《資料編》

- 1. 「2012-13年予算に関する幹部会での事務総長発言」(2011年3月7日)
- 2. 「統合に関する事務総長決定」(2008年6月26日)
- 3. 「ガイドライン:国連戦略評価」(2009年5月承認、2010年5月アップデート版)
- 4. 「国連 IMPP (統合ミッション立案過程) 概要」(2010 年 1 月)
- 5. 「IMPP ガイドライン:国連フィールド・プレゼンスの統合的立案:本部の役割」 (2009 年 5 月承認、2010 年 5 月アップデート版)
- 6. 「IMPP ガイドライン:国連フィールド・プレゼンスの統合的立案:フィールドの役割」 (2009 年 12 月承認、2010 年 1 月アップデート版)

TO: *All Heads of Departments and Offices

DATE: 7 March 2011

REFERENCE:

FROM: Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Chef de Cabinet

DE: Executive Office of the Secretary-General

SUBJECT: Remarks of the Secretary-General at the Senior Management Group meeting

OBJET: on 7 March 2011 concerning the proposed Programme budget for 2012-2013

On behalf of the Secretary-General, please find attached a summary of the remarks he delivered at the Senior Management Group meeting this morning with respect to the proposed Programme budget for 2012-2013. The Secretary-General has indicated that we need to show that we can do business with a reduction of at least three per cent of the budget outline figure of \$5.4 billion. He has asked that you convey to the Controller by close of business on 9 March 2011 the measures you intend to implement to reduce your budgetary proposals in line with such a reduction.

Thank you.

The Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. KIM Won-soo Mr. Jun Yamazaki

*Distribution: As per attached list

SG's remarks in the Senior Management Group meeting on 7 March 2011 regarding the Programme budget for 2012-2013

This is an issue that is special to me – both regular budget and peacekeeping.

I want to provide good working conditions for our staff -- that is desirable. But the current situation necessitates a change in our mindset.

We are in an emergency situation. We need to tighten our belts. In some European countries, they are even cutting salaries by 20 to 30 per cent. The UN should not take it for granted that we are able to exist. We need to be creative and innovative.

I am deeply concerned that almost all budget submissions for 2012-2013 from Departments and Offices were above the planning figures. Things cannot be business as usual. We need to change the mentality. Nothing is guaranteed in this global climate.

The World Bank has talked about reducing its budget by three per cent. Margaret Chan of WHO has spoken to me of the need to reduce her budget by around twenty per cent. I was shocked.

Two years ago, we instituted a two per cent cut. Many of you complained, and even Member States complained, saying "the SG does not cut." I can say now that my instructions were right.

We need now to show that we can do more with less, but without sacrificing the mandates or reducing programme delivery. I ask you to support me in putting forward proposals which show that we are serious about belt-tightening.

As a general rule, we need to show that we can do business with a reduction of at least three per cent of the budget outline figure of \$5.4 billion. This will be painful. But you will need to be disciplined. I am authorizing the Controller to work towards that goal and would request that you support him in this endeavour. This should apply irrespective of source of funding, i.e. regular budget or peacekeeping.

You need to think outside of the box. I ask you to leverage the efficiency gains we can make by capitalizing on greater use of digital/information technology as well as consolidation/integration/rationalization. An example is UN Women. Integration of Departments and Regional Commissions can be thought about. I will communicate separately on that.

These are some examples. I am confident that you will all give them serious thought. I request you to make concrete proposals to the Controller on how to implement such measures. In view of the time frame, I ask that your views on measures to prune your budgetary proposals reach the Controller before **cob 9 March 2011**. We need to act decisively and swiftly, and we need to adhere to the timelines of the established budgetary process of the General Assembly.

TO: Members of the Policy Committee

DATE: 26 June 2008

 A: Participants at the 25 June Policy Committee meeting (see distribution list)

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:

S/C DE:

FROM: The Secretary-General

DE

SUBJECT: Decisions of the Secretary-General - 25 June meeting of the Policy Committee

OBJET:

Decision No. 2008/24 - Integration

i. Building on existing guidance, the Secretary-General reaffirms integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. A list of situations where the principle should be applied is attached. The following are endorsed as defining elements of integration:

a. The <u>main purpose</u> of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.

- b. To achieve this main purpose at the country level, there should be an effective <u>strategic partnership</u> between the UN mission/office and the Country Team, under the leadership of the SRSG (or ERSG), that ensures that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.
- c. The <u>country level arrangements</u> should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. In all cases they should include (i) a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives, (ii) closely aligned or integrated planning, (iii) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and (iv) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.
- d. An integrated approach and integration arrangements can yield significant benefits for humanitarian operations. Integration arrangements should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space, and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors.
- ii. To ensure that the elements listed in recommendation (i)(c) are in place, all integrated UN presences should have a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic framework that should be reflected in and draw on all other UN planning, programming and budget instruments. (Action: all integrated UN presences, supported by relevant HQ entities)
- iii. Lead departments will maintain Headquarters level task forces for each integrated UN presence to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance. The PBSO will support the lead departments, as appropriate, particularly in relation to countries before the PBC. The task forces will include relevant Secretariat departments and offices, agencies, funds and programmes and consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country. They will meet at the Director level as needed. (Action: DPKO, DPA)

- iv. An Integration Steering Group, convened by DPKO, consisting of the key UN entities and meeting at the ASG level at least on a quarterly basis, should help ensure implementation and progress on integration related issues. Initial follow-up recommendations will be presented to the Policy Committee by December 2008. (Action: DPKO)
- v. DPA, in coordination with relevant UN Country Teams and UN entities at headquarters, will review current arrangements in countries with DPA led missions/offices and agree on steps to implement the above and other relevant guidance, as necessary, by the end of 2008. (Action: DPA)

cc: Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. Nambiar

Mr. Kim

Mr. Pascoe

Mr. Guéhenno

Mr. Holmes

Ms. Arbour

Mr. Akasaka

Mr. Sha

Mr. Michel

Mr. Dervis

Mr. Duarte

Mr. Guterres

Ms. Venemen

Ms. Sheeran

Ms. McAskie

Mr. Orr

Annex

List of current countries/areas where the principle of integration should be applied

Africa

Burundi (BINUB)
Central African Republic (BONUCA/MINURCAT)
Chad (MINURCAT)
Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
DRC (MONUC)
Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)
Liberia (UNMIL)
Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)
Somalia (UNPOS)
Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID)
Uganda (Office of the Special Envoy)

Middle East

Iraq (UNAMI) Israel/oPt (UNSCO) Lebanon (UNSCOL)

Asia

Afghanistan (UNAMA) Nepal (UNMIN) Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

Europe

Kosovo (UNMIK)

Americas

Haiti (MINUSTAH)

¹ The following countries/areas with UN peacekeeping mission are not included since the relevant missions are not multidimensional, as required by decision (i): Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Georgia (UNOMIG), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Pakistan and India (UNMOGIP), and Western Sahara (MINURSO). Also not included are countries with Special Representatives/Envoys that do not have a presence at the country level, e.g. Myanmar, or countries where the UN has some political involvement but no formal political mission/office/envoy (e.g., Kenya). Lastly, political offices with a regional mandate are not included (e.g., Central Asia and West Africa).



Guidelines

UN Strategic Assessment

Approved by:

The Secretary-General

Approval date:

May 2009

Contact:

Policy Planning Unit, DPA

Review date:

May 2010

Approved on behalf of the Secretary-General

Vijay Nambiar

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A. INTRODUCTION


- 1. <u>Purpose</u>: These guidelines outline a process for UN staff to conduct an inter-departmental and inter-agency Strategic Assessment of a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation. The Strategic Assessment provides a mechanism for joint analysis and strategic discussions that cut across the political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights aspects of the UN's work. It brings together the key UN departments and agencies in each of these areas and is intended to allow senior decision-makers, in particular the Secretary-General, to consider new or re-oriented forms of UN engagement based on the country's needs. It builds upon existing department and agency analysis and assessment processes as well as relevant outside research.
- 2. The Strategic Assessment is an assessment tool, not a planning tool. Its focus is strategic rather than operational. Other forms of assessments such as Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) are generally more frequent and more operational in nature. The Strategic Assessment is a major product in itself, while TAMs are tools that contribute to other products.
- 3. <u>Scope</u>: These guidelines are relevant to all UN personnel responsible for, or tasked with, the development of strategic analysis and options for UN engagement in conflict-affected countries where there may be a need for a multi-dimensional UN strategy for peace consolidation. If deemed appropriate, a Strategic Assessment could be repeated in a country

when there are conditions that warrant a re-orientation of the UN's response. All analysts, desk officers, planners, managers and senior leadership in UN departments and agencies should be aware of these guidelines.

- 4. These guidelines are written to address **country** situations, not regional issues. However, regional implications will be taken into consideration when there is an intrinsic link with the country-specific situation.
- 5. <u>Rationale</u>: While there are many assessment and planning tools within the UN for conflict and post-conflict situations, there has not been a standardized inter-department/agency tool that assists the UN system to formulate a shared analysis, vision and strategy¹. These quidelines on Strategic Assessments aim to fill that gap.
- 6. These guidelines have been developed in the context of wider discussions on system-wide integration, integrated planning processes, peacebuilding guidance, and lessons learnt in previous strategic assessment exercises. The Strategic Assessment process may lead to an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) if a decision is taken by the Secretary-General to initiate integrated planning for a political or peacekeeping mission. However, as noted above, the Strategic Assessment process can be used for a number of other purposes, including in circumstances where a mission/political office already exists or where there is no likely prospect of one being established. Section G of this guidance lists previous guidance and others still in development which shaped the drafting of these Strategic Assessment guidelines.

As noted in the 2006 IMPP guidelines and the 2008 Secretary-General's decision on integration (2008/24), an integrated approach, including the Strategic Assessment, should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space, and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors. It should also be reiterated that the main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN.

7. <u>Overview of the Strategic Assessment process and its tools</u>: The following diagram summarizes the Strategic Assessment process, the range of settings it may be conducted in, and the documents it will generate:



- 8. <u>Factors contributing to successful Strategic Assessments</u>: Based on experience to date, there are a number of factors that contribute to the successful conduct of Strategic Assessments. Conversely, the absence of these conditions may result in processes and outcomes that do not meet the basic purpose of a Strategic Assessment, resulting in a significant waste of human and financial resources and, in some cases, loss of trust among UN entities participating in the process. It is therefore critically important that these factors are taken into account in the planning and conduct of a Strategic Assessment. They include:
 - a. A strong focus on substantive and strategic priorities for the UN in the relevant country, **based on the country needs**. The analysis should be needs rather than supply driven. Any discussions about how the UN's presence on the ground should be organized (or reorganized) should be driven by this analysis (form has to follow function) and should not be the primary focus of a Strategic Assessment.
 - b. Very close collaboration between HQ and the field throughout the process, as well as between the members of the ITF and the senior leadership of their respective departments and agencies.
 - c. A clear understanding on the part of the lead department and all its relevant staff that the Strategic Assessment process is intended to be inclusive, transparent and conducted in a manner that fully takes into account the views expressed by all participants.
 - d. A clear understanding by all participants that, while the Strategic Assessment is a joint product, the process is not necessarily intended to generate a consensus or a product that incorporates everybody's inputs in verbatim form. While the lead department is responsible for producing and presenting the final Strategic Assessment report, it also has to ensure a strong sense of joint ownership and participation, including by reflecting any substantive disagreements on the analysis or recommendations of the report.
 - e. A concerted effort by all participants to ensure that the best possible expertise is available to the Strategic Assessment process, including personnel participating in the ITF² and at the country level, as well as external resources that should be consulted, particularly by the lead department. Efforts should be made to systematically include expertise on human rights and gender.
 - f. The leadership of a senior staff member to chair the ITF and lead the field visit. The leader should have extensive and successful experience with running inter-departmental/agency processes and be highly regarded by the main entities involved. The leader should also be well-versed in the principles of integration and its supporting guidance. If the lead department cannot make a suitable senior staff member available, it should request other ITF members to propose candidates for this role.
 - g. A clear understanding by all participants that the Strategic Assessment process involves a critical and honest analysis of the main ongoing UN activities. This analysis should include consultations with non-UN stakeholders such as the government of the relevant country, civil society, including women's groups, donors and international NGOs with a significant presence in the country.

B. SETTINGS AND TRIGGERS

9. A Strategic Assessment can be carried out in any political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation that may warrant a multi-dimensional approach regardless of the type of UN presence

Integrated Task Force. For the purposes of these guidelines, the term "Integrated Task Force" and ITF refer to both ITFs and Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF).

on the ground (e.g. UN Country Team with a Resident Coordinator and/or Humanitarian Coordinator, a peacekeeping operation, a political office, etc.)³

- 10. A Strategic Assessment is triggered by the need to formulate (or reformulate) the UN's strategy for engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation in a particular country, especially if there is a recognition that different parts of the UN system may lack a common assessment of the situation and/or common understanding of the UN's strategic objectives. In some cases, this need may arise from a drastic change in circumstances, in others it may arise from a sense that the UN is generally underperforming or is without strategic direction in the relevant country.
- 11. A Strategic Assessment can be requested by a number of UN entities, including:
 - a. The Secretary-General
 - b. A member of the Policy Committee
 - c. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security
 - d. The (Headquarters) Integrated Task Force or Integrated Mission Task Force
 - e. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission
 - f. The (field) Integrated Mission Planning Team, or
 - g. The UN Country Team

The decision to conduct a Strategic Assessment is taken by:

- a. The Secretary-General (including through the Policy Committee process); or
- b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security
- 12. In situations with existing UN peace operations, the Strategic Assessment could contribute to the **reformulation** of the UN's overall strategy and possible reconfiguration of the UN's presence. A Strategic Assessment may have a particular added value in promoting and fostering join planning and stronger coherence, where the UN already has a multi-dimensional presence but coordination among the UN actors is sub-optimal.
- 13. While a Strategic Assessment is primarily a UN instrument, its development must take into account the activities and concerns of other non-UN stakeholders to ensure that the UN multi-dimensional response to a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation takes into account, as much as possible, the resources and capacities of all those involved in the response.
- 14. When conducted in the early phase immediately following a peace agreement, the outcomes of the Strategic Assessment should also inform the UN input in the development of a larger peacebuilding and recovery plan, one that highlights key country priorities and response strategies of the UN and other national, regional and international actors.

C. THE ITF AND THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Convening the ITF

15. The Strategic Assessment should be undertaken by an Integrated Task Force (ITF)/Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). Depending on the country situation to be assessed,

If the Strategic Assessment results in the launching of an integrated peace operation including a Special Political Mission, then the IMPP guidelines should be applied (see guidelines on IMPP responsibilities for the Headquarters and the Field).

an ITF⁴ may already exist or one may need to be established. The establishment of an ITF for the purpose of a Strategic Assessment does not presume a structurally integrated UN presence on the ground. The ITF is chaired by the lead department for the relevant country in the UN Secretariat (DPA or DPKO). Every ITF/IMTF is required to have Terms of Reference (TORs), which will vary from case to case. Generic guidelines for TORs for ITFs/IMTFs are attached at Annex A. <u>UN field presences (i.e. the UNCT and UN peace operation if one is present in the country) should be members of the ITF, therefore heavily involved in the shaping and conduct of the Strategic Assessment.</u>

Strategic Assessment Terms of Reference and Workplan

- 16. The Strategic Assessment TORs articulate the objectives for the Strategic Assessment as well as how and when it is to be carried out. In particular, the objective/aim of the Strategic Assessment is critical, as it frames the entire exercise. As noted later in Section D, the Strategic Assessment is not a comprehensive country analysis. The objective/aim in the TORs should include: a) a brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents for a potential change in the UN strategy; b) the identification of specific areas of concern; and c) consideration of prior engagements/actions in the country. A guide for drafting the Strategic Assessment TOR is at Annex B. The ITF should develop a Strategic Assessment Workplan as soon as possible. This should be a working document, with a matrix of activities, timeline and division of labor. New versions should be distributed regularly to ITF members including field-counterparts. The minimum components of the workplan should include:
 - a. A statement of the objectives and outputs of the Strategic Assessment, derived from the TORs
 - b. A matrix of indicative working timeline and activities

Organization and roles and responsibilities

- 17. An ITF conducting a Strategic Assessment should ensure senior participation for decision-making. ITF members should be empowered to represent their respective department and agencies in the assessment. They should possess the requisite analytical skills and have an expert understanding of the assessment and planning modalities of their department or agency, as well as a thorough understanding of the principles of integration. The ITF could also consider consultant expert advisers and/or one or two dedicated lead writers. The ITF should also consider bringing in specific thematic expertise from non-resident and specialized agencies not represented in the ITF, when a particular thematic issue is salient for the country situation.
- 18. The ITF may decide to create a sub-group or task team to develop an initial draft, using the full ITF for consultations, revisions and sign-off on a final draft.

Duration

19. There is no strict guideline on the duration of a Strategic Assessment and each case will be determined based on its merits. At the same time, the ITF should ensure the substantive nature of the Strategic Assessment by dedicating at least 2-3 months from inception to conclusion. The ITF also needs to bear in mind any external deadlines, such as requests from the Security Council for recommendations/reports. The ITF should contact the Policy Committee

⁴ As noted previously, for the purpose of these guidelines, the term "ITF" covers both ITF and IMTF.

Secretariat as soon as the Strategic Assessment is initiated to ensure timely consideration of the strategic options.

Desk Review

20. The Strategic Assessment, to the extent possible, should draw upon existing UN analyses and country strategies. The following is an indicative list of the possible existing analyses and the on-line links:

Secretary-General Reports and Security Council Resolutions (Security Council on-line)

UNDAFs and CCAs (UNDG on-line)

PRSPs (IMF and World Bank on-line)

PCNAs (UNDG on-line)

Peacebuilding Commission reports, Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks (PBC on-line)

Peacebuilding Fund documents (PBF on-line)

CAPs (OCHA on-line)

Previous Strategic Assessments (contact relevant desk officer)

UN human rights reports (<u>OHCHR</u> on-line), reports by special mechanisms of the Human Rights Council (<u>on-line</u>) and concluding observations by treaty bodies

21. In addition, the Strategic Assessment should draw upon relevant non-UN analyses. This should include analyses provided by important players on the ground, including Member States, regional organizations and NGOs, in order to ensure coherence with their action. An indicative list of documents to be considered includes reports produced by:

Think tanks, academic institutions, research organizations Human Rights organizations Women's organizations Member States documents

- 22. Each member of the ITF should bring to the attention of the Task Force any relevant analysis that should be considered within the framework of the Strategic Assessment. In particular, the field presences (i.e. UNCT and a UN peace operation if there is one in country) could contribute significantly to the desk review exercise by providing all relevant analyses and assessments. While the Strategic Assessment should not repeat the analyses contained within these documents, it should list the documents that were considered.
- 23. As part of the desk review, a stakeholder mapping exercise should be undertaken. This would ideally be conducted by the field presences and would map the various actors (national/sub-national government, donors, UN, international and national civil society groups, women's groups, regional actors etc.) and their activities as they relate to peace consolidation in the country. This mapping will assist the Strategic Assessment at a later stage in determining the UN's comparative advantage in meeting certain priority objectives of peace consolidation in the country.

Analysis

24. Detailed guidelines on the analytical methodology of the Strategic Assessment are contained in Section D. While most of the drafting should take place during the field visit, the following steps should ideally be completed at Headquarters, with the participation of field presences (UNCT and field mission, if any): articulation of the main objective of the Strategic

Assessment, desk review of existing documents, stakeholder mapping, and an initial understanding of the main conflict factors. This preliminary work should inform the conduct of the field visit when deciding on meetings with UN and non-UN actors.

Field visit(s)

- 25. Except for exceptional circumstances, a Strategic Assessment requires at least one field visit by the ITF or by the sub-group developing the initial draft. Wherever possible, the field visit should be undertaken early in the Strategic Assessment process in order to foster active engagement of the UNCT and field mission (if present). The field visits should in general be at least 1-2 weeks in length, to ensure proper consultations as well as time for drafting/redrafting of the Strategic Assessment report.
- 26. In some cases a field trip may not be possible, e.g. during a crisis when it is not permitted to travel or there is not the time. When a field trip is not possible special measures should be taken to fully capture field-based assessments from all appropriate national, regional and international actors. In all cases, the UNCT and the mission (if present) must be members of the ITF, as indicated in paragraph 15. Where a field trip is not possible, special efforts should also be made to involve country-based UN leadership in the development of both UN priorities and UN strategic options.

Consultations with external stakeholders

- 27. While the Strategic Assessment is an internal UN process, consultations with external stakeholders and other actors are essential for a number of reasons:
- To ensure that the Strategic Assessment is developed on the basis of the best available expertise and information (including from relevant academic institutions, think tanks, women's groups and NGOs).
- To ensure that the recommended options for UN engagement are properly aligned with national, regional and international initiatives, and that they have the support of key stakeholders (notably Members States, including TCCs, PCCs, UNSC members, neighboring countries, and national authorities as well as relevant regional organizations).
- Close involvement of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional development banks, as appropriate, as well as bilateral donors, are also important to closely align options for UN engagement with funding and resource mobilization discussions.
- To ensure that local civil society leaders, including women, as well as private sector associations are engaged.

The World Bank is given a standing invitation to join a Strategic Assessment. The ITF lead entity should formally contact the World Bank when the Strategic Assessment is being developed.⁵

28. In situations where the Strategic Assessment is undertaken along-side broader consultations between the national and international community (including the UN) on post-conflict priorities (including, for instance, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Process (PCNA),

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This is based on the UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations of October 24, 2008 in which agreement was reached on, among others, closer strategic dialogue and engagement through integrated joint assessment and planning, and the use of shared benchmarks/results frameworks.

or discussions within the Peacebuilding Commission), it is critical to make all efforts to ensure that these different processes are linked and coordinated, in order to avoid lack of coherence and fragmentation of efforts.

The Strategic Assessment report

- 29. Following the field visit(s), the ITF (or sub-group) finalizes the draft Strategic Assessment report. The report should be structured along the following lines (an outline is provided in Annex B):
 - Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment;
 - Key conflict factors;
 - Analysis of priority objectives;
 - [Existing capacities];
 - Strategic options, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on UN configuration (if any).

Internal Consultations and endorsement of report


- 30. Following the development of a draft Strategic Assessment report, the ITF as a whole should review the document and make any necessary changes. The draft should then be circulated for comments within each ITF member entity, keeping in mind paragraph 8 (g), which stipulates that members should keep their respective entities informed throughout the process, with inputs consolidated by the relevant ITF representative. These internal consultations on the draft facilitate institutional buy-in to the conclusions of the Strategic Assessment exercise. These consultations shall also be mindful of the need to consolidate views between field and Headquarters, which is the responsibility of each entity in the ITF.
- 31. The Strategic Assessment is a collective product of the ITF. Therefore, the ITF has a collective responsibility to ensure that consultations are undertaken with sufficient time and care to promote substantive improvements in and institutional commitment to the Strategic Assessment. The ITF should budget several weeks for the consultation process. Following these consultations, the ITF prepares a revised draft, which is then endorsed by the ITF at the directors' level.
- 32. The ITF, through the lead department, should ensure that the country is scheduled on the Policy Committee agenda at an appropriate time to meet any external deadlines. The ITF, through the lead department, should also consult the Policy Committee Secretariat from an early stage of drafting to ensure that the final report (which will inform a Policy Committee submission paper) complies with the requirements of the Policy Committee.

Administration, logistics and budget

33. Each participating entity shall cover the cost of its representative for the Strategic Assessment, including field visits. The hiring of consultants should be undertaken by the lead department.

D. METHODOLOGY OF THE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

- 34. The following is a **suggested** methodology and process for drafting the Strategic Assessment report (see Annex B for additional guidance). The Strategic Assessment TORs may modify this outline or the ITF may decide on a more appropriate format. Annex C provides a non-exhaustive list of conflict analysis approaches that could be applied in addition to the assessment outlined below.
- 35. Drawing upon previous assessment and analysis where appropriate, the Strategic Assessment should propose an integrated UN response to the situation prevailing in the country. To this end, the Strategic Assessment should (1) present a shared UN analysis of the conflict situation including its key factors and dynamics, (2) identify the main priority objectives to address those key factors (3) identify the strategic options for the UN in order to respond to the situation on the ground (and potentially revisit the UN's configuration).
- 36. The Strategic Assessment should therefore be based on the following components:
 - (a) Articulation of the aim of the Strategic Assessment in the context of the country;
 - (b) A conflict analysis centered around the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios;
 - (c) The analysis of priority objectives for peace consolidation;
 - (d) *The articulation of UN strategic options* to address the situation in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for reconfiguration).
- 37. Ideally, two to three strategic options should be presented at the end of the Strategic Assessment. Of these, one strategic option for a UN approach to peace consolidation in the country may be recommended, based on possible scenarios and timelines for future developments (if there is agreement on the recommendation). It should be kept in mind that the status quo could be one of the strategic options presented.
- 38. The following diagram gives an overview of the analysis process, with the tools allowing to move from one part of the process to the other:



Each of the components and tools is described in detail below:

(a) Aim of the Strategic Assessment in the country situation

39. The Strategic Assessment is not a comprehensive country analysis, but an exercise to articulate a limited range of UN strategic options to contribute to the consolidation of peace in an integrated manner. Therefore, a limited aim, tailored to the country situation should frame the ensuing analysis, to ensure that the Strategic Assessment exercise remains focused and articulates options for an integrated UN response in the short to medium term. This aim should be clearly articulated in the Strategic Assessment TORs. It is essential that all members of the ITF accept and commit to the aim throughout the exercise.

(b) Conflict analysis


40. The development of a shared analysis of causes, dynamics and consequences of a given conflict provides an important basis for determining the appropriate form of UN support. The key factors (both underlying causes and near-term effects) driving the conflict situation in the country should first be surveyed and their dynamics analysed. The only criteria to identify factors to be included should be their relevance to the overall country-specific aim of the Strategic Assessment (e.g. a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS may be a problem for the country but often does not enter the scope of a Strategic Assessment). The analysis should aim at identifying the factors most salient for addressing the conflict through a multi-dimensional UN strategy. The following is an example list of factors: unequal access to resources, poor governance, inter-ethnic strife, separatist ambitions, rising food insecurity, lack of national strategies, incomplete reintegration of ex-combatants, displacement, inconclusive elections, gender inequalities in accessing resources, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence including when perpetrated as a warfare tactic. The analysis of these factors should include the rights of individuals and obligations of authorities based on the applicable international human rights standard.

41. A "Problem Tree" approach may be useful in mapping the links between key conflict factors (see diagram below.

Analytical tool: Problem tree

The problem tree methodology allows the visualization of the links between conflict factors. It can help translate the analysis into strategic priority objectives for the country.

Diagram 1: Problem tree




(c) Priority objectives for the country

42. The conflict analysis should provide the team with a comprehensive overview of key conflict factors that need to be addressed in any attempt to promote peace consolidation. From the conflict analysis, the Strategic Assessment should then identify the key factors that need to be addressed as priorities in the near term and state these as priority objectives for an integrated effort by the UN system. The priority objectives should reflect fully relevant international legal obligations of the State, including human rights obligations. These key conflict factors are then transformed into priority objectives, These priority objectives are linked to one another according to the initial conflict analysis. Taken together as a whole, the priority objectives should present a map that would highlight the most important elements to be addressed in order to consolidate peace in the country. It should be kept in mind that the priority objectives should not be limited to the scope/mandate of one UN entity.

