1. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a struggle for leadership broke out in the former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan between communist factions and a coalition of anti-communist and Islamicist opposition groups. The result was an intense and bloody civil war that in early 1991 spread from the capital, Dushanbe, into rural areas and lasted until December of 1992. In the villages, the political content of the conflict was blurred so that it came to resemble an ethnic conflict between Kulyabi Tajiks, who supported the communist faction, and Garmi Tajiks, who were associated with the opposition. Kulyabis and Garmis are Tajik sub-groups that share the same religion, customs and language, a dialect of Farsi.

2. The worst of the fighting was concentrated in Khatlon Province, located in southwestern Tajikistan and bordering on Afghanistan. The area had been settled during the 1930's and 1940's when the Soviet government had forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Garmis and Kulyabis to the area to become workers in the newly created cotton-growing state farms. Typically, entire villages were relocated and, as a result, the region became a patchwork of mono-ethnic villages. However, over the years some villages merged and, by the outbreak of the civil war, about a quarter of the villages in the region were ethnically mixed. In the cities and towns, there was a high degree of inter-group marriage. Demonstrations of strong ethnic identification were rare in the daily lives of the people.

3. During the war, villages became targets of looting and burning by both sides. In late 1992, with the help of Russian troops still stationed in the area, the Kulyabi forces defeated the Garmi. Though damage had been moderate during the war, the victory was followed by a rampage of the Kulyabi militias during which Garmi houses and villages were systematically destroyed. Many men were killed, over 20,000 homes were severely damaged or destroyed, and many families fled for safety. In many Garmi villages, only the mosque was left standing.

4. Though open warfare ended in late 1992, the armed opposition remains active in northern Afghanistan and continues to stage cross-border raids from time to time. In addition, they control some mountainous sections of Tajikistan. Twenty-five thousand Russian troops remain in the country, helping keep open warfare from breaking out again. Even so, an atmosphere of relative lawlessness continues as bands of armed thugs (sometimes inter-ethnic in their composition) continue to loot villages and steal humanitarian relief supplies.
5. By fall 1994, Save the Children Federation (SCF) had a large and active programme underway in several districts of Khatlon Province. The programme provided food payments from Food for Work (FFW) to village-based brigades of local people in payment for their labor on the reconstruction of war-damaged homes. The project was successful in supporting the rebuilding of many homes and this, in turn, encouraged the rapid repatriation of people who had fled during the war. SCF staff felt that repatriation was an important first step in reconciliation, but they also wanted to find other opportunities to use their programme to promote inter-group linkages and reconciliation.

6. Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet Republics. By decision of central Soviet authority, the economy was concentrated in cotton production and related enterprises (such as cotton milling, cotton seed production and garment making). The single-sector specialization meant that Tajikistan, like other Soviet Republics, depended heavily on trade for most goods. Most basic foodstuffs have been imported since the 1930's.

7. Cotton production fell throughout the 1980s. The war greatly worsened an already bad economic situation. Destruction of factories, equipment and the extensive network of irrigation canals essential for cotton production, coupled with an out-migration of many non-Tajik skilled technicians and managers, left the country's economy severely disrupted. The breakdown in trade left Tajikistan facing serious food shortages.

8. The cotton farming in Khatlon was organized in large state farms that held most of the province's best arable land and employed the majority of the working population. Each state farm included many villages without regard for their ethnic composition. Thus, Kulyabi and Garmi had worked side-by-side, men in positions of management and on canal maintenance and women in planting, cultivation and harvesting. Villages also shared schools, clinics and all the other social services of the Soviet system. In spite of occasional tensions and competition for leadership positions within the state farms, relations between groups were generally harmonious. As the war came to an end, the fields lay fallow awaiting the planting of a cotton crop on which virtually everyone in Khatlon Province depended for survival. The vast network of irrigation canals was disrupted, undermining any potential cotton crop and water access in villages as well.

9. Each household in Khatlon continues to own a small private plot on which they have always grown vegetables for household consumption and local sale.

10. In some cases, local people of Khatlon took "reconciliation initiatives" in the period of repatriation. For example, a woman officer of one district government knew her former Garmi neighbors were returning. She "prepared food for three days" and invited these returnees and her Kulyabi neighbors to dinner beneath her garden arbor. Facing each other across her table, they ate together in what she hoped was a reconciling way. In another village, when Garmi families returned, Kulyabi residents "went out to meet them with bread and salt," a traditional
symbolic welcoming. Many people believed that "the common people don't want war, but policy people make it."

11. Many noted that women have a special role to play in overcoming animosity. As one woman said, "The nature of women is different. She can forget and forgive but man is a little bit animal. His blood is hot." Others outlined things women could do including: "training their children better not to hate" (Kulyabi woman); "teaching my children and grandchildren not to seek reprisals, not to keep remembering and not to 'play' war with 'them'" (Garmi woman); "working together on common projects with 'them'" (Kulyabi woman); "getting my husband who was a school teacher to meet with 'their' teachers to talk about how teachers from both groups can teach better attitudes in school" (Garmi woman); and "women must lead us" (Kulyabi man).

