

核兵器の不拡散に関する条約

この条約を締結する国（以下「締約国」という。）は、

核戦争が全人類に惨害をもたらすものであり、したがって、このような戦争の危険を回避するためにあらゆる努力を払い、及び人民の安全を保障するための措置をとることが必要であることを考慮し、

核兵器の拡散が核戦争の危険を著しく増大させるものであることを信じ、

核兵器の一層広範にわたる分散の防止に関する協定を締結することを要請する国際連合総会の諸決議に従い、

平和的な原子力活動に対する国際原子力機関の保障措置の適用を容易にすることについて協力することを約束し、

一定の枢要な箇所において機器その他の技術的手段を使用することにより原料物質及び特殊核分裂性物質の移動に対して効果的に保障措置を適用するという原則を、国際原子力機関の保障措置制度のわく内で適用することを促進するための研究、開発その他の努力に対する支持を表明し、

核技術の平和的応用の利益（核兵器国が核爆発装置の開発から得ることができるすべての技術上の副産物を含む。）が、平和的目的のため、すべての締約国（核兵器国であるか非核兵器国であるかを問わない。）に提供されるべきであるという原則を確認し、

この原則を適用するに当たり、すべての締約国が、平和的目的のための原子力の応用を一層発展させるため可能な最大限度まで科学的情報を交換することに参加し、及び単独で又は他の国と協力してその応用の一層の発展に貢献する権利を有することを確信し、

核軍備競争の停止をできる限り早期に達成し、及び核軍備の縮小の方向で効果的な措置をとる意図を宣言し、

この目的の達成についてすべての国が協力することを要請し、

千九百六十三年の大気圏内、宇宙空間及び水中における核兵器実験を禁止する条約の締約国が、同条約前文において、核兵器のすべての実験的爆発の永久的停止の達成を求め及びそのために交渉を継続する決意を表明したことを想起し、

厳重かつ効果的な国際管理の下における全面的かつ完全な軍備縮小に関する条約に基づき核兵器の製造を停止し、貯蔵されたすべての核兵器を廃棄し、並びに諸国の軍備から核兵器及びその運搬手段を除去することを容易にするため、国際間の緊張の緩和及び諸国間の信頼の強化を促進することを希望し、

諸国が、国際連合憲章に従い、その国際関係において、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使を、いかなる国の領土保全又は政治的独立に対するものも、また、国際連合の目的と両立しない他のいかなる方法によるものも慎まなければならないこと並びに国際の平和及び安全の確立及び維持が世界の人的及び経済的資源の軍備のための転用を最も少なくして促進されなければならないことを想起して、

次のとおり協定した。

第一条

締約国である各核兵器国は、核兵器その他の核爆発装置又はその管理をいかなる者に対しても直接又は間接に移譲しないこと及び核兵器その他の核爆発装置の製造若しくはその他の方法による取得又は核兵器その他の核爆発装置の管理の取得につきいかなる非核兵器国に対しても何ら援助、奨励又は勧誘を行わないことを約束する。

第二条

締約国である各非核兵器国は、核兵器その他の核爆発装置又はその管理をいかなる者からも直接又は間接に受領しないこと、核兵器その他の核爆発装置を製造せず又はその他の方法によって取得しないこと及び核兵器その他の核爆発装置の製造についていかなる援助をも求めず又は受けないことを約束する。

第三条

1 締約国である各非核兵器国は、原子力が平和的利用から核兵器その他の核爆発装置に転用されることを防止するため、この条約に基づいて負う義務の履行を確認することのみを目的として国際原子力機関憲章及び国際原子力機関の保障措置制度に従い国際原子力機関との間で交渉しかつ締結する協定に定められる保障措置を受諾することを約束する。この条の規定によって必要とされる保障措置の手続は、原料物質又は特殊核分裂性物質につき、それが主要な原子力施設において生産され、処理され若しくは使用されているか又は主要な原子力施設の外にあるかを問わず、遵守しなければならない。この条の規定によって必要とされる保障措置は、当該非核兵器国の領域内若しくはその管轄下で又は場所のいかんを問わずその管理の下で行われるすべての平和的な原子力活動に係るすべての原料物質及び特殊核分裂性物質につき、適用される。

2 各締約国は、(a) 原料物質若しくは特殊核分裂性物質又は (b) 特殊核分裂性物質の処理、使用若しくは生産のために特に設計され若しくは作成された設備若しくは資材を、この条の規

定によって必要とされる保障措置が当該原料物質又は当該特殊核分裂性物質について適用されない限り、平和的目的のためいかなる非核兵器国にも供給しないことを約束する。

3 この条の規定によって必要とされる保障措置は、この条の規定及び前文に規定する保障措置の原則に従い、次条の規定に適合する態様で、かつ、締約国の経済的若しくは技術的發展又は平和的な原子力活動の分野における国際協力（平和的目的のため、核物質及びその処理、使用又は生産のための設備を国際的に交換することを含む。）を妨げないような態様で、実施するものとする。

4 締約国である非核兵器国は、この条に定める要件を満たすため、国際原子力機関憲章に従い、個々に又は他の国と共同して国際原子力機関と協定を締結するものとする。その協定の交渉は、この条約が最初に効力を生じた時から百八十日以内に開始しなければならない。この百八十日の期間の後に批准書又は加入書を寄託する国については、その協定の交渉は、当該寄託の日までに開始しなければならない。その協定は、交渉開始の日の後十八箇月以内に効力を生ずるものとする。

第四条

1 この条約のいかなる規定も、無差別にかつ第一条及び第二条の規定に従って平和的目的のための原子力の研究、生産及び利用を進展させることについてのすべての締約国の奪い得ない権利に影響を及ぼすものと解してはならない。

2 すべての締約国は、原子力の平和的利用のため設備、資材並びに科学的及び技術的情報を可能な最大限度まで交換することを容易にすることを約束し、また、その交換に参加する権利を有する。締約国は、また、可能なときは、単独で又は他の国若しくは国際機関と共同して、世界の開発途上にある地域の必要に妥当な考慮を払って、平和的目的のための原子力の応用、特に締約国である非核兵器国の領域におけるその応用の一層の発展に貢献することに協力する。

第五条

各締約国は、核爆発のあらゆる平和的応用から生ずることのある利益が、この条約に従い適当な国際的監視の下でかつ適当な国際的手続により無差別の原則に基づいて締約国である非核兵器国に提供されること並びに使用される爆発装置についてその非核兵器国の負担する費用ができる限り低額であり、かつ、研究及び開発のためのいかなる費用をも含まないことを確保するため、適当な措置をとることを約束する。締約国である非核兵器国は、特別の国際協定に従い、非核兵器国が十分に代表されている適当な国際機関を通じてこのような利益を享受することができる。この問題に関する交渉は、この条約が効力を生じた後できる限り速やかに開始するものとする。締約国である非核兵器国は、希望するときは、二国間協定によってもこのような利益を享受することができる。

第六条

各締約国は、核軍備競争の早期の停止及び核軍備の縮小に関する効果的な措置につき、並びに厳重かつ効果的な国際管理の下における全面的かつ完全な軍備縮小に関する条約について、誠実に交渉を行うことを約束する。

第七条

この条約のいかなる規定も、国の集団がそれらの国の領域に全く核兵器の存在しないことを確保するため地域的な条約を締結する権利に対し、影響を及ぼすものではない。

第八条

1 いずれの締約国も、この条約の改正を提案することができる。改正案は、寄託国政府に提出するものとし、寄託国政府は、これをすべての締約国に配布する。その後、締約国の三分の一以上の要請があつたときは、寄託国政府は、その改正を審議するため、すべての締約国を招請して会議を開催する。

2 この条約のいかなる改正も、すべての締約国の過半数の票（締約国であるすべての核兵器国の票及び改正案が配布された日に国際原子力機関の理事国である他のすべての締約国の票を含む。）による議決で承認されなければならない。その改正は、すべての締約国の過半数の改正の批准書（締約国であるすべての核兵器国の改正の批准書及び改正案が配布された日に国際原子力機関の理事国である他のすべての締約国の改正の批准書を含む。）が寄託された時に、その批准書を寄託した各締約国について効力を生ずる。その後は、改正は、改正の批准書を寄託する他のいずれの締約国についても、その寄託の時に効力を生ずる。

3 前文の目的の実現及びこの条約の規定の遵守を確保するようにこの条約の運用を検討するため、この条約の効力発生五年後にスイスのジュネーヴで締約国の会議を開催する。その後五年ごとに、締約国の過半数が寄託国政府に提案する場合には、条約の運用を検討するという同様の目的をもって、更に会議を開催する。

第九条

1 この条約は、署名のためすべての国に開放される。この条約が3の規定に従って効力を生ずる前にこの条約に署名しない国は、いつでもこの条約に加入することができる。

2 この条約は、署名国によって批准されなければならない。批准書及び加入書は、ここに寄託国政府として指定されるグレート・ブリテン及び北部アイルランド連合王国、ソヴィエト社会主義共和国連邦及びアメリカ合衆国の政府に寄託する。