The following table shows an example of how conflict factors can be translated into priority objectives:

Conflict factor	Priority objective
Unequal participation in political representation	Support inclusive form of government as key
or access to power key factor fueling conflict	component of a negotiated settlement
Militarization of politics perpetuates violent	Establish comprehensive process of disarmament,
conflict and impedes peaceful resolution of	demobilization and reintegration of armed groups
disputes	following a cease-fire
High level of impunity for sexual violence used as	Develop security sector and justice sector
a tactic of warfare or as a means of destabilizing	strategies to prevent sexual violence
communities	
Political and social inequality in access to	Establish inclusive system of government; provide
economic and social rights fuels grievances and	population with equal access to services and
conflict	entitlements
Massive population displacement preventing	Protection, resettlement and reintegration of
economic recovery and creating new causes of	displaced populations in secure areas of return
conflict	
Weak civil society leading to lack of progress in	Support strengthening of civil society in conflict
local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts	resolution and peacebuilding efforts

Diagram 2: Priority objectives



(d) Development of UN strategic options

43. The Strategic Assessment should develop a range of one to three possible strategic options for UN engagement to address the identified priority objectives for peace consolidation. In doing so, rather than focusing on activities of individual UN actors, the Strategic Assessment should review clusters of priority actions within priority objectives. It should also take into account the likelihood of scenarios and focus on the needs of the country as well as the UN's comparative advantage and capacity.

Analytical tool: SWOT analysis

The translation of the priority objectives for the country into a coherent UN strategy can be aided by using a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. This methodology analyzes the internal and external capacities to address priority objectives. For each priority objective, the Strategic Assessment could list the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the UN. The aim of the analysis is to determine the UN's comparative advantage. The stakeholder mapping exercise as part of the desk review (described in paragraph 23) should be taken into account when conducting the SWOT analysis.

For each priority objective, a SWOT analysis will allow the team to assess whether the UN should be involved, what type of role (lead versus support) it should take, and which key actors it should engage with to ensure that the priority objective is fully addressed. In some cases, it may result in supporting another, better-positioned actor, rather than taking the lead for a given priority objective.

If helpful, the team could include tables for priority objectives. The following is a basic example. In actual cases, there should be more details.

Priority objective : Build local secu	rity capability
Strengths of the UN Some operational capacity in UNCT and field mission Expertise and experience of departments, agencies or funds Standards, values and instruments, including on human rights	Opportunities for UN and non-UN actors Regional organization with readily available expertise, experience and funding Capacities and mandates of government authorities and bilateral actors (e.g. ongoing capacity-building programme jointly organized by donors, regional organization and government).
Weaknesses of the UN Lack of funding for programmes Duration of necessary implementation Lack of fit with mandates of departments, agencies or funds Lack of available human resources, institutions, budgets Likelihood of success low	Threats to the priority objective Rebel group outside of peace agreement Shift in power relations Other priorities of donors and beneficiaries

Based on this table, the UN should probably assume a support role in this priority objective area (i.e. building local security capability) and work closely with lead actors such as the regional organization, donors and national government.

- 44. The different strategic options can be based on different scenarios or timelines or on differences in the interpretation of the analysis of opportunities and threats for the UN (based on the SWOT analysis). Each strategic option should frame the broad strategic orientation of UN engagement, with the understanding that subsequent planning processes will provide further details on how the strategic option will be operationalised, including respective roles for different parts of the UN system. It should always be kept in mind that the status quo is also a strategic option that could be presented (and in some cases recommended).
- 45. Each strategic option should include the following elements:
 - a) Overall approach and expected impact of the UN in helping achieve the priority objectives: This is the main part of the strategic option. It provides the "function" part of

the "form follows function" principle. The overall approach should be developed on the basis of a realistic appraisal of existing UN capacities and expertise, as well as those which can be deployed in short order. It should also take into account the role of other actors (national, regional and international) undertaking related peace consolidation efforts. Finally, the approach should include consideration of key assumptions and risks related to the strategic option and adequately reflect existing obligations of the State, including human rights obligations.

- b) Implications for alignment and coordination of the various elements of the UN response: The effectiveness of UN engagement will depend on effective coordination of individual UN entities based on a clear understanding of key priorities. The strategic option should articulate alignment/coordination implications of the UN response, keeping in mind that planning processes and instruments developed by humanitarian, development and other entities of the UN system cover other priorities specific to their individual mandates.
- c) Proposals for the form and structure of UN engagement: The strategic options should provide preliminary indications regarding the required form of UN engagement, which refers to how the UN, as a system, could organize its country presence and capacities to implement its overall peace consolidation approach in an integrated and coherent manner. As noted in paragraph 8 (f), this should be driven by the analysis and the the resulting overall approach of the UN. Examples of organizational configurations include, but are not limited to, a "normal" UN Country Team (UNCT) configuration, a special political mission, a structurally integrated peacekeeping operation, the deployment of a human rights presence, the reduction or withdrawal of the UN presence.

E. DECISION AND FOLLOW UP

Policy Committee submission

46. Following the endorsement of the Strategic Assessment report by the ITF at the directors' level (as stipulated in paragraph 31), the ITF develops a Policy Committee submission paper. The strategic options for UN engagement contained in the Strategic Assessment report should yield recommendations for consideration by the UN Secretary-General and the Policy Committee. These may include:

- a. Recommendations on UN integrated strategic options for the country in question;
- b. Recommendations on the form of UN engagement;
- c. Recommendations regarding the appropriate alignment and coordination of relevant UN planning processes necessary within the context of a given strategic option for UN engagement;⁶
- d. Recommendations regarding appropriate actions following a decision on a strategic option. These could include a strategy for approaching member-states for endorsement, mobilizing resources, or initiating detailed planning processes (e.g. the IMPP);

⁶ These can include, for instance, recommendations on aligning planning and operational cycles between relevant political, peacekeeping, human rights, development and humanitarian entities, or even in certain cases recommendations on the adoption of a single planning process, cycle and framework for all concerned UN entities.

e. Recommendations regarding the future of the Strategic Assessment, including whether it will be continuously refined and updated, and the decisions it will subsequently inform.

Significant differences among ITF members should be highlighted in the Policy Committee submission.

Approval

- 47. The Policy Committee discusses, and enables the Secretary-General to take decisions on the conclusions of the Strategic Assessment. After the Policy Committee meeting, follow-up actions are undertaken on the basis of decisions by the Secretary-General.
- 48. Depending on the outcome of the decision, relevant parts of the UN system should consider planning implications for their respective areas and make adjustments as appropriate.

F. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Strategic Assessment: An internal UN inter-agency assessment tool to formulate or reforumulate UN engagement in a political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation.

Integrated Task Force/Integrated Mission Task Force: A Headquarter-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to UN presences applying the principles of integration. The ITF/IMTFs are main bodies to conduct Strategic Assessments. While they are Headquarters-based, field presences (the UNCT and mission) are members of the ITF/IMTF and are heavily involved in the shaping and conduct of the Strategic Assessment. For further guidance on the ITFs/IMTFs, refer to IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters.

Priority objectives: Objectives that need to be addressed in the short to medium term to promote peace consolidation in the country. These objectives are derived from key conflict factors. If the Strategic Assessment leads to an Integrated Mission Planning Process, these priority objectives should inform the development of an integrated strategic framework.

G. GUIDANCE ADMINISTRATION

- 49. <u>Monitoring and Compliance</u>: Implementation of this guidance shall be monitored by the Policy Committee. Non-compliance with this guidance may result in a reduction in the quality of strategic assessments and a corresponding lack of impact in UN programs to address the symptoms and causes of conflict.
- 50. Contact: The contact for this guidance is Policy Planning Unit, DPA
- 51. <u>Dates</u>: The guidance shall be effective on [xx May 2009] and reviewed no later than May 2010.
- 52. *History*: This guidance was approved on [xx May 2009] and has not been amended.
- 53. Abbreviations:

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
UNDOCO	UN Development Operations Coordination Office
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
ITF	Integrated Task Force
IMPT	Integrated Mission Planning Team
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SPM	Special Political Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

H. REFERENCES

- A. [GA/SC: improved system-wide analysis in the UN; one-UN approach, etc]
- B. Policy Committee Decision [25 June 2008, Integration]
- C. Policy Committee Decision [2005, RC/HC]
- D. OCHA analysis and planning instruments
- E. UNDG analysis and planning instruments
- F. Policy Committee Decision [2006, IMPP]
- G. IMPP Guidance Notes [in development]

I. ANNEXURES

- A. Generic Template for TORs for ITFs/IMTFs
- B. Guide for Strategic Assessment documents TORs, Report
- C. Conflict Analysis Methodologies

Annex A: Generic template for Terms of Reference for Integrated Task Forces (ITF) and Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF)

Integrated Task Forces (ITF) and Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF)⁷

ITFs and IMTFs are the principal Headquarters-level inter-agency bodies that ensure a coherent and consistent UN engagement in a given country/region. Following the Secretary-General's decision on integration (decision 2008/24), lead departments are required to maintain such task forces for each integrated UN presence. Task forces may also be formed by the lead department, when there is a need for Headquarters-level coordination, regardless of the type of presence in the field.

The primary role and focus of the task force may shift depending on the situation at hand and/or phase of the integrated presence. For example, the task forces will have a more intensive role in planning at the start-up phase of a field mission, while the focus will shift to a support and guiding role once the field mission is established. Some of the key functions of the task forces include the conduct of UN Strategic Assessments, implementing the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and providing support and policy guidance to the relevant integrated UN presence.⁸

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for each task force should be tailored to the distinct needs of the situation/country/integrated presence. The task force should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or the integrated presence enters a new phase (e.g. transitioning out at the end of the mandate).

While each task force will have distinct TOR, the following components should always be included:

Background

This section should describe the legislative basis for the peace operation and the group, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also identify the purpose of the task force, using selected language from these key decisions (e.g. aiming at "maximizing the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace"9). It may also refer to any Strategic Assessment or any other type of assessment undertaken. The section could also include the rationale for an integrated task force, particularly in cases where there are no integrated field presences.

Purpose and principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the task force. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase of field presence. Each task force should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of a task force:

In practice, the Department of Political Affairs uses the term "Integrated Task Force" for the inter-agency task forces they chair, whether or not in support of a field mission or office. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations uses the term "Integrated Mission Task Force."

Detailed guidance on the Task Forces' central role in Headquarters-level planning for an integrated mission is provided in the forthcoming "Guidance Note on Headquarters level planning for integrated UN Peace Support Missions" and the 2006 IMPP Guidelines.

Policy Committee Decision No. 2008/24 on Integration, page 1 (section i, a)

- Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for UN inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support and information exchange
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy planning processes
- Coordinate a UN Strategic Assessment that conducts joint analysis, identifies UN priorities and recommends strategic options for the UN
- Undertake the various planning activities outlined in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)
- Develop the key strategic goals of the UN presence for the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). (The remainder of the ISF will be completed by the Field Mission)
- Plan and conduct Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) as required
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies (e.g. RBB, SG reports, Policy Committee papers)¹⁰
- Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work [in cases where the country is under consideration in the PBC]
- Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field [the list of sectors will vary from case to case]
- Maintain a dialogue with field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams (or similar field-based integrated working groups) and provide support to them as required
- Regularly share and review information
- Support coordination with non-UN actors

Composition

This section should define the composition of the task force. The task force should be chaired by the lead department. The chair may draw on the support of the PBSO in cases where the country is under consideration by the PBC. In principle, the membership should comprise all key branches of the UN including political, peace and security, field support, humanitarian, human rights, recovery, development and peacebuilding.

The field integrated presence should also be represented, preferably by the DSRSG/RC/HC, when there is structural integration. In other cases, the field mission and the UNCT should both be represented. Relevant UNCT agencies, funds and programmes should be represented by HQ-based staff according to the "2+4" formula agreed by UNDG/ECHA in 2006.¹¹

All task force members should participate in meetings at the senior officer level and be empowered to represent their entities.

In some cases, the task force may decide to have a "core" membership and an expanded membership that meets less frequently.

This section should describe the working modalities of the task force. It should define who

Organization of work

chairs meetings and how frequently the task force meets and at what level. Some task forces may decide to have two tiers by meeting more frequently at the working level and less frequently at the Director level. Information about the development of a workplan, the modalities for

formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points or minutes may also be included in this section.

This is not to duplicate any field-level coordination in preparation for these documents.

Under this formula the humanitarian community is represented by OCHA and the development community is represented by DOCO. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN Funds, Programmes, and Agencies may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

This section should also describe how the work of the task force is linked to similar field-level groups, such as Integrated Mission Planning Teams. It should describe the modalities for the exchange of information between these groups and note that the task force provides support to field-based working groups as required. For example, the task force could regularly exchange minutes/summaries of meetings with the field.

Annex B: Guide for Strategic Assessment documents

Strategic Assessment Terms of Reference (TORs)

- A Strategic Assessment TORs should have the following:
 - a. <u>Background</u>: why is the Strategic Assessment being done at the time, and which UN body has requested it.
 - b. What: the objectives of the Strategic Assessment. This should include: 1) a brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents for a changed UN strategy; and b) the identification of specific areas of concern.
 - c. Who: list the participating entities, noting the lead department for the exercise. It is useful to specify that the exercise should be conducted at the senior level.
 - d. <u>How</u>: Reference to these guidelines for how to conduct the Strategic Assessment. Any major deviation from these guidelines should be noted here.
 - e. When: provide a timeline and an indicative report submission date or a strict deadline for the Strategic Assessment Report. The latter will be necessary if the Strategic Assessment is bound by an external deadline such as finalization of a Report of the Secretary-General or a mediation process etc.
- 2. While the preference is for the Strategic Assessment TORs to be concise, they **may** provide guidance to additional issues, and may also explicitly refer to:
 - a. A more detailed **summary** of the situation, and an outline of the UN institutional setting
 - b. The type of **conflict analysis** required, and existing UN or non-UN assessments to be used
 - c. The scope of **UN priorities** to consider UN priorities in existing official UN documents (for example in UNDAFs, Reports of the Secretary-General, General Assembly or Security Council statements or resolutions)

Strategic Assessment Report

In general, a Strategic Assessment report should include the following sections:

Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment

Key conflict factors and dynamics

This section could include the problem tree diagram

Priority objectives

This section could include a diagram of the priority objectives as well as SWOT tables

[Existing capacities]

Strategic options

- a. Option 1
- b. Option 2
- c. Option 3

Recommended option

Recommendations on UN configuration

Annexes:

- a. List of people interviewed
- b. List of references (with hyperlinks)
- c. Current UN Organizational structure at the country-level
- d. Tables and diagrams on analysis, UN priorities and strategic options (if not in body of the report)

Annex C: Conflict Analysis Methodologies

The following is a list of some existing conflict analysis methodologies an ITF may be interested to explore (courtesy of DOCO):

- CARE Guide to Conflict Assessment
- Common Interagency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (UNDG/ECHA) http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=150
- Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes (DFID) http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf
- Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: a resource pack (2004), Safeworld, International Alert, FEWER
 - http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=148
- Conflict related Development Analysis Tool (UNDP/BCPR) http://www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/CDA_combined.pdf
- DAC Guide on conflict resolution

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5DTEAJ/\$file/oecd-guide-1997.pdf?openelement

- Early Warning and Early Response Handbook (CPRN)
 http://cpr.web.cern.ch/cpr/Library/tools/EW-HandbookFinalEn_v2.3.pdf
- Framework for political analysis (UN/DPA)
- Joint Stabilisation Assessment Tool (DFID)
- Joint Stabilisation Assessment Working Draft (DFID)
- Lessons Learned Workshop: Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into UN Planning and Programming (2006)

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:BqoMlcOUiQQJ:www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/integrating conflict.shtml+-

- <u>+Lessons+Learned+Workshop:+Integrating+Conflict+Sensitivity+into+UN+Planning+and</u> +Programming&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us
- The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development, published in 2005, Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200_cru_paper_stability.pdf (accessed October 2008)
- Gender and Conflict Analysis (UNIFEM)
 - http://www.womenwarpeace.org/docs/UNIFEM Conflict Prevention.pdf
- Conflict Analysis Framework for Natural Resources and the Environment (UNEP)
 http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/CAF draft jan 09.pdf





Overview: Integrated Missions Planning Process

Background

The 2000 "Brahimi Report" identified the absence of an integrated planning capacity in the Secretariat for peacekeeping operations as a major vulnerability in the system.

"There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment."

That same year, the **Secretary-General's Note of Guidance** created the triple-hatted DSRSG/HC/RC function, which formalized the concept of "structurally integrated missions" by bringing the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators into the mission leadership structure as a method of linking the Mission and the UNCT. This guidance was further updated in 2006 to help clarify chain of command and reporting lines.

Then, in 2006, the Secretary-General endorsed the **Guidelines for the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)** and established the IMPP as "the authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programmes."

Most recently, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee, through Decision 2008/24 on Integration, reaffirmed integration as the "guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not those presences are structurally integrated or not." This decision identified 18 countries where the principles of integration should be applied including: Burundi (BINUB), CAR (BONUCA), Chad (MINURCAT), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Somalia (UNPOS), Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), Iraq (UNAMI), Israel/oPt (UNSCO), Lebanon (UNSCOL), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Nepal (UNMIN), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH).

The decision also reaffirmed that lead Departments should maintain **Headquarters-level integrated task forces** (called IMTFs for DPKO-led missions and ITFs for DPA-led missions) for each integrated UN presence "to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance" and called upon these task forces to "meet at the Director level as needed." It also asked each of the 18 integrated UN presences (the Mission and the UNCT) to have a "**shared analytical and planning capacity** as well an **integrated strategic framework (ISF)** to articulate a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives and an associated set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for tasks critical for peace consolidation.

IMPP Overview

The IMPP and the principles of integration should be applied to the 18 countries identified in the Policy Committee Decision of June 2008 regardless of whether the mission is structurally

¹ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, 21 August 2000



integrated with a DSRSG/HC/RC. The IMPP is particularly important for planning new multidimensional peace operations and current operations under-going transition, revision, or downsizing. Although the IMPP tools are used most intensively at mission start-up and during transition, the planning fora and tools identified in the IMPP (e.g. HQ-based Task Forces, integrated field coordination structures in the field, integrated strategic frameworks) should be used throughout the life of the mission to "maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace."²

Strategic Assessment

A Strategic Assessment may be conducted by the Secretariat to devise concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General for how the UN system could formulate or re-formulate its response to a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation. It is most likely applied to situations where there is currently no UN peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, but may also be applied to situations where the existing UN architecture may need to be adapted in response to changed circumstances. The Strategic Assessment should be managed by the lead Department through the Integrated Task Force (ITF)/Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF). The ITF/IMTF is responsible for writing the terms of reference, fielding the team, and managing the follow-up to the mission. A Strategic Assessment may or may not lead to the fielding of a multi-dimensional peace operation and thus, may or may not trigger the IMPP.

Figure 1: Strategic Assessment: Typical Sequence



For a full description of the Strategic Assessment process, please see Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment (released June 2009).

IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters

The main responsibility of the lead Department in implementing the IMPP at the Headquarters level is the management of the Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF). The IMTF/ITF is "established as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country" and "ensures coherent and consistent support and policy guidance" to the relevant integrated mission and, in particular, its senior leadership, integrated mission planning and coordination and planning staff.

Composition: The IMTF should be chaired by a senior representative from the lead UN Department and will consist of representatives from all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, and DSS, as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the '2+4'

² Policy Committee Decision 284/2008 on Integration, page 1,26 June 2003.

³ Policy Committee Decision No. 2008/24 on Integration, p. 1, iii.



formula.⁴ Field representatives from both the Mission and the UN Country Team should also be regularly included in the IMTF/ITF through teleconferencing or video teleconferencing, and as per the July decision of the Integration Steering Group, the field should co-chair the task force or alternating chairmanship (between HQ and the Field) arrangements should be instituted. IMTF members should participate at the senior officer level and meetings should be held at the Director level, as required.

Role of the IMTF at Mission Start up: IMTFs are most active at the mission start-up phase. The IMTF's main role at mission start-up is to undertake the necessary analysis and field missions to produce the key planning products identified in the flow chart below. These include: Planning Directive(s), Commitment Authority (the funding mechanism), Technical Assessment Missions (TAM), the Report of the Secretary-General, Mission Concept, Mission Results-Based Budget, and the Directive to the SRSG. The IMTF should be consulted on the mission budget (Results Based Budget, RBB), structure and staffing to ensure complementary programmatic funding and human resources are available in the UN Country Team to achieve UN system objectives, to avoid duplication of tasks/capacities, and to identify potential synergies.

Figure 2: IMPP Headquarters Process and Products



The role of the IMTF beyond mission start-up: The IMTF should remain active once a mission is deployed, but generally meets less frequently and has a more supportive role. At this stage, the IMTF considers relevant policy documents (e.g. Policy Committee papers, Reports of the Secretary-General) that have strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country." The IMTF will become more active again in mission planning during periods of mandate adjustment, transition planning, and drawdown phases. During these adjustment periods, planning should be closely coordinated between the Field and the Headquarters through the IMTF. The IMTF should devote particular attention to programmatic areas of overlap among the peacekeeping, humanitarian and development components of an integrated mission (e.g. DDR, protection, rule of law, and early recovery) since experience shows that coordinated operational and resource planning is required for successful outcomes.

For a full description of the IMPP process at the Headquarters level, please see the IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Presences (released June 2009).

⁴ Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN Funds, Programmes, and Agencies may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

⁵ Policy Committee Decision 2008/24, p. 1, iii.





IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field

Once a mission becomes fully operational, the primacy of the integrated planning effort shifts to the field. In this regard, the main responsibilities of the field missions and UNCTs in the IMPP are to develop and implement (1) integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team) and a related (2) Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that defines the strategic partnership between the Mission and the UNCT towards joint peace consolidation priorities.

Integrated Field Coordination: Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction, coordination, and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence. The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN's operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of "form follows function". Regardless of their configuration, the coordination architecture should fulfill key functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels. In multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group and a senior working level Integrated Strategy and Planning Team may be considered. In smaller integrated peacebuilding environments, a Strategic Policy Group may be sufficient. In many cases, existing coordination bodies of either the Mission or UNCT may be leveraged to create integrated field coordination structures. Moreover, thematic working groups will often be utilized to coordinate development and implementation of joint strategies.

Integrated field coordination structures should be supported by a "shared analytical and planning capacity" to facilitate and support joint strategic planning exercises. Dedicated strategic planning resources are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO). On the Mission side, planning capacity is budgeted through the Results Based Budgeting process. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference that is developed under the direction of the senior leadership team and/or integrated field coordination structures.

Integrated Strategic Framework: The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an integrated strategic framework (ISF) that reflects:

- "a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives" and,
- "a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace"

The **purpose** of an ISF is to:

• Bring together the Mission and the UNCT around a common set of agreed peace consolidation priorities


⁶ Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions, 2005 p. 19.



- Prioritize and sequence agreed elements
- Facilitate a shift in priorities and/or resources, as required
- Allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers

An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It therefore, should not reach the level of programmatic interventions. That said, an ISF will need to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF's objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, RBB). (See figure 3, below)

Figure 3: Scope of the ISF and linkages to other mandated frameworks



The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. In that regard, a review of current ISFs⁷ reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection of civilians, return and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.

For more information, see the detailed guidelines: IMPP: Role of the Field, Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences, January 2010

January 2010

⁷ Reflects the thematic priorities in ISFs under development in Chad, DRC, and Cote d'Ivoire.



IMPP Guidelines:

Role of the Headquarters

Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

Approved by: The Secretary-General

Approval date: May 2009

Contact: DPKO Integrated Mission

Planning Officer

Review date: May 2010

Approved on behalf of the Secretary-General.

Vijay Nambiar

Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

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Introduction

A. PURPOSE

- These guidelines focus on the joint mechanisms and planning products that should be in place at UN headquarters for the planning of peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that operate alongside a UN Country Team (UNCT) presence. These guidelines apply, in particular, to UN presences 1 that are applying the principles of integration and the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). This includes, but is not limited to, Missions that are "structurally integrated" through the appointment of a DSRSG/RC/HC. Integration refers both to internal civil and military integration within the field mission as well as the strategic partnership between the UN field mission and the UNCT.
- While these guidelines apply to existing UN presences, they describe in detail the planning mechanisms related to the establishment of new UN field missions working alongside UNCTs. In this context, the mechanisms described generally take effect following the completion of a UN system-wide Strategic Assessment process that recommends a

¹ In these Guidelines, the UN field mission (either a peacekeeping mission or a Special Political Mission) and the UN Country Team are jointly referred to as the "UN presence."

peacekeeping mission or SPM and a related decision to begin the planning process.² Such a decision would allow the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to establish itself as the appropriate lead department for planning in close coordination with the Department of Field Support (DFS).

3. These guidelines further explain and operationalize the IMPP Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006³ and integrate additional principles as prescribed in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008).⁴ These guidelines should also be read in conjunction with the Secretary-General's Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005). Finally, these guidelines are part of a larger guidance package, which also includes separate notes on Strategic Assessment and Integrated Field-Level Planning.⁵

B. SCOPE

- 4. These guidelines primarily apply to headquarters staff responsible for or tasked with participating in the planning of UN peacekeeping missions or SPMs implementing the IMPP Guidelines and the guiding principles of integration identified in the Policy Committee Decision on Integration. Currently, 19 UN presences are required by the Policy Committee to apply the principles of integration, and this list may be revised as necessary. 6 More generally, new multidimensional peacekeeping operations and SPMs are expected to apply the guiding principles of integration and the IMPP.
- 5. The administrative and budgeting procedures described in these guidelines describe the planning process for peacekeeping missions led by DPKO. At the same time, the inclusive procedures and structures described in these guidelines may also be applied to the planning of DPA-led SPMs. For example, the roles and functions of the Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), as described, are also applicable to DPA-led Integrated Task Forces (ITFs) supporting SPMs. However, since there are some differences in the process for DPKO-led peacekeeping missions and DPA-led SPMs, the steps unique to the establishment and planning of SPMs will be explained in a special explanatory note and included in the overall IMPP Guidance Toolkit.

C. RATIONALE

6. The Secretary-General's 2006 IMPP Guidelines set the basic procedures for integrated planning for missions and UNCTs. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) further clarified the requirements for "conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional operation or political mission/office" subject to the principle of integration, including the basic coordination structures and the products that should be produced. These guidelines provide advice, examples, and templates useful in the implementation of the aforementioned policy documents. The IMPP is a dynamic, evolving process and this document seeks to integrate

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² See Strategic Assessment Guidelines. Strategic Assessments may or may not result in an IMPP for a peacekeeping mission or SPM.

³ United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006. Approved through Decision 2006/26 of 14 June 2006.

⁴ Decision on Integration (24/2008), 26 June 2008.

⁵ Forthcoming in June 2009

⁶ Burundi (BINUB), CAR (BONUCA/MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), Somalia (UNPOS), Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), Uganda (Office of the Special Envoy), Iraq (UNAMI), Israel/oPt (UNSCO), Lebanon (UNSCOL), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Nepal (UNMIN), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH).

actual practice since the coming into force of the 2006 IMPP Guidelines. These guidelines will be updated regularly to ensure the timely inclusion of emerging best practices.

II. GUIDELINES

The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)⁷

7. IMTFs are the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and inter-agency mechanism to "ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance" to UN presences applying the principles of integration and undertaking the IMPP both before and throughout the deployment of a field mission. They should "consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country." IMTFs provide an important link between headquarters and the field, aiming to provide coordinated guidance and support to the leadership of the field mission, UN Secretariat departments, and the UNCT while at the same time, respecting individual mandates. The role of the IMTFs varies in intensity throughout the mission life cycle, so the guidelines below delineate the key planning roles and products according to the following phases: mission start up, "steady state", and transition/drawdown.

Background

- 8. According to the Secretary-General's 2006 IMPP Guidelines, the IMTF is "established as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country" and is "composed of department, agency, and UNCT participants who should be empowered to represent their respective offices in the planning process." 10
- 9. It aims to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to the relevant UN presence, so an active and on-going dialogue with senior leadership, mission planning and coordination bodies (e.g. field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams or IMPTs), and planning staff is required. The IMTF may also provide advice regarding modalities for ensuring adequate, timely, and complementary resource allocation, while respecting the respective mandate of the mission and the UN agencies, funds, and programmes.