12. In some villages, elder women and men formed committees to help settle disputes over housing when a Garmi family would return to find that a Kulyabi family had moved into their former home. However, many people also put responsibility for peace-making somewhere else. They shrugged and said: "time is the best healer" or "it will never happen again because people don't want war" or "we have learned our lesson" or "they have learned their lesson."

13. At the beginning of the repatriation process, Save the Children Federation (SCF) identified two main problems in post-war Tajikistan— a shortage of food and a large number of damaged or destroyed homes. Although food security was less than optimal in Kulyabi villages, malnutrition was mainly found in the destroyed villages.

14. SCF's response was to set up village-based brigades whom they paid with Food for Work to rebuild and repair houses. Priority was given to those villages with the most extensive damage and all destroyed houses in a targeted village were eligible for reconstruction. All village residents—both men and women—who wished to work were eligible to join a brigade. SCF surveyed housing to set priorities for repair and entered into "contracts" with brigades to do the work. The brigades built houses in the traditional way using local mud to make bricks for walls, and SCF provided roofing materials (donated by UNHCR which supplied these as part of their mandated programme to repatriate refugees). Food earned by one person working in a brigade was sufficient to meet 80% of an average family's caloric requirements through the winter of 1994-95.

15. By the fall of 1994, the FFW programme was well established in several districts of Khatlon Province. With over 80 locally hired staff, the programme had been able to organize 15,000 people, mostly returning refugees, to build 12,000 houses. To ensure that they did not hire staff with ethnic prejudices, SCF instituted an interviewing arrangement whereby staff of several different ethnicities interviewed each prospective candidate. It was assumed that any ethnic slurs or biases would be noted by at least one of the interviewers. SCF was satisfied that they were enabling the faster and safer repatriation of refugees and IDPs to the area and that this was a prerequisite for reconciliation.
### Framework For Considering The Impact Of Aid On Conflict

#### CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace</th>
<th>AID</th>
<th>Dividers/Tensions Capacities for Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✤ Systems &amp; Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>✤ Systems &amp; Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✤ Attitudes and Actions</td>
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<td>✤ Attitudes and Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✤ [Shared] Values and Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>✤ [Different] Values and Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✤ [Common] Experiences</td>
<td></td>
<td>✤ [Different] Experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✤ Symbols and Occasions</td>
<td></td>
<td>✤ Symbols and Occasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR ✦</td>
<td></td>
<td>OR ✦</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Mandate

Mandate Fundraising Organisation

- Why?
- Where?
- What?
- When?
- With whom?
- By whom?

- How?
Framework For Considering The Impact Of Aid On Conflict

CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace

idente Systems & Institutions
idente Attitudes and Actions
idente [Shared] Values and Interests
idente [Common] Experiences
idente Symbols and Occasions

AID

Mandate Fundraising Organisation

Divider Transfers

Why ?
Where ?
What ?
When ?
With whom ?
By whom ?

Divider Transfers

How ?

Implicit Ethical Messages

OR

Implicit Ethical Messages

Dividers/Tensions Capacities for Violence

idente Systems & Institutions
idente Attitudes and Actions
idente [Different] Values and Interests
idente [Different] Experiences
idente Symbols and Occasions

OR

Implicit Ethical Messages

Framework For Considering The Impact Of Aid On Conflict

CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

Options

Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace

idente Systems & Institutions
idente Attitudes and Actions
idente [Shared] Values and Interests
idente [Common] Experiences
idente Symbols and Occasions

AID

Mandate Fundraising Organisation

Resource Transfers

Why ?
Where ?
What ?
When ?
With whom ?
By whom ?

Resource Transfers

How ?

Implicit Ethical Messages

OR

Implicit Ethical Messages

Dividers/Tensions Capacities for Violence

Options

Resource Transfers

Implicit Ethical Messages

Re design

OR

Implicit Ethical Messages

Re design
Step by Step Method
Local Capacities for Peace (LCP)
Do No Harm Analysis

1. What are the sources of tensions (dividers) or conflicts that exist between different groups?
   - in the past, current or potential in future?
   - local, regional, national?

2. What connectors (things that bring people together) or capacities for peace exist between the above groups?
   - systems, institutions
   - attitudes, actions
   - values, interests
   - experiences
   - occasions, symbols

3. Describe the program in detail (current, future). Use the following questions to guide you:
   - Why?
   - What?
   - How?
   - With whom?
   - By whom?
   - When?

4. For each action that you plan to undertake (described above), you must check:
   - In what ways does the program increase or decrease tensions?
   - In what ways can the program support or weaken the connectors?

5. For each impact (positive or negative) identified as a side effect of the planned program:
   - Develop program options that might decrease negative effects and increase positive ones
   - Check the options developed for their impact on other connectors and dividers

6. Check the questions. Repeat the process as required.
1. What are the differences between the group that cause friction?
   • Ethnicity?
   • Differing lifestyles/occupations?
   • Religion?
   • Political affiliation?
   • Different class/status groups?

2. How do different groups perceive each other?

3. What actions are individuals or groups taking which lead to tension or violence? Inside the community? From outside the community?