3 この条約は、その政府が条約の寄託者として指定される国及びこの条約の署名国である他の四十の国が批准しかつその批准書を寄託した後に、効力を生ずる。この条約の適用上、「核兵器国」とは、千九百六十七年一月一日前に核兵器その他の核爆発装置を製造しかつ爆発させた国をいう。

4 この条約は、その効力発生後に批准書又は加入書を寄託する国については、その批准書又は加入書の寄託の日に効力を生ずる。

5 寄託国政府は、すべての署名国及び加入国に対し、各署名の日、各批准書又は各加入書の寄託の日、この条約の効力発生の日、会議の開催の要請を受領した日及び他の通知を速やかに通報する。

6 この条約は、寄託国政府が国際連合憲章第二百二条の規定に従って登録する。

第十条

1 各締約国は、この条約の対象である事項に関連する異常な事態が自国の至高の利益を危うくしていると認める場合には、その主権を行使してこの条約から脱退する権利を有する。当該締約国は、他のすべての締約国及び国際連合安全保障理事会に対し三箇月前にその脱退を通知する。その通知には、自国の至高の利益を危うくしていると認める異常な事態についても記載しなければならない。

2 この条約の効力発生の二十五年後に、条約が無期限に効力を有するか追加の一定期間延長されるかを決定するため、会議を開催する。その決定は、締約国の過半数による議決で行う。

第十一条

この条約は、英語、ロシア語、フランス語、スペイン語及び中国語をひとしく正文とし、寄託国政府に寄託される。この条約の認証謄本は、寄託国政府が署名国政府及び加入国政府に送付する。

以上の証拠として、下名は、正当に委任を受けてこの条約に署名した。千九百六十八年七月一日にロンドン市、モスクワ市及びワシントン市で本書三通を作成した。

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy

Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

条約署名の際の日本国政府声明

(1970年2月3日)

日本国政府は、核兵器の拡散が核戦争の危険を増大させると信じており、核兵器の拡散を防止することは世界平和維持に関する日本国政府の政策と一致するものであるので、この条約の精神に賛成してきた。

日本国政府は、以下に述べる基本的考え方に基づきこの条約に署名する。

日本国政府は、この条約が核軍縮の第一歩になるものと確信し、またこの条約を効果あらしめるため、できるだけ多くの国がこの条約に参加することを望むものである。特に、核兵器を保有していながら、未だこの条約に参加の意図を示していないフランス共和国政府及び中華人民共和国政府が速やかに条約に参加して、核軍縮のための交渉を誠実に行なうよう希望するが、それまでの間でも、この条約の目的に反するような行動をとらないよう希望する。

この条約は現在の核兵器国に対してのみ核兵器の保有を認めるものである。このような差別はすべての核兵器国が核兵器を自国の軍備から撤廃することによって窮極的には解消されなければならないものであるが、それまでの間核兵器国は特別な地位にあると同時に特別の責任を負うものであるとの自覚がなければならない。

この条約は、核兵器その他の核爆発装置又はその管理の取得のみを禁止の対象とするものである。従って、非核兵器国は、この条約によって、原子力平和利用の研究、開発、実施及びこれらのための国際協力をいかなる意味においても妨げられてはならないし、これらの活動のいかなる面においても差別的な取扱いをされてはならない。

日本国政府は、以上の基本的考え方に基づき次の諸点に強い関心を有することを表明する。

これらの問題は、日本国政府が本条約を批准するに当り、また将来条約締約国として条約運用の再検討に参加する際においても、強い関心を払うであろうことを強調する。

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed,

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

Universality

1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

Non-proliferation

2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed.

6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.

7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols.

Security assurances

8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the

Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account.

17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in

waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

Resolution on the Middle East

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992,^{a/} affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. _____ Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;
2. _____ Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference "call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities";
3. _____ Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full- scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
4. _____ Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
5. _____ Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and

to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. _____ Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

STRENGTHENING THE REVIEW PROCESS FOR THE TREATY

1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.
3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference.
4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.
5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.
6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.
7. The Conference further agreed that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

EXTENSION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference,

Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,

Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

2000 年 NPT 運用検討会議最終文書案の概要

(2000年5月19日第6回NPT運用検討会議で採択)

I 核軍縮

NPT 運用検討会議（以下、会議）は、NPT 第6条及び「核不拡散と核軍縮の原則と目標」（以下、原則と目標）第3及び4項(C)（核軍縮に向けた努力）を実施するための制度的及び漸進的な努力にかかる以下の実際の措置に同意した。

- (1) CTBT 早期発効
- (2) CTBT 発効までの核実験モラトリアム
- (3) 軍縮会議にカットオフ条約の即時交渉開始及び5年以内の妥結を含む作業計画に合意することを奨励
- (4) 軍縮会議において核軍縮を扱う適切な補助機関の即時設置を奨励。
- (5) 核兵器及びその他の軍備管理・削減措置への「不可逆性の原則」の適用
- (6) 核兵器の全面廃絶に対する核兵器国の明確な約束
- (7) START II 早期発効及びその完全な実施、速やかな START III 妥結、ABM 条約の維持・強化
- (8) IAEA・米ロ間の3者協定の妥結・実施
- (9) 国際的な安定を推進し、すべての国の安全が損なわれないことを原則として核兵器国が核軍縮に向けて取る措置
 - ・核兵器国による一方的核削減のための更なる努力
 - ・核兵器能力及び軍縮協定実施についての「透明性」の強化
 - ・非戦略核兵器の一層の削減（国際平和と安定の推進に資するための、一方的なイニシアティブを踏まえた、及び全体の核兵器削減措置の不可分な措置）
 - ・核兵器システムの運用ステータスの一層の低減のための具体的な合意措置
 - ・安全保障政策における核兵器の役割の低減（核兵器の使用のリスクを最小限に抑え、核兵器廃絶を促進するための措置）
 - ・すべての核兵器国による核廃絶に向けたプロセスへの関与
- (10) 余剰核分裂性物質の IAEA 等による国際管理、及び同物質の処分
 - (11) 軍縮の究極的目標が実効的な国際管理の下での全面完全軍縮であることの再確認
 - (12) NPT 第6条及び「原則と目標」（核軍縮努力）の実施についての定期的な情報提供（ICJ 勧告的意見を想起した措置）
 - (13) 核軍縮のための検証能力の向上

II 核不拡散

1. 保障措置

- ・国際原子力機関（IAEA）の保障措置は、核不拡散体制の基本であること、また、保障措置の強化と効率化の重要性を確認。
- ・包括的保障措置協定の未締結国の早期締結、全ての締約国による追加議定書の早

期締結を推奨。特に、追加議定書などの締結促進のため、ＩＡＥＡに対して行動計画などの措置を検討するよう勧告。

- ・ ＮＰＴ非加盟国（キューバ、イスラエル、インド、パキスタン）に対し、ＮＰＴへの早期加盟、包括的保障措置協定及び追加議定書の早期締結を要請。
- ・ 包括的保障措置協定と追加議定書は統合保障措置として、一体として扱われるべきことを確認するとともに、統合保障措置概念の検討作業を優先的に進めることを推奨。
- ・ 新たな非核地帯の創設を歓迎するとともに、特に、中央アジア非核地帯条約構想の早期締結に向けた動きを歓迎。
- ・ 核兵器国における軍事用に不要となった余剰核物質に関しては、早急にＩＡＥＡ等の検認の下におかれるべきことを強調。
- ・ ＩＡＥＡが保障措置活動の責任をはたせるよう、全ての締約国に対し政治的、技術的、財政的支援を継続するよう要請。

2. 核物質防護、輸出管理等

- ・ 核物質防護、核物質の不法移転の防止及びそのための国際協力的重要性を確認。
- ・ 輸出管理のための国内規制の必要性を確認し、輸出管理の未実施国に対し適切な国内規制の確立と実施を勧告。
- ・ 輸出管理の透明性の向上を継続して実施すべきことを勧告。
- ・ プルトニウム管理指針によるプルトニウム管理の一層の透明性向上を歓迎し、参加国の拡大を推奨。高濃縮ウランについても同様の検討が行われることを期待。

III 地域問題

1. 中東

- ・ 中東決議は 95 年 ＮＰＴ 無期限延長決定の基礎。
- ・ 中東諸国の ＮＰＴ 加入を歓迎し、イスラエルの ＮＰＴ への加入の重要性を確認。
- ・ 中東地域の ＩＡＥＡ 包括的保障措置協定未締結国に対し、できるだけ早く締結すよう呼びかけ。
- ・ 全ての締約国に対し 2005 年 ＮＰＴ 運用検討会議議長等の中東非大量破壊兵器地帯構想や 95 年中東決議の目標の実現に向けてとられた措置につき報告することを要請。
- ・ 中東非大量破壊兵器地帯早期創設を確保するための協力の呼びかけ
- ・ イラクによる ＩＡＥＡ との完全かつ継続的な協力及び義務の履行の重要性の確認。

2. 南アジア

- ・ 98 年 5 月のインド・パキスタンによる核実験につき、98 年 6 月の安保理決議 1172 を想起。両国に対し、右決議において示されたすべての措置をとるよう要請。両国は核兵器国としての地位を有さない。
- ・ 両国に対し、ＮＰＴ 加入、ＣＴＢＴ 署名、兵器用核分裂性物質生産モラトリアム

