequences will be felt by Seoul. And our office is less than one kilometer from the Blue House. So we are very aware of what we would have to do if conflict suddenly broke out on the Korean peninsula. So you have to look very carefully at the city or area that you are in to determine "What is your contingency plan for evacuation?" and "How are you going to communicate?"

We saw with Hurricane Katrina that even for the United States government, communications virtually broke down. Even among emergency personnel, there was an inability to communicate effectively to coordinate relief efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. So this is something that no NGO can be expected to fully be able to manage. But we have to try.

One of the most important safety tips that I have found useful for my work in terms of personal transportation, is to hire a qualified driver, because car accidents are really the leading cause of death or injury. It is not actually getting shot or bombed. Car accidents are the leading cause of death for NGO personnel. So, particularly when you are in a new area, and that goes for myself as well, I am going to find, through third parties, the most qualified driver that I can, whether it is visiting the China-North Korea border, or wherever. And these were areas where, even though I spoke Korean and could manage to get around, I am a 198-cm walking target for individuals who have bad intentions. And I wanted to make sure that I had someone who is not just a driver but a guide and interpreter, someone that can keep me out of dangerous situations until I am confident that I can manage that environment on my own. That is when we are most vulnerable, I think. It is not when we are in our offices, but when we are on the streets.

But this is, I think, one of the most important steps that you can take. And it is well worth the cost to have someone you can trust who can keep you out of harm's way, because often it is managing the roads well and staying away from the wrong areas. And, of course, that applies to American cities, as well. If you go into the wrong part of Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York, you had better hope you have armed security, because the situation can be dangerous there too, unfortunately,.

When we are traveling, we also always keep our headquarters informed. When we are traveling to potential areas of conflict we inform our colleagues, as well as our headquarters, about our travel activity. Project directors

must approve all travel to potential danger zones. We also have established a separate set of guidelines for war zones, because we do have a number of offices that are in or near war zones, and particularly how to deal with checkpoints, when you are dealing with nervous, young military personnel, of how to manage that, because that can often be a dangerous situation, when they are not sure who you are working for, and they actually think that you are helping the insurgency that they may be trying to deal with. In many ways, just common-sense steps can help you to avoid conflict, even though checkpoints can be very time-consuming and can be considered a hassle. Another is how to deal with minefields if you find yourself in, or near one. Again, this depends on the office that we are dealing with. But we have very specific guidelines in place.

We also have guidelines for communications and computer security, of making sure that when we are using a cell phone not to divulge names. The information that we have, the relevant information in our reports, we share with everyone. But we do try to protect the identities of our personnel. So if an emergency arises, how do you secure your computer in a matter of minutes? How can you ensure that information about your sources is not going to fall into the wrong hands? And this really speaks to office security more broadly, of not allowing unaccompanied visitors to visit your office, of having a secured entrance to the building. Those two steps alone can virtually eliminate incidents involving your office.

These rules are easy to make, and they are more difficult to follow, because, again, our temptation is to have openness. Our temptation is to want to have our door open so that we can be accessible and not be like a barricaded embassy. But these are necessary steps that we have to take, particularly in conflict-prone areas, where your work may not be appreciated by one and all. So again, just following these two steps of office security and transportation security can really eliminate the vast majority of the risks that we think we face. Not all of it, certainly, but I think those are two important steps that we can take.

Finally, it is just having a common sense and a sensitivity of your surroundings, and being aware, being mindful, of those who are around you, being able to tell when a situation is deteriorating, being aware of people who might be following you, and just being aware of the areas that you are traveling in. Again, this applies even to American cities, where if you wander blindly into some places, even in the U.S., you may be risking your own



personal security. And that means talking to people. In our organization we only hire specialists. I am not an NGO specialist. I am a Korea specialist. That is what I have been working on for the last 18 years.

But it is talking to people. And I find taxi drivers to be one of the best sources of on-the-ground information. Merchants can be helpful. I was just at the China-North Korea border looking at trade and human exchanges between North Korea and China, and talking to a merchant who was sitting on top of an arch, looking down at the traffic to get a bird's-eye view of what was going on. And I found, whether it is visiting the China-North Korea border or going down to Albania to see Tirane, that the drivers have actually been one of the best sources of information, not only for staying out of trouble but for gaining a better understanding of the place, if you speak their language or they speak yours. In the case of Albania, some of the best interviews are just getting to know the drivers that I have and learning about their family situations or their perceptions of the situation.

But I think they can help you staying out of trouble. Before we go to a place, when we read about a place, it is very easy to get false impression. And situations change very rapidly. So it is very important for you to have the latest and most up-to-date information that you can get. And I think that often starts at the airport, by making sure that your organization or someone that you can trust is there. That is when you are most vulnerable, when you are arriving in a new environment. And it is almost written on your forehead that you are from a foreign country, potentially, at least in the minds of your tormentors, a country with a lot of money.

We have been able to avoid kidnapping, ransom situations. But we have had to deal with violence, as I said. And we have just in the last few months lost one of our contractors. So security is something that, even though I do not personally have to worry about it every day in my office, we have to deal with as an organization. During the Q&A session, I would be delighted to talk about the security issues. But I am also very interested in talking about your thoughts on "How can we keep Northeast Asia from becoming the next major conflict?" Is a clash possible over Senkaku? What happens if the Chinese or Koreans start engaging in more provocative behavior regarding these disputed islands? How can we avoid conflict, and how can we resolve these tensions that I think even overshadowed the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meetings in Pusan this week? There was no summit between China and Japan. And there was a very tense summit between Japan and South Korea.

So we see things getting worse. So the intention of our report is to be a third party, a neutral party, to try to look at "How can we reduce tensions in Northeast Asia?" We were originally going to be focusing on cooperation, how Northeast Asia can cooperate on energy and economic integration. And now, because of these lingering territorial disputes and interpretations of history, we seem to be being pulled backwards, in the wrong direction. So, as NGO personnel, I would be delighted to hear your thoughts and insights as to how we might resolve that and, if nothing else, whether this book is a symbol of a more serious problem of how Japanese may be increasingly viewing Koreans and Chinese.

Thank you very much for having me. I look forward to having a good discussion.

**Ms. Yuriya Teragaki (MC):**

Thank you very much. We would like to move on to presentations by the panelists. I would like to hand over the role of moderator to Mr. Donowaki.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki (Moderator, JCCP):**

I would like to thank Mr. Peter Beck for the complimentary words about JCCP, as I am the vice-chairman. I should thank you for your kind reference. I know the president of ICG Mr. Gareth Evans very well. And we highly respect your activities all over the world. I would like to thank Mr. Peter Beck for his very intriguing presentation. I believe there are some clues and hints in his presentation. ICG offices all have unique security guidelines. A 24-hour hotline has been established within the organization, as well as the necessity of having a proper evacuation plan, very basic but very critical issues, and very qualified drivers. And these are areas of high interest for us as well. I will be handing over to the four panelists soon, but perhaps during the Q&A session I believe Peter Beck mentioned that he would be very willing to answer questions.