Establishment of an IMTF

- 10. A new IMTF may be triggered in a variety of ways, including through a decision by the Security Council or the Secretary-General to begin planning for a new field mission. The 2006 IMPP Guidelines foresee a linear progression from a DPA-led task force to carry-out the Strategic Assessment to a DPKO-led IMTF once planning for a peacekeeping mission is required. In addition, DPA is committed to leading task forces, in keeping with these guidelines, for the start up of an SPM, although this was not mentioned in the 2006 IMPP Guidelines.
- 11. The aforementioned progression is expected to be the norm, but in the meantime, more complicated scenarios have emerged that were not foreseen in the 2006 IMPP

⁷ In practice, the Department of Political Affairs uses the term "Integrated Task Force" for the inter-agency task forces they chair, whether or not in support of a field mission or office. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations uses the term "Integrated Mission Task Force." IMTF is used throughout this document as a generic term for both ITFs and IMTFs.

⁸ Decision 2008/24, paragraph iii.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ IMPP Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General 2006, page 4.

Guidelines. For instance, Somalia currently benefits from a DPA-led SPM, the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) and a UNCT. In this context, DPA chairs the Somalia Integrated Task Force. However, Security Council Resolution 1863 (2008) mandated planning for a future peacekeeping operation led by DPKO. To accommodate this complex situation, DPKO chairs a sub-group of the ITF charged with mission planning and implementation of the IMPP.

12. In carrying out their leadership duties related to IMTFs, lead departments may request support, as appropriate, from the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO), particularly in relation to countries before the Peacebuilding Commission."¹¹

Management and Composition

- 13. The IMTF should be chaired by a senior representative, usually a Director or Team Leader, from the lead department. In DPKO, the Team Leader of the relevant DPKO Integrated Operational Team (IOT) is generally tasked with chairing IMTFs. He/she should ensure that:
 - meetings are called regularly;
 - representation of the lead department and the participants is appropriate;

Consultations in the IMTF Context

The lead Department chairs the IMTF and is responsible for ensuring that planning documents associated with the IMPP are prepared according to established deadlines. The Chair is obliged to put in place consultation mechanisms for the planning documents under development. It is understood that oftentimes these deadlines are tight. Dissenting opinions should be heard with a view to their resolution. The lead Department should also ensure that adequate consultation takes place, including where appropriate with field staff from both the Mission and the UNCT, as well as with outside groups if necessary.

- field mission and UNCT representatives are included in the discussions;
- appropriate decisions are taken; and
- meeting notes are distributed.

The chair should also promote inclusive consultations and collaborative processes (see text box: Consultations in the IMTF Context).

- 14. The IMTF should include representatives from all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, OCHA, DOCO, and DSS, as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the '2+4' formula adopted in the 2006 UNDG/ECHA IMPP decision. ¹² Mission and UNCT leadership, including planning staff, should be included in IMTF meetings through video teleconferencing (VTC) or teleconferencing facilities. Even if senior mission and UNCT leadership cannot participate directly in each meeting, it is important that IMTFs consistently include representation of both the field mission and the UNCT.
- 15. IMTF members should participate in all meetings at the senior officer level (e.g. Senior Desk Officers, Team Leaders, functional specialists) and be empowered to speak on behalf of their home offices. In general, IMTF members should nominate officers who have country-specific knowledge and expertise. IMTF membership should be adjusted as necessary based on changes to ongoing objectives and functions to better respond to mission planning needs and developments on the ground. For example, IMTFs are encouraged to draw-upon specialized actors in the UN system when relevant thematic discussions are held. IMTFs may also consider inviting non-UN system organizations, including the World Bank¹³ and/or NGOs to their meetings on an ad hoc basis. NGOs with in-

¹¹ Decision 2008/24, p. 1, iii

¹² Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN agencies, funds, and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

The World Bank may be invited to participate in an ITF/IMTF based on the UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post Crisis Situations. This agreement was signed on 24 October 2008 and aims

country field operations may be particularly well positioned to contribute. Regardless of adjustments to the IMTF membership, the core membership should include representatives from the political, military, police, security, support, humanitarian, development, and human rights branches of the UN throughout the life cycle of the IMTF.

Objectives of the IMTF

- 16. Each IMTF will develop its own specific terms of reference covering its functions, composition, and modalities of operation. Moreover, the functions will shift throughout the life-cycle of mission start up, on-going missions (so-called "steady state") and during transition/drawdown.
- 17. All IMTFs should have an active terms of reference (ToR) outlining their primary responsibilities. A template ToR and a sample are attached as reference. The template and example describe the typical responsibilities and activities of an IMTF (see Annex 1 and 2). Building on these examples, each IMTF should tailor its activities to the situation on the ground

IMTF/ITF Terms of Reference

- 1. Background
- 2. Purpose and Principle Functions
- 3. Composition
- 4. Organization of Work

and seek to define its own key deliverables. Taking into consideration that an IMTF's ToR will evolve over time, the following bullet points identify some typical functions and activities of an IMTF that remain consistent throughout its life cycle.

- Serve as the principal headquarters mechanism for UN inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support, information exchange, and monitoring;
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy planning processes;
- Coordinate a UN Strategic Assessment that conducts joint analysis, identifies UN priorities and recommends strategic options for the UN¹⁴;
- Undertake the coordination of various planning activities outlined in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), including foundational planning documents such as the Planning Directive(s), Report of the Secretary-General, Technical Assessment Missions/Reports, and Directives to the SRSG;
- Identification of synergies and resource gaps and other budgetary issues related to the strategic alignment of resources.¹⁵

Role of the IMTF at mission start up

18. The flow chart below (Figure 1: IMPP Headquarters Process and Products for Mission Start Up) documents the key steps in the IMPP at the headquarters level for a mission start up. Building on the Strategic Assessment (where one exists), the IMTF prepares the key planning products identified in the flow chart below. (Detailed guidance for each of these steps is provided in subsequent sections of this note).

at, among others, closer strategic dialogue and engagement through integrated joint assessment and planning, and the use of shared benchmarks/results frameworks.

Normally, a DPA-led ITF would lead a Strategic Assessment if there is no political or peacekeeping mission on the ground. Once a mission is up and running, an ITF or IMTF could call for a Strategic Assessment, especially if there are drastic changes in the situation and/or if there is a joint recognition that the UN"s strategic vision in a given country needs to be reformulated. However, more generic assessment tools, such as TAMs, are generally used after a mission is established.

See also "preparation of the mission budget", page 9, 2006 IMPP Guidelines.



Figure 1: IMPP Headquarters Process and Products for Mission Start Up

19. These planning documents should be developed with detailed inputs from field staff.

In this context, IMTF members may consider bringing field staff headquarters on TDY to speed the timely provision of detailed information and to allow for discussion. direct While **IMTF** members may contribute to these products to varying degrees. **IMTF** members should be

Dedicated Planning Staff: Darfur Planning Team

Large peacekeeping missions often require a dedicated planning staff with a dedicated team leader for mission start up. In these cases, the IMTF, rather than serving as working group that meets occasionally, would benefit from a dedicated team of technical planning experts working under the leadership and coordination of the lead Department. The experience of the Darfur Planning team in 2006 found that a dedicated inter-departmental and inter-agency team (including representatives of the UN agencies, funds, and programmes), promoted the effective integration of civilian and military planning objectives, including protection of civilians and in support of humanitarian aims. Moreover, the practice of transferring field staff to the Headquarters to serve on the team greatly facilitated the creation of detailed operational plans based on up-to-date information. Regular video-teleconferences (VTCs) also ensured that field-based staff were included and could provide essential information that would otherwise be difficult to collect. Finally, having dedicated and tailored information management tools (such as a common workspace with an online document repository) also facilitated the work of the Darfur Planning Team.

consulted on all the products to ensure collective ownership. Moreover, the members of the IMTF, through their participation, should be able to assure their home offices agree on their content. In this context, some of key tasks of the IMTF at this stage are:

- Building on work undertaken to date (e.g. Strategic Assessments), validate and further develop the analysis of conflict dynamics and strategic objectives for UN support within an existing or possible future mission context;
- Identify specific areas where the efforts and capacities of the UN system can be aligned with a possible future mission and develop modalities for ensuring consistency of UN security, political, humanitarian, and recovery interventions and capacities to this end;
- Map existing UN capacities with a view to identifying roles and responsibilities for the mission and the UNCT as a contribution to the development of a shared strategic vision for common peace consolidation priorities;¹⁶
- Identifying the financial, logistic and administrative requirements necessary to support the overall concept of operations for a mission, including complementary programmatic resources needed to achieve a mission's peace consolidation or peacebuilding mandate

The role of the IMTF for "steady state" missions

20. The IMTF should remain active once a mission is deployed, but it generally meets less frequently in comparison with the mission start up phase. Once a field mission is operational, the primacy of mission planning efforts shifts to the field, with the HQ-based

¹⁶ Once a mission is deployed, the mission and the UNCT should devise an integrated strategic framework (ISF). The ISF should include a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives and a related set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. Detailed guidelines on the development of an ISF are forthcoming in June 2009.

IMTF providing support and guidance to those efforts and linking its activities to the field-based Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT). As indicated earlier, IMTF meetings should have a video or telephone link to the Mission and UNCT representatives.

- 21. Once the process of mission start up is completed, the IMTF should consider other key issues and relevant policy documents that have strategic significance for the UN presence in the relevant country. Some typical responsibilities of the IMTF during this phase are provided below:
 - Contribute to planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies (e.g. SG reports, Policy Committee papers)¹⁷;
 - Review progress on the implementation of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), the framework developed in the field that articulates a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives as well as a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace¹⁸;
 - Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work in cases where the country is under consideration in the PBC;
 - Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field, with the list of sectors varying from case to case:
 - Maintain a dialogue with field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams (or similar field-based working groups) and provide support to them as required;
 - Regularly share and review information;
 - Support coordination with non-UN actors.
- 22. The IMTF maintains a dialogue with the UN presence to ensure that coherence and coordination are maintained and that efficiencies and complementarities are maximized. The IMTF should devote particular attention to areas articulated in the ISF, as it includes key peace consolidation activities where the mission and the UNCT need to work together to achieve results. These areas, such as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), protection, return and reintegration, rule of law, and early recovery, require coordinated operational and resource planning for successful outcomes.

Role of the IMTF during transition/drawdown

- 23. The IMTF will become more active again in mission planning during periods of mandate adjustment, transition planning, and drawdown. During these adjustment periods, planning should be closely coordinated between the field and the headquarters through the IMTF. Typical tasks for the IMTF during such phases may include:
 - Contribute to the development of a consolidation, drawdown, restructuring, and withdrawal plan, including benchmarks and/or strategic workplans, as applicable, including by conducting Technical Assessment Mission(s).
 - Maintain a dialogue with the Mission and UNCT on the timely scaling-up of peacebuilding activities carried out by the UNCT and other key international organizations such as the World Bank, and IMF, bilateral donors.
 - The IMTF should also play a key role in planning for a transition from a
 peacekeeping operation to a follow-on peacebuilding or integrated office, in
 particular if there is a shift in the lead Department (e.g. from DPKO to DPA).
 Typically, such transitions require a comprehensive planning process similar to

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¹⁷ This is not to duplicate any field-level coordination in preparation for these documents.

¹⁸ This requirement is based on the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration 24/2008, paragraph i.c(i) and i.c(iii) and paragraph ii. See also Guidelines for Field-Level Integrated Planning, forthcoming in June 2009.

the mission start up phase, including a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). (See text box, below right)

Key Planning Products

24. At mission start up, the IMTF is responsible, under the leadership of the lead department, for the production of number of foundational planning documents. In this context, this section describes and provides advice on the development of Planning Directives. Commitment Authorities. Technical Assessment Mission(s), inaugural report of the Secretary

Lessons: Transition from UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL

In 2008, the DPKO-led United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was handed-over to DPA and renamed United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). This transition highlighted areas that require further work at Headquarters, including through the IMTFs. Some key lessons include: the importance of transition planning processes, timely appointment of senior leadership, effective linkages between departments, support for integration, and arrangements to ensure continuity of key staff in the field. At the mission level, the importance of risk assessment and the development of strategies to mitigate risk were also underscored. Finally, the UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL transition also highlighted the important role that leadership and vision play and provided a best practice for knowledge transfer that should be emulated by other missions.

General, the Mission Concept and associated component Concepts of Operations (CONOPs), and the Directive to the SRSG. The Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) process is also summarized, but is explained in more detail in other guidance documents. These guidelines should also be read in conjunction with Part 3 of the IMPP Guidance package, "Integrated Field-Level Planning", for more details on the respective roles of the headquarters and the field presence.

Figure 2: Planning Directive(s)



Planning Directives

- 25. The 2006 IMPP Guidelines suggested that Planning Directives from the Secretary-General (strategic level) and the USG of the lead department (operational level) could be prepared as a way to provide overarching guidance to the IMPP.
- 26. In this context, the Secretary-General issues a Planning Directive upon the recommendation of the lead department in consultation with the IMTF. Ideally, the Planning Directive, should be issued at the beginning of the planning process (e.g. when the IMTF is formed). This Directive should state the broad strategic objectives, the proposed form and scope of a peace support operation, and reflect interagency support at the strategic level." Thereafter, the USG of the lead department should issue a related operational planning directive including a situation analysis, planning assumptions, strategic objectives, priorities, benchmarks, risk assessment/constraints, functions and responsibilities of the IMTF, timing and sequencing of planning activities and outputs, and required decision points.²⁰ The USG's

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¹⁹ 2006 IMPP Guidelines, page 7.

²⁰ Ibid, page 8.

Planning Directive should also request the Planning Team to carry out a mapping of existing UN capacities.

- 27. Since 2006, only one IMPP Planning Directive, the Secretary-General's Planning Directive for Darfur, has been issued. This Policy Directive, attached as an example in Annex 3, refers to foundational policy documents, provides situation analysis, presents basic assumptions and scenarios, and directs the USG for DPKO to develop options for a multidimensional mission in Darfur along with associated obligations for the stakeholders, including the mission and the UNCT. Finally, the Directive also established planning deadlines.
- 28. In keeping with the flexible interpretation of the 2006 IMPP Guidelines, lead departments and IMTFs may also seek planning guidance from the Secretary-General and/or the USG of the lead department through a variety of means. Other vehicles, such as decisions of the Secretary-General taken through the Policy Committee process may be used for this purpose. Moreover, strategic and operational planning parameters are generally validated through the production of key planning products, including the inaugural report of the Secretary-General. In the case of Somalia, the Somalia ITF and the DPKO-led sub-group on planning received guidance through a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/804). This letter outlines the Secretary-General's proposals for the next steps for military and peacekeeping planning.

Commitment Authority (CA)

Figure 3: Commitment Authority and TAM



29. DPKO and DFS expenses related to mission planning and mission start up are funded, prior to the authorization and deployment of a mission, through the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. Commitments from this fund are meant to facilitate the rapid deployment of a new peacekeeping mission or the expansion of an existing mission. The technical term for such allocations is "Commitment Authority²¹ (CA)". The Secretary-General is authorized to enter into commitments not exceeding \$50 million per decision of the Security Council with the concurrence of The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). However, if the CA exceeds \$50 million or the total outstanding commitment authorities at any one time exceed \$150 million, the matter should be brought to the General Assembly as soon as possible for decision and assessment. The CA can be used to fund activities such as assessments (e.g. TAMs), strategic deployment stocks (SDS)²², shipment and airlift, staffing, rental of premises, contracting, and travel. The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund is repaid by the mission's subsequent budget when it comes into force.

²² See also Strategic Deployment Stocks Operations Policy, December 2006. SDS provides minimum operational capacity within 30 days of mandate for a traditional mission or within 90 days of mandate for a complex mission

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Commitment Authority is based on GA A/RES/49/233 and updated A/RES/56/292 (ACABQ Report A/56/902, SG Report A/ 56/870).

30. To activate a CA, the President of the Security Council sends a letter to the Secretary-General expressing the Council's concurrence with the Secretary-General's intention to plan and prepare for a possible new mission. ²³ DFS submits commitment authority cost estimates to the Controller after consultations with DPKO, and the Controller writes to the ACABQ chairperson. If approved, the ACABQ will send an approval letter back to the Controller, and the Controller will issue an allotment advice, which constitutes the approval to spend funds.

Figure 4: Sample Timeline: Commitment Authority Request: UNMIS Start Up 2004-2005

Date	Mandate day/timing	Description
11 June 2004	M-286 days	In paragraph 1 of its resolution 1547 (2004), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan as a special political mission (UNAMIS).
		In paragraph 4 of the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to facilitate the rapid deployment of a possible peace support operation in the Sudan.
30 July 2004	M-237 days	The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) granted commitment authority in the amount of \$49,999,400 to meet the cost of the most immediate and essential preparatory steps for the pre-positioning of critical logistical and personnel requirements.
24 March 2005	M-day	Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) for an initial period of six months as from 24 March 2005 (resolution 1590 (2005)).
28 March 2005	M+4 days	Controller requests ACABQ for an additional commitment authority in the amount of \$50 million for the most immediate and essential start up requirements for 30 days to enable the rapid establishment and deployment of the Mission.

Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs)

<u>Background</u>

31. transition/drawdown, as the role of the IMTF is particularly salient during these phases. The IMTF should field Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) to gather the information needed to produce the foundational planning documents. However, TAMs may take place at various phases of a mission's cycle, including, start up, mandate review, mid-cycle review; restructuring, and/or draw-down.

These guidelines are tailored to the conduct of TAMs for mission start up and

TAM Toolbox

Key templates and examples for staff tasked with participating in or leading a TAM are annexed to these guidelines, including:

- Template ToR, including key issues that should be addressed;
- Checklist of questions typically addressed through a DPKO-led TAM for a start up mission;
- Sample ToRs from TAMs to Sudan in 2008 and Somalia in 2009
- Full TAM reports are also available on the IMPP Community of Practice

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²³ See ACABQ ReportA56/902 para. 22

IMTFs may also organize TAMs related to mandate review, restructuring, crisis response, or in response to specific requests from the Security Council (e.g. to establish benchmarks/strategic workplans). In general, the IMTF plays an important role in the development of ToRs and the fielding of staff for TAMs that are of cross-cutting importance to mission and the UNCT activities.24

- 32. A TAM in support of mission start up is generally initiated following a Security Council resolution, a letter from the President of the Security Council, or a decision by the Secretary-General, 25 the Policy Committee, or the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) to commence planning for a new UN field mission.
- TAMs undertaken prior to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission or SPM should focus on the strategic and operational aspects of planning, including the specific requirements for missions and UNCTs implementing the principles of integration. TAMs for mission start up should also focus on the mapping of current UN capacities, as this is essential information for the recommendations on mandate and in the budget planning process between the mission and the UNCT.²⁶ The fielding of TAMs provides the IMTF with critical opportunities to consult directly with key stakeholders, obtain necessary planning information, accurately assess options and requirements, and work towards a harmonized approach with the UNCT and relevant non-UN actors.
- A TAM should be conducted within a period of one-two weeks. A detailed itinerary should be produced, but members of the TAM should remain flexible and take into account the situation on the ground. More than one TAM may be required to analyze specific technical aspects and to produce key IMTF outputs such as the Report of the Secretary-General. These TAMs will be supported by DPKO/DFS and other UN entities with expert guidance on thematic issues coming from the relevant thematic advisers. Although the TAM will produce various outputs, it will be important to ensure that the key reports are consulted with the IMTF and through the usual DPA/DPKO/DFS organizational hierarchy.²⁷

Terms of Reference

35. The IMTF should develop the ToR in consultation with the UNCT and the field mission, if deployed. The ToR should be **TAM Terms of Reference**

developed in a timely manner so as to ensure broad field-level preparation, consultation, and strategizing. The ToR is then approved by the senior management of the lead department. ToRs should address the background, objectives, methodology, timeline and results, composition/leadership of the mission. Care should be taken to ensure that both the political/security and support aims of the TAM are adequately reflected in the ToR. Additional

- 1. **Background**
- 2. **Objectives**
- Methodology 3.
- **Timelines and Results** 4.
- 5. Composition
- Other (logistics, programme, 6. tasks/questions)

elements such as the mission programme, key questions/tasks, and/or logistical arrangements may also be included. Consultations and dialogue with external partners

http://intranet.dpko.un.org/dpko/pages/DocumentDetails.aspx?DocId=2356; See also the MPS version http://intranet.dpko.un.org/dpko/pages/DocumentDetails.aspx?DocId=2274

²⁴ See also the draft DFS SOP for the Conduct of Technical Assessment Missions, 3 July 2008

²⁵ See also A/56/870 para 35 et seq.

²⁶ See also UNDG guidelines "UNDG Capacity Assessment Methodology: User Guide for National Capacity Development", http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=225

²⁷ See the Survey Mission Handbook -

(including national, regional and international actors, as well as member-states) should be a priority. The itinerary should include sufficient time for meetings with the UNCT, NGOs, and civil society.

Composition

36. The composition of the TAM should be small in order to avoid overburdening the stakeholders on the ground and to avoid creating unrealistic expectations. Likewise, there should be a conscious effort to minimize the number of assessment missions. For instance, large mission components such as the military or police may undertake separate TAMs, but the initial mission start up TAM should be comprehensive and include HQ-based representatives of all the key actors in the IMPP process taking care to include adequate representation to cover both substantive and support aims of the mission. Participants should be at a sufficiently senior level to ensure that they have authority to take decisions on behalf of their home office on a broad spectrum of issues. The TAM is generally led at the Director-level and may be co-led in certain circumstances. It is also good practice to formally have the senior UN official in the field be part of the leadership team. Consultants may also be engaged to draft the final report.

Funding

37. In principle, each participating entity should cover the cost of its representative(s), including related field visit expenses.

Report of the Secretary-General

Figure 5: Report of the Secretary-General



- 38. Once a TAM has returned to UNHQ following an assessment mission for a new mission, the main imperative for the lead department is the submission of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The lead department drafts the report, consults it with the IMTF, and completes the draft taking the collective views of the IMTF members into consideration.
- 39. This report contains detailed options or recommendations for the mandate of a new peacekeeping mission and serves as the basis for the debate in the Security Council on the mission's mandate. The Secretary-General's report should focus on overall UN objectives and the development, within an integrated strategic framework, of detailed functional (e.g. military, police, rule of law, etc.) strategies and related budgetary, logistical and personnel requirements. In particular, the SG report should:
 - Identify strategic priorities that the mission and UNCT will address, building on the Strategic Assessment (where relevant) and including peace consolidation aims. These elements comprise the Secretary-General's advice to the Security Council on the mission mandate.
 - Identify specific results that the mission will aim to achieve in support of these
 priorities and offer an initial distribution of tasks among the mission and the
 UNCT for cross-cutting areas, based on existing capacities on the ground and
 projected/additional capacities from the mission;
 - Identify the time horizons (short, medium and long term) within which the objectives/results will be achieved;

- Identify linkages between UN priorities and broader national platforms or processes, as applicable;
- Identify those results for which non-UN actors (including national authorities) will play a supporting or lead role;
- Identify planning assumptions, conditions and risks for mission results
- Financial implications including annex with cost estimates for the mission.

Security Council Resolution: Impact on planning

- 40. The Security Council debates the Secretary-General's proposal, as contained in his report, and then drafts a mandate for the mission. IMTFs may proactively support Security Council members in their efforts to draft resolutions in keeping with the proposal and with the principles of integration as outlined by the IMPP process. This may include providing advice on draft resolutions.
- 41. That said, the resulting Security Council resolution frequently modifies the parameters and strategies envisaged by the Secretary-General. The adjustments made by the Security Council may require revisions to any draft plans, including organizational structures and budgets. The IMTF should provide the mechanism for making revisions after the issuance of the mission mandate, especially those of cross-cutting relevance for peace consolidation.

Mission Concept and Component Concepts of Operations (CONOPS)

Figure 6: Mission Concept, Results-Based Budget, and Directive to the SRSG



- 42. For DPKO-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, a Mission Concept is elaborated after the Security Council delivers the mission mandate. The main purpose of the Mission Concept is to provide political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate as provided by the Security Council. It should include the mission's priority tasks and related organizational and deployment structure. For mission start up the Mission Concept will be developed by the lead department²⁸ in consultation with the IMTF.
- 43. Individual mission components (police, military, political, support, etc.) also produce their own related Concepts of Operation (CONOPS). The objective of a component CONOPS is to link the mission mandate to the execution of key objectives such as, strategic intent, organization and deployment (including timelines), security/force protection, terms of engagement, administration and logistics, and command and control.
- 44. Mission component CONOPS are generally produced at the headquarters for incoming senior leadership. The roles and responsibilities for individual mission components, as reflected in their CONOPS, should be linked to the overall guidance set forth in the Secretary-General's report and the mission mandate. Component CONOPS would also benefit from consultation through the IMTFs, in particular for Mission

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²⁸ In DPKO, the IOT is responsible for the development of the Mission Concept.

Components where complementary programmatic support through the members of the UNCT is envisaged. Relevant departments should cooperate in ensuring that CONOPS comply with relevant international legal standards, including human rights and humanitarian law.

Support

- 45. The support CONOPS reflects the related support requirements for implementing the mission's mandate, including as detailed in specific CONOPS for the military, police, and substantive sections. The support CONOPS, therefore, covers logistical, security, communications, and information technology requirements for the establishment and operation of the mission, including strategic deployment stocks (SDS), transport, contracting, information technology and communications, engineering, supply, general services and medical facilities. In addition, the support CONOPS is used as a tool to finalize the staffing requirements of the support side, recruitment strategies (including senior leadership), and financial strategies (i.e. banking).
- 46. In a start up mission, the IMTF should be consulted during the drafting of the support CONOPS and suggest ways, as appropriate, in which mission assets may be made available, through cost-sharing and cost-recovery mechanisms, for joint or UNCT activities. The representatives of the agencies, funds, and programmes with existing offices in country can also make important links between DFS and their relevant field personnel in the areas of logistics, transport, and mapping where considerable work may have already been undertaken.

Military

- 47. For a new peacekeeping mission, DPKO produces a military CONOPS at the Headquarters level. The CONOPS links the mission mandate to the execution of military objectives including the strategic intent, organization and deployment/employment (including timelines), security/force protection, rules of engagement, administration and logistics, and command and control. As indicated in the attached military CONOPS template (see Annex 9), the CONOPS situation analysis includes a synopsis of the history of the conflict and peace agreement(s) as well as the current situation/threat assessment. The CONOPS situation analysis should take into consideration concerns related to gender roles and sexual violence and these findings should be reflected in the other relevant sections (e.g. strategic objectives, execution).
- 48. The CONOPS is prepared by the DPKO Office of Military Affairs in close coordination with the Office of Operations and the IMTF. If the head of the military component is already deployed to the field, he/she is also involved in the development of the CONOPS.
- 49. The military CONOPS should be closely coordinated with the development of the support CONOPS elaborated by DFS. This ensures that operations can be supported and sustained and that supplies are provided in a timely manner and in the right quantities. For missions that include a police component or have a mandate that includes SSR and DDR tasks, the military CONOPS will also be consulted with the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). CONOPS should also indicate whether the military tasks and or operational environment necessitate special pre-deployment training or other preparation.
- 50. Following the approval of the CONOPS and based on its contents, the mission's military component develops and Operational Plan (OPLAN) that will be coordinated at the mission level with other components of the field mission and with the UNCT through the DSRSG/HC/RC in structurally integrated missions or the RC/HC depending on mission structure.

Police

51. For mission start up, DPKO/OROLSI/Police Division takes the lead role in drafting a police CONOPS for the incoming head of the police component. The police CONOPS should include a situation update, mandated requirements, strategic direction, programmes for delivery, and the expected short to medium term expected outcomes for the police component. The CONOPS should also provide broad guidelines on command, coordination, administration and logistics, including the mandated strength of the police component. Development of a police CONOPS is coordinated with the members of the IMTF, with particular attention to how the police component and the UNCT activities will work together in support of reconstruction, capacity building, and training in the police and justice sectors. Thereafter, the head of the police component in the field mission takes a lead role in contributing to strategic planning at the field level, including the ISF, RBB, and internal work plans.