核関連物質等の輸出管理強化を要請。

3. 北東アジア

- ・ IAEAが北朝鮮により申告された核関連物質の正確性、完全性を検証することができない状態が続いていることを懸念。
- ・ 北朝鮮が IAEA 保障措置協定を完全に履行することを期待。

IV 原子力平和利用

1. NPTと原子力の平和利用

- ・ NPTが原子力平和利用協力を進めるための基本的枠組であることを確認
- ・ 技術協力、原子力安全確保等の重要性と、これらの分野で IAEA が果たすべき役割を再確認。

2. 原子力安全、放射性物質の輸送、放射性廃棄物、損害賠償

- ・ 原子力の安全確保が平和利用の前提であることを確認。原子力安全条約等への加入促進を要請。
- ・ 放射性物質輸送が国際基準に従い、航海の自由等を損なわずに実施されるべきことを確認。海上輸送の沿岸国等の懸念に留意。海上輸送に関する措置と国際規制に係る検討と改善のための作業の継続を要請。
- ・ 使用済燃料及び放射性廃棄物の管理に関する条約の早期発効を希望。放射性廃棄物の海洋投棄を禁止したロンドン条約付属書の受諾を要請。
- ・ 有効な原子力損害賠償の枠組みの存在が重要であることを強調。

3. 技術協力等

- ・ 原子力平和利用における技術移転・協力のための IAEA の役割の重要性を確認、このための財源確保の重要性を強調。
- ・ 途上国等との 2 国間技術協力の継続等を要請。

V 運用検討プロセスの強化

- (1) 当初 2 回の準備委員会では条約、95 年の決定及び中東決議、更に今後の運用検討会議の成果の実施に関する実質事項について審議する
- (2) その関連で条約に関連する重要な問題あるいは地域の問題もとりあげる
- (3) 運用検討会議への実質的勧告については最後の準備委員会で起草する
- (4) 準備委員会の検討結果はサマリーとする

2005年NPT運用検討会議第2回準備委員会における猪口軍縮代表部大使による一般演説（仮訳）

平成15年4月29日

議長、

尊敬する代表団の皆様、

まずはじめに、モルナール大使が2005年NPT運用検討会議第2回準備委員会の議長に選出されたことについて、心からの祝意を表明したい。閣下のリーダーシップの下、この会議が実りの多いものであることを確信しており、また日本代表団は会議中あらゆる協力を惜しまないことを保証する。

また、ジャヤンタ・ダナパラ 軍縮問題担当・国連事務次長と国連軍縮局のスタッフに対して、この会議のための念入りな準備に心からの謝意を表明したい。

（1. NPTの役割と多国間軍縮・不拡散体制の重要性）

議長、

NPTは核不拡散と核軍縮の2つの側面に係わる条約であり、相互に補完しあっている2つの側面は密接に関連しており、両者は同時に促進されねばならない。核不拡散の側面に関しては、NPTは、ほぼ全世界的な普遍性の達成、1995年の無期限延長の決定、及び追加議定書を含むIAEAの強化された保障措置システムの導入により大いに強化され、国際安全保障の強化に大きく貢献している。さらに一昨年（1999年）の9月11日の米国同時多発テロ事件は、核テロ防止におけるNPTの役割を一層際立たせることとなった。

核軍縮の側面に関しては、NPTは核兵器国に対して核軍縮を行うことを義務づけている。核兵器の全面的廃絶はNPT条約第6条の完全な履行により達成される。1995年の「原則と目標」に関する決定及び2000年の最終文書はこの目的を再確認している。

すべての締約国はNPTが世界規模の核不拡散及び核軍縮を達成するための主たる手段であることを完全に確信し続けなければならない。核兵器国及び非核兵器国の両者とも条約上の義務と約束を完全に遵守し続けなければならない。

核兵器を含む大量破壊兵器が現在も存在し、地域紛争や局地化された戦争が大量の虐殺と受難を世界の各地で引き起こし続けていることは遺憾である。大量破壊兵器及びその運搬手段の拡散はこうした地域紛争の危険性を増し、テロの脅威を高める。

従って、大量破壊兵器の拡散の防止・抑止は緊急課題である。この目的は、各国独自、二国間、地域、また多国間アプローチを含む、重層的かつ相互補完的な努力によって追求されるべきである。特に多国間軍縮・不拡散体制は国際安全保障環境を改善するために主要な役割を果たし続けなければならないし、またNPTはこれらの体制の主たる柱として一層強化されなければならない。

議長、

この機会に日本の非核政策に関する立場を繰り返したい。唯一の被爆国である日本は核兵器を保有する意図はなく、いわゆる「非核三原則（核兵器を持たず、作らず、持ち込ませず）」を堅持している。小泉内閣を含む、歴代の内閣はこの三原則を明確に支持してきたし、日本はこの立場をとり続けていく。

（2. NPT第2回準備委員会）

議長、

ご記憶の通り、NPT第1回準備委員会は、国際政治及び戦略環境がかなり劇的に変化しつつある中で開催された、その主要な課題は新たなNPT運用検討のサイクルを円滑に開始することであった。同委員会においては、議長サマリーが作成され、2005年NPT運用検討会議に向けて第一歩を踏み出すことができた。

今回の第2回準備委員会は、国際安全保障環境が引き続き悪化している中であって、NPTに対する大きな挑戦の時代の中で開催されている。従って、同委員会では、NPT体制の維持と強化を目的として、核不拡散、核軍縮、そして特に核物質の管理との関係で原子力エネルギーの平和利用を最も効果的でバランスのとれた方法で扱わなければならない。

この準備委員会は第1回委員会と同様に、「条約の実施に関する実質事項」、1995年に採択された3つ決定の内容及び、「条約の運用と目的に影響を及ぼす進展を含む、今後の運用検討会議の成果」の実施について審議することとしている。つまり、今次委員会は、2005年運用検討会議への提言を含めた、全会一致に基づく報告書の

作成が課せられている第3回委員会とは異なり、合意に基づく提言のための交渉が課せられていない、2回ある会合のうち第2回目である。このため、今後数年間において、NPT締約国が自由に、広範でかつ相互作用的な議論ができる最後の機会である。

今次委員会において、前回委員会での議論や各国の報告、1995年の「原則及び目標」及び2000年最終文書に基づいた、自由かつ建設的な意見交換がなされ、そのような意見交換が2005年運用検討会議に近づくにつれ、条約の実施を促進することになるよう希望する。

(3. 普遍性)

議長、

日本はキューバ共和国のNPTへの加入を歓迎する。キューバの加入はNPT体制を一層強化し、この体制は普遍性をほぼ達成した。しかし遺憾なことに、インド、イスラエル、パキスタンはNPT非締約国のままである。これらの国に対して遅滞なく非核兵器国として条約に加入することを引き続き求めるべきである。これに関連して、NPTへの早期加盟に関する日本の要請に対して、東チモールの外務・協力上級大臣は、先週、加入準備を進め、早期にNPTに加入したいとの回答があったことを、私は大いなる歓迎の意をもって紹介したい。

(4. 不遵守)

NPT等の多国間軍縮条約は、我々が全人類に対して平和と安定を与えるために行った努力の成果である。唯一の被爆国から来た私は、我々の世代のみならず次世代のためにも、NPTの遵守に関わる問題を克服し、核不拡散体制を守り、維持し、強化するために、我々が平和的に力を合わせて努力していくことを願う。

この観点から、日本は北朝鮮によってとられた措置を深く懸念する。多国間主義は重要であり、多国間軍縮条約の信頼性が損なわれることは我々の誰にとっても利益にならないとの考えを我々皆が共有していると確信している。

現在の国際社会は安全保障面で多くの不確実性と困難に直面しており、日本は、北朝鮮に対して、具体的な行動を起こすことで、この不確実性を減らし、また、相互信頼

を増すために協力するという政治的意志を示すことを強く求める。日本は、北朝鮮が核兵器を開発、移転或いは保有することを決して認められない。日本は、北朝鮮に対してNPT上のすべての義務、そしてその帰結としてIAEAとの保障措置協定上の義務を遵守し、核関連施設を再凍結し、核兵器開発計画を検証可能且つ不可逆的な形で撤廃するために速やかに行動をとることを強く要請する。

私は、先週北京で開催された三者会談のために払われた、中国による中心的な役割を含むすべての関係国による努力を歓迎する。日本は、この会談の結果を注意深く検討している。日本は、この問題が、日韓を含む関係国の早期参加を伴って、引続き多数国間で対処されるべきと考える。私は北朝鮮に対して、状況を緩和し、改善するために必要な措置をとり、また、関係国との協議に責任ある前向きな、かつ、建設的な形で臨むことを要請することについて、全ての関係国の間に強い共通の利益があると感じる。我々の政治的意志と協調努力が、21世紀における人類の安全保障環境に大きな違いを生み出し得るのだと我々の子供達に伝えることができるよう、国際社会はこの問題を平和的に解決するよう努力すべきである。