4. What attitudes exist which worsen relations between the groups or lead to violence?
   • Hatred
   • Fear, mistrust
   • Racism
   • Intolerance

5. How do the perceived interests of the groups differ?

6. What do the groups compete over?
   • Resources?
   • Economic Benefits?
   • Political Power?

7. What institutions exist which are promoting the conflict or increasing the likelihood of violence? What are the structures or institutions that exist that threaten lives or livelihoods? Inside the community? Outside the community?
   • Discrimination in e.g. education, employment, healthcare
   • Globalization of economies
   • Denial of rights and liberties
   • Segregation e.g. apartheid or other institutional racism/discrimination

8. Who stands to gain from continued tension?

9. Other sources of tension?
Definitions:

In the LCP manual – and, hence, in the workshop –, the word **conflict** refers to negative, destructive, often violent, group interactions. It does not refer to the variety of intergroup disagreements and other forms of constructive struggle by which social change occurs.

Also, in the LCP manual and in the context of LCP workshops **Aid** is a shorthand to refer to the various forms of humanitarian or development assistance provided by international and local non-governmental as well as governmental and international organizations. The use of the term “aid” has led to various misunderstandings. For example, many people assumed that the use of the term “aid” signals that the empirical evidence of the LCP project came only from the context of humanitarian or emergency aid – and therefore the tool was relevant only for programming humanitarian emergency interventions. In fact, experience of agencies working in development cooperation has contributed to the learning process throughout the entire project. Development organizations have been part of process all the time.
### Identifying
Dividers/ Sources of Tensions/ Capacities for War and Connectors/ Local Capacities for Peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems &amp; Institutions</th>
<th>Dividers/Sources of Tension/Capacities for War</th>
<th>Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes &amp; Actions</td>
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<td>Values &amp; Interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Different/Common)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experiences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbols &amp; Occasions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Unpacking Your Aid Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Impact on Dividers (identified on page 1)</th>
<th>Impact on Connectors (identified on page 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fund raising</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HO Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Why?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Where?</td>
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<td>What?</td>
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<td>When?</td>
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<tr>
<td>By Whom?</td>
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<tr>
<td>With whom?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Understanding Aid’s Impact on Conflict Through Resource Transfers

There are five different mechanisms by which resource transfers (RT) affect aid’s impact on conflict. Analyse (unpackage) your aid program and identify its impacts on Dividers and Connectors along each of the five RT mechanisms. For example, how do the resources or services you deliver affect markets? What prices fall? How does this impact the dividers and connectors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Transfers</th>
<th>Impact on Dividers (identified on page 1)</th>
<th>Impact on Connectors (identified on page 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
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<td>Substitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Understanding Aid’s Impact on Conflict Through Implicit Ethical Messages**

There are seven types of Implicit Ethical Messages (IEMs) involved in the giving of aid. Analyse (unpackage) your aid program and identify the IEMs and their impact on Dividers and Connectors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implicit Ethical Message</th>
<th>Impact on Dividers (identified on page 1)</th>
<th>Impact on Connectors (identified on page 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arms and Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Impunity</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Different Values for Different Lives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Powerlessness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Publicity/Funding</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Generating And Testing Programming Options I: Dividers

Reminder · If an aid program increases Dividers or feeds into sources of tension:
- List all possible options for reducing that Divider while still maintaining the goal of the aid program
- Then assess the likely impact of each option on the Connectors

Question: How can you (re) design the aid program in such a way as to reduce the Dividers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dividers</th>
<th>Programming Options</th>
<th>Likely Impact on Connectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Here, list those Dividers which you have identified as those with which your project may be interacting</td>
<td>Identify alternative ways of doing what you intend to do but avoiding negative impacts</td>
<td>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on Connectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1.</td>
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<td>#2.</td>
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<td>#3.</td>
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<td>#...</td>
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</table>
Generating And Testing Programming Options II: Connectors

Reminder: If an aid program weakens Connectors or local capacities for peace:

- List all possible options for strengthening that Connector while still maintaining the goal of the aid program
- Then assess the likely impact of each option on the Dividers

Question: How can you (re) design the aid program in such a way as to strengthen the Connectors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connectors</th>
<th>Programming Options</th>
<th>Likely Impact on Dividers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Here, list those connectors/LCPs which you have identified as those with which your project may be interacting</td>
<td>Identify alternative ways of doing what you intend to do but avoiding negative impacts</td>
<td>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on Dividers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#1.

#2.

#3.

#...
What Are Local Capacities for Peace?

Every society has both individuals and many other factors that prevent every disagreement from breaking out into war and that help contain and move away from violence if it begins. These include justice and legal systems, police forces, implicit codes of conduct, elders groups, church or civic leaders, etc. The roles of conflict prevention and mediation are assigned to some people and institutions in every society. These are what we mean by capacities for peace.

The trainer should caution the group against “easy” identification of connectors or peace capacities. For example, many people assume that “women’s groups” are connectors or peace capacities. But experience shows that women’s groups can either be connectors or deeply committed dividers. Similarly, churches can serve to connect groups or they can serve to divide. One must always look, in context, for who is being connected and who is being divided and how this is occurring in order to do this analysis accurately. If people within one group are being effectively “connected” in order to oppose other groups with greater strength, it would be a mistake to identify this connection as one that is promoting intergroup harmony.