Justice and Corrections

52. Similarly, DPKO/OROLSI/CLJAS takes the lead in drafting CONOPS for justice and corrections components of new missions, which are linked with the police CONOPS and done in close coordination with the respective IOT. These CONOPS should include the same elements as the police CONOPS as above, including the expected outcomes, command and other, logistics and other aspects. Development of justice and corrections CONOPS should be coordinated with the IMTF, including through an IMTF sub-group for the rule of law as necessary. The CONOPS should pay particular attention to how the justice and corrections components can engage with the police component and draw upon the capacities of other UN system partners. After the development and adoption of the initial CONOPS, the DSRSG for Rule of Law and/or heads of the justice and corrections components take the lead role in contributing to strategic planning at the field level, as above.

Results-Based Budget

- 53. The first full budget for a peacekeeping operation is submitted to the ACABQ and the General Assembly as soon as possible after adoption of a decision by the Security Council.²⁹
- 54. The process for preparation of the budget is as follows:
 - First of all, the Controller will issue specific budget instructions with a submission time table and forms. The main parts of the initial budget are the RBB frameworks, staffing (staffing table, post justifications, organization chart) and cost estimates;
 - DPKO/DFS will, subsequently, issue strategic guidance with key assumptions for the budget period, a mission/HQ submission timetable and a list of budget counterparts;
 - DFS also issues additional budget guidance including standard costs and rations manual:
 - To help the mission draft its budget in keeping with the controller's deadlines, and especially where mission staff are not yet fully deployed, DPKO/DFS usually deploy RBB and ABACUS teams;
 - DPKO/DFS/Mission budget proposal is completed and submitted to the Controller;

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²⁹ See A/RES/49/233, Administrative and budgetary aspects of the United Nations peace-keeping operations

- Controller reviews it on behalf of SG, and submits a published budget document to the GA and ACABQ. ACABQ also receives a budget supplementary package;
- Budget is discussed in the ACABQ with senior mission managers as well as the Controller, DPKO and DFS representatives, who are called upon to answer questions by the committee. ACABQ issues a recommendation report;
- Budget and the ACABQ report are considered by the Fifth Committee, again with Controller, DPKO and DFS representatives. The Fifth Committee then issues a resolution approving the budget;
- Controller issues an allotment advice, based on the resolution, which constitutes the approval to spend funds.
- 55. It is good practice for the initial budget to reflect how mission and UNCT resources will complement each other and, in some cases, how they can be jointly applied for peace consolidation priorities. For instance, a peacekeeping mission may request posts for DDR officers, but it should be documented that a member of the UNCT (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF) would also provide reintegration staff and programme funding to complete the mandated reintegration element of the DDR programme. A planned inventory of complementary UNCT resources is particularly important since the GA now requires reporting on the mission related funding provisions and activities of the UNCT as part of the budget process.
- 56. It is also important to ensure that mission planners are budgeted for and deployed promptly in support of the IMPP. In addition to the planners fielded by DPKO, IMTFs can play a role in ensuring that OCHA and the Office of the Resident Coordinator (through DOCO) both promptly budget for and deploy strategic planners to start up missions and throughout the mission life cycle. ³⁰ These planners will serve as the secretariat to key structures within an integrated mission, including the Integrated Mission Planning Teams.

Directive to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General³¹

57. After a mission is mandated and an SRSG is selected, the main imperative is to send a directive to the SRSG. This directive is produced by the IMTF under the leadership of the lead department. It provides political and operational strategic guidance to the mission on its mandate as well as the broad expectations for implementation of that mandate during its first phase. It should also articulate the roles and responsibilities of the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC³² where the mission is integrated and the RC/HC where the mission is not. It should also provide advice on areas where the field mission and UNCT should work together toward common peace consolidation aims. Finally, the initial directive to the SRSG should also include code of conduct standards and gender mainstreaming requirements.

³⁰ The UN Development Operations Coordination Office (UN DOCO) manages funds to support Offices of Resident Coordinators, including RCs who are double or triple-hatted as DSRSG/RC/HC. Depending on the context, these funds may be provided to deploy strategic planning, coordination, monitoring and evalution and/or donor relations officers. For more information see: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=6

³¹ In some cases the Secretary-General is represented by a Special Envoy, Representative, or Special Coordinator rather than an SRSG
³² See the Secretary General's Note of Contract Contra

³² See the <u>Secretary-General's Note Of Guidance On Integrated Missions</u> United Nations, Jan 2006 available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/OCHA-6MHKSR?OpenDocument and the Policy Directive for Civil Affairs, which notes that the work of Civil Affairs generally is overseen by the DSRSG for Political Affairs, but may shift to the DSRSG/RC/HC later in the mission life cycle if the emphasis of Civil Affairs evolves to operational support to state institutions and planning processes. (See paragraphs 24-25 of

http://intranet.dpko.un.org/dpko/pages/DocumentDetails.aspx?DocId=2764#

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

Integrated Mission: refers to structurally integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a double or triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission.

DSRSG/RC/HC: a triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC serves as the bridge between the mission and UNCT in structurally integrated missions. The reporting lines, relative roles and responsibilities, and key tasks of DSRSG/RC/HCs are described in the Secretary-General's Directive of 11 December 2000 and the Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions of 9 February 2006.

F. REFERENCES

Normative or Superior References

Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General, June 2006

Note of Guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and Humanitarian Coordinators (30 October 2000)

The Secretary-General's Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions (9 February 2006)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24 June 2008, 24/2008)

Related Policies

UN Security Council Resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report on the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the "Brahimi Report")

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the "Capstone Doctrine")³³

The Report of the Secretary General on the concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation³⁴

Guidelines: Strategic Assessment

³³ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) http://intranet.dpko .un.org/dpko/pages/PoliciesAndPractices.aspx

See A/56/870 particularly para. 35

G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

The Integration Steering Group (ISG) will monitor compliance with this Decision on behalf of the Policy Committee. DPKO will also track compliance with these guidelines in its role as the convener of the IMPP process.

H. DATES

I. CONTACT

Kristina Koch-Avan, Integrated Missions Planning Officer, DPKO, Office of Operations, kochavan@un.org

J. HISTORY

These guidelines were undertaken by an inter-departmental and inter-agency IMPP Working Group convened by the DPKO.

SIGNED: The Secretary-General

DATE: May 2009

Annex 1

Template: Terms of Reference Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) and Integrated Task Forces

Integrated Task Forces (ITF) and Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF)³⁵

ITFs and IMTFs are the principal Headquarters-level inter-departmental and inter-agency bodies that ensure a coherent and consistent UN engagement in a given country/region. Following the Policy Committee decision on integration (decision 2008/24), lead departments are required to maintain such task forces for each integrated UN presence. Task forces may also be formed by the lead department, when there is a need for Headquarters-level coordination, regardless of the type of presence in the field.

The primary role and focus of the task force may shift depending on the situation at hand and/or phase of the integrated presence. For example, the task forces should have a more intensive role in planning at the start-up phase of a field mission, while the focus may shift to a support and guiding role once the field mission is established. Some of the key functions of the task forces include the conduct of UN Strategic Assessments, implementing the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and providing support and policy guidance to the relevant integrated UN presence.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for each task force should be tailored to the distinct needs of the situation/country/integrated presence. The task force should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or the integrated presence enters a new phase (e.g. transitioning out at the end of the mandate).

While each task force will have distinct TOR, the following components should always be included:

Background

This section should describe the legislative basis for the peace operation and the group, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also describe the purpose of the task force, using language from these key decisions (e.g. the task force aims to "maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.")³⁶ It may also refer to any Strategic Assessment or any other type of assessment undertaken. The section could also include the rationale for an integrated task force, particularly in cases where there are no integrated field presences.

Purpose and principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the task force. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase of field presence. Each task force should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of a task force:

In practice, the Department of Political Affairs uses the term "Integrated Task Force" for the inter-agency task forces they chair, whether or not in support of a field mission or office. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations uses the term "Integrated Mission Task Force."

Policy Committee Decision No. 2008/24, page 1 (section i,a)

- Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for UN inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support and information exchange
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy planning processes;
- Coordinate a UN Strategic Assessment that conducts joint analysis, identifies UN priorities and recommends strategic options for the UN³⁷
- Undertake the coordination of various planning activities outlined in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)
- Develop key strategic goals for the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). (The remainder of the ISF will be completed by the Field Mission)
- Coordinate Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) as required
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies (e.g. SG reports, Policy Committee papers)³⁸
- Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work [in cases where the country is under consideration in the PBC]
- Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field [the list of sectors will vary from case to case]
- Maintain a dialogue with field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams (or similar field-based working groups) and provide support to them as required
- Regularly share and review information
- Support coordination with non-UN actors

Composition

This section should define the composition of the task force. The task force should be chaired by the lead department. The chair may draw on the support of the PBSO in cases where the country is under consideration by the PBC. In principle, the membership should comprise all key branches of the UN including political, support, peace and security, humanitarian, human rights, recovery, development and peacebuilding.

The field integrated presence should also be represented, preferably by the DSRSG/RC/HC, when there is structural integration. In other cases, the field mission and the UNCT should both be represented. Relevant UNCT agencies, funds and programmes should by represented by HQ-based staff according to the "2+4" formula agreed by UNDG/ECHA in 2006.³⁹

All task force members should participate in meetings at the senior officer level and be empowered to represent their entities.

A DPA-led ITF without a field mission may call for and manage a Strategic Assessment. Once a mission is up and running, an ITF or IMTF would only call for a Strategic Assessment in exceptional circumstances. More generic assessment tools, such as TAMs, are generally used after a mission is established.

This is not to duplicate any field-level coordination in preparation for these documents.

Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN Funds, Programmes, and Agencies may participate based on their involvement in the country in question.

In some cases, the task force may decide to have a "core" membership and an expanded membership that meets less frequently.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities of the task force. It should define who chairs meetings and how frequently the task force meets and at what level. Some task forces may decide to have two tiers by meeting more frequently at the working level and less frequently at the Director level. Information about the development of a workplan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section.

This section should also describe how the work of the task force is linked to similar field-level groups, such as Integrated Mission Planning Teams. It should describe the modalities for the exchange of information between these groups and note that the task force provides support to field-based working groups as required. For example, the task force could regularly exchange minutes/summaries of meetings with the field-level group.

Annex 2

Liberia Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)

Draft Terms of Reference October 2008

Background

Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), adopted 19 September 2003, authorized the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In line with the Policy Committee Decision no. 24 of 25 June 2008 that all lead Departments maintain Headquarters-level task forces for each integrated UN operation, the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) for Liberia is established to serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for UN system interagency coordination. The overall objective of the IMTF will be to coordinate and conduct interagency strategic guidance, planning support, and information exchange during the drawdown, mandate renewal and withdrawal/transition phases of the Mission. Though the IMTF's role will be advisory, it will provide guidance, planning and advice on issues with a strategic impact on the UN's presence in Liberia, with a particular focus on remaining challenges, lessons learned and best practices.

Purpose and principal functions

- Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for UN interagency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support and information exchange
- Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy planning processes
- Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General and heads of departments and agencies
- Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human rights developments in the field
- Maintain a dialogue with field-based integration mechanisms
- Regularly share and review information
- Support coordination with non-UN actors, including the IFIs
- The IMTF will serve UNMIL and the UN country team in Liberia in an advisory capacity

Composition

- The IMTF will be composed of all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DFS, DPA, DSS, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR, as well as DOCO and OCHA based on the formula adopted in the 2006 UNDG/ECHA IMPP decision, as well as the relevant international financial institutions.
- DPKO and DFS representation in the IMTF will be coordinated by Africa Division II.
- The UNMIL SRSG and DSRSG for Recovery and Governance (as head of the UN country team) may designate standing representation on the IMTF, to participate via video or teleconference.
- IMTF members should participate in all meetings at a senior level, and be empowered to represent their principals.

- IMTF membership may be adjusted as required, based on the changes to its strategic objectives and functions, or to respond to requests from the Mission for strategic advice on specific issues.
- The membership of the IMTF will always include representation of the political, military, police, security, humanitarian, development, human rights and administrative branches of the UN.

Organization of work

- The IMTF will be chaired by DPKO/OO/ADII at the IOT Team Leader (Principle Officer) or Director level
- The IMTF will meet on a monthly basis, but may convene more frequently if required. Agenda items will be circulated in advance, and IMTF members will be invited to contribute items to the agenda.
- Minutes of each IMTF meeting will be circulated to participants and shared with concerned principals.
- The IMTF will establish issue-specific sub-groups to support its work. These working groups may be used to bring in the participation of those UN agencies and other entities not directly represented in the IMTF.

Annex 3

Secretary-General's Planning Directive

Darfur - contingency planning for a possible transition to a United Nations operation

- 1. In its communiqué of 12 January 2006, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union expressed its support, in principle, for a transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations operation in Darfur. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council, in its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2006/5 of 3 February 2006, requested me to initiate contingency planning, without delay, jointly with the African Union (AU) and the parties to the Inter-Sudanese Dialogue on the Conflict in Darfur (the 'Abuja process') on a range of options for a possible transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation.
- 2. In light of the ongoing violence and consistent violation of human rights in the region, displacement of more than three million people, and increasing instability in the border area with Chad, the United Nations should have two broad objectives in Darfur: to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation and lasting peace and stability in a prosperous and united Sudan, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. These objectives should be achieved through a multidimensional presence, including political, military, police, humanitarian and human rights elements.
- 3. A transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur could take place on the basis of two scenarios. In the first, the Abuja process will have produced effective ceasefire arrangements and a comprehensive peace agreement. In this scenario, the United Nations should be prepared to supervise and directly support the implementation of such an agreement. In the second scenario, the parties will not yet have come to an agreement in Abuja, and will therefore continue to be bound by existing agreements, which have not proven effective in reducing violence in the region. ⁴⁰ Options for a United Nations presence in Darfur should be designed accordingly.

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These Include the 8 April 2004 Humanitarian ceasefire, the 9 November 2004 protocols on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur and the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur, and the 5 July 2005 Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur.

- 4. Establishing a multi-dimensional United Nations presence in Darfur, building on current human rights and humanitarian activities of the United Nations in the region, will follow from a decision by the African Union Peace and Security Council on the duration of AMIS's mandate, agreement by the Government of Sudan that such a presence should be deployed and a resolution from the United Nations Security Council mandating an expansion of the activities of UNMIS. This expansion will result in a new and qualitatively different international security presence in Darfur. In this regard and in consultation with AMIS, UNMIS would absorb those AMIS personnel and assets which can contribute effectively to the achievement of our strategic objective. The success of a United Nations operation in Darfur would also require the provision to the United Nations, by Member States, of new and additional military and police personnel to UNMIS for deployment into Darfur; as well as critical intelligence and logistical capabilities, and sustained political and humanitarian support, while optimizing the overall efficiency of UNMIS through an assessment of the essential tasks to carried out in southern Sudan and Darfur.
- 5. In consideration of the above, the Under Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations will identify a course of action for the United Nations system which will produce options for a multi-dimensional United Nations operation in Darfur. These options should be prepared by 10 April 2006, for my review and subsequent presentation to the United Nations Security Council. These options should reflect an integrated operation and should include political, military, police, human rights, public information and support elements; they should reflect a close linkage to the existing humanitarian operation and should be based on the findings of a thorough technical assessment carried out in Darfur, and should factor in the enormous physical and logistical challenges related to operating in that region. These options should clearly define the obligations of all major stakeholders and should be developed with the full participation of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and those United Nations agencies, funds and programmes which have an operational presence in Darfur, and in close consultation with the African Union Commission, AMIS, major partners of AMIS and members of the Security Council.
- 6. All identified options should allow the United Nations to achieve its objectives as described above.

3 March 2006

Annex 4

Template: Terms of Reference for Technical Assessment Missions

- 1. **Background:** Refers to UN policy documents (decisions of the Security Council, Secretary-General, Policy Committee, Reports of the Secretary-General), decisions or statements of regional organizations, or consultations that triggered a decision to begin planning for a new or revised UN presence. Also describes the national and regional political developments
- 2. **Objectives:** Describes the strategic objectives of the mission, linking (as necessary), back to specific requests made by Secretariat leadership or governing bodies. Identifies the key outputs related to the objectives. These outputs often include technical and analytical assessments or recommendations regarding the field environment such as: substantive and logistical resources needs and availability, political will and local capacity, security situation/threat assessment, the peace process, and political and technical feasibility analysis.
- 3. **Methodology:** Identifies the pre-mission, mission, and post mission tasks (e.g. from the desk review to final draft), describes the respective roles of headquarters and field staff, describes the schedule for the mission and identifies key interlocutors, data to be collected based on a desk gap analysis, and outputs for each target group to be consulted.
- 4. **Timelines and Results:** Identifies the schedule for debriefings at the field level and headquarters, and the schedule for drafting the final report (including the individual responsible), including the vehicle for presentation of the findings (e.g. Report of the Secretary-General, internal Note to the Secretary-General, etc). Lists the key components of the final report. May also refer to the role of the report in the wider political negotiations leading to the fielding of the new UN presence.
- 5. **Composition**: Identifies the leader or co-leader of the TAM and the entities represented, including both headquarters and field staff. (ome members of the TAM may not go on the mission, but are part of the pre-mission and post-mission workplan and may be identified as such). The list of participants is generally a list of offices and components within offices, but may include actual staff names.

Additional elements: The ToR may also include details on the logistical arrangements, a draft programme for the visit, and/or an annex of specific tasks/questions for the TAM.

Annex 5

DPKO-led Technical Assessment Missions

Guidelines - Checklist of Questions on Doctrinal Fundamentals

The following checklist of questions is intended to provide Team Leaders of DPKO technical assessment missions with a basic analytical framework for assessing whether the minimum conditions for a successful UN peacekeeping intervention are in place or can be put in place and to analyse an emerging mission concept of operations against core doctrinal premises for UN peacekeeping operations.

Section A addresses the environmental conditions that may support or hinder an effective UN peacekeeping deployment. Section B supports the Team Leader's analysis of the emerging concept for a mission, in particular the managerial and integration arrangements for bringing together a mission concept of operations.

The checklist is generic and is not prescriptive. It is not a substitute for the analysis required from technical specialists and country experts. It is intended to guide thinking and analysis and provide a conceptual framework for the technical assessment process.

A. Assessment of Political Conditions / Environment.

The following questions are to support the Team Leaders' assessment of the enabling environment for a UN peace operation:

- 1 Is there a workable peace agreement/peace process in place and is there genuine commitment from the key parties to that agreement/process?
 - a. Did the parties enter into the agreement of their own accord or were they coerced? Were the right players engaged? Were there any key players left out?
 - b. Has the agreement been communicated by the parties to their personnel?
 - c. Is the agreement workable? If elements are not workable, do the parties understand this, and how will this be managed?
 - d. Will the non-achievement of those unworkable elements of the agreement lead to heightened tension/conflict or breakdown of the agreement?
 - e. Is there an agreed implementation timetable/plan?
 - f. Are there effective political mechanisms in place to monitor and sustain the implementation of the agreement?
 - g. Are there any potential 'spoilers' and can they be contained?
- 2 Is there the **consent of the major parties** to the presence and the role of the UN mission?
 - a. Has there been formal high level consent by the parties?

- b. Is this consent based on an accurate understanding of the proposed UN role?
- c. Has consent been communicated by the parties to subordinate levels and the general population?
- d. Is there consent at local level in areas of deployment?
- e. If there are varying levels of consent how can this be monitored and managed
- 3 Are **regional/neighbouring countries** and/or organizations likely to play a supportive role or at least not interfere?
 - a. Which neighbouring countries are critical to the peace process? What is their stake in the process and what leverage do they have?
 - b. Are neighbouring countries explicitly committed to the peace process?
 - c. What is the popular perception of the peace process in neighbouring countries?
 - d. Is the local diplomatic representation effective and engaged in the peace process?
 - e. What is their view of the UN role?
 - f. If there are neighbouring countries that are not well disposed towards the peace process, how will this be managed?
 - g. Are relevant regional organizations ready and willing to play an active role in support of the peace process?
- 4 Is there a sufficient degree of **sustained international political support** for the peace process, in particular from the Security Council?
 - a. Is the Security Council unified in its commitment to the peace process?
 - b. Is the Security Council unified in its support of the UN role?
 - c. Is it apparent that there will be sustained international support for the peace process and the proposed UN role at the level of capitals and within the incountry diplomatic community?
 - d. Does the international community have linkages with the non-State actors/parties?
 - e. What international actors have leverage over what parties? Are they able and willing to bring pressure to bear to support the peace process?
- 5 Is there widespread host population support for the peace/transition process? And UN role?
 - a. Does the host population support the peace process?
 - b. How is the UN perceived by the local population? Is there popular support for a UN role?

- c. What major divisions or differences exist in the local population (social, cultural, economic, ethnic, religious etc) and how do these affect perceptions of and engagement with the peace process?
- d. Are women engaged in the peace process or do they have particular views on the process and on the appropriate role of the UN?
- e. How does the local population access news and information? What are the perceptions of information issued by official sources?
- f. Does the local media support the process and the UN role? Who are the key players with respect to forming media opinion?

B. Assessment of the Mission Concept:

The following questions are to support the Team Leader's overall assessment of an appropriate UN response and to support analysis of the overall mission concept of operations following inputs from all of the technical elements of the assessment mission.

- Does the mission concept derive from, or support the development of, a clear **political** strategy and peace-building strategy?
 - a. What is the political solution that the UN role will be supporting?
 - b. Do the proposed UN operational tasks support the overall political strategy?
 - c. What lines of operational activity will be the most important in support of this political strategy?
 - d. What peace-building activities will help build more scope for a political solution?
 - e. Will the proposed political strategy and possible lines of activity allow for the design of a coherent and achievable mandate?
 - f. Are there any critical gaps in the UN's capacity to support key post-conflict peace-building task? How will these gaps be addressed?
- 7 Is it possible to identify a **UN end-state and transition strategy** for the mission and its operational tasks?
 - a. Is there clarity on the probable end-state for the UN mission?
 - b. Will it be possible to measure progress towards that end-state?
 - c. What options are there for a transition strategy?
- 8 Will the UN mission approach be able to directly support a **nationally owned** and managed process?
 - a. Does the mission strategy support local and regional ownership of the peace and peacebuilding process?
 - b. Which proposed UN operational tasks will be completed and which are likely to be handed over in due course? What options might there be for hand over?
 - c. What capacity building activities will be required? And what part can the mission play?

- 9 Will the UN **supply side** be able to meet the proposed concept? Are there alternate providers to the UN?
 - a. Does the UN need to be the institution to undertake all the identified tasks?
 - b. Does the proposed concept play to UN comparative advantage and experience?
 - c. What other actors are there to support burden-sharing? Are others better positioned to undertake certain required tasks?
 - d. Does the UN have available capacity on the supply side? i.e. will the UN be able to mobilize sufficient, credible and capable mission resources to meet the proposed lines of activity of the mission?
 - e. Do force generation and resource mobilization discussions to date indicate that the military, police and civilian technical capabilities will be available?
 - f. Can the required operational tasks be deployed rapidly and sustained by UN logistical and administrative support capabilities?
 - g. Will there be well-balanced national representation within the UN force and other components in the mission? Does it support the perception of impartiality?
 - h. If the requisite materiel and personnel can not be mobilized or mobilized in a timely manner, should operational tasks be revised?
 - i. What external supporting elements may be necessary to bolster the UN role?
- 10 Is the mission concept manageable? Does the proposed concept include an **effective command and control system** and workable managerial arrangements?
 - a. Does the proposed concept of operations include sufficient clarity on leadership roles and responsibilities between MHQs, regional headquarters and field offices?
 - b. To what extent is the concept based on sound command/managerial arrangements?
 - c. Is there clarity of reporting lines and information sharing within and between individual mission components?
 - d. Is the mission concept simply too complex for existing command and control concepts?
- 11 Does the proposed concept support **effective mission integration and unity of effort** with the wider UN and international community response?
 - a. Is the mission concept based on an integrated UN approach to the situation?
 - b. Have the plans of other international actors been identified and have they been factored into the planning process (?)/concept of operations (?)
 - c. What activities are being undertaken or planned by the UN Country Team?
 - d. Is there scope for sensible and effective burden-sharing with other partners?
 - e. Are managerial support structures proposed to strengthen effective mission integration (JOC, JLOC, JMAC, Integrated SMT)?

- f. Do international donor organizations (aid and military) understand the overall UN approach so there can be effective coordination?
- g. Do humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC operating with strict neutrality understand the international community/UN strategy, and do coordination mechanisms exist?
- h. Are civil-military coordination structures in place?
- 12 In addition to a strong security management concept, is there a well-defined **crisis management** concept to be in place from the outset?
 - a. Are crisis management structures and roles and responsibilities identified?
 - b. Is crisis management and staff safety during crises included in induction training?
 - c. Does the concept include sufficient information gathering and analytical capabilities to support the early detection of potential crisis scenarios?
 - d. Is there going to be a capacity to handle mass casualties and simultaneously support the walking wounded other staff? Is there a mass medevac and evacuation reception plan with a UN entity (or partner) in a neighbouring locale?
- 13 Does the proposed concept include an **effective communication strategy** for managing local expectations and providing consistent messaging on the mission's activities to the host population and the international community?
 - a. How will the mission be perceived in terms of its role, its size, its overall composition and posture? How can effective communications address this?
 - b. Is expectations and perceptions management among the parties and population a central tenant of the communications strategy?
 - c. Does the communication strategy proposed for the mission support and enable the operational activities of the mission?
 - d. Have key audiences been identified within the population, parties, media and within the mission?
 - e. Will the essential infrastructure for effective communications be available? If not, what alternative options are available?
- 14 Have any potential adverse effects of the mission been taken into consideration and is there a **mission impact management** element in the operational concept?
 - a. What baseline data/information exists and can be collected in advance of the mission and during the mission to assess and manage mission impact?
 - b. What is the potential economic impact?
 - c. What is the potential environmental impact?
 - d. If not actual impact, what perceptions of mission impact might the mission generate?

- e. What conduct and discipline issues will be essential to manage from the outset?
- f. What resources are required to manage mission impact?

Annex 6

UNMIS: Technical Assessment Mission to Sudan, February 2008

Terms of Reference

Objectives of the Mission

- Working jointly with UNMIS and the UN Country Team, in consultation with the parties and other relevant stakeholders, and drawing on relevant documents, particularly the comprehensive Strategic Review (Strategic Assessment, scenario planning and Structural Review) conducted by UNMIS in 2007, and the decisions of the Secretary-General following the Policy Committee of 19 December 2007, the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) will:
 - a) Identify the major challenges facing the mandate and efforts of the UN and particularly of UNMIS in supporting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the next phase of implementation; assess the capacity and political will of the parties to overcome challenges, and identify the areas in which the UN is best placed to assist, including through its recovery and development activities;
 - b) Prepare an outline for a common political strategy to support CPA implementation in 2008-9, including mechanisms for providing good offices to the parties and engaging key Member States,
 - c) Review the assumptions and findings of the UNMIS Structural Review, and provide specific recommendations for adjustments and changes to the mandate, size and structure of the Mission to support the next phase of CPA implementation.
 - d) Examine the substantive linkages between the mandate and tasks of UNMIS and UNAMID, particularly in relation to implementation of CPA power-sharing arrangements and countrywide activities including census and elections, and provide recommendations on how these should be managed.

Background

- 2. The six-year interim period of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has entered its second phase, during which the peace process will increasingly focus on border demarcation, the census, elections, and preparations for the 2011 referendum. With much of the initial task of military monitoring and verification accomplished, the focus of security concerns has shifted to the Three Areas astride the disputed 1-1-56 boundary. Increased attention is also needed to security sector reform and DDR. Meanwhile, delivery of emergency assistance should give way to recovery and development, especially in Southern Sudan. Altogether, the needs of the CPA process, in terms of external support, are quite different from 2005 when UNMIS was established.
- 3. In 2007, UNMIS conducted a broad-ranging Strategic Review, which concluded that while the CPA had delivered some major achievements, implementation was profoundly hampered by a lack of political will. Regarding UNMIS' role, the Review found that UNMIS had achieved considerable impact in areas where the parties explicitly sought its

support and cooperated with it. However, on issues to which the parties were less committed, the Mission's efforts had been less effective or simply stonewalled. As such, the Review found that the size of UNMIS was disproportionate to its impact, and that in several areas its role and resources should be reviewed or clarified.

