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General and complete disarmament: steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons

Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Marshall Islands, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago and Türkiye: draft resolution

Common steps towards a world without nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that achieving a world without nuclear weapons is a common goal for the international community,

Recalling that it has been 81 years since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

Reaffirming the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹ as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and a key instrument for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology, recognizing the value of the Treaty and its historic achievements for more than five decades, and underscoring the determination to exert all efforts to promote the universalization of, and universal adherence to, the Treaty,

Noting that the commitments from past Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including those contained in the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,² the outcome document of the 2000 Review Conference,³ especially the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, and the conclusions and recommendations

* Reissued for technical reasons on 26 October 2026.

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

² 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)/Corr.2).

³ 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document*, vols. I–III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part III) and NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part IV)).



for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference,⁴ remain valid, and recalling the importance of the full and effective implementation by all States Parties of the commitments outlined above,

Recognizing that, while the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held from 27 April to 22 May 2026, was not able to reach consensus on a substantive final document, the intensive and substantive deliberations undertaken at the Review Conference demonstrated the unwavering commitment of the States Parties to the Treaty and to strengthening its implementation, and stressing the importance of moving forward, building upon the discussions held at the Review Conference, to advance nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a pragmatic manner in the review cycle leading to the 2031 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,

Emphasizing the importance for all States, especially for the nuclear-weapon States, to take further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all,

Reiterating deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2017 and entered into force on 22 January 2021,

1. *Reaffirms* that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, and the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war;
2. *Urges* all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
3. *Emphasizes* the concern at the rapid and non-transparent quantitative expansion and opaque qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States and the importance of avoiding a nuclear arms race, and urges all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;
4. *Deeply regrets* the lack of recent progress in the fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while recognizing the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral effective measures taken by some nuclear-weapon States since the entry into force of the Treaty to implement those obligations, and calls on the nuclear-weapon States to fully implement their obligations under article VI;
5. *Recognizes* the importance of substantial engagement among the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to engage in efforts, including multilateral strategic stability talks to promote international peace and stability, enhance mutual transparency and adopt concrete risk reduction measures, and notes that such engagement contributes to avoiding misinterpretation and miscalculation, lays the foundation for further arrangements and helps progress towards nuclear disarmament, based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all;

⁴ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document*, vols. I–III (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. II) and NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. III)).

6. *Underscores* that the risk of nuclear war will persist as long as nuclear weapons exist and that risk-reduction measures are neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament, but are important and contribute to the efforts aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons, calls on the nuclear-weapon States to explore measures necessary to prevent nuclear war and reduce international tension and strategic risks, including risks of miscalculation, misperception or miscommunication, and suggests that such measures could include but not be limited to: crisis prevention and de-escalation, measures to build trust, confidence and predictability, preserving relevant international agreements and arrangements, dialogue on doctrines, crisis communications, military-to-military engagement, declarations of restraint, discussions on risks and benefits associated with emerging technologies, non-targeting, transparency and confidence-building measures, data exchanges, notifications including establishing a ballistic missile and space launch notification mechanism and confidence-building measures regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, without prejudice to national security;

7. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, recalls that verification is essential to achieving full implementation of the Treaty and notes the work undertaken in this area, and, while taking note of the transparency and reporting efforts already undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States, calls for enhanced and equal transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the implementation of their obligations and commitments, including through the presentation of their national reports in a standard reporting form that provides concrete information and data on their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, without prejudice to national security and the organization of structured, in-person and interactive discussions on the national reports by all the nuclear-weapon States in each review cycle of the Treaty;

8. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, emphasizes that any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes undermines the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein;

9. *Recalls* the thirtieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,⁵ reaffirms the importance of its early entry into force, which would require ratification by the remaining nine States listed in its Annex 2, and urges all States that have yet to sign and/or ratify the Treaty to do so in all expediency, to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, and to declare or uphold and adhere to moratoriums against all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

⁵ See General Assembly resolution [50/245](#) and [A/50/1027](#).

10. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to honour and respect all existing negative security assurances undertaken by them, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones, consistent with their respective obligations and commitments, as well as with the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994;

11. *Underscores* the continuing significant contributions of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, consistent with the principles and guidelines of the Disarmament Commission⁶ for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and supports efforts of States to enhance the cooperation between the nuclear-weapon-free zones;

12. *Recognizes* the importance of implementing the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁷ recalls the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and reaffirms its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region and in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, noting the efforts in this regard;

13. *Underscores* the importance of fully complying with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and relevant Security Council resolutions, and of resolving all matters of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the safeguards system, and emphasizes the importance of urgently remedying the ongoing non-compliance situation through the full and effective implementation of the applicable safeguards agreement, including full and timely cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

14. *Emphasizes* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issue has a direct bearing on the integrity of the regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, reaffirms the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and the importance of all Member States' full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and confirms that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon State, as stated in relevant Security Council resolutions;

15. *Calls upon* all States to continue facilitating efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, as well as to commit to take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), annex I, sect. C.*

⁷ *See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)/Corr.2), annex.*

interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons irrespective of their nationalities and origins;

16. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-second session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Common steps towards a world without nuclear weapons”.