I would like to move on to the panel discussion. We will hear their presentations, and each of the panelists will be sharing different perspectives with us. First, we will be hearing from Mr. Fukada, who is the Deputy Director-General of MOFA. He will be touching upon the topic of Japanese safety abroad. He is an expert in this

field, and I believe we will be hearing from him on this aspect. Ms. Yoshida, as a freelance journalist, has traveled through various areas throughout the world. And she has hands-on experience regarding crisis management. Mr. John Campbell actually attended the Crisis Management Workshop as one of the trainers last week. And he has a very long experience with the UNHCR. And again, I believe that we will be hearing about some very interesting issues from him. And Professor Isezaki is the director of our organization. In East Timor, Afghanistan, and other areas he has been working as a member of the government. And I believe that he will be shedding some light on various forces being deployed throughout the world. So each of the panelists has been allocated with approximately 10 minutes. After we hear from all the panelists, we would like to move on to the overall Q&A session. Without further ado, I would like to hand over the microphone to Mr. Fukada, from MOFA.

### **(3) Speeches by Panelists:**

#### **Mr. Hiroshi Fukada: Deputy Director General, Consular Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan**

Thank you very much for the introduction. My name is Fukada, from MOFA. As was just introduced, since August of last year, I have been acting as the crisis management director-general. Unfortunately, I was assigned, perhaps I should say, because as soon as I was appointed I realized that this past year has been quite a tough year. Various acts of terrorism have occurred overseas, and natural disasters have hit us in various parts of the world.

As most recent example, looking back, as you all know, was in July in London. There was the subway bombing. And in October once again Bali was a target. Again restaurants catering to tourists were bombed. And in Amman, Jordan again hotels were hit as well. Regarding these terrorist acts, one Japanese was killed in Bali, and terrorist acts are now more distributed. I'm especially focused on the London bombing incident. Although it was not something on a major scale like 9/11, the bombers in London were Pakistanis, who were born and grew up in London. And these youngsters felt very frustrated about the treatment they were receiving as Muslims. And they were recruited to become terrorists. These were small bomb devices. But nevertheless, they were able to trigger something that large. And I believe that the same can be said for the Bali bombing as well. So for us at MOFA, we have to assume that such unfortunate incidents will still occur.

All of you gathered here today, I believe, are members of NGOs or perhaps students who are planning to perhaps involve yourselves in such activities. We all have humanitarian missions, and we also have to pursue the need to balance our personal security. This balance is difficult now to maintain. But again, regardless of the circumstances I believe that we should not become too timid. Rather, I think this is a good opportunity for us to prepare ourselves. If we prepare ourselves properly, we can, to an extent prevent ourselves from becoming the victims of terrorist acts.

Last year more than 1 million Japanese traveled abroad, and 500 died, 350 of suicide and only 15 as a result of terrorist acts. In other words, statistically the number is quite small. However, needless to say, you need to be prepared. And as long as you are prepared, again, to an extent, you can avoid being caught by acts of terrorism. So

my advice is not to be timid but to be cautious. I believe you all have handouts of my summary. It does not even include my name or credit, but I believe you see in front of you the words "Not to be timid but to be cautious." But at the same time, I also want to say that being "courageous" is something extremely different from being "audacious". In other words, having the courage to pursue your mission is one thing, and being audacious and not heeding warning is something totally different.

In August, as I believe all of you remember, a male school teacher and a female teacher in Hiroshima Prefecture went to Kabul. And during that trip they were killed. Again, I unfortunately have to say that they were not courageous but rather audacious. It was the first trip to this area in the world for the female teacher. And I believe that they needed to heed the warnings more and take further precautions. It is a reality that this happened. I think the message is quite clear, that being courageous and being audacious are totally different things. At the same time, it is you that can protect yourselves and your organizations. In other words, although this sounds like common sense, regardless of whether you are an individual or you are part of an NGO, it is you, who has the take the responsibility to protect yourself.

In the interest of time, I would like to touch upon just a few points from this summary sheet. At our ministry, we refer to the three basics of security, the three C's. Although the summary sheet refers to the three P's, it is the three C's: *Caution*, *Contingency Plan*, and *Care*. Caution is obvious. Contingency Plan is when an emergency occurs how you cope with that situation, or how you prepare yourselves under normal circumstances, and preventing trouble.

The third point is care. This refers to what you do after a terrorist act, how you care for the victims. As the summary sheet implies, within "Caution" there are three P's: *Precaution*, *Prevention*, and *Protection*. These three P's are reflected in our guidelines for security that we issue from the ministry. And I would like to give you a brief summary of this approach. Precaution is being aware, being cautious. This also means our various levels for the various areas of the world. Level zero is the safest. For London, unfortunately, we had been issuing a level zero in the past.

It is easy to say and very difficult to implement, but during this phase of precaution you have to be very

heedful of the information that is available. As NGO consultants or as students, when you go outside of this country, especially if you are involved in humanitarian aid activities, you will find yourselves in very dangerous areas. Especially in these areas, you have to be very heedful of the information. You have to keep your eyes and ears open. You have to make sure that you absorb any possible pieces of information. And the sources for this can be found in the spot information that is issued by the government, as well as the various levels of safety that are announced by MOFA. Aside from this, there are many sources of information, from the U.S., from Great Britain, or you can utilize the Web. And other point that I think is critical, is gathering information from field staff in the country where you are planning on traveling.

Once you have that information, how do you process it? Security information is just a piece of guidelines. So how do you interpret those guidelines? Again, you have to take full responsibility for how you actually interpret or implement those warnings.

Another point that is critical under the heeding of Precaution is how you secure lines of communication. Again, it is easy to say and very difficult to implement, especially in the London subway bombing or the tsunami last year. There were many inquiries from families: "My son is in that area at the moment. I cannot contact him," et cetera. This means that there needs to be precautions taken before leaving the country and traveling to such areas. Again, if something were set, or if some form of communication approach were decided beforehand, some of these inquiries perhaps did not have to happen. The second P is Prevention. Again, this refers to the level that MOFA announces for the various countries or areas. For example, Bali is a Prevention area. If you are traveling to Bali, then do not go near sites that perhaps might be targets, such as crowded restaurants or embassies, in some cases. And especially in countries that are deemed at this level, you have to be careful of kidnapping as well.

Protection is the third P, where you physically have to take some protective measures. Level 2 is what we deem at MOFA are Saudi Arabia and Columbia, for example. These are considered level 2 at the moment. So, aside from taking precautions and implementing preventative measures, you should limit your scope of activities. You have to adhere to, a self-set curfew. You also have to make sure that you understand, or you are fully aware of the staff that perhaps you are hiring in the local areas. There is a level 3 that we issue at MOFA, where we warn or

suggest that you do not travel to such areas at all. Those include Afghanistan and some parts of Nepal. From my personal perspective, level 3 is an area to which you should not travel. If you must, then you have to go with great caution. Level 4 is evacuation. Iraq is a good example. This is, in a sense, out of the question to travel there. To our ministry, it is an area that we do not want you to set foot in.

I am out of time, so one last point, if I may: As I mentioned, how do you interpret these guidelines? These levels of warning are left to your interpretation. However, we often hear that NGO members traveling to level-3 or -4 areas. And sometimes I go to the extreme of calling them directly to warn them not to go. If you get a call from me, assume that the place you are planning to visit is a very dangerous one. Sometimes I cannot reveal confidential information. But they complain and say, "Just telling us not to go, you are not explaining the reason for us not to go." And sometimes the NGO members say further, "We have been there many times. And we know the field better than you do." But I think that is a very good example of being audacious, if I may say.