議長、

イラクにおける大量破壊兵器開発疑惑に関する事項は新たな段階に入った。日本は、イラクにおける再構築が円滑に進むこと、及び出来る限り早期に地域の安定が回復されることを希望する。我々はイラクに対し、NPTを含む軍縮体制の下での義務を遵守するよう要請する。

(5. 核軍縮)

日本は唯一の被爆国であり、出来る限り早期に核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を実現することは、日本の国民及び政府の願いである。この目的を達成するために、日本はすべての締約国、特に核兵器国に対し、核軍縮の為の建設的なロードマップを示している、2000年運用検討会議の最終文書にある「13項目」を含む具体的な核軍縮措置の実施上の進展が見られるよう誠実に努力する事を要請する。

日本は2000年以来、「核兵器の全面的廃絶への道程」と題する決議を毎年提出してきた。これらの決議は2000年運用検討会議での合意に基づいた、核兵器の全面的廃絶への具体的な道筋を示したものであり、また核軍縮・不拡散の現状を反映した

ものである。これらの決議は国際社会に対し核軍縮が進展することの必要性を強く訴えるものである。

「13項目」の12番目として、締約国はNPT第6条の実施に関する定期報告を提出することが要請されている。この定期報告は、具体的な核軍縮措置の実施を促進するための有効な手段である。日本は今次準備委員会において自国の定期報告を提出する予定である。全ての締約国、特に核兵器国が、「13項目」実施のための努力及び今後とる予定の具体的な措置についての報告を提出することを期待する。

議長、

核軍縮に関して、次の具体的な事項について言及したい。

第1回準備委員会において、NPT締約国は、戦略核兵器削減に関して続いていた米露2国間交渉を歓迎した。多くの締約国はこのような米露間の努力が法的拘束力を持つ文書となることへの希望を表明した。米露戦略攻撃力削減条約（モスクワ条約）の署名は両国の核軍縮・不拡散にむけた努力を示したものである。日本は、米国が同条約を批准し、ロシアが同様の措置をとるための努力を続けていることを歓迎し、また同条約の早期発効及び着実な実施を希望する。

他の核兵器国も核軍縮へのコミットメントを進めて行かなければならない。日本は、すべての核兵器国が核兵器廃絶に向けてのプロセスに従事し、各国独自でまたは他国との交渉を通じて核兵器のさらなる削減を進めていくことを要請する。これに関して、G8カナナキス・サミットにて合意された「大量破壊兵器及び物質の拡散に対するG8グローバル・パートナーシップ」は、核軍縮・不拡散の実際的な措置を促進するという意味において歴史的な重要性を持つものである。日本は、このグローバル・パートナーシップの下、ロシア、ウクライナ、カザフスタン、ベラルーシに対して核兵器廃絶に関する種々のプロジェクトへの協力を行ってきている。

議長、

核兵器に関する多国間軍備管理・軍縮については、残念ながら非常に限られた進展しか見られない。

CTBTが核兵器の拡散防止に貢献するだけでなく、核兵器の質的向上を抑制していることを強調したい。CTBTはIAEA保障措置と同様に、NPT体制における主要な柱の一つであり、核兵器のない世界を達成するための現実的かつ具体的な手段である。CTBTが1996年に採択されて以来6年を経てもなお未発効のままであり、核軍縮の将来を不確定な状況にしていることを非常に遺憾に思う。

CTBTの早期発効は達成されなければならない、日本はこの為のあらゆる努力を行ってきた。CTBTの未署名国・未批准国に対し、署名・批准するよう促す努力を続けてきているのに加え、同様の目的で日本はオーストラリアとオランダとともに、昨年9月に「CTBTフレンズ外相会合」を開催した。さらに日本は、CTBT国内運用体制を立ち上げ、国内の監視施設の建設を開始した。現在から本年9月に予定されている次回CTBT発効促進会議までの間に、さらに多くの国がCTBTに署名・批准することを強く希望する。CTBT発効までの間、核実験のモラトリアムは全ての関係国によって遵守され続けなければならないということを全ての国が認識する必要がある。

軍縮会議(CD)はその作業計画にかかる停滞を打開しなければならない。CDにおいて、兵器用核分裂性物質生産禁止条約(カットオフ条約:FMCT)についての交渉が開始されておらず、核軍縮を取り扱うアドホック委員会が設立されていないことは非常に残念である。日本は、作業計画が早期に合意され、FMCT交渉が開始されることを非常に重要視している。この関連で、日本はオーストラリアとUNIDIRと共同で、本年3月にFMCT交渉の開始にモメンタムを与えるためにワークショップを開催した。CDの加盟国が、CDのマンドートに関する相違を乗り越えて、この多国間軍縮体制を通じて、国際安全保障を強化するという共通の目的のために、実質的な作業を再開する時期はすでにきている。

議長、

核軍縮・不拡散を促進するために、非戦略核兵器の更なる削減も重要である。非戦略核兵器を保有している全ての国に対して、2000年運用検討会議の最終文書に基

づいて、透明性のある方法でこれらの核兵器を更に削減することを要請する。更に、1991年及び1992年の非戦略核兵器削減についての大統領イニシアチブの実施に関する情報の提供を希望する。

議長、

核兵器の使用に対する敷居は可能な限り高く維持されなければならないことを、強調したい。国際社会は、核兵器の使用が悲惨で長期に渡る結果をもたらすものであることをよく知るとともに常に意識していかなければならないと確信している。

(6. 核不拡散)

日本は、核不拡散体制の信頼性と有効性を維持すること、特に、IAEA保障措置の完全な実施を確保し、未申告の核関連活動を探知する能力を強化することを非常に重視している。

追加議定書の普遍化もIAEA保障措置の強化を図るために重要である。日本は昨年12月東京に於いて、「IAEA保障措置強化のための国際会議」を開催した。

日本は、高度な原子力関連技術を有する国ほど、透明性の確保を含め原子力の平和利用についてより大きな責任を持たなければならないと、確信する。日本はこれらの技術を持つ国、特に発達した核燃料サイクル技術を保有する諸国に対して、追加議定書の即時締結によってその責任を果たすよう要請する。

(7. 核テロ)

議長、

2001年9月11日以来起きた、一連のテロ関連の事件を通じて、国際社会はテロリストによる核物質及び核兵器の入手が現実のかつ差し迫った脅威であることを再認識した。核テロを防止するために、国際社会は国家、地域及び国際レベルで協力しなければならない。

日本は、全ての国に対して、大量破壊兵器及びその運搬手段がテロリストの手に渡らないように、最大限の対策をとることを要請する。更に日本は、各国が核テロ防止のために、放射線源の安全管理を確保する国内的・国際的に必要な全ての措置をとることを訴える。

(8. 非核兵器地帯)

日本は、関係地域の国の提唱により、また当該地域の安定と安全保障に貢献するという条件を満たすような非核兵器地帯の設立を強く支持する。中央アジア諸国が、同地域の安全保障及び核テロ防止に貢献する中央アジア非核兵器地帯の設立のために協議を重ねていることは歓迎すべきことである。5核兵器国と中央アジア5ヶ国との協議会合の結果が、関係国にとって満足のいくものであり、核軍縮・不拡散の分野での新たな成果となることを希望する。日本は国連を通じて、同非核地帯設立のための努力を支援してきている。

(9. 原子力の平和利用)

議長、

安定した原子力の平和利用は、安定したエネルギー供給の確保のみならず、地球環境を保護するためにも極めて重要である。日本はNPTの締約国として、原子力の平和利用の権利を享受し、促進してきた。日本はまたNPT第4条に基づいて、原子力の平和利用の分野での国際協力推進のために貢献している。

(10. 市民社会及び次世代との対話の強化：軍縮・不拡散教育)

議長、

軍縮・不拡散を進めるために、若い世代と全体としての市民社会の理解と支持を得ることが必要である。この観点から、バランスがとれた軍縮・不拡散教育は重要である。日本は、昨年7月に政府間専門家グループによって提出された「軍縮・不拡散教育についての国連の研究」報告書を歓迎する。この報告書は、軍縮・不拡散教育及びトレ

ーニングの促進についての具体的な提言を含んでいる。日本は、海外の軍縮教育者の招聘等の措置をとり始めており、上記提言の実施のために多大な貢献をしている。

(11. 地域軍縮会議)

地域軍縮会議は、地域レベルで軍縮の重要性についての認識を高めるもう1つの有効な手段である。日本は毎年、国内の異なる地方都市における国連軍縮会議を後援しており、世界中から集まる著名な軍縮専門家が有益な議論をする、貴重な機会を提供している。今年の国連軍縮会議が大阪で開催されることを喜んでお伝えする。私は、国連アジア太平洋平和軍縮センターが従事してきた、軍縮における弛まざる貢献に対して、この機会に心からの謝意を表明したい。

議長、

NPTは1970年の発効以来、国際平和と安全保障の維持・強化に多大な貢献をしてきた。NPTは核不拡散体制における礎石であり、また核軍縮を促進するための基礎である。その役割は絶対に不可欠のものである。

日本政府代表団は、NPTの重要性を高め核不拡散・軍縮に対する我々のコミットメントを新たにするために、全ての参加者と緊密に努力を続けていきたいと考える。

STATEMENT BY H.E. DR. KUNIKO INOUCHI

**AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

**THE SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

29 April 2003, Geneva

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,

At the outset, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations to you, Ambassador Laszlo Molnar, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT. I am fully confident that this session will be fruitful under your leadership and I assure you of my delegation's full support throughout the session.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, and the members of his department, for the diligent work they have put into the preparation of this Preparatory Committee.