What Do We Mean By Connectors or Local Capacities for Peace?

In the midst of warfare, especially in situations of civil war where former fellow-citizens are fighting each other, there continue to exist a whole series of things that connect - or can connect - people who are fighting. These include:

Systems and Institutions

For example, in all societies where civil war breaks out, markets continue to connect people across the lines of fighting. Sometimes these involve formal inter-enemy trade; sometimes they involve women meeting at the market by the river-side one morning a week. Communications systems can provide linkages (for example, we have been told by many people that they value the BBC because they know that everyone on all sides of a war can hear the same
information about what is happening); in some cases, irrigation systems, bridges, roads and electrical grids connect people in spite of war (in some cases, they are destroyed by warriors intent on separating people).

**Attitudes and Actions**

For example in the midst of war, one finds individuals and groups who continue to express attitudes of tolerance, acceptance, even love or appreciation for people on the “other side.” One finds people who act in non-war ways, doing things that the war would dictate were wrong such as adopting abandoned children of the “other side,” linking across lines to continue a professional association or journal, setting up new associations of people opposed to the war. They do these things because they seem “normal” or “right.” Often, they do not think of them as extraordinary or, even, as non-war.

**Shared Values and Interests**

For example, the common value placed on children’s health has been the basis for UNICEF’s success in negotiating days of tranquility for inoculations against childhood diseases. Sometimes a common religion can bring people together.

**Common Experiences**

For example, war itself can provide linkages among different sides. Citing the experience of war and suffering as “common to all sides,” people sometimes create new anti-war alliances across boundaries.

**Symbols and Occasions**

For example, stories abound of the soldiers in the trenches in WWII who, on Christmas eve began to sing “Silent Night” together, and then, they returned to war. National art, music, historical anniversaries, national holidays, monuments can bring people together or link them across differences.

These five categories are illustrated in many of the vignettes in Appendix II.

*The categories are not meant to be conceptually tight and mutually exclusive; rather, they are meant to open up our minds so that we actually see how many things do continue to connect people even in warfare. To be able to recognize these and support them offers options for aid programmers in conflict settings.*
第4回ワークショップ
「受益者のアカウンタビリティ確保について」

＜タイムスケジュール＞

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Issues Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 10:00 – 12:00 | Welcome & Introductions                    | • Session introductions  
|            |                                            | • Participant introductions                         |
|            | What is Accountability and Why Does it     | • Definitions and overview                         |
|            | Matter?                                    | • Case study                                       |
|            | Foundation of Accountability               | • Case study on principles of accountability       |
|            |                                            | • Overview of International standards, specifically the Red Cross Code of Conduct |
| 12:00 – 12:15 | Tea Break                                  |                                                    |
| 12:15 – 12:45 | Components of Accountability               | Overview of:                                       |
|            |                                            | • Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) Benchmarks |
|            |                                            | • Good Enough Guide Basic Elements of Accountability |
| 12:45 – 1:30 | Lunch                                      |                                                    |
| 1:30 – 2:35 | Components of Accountability (continued)   | Overview of:                                       |
|            |                                            | • Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) Benchmarks |
|            |                                            | • Good Enough Guide Basic Elements of Accountability |
| 2:35 – 2:45 | Tea Break                                   |                                                    |
| 2:45 – 4:00 | Implementing Accountability                | • Review of accountability in World Vision Myanmar Cyclone Nargis Response |
|            |                                            | • Translating the accountability model into practice |
|            | How Can You Support Accountability?        | • Individual exercise to identify immediate and long-term steps you and your organization can take to support accountability |
|            | Evaluation                                  |                                                    |
Scenario – The Bus Service
Courtesy of HAP International

Around 75 passengers including children and elderly people are waiting at a bus stand. They are waiting to take the bus to Tentaka, which is 8 hours away. The bus to Tentaka only comes once every week.

The bus arrives 3 hours late, forcing the passengers to wait in the sun. When it arrives the passengers surge on to the bus and their luggage is loaded on top and inside the bus. As the bus has seating capacity for 40 it is very over-crowed. A woman with 4 young children talks quietly to the bus conductor to see what she can do to get a seat.

But the bus does not depart. The bus conductor tells the passengers that it will leave within 10 minutes, but the bus remains at the bus stand for another 2 hours, while more cargo is loaded on the bus. Eventually the bus starts its journey, but some passengers begin to suffocate in the overcrowded hot bus, and everyone begins to panic.

One of the passengers, an old man shouts at the bus conductor and threatens to hit him. The bus conductor shouts back at him and stops the bus.

Questions for discussion:

1. What do you think happened next?
2. Why do you think this situation occurred?
3. What are the parallels with the humanitarian world (and NGOs)?
# Key International Standards and Tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STANDARD (incl PRINCIPLES)</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>APPLICATION TO FIELD ACCOUNTABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Code of Conduct:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principles of Conduct for</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the International Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and Red Crescent Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>and NGOs in Disaster</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp">www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp</a></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

A list of ten principles which all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work. These principles should guide the behavior of humanitarian workers on a day-to-day basis both at the field level in how we work with communities, government and other stakeholders and at a headquarters level in our relationships with donors and the public.