As I mentioned in the beginning, NGO members, especially those who are planning to work in sensitive areas, must be careful, and you have to have an extremely cautious mindset. At the same time, if you are going to go anyway, then you have to be courageous enough to pursue your mission and survive.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki (Moderator):**

Thank you very much. The summary sheet is being distributed now. Thank you very much, Mr. Fukada. We would like to entertain any question that there may be during the Q&A session. Our next speaker is Ms. Suzuka Yoshida, freelance journalist. She has written many books on her experiences.

**Ms. Suzuka Yoshida: Freelance Journalist; CEO, Sue International, Ltd.**

First and foremost, I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak at such symposium. Although I am a journalist, I am also an expert on public relations as well. So hopefully I can shed some light on this theme we have today, from these perspectives.

Regarding war zones and other dangerous areas, what are the types of dangerous areas? That is the first topic that I would like to touch upon. Traffic accidents, natural disasters are common dangers that we hear about here in Japan every day. That is one scenario. A second is hostage taking. In other words, some group or entity wants to issue some sort of message. And it is usually an action based on some political initiative. A third scenario is kidnapping itself. Kidnapping is usually done for the objective of getting money. So I'm separating this from the category of hostage taking. Another scenario is terrorism itself: bombings, and so forth. Regardless of the type of incidents, they will fall under one of these categories. They are shown on the slide. Based on these scenarios, I would like to get into my presentation. As NGO members or students, prior to traveling, what do you need to do? That is a simple question that you should ask yourselves.

First I would like to talk about mindset. You have to question yourselves as why you are going there. You need a very clear-cut objective. Is it something that you and only you can do? You have to have a firm objective. Once you are there, once you do arrive in the designated area, this objective will be the philosophy that will support you throughout your mission. In other words, you have to have a firm, concentrated mission. Otherwise, as Mr. Fukada mentioned, you may be biased if your objectives are not clear.

Another part of preparations is to collect information, and at the same time, to probe into various information sources. What should you check on? For example, "Who is the political leader in the target area?" "Who are the religious leaders in that area?" "What type of or what diversity exists in that region?" and "What are the other NGOs or U.N. entities that are deployed in that area?" If JICA is there, then you can obviously gather information from JICA, as well as from the embassy. Also if possible, contact the local media in the area.

These are some things that can be done prior to traveling, while you are still in Japan. And when you actually go to that area, these are some of the points that you need to keep in mind. I have listed here on the slide: risk



management manual, and critical management manual. These are two definitions under the category of security management. Usually, there are three. But my definition is based on public relations. So it might be different from some of the definitions that those of you in the security field are using.

Issue management is a third point, from a public-relations perspective. In other words, risk exists prior to risk management. It refers to potential risks. So it is that preventive action is the same as issue management. For example, Mr. A and Mr. B seem to be in a quarrel. The Sunnis are not on friendly terms with some other group. So these potential risks require your attention.

Risk management comes next, then crisis management. I would like to highlight a few things. For example, if you are isolated, how do you secure a communication line? When you are isolated and without communication, nobody will be able to rescue you. So what do you do? You might be willing to give up your life, but what about the organization that sent you to that area? So that needs to be taken into consideration. Also, you do need a concrete network for acquiring information, as well as expertise in the operation that you are involved in. If you are an expert in that field, then it is very easy to tap into resources of other NGOs and other entities.

Another is that you need language skills, as well as knowledge of various international laws, such as the Geneva Convention. Another is that you absolutely have to be equipped with wireless communication, not just one device, radio as well as multiple cell phones. Peter referred to this briefly, but why do you need a security guard? They are usually connected to grass-roots movements in that country or area. If you are up against guerrillas or, let's say, organized acts, then it is actually quite easy to negotiate. But with terrorists, it is very difficult to predict what they will be doing next. And they have their own game theories. So, by tapping into grass-roots information sources, you are able to access not just openly available information but also disclosed information. You can have a grasp on real information. Most of the time, these terrorists are mingled among your general civilian population.

As Peter mentioned, maids, drivers, or merchants on the street are good sources of information. And they have true and viable information. So being on friendly terms with them and creating a network of your own is better. You have to make sure that you are not too biased in your information sources as well. There are other topics that I would like to touch upon perhaps later. So this will conclude my part for now. Thank you.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki (Moderator):**

Thank you very much, Ms. Yoshida. Especially for safety considerations, we also need to have a list of all those mechanisms that have to be prepared before traveling. I think that is quite a useful information. She also talked about terrorism. We need to have that grass-roots information that is going to be quite important. Her speech was based on her own experience in local cities in those areas, which enabled us to learn quite a lot from her.

The next speaker is from UNHCR eCentre Mr. John Campbell.

**Mr. John Campbell: Coordinator, UNHCR eCentre**

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to start by thanking JCCP sincerely for this invitation to be here tonight. I want to talk to you about the importance of security management, because for humanitarian staff operations in the zones of conflict throughout the world, security has become paramount. It has become really serious.

Many years ago, it was thought that if a humanitarian worker was killed, it was in the wrong place at the wrong time. This is no longer the case. And many NGOs are perceived as being political, as are UNHCR staff. The fact that Japan has troops in Iraq also puts any NGOs that would work there at risk and any NGOs anywhere in the region at risk. Similarly, an Australian working in Indonesia is viewed with some suspicion, because in Indonesia many of the radicals would blame Australia for the loss of East Timor. So we are becoming political. We aim to cover the following topics in this short talk. I want to illustrate the effects of the use of security information for humanitarians in conflict zones. I would like to talk a bit about addressing that threat and how to make the environment safer. Obviously, this is going to be difficult to cover in 10 minutes.

Let's look at several examples of security incidents that have occurred in recent years. The list is not comprehensive. It only touches on the surface. There are countless more that may or may not have resulted in deaths, which often lead to wounds and injuries, both physical and psychological.

Here we see some examples of what happens to you when you are in the field, what has happened in the past. And it is from that basis that I want to move forward. It begins with the death of the JICA experts. This driver for UNHCR was killed as a result of very poor information management. Criminals found out information, a courier was robbed, and a man died. Head staff, lying asleep in a hospital, were killed. Following the genocide in Rwanda, that number of UNHCR staff alone were killed or went missing. Goodness knows how many NGO staff went missing. This death here was totally unnecessary. Information was shared, and it was well known that there was a minefield, and yet staff still went into it. These three were killed when carrying out human-rights activities in Aceh. This particular death was in an area that we did not even consider to be risky. This death was a result of a humanitarian worker who stayed too long. The signs were there to get out, but he hang on, and he hang on, and he

left too late and was killed. This was a UNHCR staff, a woman, a protection officer, killed in the street. Five Afghans working for an NGO were killed. They were medical workers, doctors, going to a village. This one here is significant. It led to the withdrawal for the first time ever of MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières). The culmination of these incidents is the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, which resulted in 22 deaths.

I have got here these "Might have been avoided." I will change that. These could have been avoided if sounder security procedures had been in place as a result of the information that was available. This is a UNHCR field office in Atambua, which was attacked. People were killed in it and outside of it. This area here, where the fire was, is where the bodies were chopped up and burned. This incident was avoidable. With proper use of information and proper security management, this would not have happened. And here are the victims.