(1. The role of the NPT and the importance of multilateral disarmament and the non-proliferation regime)

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT is a treaty on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These two complementary aspects are closely interlinked, and therefore, need to be promoted simultaneously.

With respect to its nuclear non-proliferation aspect, the treaty has been greatly reinforced with the achievement of its near-universality, the 1995 decision on its indefinite extension, and the introduction of the strengthened IAEA safeguards system, including the Additional Protocol, thus contributing greatly to the enhancement of international security. Moreover, the terrible events of 11 September two years ago have further highlighted the NPT's role in preventing nuclear terrorism.

As for its nuclear disarmament aspect, the NPT obligates nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of their nuclear weapons will be achieved upon the full realization of article VI. The 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives" and the Final Document of the 2000 Conference reaffirm this objective.

All States parties must remain fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in realizing global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States must remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty.

It is regrettable to note that weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, still exist, and regional conflicts and localized wars continue to cause massive carnage and suffering in many parts of the world. The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery increases the danger of these conflicts as well as heightening the threat of terrorism.

Preventing and curbing the proliferation of WMD is thus a matter of urgency. This goal should be pursued through multi-layered and mutually complementary efforts, encompassing unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches. The multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, in particular, should continue to play a key role in

improving the international security environment, and the NPT, the main pillar of these regimes, should be further strengthened.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate Japan's stance on its non-nuclear policy. Japan, being the only country to have ever experienced nuclear devastation, has no intent to possess nuclear weapons and firmly maintains the so-called "Three Non-Nuclear Principles"—the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. Successive Cabinets, including that of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have repeatedly articulated these principles, and Japan continues to uphold this position.

(2. The second session of the Preparatory Committee)

Mr. Chairman,

As we recall, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was held in a rather drastically changing international political and strategic environment, and the major task before us at that time was to ensure a smooth start to the new NPT review cycle. The session consequently produced the Chairman's factual summary and made a successful first step toward the 2005 Review Conference.

This second session of the Preparatory Committee is being held at a time of great challenge to the NPT, in a continuing adverse international security environment. It should thus address, in a most effective and balanced manner, both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues, as well as peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly with respect to the control of nuclear material, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime.

This Preparatory Committee, as in the case of the first session, is to consider "specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty" and the contents of three collateral documents agreed upon in 1995, as well as "the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including

developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.” In other words, this session, unlike the third session which will be tasked to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference, is the last of the two sessions where negotiation on agreed recommendations is not required, thus providing us with the last opportunity for some years where States parties will be able to engage in free, wide-ranging and interactive discussions.

I hope that open and constructive exchanges of views will take place, based on last session’s deliberations and national reports, as well as the 1995 decisions on “Principles and Objectives” and the Final Document of the 2000 Conference, and that such exchanges will facilitate the implementation of the Treaty as we progress toward the 2005 Review Conference.

(3. Universality)

Mr. Chairman,

Japan welcomes the accession by the Republic of Cuba to the NPT. Cuba’s accession has further strengthened the NPT regime and this regime has achieved near universality. Regrettably, however, India, Israel and Pakistan still remain non-member States. We must continue to urge those states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States without delay. In this connection, I would like to inform you with great pleasure that in response to Japan’s request for their early accession to the NPT, Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor Leste advised us last week that preparation is well under way and that it will join the NPT in due time.

(4. Non-compliance)

Multilateral disarmament treaties, such as the NPT, represent the fruit of efforts which we have made to provide peace and stability for all of humankind. Coming from the only nuclear weapon affected country, it is my wish that we be able to work together peacefully to overcome problems

associated with NPT non-compliance, and to protect, preserve and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, not only for our own generation, but also for the generations to come.

Japan is deeply concerned about the steps taken by North Korea in this regard. I firmly believe that multilateralism does matter, and that we all share the view that the erosion of the credibility of multilateral disarmament treaties is not in anyone's interest.

As the international community is confronted with multiple uncertainties and difficulties concerning security matters, Japan strongly calls upon North Korea to show its political will to cooperate with the international community in reducing such uncertainties and in increasing mutual confidence by taking concrete actions. Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development, transfer or possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Japan strongly urges North Korea to comply with all its obligations under the NPT and consequently obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to refreeze its nuclear related facilities and to take prompt action to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

I welcome efforts made by all countries concerned for the trilateral meeting in Beijing including the pivotal role played by China. Japan is now carefully studying the result of the meeting. Japan believes that this issue should continue to be dealt with multilaterally with the early participation of the concerned countries including Japan and the Republic of Korea. I believe that a strong common interest exists, among all those concerned, in urging North Korea to take necessary action to de-escalate and improve the situation, and to engage in talks with countries concerned in a responsible, forthcoming and constructive manner. International community should endeavour to resolve this problem peacefully so that we are able to relate to our children how our political will and concerted efforts are able to make a profound difference in the security environments of the mankind in the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman,

Issues related to the suspicion of WMD development in Iraq have entered into a new phase. Japan hopes that reconstruction work will proceed smoothly in Iraq and that regional stability will be restored as soon as possible. We urge Iraq to observe obligations under the disarmament regimes, including the NPT.

(5. Nuclear disarmament)

As Japan is the only country to have experienced the horrific destruction of nuclear bombs, it is the desire of the people and the government of Japan to realize at the earliest possible date a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons. In order to achieve this goal, Japan urges States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to strive faithfully to make progress in implementing specific nuclear disarmament measures, including “the thirteen steps” in the Final Document of the 2000 Conference, which provide a constructive roadmap for nuclear disarmament.

Japan has submitted a resolution entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” at each session of the General Assembly since 2000. These resolutions identify concrete steps toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on 2000 Review Conference agreements, and also reflect the present situation of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. These resolutions strongly appeal to the international community for the necessity of progress in nuclear disarmament.

In the twelfth of “the thirteen steps,” States parties are requested to submit regular reports on their implementation of Article VI. This reporting is an effective means to facilitate the implementation of specific nuclear disarmament measures. Japan will submit its report at this session of the Preparatory Committee, and looks forward to all States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, putting forward reports on their efforts to implement “the thirteen steps,” as well as on specific measures they intend to take in the future.

Mr. Chairman,

With regard to nuclear disarmament, I would like to touch upon the

following specific issues.

During the first session of the Preparatory Committee, States parties welcomed continuing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument. The signing of the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction (the Moscow Treaty) demonstrates efforts made by both states to strive towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan welcomes US ratification of the Treaty and continuing efforts by Russia to follow suit, and hopes for its early entry into force and steady implementation.

Other nuclear-weapon States must also make progress in their commitment to nuclear disarmament. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to engage in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, unilaterally or through negotiations. In this connection, I would like to note that the “G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” agreed upon at the G8 Kananaskis Summit, is of historic significance in terms of promoting both practical nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Japan has been providing support to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus under this Global Partnership for various projects related to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

With regard to multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament, it is regrettable to note that there has been very little progress made.

I would like to stress that the CTBT will not only contribute to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but also to constraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, like the IAEA safeguards, is one of the major pillars of the NPT regime as well as a realistic and concrete instrument for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is truly regrettable that the CTBT has not yet come into force, more than six years after its adoption in 1996, leaving the future of nuclear disarmament in a state of uncertainty.

Early entry into force of the CTBT must be achieved, and Japan has been making various efforts in this regard. Apart from its continuous effort to urge those states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, Japan, together with Australia and the Netherlands, held the "Friends of the CTBT Foreign Ministers' Meeting" last September, to this aim. Japan has also launched the CTBT National Operation System and has begun to construct domestic monitoring facilities. We strongly hope that many more states will sign and ratify the CTBT between now and the next Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, scheduled in September this year. All States must be reminded that pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the moratoria on nuclear test explosions should continue to be observed by all States concerned.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) must resolve the deadlock on its program of work. It is extremely disappointing that the CD has neither commenced negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons nor established an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. Japan gives high priority to an early agreement on a programme of work and the commencement of FMCT negotiations. In this connection, Japan, jointly with Australia and the UNIDIR, hosted a workshop last March in order to give momentum to FMCT negotiations. It is high time for CD member States to overcome differences relating to its mandates and resume substantive work toward the common objective of strengthening international security through this multilateral disarmament regime.

Mr. Chairman,

Further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons are also important in order to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We call upon all States parties in possession of non-strategic nuclear weapons to further reduce these weapons in a transparent manner, based on the Final Document of the 2000 Conference. In addition, we hope to receive information on the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to emphasise that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons

should be kept as high as possible. In this vein, we believe that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

(6. Nuclear non-proliferation)

Japan attaches great importance to maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and in particular to ensuring full implementation of IAEA safeguards as well as strengthening the ability to detect non-reported nuclear activity.