World Vision International has signed on to these principles, agreeing to abide by them.

A detailed description of each principle can be viewed at the IFRC website [www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp).

The Code of Conduct outlines important foundational principles which are critical to accountability by reinforcing beneficiary participation, impartiality, transparency, respect and accountability.

Specifically, the Code of Conduct calls for:
- Benefit participation
- Thorough assessment to ensure assistance is appropriate, needed and sustainable
- Understanding and use of local capacities and resources, including community knowledge, structures, processes and people.
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<tr>
<th>Standard (incl Principles)</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Application to Implementation</th>
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| **HAP** The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP):  
2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management  
[www.hapinternational.org](http://www.hapinternational.org) | Its principles and benchmarks were developed by a partnership of humanitarian agencies, including World Vision International to establish best practice for accountability. The benchmarks were created as indicators that an agency was meeting the HAP accountability principles. The benchmarks are auditable indicators, when met, that indicate accountable practices according to the HAP Standard. The Guide to the HAP Standard provides practical guidance and tools on how to implement the benchmarks. | The key international standard dedicated to humanitarian accountability. The standard incorporates aspects of other standards, such as the Red Cross Code of Conduct and Sphere, especially in its principles. Specifically, the Standard calls for:  
- Beneficiary participation  
- Informing beneficiaries about our agency, our commitments and all aspects of our projects  
- Consultation with beneficiaries to achieve informed consent where they understand what they are consenting to  
- Thorough assessment to ensure assistance is appropriate, needed and sustainable  
- A Humanitarian Accountability Framework and Quality Management System both designed to provide a list of our commitments as an agency and a plan to ensure that we meet those commitments (such as adherence to the HAP Standard or the Code of Conduct)  
- A beneficiary complaints process. |

**Principles**

1. Commitment to humanitarian standards and rights  
   - Members state their commitment to respect and foster humanitarian standards and the rights of beneficiaries
2. Setting standards and building capacity  
   - Members set a framework of accountability to stakeholders  
   - Members set and periodically review their standards and performance indicators, and revise them if necessary  
   - Members provide appropriate training in the use and implementation of standards
3. Communication  
   - Members inform and consult with stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries and staff, about the standards adopted, programmes to be undertaken and mechanisms available for addressing concerns
4. Participation in programmes  
   - Members involve beneficiaries in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and report to them on progress, subject to operational constraints
5. Monitoring and reporting on compliance  
   - Members involve beneficiaries and staff when they monitor and revise standards  
   - Members regularly monitor and evaluate compliance with standards, using robust processes  
   - Members report at least annually to stakeholders, including beneficiaries, on compliance with standards. Reporting may take a variety of forms
6. Addressing complaints  
   - Members enable beneficiaries and staff to report complaints and seek
7. Implementing partners
   - Members are committed to the implementation of these principles if and when working through implementation partners

**Benchmarks**

**Benchmark One:** The agency shall establish a humanitarian quality management system.

**Benchmark Two:** The agency shall make the following information publicly available to intended beneficiaries, disaster-affected communities, agency staff and other specified groups: (a) organisational background; (b) humanitarian accountability framework; (c) humanitarian plan and financial summary; (d) progress reports; and (e) complaints handling procedures.

**Benchmark Three:** The agency shall ensure beneficiaries and their representatives participate in programme decisions and seek their informed consent.

**Benchmark Four:** The agency shall determine the competencies, attitudes and development required for staff to implement the humanitarian quality management system.

**Benchmark Five:** The agency shall establish and implement complaints handling procedures that are effective, accessible and safe for intended beneficiaries, disaster-affected communities, agency staff, humanitarian partners and other specified bodies.

**Benchmark Six:** The agency shall establish a process of continual improvement for its humanitarian accountability framework and humanitarian quality management system.

mechanism reinforcing that beneficiaries have rights and we should respond to their complaints about our project or actions.