Before we can plan for our safety, we need the information to go on. We in UNHCR use several sources. Our national staffs have a good grasp on what is going on, but they may not always be able to share it, because they put themselves at risk. Partners, you, NGOs, are very good sources of information. And we should have regular meetings with you. In Kosovo, every Monday night, every NGO in Kosovo and UNHCR met in the office and exchanged information. We knew everything that was going on about security.

The security, regular and irregular, may only tell you what they want you to hear. So treat them with of suspicion. And don't tie that down to just regular forces. Irregular forces, too. You may have to communicate with them. We used to have to do this so in Somalia, with General Hersi Morgan, one of the clan leaders. We had to work with him. We had to work with the Kosovo Liberation Army to find out what was going on. Government interlocutors also are a good source of information, but some government interlocutors will only tell you what they want you to hear. Community leaders we use as a good source, especially if you are helping the community. The media, we rate as an excellent source for general information, because they are going to try to get things right. Their credibility depends upon it. The diplomatic community is another source. We develop a rapport with diplomats, especially the defense attaches. If the embassy has a security officer, develop a rapport with him.

With regards to travel advisories, we do not follow them blindly. Some countries tend to exaggerate the risk

and overstate the problem. Refugees are also a good source of information. But we must be cautious in acting on any information we get from them, because they might have a hidden agenda. As to U.N. security phases, we have five phases. The lowest one is precautionary, then restricted movement, relocations, and emergency operations only. You would only generally find UNESCO working in that situation, perhaps World Food Program. Then finally, phase 5 is evacuation.

The U.N. has this system, but again, it does not follow it blindly. Sometimes it can be misleading. I know some NGOs look at the situation and say, "That's U.N. phase 4." And they think "war." They think emergency operations only. It is not necessarily the case. Just look at the situation more deeply. Use this as a guide only. So where do we go from here? It cannot be that we continue to accept risks readily and also accept the deaths of colleagues and humanitarian operations at the present rate. There must be an effective way to address this and minimize the casualties. This is not, of course, an option that we would ever want to consider, but if it is too dangerous, we do not go.

One way ahead is the effective use of security-risk management techniques, the systematic and analytic use of information to identify and process threat to staff, assets, and programs, actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of attack. That is a real mouthful. It takes five days for us to teach that in our risk-management courses. It is a management tool to support decision-making. It will make you the manager more confident in making your decision. But really, the more experienced of you will find that it is something you are doing already subconsciously. But you may have missed some things. This is why it should be done more methodically, even if you are an expert.

There are four good reasons for having security-risk management. It leads to better decision-making. Most important to me is that it makes the staff happy and more confident when they see that they have a manager who really cares and who encourages accountability. After the Baghdad bomb, heads rolled. People were found to be culpable. People were found to have been careless in their judgment. So now a manager, certainly in UNHCR, knows that in a conflict zone if he makes a bad decision it will be investigated, and he will be held to account. One way of helping him with this accountability is by encouraging security-risk management.

There are many ways to view the threat. And I will go over this very quickly, by vulnerable locations:

- In the office: We consider all the things that could happen to you in the office that would pose a threat to you.
- At the work site: This could be the refugee camp. It could be the village you are working in. And we consider all the threats there. And this must not be done by one person. It would be too subjective. We do security-risk management with three or four people who know what they are doing, three or four security officers, in close consultation with the head of the office or the country representative.
- On the road: All the things that can happen to you, the most dangerous time of all on an NGO operation: ambush, hostage taking, car hijacking, mines.

We can view the threat by the potential sources:

- The population: Everything the population could do to you to pose a threat
- Extremists: There, we could categorize all the things extremists could do.

In our threat assessment, first of all, we have to identify what the threat is:

- Assess the impact: How serious will it be if we are bombed?
- Assess the likelihood: Is it going to happen?
- Determine mitigation measures: How we can lessen the risk.

Let's take an office in Southeast Asia as an example. This one, we did on the Jakarta office. My colleague and

I ascertained that these were all the threats that could happen to us in that office:

A direct bomb at the building; Collateral damage: The American embassy was 400 meters away.

If they got a big bomb, we would get a piece of it, too; Local demonstrations; Occupation;

Refugee demonstration; Refugee occupying the office; Assault by a refugee; Refugee suicide;

Natural disaster.

And this is how we quantified the risk before we actually did the assessment, implemented the mitigating measures.

And we had implemented them, we found (and this was not one person; this was several people doing it) that we could get the *direct bomb at the building* down to just "high risk" by improving the fencing, improving the access

controls, having a policeman outside, having guards alert with radio, and having a CCTV camera overlooking the entrance so that anything that came along would be identified.

*Collateral bomb damage*, we got that down to "completely low risk" by fitting shatter-resistant film. Many NGOs will at this stage be saying, "How can we afford that? It is expensive." Yes, it is expensive, but I am afraid it is the cost of doing business if you want to keep your staff safe.

*Local demonstrations*, we got that down by much better visibility of the guards and the police and intelligence from the police, the police telling us when a demonstration was coming so we could send staff home or take extra precautions.

*Local occupation*, we got down to "low risk" by the same means. And the refugee demonstration we got down to "high risk" by improving our procedures. For *when an asylum seeker was waiting too long for a decision on when he was going to be resettled*, we improved our procedures so that he did not have to wait so long. But it was still a "high risk," because asylum seekers are such desperate people.

*Occupation of the office by refugees*, again, this was mitigated by good access controls.

*Assault by a refugee*, we deal with that by having guards present during an interview.

*Refugee suicide--setting themselves on fire*, we put fire blankets out, carbon dioxide fire extinguishers, first-aid kits, and had procedures for getting a casualty to a hospital quickly.

*Natural disasters*, we could not do much about that. That was an earthquake, just have a better drill.

So this is an example of how security-risk management works, in effect. But I do stress that it takes many, many days to teach a security focal point how to do this. We also deal with the security triangle: *acceptance*, *protection*, and *deterrence*. Acceptance is getting the NGO to convince other people that we are friendly, that we are harmless, and that we are just there to help the population. That is acceptance. It often works but not always. Protection is defending yourself, by putting wire around your compound, armed guards, if necessary. We put armed guards in many offices. Outside the office in Bangladesh there are armed guards. Outside Jakarta we have put armed guards. Deterrence--countering the threat if we are harmed, by having these armed guards. It is a sad fact of

life, but we have to do it now. I know one Japanese NGO working in Iraq is using armed guards actually in their cars. The driver is carrying a gun. The guards are carrying guns.

Security management is not magic. It is not an idea that will tell you everything is safe. And it is not a procedure that will stop you from becoming a victim. It is certainly not a rocket science.

In summary, regarding practical security in conflict zones, it is absolutely of paramount importance that only trained and mature people embark on humanitarian activities. There is no longer room for the hippy with the long hair and the big heart on his sleeve. That is a thing of the past. Humanitarians today have got to be professional, who are motivated, with the abilities and skills to help those in need. The humanitarian worker can only do it when he is fit and well and well-informed and briefed. Formal training is now a must and no longer a luxury. If we are to continue to operate in the conflict areas around the world, it is essential that we evolve with the times and understand that we may be, and often are, the targets. No longer do either Japanese logos on cars or the U.N. flag on a building offer us the protection that they might have in the past. We in UNHCR take the safety of our staff and our partners very seriously, and we will do all we can to assist Japanese NGOs similarly. We hope to develop this cooperation in the following year.