Universalization of the Additional Protocol is also important in order to strengthen IAEA safeguards. Japan hosted the International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards in December last year in Tokyo.

Japan believes that the more advanced nuclear technology a State has, the more responsible it should be for its peaceful use of nuclear energy, including ensuring transparency. Japan calls upon these countries, particularly countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycle technology, to discharge their responsibility by effectuating the prompt conclusion of the Additional Protocol.

(7. Nuclear terrorism)

Mr. Chairman,

Through a series of terrorist events since 11 September 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of the acquisition of nuclear material and nuclear weapons by terrorists. In order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the international community must cooperate at national, regional and international levels.

Japan calls upon all States to take measures of the highest possible level to ensure that WMD and their means of production do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Furthermore, Japan appeals to States to take all necessary national and international measures to ensure the safe and secure

management of radioactive sources in order to avert nuclear terrorist acts.

(8. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones)

Japan strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. It is encouraging that Central Asian countries have been engaged in consultations in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, which would contribute to regional security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. We hope that the outcome of the P5-C5 Consultative Meeting will meet the satisfaction of countries concerned and become another achievement in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan, through the United Nations, has been supporting such efforts.

(9. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy)

Mr. Chairman,

The steady use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to secure a stable energy supply, but also to preserve the global environment. Japan, as a State party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan is also making positive contributions towards promoting international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, based on Article IV of the NPT.

(10. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations:
disarmament and non-proliferation education)

Mr. Chairman,

In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people and of civil society as a whole. Well-balanced disarmament and non-proliferation education is

important in this respect. Japan welcomes the report entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education,” submitted by the Group of Governmental Experts in July last year, which contains practical recommendations on the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Japan has initiated various programmes, such as overseas disarmament educator exchange programmes, and contributed greatly to the implementation of these recommendations.

(11. A regional disarmament conference)

Regional disarmament conferences are another effective means to enhance awareness of the importance of disarmament at a regional level. Japan sponsors a United Nations conference on disarmament in a different local city each year, providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts from around the world to engage in useful discussions. I am pleased to announce that this year’s United Nations Conference on Disarmament will be held in Osaka, Japan. I would like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for their continued dedication to disarmament work.

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT, since its entry into force in 1970, has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. It is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament. Its role is indispensable.

The Japanese delegation looks forward to working closely with all participants to reinforce the significance of this treaty and to renew our commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Thank you.

2005年核兵器不拡散条約（NPT）運用検討会議第2回準備委員会に 日本が提出した「作業文書」の概要

1. 総論

2005年NPT運用検討会議にむけた運用検討プロセスは、2002年の第1回準備委員会にて円滑に立ち上げられた。日本は、第2回準備委員会においては、NPT締約国が一致してNPT体制への新たな挑戦に対処し、2005年NPT運用検討会議にむけてNPT体制の維持・強化を効果的に図ることが重要と考える。

日本は、唯一の被爆国として「核兵器を持たず、作らず、持ち込ませず」という非核3原則を堅持している。小泉内閣を含み歴代の内閣は、非核3原則繰り返し表明しており、今後ともこれを堅持していく立場に変わりはない。

2. 核軍縮

(1) CTBT

CTBT未署名・未批准国、特に発効要件国が、CTBTを早期に署名・批准することを強く求める。日本は、2002年9月CTBTフレンズ外相会合を開催した。CTBT発効までの間、全ての国が核実験モラトリアムを継続すべき。

(2) FMCT

遅滞なく兵器用核分裂性物質生産禁止条約（FMCT）の交渉を開始すべき。核兵器国を含む全ての国が、FMCT発効までの間、兵器用核分裂性物質生産モラトリアムを継続する政治的意思を維持すべき。日本は、2003年3月にジュネーブにおけるワークショップを開催した。

(3) 米露核削減

日本は、米露間の戦略攻撃削減条約の署名を、これまで米露がそれぞれ表明してきた戦略核兵器削減を法的拘束力を有する形式（条約）で担保しようとするものとして、高く評価する。米の同条約批准に続いて露が早期に同条約を批准することを希望し、両国が同早期発効を期待。

(4) 非戦略核

非戦略核兵器を有する全ての国が、透明性を確保しつつ非戦略核兵器の削減を行うことが必要。

(5) 旧ソ連諸国に対する非核化協力

日本は、核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を早期に実現するためには、現実的

かつ具体的措置を一つ一つ積み重ねていく以外にないと考えており、積極的に具体的措置を取っている。日本は、既に露に対し、液体放射性廃棄物処理施設を供与し、現在は退役原潜を解体するプロジェクトに日露は取り組んでいる。

(6) 報告

全てのNPT締約国によるNPT第6条（注：核軍縮交渉の義務）履行に関する報告の提出は、2000年NPT運用検討会議最終文書に記された13項目の実際の措置の一つであり、また核軍縮のための重要なステップの一つ。

3. 不拡散

(1) IAEA保障措置の強化

核不拡散体制の信頼性及び効率性の維持やNPTに基づく国際原子力機関（IAEA）保障措置協定不遵守のIAEAによる検知能力の強化は重要。追加議定書の普遍化は、喫緊の課題。

(2) ロシアの余剰兵器級プルトニウムの管理

米露の核軍縮努力の結果、解体された核兵器から兵器級プルトニウム等核物質が大量に抽出されている。同核物質が軍事転用されないよう防止することが喫緊の課題。

(3) 輸出管理

原子力供給国グループ（NSG）等による国際輸出管理は、締約国がNPT第3条2（注：全ての核物質へのIAEA保障措置の適応）を履行する上で重要な役割をはたす。

(4) 核テロリズム対策

国際社会は、核テロを防止するために、国家、地域、国際レベルで協力し、情報交換、国境管理体制、核物質及び核関連施設の防護において、個別及び集団で努力をするべき。放射線源の安全管理も、極めて重要。

4. 原子力の平和利用

エネルギーの安定的な確保と地球温暖化防止の観点から、安定的な原子力の平和利用は重要。

原子力の平和利用にとって、放射性物質の安全かつ円滑な輸送は必須条件。放射性物質の輸送は、国際法上確立された「航行の自由」に従って行われており、また、国際海事機関（IMO）やIAEA等の信用できる国際機関が定める国際規準に従い、安全確保のため最も慎重な予防措置をとりつつ実施されている。

5. 普遍性と不遵守

(1) 普遍性

キューバの加入を歓迎。印、イスラエル、パキスタン等のNPT非締約国が早期にNPTに加入するよう粘り強い努力を継続すべき。NPTへの早期加入に関する日本の要請に対して、東ティモール側は早期にNPTに加入したいとの回答があった。

(2) 不遵守

(北朝鮮) 日本は、北朝鮮が核兵器を開発、移転、取得或いは保有することを決して認められない。日本は、北朝鮮に対しNPT上の全ての義務そしてその帰結としてIAEAの保障措置協定上の義務を遵守し、核関連施設を再凍結し、核兵器開発計画を検証可能且つ不可逆な形で撤廃するために速やかに行動を取ることを強く要請する。国際社会はこの問題を平和的に解決するよう努力すべき。

(イラク) イラクの大量破壊兵器をめぐる問題は、適切な国際的関与により解決される事が極めて重要。

6. 非核地帯・消極的安全保障 (NSA)

(1) 非核地帯

地域の安定と安全保障に貢献するという条件を満たすような、非核地帯が創設されることを支持する。日本は、中央アジア非核地帯創設のための国連軍縮局の作業を支援している。

(2) 消極的安全保障

軍縮会議において消極的安全保障のアドホック委員会設置を含む作業計画に速やかに合意することを支持する。

7. 市民社会・次世代との対話の強化

過去20年に亘って、450名以上に及ぶ国連軍縮フェローシップの参加者を広島・長崎に招待し、原爆がいかなる悲劇をもたらすものかについての実相を学ぶ機会の場を設けてきた。このような努力を継続してゆく。核不拡散・核軍縮を促進する上で、市民社会が果たす建設的役割を重視。

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working Paper submitted by Japan

I. Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970 and particularly after the end of the Cold War. Its role in this respect is indispensable.
2. The review process for the 2005 Review Conference was launched smoothly at the first Preparatory Committee in 2002. Japan considers it crucial for the States Parties to the NPT to unite and take actions to deal with emerging challenges to the NPT regime, and make efforts to effectively maintain and strengthen the NPT regime toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
3. Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, continues to adhere to its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan”. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the present Koizumi cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, and there is no change in the position of the Government of Japan in that it continues to uphold these principles.
4. Japan, since its accession to the NPT, has concluded IAEA safeguards agreements as well as the IAEA additional protocol in an effort to ensure transparency of its nuclear related activities. Furthermore, in 1955, Japan promulgated “the Atomic Energy Basic Law” that requires that the utilization of Japan’s atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes. These points also testify that Japan has no intent to possess nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear disarmament

5. The NPT pursues both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fact that an overwhelming majority of countries have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons is epoch-making in international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This achievement should be taken seriously by nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with “Principles and Objectives”, which includes the promotion of nuclear

disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must respond to such resolute determination on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

6. The international community should realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. It is imperative that nuclear-weapon States strengthen and continue to take disarmament measures. In recent years, concern over the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been expressed more frequently. As the only nation which suffered atomic bombing, Japan has strongly urged that nuclear devastation never be repeated. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be kept as high as possible. In this vein, Japan believes that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

7. It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to faithfully strive to make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. At the General Assembly of the United Nations since 2000, Japan has been submitting a resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons," which identified concrete steps that should be taken to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the agreements made at the 2000 Review Conference. It also reflected the present situation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and strongly appealed to the international community for progress in nuclear disarmament.

A. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

8. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by restricting the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, together with the IAEA safeguards, has a significant role as one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards realizing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Although, despite more than six years having passed since its adoption in 1996, the CTBT has not yet come into force. This lack of progress is making the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation less certain and it is feared the NPT regime may be negatively affected.

9. In response to the Final Declaration of the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2001, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date. It is also important that efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime undertaken by CTBTO will continuously be made, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), and that necessary budget will be ensured to establish such a regime.

10. Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important, and has worked actively to this aim. As a part of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), Japan launched the construction of domestic monitoring facilities last year and has established the CTBT National Operation System of Japan.

11. On September 14, 2002, Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, together with the Foreign Ministers of Australia and of the Netherlands, co-chaired the Friends of the CTBT Foreign Ministers' Meeting, in which the Ministers of States that had ratified the CTBT met in New York and issued the Joint Ministerial Statement. This statement included a call for signing and ratifying the CTBT as early as possible. To date, Foreign Ministers from

over 50 countries have associated themselves with the Joint Statement. Japan strongly hopes that many more States will sign and ratify the CTBT in view of the third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which will take place in September 2003.

12. Japan firmly believes that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on nuclear-test explosions. Also, it must be recalled again that in paragraph 3 of its resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council called on all countries to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT.

B. Fissile material cut-off treaty

13. It is truly regrettable that, despite the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not yet commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. All states, including nuclear-weapon States, should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of the FMCT. The fact remains valid that the FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Furthermore, the delay in entry into force of the CTBT should not justify the delay in commencement of the negotiations on FMCT.

14. Japan, which considers reaching agreement on a programme of work at the CD and the early commencement of negotiations of FMCT as primal tasks, has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference of Disarmament, also reiterated the importance of early commencement of the negotiations on FMCT in her speech delivered at the CD. As a part of Japan's effort to promote early commencement of negotiations on FMCT, Japan hosted a workshop titled "Promoting Verification in Multilateral Arms Control Treaties" in March 2003 in Geneva.

C. Reduction of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia

15. Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on reduction of their nuclear weapons, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the START I Treaty, the measures for unilateral reduction and the recent signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.

16. Japan highly values the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as guaranteeing, in a legally binding form, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons which the U.S. and Russia had already respectively declared, and hopes that ratification by the U.S. will soon be followed by that of Russia and that the two Parties will soon put it into effect. Japan hopes that the other nuclear-weapon States will undertake, unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions of their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions to be undertaken by the United States and Russia.

D. Non-strategic nuclear weapons

17. It is imperative for all states that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to undertake measures to reduce them, while maintaining transparency, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is crucially important in terms of regional and international security, as well as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the U.S. and the Russian Federation implement their initiatives on the reduction of their non-strategic nuclear forces completely and on a voluntary basis, as declared in 1991-1992, and provide data on the status of implementation of these initiatives.

E. Assistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet States

18. Japan considers that making one practical and concrete step after another is the only way to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Thus, Japan has been actively taking the following practical measures.

19. In June 2002, Japan announced it would make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million US dollars for the time being, 100 million of which would be allocated to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and the rest to other projects such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines. Japan has already extended assistance to Russia by providing a floating facility for liquid radioactive waste treatment. Japan and Russia are currently engaged in a project for dismantling a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine. A joint research program between Japanese and Russian research institutes also brought success in disposing of approximately 20 kg of weapon-grade plutonium.

(International Science and Technology Center (ISTC))

20. Japan signed the "Agreement for the Establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)" in 1992, and has been actively supporting the project since the inauguration of the ISTC head office in Moscow in March 1994.

F. Reporting

21. The submission by all States Parties of reports on the implementation of article VI of the NPT, one of the thirteen practical disarmament steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, is an important step in nuclear disarmament. Japan believes that specific methods of reporting should continuously be discussed. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that nuclear-weapon States report on their progress in implementing nuclear disarmament and on their future policies.

III. Non-proliferation

A. Strengthening of the commitment to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards

22. Japan attaches great importance to maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and strengthening the capability of the IAEA to detect non-compliance with its safeguards agreements under the NPT. In this respect, the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends, among others, a possible plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of the IAEA safeguards

agreements and additional protocols. Japan strongly supports this recommendation and believes that it is an urgent task to promote the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

23. In view of the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol, Japan took part in formulating the "Plan of Action", hosted the *International Symposium for Further Reinforcement of IAEA Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific Region* in June 2001 and the *International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards* in December 2002 in cooperation with the IAEA, and contributed financial and human resources to a series of regional seminars.

24. The latest *International Conference* aimed at consolidating the outcomes of the regional seminars from a global perspective and succeeded in providing participants with the opportunity to recognize the importance of the IAEA safeguards and consider concrete steps toward the universalization of the Additional Protocol. At this Conference, the participating governments agreed that impartial and critical inspections are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the IAEA should be given the authority to provide the international community with credible assurances, not only on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The participants also expressed their hope that all States that had signed, but not yet ratified, additional protocols - notably, the remaining nuclear-weapon States and EU member states - redouble their efforts to finalize their national ratification procedures promptly in order to maintain political momentum.

25. The Additional Protocol can play a pivotal role in strengthening international non-proliferation regime and increase the transparency of States' nuclear related activities, by providing the IAEA with the enhanced ability to, *inter alia*, verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Japan hopes that the States Parties will identify the need that the Additional Protocol be universalized as soon as possible.

26. In addition, Japan firmly believes that the more advanced nuclear technology a State has, the more responsibility and transparency it should have in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the light of this belief, Japan calls upon all countries with advanced nuclear technologies, such as fuel cycle technology, to discharge their responsibility by, among others, concluding the Additional Protocol.

27. In this regard, Japan has closely followed with concern the development of Iranian nuclear programmes and, in particular, its new nuclear facilities recently made public. Japan views that, since uranium enrichment and heavy water production could easily be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, a country which possesses plants or technologies related to uranium enrichment and heavy water production should bear a heavy responsibility for achieving a high level of transparency in its nuclear activities. In this respect, Japan calls on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, conclude the Additional Protocol as a matter of priority, and ensure high transparency commensurate with the level of its nuclear activities, while appreciating as a positive step its recent revision of the Subsidiary Arrangement to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

B. Management and Disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium

28. A significant amount of nuclear material including weapon-grade plutonium has been withdrawn from dismantled nuclear weapons as a result of ongoing nuclear disarmament

efforts by the U.S. and Russia. It is an urgent task to prevent such material from being reused for military purposes or proliferated to a third country or terrorist group in view of counter-terrorism. In this regard, Japan announced in June last year that it would contribute 100 million US dollars to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium.

C. Export control

29. International export control frameworks for nuclear related materials and technologies, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), play a pivotal role in ensuring the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT by the States Parties. The coordinated export control policy, in line with common guidelines of the NSG and the ZC, and their outreach activities are of great significance for the effective deterrence and prevention of proliferation from the supply side. In this respect, Japan urges that the roles of the NSG and the ZC be explicitly endorsed in the NPT review process towards the 2005 Review Conference as important mechanisms to help ensure the strict and compliance with the NPT.

30. Japan, considering such significance of both regimes in connection with the NPT, has been actively taking part in their endeavors, by acting as the Point of Contact of the NSG, for instance. Japan calls for a redoubling of efforts of the international community towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the strengthening and reaffirming of strict export regulations to control related items that may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons.

31. Furthermore, so as to complement nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is necessary for the international community, as a whole, to prevent proliferation of the means of delivery of nuclear materials. In this regard, Japan highly values the successful launch in November 2002 of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) as an important step, and is determined to take part in the universalization process of the ICOC by promoting dialogues with non-participating states.

D. Measures against nuclear terrorism

32. Through a series of terrorist events since 11 September 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear material and nuclear weapons. In order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the international community must cooperate at national, regional and international levels, and exert individual and collective efforts in relation to exchanges of information, border control and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In this respect, Japan welcomes the current efforts to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

33. The IAEA also has an essential role in this area. At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March 2002, Japan announced that it would contribute half a million US dollars to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and called upon other Member States of the Agency to make their contributions as well. In the context of nuclear terrorism, Japan acknowledges that the *International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources*, held in Vienna in March this year, successfully drew international attention, as the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is also of extreme importance. Japan hopes that the international community will devote its available resources to efforts to tighten the management of

radiation sources in line with the Major Findings issued by the said International Conference and the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* endorsed by IAEA Member States. Furthermore, Japan encourages the IAEA to continue its efforts in line with the *Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources* and its revision.