- 4. The Strategic Review made recommendations for the future direction of UNMIS, based on the expected needs of the peace process in the period 2008-2011. At the political level, these included the need to :
 - a. Strengthen consent and support for UNMIS activities through close engagement with the parties;
 - b. Develop a strategy to fully engage key Member States in support of CPA implementation.

At the operational level, the Review identified the need to:

- a) review the strength of the military component, including observers;
- b) clarify UNMIS' mandate to support border demarcation, census and elections, and assess resources required to meet these needs;
- further integrate activities related to building the rule of law and security institutions, identify reliable programme funding, and consider a new mandate in the area of security sector reform;
- d) review the scale and staffing of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Returns, Reintegration and Recovery units, based on realistic expectations of these processes;
- e) review functions of the Humanitarian Affairs Liaison Unit and Regional Coordinator Office functions and resources required.

The Review also made a number of recommendations relating to the geographical structure of the Mission, its configuration of field offices, and internal management of people and assets; these are being taken forward by UNMIS at local level.

[The full Strategic Review is being finalized and is due to be received from the Mission in mid-January.]

- 5. In his report dated 23 October (S/2007/624), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the strategic review process, and recommended that the Council review the UNMIS mandate in the context of the mandate renewal in April 2008. In response, the Security Council, in its resolution 1784 (2007), requested that the Secretary-General provide "an assessment of whether any changes to UNMIS mandate may be needed to enhance its ability to assist the parties in the implementation of the CPA."
- 6. The DPKO Issues Meeting held on 5 December and the Policy Committee on 19 December 2007 discussed the challenges facing UNMIS. [The Policy Committee emphasized the need for a multi-pronged political strategy to engage all parties in support of the CPA. It recommended that the Organization should make an effort to contribute to the resolution of the Abyei issue, and encourage key Member States to help the parties explore medium-term mechanisms for wealth-sharing. The Policy Committee also stressed the need urgently to scale up recovery and development activity in Southern Sudan. These recommendations will guide the work of the TAM.

UNMIS' mandate

7. UNMIS draws its current mandate from Security Council resolution 1590 (2005). In resolution 1784 (2007), the Council stressed some priority areas for the Mission within the existing mandate. Both resolutions are attached for ease of reference.

Methodology of the TAM

- 8. The TAM will consist of representatives from relevant UN Departments, Offices and Agencies (listed below), each of whom will be matched by a relevant counterpart from UNMIS or the UN Country Team. The team will be jointly headed by Margaret Carey (DPKO) and a counterpart from UNMIS. The joint TAM will operate as a unified task force to generate a single set of agreed recommendations for the consideration of the Secretary-General.
- 9. The New York team will conduct a preparatory review of materials in January 2008, during which participants will absorb and review the findings of the UNMIS Strategic Review (comprising strategic assessment, scenario planning and structural review), as well as other documents and guidance provided by UNMIS, and work with UNMIS counterparts to refine the workplan for the TAM.
- 10. The TAM will then convene in Sudan from 10-21 February. It will hold consultations with Mission leadership in Khartoum and will conduct visits to the Regional headquarters in Juba and other locations as required. TAM members will hold consultations with government counterparts and other relevant stakeholders in their respective areas as detailed below.
- 11. The TAM will issue a final report in which it will:
 - Describe key upcoming challenges for CPA implementation, and the scope for the UN to assist:
 - b. Recommend mechanisms for effective political engagement with the parties, and with key Member States, both in Sudan and at Headquarters;
 - c. Review the findings of the strategic review carried out by UNMIS;
 - d. Provide specific recommendations for any changes required to the UNMIS mandate required to ensure effective support to the next phase of CPA implementation:
 - e. Provide specific recommendations for changes required to the size and structure of the Mission:
 - f. Provide recommendations for addressing resource concerns raised by the Mission, eg reliable program funding for activity in the area of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (ROLSI).
- 12. The TAM recommendations should also reflect the results of the review of DDR activity requested in SCR 1784 OP16a), which is already being undertaken in UNMIS in consultation with DPKO/ROLSI.
- 13. Once approved, relevant recommendations of the TAM will be included in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in April 2008.

Consultations

14. The TAM will conduct its work in consultation with all relevant stakeholders. In addition to close co-operation with UNMIS and the UNCT, the TAM will hold consultations with both parties to the CPA as well as with the diplomatic community and other relevant stakeholders. Individual TAM Members will hold consultations with government counterparts, national and international partners and relevant stakeholders in their respective areas.

Composition

- 1. OO/DPKO (lead)
- 2. OMA/DPKO
- 3. ORoLSI/DPKO (including judicial, corrections, police, DDR and SSR)
- DFS
- 5. DPA (including Electoral Affairs)
- 6. OCHA
- 7. DGO
- 8. DPI
- 9. DSS
- 10. UNDP
- 11. OHCHR

Annex 7

Technical Assessment Mission to Somalia, January 2008

Terms of Reference

A. Background

- 15. In the Policy Committee decision of 11 March, the Secretary-General endorsed the three-track strategic approach to Somalia, incorporating: a) political track; b) security track; c) programmatic track. Regarding the security track, the Policy Committee also noted the need to plan for the possibility that an international stabilization force may not materialize.
- 16. In a letter dated 19 December from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/804), the Secretary-General advised that it was unlikely that Member States would pledge sufficient troops to allow the deployment of a MNF. Accordingly, the Secretary-General proposed an alternative approach based on a package of "next steps" that would be undertaken immediately to support implementation of the Djibouti peace process, and would contribute to enabling the conditions required for eventual deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.
- 17. In subsequent consultations with DPKO and DFS, Security Council Permanent Members expressed interest in the proposals of the Secretary-General and requested further details, particularly with regard to steps a) and b) in section B below.
- 18. Ethiopia has announced that it will withdraw its forces from Somalia at the end of 2008. A number of Member States, as well as the Chairman of the African Union Commission Mr. Jean Ping, have expressed their concern about the impact of Ethiopia's withdrawal on the situation in Somalia. In a meeting of the International Contact Group for Somalia on 16 December, the African Union's Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra noted the AU's political commitment to keeping the AU Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) in place after Ethiopian forces depart, noting that this would only be possible if AMISOM received the international assistance necessary to enable it to reinforce and sustain its operations.
- 19. AMISOM has also been requested by the Somali parties in their ceasefire agreement on 26 October 2008, to assist with the establishment and training of a joint security force and a reformed and restructured police force. Work is underway in the AU, with the assistance of the UN Planning Support team, to review the AMISOM CONOPS to reflect their evolving mandate in Mogadishu and develop a logistic support plan that will enable them to undertake limited security operations and training tasks in a logistically sustainable manner.
- 20. The Joint Security Committee (JSC) is expected to hold meetings in Somalia as of January 2009 and establish a headquarters and liaison office. It is likely that elements of UNPOS will be required to attend future meetings in Mogadishu. Meanwhile UNPOS will also have an expanding role in coordinating and providing leadership to the efforts of the UN and the international community in Somalia. In this regard, UNPOS expects to develop a comprehensive strategy for presentation at the international conference on Somalia planned for March/April 2009. To accomplish these tasks it is anticipated that UNPOS will need additional resources, particularly in specialized areas relating to

strategic planning, and capacity-building for rule of law, correctional, judicial and security institutions.

B. Objectives of the Mission

- 21. Working jointly with concerned UNHQ Departments, UNPOS, the UN AMISOM Planners in Addis Ababa, and the UN Country Team; in consultation with the African Union, the parties and other relevant stakeholders; and drawing on relevant documents including the letter and attachment dated 19 December from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/804) and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) will:
 - a) Assess the logistical, security and other operational conditions in Somalia as well as the current support capacity of the AU forces deployed there; and also collect information regarding the existing activities of UNPOS, the UN Country Team and other partners in the area of security sector reform and rule of law capacity-building;
 - b) Develop detailed plans for the United Nations to reinforce AMISOM through a support package as outlined by the Secretary-General in the documents listed above, with the objective of providing AMISOM the same level of support that DFS would provide for a UNPKO of the same size; prepare options and recommendations on modalities for delivery of the AMISOM support package, and identify resource requirements; and collect information on the budgetary requirements of AMISOM that will need to be met through voluntary sources;
 - c) Develop proposals on arrangements for international support to building capacity of Somali's Transitional Security Forces and the civilian police force, as envisaged by the Joint Security Committee (JSC), with clear recommendations for the respective roles of the United Nations, AMISOM, Member States and other partners;
 - d) Identify resources needed by UNPOS to enable it to perform the role envisaged in the 19 December paper, including to develop arrangements for support to the Somali parties in the areas of security sector, rule of law, and corrections, and public information and communications strategies to support these activities;
 - e) Collect information required to further develop contingency plans for a follow-on peacekeeping operation that would include all relevant components.

C. Methodology of the TAM

- 22. The TAM will consist of representatives from relevant UN Departments, Offices and Agencies (listed below), including representation at an appropriate level of UNPOS and UNCT in the field. The team will be jointly headed by [DPA (to be confirmed)], DPKO (Raisedon Zenenga) and UNPOS (DSRSG Charles Petrie). It will liaise closely with the African Union including through the UN Planners Team in Addis Ababa. The TAM will operate as a unified task force to generate a single set of agreed recommendations for the consideration of the Secretary-General.
- 23. The New York team will conduct a preparatory review of materials in January 2008, including the documents referenced in paragraph 1 above together with other relevant materials to be provided by participants, and will work with AU and UNPOS counterparts to refine the workplan for the TAM.

- 24. The TAM will arrive in Nairobi on 12 January. On 13 January, it will meet with the SRSG to receive his briefing and political guidance, and hold other introductory meetings as may be required. The TAM will then proceed on 14 January to Addis Ababa, where it will hold consultations with African Union Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra and with the Peace Support Operations Division, including the team of UN Planners dedicated to support that Division in its work on AMISOM. Outputs from the Addis Ababa leg will include:
 - a. Review of the revised AMISOM concept of operations to provide limited security and training tasks in support of the Djibouti Agreement;
 - Assessment of existing AMISOM capacity, including self-sustainment capacity of contingents, current encampment sites and their surroundings, state of contingent-owned equipment and medical facilities (Level I and II);
 - c. On the basis of b) above, identification of AMISOM's support needs to achieve the standards normally expected of a PKO in respect of the revised CONOPS, and identification of components to be provided through the UN support package;
 - d. Identification of administrative, logistic and security requirements for the proposed UN support component, including suitable locations for logistic bases and proposed lines of communication;
 - e. Consolidated information on AMISOM budgetary requirements;
 - f. Developing contingency plans, e.g., for emergency evacuation.
- 25. Following consultations in Addis Ababa, TAM members from substantive sections plus senior DFS representatives will travel to Nairobi on 17 January. In partnership with UNPOS, the TAM will hold consultations in the period 17-23 January with UNPOS staff, the UN Country Team, relevant international stakeholders, and with the Somali parties, particularly representatives of the Joint Security Committee. Relevant interlocutors from AMISOM and the parties themselves should be invited to meet the TAM in Nairobi for this purpose. Outputs from the Nairobi leg are expected to include:
 - a. Refinement and testing of outputs developed during the Addis Ababa leg;
 - Assessment of local infrastructure, administrative and logistics capabilities available within Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, including through consultation with local authorities and service providers, to determine an approach for the deployment of UN personnel;
 - c. Detailed planning for delivery of the AMISOM logistic support package, with a view to delivering the required support as soon as possible;
 - d. Detailed proposals, options and plans for the security track in support of the Djibouti process and closely linked to an overall three-pronged comprehensive strategy; outputs (e) - (g) below shall fall within this detailed approach to be jointly agreed among TAM members and UNPOS;
 - e. Options on arrangements for training and development of the Somali Transitional Security Forces, and for mechanisms of delivery via bilateral and international support, noting that the UN does not provide training to militaries;
 - f. Recommendations on arrangements and plans for the delivery of police training to the Somali Police Force, which must take account of existing activity and comparative advantages of the UNCT, AU and partners;
 - g. Identification of key national actors and mapping of ongoing capacity-building activities in the areas of rule of law, justice and corrections, and de-mining, including formulating recommendations for needed enhancement of UN activity in these areas and resource requirements, and public information and communication strategies to support same;

- h. Recommendations for strengthening UNPOS as required to deliver the above strategy, including in the areas of strategic planning; security sector reform and rule of law capacity-building; and strengthening linkages to AMISOM/AU; and advice regarding the establishment of a strengthened military and security cell within UNPOS that can provide an accurate security picture of Somalia, sound military advice to the SRSG, liaison with the Military Attaché community and with DPKO, and other security sector-related tasks as directed.
- i. Determine the mine action requirements for the safe and timely deployment of UN staff in Somalia and the effective implementation of their mandates.
- 26. Members of the TAM will conduct consultations with relevant stakeholders and side visits to additional locations as may be necessary according to their specific roles and responsibilities. In particular, while the main component of the TAM is in Nairobi as detailed above, a sub-team of logistics specialists (log ops, MOVCON, Engineering, Supply, Medical) is expected to continue technical consultations in Addis Ababa and Mombasa as necessary to take forward planning of the envisaged logistics support package.
- 27. Subject to advice from DSS, members of the TAM will travel to Mogadishu if security permits. Should this be possible, the TAM will extend its stay in the region to 26 January. In Mogadishu, it would meet with AMISOM and local interlocutors to further test and refine the outputs developed during the Addis and Nairobi legs of the trip. In the event that travel to Somalia is not authorized, efforts will be made to meet with AMISOM and other relevant interlocutors in Nairobi.
- 28. The TAM will conclude with a debriefing meeting to the SRSG in Nairobi. Other debriefings shall be undertaken (e.g., with AUSR, IGAD) upon the advice of the SRSG. A senior representative of the TAM shall return to Addis Ababa immediately after the conclusion of the Mission to debrief the AU on the Mission's conclusions. Alternatively, a VTC would be arranged from UNHQ to brief the AU.
- 29. All components shall prepare reports of findings and recommendations in their areas which will be harmonized and approved by the TAM leadership. The TAM will produce a final report to the Secretary-General (2-3 pages) in which it will summarise its findings. A summary of the TAM's relevant conclusions and recommendations will be included in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in February 2008.

Composition

- 12. DPA
- 13. UNPOS (led by DSRSG and including other components as required)
- 14. OO/DPKO
- 15. OMA/DPKO
- 16. ORoLSI/DPKO (including judicial, corrections, police, DDR, SSR, mine action)
- 17. DFS (including logistics, finance, communications)
- 18. DSS
- 19. UN Country Team [participation to be advised]
- 20. OHCHR [at field level]

Annex 8

Template: Police Component CONOPS

PART A:

1.0 References

(Usually the list of references including those relevant from the trigger to UN response to the current mandate)

2.0 Introduction

(Includes the objectives of the ConOps)

3.0 The Mandate of the UN Police

(Specific requirements of UNPOL as stipulated in the mandate)

4.0 Situation

(Brief statement of the ground situation)

5.0 External Challenges to UN Police Operations

- 5.1 Recruitment
- 5.2 Deployment
- 5.3 Training
- 5.4 Leadership
- 5.5 Management
- 5.6 Operations
- 5.7 Logistics and Support
- 5.8 Media

6.0 Local Challenges to UN Police Operations

- 6.1 Politics
- 6.2 Military
- 6.3 Leadership
- 6.4 Organization
- 6.5 Logistics
- 6.6 Civil Society
- 6.7 Effectiveness
- 6.8 Other Factors

(4.0, 5.0 & 6.0 are based on Pre Mandate TAM findings, Post Mandate strategic assessments, information from Country Teams and any other time relevant and specific source of information and are but just a summary for start-up purposes; further assessments may be required by the Police head of mission on the ground for Operational purposes)

7.0 Core Assumptions to UN Police Operations

8.0 Police Adviser's Strategic Intent

- 8.1 Objective
- 8.2 Method
- 8.3 End State

(This is the broad statement of the Police Adviser to the incumbent head of the Police Component and provides guidance on the various phases of the mission: start up, build up, maintenance/ operations, draw - down and withdrawal)

PART B:

9.0 Strategies of the UN Police

- 9.1 Interim Law Enforcement
- 9.2 Security Support to national police and other law enforcement agencies and related functions
- 9.3 Institutional development & capacity building
- 9.4 Monitoring, observing and reporting,
- 9.5 Security provision to UN personnel and properties

(The roles will have to be mapped against the Mandate and appropriate strategies drafted: all roles may not be relevant)

10.0 Operational Directions of UNPOL

(These would basically be the Key programmes/ operational statements of strategies outlined in 9.0 above)

11.0 Monitoring & Evaluation of UNPOL Mandate implementation

(Provides for the reporting of measures of operational performance / management/ effectiveness of MIPs – Coordinating Statement)

12.0 Administrative & Reporting Guidelines

(Administrative Instructions)

13.0 Integration/ Coordination issues

(States the coordination mechanisms)

14.0 Logistics & Support

(Statement of logistical support)

15.0 Organization of the UNPOL Component

15.1 Size and Strength

15.2 Deployment Plan including Police Generation, Administration & Rotational Plan

15.3 Command and Reporting Structure

15.4 Downsizing Plan

PART C:

Annex I: UN Police Deployment Plan

Annex II: Command and Reporting Structure for the UN Police Component to

Mission Command & UNPD

Annex 9

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DPKO/OMA	(issuing	authority)
New York, x	xXXXxx	(date of
signature)		

MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR (UNXXX)

<u>References</u>: This is a list of pertinent documents that provide a foundation for the CONOPS; normally, references will be made in ascending chronological order.

- a) (peace agreements)
- b) (SG's reports)
- c) (Security Council resolutions)
- d) (DPKO mission specific guidance)
- e) (Logistic Support Concept)
- f) (Police CONOPS)
- g) (TCC guidelines)
- h) (strategic estimates)
- i) (operational estimates)
- j) (any other relevant documents)

Review

This paragraph states when the CONOPS should be reviewed, usually annually or at the renewal of the mandate, whichever is the earlier

Force organization:

See Annex C - Troop to Task

1. Situation

a. Background

This section should provide a brief synopsis of the conflict, with a brief history of UN involvement if any. It should cover measures that have been undertaken by the international community to address the conflict. It should refer to ceasefire or comprehensive peace agreements that have led/are leading to the deployment of UN forces. This sub-paragraph could be approximately one page in length and divided in sub-sub-paragraphs, and should be derived from the strategic assessment. If required, a more comprehensive document on the background of the crisis can be attached as an annex. A revised CONOPS should refer to the main developments since the previous CONOPS was issued.

Annex A - Background to the crisis

b. Current Situation

This sub-paragraph should provide a broad description of the security situation on the ground concerning the parties to the conflict, the humanitarian situation and any external forces in the country

c. Threat Assessment

A broad sub-paragraph on the parties, including militia and spoiler groups, their intent, capabilities, and sources of support. Mention should also be made of any external actors including neighbouring countries and their specific role in the crisis. The most likely and most dangerous courses of actions of the parties as they affect the UN military mission should be analysed. A detailed threat assessment could be attached as an annex.

Annex B - Threat Assessment

2. Planning Assumptions

The key military assumptions which directly impact on the planning process should be listed in order to provide the Force Commander with the basis for the logic of the CONOPS.

3. Strategic Objectives

This paragraph states the strategic political objectives of the mission. It should refer to relevant SC reports, resolutions and mandates pertaining to the conflict and must refer to the specific mandate authorizing the UN mission. The paragraph should then state the mandated tasks as outlined in the SC resolution authorizing the UN mission that must be achieved to support the high political strategy.

4. <u>Mission Statement</u>

The military mission to the Force Commander describes the role of the military component of the mission in achieving the strategic objectives of the UN mission. The military mission statement should be concise and end with a unifying purpose. The paragraph must not be sub-paragraphed.

5. <u>Strategic Endstate</u>

This is a description of the Mission's endstate which defines the environment that would indicate successful completion of the military mission.

6. Execution

a. Intent

This should give a description of the USG's and MILAD's intent on the ways to achieve the military mission and the UN mission's strategic endstate)

b. Concept

This sub-paragraph explains how military operations will be conducted in support of the UN mission. It should provide an outline description of the pattern of military operations, which should be well synchronised and integrated with the UN Mission's overall plan and all other UN Mission components (Support, Police, etc.). It should highlight all the phases of the mission, from initial deployment and force build-up, to consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal. It is advisable that the most immediate phases be developed in more detail, whereas later phases will be outlined and detailed in subsequent revised CONOPSs. The military main effort for each phase should be stated and where identifiable, an endstate provided. A graphic may be used to illustrate the concept.

Annex D - Concept Graphic

c. Tasks

This paragraph assigns specific tasks to manoeuvre units, including UNMOs and reserves at every level, which are either not included in the overall mandated tasks, or whose importance requires to be highlighted.

d. Coordinating Instructions

This paragraph includes instructions applicable to two or more elements of the force organization, which require specific coordination measures. Other information should also be included, such as reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution and when the CONOPS becomes effective for planning and/or execution.

7. <u>Administration and Logistics</u>

This paragraph should include the summary of the concept of logistic support, as prepared by the Office of Mission Support, which should be well synchronised with the military, police and other plans. The logistic support concept should be identified in the initial references, as well as the TCC guidelines issued for the specific mission.

8. (Other paragraphs)

(Other paragraphs can be included, as required. However, it should be taken into consideration that, issues such as Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Gender Balance, etc., would be better addressed through the Force Commander's Directive). However, it will include [as directed by UNSC] a paragraph on Protection of Women and Children against Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV).

9. Command and Control

This paragraph should follow DPKO guidelines on the "Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations". The chain of command (Force Headquarters, Division, Sector and battalion headquarters) are described as well as the identification of any liaison officers present in neighbouring missions. The span of command and interface with neighbouring missions or other in-place non-UN forces should be covered (e.g. UNOCI with LICORNE). This section should normally be supplemented with a diagram outlining the command and control arrangements provided as an annex.

Annex E - Force and FHQ structures

10. Acknowledgement

The Force Commander is to formally acknowledge the receipt of the CONOPS and is to produce his/her Operational Plan (OPLAN) which is to be endorsed by the SRSG. The FC must submit to the MILAD copies of all subsequent OPORDs, Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) and other orders issued or related to the military component of the UN mission.

(Signatures)

. Military Adviser Department of Peacekeeping Operations

....... Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations

(date) (date)

<u>Annexes</u> (the following annexes, and other as required, may be included): Annex A - Background of the crisis

Annex B - Threat Assessment

Annex C - Troop to Task

\

Annex D - Concept Graphic
Annex E - Force and FHQ structures
Annexe F - Operation timelines

<u>Distribution List</u> : (the following copies, and other as required, may be issued)	Сору No.
External Action: - Force Commander UNXXX	1 of
External Info: - Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNXXX - Police Commissioner UNXXX - SRSG for UNXXX (neighboring UN mission) - SRSG for UNXXX (neighboring UN mission)	2 of 3 4 5
Internal: - Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations - Assistant-Secretary General for the Office of Operations - Assistant-Secretary General for the Office of Mission Support - Military Adviser - Police Adviser - Current Military Operations Service - Force Generation Service - Training and Evaluation Service - Military Planning Service	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 to

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IMPP Guidelines Role of the Field

Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

Approved by: The Secretary-General Effective date: December 2009

Contact: DPKO Office of Operations

Review date: January 2010

IMPP GUIDELINES: Role of the Field Integrated Strategy and Planning

Contents: A. Purpose

B. Scope

C. Rationale

D. Guidelines

E. Terms and definitions

F. References

G. Monitoring and compliance

H. ContactI. History

ANNEXES

Integrated Field Coordination

- 1. Examples of Integrated Field Coordination: Liberia and DRC
- 2. Template Terms of Reference Strategic Policy Group
- 3. Template Terms of Reference Integrated Strategy and Planning Team
- 4. Example Terms of Reference: UNDAF Outcome Group Liberia
- 5. Template Terms of Reference Shared Analytical and Planning Capacity

Integrated Strategic Frameworks

- 6. Diagnostic Phase: Key Questions in Preparing to Develop an ISF
- 7. Evaluating Existing Frameworks against the ISF Minimum Standards
- 8. Example Terms of Reference: ISF Support Mission to Cote d'Ivoire
- 9. Methodology of the Strategic Assessment
- 10. Note on Mapping Country Level Frameworks
- 11. Note on Planning an ISF retreat
- 12. Example ISF Content
- 13. Example UN Security Stabilization and Support Strategy for DRC Scorecard

A. PURPOSE

1. These guidelines outline the minimum standards for integrated strategy, planning, and coordination to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's peace consolidation efforts at the country level. They further explain and operationalize the United Nations Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006¹ and integrate additional principles as prescribed in the Secretary-

¹ United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006. Approved through Decision 2006/26 of 14 June 2006.

General's Decision on Integration (24/2008). These guidelines should also be read in conjunction with the Secretary-General's Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005) and the Secretary-General's Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions. Finally, these guidelines are part of the IMPP guidance package, which also includes (1) UN Strategic Assessment and (2) the Role of the Headquarters in Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences.²

B. SCOPE

These guidelines apply to UN field presences with both a peacekeeping operation or 2. political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT)³. This includes, but is not limited to, Missions that are "structurally integrated" through the appointment of a DSRSG/RC/HC and the UN country presences subject to the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) of 26 June 2008. Integration refers both to internal integration of components within the field mission (e.g. civilian and military) as well as the strategic partnership between the UN field mission and the UNCT.

C. **RATIONALE**

- The aim of the guidelines is to assist multi-dimensional UN field presences in the establishment of integrated field coordination structures and an integrated strategic framework (ISF) reflecting common priorities for peace consolidation. Such guidelines are required given the increasingly complex and interdependent nature of work of the United Nations system in conflict and post-conflict environments. In this context, the guidelines promote a strategic partnership between Missions and UNCTs in support of common peace consolidation objectives.
- 4. The guidelines are not overly prescriptive but rather spell-out the minimum requirements and provide further operational advice on the implementation of the IMPP at the field level. It is recognized that each country situation requires a unique and tailored response and, therefore, it is expected that the UN's Senior Leadership in country will guide field teams in the application of the IMPP tools described herein. As the implementation of the IMPP guidelines is also required in some UN presences that are not structurally integrated with a DSRSG/RC/HC, it is important to underline that undertaking the IMPP will not alter existing structural relationships between Missions and UNCTs. While these guidelines remain relevant throughout the life-cycle of a UN presence, the processes described herein are particularly important for UN field presences undertaking a transition in institutional arrangements (e.g. start-up or drawdown of a peacekeeping operation or special political mission).

In these Guidelines, the UN field mission (either a peacekeeping mission or a Special Political Mission)

² These guidelines are available on the UN Peace Operations intranet (http://intranet.dpko.un.org) and to the entire UN system and its partners through the IMPP Community of Practice. To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit http://cop.dfs.un.org or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).

and the UN Country Team are jointly referred to as the "UN field presence."

⁴ Burundi (BINUB), CAR (BONUCA/MINURCAT), Chad (MINURCAT), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Somalia (UNPOS), Sudan (UNMIS/UNAMID), Iraq (UNAMI), Israel/OpT (UNSCO), Lebanon (UNSCOL), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Nepal (UNMIN), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH)

D. GUIDELINES

- 5. These guidelines provide advice, examples, and templates useful in the implementation of IMPP at the field level. They are organized into two sections as follows:
 - o integrated field coordination
 - integrated strategic frameworks (ISF)

Integrated Field Coordination

- 6. Each UN field presence should have a standing coordination body or bodies that bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction and planning oversight to the joint peace consolidation efforts of the UN field presence. These coordination bodies assist with the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) for the development and implementation of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT to "ensure that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner." The field-based integrated field coordination structures also serve as partners to headquarters-based IMPP structures, in particular the Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) (see also paragraph 23, below).
- 7. The configuration and composition of integrated field coordination mechanisms will vary from country to country based on the scale of the UN's operations and the level of strategic and programmatic coordination required in keeping with the principle of "form follows function." The integrated field coordination architecture should be as light as possible while fulfilling the following core functions at the strategic, coordination, and planning levels.