As a final footnote, training is absolutely essential. And we offer vacancies on training courses down in Thailand on security-risk management, on personal security, and on advanced security for as many Japanese as will volunteer. The next one is in April. And I would hope to pack with at least 20 Japanese NGOs on that. Thank you very much for your attention.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki (Moderator):**

Thank you very much. We had our workshop last week. And he gave us a lot of information and knowledge. And he is quite knowledgeable. He was teaching us the type of crises or threats and also the severity of threats. And he was emphasizing that we really have to have good assessments of threats and need to have a really good list.

Our last speaker is Mr. Isezaki, from JCCP. Based on his experience, he is going to give a presentation.



**Mr. Kenji Isezaki: Professor, Graduate School of Social Design Studies, Rikkyo University; Director, Japan Center for Conflict Prevention**

My theme is quite simple: "How can NGOs protect themselves?" As Mr. Campbell mentioned, in East Timor three JICA members were killed. Actually, I was in East Timor working for UNTAET. I was the governor at the border of the nations. We actually sent two gunships to identify the bodies. And I happened to be in East Timor. My responsibility was to act as a governor, but at the same time, I had the responsibility as a security coordinator, sent by the security office located in the U.N. headquarter. And since I am not a military man but a civilian, in each region I was responsible for the security of NGOs, not of the military.

How should we view security management from a civilian perspective? Ultimately, the security phase and also plans of action have to be determined. And in order to come to that phase, I want to briefly tell you that as civilians, we rely on the military threat indicators. And whenever you work in a conflict zone, I am sure that some PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) or coalition army refers to some of this security phase, since this is a military threat indicator, and on top of that, we use political analysis. We have a sort of sense to determine that security phase.

This is quite similar to the list given by Mr. Campbell. And this is a typical military threat indicator, starting with "very low" and going up to "very high." I think the color-coding is sort of universal. Also this gives the size of the threat, which refers to the size of the guerrilla force that is actually invading that area, and the size of that force is going to determine the level of the threat. Also, there are security phases defined by the United Nations. They have security officers in the regional offices of the U.N. And based on their understanding of the area, they define the phase. This has already been covered by Mr. Campbell, so I will skip this slide.

The U.N. would subcontract some of their activities to NGOs, as UNHCR does. To a NGO that has a subcontract agreement with the U.N., what kind of responsibilities does U.N. have to have on? I would say, as far as I understand it, for the major NGOs, there are three things related to security. One is a memorandum understandings between the partner NGOs and the U.N. This is quite controversial. And there are two reports from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Those are the only things related to the security issues in the

agreement between the U.N. and an NGO.

There are three challenges. The first is in an emergency chain of command of the U.N. versus NGO independence. When the U.N. is responsible for the safety of NGO personnel, they actually have a right of enforcement, applying their security phases or security actions. All the NGOs have to follow the U.N. security phases or security actions; otherwise, the U.N. cannot be responsible. But what happens to the independence of NGOs? If the U.N. says evacuate, then evacuate as ordered? Another problem is the local staff. Taking care of the local U.N. staff is even a low priority. So the U.N. considers taking care of the local NGOs who are their implementation partners as the least priority. The third one is billing. If we are going to use U.N. helicopters or airplanes to evacuate NGO staff, the NGO is going to get a bill from the U.N. That is why there are no NGOs that can have this agreement with the U.N. So this is actually not functioning at all.

Simply stated, we cannot depend on the U.N. So maybe we can refer to U.N. information, but we cannot rely on the U.N. No one can guarantee the safety of NGO staff, even though you have a partnership with the U.N., there is no guarantee. The most important thing is how you are going to obtain information from the military. Especially for Japanese NGOs, this is critical, because we have Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Also, the left-wing Japanese NGOs found the way for their activities overseas. That is why this is critical.

In 2003, after East Timor gained independence, there was a riot in Dili. This was against the East Timor government. This riot was organized by the civilians. At that time, the Japanese Self-Defense Force was working in that area. Since it was considered quite safe, many Japanese including JICA staff and those of all the Japanese NGOs, were working in this area. What could the Japanese civilians expect from the Self-Defense Force at that time? At the time, deployment of the Self-Defense Force there was controversial in Japan, but the Self-Defense Force was not legally allowed to be in such areas. This was in 2003, and the Japanese Self-Defense Force was deployed there.

I was staying in this area, near the border, in 1999. And security was quite a big issue. Also, the incident in Atambua was taking place. Also some U.N. peacekeepers were shot. At that time, the rules of engagement were raised. And it was a sweep operation. That was the end of the civilian terrorist activities in 2001. In 2001 East

Timor was the safest country on Earth. And two years later the Self-Defense Force was deployed. And activities were carried out by NGOs. Also, all the activities were carried out by NGOs contracted by the U.N. So the Self-Defense Force was deployed, regardless of the needs in this region. And I think this was a fact.

As to how Japanese NGOs deal with the military, in our case, the Self-Defense Force, how should we view the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces? This is quite controversial. In the case of East Timor, the media was chasing after a female worker, so it is not fully understood. But currently we are facing the force deployment in Iraq and how we understand the coalition operations in Iraq. This is quite controversial. And these are very different issues, but at this moment we cannot differentiate one from the other. Especially when the war itself is controversial, even in the United States, because the justification for that war is not fully understood. Under the circumstances, in Afghanistan all the Japanese NGOs have to depend on the public capital. They are working on the borders, and they are relying on the public capital.

Finally, I would like to touch upon Article 9 of Japanese Constitution. As it was mentioned by Ms. Yoshida, from a public-relations perspective in terms of security, we have to be safe and harmless people. We need to get the message out that we are harmless people to the population in the areas where we are working. And we really need to conduct public-relations activities. If we think about Article 9, we do not engage in military activities and we do not have an armed forces. And this itself can be quite an effective PR mechanism. This is quite an effective mechanism from a public-relations standpoint, to make the local population understand that we are only there on humanitarian missions. And now policy makers are trying to change Article 9. That is quite controversial, but we have to consider that Article 9 can be cited in our public-relations activities, to help keeping us safer in conflict areas. Or is this something that is going to keep us from achieving our missions? Because of the PKO regulations, even though the Self-Defense Force is working in that area, NGO people have to be in the area where the Self-Defense Force is, doing the same tasks.

If you do not want to rely on that, then you have to separate your organizations from your own country. And when you separate yourself from Japan, then you cannot rely on public funds. Usually, the U.S. or Europe NGOs have a lot of funds, but Japanese NGOs do not have a lot of funding. There are a very few private corporations

supporting the Japanese NGOs, and it has been that way for the last 25 years.

One Japanese NGO has armed its own staff. Do we have to arm ourselves now? It is not just hiring guards, but we may have to outsource of the defense to private military companies. Especially right now, even some of the U.N. sometimes engages the services of private military company in really dangerous areas, with private companies providing some of the security service in those areas. And I think we really have to face this situation. Thank you very much.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki (Moderator):**

Thank you very much, Professor Isezaki. We need to think about NGOs and their involvement, especially with the Self-Defense Force and how you balance you activities against Self-Defense Force activities.