- Continuous program improvement as a result of beneficiary feedback.
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<tr>
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<th>Field</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Sphere Project</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Humanitarian Charter</strong></td>
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<td>Humanitarian agencies...</td>
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<td>1. Principles</td>
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<td>- The right to life with</td>
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<td>- The distinction between</td>
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<td>combatants and non...</td>
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<td>- The principle of non-...</td>
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<td>2. Roles and Responsibilities</td>
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<td>- We recognize that it is</td>
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<td>firstly through their...</td>
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<td>- Those affected are entitled to protection and assistance</td>
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<td>- Humanitarian agencies' role in providing humanitarian assistance reflects the reality that those with primary responsibility are not always able or willing to perform this role themselves</td>
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<td>- The frequent failure of warring parties to respect the humanitarian purpose of interventions has shown that the attempt to provide assistance in situations of conflict may potentially render civilians more vulnerable to attack, or may on occasion bring unintended advantage to one or more of the warring parties</td>
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<td>- We recognize and support the protection and assistance mandates of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees under</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Behavioral standards included in the Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum Standards Common to all Sectors</td>
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<td>2. Technical minimal standards for assistance activities</td>
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<td>As with the Red Cross/Crescent Code of Conduct, all NGOs should adhere to the Humanitarian Charter and Common Standards in their disaster response work, regardless of the technical sector. These principles should guide the behavior of humanitarian workers on a day-to-day basis.</td>
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<td>World Vision International has signed on to the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards, agreeing to abide by them.</td>
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<td>Specifically, the Humanitarian Charter and Common Standard I calls for:</td>
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<td>- Beneficiary participation</td>
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<td>- Understanding and use of local capacities and resources, including community knowledge, structures, processes and people</td>
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</table>
3. Minimum Standards
   - The Minimum Standards are based on agencies’ experience of providing humanitarian assistance. We commit ourselves to attempt consistently to achieve them and we expect to be held accountable accordingly. We invite other humanitarian actors, including states themselves, to adopt these standards as accepted norms.
   - By adhering to the standards, we commit ourselves to make every effort to ensure that people affected by disasters have access to at least the minimum requirements to satisfy their basic right to life with dignity.
   - We expect to be held accountable to this commitment and undertake to develop systems for accountability within our respective agencies, consortia and federations. We acknowledge that our fundamental accountability must be to those we seek to assist.

**Minimum Standards Common to all Sectors**
1. Participation
2. Initial Assessment
3. Response
4. Targeting
5. Monitoring
6. Evaluation
7. Aid worker competencies and responsibilities
8. Supervision, management and support of personnel

**Minimum Sector Standards**
1. Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion
2. Food Security, Nutrition and Food Aid
3. Shelter, Settlements and Non-Food Items
4. Health Services

REFER TO SPHERE HANDBOOK FOR DETAILED MINIMUM STANDARDS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Elements of Accountability</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Application to Implementation</th>
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</table>
| At a minimum, humanitarian project staff should:                                                 | The Guide is not a standard such as the Red Cross/Crescent Code of Conduct, HAP Standard or Sphere Charter and Minimum Standards. Rather, it is a set of basic guidelines and tools to be accountable to communities and help guide the behavior of humanitarian workers. Good enough means that it promotes simple and practical solutions. The tools within the Good Enough Guide have also been incorporated into the Guide to the HAP Standard and they can be used together with the Standard. World Vision International is one of the seven humanitarian agencies that developed the Guide and has committed to promoting use of the Guide in its programs. | The Good Enough Guide is a key tool in the application of accountability in the field. It incorporates the HAP Standard as well as other accountability initiatives. Specifically, the Guide provides guidelines, tools and resources to support:  
- Beneficiary participation  
- Informing beneficiaries about our agency, our commitments and all aspects of our projects  
- Consultation with beneficiaries to achieve informed consent where they understand what they are consenting to  
- Thorough assessment to ensure assistance is appropriate, needed and sustainable  
- A beneficiary complaints mechanism reinforcing that beneficiaries have rights and we should respond to their complaints about our project or actions  
- Continuous program improvement as a result of beneficiary feedback |
| 1. Provide public information to beneficiaries and other stakeholders on their organisation, its plans, and relief assistance entitlements.  
2. Conduct ongoing consultation with those assisted. This should occur as soon as possible at the beginning of a humanitarian relief operation, and continue regularly throughout it. "Consultation" means exchange of information and views between the agency and the beneficiaries of its work. The exchange will be about:  
- The needs and aspirations of beneficiaries  
- The project plans of the agency  
- The entitlement of beneficiaries  
- Feedback and reactions from beneficiaries to the agency on its plans and expected results  
3. Establish systematic feedback mechanisms that enable:  
- Agencies to report to beneficiaries on project progress and evolution  
- Beneficiaries to explain to agencies whether projects are meeting their needs  
- Beneficiaries to explain to agencies the difference the project has made to their lives  
4. Respond, adapt, and evolve in response to feedback received, and explain to all stakeholders the changes made and/or why change was not possible. |                                                                                                   |                                                                                                |
Tool 1: How to introduce your agency: a need-to-know checklist

This checklist can be used to help make sure field staff know the answers to questions they are likely to be asked by beneficiaries, government officials, and others. You can use it at the start of a project or in conjunction with Tool 11 to brief new staff.

Who are we?
1. What is an NGO?
2. What is our mandate?
3. Why is our agency here?
4. Where do we get the money?

Our aim
5. What can we do for people affected by the emergency in relation to:
   a) Water and sanitation
   b) Shelter
   c) Livelihoods
   d) Public health promotion
   e) Other kinds of project
6. Why do we do this rather than other things?

The project and the community
7. What is our project area?
8. Who decided?
9. Who was involved in deciding project activities?
10. What is the plan for the whole project?
11. How long will it last?
12. Who are the beneficiaries?
13. Why were some people chosen and not others?
14. Who was involved in deciding who the beneficiaries should be?

15. How does the project work? How are beneficiaries involved?
16. What will beneficiaries contribute?
17. What will we contribute?
18. What do the materials cost us?
19. What is the progress this month? What is the plan for next month?
20. What are the main challenges for technical staff this month?
21. What are technical staff doing to address these challenges?
22. What exactly will beneficiaries receive?
23. When will they receive it?