8. Strategic Direction

- Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the UN system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantage of the UN system
- Delineate roles and responsibilities among the UN actors ensuring complementarities between Mission and UNCT and minimizing overlap
- Review progress on an integrated strategic framework (see paragraphs 24-54) and provide direction to UN components/agencies on implementation challenges
- Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities

9. Coordination

- Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning processes including ISFs
- Guide and review the work of thematic working groups

4

⁵ These guidelines update the 2006 IMPP Guidelines, which called for an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) at the working level comprised of "peacekeeping operation and UNCT planners and other relevant actors." While the 2006 Guidelines delegated integrated planning responsibilities to the working level, these guidelines stress the direct role of senior managers, notably SRSG/ERSGs, DSRSGs (including DSRSG/RC/HCs), and RC/HCs. Thus, the terminology "Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT)" has been retired in favor of more generic terms (e.g. Strategic Policy Group and/or Integrated Strategy and Planning Team). Tailored terminology and approaches, which may be particularly useful for non-structurally integrated mission environments, are also encouraged.

⁶ See IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters for more details on the role and functions of the IMTF/ITFs.

⁷ Eide, Kaspersen, Kent and von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions*, 2005 p. 19.

- Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with Integrated (Mission) Task Force (IMTF/ITF) and other HQ-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new requirements (e.g. transition and drawdown)
- Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by promoting the development of UN system-wide thematic strategies (e.g. protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform)

10. Planning

- Provide secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (e.g. Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, or similar, see below), including preparation of agendas, background papers, and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans, and monitoring frameworks
- o Compile inputs and draft shared strategies and plans and related monitoring reports
- Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages between UN-internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for headquarters and facilitate linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF

Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures

11. Before new structures are constituted, a mapping of existing structures should be undertaken to identify structures that could be leveraged or adjusted, either permanently or periodically, to fulfill the functions outlined above. For instance, a Strategic Policy Group (see figures 1 and 2) could be formed by expanding the Mission Leadership Team (MLT)⁸ periodically and according to an agreed schedule to include the RC/HC (for non-structurally integrated missions) and members of the UNCT. Likewise, meetings of the UNCT could be periodically expanded to include Mission representatives to create an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT), and humanitarian clusters could be expanded to comprise integrated thematic working groups.⁹


Models

12. These guidelines provide two possible models building on current field practice (see Annex 1: Examples of Integrated Field Coordination in Liberia and DRC). These configurations and titles are not required, but rather, provide an example methodology for fulfilling the minimum requirements described herein. The first, as depicted in Figure 1 below, could be applied for smaller UN field presences with integrated peace building offices. It has a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group which is supported by the shared analytical and planning capacity and thematic working groups.

⁸ According to the *Peacekeeping Mission Start Up Guide*, the Mission Leadership Team generally includes: SRSG/HOM, DSRSGs, Head of the Police Component, Head of the Military Component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the Chief of Staff. The MLT's key tasks include: providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to mission components and approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.


⁹ Leveraging humanitarian clusters should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Any decision to leverage humanitarian clusters into an integrated field coordination structure should be taken after consutations with the humanitarian partners through the Humanitarian Coordinator.

Figure 1: Example Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT



13. The second, below, may be appropriate for UN field presences with large multidimensional peacekeeping operations (including military and police components). It has three layers: a Strategic Policy Group at the Principals level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT) 10 at the senior officer level, and thematic working groups. The Strategic Policy Group provides the strategic direction; the ISPT translates that strategic direction into concrete deliverables and coordinates implementation. Thematic working groups (standing or ad hoc) are also recommended and should be formed based on the key peace consolidation objectives of the UN presence. (In many cases, these thematic working groups may already exist). Template Terms of References for both a Strategic Policy Group and an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team are provided in Annexes 2 and 3, respectively.

Figure 2: Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT



Leadership and Composition

14. SPGs and ISPTs should include representative members of the UN field presence including peacekeeping/political, rule of law/justice, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should typically be represented, where present. UN DSS may also be included, particularly in volatile environments. SPGs should be chaired by SRSGs or ERSGs, taking into consideration the importance of strong partnership with the DSRSG(s), in particular the DSRSG/RC/HC and/or RC/HC for non-

¹⁰ It may be advisable to use the term "Joint Strategy Team" for UN presences that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

structurally integrated missions. The Mission Chief of Staff and the Head of the RC/HC's Office are recommended co-chairs for ISPTs in large UN presences (e.g. those with peacekeeping operations). Senior planners from the Mission and UNCT may chair ISPTs in smaller UN presences.

- 15. Missions and UNCTs vary, so the composition of integrated field coordination structures will be context-specific. Composition should ensure adequate coverage of the priorities identified in an integrated strategic framework and should also take into consideration the capacity of mission components and agencies to participate. There are pros and cons to constituting larger or smaller groups. For example, a broader representation of Mission and UNCT actors has the advantage of promoting wide ownership, transparency, and inclusion. Such broad representation in ISPTs (e.g. with all mission components and all UNCT members) may be appropriate, while SPGs may need to be smaller to allow for confidential deliberations.
- 16. The RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representation in integrated field coordination bodies and is responsible for keeping the entire UNCT informed of developments. In addition, the SRSG/ERSG and RC/HC should also consult the World Bank Country Director regarding the inclusion of World Bank representatives.

Thematic Working Groups

- 17. SPGs and ISPTs may also develop and/or monitor implementation of their joint strategies through thematic working groups (see Figures 1 and 2, above). In establishing thematic groups, care should be taken to leverage existing groups (e.g. humanitarian clusters), as appropriate. UN field presences are encouraged to involve non-UN actors (e.g. humanitarian NGOs) in thematic working groups on a case by case basis. For instance, an existing intra-Mission working group on Rule of Law could be expanded to include UNCT and Humanitarian Country Team representatives. Likewise, partners could decide that UNDAF outcome group or humanitarian cluster be expanded with Mission representatives.
- 18. The SPG and/or ISPT should provide strategic direction to these groups and regularly review progress against their commitments, as reflected in the integrated strategic framework, to promote mutual accountability. Moreover, each thematic working group is responsible for consulting relevant government officials as per their usual planning or programme development process. Functional (resource mobilization, management, communications, monitoring and evaluation, programming, contingency planning) or crosscutting (gender, human rights, HIV/AIDS, natural resources) thematic groups may also be convened on an ad hoc or standing basis. An example Terms of Reference (ToR) for an integrated outcome group in Liberia is attached in Annex 4.

Planning Capacities

19. Integrated field coordination structures require the direct support of a "shared analytical and planning capacity." This takes the form of dedicated strategic planning resources in both Missions and UNCTs. Strategic planners are provided to Resident Coordinators through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), which maintains a roster and funds strategic planners in the Offices of Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) in conflict-affected countries. On the Mission side, planning capacity is funded through the Mission's Results Based Budget. Analytical capacity within Missions is typically provided through Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) as well as political and civil affairs offices.

20. The actual structure of a planning capacity may vary according to the field requirements, but there should, at a minimum, be at least one permanent planner representing the peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and one for the UNCT. Multidimensional peacekeeping environments usually have an expanded team of three-five planners on the Mission budget with at least one planner on the UNCT side. Figure 3, below provides example staffing allocations for Mission and UNCT planning capacities in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, and Somalia.

Figure 3: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan (UNMIS), DRC, Somalia

	Sierra Leone	Sudan	DRC	Somalia
Mission	Joint UNIPSIL/UNCT Strategic Planning Unit	1 P5, 1 P4, 2 UNVs (UNMIS)	1 P5, 2 P3s	1 P4, 1 P3
UNCT	1P4 (Strategic Planning), 1P4 (Peacebuilding Coord), 1P3 (Coordination), 3 NPO	1 P5, 1 P4	1 P4 (Integrated Office DSRSG/RC/HC)	1 P5, 1 P4

- 21. The "shared analytical and planning capacity" should be comprised of strategic planners drawn from the planning teams of the Mission and UNCT, respectively. ¹² Missions and UNCTs with more than one planner should identify focal points for integration-related strategy and planning to be part of the shared analytical and planning capacity. Although some UN field presences may decide to create a structurally-integrated planning unit, this is not a requirement. This has been done, for example, in Sierra Leone between the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL) and the Sierra Leone UNCT.
- 22. The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team, and the organization of work. This joint understanding should be captured in a Terms of Reference. Although each ToR will be adjusted to specific country realities, a template is attached in Annex 5 as a useful reference point. All members of the shared analytical and planning capacity should have some or all of these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals. Finally, it is also advisable to have planners located in the same building to ease communication and help build personal relationships.

Link between Field Coordination Structures and the Headquarters IMTF/ITF

23. In keeping with the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration and further guidance from the Integration Steering Group (ISG)¹³, headquarters-based Integrated (Mission) Task Forces (IMTF/ITFs) are required for all UN presences with a Mission and a UNCT. Their

8

¹¹ Smaller integrated peacebuilding offices may have one planner in the integrated office of the ERSG/RC/HC covering both the Mission and UNCT.

¹² In most peacekeeping Missions, the analytical and planning capacities are designed as separate work units. However, as strategic planning processes require both analytical and planning capacities, the contribution from the Mission to the "shared analytical and planning capacity" will typically extend beyond the planning unit and reflect contributions from a diversity of mission components (e.g. JMAC, political affairs, civil affairs). Key inputs from these other mission components (e.g. conflict analysis for an ISF) should be reflected in the ToR of the joint analytical and planning capacity.

¹³ The Integration Steering Group is a Principals-level body charged with ensuring implementation and progress on integration-related issues. It is chaired by DPKO and consists of DPA, DFS, OCHA, OHCHR, DOCO, PBSO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, and EOSG.

purpose is to ensure coherent and consistent policy support and guidance. ¹⁴ These task forces should be co-chaired by the field or benefit from alternate chairing arrangements between the field and headquarters. Thus, UN field presences should designate standing representatives from their integrated field coordination structures (e.g. ISPT chair(s) and/or selected ISPT members, mission and UNCT planners) to participate in Task Force meetings by telephone or VTC. Field participation in IMTF/ITFs may also be tailored based on the specific agenda of the meeting. The field participants in the IMTF/ITF should be actively engaged in the development of IMTF/ITF agendas and ensure adequate follow-up to action points. Field-based strategic planners should also ensure an exchange of action points or meeting notes between the ISPT and/or SPG and the HQ-based IMTF/ITF.

Integrated Strategic Framework

Policy Framework and Background

24. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration of June 2008 requires UN field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is a multi-dimensional

peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT) to have an integrated strategic framework (ISF) that reflects:

- "a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives" and.
- "a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace"

25. The **purpose** of an ISF is to:

- Bring together the Mission and the UNCT's combined mandates and resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities
- Prioritize and sequence agreed elements

oi agreed peace

- Facilitate an appropriate shift in priorities and/or resources
- Allow for regular stocktaking by senior managers

26. The ISF is meant to be a **short document** (e.g. 10-15 pages) **at the strategic level.** Unlike planning tools of the Mission (e.g. Results Based Budget, RBB) or the UNCT (CHAP/CAP, UNDAF, Transition Plan), an ISF does not reach the level of programmatic interventions or outputs. In addition, the ISF is, first and foremost, an internal UN document. If UN field presences would like to produce a version of the ISF as a public information tool or for consultation purposes, it should be adapted from the original internal document. In this

Example ISF Development Roadmap

Preparation/Diagnostics

- Develop/update conflict analysis
- Map existing strategies and plans

Strategic Policy Group Retreat

- Establish shared vision
- Identify strategic objectives

ISPT and Strategic Planners develop content

- Thematic Groups develop strategies/results
- Consult non-UN partners and Government
- Identify resource gaps
- Develop monitoring framework

Consultation/Finalization

- Involves SPG, IMTF/ITF, SRSG, RC/HC (on behalf of UNCT), USG Lead Department

¹⁴ Secretary-General's Decision on Integration, para iii. See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters.

context, it might be necessary to exclude sensitive annexes and/or conflict analysis in the public versions.

27. These guidelines present suggested methodologies for diagnostics/preparation, content development, and consultation/approval of an ISF. The ISF is meant to be a light and flexible exercise, so these guidelines may be broadly applied depending on the capacities and circumstances in country. They may also be applied for the development of an "early ISF" at mission start-up (see text box below, right). It should be noted that with the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a "Mandate Implementation Plan" (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication.

Preparation/Diagnostics

28. The Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) established the requirement for an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), but gives scope and flexibility for different types of vehicles or tools

to fulfill this requirement.

The decision to begin an ISF exercise should be taken at the field level in consultation with IMTF/ITF the based developments in country (e.g. peace mission start-up, agreement, elections/new government). It is also strongly recommended that an ISF exercise be undertaken with a view to harmonizing and adding coherence to UN system planning cycles. For this reason, an ISF should come before the annual development of a Mission's RBB, an CCA/UNDAF review, or a CHAP/CAP review. 15 (See also Annex 6: ISF Diagnostic Phase: "Early ISF" at mission start up

These guidelines may also be used to support the development of an "early ISF" or "early strategy and action plan" at Mission start up as called for in the recent Report of the Secretary-General on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict. An "early ISF" may require an abbreviated development process and would address a smaller number of immediate priorities, with clear roles and responsibilities. Thus, achieving an early ISF will require even more involvement of the senior leadership team, more direct support from headquarters (including surge capacity), and be shorter in its duration (e.g. 6-9 months). The aim of an early ISF is to speed delivery of an early peace dividend. The content of an early ISF may also prove useful for the development of resource mobilization plans for the programmatic elements of a peace consolidation plan that are not funded by the assessed budget of a peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and may be presented to the various multilateral sources of pre-positioned pooled funds (e.g. UN Peacebuilding Fund, World Bank Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund, EU Stabilisation Fund, UNDP/BCPR Trust Fund).

Key Questions in Preparing to Develop an ISF).

- 30. A UN field presence (Mission and UNCT), in close consultation with the IMTF/ITF, may propose that an existing strategy/framework corresponds to an ISF. If this is the case, the framework should be reviewed against these guidelines, and a short evaluation should be sent to the headquarters-based IMTF/ITF for discussion. (See also Annex 7: Evaluating Existing Frameworks Against ISF Minimum Standards).
- 31. Where no existing strategy or framework corresponds to an ISF, this diagnostics phase lays the analytical basis for the ISF development process and maps country strategies among the UN actors in country. If capacity gaps for the preparation, kick-off, or development of an ISF are identified, the UN field presence may request an ISF support

¹⁵ According to the 21 October 2009 decision of the Integration Steering Group, all 18 countries required by the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration to produce an ISF should have ained approval for an existing framework against the minimum standards described herein or undertaken an ISF exercise by the end of 2010. All ISFs should be in place by mid-2011.

mission be mobilized through the IMTF/ITF. An example Terms of Reference for the ISF support mission to Cote d'Ivoire is included in Annex 8 as an example of the types of assistance and deliverables that an ISF support mission may provide.

Linkages between the ISF and other Planning Tools

- 33. The purpose of an ISF process is to achieve an overarching strategy for the UN's role in peace consolidation in a given country. Therefore, the focus should not be on ascertaining whether the ISF can or should replace other planning processes ¹⁶, but rather the need for a case by case analysis and design for each country as described in the "preparation/diagnosis" section above. Whereas existing UN planning processes (e.g. UNDAF for development, CHAP/CAP for humanitarian action, RBB for the Mission) are specific to development, humanitarian, or peace and security, the ISF is unique in that its primary purpose is to reflect the collaborative objectives of the UN system for peace consolidation at the strategic level. In order to foster synergies and avoid duplications, whenever possible, a coherent process should be used for the different UN planning tools and instruments.
- 34. If the ISF follows other planning processes and instruments it should draw upon existing analysis, while allowing senior managers to step back and have a strategic discussion about current peace consolidation priorities. The ISF process is likely to reveal gaps and suggestions regarding how current plans could be revised in order to contribute more effectively to peace consolidation. Different processes will have different scopes and different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them.
- 35. When examining the linkages between the ISF and existing UN system planning tools, some UN field presences may consider whether an existing in-country tool, such as an UNDAF or an integrated peacebuilding strategy, could be adapted to fulfill the minimum standards for ISFs described herein (see also preparation/diagnostics section above). However, in certain situations adapting a current tool may not be sufficient. For instance, complex UN architectures with multiple mandated presences would benefit from developing an ISF (as described in these guidelines) that effectively brings together the UN presence around a set of agreed priorities. Likewise, multi-dimensional operations (e.g. that include police and/or military components) would require an ISF so as to adequately reflect the scale of mission resources and/or allow for a short-term planning horizon suited to these typically volatile environments.
- 36. An ISF is meant to focus the attention of senior managers around a shared set of high-level strategic priorities. It therefore, should not reach the level of programmatic interventions. That said, an ISF will need to be translated into concrete resources and actions, by updating (or developing from scratch where they do not exist) the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the RBB, UNDAF, and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF's objectives are adequately resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation aims within existing UN system planning tools (e.g. UNDAF, CHAP/CAP, RBB).

¹⁶ With the coming into effect of the ISF requirement, DPKO and DFS decided to eliminate the requirement to elaborate a "Mandate Implementation Plan" (MIP) in order to streamline the planning requirements and reduce duplication. Missions are required, however to produce a Mission Concept that provides political and operational direction, timelines and lead/supporting roles to Mission components for priority activities to achieve the mission's mandate. (See also IMPP Guidelines for the Headquarters and DPKO-DFS guidance on the development of Mission Concepts).

- 37. **Conflict Analysis:** According to the overall IMPP methodology, an ISF would ideally be elaborated after a Strategic Assessment ¹⁷ has taken place, in particular the conflict analysis and strategic options for the UN. However, if no Strategic Assessment has taken place, conflict analysis will need to be consolidated from existing strategies or reports (e.g. Common Country Assessment, humanitarian CAP/CHAP, Reports of the Secretary-General, work products of the Mission's JMAC, political affairs division, civil affairs, human rights, child protection, and gender units). Work that identifies immediate conflict drivers is particularly pertinent, as an ISF addresses short to medium-term priorities.
- 38. In some circumstances, conflict analysis will need to be developed. In such cases, the recommended methodology is contained in Annex 9, which provides the authoritative guidance as per the guidelines for Strategic Assessment. These guidelines, which are part of the IMPP guidance package, describe how to conduct and apply conflict analysis and comparative advantage methodology (problem tree and SWOT analysis, respectively) to identify strategic options for UN engagement (see figure 4, below).

Figure 4: Methodology for Conflict Analysis and Development of Strategic Options



- 39. **Mapping of Strategies:** Mapping of existing planning frameworks and strategies is a useful element of the preparatory phase and aims to: (1) assist stakeholders to determine the level of strategic discussion required to foster enhanced collaboration and prioritization; and (2) provide a useful first step towards achieving a coherent overview of the planning architecture in country. A mapping of existing planning frameworks serves the following purposes:
 - Identifies the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place at both national level and within the international community including the UN family¹⁸;
 - Provides an overview on how the various frameworks complement and build upon each other (or not);
 - Assists in identifying any inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps amongst the existing planning processes and the results articulated therein;
 - Allows planners to use the planning process as an opportunity to build or enhance complementarity between different processes and address gaps that might exist.

A short guidance note on how to carry out a streamlined mapping of country level frameworks is provided in Annex 10.

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
¹⁷ UN Strategic Assessment Guidelines, Approved by the Secretary-General in May 2009

¹⁸ The mapping should build on any tools or mapping exercises already undertaken in country. For example, in some countries UNDP assists the government in operating a Development Assistance Database (DAD) that captures information of a wide range of government, UN, national and international actors' activities in country that can be disaggregated by various parameters.

Developing the ISF Content

- 40. **Roadmap**: Field teams should develop a road map for the development of the ISF that delineates key steps/outputs, sets deadlines, identifies roles and responsibilities, and reflects how all stakeholders will be included in the ISF development process, including the non-UN members of the Humanitarian Country Team.
- 41. **Retreat of senior managers:** A retreat of the Strategic Policy Group (or similar) may be held to (a) identify three-four strategic priorities for peace consolidation that are achievable in the envisaged time frame (e.g. 1-2 years) and (b) establish clear leads and/or co-leads for each of the strategic priorities. (A note on preparing an ISF retreat is contained in Annex 11).
- 42. **Design and Scope of an ISF:** Figure 5 demonstrates that cross-cutting issues carried out by the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors are at the heart of the ISF. At the same time, as indicated by the dotted-line, some elements of an ISF may primarily be carried out by one of these mandated bodies.

Figure 5: Example ISF Scope (1)




- 43. The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. Figure 5, for example, represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation or peacebuilding context. In that regard, a review of current ISFs ¹⁹ reveals the following thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state authority, protection of civilians, return and reintegration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily sequenced inputs from number of UN actors and, thus, could benefit from inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities.
- 44. The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (e.g. Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern DRC). For example, Figure 6 demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the UN would be obliged to prioritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian

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¹⁹ Reflects the thematic priorities in ISFs under development in Chad, DRC, and Cote d'Ivoire.

assistance in these environments. In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.

Figure 6: Example ISF Scope (2)



- 45. In this regard, principled humanitarian action remains an important element of the UN system's response. However, even though humanitarian response often supports peace consolidation, its primary aim is to respond to needs. Accordingly, many humanitarian activities (as reflected in a CHAP) are likely to remain outside the scope of an ISF. Key exceptions may be activities related to protection of civilians, return and reintegration, and early recovery.
- 46. It is also important to recall that certain subjects, including human rights, must be mainstreamed into the work of all UN bodies. For example, according to the decision of the Secretary-General No. 2005/24 on Human Rights in Integrated Missions, 'all UN entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected through and within their operations in the field'. In addition, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 requests "all entities of the United Nations system should institute mechanisms for gender mainstreaming in their planning and programming for example, through participation of gender specialists in these processes." Within the IMPP process at the field level, the form and structure of integration and how this is captured in the ISF -- should enable the human rights and gender components to further mainstream human rights and gender across UN peace consolidation priorities.
- 47. **Dialogue with Headquarters:** Field teams should maintain a dialogue with headquarters through the IMTF/ITF throughout the ISF development process to ensure consensus around the key peace consolidation priorities (strategic objectives) before elaborating the full strategy. For example, a schedule of VTCs between the IMTF/ITF and its field counterpart could be elaborated as part of the ISF development road map.
- 48. **Methodology and Key elements of an ISF.** The presentation of an ISF should typically follow the results framework methodology (see Figure 7 below). Recalling that an ISF is at the strategic level and does not reach the programmatic level, an ISF result is equivalent to "expected accomplishment" (RBB) or "UNDAF outcome". An example end state, strategic objective (with narrative) and result are provided in Annex 12 as adapted from existing strategies in Somalia and eastern DRC.




Figure 7: Results Framework Methodology

49. Thematic working groups and the elaboration of results: Once basic decisions are taken about the three-four strategic peace consolidation priorities (the strategic objectives) that will be addressed by the ISF, it is useful to further develop the ISF content through thematic working groups. In most cases, this will involve senior working level staff from Mission components and the members of the UNCT. In this context, it is important to involve those with a direct understanding of programming and budgetary allocations (e.g. cluster leads, outcome group leads, Mission heads of components) to ensure that

commitments in the ISF can be adequately resourced (through RBB. CPAPs, etc). These thematic working groups should report to the ISPT or SPG and benefit from the coordination and facilitation support of strategic planners of the Mission and RC Office. Thematic working groups should be engaged in the development of ISF content includina the political operational strategy, risk analysis, sequencing of priority results, linkages to other elements of the ISF, partnerships and the strategy (with World Bank, bilaterals, etc).

Consulting non-UN actors:

Unlike an UNDAF or PRS, an ISF does not require the direct endorsement of national authorities. That said, each contributor to an ISF is responsible for consulting the appropriate national authorities, non-UN actors (e.g. NGOs, bilateral donors, other multilateral actors) throughout the ISF development process and should be able to articulate how the ISF's priorities contribute to national peace consolidation strategies (e.g. PRSPs, Transitional Results Frameworks, National Recovery Strategies, etc).

The nature of consultations with national actors will vary depending on the context. For instance, consultations on an ISF being developed in a peacebuilding context may be extensive and an ISF may be explicitly linked to existing national peacebuilding and development strategies. However, consultations with national authorities for ISFs in conflict situations will require more care, and may involve non-state actors and civil society.

50. To aid field teams in the preparation of an ISF, a generic ISF outline is provided below and reflects **the minimum standards for the ISF content**.

Figure 8: Minimum Standards for ISF content

Shared Vision and Analysis

- Situation analysis: Draws on the conflict analysis and current conflict triggers identified in the preparatory phase (or previous strategic assessment), may consider divergent trends within the country and reflect risks and assumptions
- Description of the UN's combined mandate and partnerships in country and expectations regarding its future strategy
- Peace consolidation end state that the UN seeks to achieve over the ISF timeframe (generally longer than the Mission mandate and shorter than a typical multi-year development programming cycle)
- o Reference to the ISF development and endorsement process

Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities

- Overall approach: Scope of the ISF priorities, reasons for the prioritization, role of non-UN actors, link between the ISF and national strategies (as relevant), assumptions/risks/scenarios
- Narrative Strategy for Each Strategic Objective: Each thematic area has a unique narrative
 explaining what is to be achieved, why it is a priority, how it will be done, and who is/are
 the responsible leads/co-leads, and risks to achievement
- Results: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF "outcome" or RBB "expected accomplishment"). Special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented
- Timelines: explanation of how the strategic objectives and related results will be phased to take into consideration the synergies in the plan (may split results into phases, use critical path methodology, etc)
- Summary results framework: A summary of the ISF results framework may also be presented graphically as part of the ISF document (see figure 7).

Coordination and Implementation arrangements

 Brief description of coordination arrangements (e.g. visual graphic) and any integrated approaches to be employed in implementation of the ISF

Monitoring

- Frequency of reporting
- Role of integrated field coordination structures (SPG, ISPT, etc) in reviewing/acting upon monitoring reports
- Actual reporting format (attached to the ISF)
- o Roles and responsibilities in data collection
- 51. Consultation and Finalization: The SPG (or similar) should receive regular updates on the development of the ISF and review drafts as they are finished. The SPG's validation of the ISF means that the Mission and UNCT agree to pursue the results, timelines, and responsibilities as described and will be mutually accountable for achieving the results. This concept of mutual accountability takes into consideration that the contributors are also pursuing other mandated priorities outside the scope of the ISF. Following the endorsement of the SPG, the SRSG/ERSG and UNCT (represented by the RC/HC) should present the document for discussion at a Director-level meeting of the Headquarters-based IMTF/ITF. At this stage, IMTF/ITFs may call upon the expertise of the IMPP Working Group to assist with quality assurance in the ISF process and product. Following these discussions, the SRSG/ERSG, RC/HC, and IMTF/ITF should formally endorse an ISF. The USG of the lead Department should also sign-off on the ISF as a demonstration of support.

Monitoring and Evaluation

52. Each ISF must contain a monitoring and evaluation when it is presented for endorsement. This monitoring framework should leverage existing data collection and

monitoring capacity and experience within the Mission and UNCT (e.g. UNCT monitoring and evaluation working group, Mission JMAC, RBB performance monitoring reports).

- 53. Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF's tracking tool should provide scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring tool is the senior leadership team and the Strategic Policy Group (or similar), who should review the monitoring reports regularly, identify strategies to further progress, define strategies to mitigate risks, allocate responsibilities for remedying lags in implementation, and adjust strategies as required in light of the evolving situation on the ground. As the monitoring tool is designed to be discussed by groups such as the SPG, it is an important tool for promoting teamwork and ensuring mutual accountability for results under the ISF.
- 54. As the ISF is a new requirement, there are currently no best practices for monitoring and tracking progress. However, the scorecard from the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UN SSS) for eastern DRC offers a good methodology for reference and is unique in that it includes proposed management interventions for results deemed "yellow" or "red" (see UN SSSS Scorecard, Annex 13). In addition, it is advisable to engage the thematic working groups in the monitoring process to maximize thematic expertise and minimize overlap in reporting. Additional ISF monitoring frameworks will be posted on the IMPP community of practice ²⁰ as they become available and future updates of these guidelines will include additional examples.