We heard from our main presnter and the four panelists. And we have about 30 minutes left. So we would like to open the floor to questions for Mr. Beck, as well as for the panelists. If you have a question, please state you organization and your name, as well as to whom you would like to direct your question. Are there any questions? The issue of how to ensure your safety on your own in overseas operations is a huge one. And nowadays we also have to consider unpredictable threats like terrorism, not just the conventional threats, and think what kind of humanitarian aid operations should be there in the midst of this kind of international condition

#### **(4) Q&A Session:**

##### **Ms. Tojo (Red Cross Hospital):**

I am from the Red Cross hospital in Nagoya. My name is Tojo. I would like to ask Mr. Campbell a question. You spoke of risk assessment, and you mentioned some points that one needs to learn beforehand. If you could perhaps give us some perspectives and a little more on the points on to assess that information.

##### **Mr. John Campbell:**

Thank you very much for that question. The whole business of security-risk management is quite complex. As I said earlier, it is not a rocket science, but it does take a long time to learn how to identify risks, determine the impact, mitigate the impact, assess the likelihood, and then implement all the recommendations that you come up with.

It really means cutting into the country and being there for quite a long time, several weeks. If I were doing a security assessment on a country, I would want to be there for at least two weeks. And I would be going around to agencies, every NGO, no matter how small it is. I would be going to speak to them. I would contact the diplomatic community as well. I would go to my own embassy and try to make friends with the defense attaché, with the security officer, and ask what the threats are.

I would also ask to see situation reports, incident reports, what has happened, how it happened, where it happened, why it happened, what the likelihood is of it happening again. Once you get all these threats, you then look at each one and think, "How can I minimized the chance of that happening to me?" I will give you an example. In occupied Croatia, back in the early 1990s, when I was working with Kiyama-san, there was a situation where hijacking was prevalent. Every time you went out in a car, there was a risk that you were going to be taking. I mitigated that risk by using a plain-clothes policeman with a hidden weapon traveling in the car behind me. And we never lost a car.

ICRC, who is not allowed to do that and does not carry weapons at all, lost cars several times, because they

would not step into an area where they were forbidden to go. So I had done my assessment, I mitigated it, and it worked. And I do not pick on ICRC. It is a noble organization. And they have got their principles, and I respect them for keeping them. But there are some times when you have to take measures that are against the philosophy of your organization.

I will give you an example. A NGO was operating in one conflict area a couple of years ago, and they had been given very strict security briefings: "No armed people in your vehicle." And they came to a checkpoint of soldiers, and the soldiers asked them for a lift. And they said, "You are not having a lift. We are not allowed to give a lift". So to make a long story short, the soldiers beat them up, threatened them, and said, "If you report this, we will kill you." And this was an example of security just going too rigid. They should have had the ability to say, "Okay, we will give you a lift." Report it later and get something done about it. But do not put your lives at risk because of principles and risks.

There are many examples that come to mind about assessing threats and mitigating them. But, as I said, it is a long process. And what I would like to do is to get someone from every NGO in Japan at our risk management course down in Thailand for four or five days and train a security focal point so that you will have someone when you go into a conflict area who can handle this with confidence, write a security plan, write standard operating procedures, and understand crisis management, how do deal with a situation when you have has a staff member killed or wounded or kidnapped. That is my aim for the next two years, to do that. But it is not a thing I can do just in a few minutes here. Thank you for your question.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you.

**Ms. Kiyama (JEN):**

I am Kiyama, from JEN. To Mr. Beck, I have one question. And I have another question for Mr. Beck and Mr. Campbell. The first question to Mr. Beck is about the Hurricane Katrina. You said communications were not really

effective as expected. But after that, what kinds of measures were taken to improve the communication?

My second question, to both of you, is about Kabul. The place is not facing the ocean, and there is no place close by to which to evacuate. When you are in an area where there is not a place to which to evacuate, what kind of evacuation plan do you have?

**Mr. Peter Beck:**

Thank you very much for the question. The situation reports that I have read, both from the military and from civilian personnel, was that the destruction was so complete in Katrina that the established emergency communication systems were effectively wiped out. In the case of the military, they had to improvise. They actually used a private security firm in the New Orleans area that had established a very grounded facility that was not damaged and still had power through generators. Actually, the government agencies had to rely on a private security firm to provide critical communications in the first few days. Again, I think this is a great example that even in the U.S., we can have serious communications problems in an emergency.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

What about the evacuation plan?

**Mr. John Campbell:**

On evacuations, you pointed out Kabul being inland, with no seaport. What we have is an evacuation plan that relies heavily on airlift. We designate safe havens, which are safe countries to go to. I am not sure what they are for Afghanistan. It is outside of my area. I cover Asia-Pacific. But I would guess that there is a plan to go to New Delhi or perhaps Colombo or even Dubai. But it would be done by air, and it would be done with that army's securing your safety until the aircraft were brought in. And we would charter aircraft and bring them in. We had this facility in Indonesia. We had an aircraft on call on 24 hours notice to fly in. So it would be done by air.

I know there is problem with funding and paying for things and agreements. But whenever I have seen an

evacuation, we have never left NGO staff behind. We have always taken them with us, wherever that has been, whether it was Kosovo or Indonesia. But the answer to your question, Keiko-san, is that it would be done by air, with the military perhaps helping us, maybe the military even supplying the aircraft to get us out.

**Ms. Kiyama (JEN):**

I have an additional question for Mr. Campbell's answer. Of course, we are planning to evacuate by air, but because of the funding issue, we cannot really prepare and have a plane on 24-hour standby. What advice would you have in that case?

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Maybe other panelists have some experience in evacuations. Fukada-san?

**Mr. Hiroshi Fukada:**

Actually, I want to ask John this question as well. In Qandahar, I believe when a new governor was appointed, some civilian got quite upset and targeted the embassy. And a situation arose. To where do you evacuate? Unfortunately, for the Ministry back then, as I recall, I gathered information from various other embassies at that time. And we could not do anything, either. We could not understand the whole situation. We could only inform that they should evacuate to anywhere they could.

I think Iraq is an exception, but, for example, for Afghanistan there is a prediction that something like that can happen. So for the planning for where to evacuate, at least you have to have a tentative plan in mind. That's all I can say. So you tentatively separate yourself from that incident somehow. In some case, you put yourself under the protection of the deployed forces in that country. So in that regard, contingency plans for the NGOs that are active in that area are a necessity. That's perhaps all I can say.



**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Any comment? From Ms. Yoshida, perhaps?

**Ms. Suzuka Yoshida:**

Avoiding it is about the only answer that comes to mind. Again, for myself, my expertise is not in the military field. So I am afraid I cannot answer that.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Professor Isezaki, you were there.

**Mr. Kenji Isezaki:**

A good example is, I think, toward the latter half of last year in Harrow there was a riot, and a minister's son was involved in an incident. And the son of the Israeli minister was killed. The targets included foreigners, including NGO staff. There were Japanese NGOs as well. And the first action that was taken was to contact the regional U.N. office and evacuate there.