Dealing with problems or complaints
(see also Tool 13)
24. If something goes wrong with the project what can people do?
25. If there is a problem with a community leader or community member working with us, what can people do?
26. If there is a problem with one of our staff (corruption, fraud, bad behaviour), what can people do?

Other organisations and the government
27. Which other NGOs are working in the project location?
28. What do they do?
29. What government assistance is available?
30. How do people access it?
31. What other problems are people having? (For example, being displaced, no access to land, not being able to meet government officials to resolve problems.)

Tool 3:
How to involve people throughout the project

This tool suggests ways of informing, consulting, involving, and reporting to people affected by an emergency at every stage of the project. It was originally developed for use in villages in Aceh. It can be adapted for other sites too.

Before assessment
- Determine and clearly state the objectives of the assessment
- If you can, inform the local community and local authorities well before the assessment takes place
- Include both women and men in the project team
- Make a list of vulnerable groups to be identified during the assessment
- Check what other NGOs have done in that community and get a copy of their reports

During assessment
- Introduce team members and their roles
- Explain the timeframe for assessment
- Invite representatives of local people to participate
- Create space for individuals or groups to speak openly
- Hold separate discussions and interviews with different groups, for example: local officials, community groups, men, women, local staff
- Ask these groups for their opinions or needs and priorities. Inform them about any decisions taken.

Note: If it is not possible to consult all groups within the community at one time, state clearly which groups have been omitted on this occasion and return to meet them as soon as possible. Write up your findings and describe your methodology and its limitations. Use the analysis for future decision-making.

During project design
- Give local authorities and community, including the village committee and representatives of affected groups, the findings of the assessment
- Invite representatives of local people to participate in project design
- Explain to people their rights as disaster-affected people
- Enable the village committee to take part in project budgeting
- Check the project design with different groups of beneficiaries
- Design a complaints and response mechanism

During project implementation
- Invite local community, village committee, and local authorities to take part in developing criteria for selection of beneficiaries
- Announce the criteria and display them in a public place
- Invite the local community and village committee to participate in selecting beneficiaries
- Announce the beneficiaries and post the list in a public place
- Announce the complaints and response mechanisms and forum for beneficiaries to raise complaints

During distribution
- If recruiting additional staff for distribution, advertise openly, e.g. in newspaper
- Form a distribution committee comprising the village committee, government official(s), and NGO staff
- Consider how distribution will include the most vulnerable, such as disabled people, elderly people, and other poor or marginalised groups
- Give the local authority and local community a date and location for distribution in advance where safety allows
- List items for distribution and their cost and display this list in advance in a public place
- In order to include people living a long way from the village or distribution point, consider giving them transport costs
- In order to include vulnerable people, such as pregnant women, for example, distribute to them first
- Ensure people know how to register complaints

During monitoring
- Invite the village committee to take part in the monitoring process
- Share findings with the village committee and community

From S. Phoeuk (2005) 'Practical Guidelines on Humanitarian Accountability', Oxfam's External Relations Department, Cambodia (internal, adapted).
<Components of Accountability>

**TRANSPARENCY** in mandate, objectives, beneficiary and entitlement criteria and implementation reporting

**HAP Benchmark 2**: The agency shall make the following information publicly available to intended beneficiaries, disaster-affected communities, agency staff and other specified groups: (a) organisational background; (b) humanitarian accountability framework; (c) humanitarian plan and financial summary; (d) progress reports; and (e) complaints handling procedures

**Good Enough Guide Basic Element** 1: Provide public information to beneficiaries and other stakeholders on their organisation, its plans, and relief assistance entitlements.

**CONSULTATION with and PARTICIPATION** of disaster survivors right from the beginning to gain their informed consent

**HAP Benchmark Three**: The agency shall enable beneficiaries and their representatives to participate in programme decisions and seek their informed consent

**Good Enough Guide Basic Element 2**: Conduct ongoing consultation with those assisted. This should occur as soon as possible at the beginning of a humanitarian relief operation, and continue regularly throughout it. ‘Consultation’ means exchange of information and views between the agency and the beneficiaries of its work. The exchange will be about:

- The needs and aspirations of beneficiaries
- The project plans of the agency
- The entitlement of beneficiaries
- Feedback and reactions from beneficiaries to the agency on its plans and expected results

**FEEDBACK/complaints & redress-handling system**

**HAP Benchmark Five**: The agency shall establish and implement complaints handling procedures that are effective, accessible and safe for intended beneficiaries, disaster affected communities, agency staff, humanitarian partners and other specified bodies.

**Good Enough Guide Basic Element 3**: Establish systematic feedback mechanisms that enable:

- Agencies to report to beneficiaries on project progress and evolution
- Beneficiaries to explain to agencies whether projects are meeting their needs
- Beneficiaries to explain to agencies the difference the project has made to their lives

**COMPETENCE of staff**

**HAP Benchmark Four**: The Agency shall determine the competencies, attitudes and development required for staff to implement its humanitarian quality management system.