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP): the authoritative basis for planning new multidimensional missions and UNCTs applying the principles of integration, as well for the revision of existing mission and UNCT plans

Integrated Mission: generally refers to <u>structurally</u> integrated field missions, e.g. UN peacekeeping or Special Political Missions (SPMs) that have a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC who reports to the SRSG/Head of Mission. However, structural integration is no longer the key trigger for applying an "integrated approach" as required by the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration (24/2008) and as indicated in these guidelines. Rather, the collaborative principles of integration are to be applied in UN field presences with a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office working alongside a UN Country Team.

DSRSG/RC/HC: a multi-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC serves as the bridge between the mission and UNCT in structurally integrated missions. The reporting lines, relative roles and responsibilities, and key tasks of DSRSG/RC/HCs are described in the Secretary-General's Directive of 11 December 2000 and the Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions of 9 February 2006.

F. REFERENCES

Normative or superior references

²⁰ To join the IMPP community of practice, please visit http//cop.dfs.un.org or contact Maria Regina Semana (semana@un.org).

Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General, June 2006

Note of Guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators, and Humanitarian Coordinators (30 October 2000)

The Secretary-General's Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions (9 February 2006)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (24/2005)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24 June 2008, 24/2008)

Related Policies

UN Security Council Resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report on the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the "Brahimi Report")

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the "Capstone Doctrine")²¹

The Report of the Secretary-General on the concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation²²

Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment

Guidelines: IMPP Role of the Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences

G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

The IMPP Working Group will track compliance with these guidelines and provide regular status reviews to the Integration Steering Group. This will include quality assurance on the development and implementation of integrated field coordination structures and integrated strategic frameworks. The Integration Steering Group (ISG) will also monitor compliance with these Guidelines and report to the Secretary-General's Policy Committee.

H. CONTACT

Kristina Koch-Avan, Integrated Missions Planning Officer, DPKO, Office of Operations, email: koch-avan@un.org

I. HISTORY

See A/56/870 particularly para. 35

²¹ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008) http://intranet.dpko.un.org/dpko/pages/PoliciesAndPractices.aspx

These guidelines were undertaken by an inter-departmental and inter-agency IMPP Working Group convened by DPKO including DPA, DFS, OCHA, DOCO, PBSO, OHCHR, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR. They were approved by the Integration Steering Group (ISG), a Principals-level body at headquarters with the same institutional representation as the IMPP Working Group, in December 2009 and subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General.

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:

DATE OF APPROVAL:

Concept Note Joint Planning Unit: United Nations Somalia 2 April 2009

Background

The establishment of a Joint Planning Unit (JPU) mechanism has so far been activated in the context of structurally "integrated" UN missions, which is not the case of Somalia. It nevertheless has been agreed in the Strategic Assessment report of February 2008, reiterated in the TAM report of February 2009, discussed recently in the Integrated Task Force (ITF) and subsequently endorsed by the Policy Committee in March 2009 that a JPU would enhance the work of the UN by ensuring regular information exchange between the 4 agreed tracks (political, security, humanitarian, recovery) to enable commonly-shared analysis to lead into planning. The JPU for Somalia would be established with these specific requirements in mind.

UN in Somalia

Ongoing discussions between UNPOS and the UNCT on approaches to coordination and information exchange highlight the need for a joint mechanism. A JPU would enable better shared analysis, allow for sharing of political information on the basis of do no harm and provide a forum for information exchange and operational coordination. A JPU would also serve as a mechanism to jointly plan in areas where greater coherence is needed, such as institution-building and rule of law. It is recognized at the same time that given the scale and urgency of humanitarian needs, humanitarian assistance must continue to be provided in a manner that is consistent with humanitarian principles of impartiality, while not harming the work undertaken on the political, security and recovery tracks.

In the challenging environment that Somalia presents, all tracks of action (political, security, humanitarian, recovery) should be implemented simultaneously in a manner that is hopefully mutually reinforcing but at least that is respectful of distinct "spaces" and principles.

In that context, UN coherence in Somalia is defined as follows:

- UNPOS and the UNCT pursue the above-stated objective in a coherent manner through a clear division of responsibilities and the existence of an overarching shared vision of the situation and of the strategic end-game as well as pre-agreed indicators of the situation.
- However UNPOS pursues other priority tasks that are related but distinct, and so does the UNCT.
- UNPOS implements its mandate as defined in Security Council resolutions and works closely with HQ departments such as DPKO and DFS in so doing.
- The UNCT implements the overall UN Transition Plan which aims to support Somalis in building a durable peace and beginning reconstruction and development in their country.
- The UNCT with other IASC partners pursues a sizeable programme of humanitarian assistance as defined in the CAP 2009.
- Both UNPOS and UNCT insist that emphasis should be placed on those ongoing initiatives that have demonstrated a degree of success rather than importing new programmes. Several NGOs and donors have been active in Somalia for the last 2 decades and good lessons and approaches have been learnt upon which current programmes are designed.

Objectives

The objective of the JPU in the Somalia context would be to enable better shared analysis to enable joint planning in the areas of recovery and development, allow for sharing of political information on the basis of do no harm and provide a forum for information exchange and operational coordination.

Composition

The JPU should be composed of five (5) standing members, with others invited on the basis of need. These are: UNPOS, OCHA, RCO (on behalf of UNCT), UNDSS, and UNSOA. All members will have equal status in participation but the UNPOS representative will also play the role of convening the JPU.

Each institution will designate a senior technical expert who will be able to participate on a regular basis. This task will become part of the staff member's ToRs. Representation of an office of a constituency implies undertaking the required internal consultations.

UN Agencies may be invited on an ad hoc basis depending on the topics under discussions. The same also applies to technical units within UNPOS and/or non-UN partners.

The members of the JPU will retain their present reporting lines which will be either to the DSRSG/UNPOS in the case of UNPOS and DFS, or to the UN RC/HC/DO in the case of OCHA, UNDSS and RCO. The JPU will brief the UNCT and other relevant partners on a regular basis.

Unless otherwise directed by the RC/HC/DO and the DSRSG/UNPOS, the JPU will not have a direct line of reporting or representation with HQ-level departments, agencies, nor with the ITF or IMPP working group.

Tasks

The JPU will do the following:

- Jointly plan in areas requiring more coherence, such as institution-building, rule of law, etc;
- Regularly share information on the 4 tracks (political, security, humanitarian, recovery and provide a commonly shared analytic base;
- Coordinate on operational issues;
- Provide a regular overview of the status of particular issues, such as negotiation with local actors for access, impact of humanitarian and recovery programmes on the political process and vice versa, issues of concern relating to AMISOM, etc.
- Produce joint thematic / analytic reports on political trends, SG's Reports, etc;
- Highlight possible arising issues to the DSRSG UNPOS and the RC/HC/DO;
- Brief the UNCT and other relevant partners on a regular basis, and;
- Perform other tasks as agreed by both the DSRSG of UNPOS and RC/HC/DO.

Template Terms of Reference Shared Analytical and Planning Capacity for UN Field Presences

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each shared analytical and planning capacity ("shared capacity") should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. Given the dynamic operational environment, this ToR should be updated annually. The title of the shared analytical and planning capacity may also be tailored by the UN field presence (e.g. "Joint Planning Unit")

Purpose

The shared capacity is comprised of strategic planners from the Mission and the UNCT. Although the members of the shared capacity have their own distinct tasks related to the Mission (e.g. RBB) and the UNCT (UNDAF), respectively, the strategic planners also work on joint Mission/UNCT initiatives that aim to develop a strategic partnership between the Mission and UNCT around core peace consolidation objectives.

The shared analytical ad planning capacity responds to the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration¹ for UN country level arrangements to have a "shared analytical and planning capacity" to ensure that the following is in place:

- A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives
- Closely aligned or integrated planning
- A set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of task critical to consolidating peace
- Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation

The shared capacity cannot fulfill these tasks alone. To be successful, the team requires the active direction and involvement of the Senior Leadership Team (from both the Mission and the UNCT) as well as an appropriate coordination structure such as an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT).

Core Tasks

Each shared capacity should develop its own list of priority tasks and present them to their managers and the ISPT for approval. A list of generic tasks follows:

- Regularly share information to promote a common analytical basis and closely aligned or integrated planning between the Mission and the UNCT
- Serve as the Secretariat to the Strategic Policy Group and/or Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPG) or similar (e.g. preparation of agendas, background papers, develop and consult joint initiatives)
- Coordinate the implementation of decisions and activities of the SPG and/or ISPT (or similar), including the actual development and drafting of joint analysis, strategies, and planning frameworks
- Provide direct support to the development of a UN system-wide integrated strategic framework (ISF), implementation arrangements, and a monitoring and evaluation framework
- Compile regular monitoring reports on the implementation of an ISF or other similar strategies or planning documents prepared by the SPG

¹ Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration – 25 June 2008 meeting of the Policy Committee. Decision 2008/24

- Prepare or contribute to the development of resource mobilization plans that are an outgrowth of a joint Mission/UNCT strategy
- Provide coordination support and guidance to thematic groups that bridge the Mission and the UNCT
- Design, coordination, and conduct of joint Mission-UNCT assessments, as required
- Consult relevant Mission (RBB, Mission Concept, etc) and UNCT (UNDAF, CHAP/CAP) plans with stakeholders from throughout the UN system to ensure closely aligned planning and avoid overlap
- Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for headquarters and facilitate linkages between the SPG and/or ISPT and Integrated (Mission) Task Force
- Liaison, on behalf of the Mission and UNCT with the Peacebuilding Commission and PBSO, as required for the development, approval, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of projects under the Peacebuilding Fund

Composition

This section should define the composition of the shared capacity. It should include at least one dedicated strategic planner from the Mission and the UNCT. A team leader or chair of the group should be identified to facilitate the organization of work. In some cases, the shared capacity may have a core team comprised of the professional strategic planners in O/SRSG and O/RC/HC, with additional analysts or planners from Mission Components (e.g. Joint Mission Analysis Cell, political affairs, military, police, rule of law) and the members of the UNCT brought in as resources for detailed strategy and planning exercises.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities of the shared capacity. Some shared capacities may choose an integrated structure for the team with a joint chain of command and reporting arrangements. Others may choose lateral collaboration. In such cases, the modalities for communication and joint collaboration should be specified. For structurally integrated missions, it is advisable to have the shared capacity co-located in the same building to ease communication. All members of the shared capacity should have these tasks reflected in their annual performance appraisals.


IMPP Guidelines for the Field

Annex 3

Integrated Planning Mechanisms - Summary Terms of Reference

Mational (Kinshasa)	lectives: Ensure ectives, agree Level IMPT/Policy me Working Groups	Objective: Ensure the development and implementation objectives, agreed results, timelines and responsibilities Level Chair Members Pt. IMPT/Policy SRSG MONUC SMG and De UNCT SNS SSC NONCT SNS SSC NONCT SSC NONCT SC N	t and implementat s and responsibiliti Members MONUC SMG and UNCT Heads of MONUC Sections and Inter- Agency Programme Management Team (PMT) Ad hoc	ion of an overarching straties for critical tasks to consider for critical tasks to consider by the pose Determine shared vision and ensure the achievement of UN System common objectives in the DRC. Translate vision and common objectives into ISF. Oversee the development and implementation of integrated workplans for implementation of ISF. Support the work of the IMPT	Objectives: Ensure the development and implementation of an overarching strategy for the UN System in the DRC, including a shared vision of its objectives, agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for critical tasks to consolidate peace and a gradual transition to recovery and development. Level Chair Members Purpose Tasks Tasks Frequency IMPT/Policy SRSG MONUC SMG and objectives in the DRC. Determine shared vision and common objectives in the DRC. - Define strategic orientations of implementation reports) - Define strategic orientations of implementation of integrated action plan / resource framework objectives in to UNCT objectives into ISF. Oversee - Define strategic orientations of implementation of integrated action plan / resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan / resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework of the IMPT occordidate action plan of resource framework occordidate action plan of resource framework occordidate action plan occordinate action plan occordidate action plan occordinate action plan occordinate action plan occordinate action plan occ	ed vision of its and development. Frequency Quarterly (replaces UNCT/ SMG meetings on weeks it is held) Monthly (replaces PMT meetings on weeks it is held) As necessary
Regions/Provinces	Regional/ Provincial IMPT Working Groups	East: Eastern Coordinator West: HoOs/Area Coordinators Ad hoc	Provincial Heads of MONUC sections/ UN Agencies Ad hoc	Develop and coordinate implementation of Integrated Workplans Support the work of the regional IMPT	 Contribute to development of thematic/ regional strategies Develop costed integrated workplans/ConOps for implementation of ISF Report on implementation of workplans Perform task requested by the regional IMPT 	Weekly As necessary

Integrated Planning Mechanisms



Plan and coordinate implementation of ISF through integrated workplans

Template Terms of Reference Strategic Policy Group

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each Strategic Policy Group (SPG) should be tailored to the distinct needs of the country and UN presence. The SPG should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or when the UN presence enters a new phase (e.g. from conflict to peacebuilding). The title of the group (SPG) may be altered according to the specific needs/interests of the field.

Purpose

The Strategic Policy Group is the senior integrated coordination body for UN presences with a multidimensional peacekeeping operation and/or political mission/office and a UN Country Team (UNCT). It aims to provide strategic direction to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's peace consolidation efforts by promoting the development and implementation of a strategic partnership between the Mission and UNCT for peace consolidation. It is a forum to negotiate the delineation of roles and responsibilities for the UN actors contributing to peace consolidation and promotes a mutual accountability between members of the UN presence against their commitments

Background

This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the Mission and the UNCT's activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments, Technical Assessment Missions, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, or any other type of joint assessment undertaken by the Mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a tailored configuration, purpose, and working methods of this particular ISPT. This is particularly important for Missions and UNCTs that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

Principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the Strategic Policy Group. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase. The core functions of an SPG are listed below:

- Establish the strategic vision for peace consolidation for the UN presence based on the country needs and the comparative advantage of the UN system
- Identify key peace consolidation strategic objectives based on a shared analysis of conflict triggers
- Delineate roles and responsibilities among the UN actors for peace consolidation priorities
- Review progress on an integrated strategic framework (or similar) and provide direction to UN components/agencies on implementation challenges
- Provide strategic direction in response to resource mobilization challenges for the common peace consolidation goals of the UN system
- Work with non-UN actors to delineate roles and responsibilities where there is interdependence related to common peace consolidation priorities

Composition

This section should define the composition of the SPG. The SPG should be comprised of representative members of the UN presence including peacekeeping/political, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSG and RC/HC may decide to identify a representative group of Mission and UN Agencies for inclusion in the SPG based on their respective contributions to the agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework or similar). If this is the case, the RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representatives. All SPG members should commit to participate at the level of Heads of Agency or Head of Mission Component.

Annex 4

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities, including how frequently the group meets, modalities for formation of meeting agendas, procedure for the preparation and presentation of background documents for decision, and the production of action points and/or minutes. This section should also describe how the work of the SPG is linked to other integrated coordination structures in the field (e.g. Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, thematic working groups, provincial/regional ISPTs) and UN Headquarters (Integrated (Mission) Task Force). (A graphic such as Figure 1, below, may be used). It may also describe how the SPG interacts with national coordination structures and/or coordination structures involving other non-UN actors (e.g. donors, World Bank).

Template Terms of Reference Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT)

Note: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for each ISPT should be tailored to the distinct needs of the country and UN presence. The ISPT should be ready to revise its TOR when the situation changes or when the UN presence enters a new phase (e.g. from conflict to peacebuilding). **The title of the group (ISPT or other) may be altered according to the specific needs/interests of the field.**

Purpose

Suggested generic text: "The Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT) aims to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. The ISPT responds to the requirement in the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration for UN country level arrangements that promote the development and implementation of a strategic partnership for peace consolidation. It also aims to ensure that all components of the UN mission and the members of the UN Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner and in close cooperation with other national and international partners. The ISPT receives direction from and reports to the Strategic Policy Group and is the field-level counterpart to the [country] Integrated (Mission) Task Force chaired by [lead Department].

Background

This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the Mission and the UNCT's activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments, Technical Assessment Missions, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, or any other type of joint assessment undertaken by the Mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a tailored configuration, purpose, and working methods of this particular ISPT. This is particularly important for Missions and UNCTs that are not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.

Principal functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the ISPT. As noted above, these may change depending on the situation and phase. ISPT should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of an ISPT:

- Promote, provide direct support, and conduct joint and coordinated strategic planning processes including, inter alia, integrated strategic frameworks (ISFs) and benchmarking/strategic work plans requested by the Security Council
- Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by providing a UN system wide forum for consultation on strategies or planning processes unique to select component(s) (e.g. Mission Results Based Budget, UNDAF, CHAP/CAP)
- Serve as the field-level counterpart to the HQ-based Integrated (Mission) Task Force and ensure appropriate representation in meetings of the HQ-based IMTF/ITF (through telephone or videoteleconferencing link)
- Ensure adequate analytical and planning resources are provided by the Mission and UNCT (development and humanitarian actors), that these resources are joined-up through a shared analytical and planning capacity with an active Terms of Reference, and provide strategic guidance to its work
- Prepare and participate in UN system wide assessments including, inter alia, Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs), Strategic Assessments, and Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs)
- Prepare background papers for strategic decisions of the Senior Policy Group and/or HQbased Integrated (Mission) Task Force.

¹ Decision of the Secretary-General on Integration – 25 June 2008 meeting of the Policy Committee. Decision 2008/24

Annex 5

- Establish technical or thematic working groups to produce specific inputs required for the fulfillment of its responsibilities, as required
- Provide support to the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC) work [in cases where the country is under consideration in the PBC]
- Regularly share and review information
- Support coordination with non-UN actors

Composition

This section should define the composition of the ISPT. The ISPT should comprise representative members of the UN presence including peacekeeping/political, support, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSG and RC/HC may decide to identify a representative group of Mission and UN Agencies for inclusion in the ISPT based on their respective contributions to the agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework or similar) and to limit staff time in meetings. If this is the case, the RC/HC should consult the UNCT to establish the UN agency representatives. ISPT members should participate in meetings at the senior officer level in order to maintain the strategic focus of the ISPT and be empowered to represent their entities.

Organization of work

This section should describe the working modalities of the ISPT. It should define how frequently the team meets. Information about the development of a work plan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section. This section should also describe how the work of the ISPT is linked to other integrated coordination structures in the field (SPG, thematic working groups, provincial/regional ISPTs) and UN Headquarters (Integrated (Mission) Task Force). (A graphic such as Figure 1, below, may be used). It may also describe how the ISPT interacts with national coordination structures and/or coordination structures involving other non-UN actors (e.g. donors, World Bank).

Terms of Reference for UNDAF Outcome Groups

Background

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008-2012 (UNDAF) for Liberia provides a clear, overarching framework that details the support of the United Nations to the national priorities of Liberia. It identifies five 'UNDAF Outcomes' that respond to the four pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy as well as HIV/AIDS.

The United Nations has agreed to form a coordination mechanism called an UNDAF Outcome Group, which includes participants from all UNCT Agencies and UNMIL sections responsible to deliver within each respective UNDAF Outcome area. The DSRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC), who retains overall leadership and accountability to the Government of Liberia for delivery of the outcomes, is delegating responsibility to five UN Conveners to act on the RC's behalf in a number of specific ways (see below) to support the UNDAF Outcome Group.

Each UNDAF Outcome Groups is responsible to:

- Provide joint UN advocacy, policy support and advice through the PRS structure and to relevant PRS Pillar meetings;
- Exercise technical leadership and providing expert UN opinion on areas falling within the mandate of the group;
- Ensure / Maintain links to the Functional and Cross Cutting Groups;
- Share information on existing and pipeline programmes as well as on relevant resource mobilization efforts; and
- Facilitate the implementation of joint outputs under respective outcomes, address bottlenecks/constraints, and identify key gaps and areas for joint interventions on advocacy, policy and programmatic levels.

Joint Annual Work-Plan

Each UNDAF Outcome Group is responsible for the preparation and follow-up of a Joint Annual Work Plan, with assignment of lead agency for each output. The Plan will include the Outcome Group's joint activities towards achieving the UNDAF Outcomes and Outputs. The Outcome Group will, under the leadership of the Convener, prepare mid-term and annual reports on its implementation to the SPG.

Group Membership and Accountability

The agencies/UNMIL will formally designate a member to the relevant Outcome Group. If this appointee to the Outcome Group can not attend, he/she is expected to appoint a representative in his/her place. The Convenor is responsible for maintaining a membership list and record frequency of attendance by the members or their representatives in the meetings. This information will be included in the quarterly reports to the SPG.

Members are expected to be empowered to represent their organisations on the matters under discussion at meetings. The members of the Outcome Groups will be responsible for briefing their organization on the orientation, recommendations, and decisions of the Outcome Groups.

The Outcome Groups can establish working groups to focus upon a particular topic or sub-sector as determined by the Outcome Group. The working group will report to the Outcome Group on its activities and results.

Calendar of meetings

The UNDAF Outcome Groups will meet at least every second month and as necessary to prepare for the relevant PRS Pillar meetings.

UN Conveners

The DSRSG/Resident Coordinator is delegating responsibility to UN Conveners to act on his/her behalf in a number of specific ways. In this regard, the Conveners do not act in the capacity of their organization (UN agency / UNMIL section) but on behalf of the entire United Nations in Liberia. The Conveners, who will be appointed for an initial term of one year, are expected to guide the group and ensure that the group fulfils its mandate through adequate consultation and participation by all members.

The UN Convener:

- Acts on behalf of the RC on matters related to his/her specific UNDAF Outcome and UN support to the Government's PRS Pillar meetings
- Serves as the UN Focal Point for the corresponding Government Pillar Group and represents UN at high-level interaction with national and other partners (including civil society and donors) in respective thematic area
- Brings UN (UNCT and UNMIL) together in the respective area and Chairs the UNDAF Outcome Group
- Facilitates the preparation and reporting of the workplan.
- Fosters Joint Programming, including operationalization, resource mobilization and monitoring
- Ensures and communicates joined-up UN policy advice in respective thematic area
- Reports quarterly to the Strategic Planning Group meetings.
- Ensures that necessary secretarial support is provided to the Outcome Group, with support and guidance from RCO.
- Liaise with the Conveners of the other UNDAF Outcome Groups for support and sharing of ideas on how to facilitate the work of the Outcome Groups.

Cross-cutting / Joint Programme Groups and Conveners

In addition, the UNDAF identified several cross cutting areas and the United Nations has established cross-cutting thematic groups in the following areas:

- Gender Equality
- Children and Youth Empowerment and Employment
- Peacebuilding & Conflict Sensitivity
- Food Security & Nutrition
- Environment & Climate Change
- Macroeconomic Taskforce

The cross-cutting / joint programme groups are responsible for

- Providing joint UN policy support and advice to the Outcome Groups
- Exercising technical leadership and providing expert UN opinion on areas falling within the mandate of the group
- Acting as the UN coordinating mechanism for Joint Programmes (under the Joint Steering Committees) on Youth Empowerment and Employment, Food Security & Nutrition, Gender (including SGBV JP)

- Reporting to the UNCT and Joint Programme Steering Committee
- Advancing research and analytical thinking by producing issues papers

A convener will coordinate the support of the United Nations following the same TOR as for Convener's above with the additional responsibilities to ensure crosscutting issues are mainstreamed in the work of all outcome groups

Functional Groups

The following functional groups provide oversight, outreach advice and support in accordance with their respective ToRs.

- Inter-Agency Programming Team (IAPT)
- Operations Management Team (OMT)
- UN Communications Group (UNCG)
- Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Côte d'Ivoire Integrated Mission Task Force

Terms of Reference Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) Support Mission for Côte d'Ivoire 9 June 2009

Background

The Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision on Integration (24/2008) reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. The Decision also included a list of situations, including Côte d'Ivoire, where key principles of integration should be applied.

The Decision on Integration also stressed the importance of an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission and UNCT. In this regard, it established that UN country presences should have a shared analytical and planning capacity as well as an integrated strategic framework (ISF). As established by this Decision and further developed by the ASG-level Integration Steering Group¹ at its 12 March 2009 meeting, an ISF should include:

- 1) a shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives, and
- 2) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace

At its March 12 2009 meeting, the Integration Steering Group (ISG) also endorsed a number of principles and assumptions for the development of an ISF.² These include:

- Developed through a building block approach (see points 1,2 above)
- Both process and a product, not a "cut and paste" from existing frameworks
- Process ensures joint ownership by Mission and UNCT
- Development led by Senior Managers
- Provides clarity on roles and responsibilities
- Does not alter structural arrangements between the Mission and UNCT
- Linked to national frameworks, as appropriate
- Applies to existing UN presences as well as future start ups, rolled-out in phases for existing UN presences

At the same meeting, the ISG also asked the IMPP Working Group to develop guidance on the ISF and to "accompany" the ISF development process in 1-2 locations in order to root the eventual ISF guidelines in actual practices. Côte d'Ivoire is one of these two ISF case studies.

Purpose

It is understood that the development of an ISF for Côte d'Ivoire is already in the advanced stage. In this context, the Côte d'Ivoire IMTF, in coordination with the IMPP Working Group, is fielding an ISF support mission with the <u>dual objectives</u> of:

- Providing technical support for the finalization of an ISF for Côte d'Ivoire
- Learning from the field-based process and documenting practices in real-time to inform the development of the ISF guidance package

¹ The ASG-level Integration Steering Group was established by the Decision on Integration to "help ensure implementation and progress on integration-related issues. The group is convened by DPKO and includes DPA, DFS, PBSO, OCHA, OHCHR, DOCO, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and EOSG.

² See also the full ISF Discussion Paper approved by the ISG, which is available on the IMPP Community of Practice

In this regard, the key deliverables associated with the objectives above are:

- Design and deliver a workshop to UNOCI and the UNCT including:
 - o background information on global policy development for an ISF
 - o a validation process for the work undertaken to date
- Complete an After Action Review of the ISF Development Process to date with a view to identifying best practices for a generic ISF development process map, which is currently under development for the global ISF guidelines
- Document practices in Côte d'Ivoire that have been established to support the common objectives identified in the ISF (e.g. joint field offices)
- Provide technical assistance to the strategic planners from UNOCI and the UNCT to finalize
 the ISF draft that is proposed to cover the period June 2009 to June 2010. This may include
 facilitating thematic discussions, technical assistance with indicators, design of tracking tools,
 and finalization of the ISF narrative.

Composition

The Côte d'Ivoire IMTF will establish an ISF Support Mission with the assistance of the IMPP Working Group. The group will (keeping in mind logistical constraints) include representatives of DPKO (Office of Operations), OCHA, UNDP, PBSO, and DOCO.

Dates and Duration

The ISF Support Mission will travel to Côte d'Ivoire from 21 June to 26 June. The specific dates and agenda will be agreed with UNOCI and the UNCT through the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC.

Logistical Support

The ISF Support Mission will rely on the logistical and administrative support of UNOCI and the UNCT including for scheduling of meetings, transport and accommodation. All costs related to travel, DSA, and accommodation for task team members will be borne individually by each department and agency participating in the mission.

Key drivers of conflict and risks to peace consolidation in the DRC

- 1 Law and order, as well as security apparatuses unable to protect rights-holders which enabled and continue to foster the presence/emergence of community-based militia and foreign-backed armed groups all of which finance themselves through the illegal exploitation of natural resources
 - National army ill-disciplined, poorly trained, irregularly paid, subject to parallel chains of command and unable to restore state authority in large areas of the country
 - Presence of powerful local militias and foreign-backed rebel movements with strong ties to traditional chiefs and individual corrupt officials operating illegally
 - Illegal exploitation of natural resources fuelling violence and corruption
 - Patterns of collusion between illegal armed groups, criminals and authorities

2 – Weak or lack of state institutions which foster the resolution of grievances through violent means

- Weak or absent judicial system
- Weak democratic institutions in which the people lack confidence
- Culture of impunity and lack of accountability

3 – Land-tenure and political representation related grievances that are not channeled through state institutions, as the latter are too weak to address them

- Communal tensions and competition over resources, including land, charcoal, minerals and trade / trafficking routes
- Lack of effective, representative, and transparently-selected government at the local level
- Ethnically non-inclusive political and security apparatuses resulting in alienation of some ethnic groups and politicization of the security apparatus
- Absent or ineffective provincial institutions

4 – Lack of economic opportunities, the inability of the state to deliver social services and the legacy of decades of violence have led to an acute social crisis where livelihoods are sought through illicit means and traditional taboos against violence are severely eroded.