Every regional office has a basement. So that was used as an evacuation site. For this incident, it proved to be effective, because the rioters did not focus on that site. So the people were in Kabul, and an aircraft came in to pick up civilians, including Japanese. And these people were evacuated from the site. I am not sure what the capacity is at the Japanese embassy in Kabul, but it does have quite a large basement. But the problem with that basement is that it is so obvious that there is an evacuation site underground at the embassy. But if something happens, one of the guidelines for that area is to evacuate to the embassy. There was one hotel in Kabul where a bombing occurred. And the JICA members and the Japanese living there evacuated to the embassy, but they did not use the basement. That is a different story, but the message here is that the only means of escape there is by air. As long as Japan does not send Self-Defense Force troops there, we have to depend on forces of other nations. And in Kabul there are priorities in the embassy, obviously. We are No. 23. There are 22 countries involved in ISAC. Japan is not. We do not have much clout in that country. So we are No. 23 in terms of being evacuated or supported in an evacuation

situation.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you. As Mr. Fukada has mentioned, primitive as it may be, you need some place to run to. And for the country that you asked about I think that is the case. Mr. Campbell, we haven't heard from you yet.

**Mr. John Campbell:**

With regards to Afghanistan, specifically the area we are dealing with, I would make contact with representatives of UNHCR Afghanistan and find out exactly what the situation is in regards to getting NGO staff out in an evacuation situation, and I will make sure that information is communicated to you. Just give me a few days to do that. But I would like to stress that the U.N., despite all the rules and regulations, I could not think of a situation where they would leave people sitting on the tarmac just because they did not have money. They would get them out, and the money could be something to argue about later. But the priority certainly, with all the UNHCR people I know, would be to get the staff to safety, get people to safety, and then think about bureaucracy later.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you. Any other questions?

**Mr. Hayashi (FASID):**

I am Hayashi. I am from FASID. Thank you very much for your great presentations. I have a question for Mr. Beck. ICG is collecting a lot of information, using local staff. However, depending on the areas or countries where you are conducting your activities, I think the local staff can be regarded as spies by the government in that country. Sometimes it may result in having those local staff no longer be able to stay in that country. In that case, those local staff may become refugees. Do you have some kind of policy to support those people?

**Mr. Peter Beck:**

That is an excellent question. You are quite right, that often our work is viewed with suspicion. And in fact, when I was at the China-North Korea border and talking to merchants and border guards, I did feel, honestly, myself like a CIA person asking questions. So I am sure that governments will view us with great suspicion. And you are right. Actually, I will not even name the offices, but there are several offices where we do rely very heavily on local individuals. And many of them are not working openly for us. They are working in--I do not want to say secret, but we do not advertise either publicly or to the government where they are working. And we do have on individual who we are watching very closely right now, because he is facing some possible exposure by the local government. And we would have to take care of that individual.

Fortunately, we have very good ties with most Western governments. And we have informal arrangements, that if we need to get someone out, they can go on for educational purposes until the situation changes or improves in their home country. So we do have some informal contingency plans in place. Because you are right, we are, by the nature of our work, putting some local contract people at risk.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you. This time, we have a question about humanitarian aid in NGO activities being monitored, so to speak, by the local governments, with the local staff therefore being "monitored" is a possibility. But for a group like ICG, you are more involved in actually preventing or probing directly into the conflict. And especially for an entity like JCCP as well, being neutral is a common theme. And that is how you gain credibility and reliability. In that sense, I think entities like ICG or JCCP being monitored or viewed with suspicion is not an ideal situation. But again, which side of the argument is justifiable is another question, I believe. Any other questions?

**Mr. Ishikawa (Shanti Volunteer Community):**

My name is Ishikawa, from Shanti Volunteer Community. I would like to ask a question to Mr. Fukada. I spend two years in Afghanistan, and I returned to Japan. Now Afghanistan is considered as level 3, and I was

working in an area deemed as level 4. For two years I was living in an area that was deemed very vulnerable. But the other NGOs, international NGOs as well as ourselves, were very cautious about security, the drivers and the guidelines. That was a matter of everyday life for us.

My point is that MOFA, of course, issues many warnings for traveling, but warnings issued for general tourists and warnings that you issue for NGO members, I think, should be different. And I assume that you are sort of mixing everything together. So perhaps MOFA can be more pro-active in defining these two warning types separately. I am not criticizing. And I am not saying that I am totally right. But I think that you are sort of stereotyping the warning levels. You are mixing everything together.

**Mr. Hiroshi Fukada:**

It is a sensitive topic. If I may make one candid comment, I have been acting as a crisis-management director, and personally I do not want anybody working in Afghanistan. As I said, in level 3 or level 4 areas, you have to have a firm communication line. You have to equip yourselves and guard yourselves with armed guards.

The question is whether you have sufficient resources to equip yourselves with that much protection. There are many people operating in level 3 or level 4 areas. And we cannot close our eyes to that fact. And I am sure the NGOs understand that. And we try to find common ground somehow. The spot information and the travel information issued by MOFA is not mixing and matching. There are some pieces of information that we just cannot reveal, because of the nature of our ministry. Let's say a specific NGO member is kidnapped by a specific group. And when that occurs, we have our hands tied, because we cannot release that information. We still have to assess the information. We have to gather information from various intelligence sources.

There is only so much that we can reveal. So the extent of what we can do is to be very realistic in issuing the warning levels. So regardless of whether you are an NGO member or just a tourist, it is the same. For level 4 areas, you have to be very professional in your mindset, in going to that area. And the information that we provide, although we may not be able to reveal all the information, you should assume that there is more to be said. And you have to take that to heart. Thank you.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

The level of risk is provided by the U.N. And MOFA provides travel information in terms of the warning. Also, ICG has that kind of information. Iraq is a country where we have to evacuate. All NGOs understand that they have to evacuate themselves from Iraq. Would you please comment on that, Mr. Beck? Do all NGO have to evacuate from Iraq?

**Mr. Peter Beck:**

I am not working on the Middle East. I am actually not aware of contingency plans. Mr. Campbell might be in a better position to answer.

**Mr. John Campbell:**

I cannot speak about NGOs in Iraq, but it is the U.N.'s feeling that the country is not yet ready for humanitarian intervention. There is a party of U.N. people in the Green Zone in Baghdad. But any humanitarian activity taking place is being carried out by national staff. So the question of evacuation does not arise. We still think it is too unsafe an environment in which to be working. And last week, quite honestly, we were very surprised to hear that a Japanese NGO was working there, with armed men in their cars to go about their business. To us, it is beyond the threshold. We would not do it. But with regards to NGOs working there, I just do not know who is there and what their plans are.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you very much. How about you, Yoshida-san? The Japanese humanitarian aid, not only NGOs, but also freelance journalists are going to Iraq and face some problems? How do you regard that?

**Ms. Suzuka Yoshida:**

At the beginning of my presentation, I mentioned this. There are many journalists in that area. A journalist

cannot think he or she is the only one there. We pay the cost of getting there, and if you are killed, what can you leave behind? Even if you are not going to that area, maybe you can ask local journalists. And I think communicating what you want to say is one of the skills that a journalist has to have. And I think maybe it is better to even employ local journalists to ask them what you want them to see.

So you should not be self-centered, but rather maybe use the local resources, and things you make can be even better, because when you go to that area, you are putting yourself right in the dangerous zone, and you may act audaciously, because you are in danger by just being in that country.