**LEARNING for continuous improvement**

**HAP Benchmark One**: The agency shall establish a humanitarian quality management system.

**HAP Benchmark Six**: The agency shall establish a process of continual improvement for its humanitarian accountability framework and humanitarian quality management system.

**Good Enough Guide Basic Element 4**: Respond, adapt, and evolve in response to feedback received, and explain to all stakeholders the changes made and/or why change was not possible.
What the Listening Project has Learned

As the Listening Project (LP) wraps up its 13th Listening Exercise in Ecuador, we are looking back at the wealth of insights gathered in over 1,400 conversations with more than 3,200 people on how people in societies on the recipient end of international assistance view these efforts. We will produce a series of short Issue Papers in the coming months to explore in more depth key topics that have repeatedly come up, but here are a few insights that have captured our attention:

**International assistance has become an “industry” more focused on delivering goods and services than on building relationships.** People often characterize international assistance as “an industry” with multiple layers and actors, that is professionalized to meet certain delivery standards through often inflexible systems, programs and activities, and which reports against pre-determined indicators that often do not measure success in the ways they, as aid recipients, would. People tell us that they do not get to select the agencies that work in their communities, and that they often do not really know who these organizations are or what their agendas might be. They tell us that “how” agencies provide assistance, and the relationships they make in that process, is often more important to them than “what” agencies provide, even though these “tangible” outcomes are often what is reported on and evaluated.

**This system limits opportunities and incentives for listening in open-ended ways.** Since the aid system is designed to deliver goods and services efficiently, most agencies listen to people who are in (not outside of) the chain of delivery and they listen primarily for assessments of efficiency or effectiveness of their projects. While listening teams have heard lots of feedback on specific project details, such as “the wrong people got the aid,” “you have to know someone to get assistance,” “the seeds arrived too late to plant,” and so on, people everywhere consistently expressed concerns that seemed go deeper than programming flaws. They say that aid agencies should “invest the necessary time”, “go more slowly”, and “listen to people” in order to “learn about the real circumstances”, “get to know people”, and “show respect for people’s ideas and opinions.” It is clear that people care a great deal about the relationships they have with those who are trying to help them, and want to feel respected and listened to.

**In many cases, the amount of aid and of money is not seen as the problem.** Almost everywhere, people talk about the significant amounts of waste and mismanagement of resources in the aid system, for instance: “with all of the aid that has come into Kenya, it should be a heaven!” They suggest that agencies should combine resources to address deeper, systemic problems rather than use individual projects for piecemeal solutions. In several different places, people have described the “water bottle” effect of international assistance being passed from donors to international NGOs or contractors, to local NGOs or sub-contractors, to community-based organizations. As the last in line, the people in communities who are the intended beneficiaries get but a tiny sip.

Some even complained of the “excessive generosity” of agencies. Of much greater concern to people is how aid is given. Many resent “pre-packaged” programs that they see as signals of arrogance and disrespect, as if local people do not have the analytic ability to discuss and find solutions to the major issues affecting their lives. This has raised the question of whether the increased focus on “coherence” and “coordination,” which assumes that a shared overall strategy can bring desired results, is enough without the participation of local people. And is raising more resources the way to improve the effectiveness of international aid, when people seem to care more about how it is spent?
How Can You Be Accountable

Courtesy of HAP International

• Be a true representative of your agency: Understand what your agency believes in and strive to uphold these values and commitments.

• Set yourself a high standard of work: Use established guidelines, codes or principles to help guide your work. Inform people about those.

• Develop a culture of respect for individuals, their rights and their dignity: Ensure that you and all your colleagues are showing respect for each other and beneficiaries. Value the opinions of each other.

• Change the power balance: Recognize the huge imbalance of power and influence that exists between you and survivors. Try to change this through meaningful engagement with staff and beneficiaries.

• Be transparent about your progress: monitor your work and make sure it is still meeting the standards that you originally set out. Tell people the results, and change the plan and standards if necessary.

• Ensure that crisis-affected people can voice their opinions, and that you listen to and hear these, whether these are suggestions, requests or complaints. Your organisation is obliged to receive and respond to these.
Steps in Implementing Accountability

Assess community preferences, dynamics and opinions:
- To identify: a) community information needs; b) preferred methods for delivering information; c) preferred method for filing complaints; d) community representatives; e) role in project design/implementation/monitoring; and f) Stakeholder analysis.

Staff self-assessment: Staff identify existing strengths in accountability so that we can build on those.

Accountability plan to contextualize accountability based on input from community and staff.

Provide information:
- Implement variety of methods based on plan to inform communities about organization and its programs.

Community feedback and complaints mechanism:
- Establish policy, procedures and build staff and community capacity to use it.

Consultation methodology:
- According to community preferences.

Lessons learned, evaluations and FGDs: Evaluate accountability activities through discussions with children and communities for continuous improvement.

Reviewed compiled data from complaints mechanism for program improvement.

Amend accountability methods: If deemed necessary after review.

Compiled data from complaints mechanism informs revision in program strategy, plans or activities.

Program transition strategy: Inform communities of transition timelines and plans and work jointly to identify opportunities for sustainability of project inputs.