- Absence of a functioning, diversified, transparent economy and taxation system
- Lack of government control over extraction and trade of natural resources
- Insufficient resources at the central level to deliver basic services or pay salaries of civil service, army and police
- Lack of economic opportunities in conflict-affected areas, and insufficient infrastructure to foster economic growth
- Entrenched informal economy
- Lack of access to education
- High unemployment / lack of livelihoods, especially among youth
- Lack of sustainable re-integration of ex-combatants
- Deteriorating social fabric due to the aftermath of conflict, continued endemic human rights violations, sexual violence and recruitment and use of children in armed forces and groups

5 – Regional actors addressing the legacy of two international armed conflicts that were fought on the territory of the DRC, with the

- Relations with Rwanda and impact on security and economic issues
- Relations with Uganda and impact/presence of LRA

· Relations with Angola

Potential risks to peace consolidation

In addition to the conflict drivers identified above, there exist a number of potential risks that could further destabilize the situation in DRC. These include:

- Collapse of integration process following non-payment of salaries and/or refusal of former rebel groups to re-deploy out of the Kivus
- Stalemate in the political process
- Deteriorating communal relations exacerbated by continued violence and human rights violations
- Land disputes created or exacerbated by the return of displaced populations
- Deterioration of relations with neighbouring countries
- Armed incursions by foreign armed forces or groups
- Social unrest caused or exploited by disenchanted political elites, particularly in the run-up to local elections and general elections in 2011
- Lack of political will and administrative capacity to implement reforms
- Impact of the decentralization process and its potential to upset the balance of power
- Acute fiscal crisis brought on by the global financial crisis and collapse of commodity prices
- Judicial pursuit of divisive figures such as Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda

Opportunities

In spite of the above challenges and risks, the UN System in the DRC recognizes important opportunities to achieve concrete and lasting results in peace consolidation. A successful general election, improved relations with key regional powers, and progress in dismantling illegal armed groups and parallel administrations represent significant steps forward and have paved the way for accelerated progress. The development of the UN System's first national peace consolidation strategy, in the form of the Integrated Strategic Framework, will better position the UN to take advantage of this important window of opportunity to achieve results for the people of DRC.

Note on mapping of country level frameworks

This note aims to give guidance and examples on how to undertake a mapping of frameworks as part of a strategic planning process.

When initiating a process of in country joint UN planning; a mapping of existing analysis, planning frameworks and strategies can be a very useful starting point to: (1) assist stakeholders to determine the level of strategic discussion required and to foster coordination; and (2) provide a useful first step towards achieving a coherent overview of the planning architecture in country.

A mapping is therefore useful in the preparatory and analytical stages of the strategic planning process.



Purpose

A mapping of existing planning frameworks serves different purposes:

- 1. **It identifies the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place** at both national level and within the international community including the UN family¹;
- 2. It provides an overview on how the various frameworks complement and build upon each other (or not);
- 3. It assists in **identifying any inconsistencies**, **overlaps or gaps** amongst the existing planning processes and the results articulated therein;
- 4. It allows planners to use the planning process as an **opportunity to build or enhance complementarity between different processes** and address gaps that might exist.

What to map?

In undertaking a mapping, the following aspects should be considered:

Scope of mapping: It is important to consider the inclusion of both national frameworks and those done in cooperation with international partners, as well as UN internal plans. Plans that refer to the UN response in country must be included and should take into account the full range of peacekeeping, humanitarian and development plans of the UN system. That way, an assessment of UN strategy will include a review of the wider framework within which the UN operates and can inform discussions on UN positioning. Examples: PRSP, peace agreements, UNDAF,

¹ The mapping should build on any tools or mapping exercises already undertaken in country. For example, in some countries UNDP assists the government in operating a Development Assistance Database (DAD) that captures information of a wide range of government, UN, national and international actors' activities in country that can be disaggregated by various parameters.

Mission mandate and planning frameworks (MIP, RBB etc), CHAPs (Humanitarian plans), cross-cutting sectoral strategies, and frameworks that have geographical focus.

Different planning processes will have different scopes and a different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so long as there is an overall coherence among them. Moreover, it is important to consider that certain foundational processes or documents (such as peace agreements, SC mandates) ought to be included in the mapping, even if not translated in planning processes as such, as they are a key part of the basis to determine priorities.

Time frame: It should be acknowledged at the outset that plans as they stand have different timeframes and therefore articulate results that are to be achieved along different time horizons. It is therefore important to decide how to deal with such discrepancies.

Results level: it must be determined at the outset at what level results (outcome/output/activity) should be reflected. The results level of each framework is likely to differ and therefore analysis must be done to determine how various frameworks correspond to each other.

Form: Mapping can take different forms and can be categorized in various ways. The most common types of mapping are categorized either on (A) the hierarchy of existing frameworks (B) along thematic areas of work, or (C) based on triggers of conflict. A mapping can start at any point of the results hierarchy of frameworks depending on what the mapping attempts to clarify.

Examples:

Based on hierarchy of results (in narrative)

Annex IV: Current UN Priorities for Guinea-Bissau

A number of exercises have been undertaken by the UN system and the Guinea Bissau authorities to identify the country's peace comolidation priorities as well as the appropriate UN response. The analysis of current "UN priorities" for the country is based on the following

- Secretary general reports to the Security Council (latest: 2 December 2008), and the ted 10 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (\$/2008/777)
- UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2008-2012)
- Strategic framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (2008)
- Report of the UN Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau (2008)
- Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP, 2009)

Current priorities by strategic document.

The latest Secretary General's report emphasizes the positive developments on the electoral front, with the successful holding of legislative elections in November 2008. It stresses the importance of strengthening UN support in SSR, especially following the October 2008 Inter-Agency mission, and of improving the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, seen as "highly detrimental to the consolidation of the rule of law, peace and stability in the region" Finally, it recognizes that "overall social and economic indi cators for the country still remain

The Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/777) clearly spells out the mandate of UNOGBES in Guinea-Bissau:

- "(a) assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its multidimensional engagement with Guinea-Bissau;
- (b) strengthening the capacities of national institutions, including law enforcement and criminal sustice systems, in order to maintain constitutional order
- (c) supporting an all-inclusive national reconciliation and political dialogue process as an
- institutionalized peace consolidation framework
- (d) supporting and facilitating the implementation of security sector reform;

Based on hierarchy of results (in matrix)

Included in both STERP and 100 day plan Included in STERP but not in 100 day plan Included in 100 day plan but not in STERP Included in needs assessment or CAP/CHAP but not in STERP or 100 day plan IN GPA BUT NOT IN STERP AND/OR 100 DAY PLAN IN GPA AND ALSO IN STEPR AND/OR 100 DAY PLAN

Clusters	Global Political Agreement (GPA)	STERP Sectors	100 Day Plan Sectors	CAP/CHAP Sectors ¹	Needs Assessment Sectors
Overarching issues (STERP: Cross Cutting Issues)	- ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME	- Support to GPA - Regional integration - Environment - Research, science and technology - Diaspora and brain drain - Youth development - Engagement of the international community (debt) - Investment			- Environment - Gender - HIV/AIDS - Youth

Based on thematic areas of work (schematic overview) Ovil service is reformed and transformed into Justice system ristormed and reorganized in line with new Advice to strengthen institutions at all assistance, justice, nal HR of human rights apacities to deliver social Promote the rule in place in pilot areas mensitry -training of child -Training to 800 restoration of legitimate authority and the SV protection and Ryla Ta Znomyoligo певропов SERVAL VIOLENCE (authorities Promote national reconciliation ystem -Training to women's againstations to influence ocial expenditures at local and internal political dialogue Depley dell including strengthening chill society and multi-party democracy and support to G application of 2006 Support implication of state authorities and shell society in management and pracetures obtion of local confirm. cracy and support to Goma s Nairobi processes Community radio states estice for 5V impunity Actions Spe S'o' wir time. Recal conflicts Capacitus futate eustrations and CBOS to deliver basic services eucrossed and area: Create a protective Training to local officials on a sector, clacking data of retection from SV

How to map

The process of mapping will depend on the specific context and the number of analytical and planning processes and documents which need to be considered. However, in general, such a process would entail:

Trilling to officials in public econd offices

1. Listing of existing frameworks:

Develop national

- Can be done through a desk review and gathering of documents
- Estimated time frame: 3-4 days

2. Determine strategic linkages:

- Establish results level (outcome/output/activity) of each framework and determine how the results correspond to each other.
- Requires an analytical review of the different processes and documents
- It may be useful to base this on a discussion amongst key partners to ensure ownership
- Could feed into the senior level discussion on identification of gaps, overlaps, contradictions, etc.
- Can be done through a matrix or any other format
- Estimated time frame: 1-2 weeks

3. Gap analysis:

- Identify areas where the frameworks overlap or show gaps
- Can be used to prepare the ground for the planning and use the actual planning process to reconcile differences, build upon commonalities and as much as possible address gaps.

4. Consideration of thematic issues:

• If extensive planning or analytical processes and documents related to a specific thematic issue(s) exist in country, a mapping of thematic issues is recommended.

Guidance on Mapping Existing Frameworks

A mapping of existing frameworks and strategies can be a very useful starting point to get an overview of strategic frameworks that are in place both at national, level, within the UN family and frameworks in place with a wider range of international partners.

A mapping should consider the following aspects:

Scope: depending on the purpose of the mapping, a range of various frameworks may have to be taken into account. It is important to consider the inclusion of both national frameworks and those done in cooperation with international partners, as well as UN internal plans. Plans that refer to the UN response in country must be included and should take into account the full range of peacekeeping, humanitarian and development plans of the UN system. That way, an assessment of UN strategy will include a review of the wider framework within which the UN operates and can inform discussions on UN positioning. Examples: PRSP, UNDAF, Mission mandate and planning frameworks (MIP, RBB etc), CHAPs (Humanitarian plans), cross-cutting sectoral strategies, and frameworks that have geographical focus etc.

Time frame: It should be acknowledged at the outset that plans as they stand have different timeframes and therefore articulate results that are to be achieved along different time horizons.

Results level: it must be determined at the outset at what level results should be reflected. It is also important to determine strategic level (outcome/output/activity) of each framework and determine how various frameworks correspond to each other.

Mapping can take different forms, basing the categorization on the frameworks, or working along thematic lines.

Description of process:

- 1. Listing of existing frameworks
- 2. Determine strategic level (outcome/output/activity) of each framework and determine how correspond to each other.
- 3. Determine scope each framework (from intro)
- 4. Do a mapping of thematic issues (substance)
- 5. Analyze existing frameworks : docs, substance, level and scope
- 6. Identify commonalities and contradictions and GAPS in frameworks
- 7. Use mapping to articulate the:
 - a) Harmonization of the hierarchy of results,
 - b) Solve the contradictions, fill the gaps
 - c) Set priorities
 - d) Mapping of UN capacity needed to fulfill

ISF Development Road Map

Draft as of 9 September 2009

What	Deadline	Who
Strategic Management Retreat	03.09.09	Senior
		managers
Desk review of UN strategic frameworks to help define ISF scope and	10.09.09	HQ mission
gaps		
Synthesis of DRC conflict analysis	10.09.09	HQ mission
Development of ISF template and guidance	10.09.09	HQ mission
Development of guidance for thematic working groups	Draft by	HQ mission
	10.09.09	
Identification/validation of ISF components/strategic objectives	11.09.09	IMPT
Formation of thematic groups for each ISF component/strategic	11.09.09	IMPT
objective and identification of chairs/co-chairs and members		
Senior Managers discuss ISF with national and international partners ¹	15.09.09-	SRSG,
	15.10.09	DSRSGs
Thematic working groups define strategy, results for each strategic	15-	Thematic WGs
objective/component and establish priorities for year 1 and years 2-3	22.09.09	& HQ mission
(see separate guidance)		
Chairs/co-chairs of Thematic Working Group present consolidated	22.09.09	Thematic WGs
inputs to ISF secretariat		
ISF secretariat presents Zero Draft ISF to IMPT	24.09.09	ISF Secretariat
ISF secretariat revises Zero Draft based on feedback; circulates to	01.10.09	ISF Secretariat
IMPT		
IMTF discusses Draft 1 ISF with IMPT	08.10.09	IMTF/IMPT
Development of ISF monitoring framework	01-	ISF Secretariat
	15.10.09	
ISF secretariat presents Draft 2 ISF and monitoring framework to	15.10.09	ISF secretariat
Principals IMPT		
IMTF endorses final draft ISF	22.10.09	IMTF
USG DPKO endorses final draft ISF	29.10.09	
IMTF prepares Policy Committee deliberations and communicates	29.10.09 -	IMTF
results of ISF as part of background documentation	15.11.09	
Policy Committee endorses DRC ISF	17.11.09	Policy
		Committee

Note: Complementary action plans for communications and resource mobilization will be developed.

¹ See also ISF communications action plan, under development

Draft Outline: DRC Integrated Strategic Framework 9 September 2009

Shared vision

- 1. Situation analysis: Narrative analysis (no more than 2 pages) on conflict factors along with associated assumptions, risks, and contingencies. This aims to ensure that the document is sufficiently dynamic and, therefore, flexible enough to address issues in the peace consolidation process as they arise. A reflection on the different phases of the conflict throughout the DRC (e.g. east, west) should be included.
- 2. Legacy of the UN in DRC and the road ahead in the next three years: Narrative analysis (no more than 1 page) of the main accomplishments of MONUC and the UNCT since 1999, parameters for MONUC's reconfiguration and scaling-up of UNCT, and expectations for an enhanced role of local actors. Likewise, this section should also highlight the key requirements to maintain the UN's legacy and move forward to transitional arrangements.
- 3. Summary: Description of the peace consolidation end state that the UN seeks to achieve over the next three years (2010-2012) expressed as a measurable, achievable, sustainable change in country situation and people's lives. This may broadly reflect the contributions of the entire UN system in DRC (e.g. peacekeeping, human rights, development, and humanitarian aspects).

Example end state: "A state that controls its borders with public administration, basic services, security, and justice deployed in all provinces"

Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities

- 4. Overall approach: The strategic objectives and results are the main element of the ISF (maximum 10 pages) and collectively represent the peace consolidation scope of the strategy. Thus, the ISF's strategic objectives and results should not represent the sum total of the UN's activities in DRC, but rather are limited to the peace stabilization/consolidation priorities for the next three years. Moreover, concerns about humanitarian space should be taken into consideration. This section should also explain the need for a varied approach for conflict-affected vs. recovery areas and refer to the collaborative development process for the ISF.
- 4. Strategic Objectives: Each of the four thematic areas (e.g. governance and state authority, security and territorial integrity, protection of civilians, recovery and development) should be expressed as a strategic objective. Each strategic objective should have a unique narrative of no more than 1.5 pages explaining **what** is to be achieved, **why** it is a priority, and **how** it will be done. The following should be included in this narrative:
 - What: description of what is to be achieved under this objective
 - Why:
 - basis for its prioritization, including how it builds on or reinforces priorities in existing strategies, where relevant
 - description of the UN's comparative advantage and operational capacity
 - o the complementary work of other national/international partners
 - How:
 - a statement of "strategy" addressing how the objective will be pursued using the political and operational mandate of the UN (may specify different approaches for conflict-affected vs. recovery areas)
 - o how this strategic objective is linked to other elements of the ISF
 - o key risks/challenges and how they will be addressed/mitigated
 - description of arrangements for a joint UN approach in this area (e.g. joint programmes, coordination structures, joint offices/teams, pooled funds), as appropriate

- o how cross-cutting themes will be addressed
- 5. Results: Each Strategic Objective should have related set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF "outcome" or RBB "expected accomplishment"). Each result should also have 1-3 priority outputs. These results may, in some circumstances, be specific for certain geographic areas of DRC. Key operational partners should be identified for each result and each priority output. In some cases, special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented, in particular when new arrangements are to be undertaken.

Coordination and Implementation

6. This section should describe (one page maximum) the overall coordination and implementation arrangements for the ISF and the role of the ISF vis-à-vis other strategies and planning tools currently in use by the UN (diagram suggested). Coordination arrangements should reflect the various levels of the IMPT and/or thematic groups and recommend the frequency of meetings for these groups.

Monitoring Progress

7. This section should establish the frequency for reporting against the ISF (e.g. monthly, quarterly), how progress reports will be reviewed (e.g. IMPT, IMTF), how data and analysis will be collected, and how existing capacities will be leveraged to collect this data and analysis. <u>An agreed monitoring framework should be annexed to the ISF.</u>

DRAFT September 2008 Update Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC

Goma Process and Nairobi Communiqué:

- > The Goma process is seriously challenged since the resumption of military confrontations on 28 August. A unilateral CNDP commitment to pull back to its original positions (pre-28 August) was followed by a Minister of Defense Communiqué also committing to a Cease-Fire for the FARDC. Yet, throughout the month of September, CNDP and FARDC continued to confront each other along several axis and proximity points in North Kivu and along the fringes of South Kivu Province.
- > Despite this phase of escalation, the GoDRC remains committed to the Amani program, but CNDP now openly started rejecting Amani and insists on direct talks with the GoDRC.
- MONUC, backed by the International Facilitation, imposed a Separation and Disengagement Plan for all signatories of the Actes d'Engagement. The SRSG will approach the Security Council to ask for formal approval of this new approach, which is dubbed Amani Plus.
- > Following the Comite d'Pilotage for the Amani Programme, fast-tracking DDR, opening the strategic axes, deploying the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and extending state authority in South Kivu, in the Grand Nord and in Maniema has been prioritized in coordination with the PNDDR.
- > The fighting in North and South Kivu is a temporary setback for the Nairobi Communiqué and especially Operation Kimia, after the Integrated and Trained Battalions of the FARDC are drawn into the combat zone in North Kivu and are moved away from the Triangles. No new FARDC battalions have joined the training centers.
- > There is not much progress on the 70 Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR/RUD) combatants in the regroupement center in Kasiki although MONUC reaches an agreement in principle with the GoDRC representatives for the Kisangani Road Map on an incentive package for FDLR who repatriate/relocate under the Program.
- > Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo did not improve during the month and mutual accusations are exchanged in media articles; President Kagame and President Kabila accuse one and other through media channels as well.

Security:

- ➤ The security situation is far from stable as long as there is no cease fire in North Kivu and Separation and Disengagement are not implemented. A flaring up of attacks by the FRPI in Ituri against the FARDC forces MONUC to use its attack helicopters and puts more strains on the FARDC, after Ituri zone Operations Commander Kinkela left to North Kivu to reinforce the 8TH Military Region.
- > The LRA are changing their modus operandi in DR Congo and stage a series of raids against soft targets in Dungu, west of the Garamba Park. The FARDC experiences serious delays in the deployment of FARDC to the Dungu. 2 Battalions of GR arrive in Kisangani but their transportation to Dungu is hampered by financial constraints.
- > Demonstrations and violent mob attacks against MONUC peacekeepers become routine and spread from Rutshuru to Goma and other parts of the Kivu Provinces. Country-wide, politicians campaign against MONUC and voice their disappointment with the slow pace of the Amani Process.

State Authority, return and recovery:

- Activities for the rehabilitation of roads and infrastructure have had to be partially suspended in North Kivu due to the security situation along those areas. Meanwhile, focus is turning to South Kivu were road rehabilitation is expected to commence in the coming weeks. Efforts to link DDR activities in the province with the extension of state authority and community reintegration activities are being made.
- The police and border police components continue to make progress in the planning and preparedness for the deployment of the PNC, including the possibility of deployment in the non-militarized zones that will need to be created as part of the disengagement plan.
- > The forth component is being revised to extend conflict resolution and recovery activities along the axes. This re-conceptualization is intended to quick-start fourth component activities in a more synchronized, rather than sequential manner, with activities implemented in the other components and therefore accelerate peace dividends for the population living in those areas.

Sub-component	Impact Indicators	September Developments	Status	Management Intervention
FARDC capability improves	 Number of FARDC battalions in TTF Facility Number of effective FARDC battalions in the Kivus 	 The courses planned at MONUC's two training facilities expected to take place in September had to be postponed until October due to the non arrival of FARDC battalions to the training site. The FARDC Command and control structure was tested by CNDP operations in North Kivu during the month of September with some set backs. However, on-going operations are having the positive effect of permitting an identification of capable FARDC commanders and experience is being gained. The lack of bi-lateral agreements to provide vehicles and radios for post-brassage and post Military Training Program (MTP) battalions remains a key limitation on capability improvement of the FARDC in the Kivus. 	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is required	SRSG and FC to persuade MoD and Chef de l'Etat Major to commit battalions to MONUC training and to site garrisons along the strategic axes SRSG to seek support from the international community for bilateral equipment support to FARDC (Vehicles and communication equipment)

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Annex 13			IMPP G	uidelines for the	Field
Armed groups are encouraged to negotiate	Number of F/battalions acengaged in operations agarmed group Kivus	tively gainst	LRA: One FARDC battalion is currently in Dungu and patrolling further afield which has sparked an increase in LRA violations. The remaining two GoDRC battalions are currently held in Kisangani for lack of transport means. ADF / NALU: Operations against the ADF/NALU were delayed due to the transfer of FARDC commander and the battalion that had been allocated to the North being redirected to other areas in North Kivu. FDLR: There were almost no operations carried out against the FDLR as three out of the eight FARDC battalions have been reassigned to operations against CNDP. The three additional battalions due to join the operations in September have not yet arrived.	Yellow: Some progress has been made	
Armed militia enter brassage or DDR/DDRRR	Number of excombatants a DDR or DDR! Number of excombatants a brassage Number of chreleased from groups	entering RR (- awaiting	Since the implementation of the Nairobi Communiqué, 862 FDLR including dependents, have been repatriated to Rwanda by MONUC. 1109 militia are assembled at Kitona, 2896 at Kamina and 1766 at Lukusa brassage centres awaiting training. Training is said not to be able to start until the number of candidates in the centers reaches 3000. 932 FARDC are at Mura undergoing training by RSA for the Rapid Reaction Force with postponed date of completion fixed on the 03 October 2008. The launching of PNDDR is expected to commence on the 3 October 2008. Intense discussions have been taking place to link the need of accelerating DDR activities with decisions being made in Amani Steering Committee. Focus is placed on prioritizing South Kivu and Maniema. A mapping of ongoing reinsertion and recovery activities for noneligible combatants is underway.	Yellow: Some progress has been made	SRSG and DSRSG to meet with the Chairman of the Amani Programme and with the Head of the UE/PNDDR to coordinate and align efforts on the resumption of DDR activities.
At-risk populations are protected, cease- fires monitored and checkpoints dismantled	 Number of ce violations Number of checkpoints dismantled 	easefire >	Continued, extensive Cease-fire violations were registered throughout September as the FARDC and CNDP both seek tactical advantage and ignore the ceasefire. FDLR and PARECO have also, but to a lesser extent, exploited the instability. Firm MONUC action has protected the main population centers and MONUC MOBs have provided a haven for IDPs. Nevertheless CNDP and FARDC actions have resulted in an increase in IDPs populations in the Petit Nord.	Yellow: Some progress has been made but intervention is required	
Spoilers are identified and sanctioned	 Number of sp whose assets been frozen Number of genocidaires arrested Number of FI leaders locall abroad with t restrictions Number of sp facing judicia financial proceedings 	DLR y and ravel poilers I and/or	attacks on villages north of Dungu. Abducting approximately 90 children, killing around 20 people as well as looted and burned the villages. The attacks has led to displacement of the population of an estimate of 75 000 persons. The deterioration of the situation along the axis Bunia-Boga, due to a sudden resurrection of a strong FRPI (using new weapons such as 82 mm mortars) suggests renewed outside support for militia in Ituri, a process that could compromise the gains made.	Red: Limited progress made despite efforts	SRSG to meet with SESG for LRA Affected areas. Rapid implementation of the FARDC deployment under 'Operation Rudia', for containment and protection of civilians. FC to encourage and participate in trilateral Chief of Staff meetings (DRC, Ugandan and Sudan).

the identification of land for construction of state infrastructure. Final authorizations and

has continued

processed

Percentage decrease in number of pretrial detainees

Annex 13

State representatives are deployed

- Number of legally recognized state representatives deployed
- Number of state offices rehabilitated
- Number of local security councils operational
- An analytical report and database of the administrative posts occupied by armed groups (parallel administration) have been completed and shared with provincial Ministries of Interior in the Kivus and is still under progress in Ituri. Basic data has been transmitted to the Amani Program.
- The selection of administrative entities to rehabilitate and support along the 6 strategic axes has been streamlined with existing legal framework and is being discussed and validated with provincial, then national authorities.
- A final detailed action plan and schedule of activities are under preparation.
- A comparative analysis of the AMANI component "restoration and extension of State authority" and UNSSS objectives and activities has been done.
- Support from the Congolese authorities is being requested on the following issues:
 - Validation of UNSSSS action plan on restoration and extension of State authority.
 - Clarification of the legal status of "Chefs de Poste d'Encadrement Administratif" (CPEA).
 - Validation of the type and number of administrative services and civil servants to be deployed.
 - Validation of buildings prototypes per administrative unit ("Territoire" and "Groupement").
 - Issuance of title deeds and proof of ownership.
 - Coordination identification, appointments and deployment mechanisms for civil servants.
 - 7. Definition of the minimum kit for equipments to be delivered to administrative services.
 - 8. Validation of capacity building activities for deployed civil servants.
 - 9. Reliable and effective salary payment system for deployed civil servants.
- Pre-deployment reconnaissance of all future Border Police Stations has been completed. Based on this exercise, the structure of the border police in North and South Kivu will be the following:
- North Kivu:
 - 1. Provincial headquarters Goma
 - 2. Beni (5 posts)
 - 3. Rutshuru (3 posts)
 - 4. Goma (4 posts)
- South Kivu:
 - 5. Provincial headquarters Bukavu
 - 6. Kalehe (5 posts)
 - 7. Bukavu (6 posts)
 - 8. Uvira (6 posts)
 - 9. Baraka (6 posts)
 - Specialized Training Center Bukavu (works completed)
- ➤ The pre-fabricated containers that will serve as border police offices in these 32 locations are already prepositioned in Bukavu and will be transported to their final locations within the



Yellow: Work has continued



Yellow: Work has continued

Border police are deployed

- Number of Border Police deployed
- Number of criminal incidents reported along eastern borders

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IMPP Guidelines for the Field

Annex 13		IIVIPP G	uidelines for the Fleid
	>	coming month. The training of the PNC officers to be deployed is expected to take place in the coming weeks.	
Return and recovery		A technical commission between Rwanda-HCR-DRC was supposed to meet in Goma on the 24-26 September as scheduled by the tripartite meeting held in July in Kigali. However, due to the situation prevailing in the Kivus, the Rwandan authorities did not respond to the invitation and the expected meeting had to be cancelled. Fighting in North Kivu has made several locations, including Karuba and Ngungu, nondurable for the return of IDPs again after initial assessments had taken place in order to launch activities on the priority axes in previous months. In Ituri and South Kivu certain areas on the priority axes do meet established benchmarks for durable return Returnee families continue to receive NFI kits in Ituri, North Kivu, Katanga and South Kivu from UNICEF as part of PEAR programme. UNICEF, UNDP and FAO are preparing a joint project to the Dutch Government to support social and economic recovery along the UNSSSS priority axes in South Kivu. Most return areas targeted as part of plan still lack basic services in health, education and water and sanitation. The fourth component is currently being reformulated to include increased transitional and recovery activities along the axes. A proposal is being developed in this regard in view of commencing activities before the end of the year.	Red: Limited progress made despite efforts. The security environment is not conducive