Also, Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously dangerous because of the situation there, but in other countries there are not such obvious clues. But there are many other areas that can be dangerous without any obvious clues, like some African countries for example. And I think in those countries, I really value having good contact with intelligence officers. They are likely to be critical of the local governments and have a broad variety of information. So by having those contacts, maybe based on their information, you decide if you should go or not. When you find something that only you can do, of course, you will become really enthusiastic about going to that area. But you have to do it on your own responsibility, and do it at your own risk to physically go there. If you can mitigate the risk by using a private military company, then use it. If you can rely on the evacuation plan, you can mitigate the risks. So you really have to make a trade-off between the price and what you can achieve in that country. And that is what I always do.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you. Are there any other questions?

**Ms. Suzuka Yoshida:**

I have a question for Mr. Campbell about the evacuation plan. If you do not have any idea where to go, is it effective to just run to the airport, for example?

**Mr. John Campbell:**

With evacuations, we write up security plans for every place where we have a presence. It is something we think of in contingency planning, right at the beginning of an operation: "What do we do if this happens?" So it is not something that is going to catch us off-guard. We have already reconnoitered. We have already checked out the safe havens in the various capital cities around the country. We have checked the hotel availability. We have checked the resources that are available to us, the means of getting out. And if a situation deteriorates, we start raising our awareness and get people on standby and think about how to move if we have to move. It happened several times in Jakarta, first of all with the bombing of Afghanistan, when the level of security awareness rose. And we knew exactly what we were going to go, even how to get to the airport if Muslim extremists blocked the road between Jakarta and Jakarta airport. So it is nothing that catches us off-guard. There are plans. And every humanitarian operation should have one. Does that answer the question?

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you. I was acting as an ambassador in Nigeria. There were no terrorists, but back then the security was not all that high. It was an unstable area. And driving to the airport, you always felt the threat of being hijacked. But, in the end, you have to escape to the airport. That is the only means of getting out of the country. So it is an instinct, I believe. And it was the natural thing to do back then.

**Ms. Ueshiba (Waseda University):**

My name is Konomi Ueshiba, and I am a senior in college. To collect information, in terms of the politics and other stuff, we need to have information that may be very politically complex. Sometimes it is very difficult to get information to ensure security for our staff. And I wonder what kind of relationship we have between the NGO and the embassies in those countries? This is a question for Mr. Isezaki.

**Mr. Kenji Isezaki:**

As to the Japanese embassies overseas, it depends on the country, so my experience is limited. So I cannot really tell you much overall. But the embassy in Afghanistan is kind of second to Iraq, which has a really good system for security for staff and other Japanese citizens. There are many ways to collect information, passive or active. We have to be active in collecting information. But sometimes it can be passive. The concept of intelligence does not exist in Japan. That is why active information collection is hardly done. But with the current situation, when I say actively collecting information, if we are going to obtain information from the military, we send an intelligence office to that military agency or defining agency or ministry of defense, maybe as part of the international aid we are going to send Japanese staff or government officers to those agencies.

And that is what I mean by active information collection. And currently we do not have that kind of activities. And that is really unfortunate. The diplomats in embassies overseas are facing this issue on an everyday basis. So I am really blunt about this to the people from MOFA. It is not just a government issue, but it is also a private issue as well in terms of the intelligence. We have to actively collect information. Also, I think as part of the organizational culture, we really have to have good intelligence. Otherwise, it can be disastrous. How about you, Mr. Fukada?

**Mr. Hiroshi Fukada:**

Basically, I think I share the same understanding as Professor Isezaki about the issue. But I think that facts are slightly different. Let me explain the current situation of how we collect information. It is true that Japan is not really good at collecting information actively. However, we can leverage information offered by the U.S. or the U.K. Of course, it is better to have a Ministry of Intelligence in Japan itself. But under the circumstances of Japan, it is really difficult for us to have such a ministry, meaning that we would train some people to be spies and to collect intelligence in other countries. It is really hard for us to do that at this moment.

However, one thing I want you to know is, that the idea that MOFA and embassies are only collecting public information is not true. Of course, I cannot elaborate, but we have the International Information Control Bureau.



And they are not just collecting open, public information. We actually obtain information from every source we can use. And, of course, we cannot disclose that "We have information from a particular source, so please be prepared" or "please be aware." We cannot say that. What we can say is "We have specific abduction or kidnapping information. So please be aware of that." That is the only information we can give out. As an intelligence agency, if we have that intelligence that means that we are already taking some preventive measures. Among the open information, we also have to be aware of the military's or politicians' behaviors and activities. We have to make a decision as an NGO. On top of that, we may have an intelligence arena, which was mentioned by Mr. Isezaki. If we do exchange views with embassies, embassies and MOFA can provide assessment information. I think we do a lot more than what Professor Isezaki mentioned. Maybe that is not really visible and obvious in all those country.

**Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki:**

Thank you very much. That was quite an interesting exchange of comments, I believe. We are running out of time, but perhaps we can entertain just one more question from the floor. This will be the last question. If there are no questions, then we will wrap up.

Today we heard several viewpoints on information gathering specific to NGO activities. We heard from Mr. Peter Beck, as well as from Mr. Fukada. And a well-known journalist in this field Ms. Yoshida. From UNHCR, we heard from Mr. John Campbell, who has a long career and experience in this field. And we heard from Professor Isezaki, from JCCP, who gave us intuitive viewpoints.

And I hope that you can take back some lessons with you. I personally learned quite a lot today. And I believe we were able to exchange some active discussions throughout the panel. In appreciation of the panelists and the main presenter, please give them a big round of applause. Thank you very much. And we would like to close at this point. Thank you.

**(5) Closing Remarks, Mr. Kenji Isezaki, Professor, Graduate School of Social Design Studies, Rikkyo University; Director, the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention**

I will have to come up with something interesting to say to close this symposium. I visited Asia recently. And there are many NGOs operating in this region. MSF, a very famous organization, was stressing that they would be stopping humanitarian aid in specific areas. There was a lot of argument from both sides.

Perhaps some of the arguments went to the extreme, but I believe that it sent out some clear messages, that it is a courageous act to pull out. You have needs and requirements. The local people need humanitarian aids. But the decision to pull out was strongly relayed. And I think in a sense it is a political advantage that the NGOs have in stressing the fact that the need of some requirement to be there, but nevertheless the conditions not longer allow them to act in that region.

And Asia, or let's say Indonesia, most of the humanitarian funds are being used, but it is quite unclear as to how most of the funds were used. Mr. Campbell mentioned this in his presentation as well, that an ICRC member was killed. So pulling out, appealing very strongly that they had to pull out, who do they appeal to? The international activities were not expanded from Kabul, for example. It is a way of saying that the conditions are extremely deteriorated. And that message itself has quite an impact. So once again, this is a weapon, so to speak, that the NGOs have. It is also a means to have an impact on the international activities as well. So "courageous pullout" is one decision as well. But if you are going to pull out, then do it dramatically, and make a big, loud noise when you do.

On that note, I would like to close. Thank you.

**Ms. Yuriya Teragaki (MC):**

We would now like to close the symposium on Information Gathering for Crisis Management for NGO Crisis Management for NGO Operations.