34. Japan is certain that the Additional Protocol can play a substantial role in preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists because it provides a reporting mechanism on the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol should therefore be promoted in order to contribute to anti-terrorism efforts.

IV. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

35. The steady use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preventing global warming. Japan, as a State Party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan aims at implementing the use of plutonium for light water reactors and establishing a nuclear fuel cycle through the utilization of fast breeder reactor technology. Japan is also pursuing the research and development of innovative reactor technologies that would be safer, more efficient, as well as more diversion and proliferation resistant, and that it would help to extend the scope of the use of nuclear energy to new areas such as hydrogen production.

36. In promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan fully complies with the IAEA safeguards agreement, including its Additional Protocol, and ensures transparency in its nuclear activities, including in the use of plutonium. At the same time, Japan gives the highest priority to the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan believes the convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management are of great importance and urges those countries that have not yet concluded these Conventions to do so as soon as possible. The Japanese Government has submitted the Joint Convention to the Diet for ratification, and hopes that the First Review Meeting on the Joint Convention, which is scheduled to take place in November in Vienna, will enhance the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management globally. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA in strengthening the global "safety culture" through the foundation of guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities.

37. Japan is making positive contributions towards promoting international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, considering Article IV of the NPT. Japan acknowledges the remarkable role of the IAEA not only in the area of power generation, but also in fields of medicine, agriculture, food, sanitary and water resources and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities in these fields, in the hope that such activities would help promote better public understanding of the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

38. The safe and smooth transport of radioactive materials is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Radioactive material transport has been conducted in line with the right of navigation established in international law with the most prudent precautionary measures taken to ensure safety in conformity with the international standards set by credible international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IAEA. In addition, information on radioactive transport has been, and will be, made available to relevant states to the maximum possible extent on the basis of the full consideration of the

physical protection and safety and smooth implementation of such transport. Japan notes with satisfaction last year's IAEA General Assembly resolution GC (46)/RES/9 that welcomes such practice of shipping states in this area. In this regard, Japan also hopes that the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, to be organized by the IAEA in July, will facilitate mutual understanding among states concerned about transport safety, fulfilling its objectives from a technical view-point within the IAEA mandate.

V. Universality and non-compliance

A. Universality

39. Japan welcomes the fact that, in November 2002, Cuba deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT, thereby becoming the 188th Party. Japan believes that Cuba's recent accession should lead to further strengthening of the NPT regime. NPT has attained almost worldwide universality. In 1998, the NPT regime was challenged from outside in the form of nuclear weapon test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan, but at the 2000 Review Conference, the States Parties made clear that these two countries would not receive new nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever. Japan continues to urge these two countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to give their utmost consideration to the problem of nuclear proliferation. Lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT. Strenuous efforts should be maintained to urge early accession to the NPT by the remaining Non-Party States such as India, Israel and Pakistan.

40. Japan wishes to inform all NPT Members, with great pleasure, that, in response to Japan's request for their early accession to the NPT, His Excellency Dr. Ramos Horta, Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste, advised us on 23 April, on the occasion of his official visit to Japan, that preparation is well under way and that it will join the NPT in due time.

B. Non-compliance

41. With regard to problems associated with compliance of the NPT, Japan is deeply concerned about the steps taken by North Korea. Japan is firmly convinced that the erosion of the credibility of multilateral disarmament treaties such as the NPT is not in the interest of any Member States.

42. As the international community today is confronted with multiple uncertainties and difficulties in security matters, Japan strongly calls upon North Korea to show its political will to co-operate with the international community in reducing the uncertainties and in increasing mutual confidence by taking concrete actions. Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development, transfer, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Japan strongly urges North Korea to comply with all its obligations under the NPT and, consequently, obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to refreeze its nuclear related facilities and to take prompt actions to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

43. Japan welcomes efforts made by all countries concerned, including the pivotal role played by China for the trilateral meeting held from 23rd to 25th April 2003 in Beijing. Japan is now carefully studying the result of this meeting. Japan believes that this issue should continue to

be dealt with multilaterally, with the early participation of the concerned countries, including Japan and the Republic of Korea. Japan believes that there exists a strong common interest among all those concerned in urging North Korea to take necessary actions to de-escalate and improve the situation, and to engage in talks with countries concerned in a responsible, forthcoming and constructive manner. The international community should endeavour to resolve this problem peacefully so that we are able to tell future generations that our political will and concerted efforts can make a profound difference in the security environments of mankind in the 21st century.

44. Japan believes it is of utmost importance that the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq should definitely be resolved with proper international involvement. Japan also considers it crucial that the future Government of Iraq adheres to all relevant non-proliferation agreements in order to prove its willingness to behave as a responsible member of the international community.

VI. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones and negative security assurance

A. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

45. Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. In particular, Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

46. Japan hopes that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between five nuclear-weapon States and five countries of Central Asia and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this view, Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the U.N. in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

B. Negative security assurances

47. It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the idea that a programme of work, containing the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, will be agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament.

VII. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

48. In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole.

49. Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary General associated with the Group of Governmental Experts to the General Assembly, which includes recommendations requesting member states to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. In an effort to realize

the recommendations in the report Japan has been making efforts, including inviting a disarmament educator from overseas.

50. In this regard, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited about 450 United Nations disarmament fellows to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

51. A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in regions concerned. Every year, Japan sponsors a United Nations conference on disarmament in a local city, providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts, not only from the Asia and Pacific region, but also from around the world, to engage in useful discussions. Japan welcomes that the UN Disarmament Conference sponsored by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs will be held in Osaka in August this year.

52. Japan attaches importance to the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In view of importance of dialogues with non-governmental organizations, which play a significant role in civil society, Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organization session is being held during this session of the Preparatory Committee.

2005年NPT運用検討会議に向けた第2回準備委員会 議長サマリーの要旨

(議長責任により作成されたものであり、合意文書ではない)

平成15年5月9日

1. 普遍性

キューバ及び東ティモールのNPT加入は、NPTの普遍性を一層高めるものであり、これを歓迎する。印、イスラエル、パキスタンに対して、NPTに加入するように呼びかける。

2. CTBT

発効要件国の13カ国の批准・署名の重要性が強調され、CTBT発効までの間の核実験停止(モラトリアム)の重要性が再確認されると共に、国際監視制度の設置における進展が留意された。

3. 米露核軍縮

米露間の戦略攻撃力削減条約(モスクワ条約)を核軍縮と戦略的安定への重要な一歩として歓迎する加盟国があった。配備・作戦状態からの撤去は、核兵器の不可逆的削減や全面的廃絶に代替するものではないとの見解が示された。

4. 非戦略核

非戦略核の一層の削減の重要性が強調された。

5. カットオフ条約

カットオフ条約の交渉妥結重要性を強調。兵器用核分裂性物質の生産モラトリアムを宣言していない国が、そうするように要請された。

6. 定期報告

定期報告による透明性は、NPT体制全体の信頼を向上することが強調された。

7. 非核地帯

中央アジア5カ国が非核地帯を創設するため協議を行い合意に達したことに勇気づけられる。

8. 北朝鮮

北朝鮮の核問題に対する懸念が表明された。締約国は、北朝鮮に対し、早期の検証可能でかつ不可逆的な方法で核兵器計画を廃棄するよう求めた。締約国は、朝鮮半島の非核化を呼びかけ、また、北朝鮮に対して行動の方向性を再考し、またNPTに従って保障措置協定を遵守するよう強く求めた。締約国は、本件は、

引き続き関係国を含む多数国間で対処されるべきと信ずる。北朝鮮の安全保障に関する正当な懸念が手当されるべきとの見解も示された。締約国の北朝鮮の条約上の地位に関する見解に関して委員会初日行われた議長発言に、準備委員会は特に留意する。

9. イラク

締約国は、イラクの大量破壊兵器計画に関する未解決の問題が残っていることを想起すると共に、残された問題を明らかにすることの重要性に留意した。

10. 消極的安全保障

多くの国が、非核兵器国の安全保障に関する普遍的且つ無条件の法的文書作成を追求すべき旨強調した。

11. 軍縮・不拡散教育

軍縮・不拡散教育は未来の世代のための軍縮・核不拡散体制を強化するために重要であることに合意。

12. IAEA保障措置・追加議定書

IAEAの包括的保障措置協定及び追加議定書の普遍化の必要性が強調された。また、IAEAの保障措置に対して適正に資金が供与されることに対する支持が表明された。

13. イラン

イランは、IAEAに対する全面的かつ前向きな協力と早急な追加議定書締結を求められた。

14. 輸出管理

輸出管理の核不拡散における重要性が繰り返し表明された。

15. 核テロ対策

IAEAの核テロ防止基金への協力の重要性が強調された。

16. 放射性物質輸送

本年7月の輸送の安全に関する国際会議において技術的な対話が推進されることへの期待が示された。

17. 原子力平和利用

IAEAが実施している技術協力活動のための十分な資源がIAEAに供与されることの重要性が強調された。